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CENTRALISED FUNDING AND THE DIVISION OF
COGNITIVE LABOUR
Abstract. Project selection by funding bodies directly influences
the division of cognitive labour in scientific communities. I present
a novel adaptation of an existing agent-based model of scientific
research, in which a central funding body selects from proposed
projects located on an epistemic landscape. I simulate four differ-
ent selection strategies: selection based on a god’s-eye perspective
of project significance, selection based on past success, selection
based on past funding, and random selection. Results show the size
of the landscape matters: on small landscapes historical informa-
tion leads to slightly better results than random selection, but on
large landscapes random selection greatly outperforms historically-
informed selection.
Word count: 4359
Introduction
National funding bodies support much of contemporary science. The
selection criteria for funding have gained increasing attention within
philosophy of science (Gillies, 2008; O’Malley et al., 2009; Haufe, 2013;
Lee, 2015). Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in model-based
approaches to understanding the social epistemic activities of scientists
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009; Grim,
2009; Zollman, 2010). The current paper builds on previous modelling
tools to explore the effects of centralised selection mechanisms on the
division of cognitive labour and the ability of scientific communities to
efficiently discover significant truths.
Science aims at discovering significant truths, i.e. not just any truths,
but truths that will eventually contribute in a meaningful way to well-
being (Kitcher, 2001). This is the justification for the public support
of science, including basic science (Bush, 1945). Some funding termi-
nology: scientific projects have high impact (ex post) if they result
in significant truths; projects have high merit (ex ante) if they are
predicted to have high impact.
Polanyi (1962) analysed merit as being composed of three compo-
nents: scientific value, plausibility and originality. Polanyi notes an
essential tension between plausibility and originality: the more original
a project, the more difficult it is to evaluate its plausibility. Polanyi ad-
vocates selection by peer review as a conformist position, that sacrifices
the occasional meritorious original project while ensuring all supported
research projects are plausible, to “prevent the adulteration of science
1
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by cranks and dabblers” (p. 8). Gillies (2008, 2014) takes an oppos-
ing position, arguing that the cost of losing (infrequent) highly original
and meritorious research is much greater than the cost of occasion-
ally supporting implausible research that ends up being of low impact.
As an alternative to peer review, Gillies advocates random selection.
The tension between plausibility and originality is clearly relevant to
questions of effective division of cognitive labour, and has direct links
to science policy. This tension, and its complexity, is explored in this
paper.
I will argue that the results of the simulations presented are both sig-
nificant and surprising. The simulations show that, under reasonable
parameter values for at least some fields of science, choosing projects
at random performs significantly better, in terms of accumulated sig-
nificant truths, compared to other funding strategies, including project
selection by peer review. The results support, to an extent, Gillies’
proposal of funding by lottery.
1. Model description
The model explores the influence of different funding mechanisms on
the accumulation of significant truths. It builds on the epistemic land-
scape model developed by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), extending it
by adding representations of centralised funding selection and dynamic
changes in project merit. The latter is added to reflect a more realistic
picture of scientific merit. For example, Strevens (2003) discusses the
effect of a successful discovery on all further pursuits of the same ques-
tion: they no longer have any merit, as they lose all originality. Several
dynamic processes affecting merit are detailed later in the paper.
The model represents a population of scientists exploring a topic of
scientific interest. They are all funded by the same central funding
body to pursue projects of varying duration, measured in years. Each
project’s significance is allocated in advance by the modeller, from a
“god’s-eye” perspective. When grants end scientists successfully com-
plete their project. Their projects’ results contribute to the collection
of significant truths in the field’s corpus of knowledge. Funding mech-
anisms are compared by their ability to generate this accumulation of
significant truths.
For simplicity, scientists in the model (unrealistically) do not share
their findings nor explore similar projects during research. They only
work on the project for which they were funded and they only share
their results at the end of a grant. The social processes set aside here
have been explored in previous works (Grim, 2009; Zollman, 2010).
Future work may combine the different models towards a unified picture
of the division of cognitive labour.
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Funding is represented as a process of selection. In every time step,
the scientists whose grants have run out are placed in a pool of candi-
dates along with new entrants to the field, and the modelled funding
mechanism selects from this pool of candidates those who will receive
funding and carry out research projects. Modelled funding mechanisms
differ in the way they select individuals, as outlined below.
Actual potential: Actual potential, which can only be known from
a god’s-eye perspective, is the significance of a project’s re-
sults were it successfully completed today. In the absence of
time-dependant merit, actual potential is simply the signifi-
cance of the project’s results. However, in the presence of time-
dependence the significance could change between the initiation
of the project (at the point of funding) and its completion (at
the point of contributing the results to the relevant corpus).
This means that in the presence of time-dependence, actual
potential might diverge from the eventual contribution of the
project.
Estimated potential: Estimated potential is the scientific commu-
nity’s ex ante evaluation (assumed, for simplicity, to be single-
valued) of the merit of a proposed project. This prediction is
taken to rely on the known contributions of past projects which
bear some similarity to the proposed project, and so depends
on the history of research projects in the field. In representing
decisions based on the research community’s prediction, this
selection method is akin to peer-review.
Past funding: Under this mechanism, funding is allocated to those
scientists who already received funding in the past, and only
to them. The model (unrealistically) represents all scientists as
being of equal skill, and so this mechanism cannot be taken to
mean the selection of the most “intrinsically able” scientists.
Rather, this mechanism is included as a “most conservative”
option, not admitting any new researchers to the field beyond
the field’s original investigators.
Lottery: Under a lottery, all candidates have equal chances of being
funded. The lottery option serves both as a natural bench-
mark for other funding methods, and as a representation of the
mechanism proposed by Gillies (2014).
The essence of the model is the comparison of the performance of these
selection mechanisms in generating results of high significance over time
under various conditions.
To represent in the model the time-dependence of merit, the signif-
icance contributions of different project results are allowed to change
over time as a response to scientists’ actions. Three dynamic processes
are included in the model (details in §2.5). Two processes involve a re-
duction of significance following a successful project or breakthrough,
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which reflects the one-off nature of discovery. The third process involves
an increase in significance when a new avenue of research is opened by
a significant discovery. Simulations based on the model show that these
dynamic processes have a significant effect on the relative performance
of different funding strategies.
2. Simulation details
2.1. Simulating the epistemic landscape. To investigate the com-
plex nature of the domain being modelled, the model was turned into a
computer simulation.1 The basic structure of the landscape simulation
follows Weisberg and Muldoon’s, of a two-dimensional configuration
space, charted with two coordinates x and y, with an associated scalar
field represented in a third dimension as height along the z axis. Each
(x, y) coordinate pair specifies a different potential research project;
the closer two projects are on the landscape, the more similar they are.
The scalar value associated to the coordinate represents the significance
of the result obtained on a successful completion of the project, were
it completed today (allowing for time dependence). The limit to two
spatial dimensions of variation between projects is likely to be unreal-
istic (Wilkins, 2008), but a higher-dimensional alternative would make
the model much less tractable.
In each run of the simulation, the landscape is generated anew in the
following process:
(1) Initialise a flat surface of the required dimensions.
(2) Choose a random location on the surface.
(3) Pick random values for relative height, width along x, and width
along y.
(4) Add to the landscape a hill at the location chosen in step 2
by using a bivariate Gaussian distribution with the parameters
picked in step 3.
(5) Repeat steps 2-4 until the specified number of hills is reached.
(6) Scale up linearly the height of the landscape according to the
specified maximum height.
This process generates the “god’s-eye” perspective of the research po-
tential of the domain. Here and later, random variables are used to
fill-in parameters whose existence is essential for the simulation, but
where (1) the specific values they take can vary across a range of valid
model targets, and/or (2) there is no compelling empirical evidence to
choose a particular value. This requires, however, several runs of the
simulation for each configuration, to average out the effects of random
variation.
1Source code for the simulation is available from the author on request.
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2.2. Simulating agents. The agents in the model represent scientists
investigating the epistemic landscape. Each agent represents an inde-
pendent researcher or group, and is characterised by its location on the
landscape, representing the project they are currently pursuing, and
a countdown counter, representing the time remaining until their cur-
rent project is finished. Like Weisberg and Muldoon’s “hill climbers”,
agents are simulated as local maximisers. Agents follow the following
strategy every simulation step:
(1) Reduce countdown by 1.
(2) If countdown is not zero: remain in same location.
(3) If countdown is zero: contribute to the accumulated significance
the significance of the current location, and attempt to move to
the highest local neighbour.
In the simulation, the agents are identical, in the sense that any
agent, when successfully completing a project of a given significance,
will contribute exactly that amount to the accumulated significance
of the field. This simplification ignores natural ability and gained ex-
perience, and stems from a focus on a particular approach to science
funding, which funds projects, rather than funding people. The focus
is informed by the explicit policies of certain funding bodies, like the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), reflected, for example, in the in-
stitution of blind peer review. Thus, the results of the current work
would not extend to the minority of science funding bodies, such as
the Wellcome Trust, that make explicit their preference to fund people
rather than projects.
The local neighbourhood of an agent is defined as the 3 × 3 square
centred on their current position. The attempt to move to the highest
neighbour depends on the selection (funding) mechanism, as discussed
below. The accumulated significance, which is the sum of all individ-
ual contributions to significance, is stored as a global variable of the
simulation and used to compare strategies.
In the beginning of the simulation, a specified number of agents are
seeded in random locations on the landscape, with randomly generated
countdowns selected from a specified range of values. An example of
an initial seeding of agents can be seen in Fig. 1.
In the absence of selection and time-dependence, the course of the
simulation is easy to describe: agents begin in random locations on a
random landscape, and as the simulation progresses the agents finish
projects and climb local hills, until, after an amount of time which de-
pends on the size of the landscape, the number and size of peaks, and
the duration of grants, all agents trace a path to their local maxima
and stay there. Since agents increase their local significance during the
climb, the rate of significance accumulation increases initially, until
all agents reach their local maxima, at which point significance con-
tinues accumulating at a fixed rate indefinitely. This is the dynamic
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -6-
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Figure 1. Landscape simulation with initial seeding of
agents. Each number on the landscape represents an
agent at its location, with the value of the number rep-
resenting the agent’s countdown. The colours indicate
the height (significance) of each position (project) in the
landscape.
seen in Weisberg and Muldoon’s simulation for a pure community of
“hill climbers”, and its unrealistic nature highlights the importance of
simulating the time-dependence of significance.
2.3. Simulating communal knowledge. In addition to their con-
tribution to significance, agents also contribute to the visibility of the
landscape (Muldoon and Weisberg, 2011). The visibility of a project
represents whether the scientific community, and especially funding
bodies, can estimate the significance contribution of that project. Ini-
tially, the entire landscape is invisible, representing full uncertainty.
Upon initial seeding of agents, each agent contributes vision of their lo-
cal neighbourhood, as defined above, to the total vision. As the agents
move, they add vision of their new local neighbourhood. Visibility is
used in the best visible funding mechanism described below.
The simulation represents visibility in a simplistic manner by assign-
ing binary values: either the community knows what the significance
of a project will be, or it does not. A more realistic representation will
allow partial visibility, with some distance decay effect, such that the
community would still be able to make predictions of significance for
less familiar projects, but these predictions will have a probability of
being wrong, with the probability of error increasing the more unfamil-
iar these projects are. This addition, however, will be computationally
heavy, as it requires maintaining multiple versions of the landscape,
both for the real values and for the estimated values.
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -7-
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2.4. Simulating funding strategies. The aim of the model is to
explore the effects of funding mechanisms on the population and dis-
tribution of investigators. Since the aim is to simulate current fund-
ing practices (albeit in a highly idealised manner), and since current
funding practices operate in passive mode (choosing from proposals
originating from scientists rather than dictating which projects aught
be pursued), the guiding principle of the simulation is that a funding
mechanism is akin to a selection process: at each step of the simula-
tion, the actual population of agents is a subset of the candidate or
potential population, where inclusion in the actual population follows
a certain selection mechanism.
Funding mechanisms are simulated in the following manner:
Every step:
(1) Place all agents with zero countdown in a pool of “old candi-
dates”.
(2) Generate a set of new candidate agents, in a process identical
to the seeding of agents in the beginning of the simulation.
(3) Select from the joint pool of (old candidates + new candidates)
a subset according to the selection mechanism specified by the
funding method.
(4) Only selected agents are placed on the landscape and take part
in the remainder of the simulation, the rest are ignored.
The simulation can represent four different funding mechanisms:
best: selects the candidates which are located at the highest points,
regardless of the visibility of their locations. This simulates a
mechanism which selects the most promising projects from a
god’s eye perspective. This overly optimistic mechanism does
not represent a real funding strategy. Rather, it serves as an
ideal benchmark against which realistic funding mechanisms are
measured.
best visible: filters out candidates which are located at invisible loca-
tions, i.e. candidates who propose to work on projects which are
too different from present or past projects. It then selects the
candidates in the highest locations from the remainder. This
strategy is closer to a realistic representation of selection by peer
review. Note that even this version is epistemically optimistic,
as it assumes the selection panel has successfully gathered all
available information from all the different agents, both past
and present.
lotto: selects candidates at random from the candidate pool, disre-
garding the visibility and height of their locations.
oldboys: represents no selection: old candidates continue, no new can-
didates are generated.
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -8-
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The key parameters for all funding mechanisms are the size of the
candidate pool and the size of the selection pool. The size of the can-
didate pool, which in turn depends on the size of the new candidate
pool (as the size of the old candidate pool emerges from the simula-
tion), has been chosen in the simulations such that the total candidate
pool is equal in size to the initial number of agents (except oldboys
where there are no new candidates). This means the success probabil-
ity changes between funding rounds, around a mean which is equal to
1/(average countdown). With an average grant duration of five years,
this yields a success rate of 20%, close to the real value in many contem-
porary funding schemes (NIH, 2014). The number of grants awarded
each year is set to equal the number of grants completed each year,
maintaining a fixed size for the population of investigators.
For simplicity, the simulated funding mechanisms do not take into
account the positions of existing agents on the landscape, except indi-
rectly when considering their vision. Future simulations may consider
a selection mechanism which explicitly favours either diversity or ag-
glomeration, though one expects difficulties in operationalisation and
measurement of epistemic diversity.
2.5. Simulating merit dynamics. To make the simulation more re-
alistic, the significance of projects is allowed to change over time in re-
sponse to research activities of the community of investigators. Three
such dynamic processes are included in the simulation:
Winner takes it all: As was made explicit by Strevens (2003), the
utility gain of discovery is a one-off event: the first (recognised)
discovery of X may greatly contribute to the collective utility,
but there is little or no contribution from further discoveries of
X. In the simulation, this is represented by setting the signifi-
cance of a location to zero whenever an agent at that location
has finished their project and made their contribution to ac-
cumulated significance. This effect is triggered whenever any
countdown reaches zero, which makes it quite common, but it
has a very localised effect, only affecting the significance of a
single project.
Reduced novelty: When a researcher makes a significant discovery,
simulated by finishing a project with associated significance
above a certain threshold, the novelty of nearby projects is
reduced, which in the model is simulated by a reduction of
significance in a local area around the discovery.
New avenues: When a researcher makes a significant discovery, it
opens up the possibility of new avenues of research, simulated
in the model by the appearance of a new randomly-shaped hill
at a random location on the landscape.
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3. Results and discussion
Here I present the results of simulations of different setups of interest,
exploring the relative success of different funding mechanisms under
different conditions.
All simulation results show a comparison between the four fund-
ing mechanisms, as a plot of total accumulated significance (arbitrary
units) at the end of the simulation run, averaged over five runs with dif-
ferent random seeds. In all simulations the range of countdowns was 2
to 7. The number of individuals was set to equal (size of landscape)3/4.
Simulations were ran for 50 steps. The trigger for significance-dependant
processes was 0.7 of the global maximum. Results are shown for a small
landscape (50× 50) in Fig. 2 and for a large landscape (500× 500) in
Fig. 3.
Figure 2. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, small landscape (50×
50).
To get a feeling for how the community is affected by the funding
mechanism, I present visualisations of the state of the landscape at the
end of the simulation run for the two funding mechanisms mentioned
in the introduction (best visible and lotto) in Fig. 4. Note that due to
the winner takes it all dynamic process it is possible to “see” the past
trajectory of exploration, as completed projects leave behind highly
localised points of zero (remaining) significance. This allows for a visual
representation of the division of cognitive labour that emerges under
different funding schemes.
As is clear from the simulations, the best funding mechanism is in-
deed best at accumulating significance over time, though with various
lead margins over the second best strategy. In the presence of dynamic
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -10-
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Figure 3. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, large landscape (500×
500).
(a) best visible (b) lotto
Figure 4. Landscape visualisation at the end of the
simulation run under different funding mechanisms.
processes, best is in the best position to locate new avenues for re-
search, wherever they show up. However, as mentioned above, the best
funding strategy is not realisable, as it requires a god’s eye view of the
epistemic landscape.
On the small landscape the three strategies, best visible, oldboys,
and lotto perform roughly similarly, with lotto at a small disadvantage
as it cannot make use of valuable information from past successes. It
seems counter-intuitive that best visible performs worse than oldboys. A
possible explanation is the effect of reduced novelty: best visible tends
to cluster scientists around the most promising projects, and so when
one makes a breakthrough it reduces the significance of contributions
for all groups working on similar projects (the phenomenon known in
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -11-
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contemporary science as “scooping”). This excessive clustering around
fashions is not present in oldboys or lotto.
On the large landscape lotto greatly outperforms best visible and
oldboys. This is because new avenues on a large landscape are likely to
spawn outside the visibility of the agents, where lotto can access them
but the other two strategies cannot. In the smaller landscape this
effect is not apparent, as the relative visibility is larger, and therefore
the chance of a new avenue appearing within the visible area is larger.
Conclusion
This paper presented a way to extend existing epistemic landscape
models so that they can represent selection by a central funding body
and time dependence of significance. This model was used in computer
simulations to compare the effectiveness of different idealised versions
of selection criteria, most notably selection based on past successes
(akin to peer review), random selection and no selection. The most
significant result from the simulation was that on a large landscape,
when a topic can be explored in many ways that could be very different
from each other, random selection performs much better than selection
based on past performance.
This result fits in with a general result from the body of works on
agent-based models of scientific communities, that shows diversity in
the community trumps individual pursuit of excellence as a way of
making communal epistemic progress. The tension of science funding,
between originality and plausibility, is thus a part of the broader tension
between diversity and excellence, between exploration and exploitation.
Previous social epistemology models have focused on the role of inter-
nal factors in shifting the balance between exploration and exploita-
tion. Kitcher (1990); Strevens (2003) look at reward structures (of
internal credit, not external monetary rewards) and individual motiva-
tion towards credit or truth. Grim (2009); Zollman (2010) look at in-
formation availability and information transfer between scientists, and
at individual beliefs. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) look at individual
researchers’ social strategy: follower or maverick.
The current work is the first within this modelling lineage to look at
the effects of an external, institutional factor: selection by a centralised
funding body. The current paper brings this line of research closer to
having a direct relevance to science policy. Hopefully future work in
this vain will continue this trend, to deliver on the challenge set out by
Kitcher (1990, p. 22):
How do we best design social institutions for the ad-
vancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored
the social structure of science. The point, however, is to
change it.
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We could start by advocating for funding mechanisms that allow for
more exploration.
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How	To	Make	Selective	Realism	More	Selective	(and	More	Realist	Too)	
Massimiliano	Badino	
Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	—	Universitat	Autonoma	de	Barcelona	
Abstract	
Selective	realism	is	the	thesis	that	some	wisely	chosen	theoretical	posits	are	essential	
to	science	and	can	therefore	be	considered	as	true	or	approximately	true.	How	to	
choose	them	wisely,	however,	is	a	matter	of	=ierce	contention.	Generally	speaking,	we	
should	favor	posits	that	are	effectively	deployed	in	successful	prediction.	In	this	paper	
I	propose	a	re=inement	of	the	notion	of	deployment	and	I	argue	that	selective	realism	
can	be	extended	to	include	the	analysis	of	how	theoretical	posits	are	actually	deployed	
in	symbolic	practices.	
1. Introduction	
Among	the	several	forms	of	realism,	the	so-called	selective	realism	(SelRealism)	is	
arguably	the	one	that	engages	history	of	science	more	seriously.	The	driving	idea	of	
SelRealism	is	that,	although	theories	as	wholes	are	false	and	doomed	to	be	
abandoned,	it	is	possible	to	select	a	certain	number	of	theoretical	posits	(TPs)	that	are	
likely	to	be	maintained	in	future	theories	and	are	therefore	true	or	approximately	
true.	How	to	determine	these	TPs	is	partly	an	empirical	question—and	this	explains	
the	historical	character	of	the	SelRealism	program—but	it	cannot	be	merely	an	
empirical	question	lest	one	end	up	in	post-hoc	rationalizations.	A	central	issue	of	
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SelRealism,	hence,	is	how	to	specify	criteria	to	properly	conceptualize	the	TPs	on	
which	one	should	place	one’s	realist	commitment.	
In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	contemporary	approaches	to	SelRealism	have	neglected	an	
important	element	related	to	the	way	in	which	theoretical	claims	are	deployed	in	
scienti=ic	theories	(Section	2).	In	Section	3,	I	propose	a	re=inement	of	SelRealism	
based	on	the	distinction	between	deploying	a	TP	fundamentally	and	deploying	it	in	a	
non-accidental	fashion.	I	use	the	concept	of	symbolic	practices	to	articulate	this	
distinction.	Finally,	in	Section	4,	I	clarify	my	points	by	discussing	the	early	
development	of	perturbation	theory.	
2. Selective	Realism:	Theory	and	Practice	
The	upholders	of	SelRealism	cherish	two	fundamental	ambitions.	First	and	foremost,	
they	aim	at	making	a	good	use	of	the	so-called	no-miracles	argument	(NMA)	
according	to	which	one	can	justi=iably	infer	the	truth	(or	the	approximate	truth)	of	a	
successful	theory,	because,	otherwise,	the	success	would	remained	inexplicable.	The	
NMA	is	considered	to	be	the	strongest	support	to	realisms	of	any	sort	(Musgrave	
1988;	Psillos	1999,	68-94).	A	challenging	objection	to	the	NMA	is	the	pessimistic	
meta-induction	(PMI)	originally	formulated	by	Larry	Laudan.	According	to	this	
argument,	the	success	of	a	theory	is	never	a	suf=icient	reason	to	infer	even	its	
approximate	truth	because	history	of	science	is	replete	with	examples	of	very	
successful	theories	that	wound	up	overthrown	at	some	later	stage.	As	it	is	likely	the	
case	that	our	most	successful	theories	will	suffer	the	same	fate	in	the	future,	one	has	
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -15-
to	conclude	that	the	realist	commitment	is	not	justi=ied	(Laudan	1981).	Among	the	
several	responses	to	the	PMI,	one	consists	in	noticing	that	the	failures	of	past	theories,	
in	fact,	did	not	depend	on	those	TPs	that	lead	them	to	success.	In	other	words,	granted	
Laudan’s	point	that	successful	past	theories	are	false	as	wholes,	it	can	still	be	argued	
that	the	constituents	of	those	theories	that	were	responsible	for	their	empirical	
success	have	been	retained	in	our	current	science.	Thus,	the	realist	needs	only	to	shift	
her	commitment	from	theories	as	wholes	to	those	enduring	TPs	that,	being	essential	
for	success,	can	be	justi=iably	believed	to	be	true	or	approximately	true.	
The	next	question	is,	of	course,	how	to	determine	those	TPs.	Thus,	the	second	
ambition	of	the	upholders	of	SelRealism	is	to	solve	the	problem	of	selectivity	in	some	
principled	way	and	so	beat	the	PMI.	In	one	of	the	=irst	instantiations	of	SelRealism,	
Philip	Kitcher	argued	that	one	must	“distinguish	between	those	parts	of	theory	that	
are	genuinely	used	in	the	success	and	those	that	are	idle	wheels”	(Kitcher	1993,	143).	
The	point	of	this	distinction	is	that	credit	for	the	success	of	a	theory	should	be	due	
only	to	those	TPs	that	effectively	contribute	to	it.	Elaborating	on	Kitcher’s	intuition,	
one	can	argue	that	the	program	of	SelRealism	is	based	on	two	major	conditions:	
(S)	Success	condition:	the	selection	of	the	important	TPs	must	hinge	on	their	
relation	with	some	signi=icant	success	of	the	theory.	
(D)	Deployment	condition:	one	must	select	those	TPs	that	were	effectively	used	in	
scoring	that	success.	
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Let	me	brie=ly	comment	on	these	two	conditions.	While	(S)	is	now	a	realist	trademark,	
the	deployment	condition	(D)	is	what	sets	apart	SelRealism	from	other	forms	of	
realism,	such	as	structural	realism,	also	engaged	in	picking	out	enduring	elements	of	
scienti=ic	theories	(Worrall	1989;	Chakravartty	2011).	It	is	also	important	to	notice	
that	(S)	and	(D)	are	independent	conditions.	Firstly,	(S)	refers	to	a	relation	between	
the	selected	TP	and	empirical	success,	while	(D)	refers	to	a	relation	between	the	TP	
and	the	rest	of	the	theory.	Secondly,	either	condition	can	be	satis=ied	separately.	(D)	
has	been	added	precisely	to	avoid	those	cases	in	which	idle	TPs	are	involved	in	
empirical	success	and,	obviously,	there	are	scores	of	examples	of	TPs	used	by	theories	
which	however	never	led	to	any	success.	It	follows	that,	while	(S)	is	supposed	to	meet	
the	=irst	ambition	of	SelRealism,	the	second	ambition,	to	block	the	PMI,	is	on	(D).	
So	much	for	SelRealism	in	theory.	Let	us	now	examine	how	this	program	has	been	
carried	out	in	practice.	One	of	the	=irst	philosophers	to	seriously	elaborate	on	
Kitcher’s	suggestion	was	Stathis	Psillos.	His	criterion	for	selecting	TPs	works	in	the	
following	way	(Psillos	1999,	110).	Let	us	assume	that	a	certain	successful	prediction	P	
can	be	obtained	by	combining	the	TPs	H,	H’	and	the	auxiliaries	A. 	According	to	1
	For	virtually	all	writers,	empirical	success	means	“successful	prediction”.	David	1
Harker	has	leveled	important	criticisms	against	this	tendency	to	interpret	success	in	
terms	of	individual	predictions	and	has	suggested	that	success	should	be	understood	
as	progress,	i.e.	in	terms	of	the	improvements	a	theory	makes	with	respect	to	its	
predecessors	(Harker	2008,	2013).
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Psillos,	the	TP	H	is	essential	to	success	P	and	should	be	considered	true	or	
approximately	true	if	and	only	if:	
(1) H’	and	A	alone	do	not	lead	to	P.	
(2) There	is	no	alternative	H*	to	H	such	that:	
(a) H*	is	consistent	with	H’	and	A;	
(b) H*,	H’,	and	A	lead	to	P;	
(c) H*	is	not	ad	hoc	or	otherwise	purposefully	concocted	to	lead	to	P.		
This	criterion	is	the	bedrock	of	Psillos’s	divide	et	impera	strategy.	The	driving	intuition	
behind	it	is	to	capture	the	indispensability	of	H:	we	should	place	our	realist	
commitment	upon	those	TPs	without	which	empirical	success	cannot	be	obtained.	
However,	Tim	Lyons	has	cogently	argued	that	Psillos's	criterion	fails	to	characterize	
indispensability	(Lyons	2006).	The	indispensability	of	H	should	be	ensured	by	
condition	(2),	which	states,	in	brief,	that	H	cannot	be	replaced	by	any	other	TP.	But,	
Lyons	notices,	“there	will	always	be	other	hypotheses,	albeit	some	that	we	=ind	very	
unappealing,	from	which	any	given	prediction	can	be	derived”	(Lyons	2006,	540).	
More	importantly,	Lyons	argues,	Psillos’s	criterion	is	not	even	an	effective	means	for	
credit	attribution,	because	it	does	not	tell	us	much	about	how	H	contributes	to	the	
empirical	success	P.	In	particular,	condition	(2)	has	no	relevance	whatsoever	for	H’s	
speci=ic	contribution,	because	it	only	concerns	conceivable	alternatives	to	H,	
alternatives	that,	if	H	is	at	hand,	nobody	would	even	bother	to	explore.	Lyons	
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perceptively	stresses	that	the	problem	with	Psillos’s	criterion	boils	down	to	the	fact	
that	it	obliterates	condition	(D):	“by	introducing	his	criterion,	[Psillos]	has	discarded	
the	central	idea	of	deployment	realism—introduced	by	Kitcher	and	seemingly	
advocated	by	Psillos	himself”	(Lyons	2006,	541).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	by	
dropping	condition	(D),	Psillos’s	position	becomes	vulnerable	to	another	form	of	PMI.	
One	could	think	of	getting	around	of	Lyons’s	=irst	objection	by	arguing	that,	even	
though	an	alternative	to	H	is	always	conceivable,	at	the	present	state	of	our	knowledge	
it	is	not,	therefore	the	objection	is	empty.	In	other	words,	one	could	inject	the	time	
factor	in	Psillos’s	criterion	and	make	it	a	statement	of	our	actual	best	knowledge.	But	
then	the	PMI	crops	up	again,	because	history	shows	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	
what	is	indispensable	today	will	be	so	tomorrow.	The	whole	point	of	the	PMI	is	that	
there	is	nothing	special	in	our	knowledge	as	far	as	it	is	considered	present,	because	
there	have	been	a	lot	of	present	knowledges	that	have	been	blissfully	abandoned.	This	
is	why	one	needs	condition	(D):	what	makes	our	present	knowledge	so	special	is	not	
its	happening	at	a	certain	time,	but	its	having	gone	through	a	certain	process,	i.e.,	a	
form	of	deployment.	The	fact	that	our	present	knowledge	has	been	deployed	at	
lengths	and	it	is	still	with	us	constitutes	a	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	true	or	
approximately	true.	
3. Deconstructing	Deployment	
Having	grasped	that	the	=law	in	Psillos’s	criterion	is	the	dropping	of	the	deployment	
condition,	Lyons	suggests	to	run	to	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	and	to	in=late	
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -19-
dramatically	the	notion	of	deployment.	His	“responsibility	model”	consists	in	
discarding	selectivity	altogether	and	in	considering	responsible	for	the	empirical	
success	of	a	theory	each	and	every	element	that	was	originally	deployed:	“credit	will	
have	to	be	attributed	to	all	responsible	constituents,	including	mere	heuristics	(such	
as	mystical	beliefs),	weak	analogies,	mistaken	calculations,	logically	invalid	reasoning	
etc.”	(Lyons	2006,	543).	Clearly,	Lyons’s	proposal	amounts	to	a	crack-up	of	the	entire	
SelRealism	program.	But,	more	importantly,	I	do	not	think	that	the	responsibility	
model	captures	the	correct	signi=icance	of	(D).	As	my	previous	considerations	about	
the	PMI	show,	the	deployment	condition	is	not	merely	supposed	to	tell	us	that	a	TP	
has	been	effectively	used	in	obtaining	empirical	success	(as	opposed	to	be	
dispensable),	but	also	that	it	has	been	robustly	so	(as	opposed	to	be	merely	
accidental).	What	makes	it	plausible	that	a	TP	will	still	play	a	role	in	future	theories	is	
the	fact	that	its	importance	for	empirical	success	has	been	tested	by	extensive	and	
repeated	deployment.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	there	are	two	ideas	nested	in	the	
deployment	condition.	One	is	the	idea,	captured	by	Psillos’s	criterion,	that	signi=icant	
TPs	must	play	a	fundamental	role	in	success	in	order	to	distinguish	them	from	idle	
hypotheses;	the	other	is	the	idea	that	the	deployment	of	a	TP	must	ensure	that	its	
success	is	not	accidental.	These	are	two	distinct	ideas.	It	might	happen,	for	example,	
that	a	TP	plays	an	essential	role	in	deriving	a	prediction	in	virtue	of	fortuitous	factors	
cancellation	or	other	favorable	circumstances.	So,	while	an	intensive	deployment	
ensure	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP,	an	extensive	deployment	founds	its	robustness.	Both	
fundamentality	and	robustness	are	ways	to	articulate	the	complex	relation	between	a	
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TP	and	the	rest	of	the	theory,	or	at	least	some	parts	of	the	theory	(more	on	this	in	a	
bit).	Further,	while	fundamentality	is	an	atemporal	articulation	of	this	relation, 	2
robustness	concerns	precisely	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	deployment	condition	
that	escaped	Lyons’s	analysis:	robustness,	as	we	shall	see	below,	is	achieved	over	time.	
In	order	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	fundamentality	and	robustness,	I	introduce	
the	notion	of	symbolic	practices.	By	symbolic	practices	I	mean	all	the	methods	
customarily	used	in	science	to	manipulate	symbols. 	These	include,	but	are	not	3
limited	to,	mathematical	methods,	formal	tools,	approximations	procedures,	models,	
heuristics,	solution	tricks,	and	any	sort	of	way	by	which	one	can	transform	a	symbolic	
expression	into	another	symbolic	expression.	Symbolic	practices	are	the	set	of	
methods	adopted	by	a	theory	to	“put	to	work”	a	certain	TP	or,	in	other	words,	to	
deploy	it	in	order	to	set	problems	and	to	interpret	solutions.	By	using	the	concept	of	
symbolic	practices,	one	can	reformulate	the	two	ideas	of	the	deployment	condition	in	
the	following	way:	
	Of	course	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP	can	change	over	time	because	it	can	become	2
more	or	less	fundamentally	used.	However,	the	relation	in	itself	does	not	concern	this	
change.
	My	discussion	is	especially	tailored	on	the	case	of	mathematical	physics.	I	do	not	3
exclude,	however,	that	it	can	be	suitably	extended	to	other	branches	of	science	by	
taking	an	appropriately	enlarged	notion	of	symbolic	practices.
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(F)	Fundamentality:	A	TP	must	be	embedded	in	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	that	lead	
to	empirical	success.	
(R)	Robustness:	The	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	deploy	the	TP	must	be	reliable.	
Let	us	begin	with	(F).	This	idea	hinges	on	the	“embeddedness”	of	a	TP	into	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices.	An	empirical	success,	a	successful	prediction	or	an	explanation,	is	
obtained	by	starting	with	one	TP—or,	better,	its	symbolic	codi=ication—and	by	
deriving	from	it	the	phenomena	to	be	treated	by	means	of	suitable	manipulations.	In	
their	analysis	of	the	path	from	TP	to	success,	philosophers	usually	disregard	the	
epistemic	role	played	by	symbolic	manipulations	of	TPs.	But	if	we	neglect	this	
important	factor	of	the	process	of	predicting/explaining,	we	are	left	with	no	other	
option	than	characterizing	fundamentality	as	a	relation	between	TPs,	i.e.,	a	‘Psillosian’	
criterion	and	then	a	‘Lyonsnesque’	argument	can	easily	prove	that	this	falls	short	of	
providing	a	satisfactory	notion	of	fundamentality.	In	my	proposal,	fundamentality	is	
rather	a	relation	between	TP	and	the	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	transform	and	
manipulate	it.	Although	intuitively	clear	enough,	the	concept	of	embededdness	
admittedly	needs	further	philosophical	analysis.	In	Section	4,	I	provide	a	historical	
example	to	clarify	what	it	means	for	a	TP	to	be	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	
practices.	
Before	discussing	the	example,	however,	I	need	to	analyze	brie=ly	the	idea	of	
robustness.	Condition	(R)	states	that	reliability,	and	hence	robustness,	is	a	property	of	
the	symbolic	practices	themselves.	In	other	words,	and	this	is	the	central	point,	a	TP	
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can	be	made	more	robust	by	means	of	historically	and	rationally	describable	strategies	
conceived	to	enhance	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	put	it	to	work.	
One	way	to	appreciate	this	point	is	to	notice	that	the	concept	of	reliability	has	three	
main	components.	First,	there	is	an	empirical	component,	that	is	its	connection	with	
success.	It	is	expected	that	reliable	symbolic	practices	have	led	and	will	lead	to	
empirical	success.	This	is	unsurprising,	because	it	is	still	part	of	the	relation	between	
(D)	and	the	NMA.	Second,	there	is	a	conceptual	component:	reliable	symbolic	practices	
allow	us	to	distinguish	between	real	facts	of	nature	and	artifacts.	This	is	the	
component	that	accounts	for	the	non-accidentality	of	success	and	it	depends	on	the	
adoption	of	strategies	to	enhance	reliability.	Applying	symbolic	practices	to	multiple	
cases,	relating	them	with	other,	better	understood,	sets	of	practices	(e.g.,	by	showing	
structure	similarities),	generalizing	solution	methods,	simplifying	computation	
procedures,	introducing	redundant	check	routines,	improving	the	symbolic	notation,	
multiplying	proof	procedures	are	just	a	few	examples	of	strategies	used	to	ensure	that	
the	result	of	symbolic	manipulation	is	a	real	information	and	not	an	artifact	generated	
by	the	practice	itself. 	Finally,	there	is	a	historical	component.	As	I	said	above,	4
deployment	is	a	process	extended	over	time.	When	are	we	justi=ied	to	consider	a	
result	as	reliable?	This	is	an	agent-	and	a	context-dependent	component	of	reliability.	
	This	component	of	the	concept	of	reliability	is	closely	connected	with	the	usual	4
notion	of	robustness	(see,	e.g.,	(Soler	et	al.	2012)	for	an	overview).	Indeed,	robustness	
has	to	do	with	the	multiplications	of	methods	of	check	and	control	as	a	way	to	
distinguish	what	is	real	and	what	is	fabricated	by	practices.
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I	submit	that	this	component	can	be	clari=ied	in	terms	of	control.	We	develop	theories	
because	we	need	to	manipulate	symbols	in	order	to	make	predictions	and	
explanations.	It	is	reasonable	to	state	that	an	agent	considers	reliable	a	theory	when	
she	has	control	on	it,	when	she	knows	how	to	do	things,	where	the	theory	can	be	
applied,	to	what	extent,	what	kind	of	information	she	can	obtain,	what	kind	of	
epistemic	risks	are	involved	in	it,	how	to	improve	progressively	the	performance	and	
a	lot	of	other	things	related	to	the	general	idea	of	knowing	what	is	going	on.	Thus,	
reliability	can	change	over	time	in	virtue	of	new	information	and	further	inquiry.	This	
component	accounts	for	the	fact	that	science	is	an	ongoing	human	endeavor.	
To	sum	up,	I	propose	to	extend	SelRealism	in	the	following	way:	
(SelRealism+)	We	are	entitled	to	consider	the	TP	H	as	true	or	approximately	true	at	
time	t	if	and	only	if:	
1. H	is	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	S	
2. S	is	reliable	
3. H	and	S	lead	to	signi=icant	success	
This	is	a	more	selective	version	of	SelRealism,	because	the	philosophical	and	
historiographical	program	stemming	from	it	extends	the	inquiry	to	the	strategies	
adopted	to	improve	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	and	the	contingent	conditions	
for	control.	As	stated	in	condition	3,	the	units	of	analysis	of	SelRealism+	are	TPs-cum-
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practices	rather	than	TPs	only.	In	the	following	section,	I	provide	an	example	of	what	I	
mean	by	intensive	and	extensive	deployment.	
4. The	Coming	of	Age	of	Perturbation	Theory	
The	Principia	Mathematica	are	a	supreme	example	of	how	to	embed	a	TP,	in	this	case	
the	gravitational	law,	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices. 	However,	Newton’s	mainly	5
geometrical	methods	were	fantastically	complicated	and	notoriously	dif=icult	to	
master.	A	signi=icant	breakthrough	in	what	came	to	be	called	celestial	mechanics	
happened	in	the	mid-1740s,	when	Leonhard	Euler	laid	down	the	foundations	of	
analytical	perturbation	theory.	Euler	made	a	number	of	decisive	steps	forward.	First,	
he	used	the	gravitational	law	to	formulate	general	equations	of	motion	for	celestial	
problems.	Second,	he	introduced	the	use	of	trigonometric	series	to	construct	
approximate	solutions.	The	use	of	these	series	also	depended	crucially	on	the	
gravitational	law,	because	it	satis=ied	the	assumption	that	planetary	orbits,	even	
under	perturbations,	can	be	represented	by	a	combination	of	periodic	functions.	
Finally	he	introduced	manipulation	practices	such	as	the	method	of	the	variation	of	
	In	what	follows,	I	consider	perturbation	theory	as	the	set	of	practices	conceived	to	5
put	to	work	the	gravitational	law.	It	must	be	noted	that	other	TPs	were	involved	(e.g.,	
Newton’s	laws	of	dynamics)	and	that	the	gravitational	law	can	be	decomposed	in	
further	assumptions	such	as	the	action-at-a-distance,	the	instantaneous	propagation	
and	so	forth.	These	considerations	affect	the	level	of	detail	of	my	example,	but	not	the	
structure	of	my	argument.
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constants	and	the	method	of	successive	approximations	to	solve	the	equations	of	
motion.	Perturbation	theory	is	therefore	a	clear	example	of	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	
conceived	to	cast	a	TP	into	a	manipulable	form	and	to	applied	it	to	speci=ic	problems.	
For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	I	distinguish	two	phases	in	the	early	history	of	
perturbation	theory.	The	=irst	phase	goes	roughly	from	the	mid-1740s	to	the	
mid-1760s	and	it	concerns	the	cause	of	numerous	astronomical	anomalies.	Newton	
had	left	behind	a	few	conundrums	that	even	his	genius	was	unable	to	unravel.	The	
most	conspicuous	of	these	problems	was	the	precession	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	
Newton's	Lunar	theory,	elaborated	in	Book	I	and	III	of	the	Principia	only	managed	to	
obtain	half	of	the	observed	value.	In	the	1740s,	there	were	two	approaches	to	the	
issue	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	The	analytical	approach	adopted	the	gravitational	law,	or	a	
slightly	modi=ied	form	of	it,	and	tried	to	calculate	the	observed	precession	by	
analytical	methods	only.	The	physical	approach	supposed	that	the	observed	
anomalies	could	be	due	to	material	causes	such	as	a	resisting	medium	or	
interplanetary	vortices.	It	is	important	to	realize	that	these	approaches	were	
compatible.	Euler	himself	supported	both	the	resisting	medium	hypothesis	and	the	
analytical	approach	and	occasionally	also	proposed	the	use	of	vortices	(letter	to	
Clairaut,	30	September	1747).	For	several	years,	the	best	mathematicians	of	Europe	
struggled	with	the	riddle	of	the	Lunar	apogee		(Bodenmann	2010)	until,	on	21	
January	1749,	Alexis	Clairaut	showed	that	if	one	pushes	the	approximation	to	the	
second	order	of	the	perturbation,	some	terms	that	are	negligible	at	the	=irst	order	
become	sizable	and	generate	the	missing	half	of	the	precession	(Clairaut	1752).	
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Clairaut’s	success	was	surely	an	impressive	breakthrough,	but	what	made	it	so	
impactful	was	not	the	brute	fact	that	gravitational	law	had	eventually	led	to	a	
successful	explanation.	Physical	hypotheses	such	as	vortices	and	resisting	medium	
also	provided	an	explanation	of	the	observed	precession.	The	crucial	difference	lies	in	
the	fact	that	the	gravitational	law	could	be	fully	integrated	with	the	analytical	
practices	and	then	manipulated	to	provide	suitable	symbolic	expressions	of	the	
precession	of	the	apogee.	That	did	not	happen	with	the	physical	hypotheses,	although	
not	for	lack	of	trying.	Euler,	for	instance,	tried	hard	to	integrate	the	hypothesis	of	the	
resisting	medium	in	perturbation	theory,	but	the	ensuing	equations	of	motion	were	
simply	unmanageable	(Euler	1747).	Clairaut’s	success	is	eminently	a	story	of	
intensive	use	of	the	gravitational	law:	he	managed	to	integrate	it	with	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices	and	to	accommodate	effectively	the	observations.	
Clairaut’s	feat	did	not	close	the	debate	on	the	gravitational	law,	tough.	His	calculations	
used	many	case-based	assumptions,	simpli=ications,	and	shortcuts	and	its	
straightforward	extension	to	more	complex	cases,	such	as	the	behavior	of	Jupiter	and	
Saturn,	was	doubtful	to	say	the	least.	But	there	was	also	a	deeper	problem.	At	some	
point	in	his	analysis,	Clairaut	obtained	an	“arc	of	circle”,	i.e.,	a	trigonometric	function	
multiplied	by	time.	Such	terms	are	obviously	unbounded	and	hence	make	the	whole	
trigonometric	series	diverge.	Clairaut	got	rid	of	it	by	ad-hoc	assumptions,	but	the	
status	of	these	unbounded	terms	remained	unclear:	they	could	represent	an	artifact	
of	the	theory,	a	limitation	of	its	predictive	power	or	even	a	dynamical	instability	of	the	
system.		
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Soon,	the	problem	of	the	arcs	of	circle	become	more	troublesome.	Euler	found	the	
same	terms	in	his	analysis	of	the	motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	and	in	1766	Lagrange	
proved	that	they	are	actually	a	necessary	consequence	of	the	method	of	successive	
approximations	applied	to	astronomical	problems	(Lagrange	1766).	Thus,	in	the	
mid-1760s,	perturbation	theory	appeared	to	be	a	fragile	set	of	practices	which	had	
scored	some	important	success,	but	was	still	marred	with	problems	of	unreliability	
under	certain	conditions.	From	the	late	1760s	onwards,	the	issue	of	improving	the	
robustness	of	perturbation	theory	became	a	central	preoccupation	of	the	leading	
mathematicians	interested	in	physical	astronomy.	
There	were	two	programs	inspired	by	this	issue.	On	the	one	hand,	Lagrange	tried	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	methods	as	a	mathematical	theory.	He	carried	
out	this	project	by	means	of	multiple	strategies:	(1)	enhancing	the	relation	between	
perturbation	theory	and	other	branches	of	mathematics	(e.g.,	potential	theory);	(2)	
elaborating	arguments	to	extract	information	from	the	equations	of	motion	without	
solving	them	(e.g.,	by	using	integrals	of	motion);	(3)	improving	methods	to	simplify	
the	solution	procedure	(e.g.,	Lagrange’s	coordinates);	(4)	introducing	new	symbolic	
codi=ications	to	manipulate	the	equations	of	motion	(e.g.,	the	perturbing	function);	(5)	
making	the	notation	less	cumbersome	(Lagrange’s	coef=icients).	Around	the	same	
years,	Laplace	was	also	working	to	improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	theory,	but	
his	program	adopted	a	different	approach.	He	concentrated	on	methods	to	make	
perturbation	theory	a	more	reliable	problem-solving	tool.		He	developed	his	own	
method	to	eliminate	the	arcs	of	circle—which	was	based	on	the	recalculation	of	the	
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integration	constants—he	imported	probability	theory	and	the	equations	of	condition	
to	deal	with	astronomical	observations	and	devised	several	strategies	to	identify	in	
concrete	cases	those	elements	of	the	equations	of	motion	that	were	likely	to	produce	
sizable	perturbation	terms	at	higher	order.	Both	Lagrange’s	and	Laplace’s	programs	
scored	their	own	successes.	In	the	early	1780s,	Lagrange	proved	a	very	general	result	
of	stability	according	to	which	the	three	more	important	orbital	elements	(mean	
motion,	eccentricity,	and	inclination)	are	invariable	or	bounded	(Lagrange	1781).	
Laplace,	on	his	part,	explained	the	decades-long	problems	of	the	anomaly	in	the	
motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	as	well	as	the	secular	acceleration	of	the	Moon	(Laplace	
1785,	1787;	Wilson	1985).		
5. Conclusions	
In	several	places,	Kyle	Stanford	has	argued	that	any	selection	of	enduring	TPs	is	
ultimately	ungrounded	and,	consequently,	the	entire	SelRealism	program	is	unviable	
(Stanford	2003,	2006).	In	his	view,	there	are	two	possible	ways	to	select	essential	TPs.	
The	=irst	way	is	to	trust	scientists	when	they	say	that	a	certain	posit	is	fundamental.	
However,	neither	commonsense,	nor,	more	importantly,	historical	records	support	the	
hypothesis	that	scientists’	take	on	this	matter	is	or	should	be	particularly	reliable.	The	
other	option	is	to	wait	and	see:	when	a	theory	is	superseded,	one	can	check	which	TPs	
have	survived.	The	reason	why	a	selective	realist	cannot	go	with	this	option,	however,	
has	been	summarized	effectively	by	Peter	Vickers:	
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If	we	cannot	identify	the	working	posits	of	a	theory	until	it	has	been	superseded	
by	some	other	theory,	then	realism	is	no	longer	about	identifying	what	we	ought	
to	believe	to	be	true:	one	is	always	waiting	for	the	next	theory	to	come	along	to	
tell	us	which	parts	of	our	current	theory	are	working	posits.	(Vickers	2013,	207)	
From	this,	Stanford	concludes	that	SelRealism	without	prospectively	applicable	
selectivity	criteria	is	empty	and	should	be	replaced	by	a	more	modest	form	of	realism.	
But	Stanford’s	wait-and-see	stance	is	neither	necessary	nor	suf=icient	to	do	the	job	it	
is	supposed	to	do,	i.e.,	to	pick	out	essential	TPs.	It	is	not	suf=icient	because	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	the	TPs	survived	one	theory	change	will	survive	the	next	ones.	It	is	not	
necessary	because	we	do	not	need	the	next	theory	to	form	reasonable	judgements	
about	essential	TPs.	As	I	have	shown	above,	science	provides	a	variety	of	strategies	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	the	TP-cum-practices	and	hence	good	reasons	to	believe,	
within	the	actual	theory,	that	a	certain	TP	intensively	and	extensively	deployed	is	in	
fact	essential.		
From	this	perspective,	Stanford’s	argument	simply	sets	the	epistemic	bar	too	high.	By	
stating	that	the	essentiality	of	a	TP	can	be	adjudicated	only	from	the	vantage	point	of	
the	superseding	theory,	he	implicitly	challenges	the	realist	to	provide	a	
“superselection	rule”	able	to	capture	the	whole	history	of	science,	a	task	that	the	
realist	is	neither	willing,	nor	actually	requested	to	accomplish.	By	contrast,	the	
historical	and	philosophical	program	of	SelRealism+	moves	from	the	conviction	that	
TPs	and	symbolic	practices	follow	a	dynamics	able	to	=ilter	out	inessential	
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components.	Consequently,	SelRealism+	is	committed	to	historically	identify	and	
philosophically	analyze	this	dynamics	and	to	trace	the	genealogy	of	our	theories	in	
terms	of	the	processes	of	codi=ication,	manipulation,	and	stabilization	of	TPs.	
Ultimately,	this	program	aims	at	producing	new	and	interesting	historical	narratives	
of	theory	change.	It	remains	true	that	the	strategies	making	up	the	theoretical	
dynamics	only	provide	good	reasons	to	allocate	the	realist	commitment.	It	might	
happen	that	the	judgement	on	the	reliability	of	the	TPs-cum-practices	change	over	
time	in	virtue	of	further	inquiry	or	new	information.	This	fact,	as	stated	above,	follows	
from	the	fallibility	of	science	as	a	human	endeavor	and,	as	such,	should	not	trouble	
the	realist.	
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Duhemian good sense and agent reliabilism 
 
Famously, according to Duhem a hypothesis can never be experimentally tested in 
isolation, but only along with the entire theoretical scaffolding it comes with. So in the face of 
disagreement between theory and experiment, it is impossible to point out which hypotheses in 
the theory are flawed. A big question for Duhem was, how does the physicist act in such a 
situation of underdetermination? Which hypotheses does s/he discard, and which one(s) does 
s/he retain? Duhem’s response was that the physicist possesses an intuitive “good sense” that 
directs this choice. Although good sense does not provide a rigorous, rule-based template for 
theory choice
1
, it allows scientists to weigh evidence and be “fair and impartial” (Duhem, 218) in 
theory choice. 
 
Recently, there has been much interest in drawing parallels between Duhem’s good sense 
and ideas in virtue epistemology (VE). VE emerged in the 1980s as an approach to epistemology 
based on virtue ethics. In the words of Greco (2004): “Just as virtue theories in ethics try to 
understand the normative properties of actions in terms of the normative properties of moral 
agents, virtue epistemology tries to understand the normative properties of beliefs in terms of the 
normative properties of cognitive agents.” A virtue epistemological reading of good sense as first 
advanced by David Stump (2007) is based on the idea that Duhem too emphasized the normative 
properties of the scientist qua cognitive agent and took them as a basis for legitimate scientific 
                                                
1
 While “theory choice” today is generally understood in the context of contrastive underdetermination, Duhem was 
primarily concerned with the holist variety of underdetermination and advanced good sense in the context of the 
latter. But for the purposes of this paper the distinction will not matter, and I shall use “theory choice” to refer to 
underdetermination in general, as do all the authors I reference. 
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knowledge in the face of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Stump finds striking 
similarities particularly between Duhemian good sense and Linda Zagzebski’s (1996) views of 
VE. Here, I discuss the views of Stump, Milena Ivanova (2010), and Abrol Fairweather (2012) in 
this regard and ultimately propose my own view in response which is an agent-reliabilist reading 
of Duhem’s good sense. 
 
Stump argues that Duhem conceived of good sense in a way that can today be understood 
as virtue theoretic. In particular, Stump finds similarities between good sense and ideas of VE 
put forward by Zagzebski (1996). As Stump tells us, Zagzebski argued that justified belief comes 
from a “cluster of intellectual virtues in the same way that the rightness of an act can be defined 
in terms of moral virtue in ethical theory”(Stump, 151). Stump argues that Duhem’s good sense 
nicely fits in with these ideas. Good sense depends on the scientist, the cognitive agent, being 
“virtuous”: s/he has to be, in the words of Duhem quoting Claude Bernard, a “faithful and 
impartial judge”. Stump further provides another illuminating quote from Duhem from his 
lectures on German science: 
 
“In the realm of every science, but more particularly in the realm of history, the pursuit of the truth not 
only requires intellectual abilities, but also calls for moral qualities: rectitude, probity, detachment 
from all interest and all passions. (Duhem, 1991b, p. 43)” (Stump, p. 152). 
 
Stump notes that some of the epistemic virtues put forward by Zagzebski include 
intellectual sobriety, impartiality and intellectual courage and the list fits very well with 
Duhem’s. Yet another striking similarity between Zagzebski and Duhem according to Stump is 
that they both appeal to non-rule-governed epistemology. Zagzebski, in making a case for an 
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epistemology based on ethics, says, “The idea is that there can be no complete set of rules 
sufficient for giving a determinate answer to the question of what an agent should do in every 
situation of moral choice.” (Stump, 152) Similarly, Duhem arrives at the idea of good sense 
when the rule-based epistemology of the physical method (i.e. strict agreement between theory 
and experiment) fails. As Stump says, 
 
“Holism threatens to make testing impossible, yet Duhem believes that scientific consensus will 
emerge. While the pure logic of the testing situation leaves theory choice open, good sense does not. 
Duhem claims that the history of science shows that while there is controversy in science, there is also 
closure of scientific debates.” (Stump, 155) 
 
Milena Ivanova (2010) has argued in response to Stump, that the latter is mistaken in 
drawing such close parallels between VE and Duhem’s good sense. She raises two main 
objections: first, while VE is concerned with getting to the truth via epistemic virtues, for 
Duhem, physical theory only asymptotically approaches truth – truth here being the truth of a 
natural order, of the “real affinities” among things. Ivanova makes this point keeping in mind 
Duhem’s view of a ‘perfect theory’ and the convergent nature of his realism: for Duhem, the aim 
of physical theory was to classify experimental laws, and a physical theory – one picked out by 
good sense in the face of underdetermination – constantly approached but never reached, a 
perfect theory which classified laws and their phenomena in exactly the way underlying 
metaphysical realities are really classified in nature. So her point is that while VE is concerned 
with getting to the truth, good sense doesn’t help us with that. But as Ivanova herself points out,  
 
“Still, in response to this objection one can adopt the weaker thesis that even though natural 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -37-
classification may not reveal the truth about the unobservable, it will be true for the observable 
phenomena. Also, one may argue that it is legitimate to aim at a particular epistemic goal 
independently of whether this goal is achievable or not.” (62) 
  
I take her point here to be that both VE and good sense are after all in the business of truth-
seeking even though attaining the truth may be impossible for with the latter. 
 
Ivanova’s more forceful objection has to do with epistemic justification. According to her 
whereas VE takes epistemic virtues to be justifications for beliefs, Duhem did not invoke the 
concept of good sense to justify belief in one theory over another. (To reiterate, Duhem did not 
have a full-blown metaphysical notion of truth of a theory – but worked with the surrogate idea 
of truth, that a right theory approaches a transcendental, natural classification.) Rather, she 
argues, good sense for Duhem was more a post hoc explanation of the physicist’s choice: it 
explains the repeated success of theories at making novel predictions. According to Ivanova, 
what really justified belief in a theory for Duhem – i.e. the belief that it was approaching a 
natural classification – was the success of the theory in making correct novel predictions: She 
says that for Duhem, “[a scientist] is justified in believing that a theory is a natural classification 
only when some empirical evidence supports it or when the theory has become a ‘prophet for us’ 
(Duhem, 27), that is, when it has managed to make novel predictions.” (Ivanova, 62). Here’s 
Ivanova’s argument broken down: 
- Physical theory is a classification of laws.  
- In a situation where we have a theory that contradicts experimental data and are left 
without any means within physics to decide what to do - whether to tweak parts of the 
theory to accommodate the available experimental data – and if so, which parts to tweak 
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– or to abandon it for another theory. Somehow in the end, the scientist decides which 
way to go.  
- The “highest test” for physical theory is to ask it to make new and novel experimental 
predictions.  
- When the theory succeeds it is justified – in that it is taken to approach a natural 
classification. 
- Repeatedly, the scientist sees her/his choices made in the difficult situation of 
underdetermination emerging successful in such predictions.  
- How does this happen? There must be some innate ability or virtue in the scientist that 
enables him to do this: good sense. 
 
Thus according to Ivanova, good sense is an explanation of theory choice rather than a 
justification for it. Moreover, according to her, Duhem doesn’t say anything about good sense as 
a method of science: he doesn’t tell us how exactly it directs our choice. His account of how 
good sense comes about and works to direct theory choice is quite thin. For Ivanova, this further 
shows that Duhem did not introduce it as a justification but only as a post hoc explanation. 
 
 Abrol Fairweather (2012) has argued against Ivanova’s above objection and has 
attempted a position on Duhemian good sense that is a hybrid of Ivanova’s and Stump’s views. 
Fairweather claims to draw upon an agent reliabilist VE to do this. Reliabilism in Alvin 
Goldman’s words,  “… as a distinctive approach to knowledge is restricted to theories that 
involve truth-promoting factors above and beyond the truth of the target proposition.” (Goldman, 
2011) Fairweather’s argument is that good sense results in a reliable process. Since Duhem’s 
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claim is that good sense has a great “track record” and always picks out a successful theory – i.e. 
a theory which inevitably correctly makes a novel prediction – good sense produces knowledge 
(which here in the Duhemian context, consists in taking a predictively successful theory to be 
approaching a natural classification) by a reliable process. Good sense is a ‘truth-promoting 
factor’ regardless of whether the theory it picks out ultimately succeeds in novel prediction or 
not. It is “tracking evidentially important features of theories” (Fairweather, 10) Fairweather 
claims that “If a belief P is the product of a reliable capacity or process this fact constitutes 
evidence in favor of P.”  This implies, “If the products of good sense reliably turn out to be 
supported by compelling new evidence, then being the product of good sense will be evidence 
for any theory with such a distinguished etiology.” (Fairweather, 10) So, Fairweather says, it 
seems that “future evidence is not required to evidentially distinguish the theory chosen by good 
sense, because the reliability of good sense is itself evidence supporting that theory.” 
(Fairweather, 10) While I agree that agent reliabilism is the best way to understand good sense, 
Fairweather does not seem to give an accurate interpretation of this reading. Although he claims 
to provide an agent reliabilist reading of good sense, he grounds the reliability of good sense in 
its track record and not in its own nature or the mind where it is born. This is antithetical to agent 
reliabilist VE which situates reliability in the cognitive character of the agent. So it seems that 
Fairweather’s characterization is more along the lines of process reliabilism or simple reliabilism 
– according to which a belief is justified just in case it is formed via reliable processes – rather 
than agent reliabilism, and hence contrary to what he set out to do. His argument does not help 
situate good sense back into VE. Let us now turn to agent reliabilism in detail. 
 
Greco and Agent Reliabilism: A Short Detour 
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 As above, simple reliabilism is the view that a belief is justified just in case it is formed 
via reliable processes. Here the proportion of true beliefs the process results in, over time, 
measures reliability. Greco (1999) argues that simple reliabilism is insufficient for two reasons:  
1. An agent might form a belief via fleeting or strange processes: Greco starts by noting that 
“Reliabilism must somehow restrict the kind of reliable process that is able to ground 
knowledge, so as to rule out processes that are strange or fleeting.” (Greco, 286) As an 
example of such processes, Greco discusses Platinga’s “The case of the epistemically 
serendipitous lesion” where an agent has a rare kind of a brain lesion, one that makes her 
believe that she has a brain lesion. There is no evidence for the lesion: there no 
symptoms, no testimony etc.; in fact there might even be a lot of evidence against it. But 
the agent is unable to take account of this (lack of) evidence due to the lesion. The 
relevant cognitive process here must no doubt be deemed very reliable, but we would not 
want to take the resulting belief as justified.  
2. Process reliabilism doesn’t guarantee that the agent has a subjective justification of her 
belief. Greco says,  
“[there] is a powerful intuition that knowledge does require that the knower have some kind of 
sensitivity to the reliability of her evidence. Sometimes this intuition is expressed by insisting 
that knowledge requires subjective justification. It is not enough that one's belief is formed in a 
way that is objectively reliable; one's belief must be formed in a way that is subjectively 
appropriate as well.” (285)  
 
 Greco’s solution to the above problems is agent reliabilism. According to agent 
reliabilism, reliability is shifted from the belief-forming process to the qualities of the agent’s 
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mind: 
“Relevant to present purposes is Sosa's suggestion for a restriction on reliable cognitive processes; it is 
those processes that have their bases in the stable and successful dispositions of the believer that are 
relevant for knowledge and justification. Just as the moral rightness of an action can be understood in 
terms of the stable dispositions or character of the moral agent, the epistemic rightness of a belief can 
be understood in terms of the intellectual character of the cognizer.” (Greco, 287) 
Following Sosa’s views, Greco proposes that “knowledge and justified belief are grounded in 
stable and reliable cognitive character.”(Greco, 287) Accordingly, “We may now explicitly revise 
simple reliabilism as follows: A belief p has positive epistemic status for a person S just in case 
S's believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S's cognitive character.” 
(Greco, 287) Hence we see that reliability now has little to do with the truth of the resultant 
belief(s) but rather with the cognitive character of the agent. 
 Greco proceeds to show how agent reliabilism also solves the problem of subjective 
justification: 
VJ: “A belief p is subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having knowledge) if 
and only if S's believing p is grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking 
conscientiously.” (289)  
By “thinking conscientiously”, Greco clarifies that he does not mean thinking with the purpose 
of finding truth, but rather the “usual state that people are in as a kind of a default mode – the 
state of trying to form beliefs accurately.” Greco contrasts this with epistemic “vices” such as 
trying to comfort oneself or trying to seek attention. Lastly, Greco points out that agent 
reliabilism reverses the “usual direction of analysis between virtuous character and justified 
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belief”. While non virtue theoretic epistemologies understand virtues in terms of justified belief, 
here justified belief is being cached out in terms of virtues of the cognizer. “Virtuous belief is 
associated with the dispositions a person manifests when she is sincerely trying to believe what 
is true”, and “The dispositions that a person manifests when she is thinking conscientiously are 
stable properties of her character, and are therefore in an important sense hers.” (Greco, 290) 
Therefore, a belief formed this way will be subjectively appropriate.  
Back to Duhem 
 Duhem’s views seem to exhibit all the features of agent reliabilism discussed above. In 
addition to the features of good sense and the physicist qua cognitive agent discussed so far I 
want to draw the reader’s attention to Duhem’s characterization of the different kinds of minds. 
For Duhem, the “strong and the narrow” mind is one capable of ordering and organizing laws 
and hypotheses into theories, and the “supple” mind or the “mind with finesse” – one capable of 
grasping a wide range of objects and at the same time able to group them logically – is the mind 
that produces good sense. This certainly seems to talk of  “stable dispositions” in Greco’s sense 
of the term, that reflect the “cognitive character” of the scientist. Duhem takes pains to carefully 
describe the mind of the physicist and discuss beliefs and attitudes in terms of cognitive character 
traits and not the other way round. i.e. Duhem talks of legitimacy of beliefs in terms of cognitive 
character traits; he does not talk of the traits or “epistemic virtues” so to speak, in terms of the 
validity of beliefs. For instance, he says about those not interested in seeing a unified system of 
classification erected, “Only those who affect a hatred of intellectual strength were mistaken to 
the extent of taking the scaffolding for a completed building.” (Duhem, 103) There are several 
such instances where Duhem turns traditional non virtue-theoretic epistemology on its head and 
makes cognitive character traits basic. Now it remains to be seen if we can defend a view of 
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justification from good sense that goes with Greco’s account. If we are successful in this, 
Ivanova’s position will be untenable. Before going there though, let us return to Fairweather for 
a moment. 
In addition to the argument from reliabilism, Fairweather advances another argument 
against Ivanova’s “deflation of good sense”: the position that good sense does not lend any 
epistemic strength or any justification to the chosen theory. The argument is that if good sense 
were indeed merely explanatory and post hoc as Ivanova claims, and not justificatory, then we 
are free to imagine a case where good sense doesn’t intervene at all. After all, if good sense 
explains theory choice and there is no choice being made – i.e. no explanandum -  we don’t need 
an explanation. So let us suppose that we don’t make any choice and just wait for a future novel 
prediction to make a choice and justify it. This might not be the most efficient way to choose a 
theory, but let us assume we do this nevertheless – for according to Fairweather, Ivanova’s 
objection should imply the possibility of this solution. Fairweather rightly points out that in this 
situation we might again end up with an underdetermination: what if all competing theories pass 
the novel prediction test? Therefore, Fairweather argues, good sense must play an important 
epistemic role above mere explanation, in the face of such a “second level” underdetermiantion. 
But he goes further than that and says that without it, we would never end up with a determinate 
choice, even with new confirming evidence. What Fairweather is ignoring here is that future 
evidence could pick out a theory, however small the probability. It is possible that when all the 
options resulting from underdetermination are asked to make a novel prediction, only one 
succeeds, hence obviating the need for any further theory revision. But the important point is that 
good sense enters the scene even before such an attempt to single out a theory based on novel 
prediction. So the merit of good sense in my view does not lie in the inability of novel 
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predictions to single out a theory. It is more fundamental than that. But reasons for meriting good 
sense apart, let us again look at Fairweather’s take on what the merit of good sense is. 
 
According to Fairweather, good sense confers uniqueness to a theory (which, according 
to him, no future evidence can confer). But after good sense has uniquely picked out a theory, it 
is a successful novel prediction that counts as evidence in favor of the chosen theory. Fairweather 
makes the following interesting observation that follows from such a reading of good sense:  
 
“This shows an interesting fact that new evidence in favor of a theory gives it a different epistemic 
standing depending on whether we are considering it alongside or independent of meaningful rivals. In 
the former case, new confirming evidence does not make a theory the determinate choice with 
fundamental epistemic standing. In the latter case, that same evidence determines theory choice and 
confers fundamental epistemic standing.” (Fairweather, 13) 
 
So there are two “epistemic values and epistemic standings”: uniqueness, which comes from 
good sense, and clinching evidential support from a successful novel prediction. This way, good 
sense alone does not confer “fundamental epistemic standing”, and evidence alone cannot confer 
uniqueness. This account which recognizes an important epistemic role for both good sense and 
new evidence, Fairweather calls the “hybrid reading”. 
 
My own view is that while Fairweather is right in that good sense plays a key epistemic 
role unlike what Ivanova says, we can go back full circle to Stump and have a proper virtue 
epistemological – specifically agent reliabilist – reading of good sense. I contend that good sense 
confers not just uniqueness, but actually does determine theory choice, also providing (an agent-
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reliabilist) justification. Good sense doesn’t simply pick one and put the rest “out of the 
running”. It is not just something that prevents the proliferation of acceptable theories obtained 
by tweaking different parts of theories that don’t agree with future experiment. Good sense 
provides a basis for the uniqueness. Just as with the problem of coming up with a realist 
interpretation of Duhem, this problem of the epistemic role of good sense is not easy either given 
the sometimes confusing nature of Duhem’s claims. Nonetheless, I still think an agent-reliabilist 
VE reading of Duhem is possible and that Ivanova and Fairweather are mistaken. 
 
Ivanova claims that good sense is only offered as a post hoc explanation of theory choice 
during underdetermination and not as a justification. I argue to the contrary. Ivanova’s claim 
seems to be based on a purely externalist notion of justification. It seems to assume that there is 
one single concept of justification – specifically, externalist, evidential – and that good sense 
doesn’t fit with it. But justification can be of many kinds. Duhem says we can “very properly 
decide” (Duhem, 217) between multiple theory choices using good sense. Further, he says good 
sense strongly “comes out in favor of” one of the choices – again implying that we are compelled 
to accept its judgment even before future experiment can ratify the choice. He goes on to say, 
“Pure logic is not the only rule for our judgments; certain opinions which do not fall under the 
hammer of contradiction are in any case perfectly unreasonable." (Duhem, 217) How do we 
understand such language? If an epistemic choice is proper, forceful, and reasonable, I don’t see 
any reason we cannot properly construe it as being justified, in an internalist sense.  
 
Further, Duhem does not introduce good sense as a merely post hoc explanation. He says, 
we can “properly decide” between the various options of theories using good sense. “Properly 
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decide” very much implies an active role for good sense during underdetermination. Duhem 
presents elaborate and careful characterizations of different kinds of minds and puts forward 
quite clearly, normative merits of cultivating/ possessing one kind of mind over the other as far 
as physics goes (the supple or the strong and narrow over the ample, broad and weak).  Good 
sense is but a feature of the supple mind. It is not introduced all of a sudden as a new idea to just 
“save the (meta)phenomenon” of theory choice during underdetermination. It is a smooth and 
natural continuation of Duhem’s views on the mind of the theorist, which he articulates way 
before he comes to this problem of underdetermination, in one of the early chapters in Aim and 
Structure.  In fact, Duhem’s view that physicists don’t actually actively choose hypotheses at all, 
and that they “come to his mind” when his mind is ready to receive them, clearly reveals the 
agent reliabilist in Duhem. 
 
Finally, Greco’s account of agent reliabilist justification seems to lend itself to Duhem 
very well. Reliable cognitive character justifies beliefs it produces and further, it is subjectively 
justified: Duhem’s virtuous scientist certainly “thinks conscientiously”, following Duhem’s 
instructions of shunning passions and interests, and so a belief, here the belief in the theory 
chosen, grounded in the cognitive dispositions, here good sense, he manifests when thinking like 
this – is subjectively justified. So we seem to have comfortably accommodated Duhem in a full-
blown agent reliabilist reading. 
 
But what about the textual evidence cited by Ivanova, which seems to say Duhem did not 
think good sense justified theory choice? Why does Duhem insist that despite good sense, it is a 
successful novel prediction that has the final word? Why does he, in the context of resolving 
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underdetermination say in as many words that the method of the physicist “is justified only by 
experiment”? I contend that throughout Aim and Structure, Duhem seems to have two distinct, 
non-intersecting epistemologies: one of physics, and one outside of physics – which we may call 
philosophy. Duhem was a physicist-philosopher. He frequently claims that although there are 
absolutely no epistemic resources within physics for us to believe that physical theory latches on 
to a natural underlying order, we are forced to believe so by various factors outside of physics, 
logic and reason. It is worth noting that Duhem cites Pascal as saying that we sometimes believe 
for ‘reasons that reason does not know’, both in the context of theories converging on to a natural 
classification as well as in that of good sense during underdetermination. About the former, he 
says: “The opinion is a legitimate one because it results from an innate feeling of ours which we 
cannot justify by purely logical considerations, but which we cannot stifle completely either.” 
(Duhem, 102) Further:  
 
“No language is precise enough and flexible enough to define and formulate them; and yet, the truths 
which this common sense reveals are so clear and so certain that we cannot either mistake them or cast 
doubt on them; furthermore, all scientific clarity and certainty are a reflection of the clarity and an 
extension of the certainty of these common-sense truths.” (Duhem, 104) 
 
 Since Duhem attributes good sense to similar patterns of thinking, we can associate his 
above assertions about the legitimacy of beliefs not borne out of logic, with good sense as well. 
Given Duhem’s commitment to the moral goodness and the intellectual acuity of the supple, 
strong and narrow minds, it is very unlikely that he would think that epistemic ends justify the 
means (here, successful novel prediction justifying that which chose the theory, i.e. good sense). 
Reliabilism in fact expressly turns this around and say it is the means (by virtue of their 
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reliability) that justify the ends. So beliefs that arise from good sense are justified from an 
(internalist, deontological) agent reliabilist perspective. The justification Duhem talks about 
when he says that the methods of the physicist are justified by experiment should be when we are 
strictly within the context of physics: there it is Duhem qua physicist speaking. But from a 
broader, philosophical perspective, Duhem rather means, I think, that experiment validates the 
choice and confers certainty on it. But we can have justification without certainty, like in agent 
reliabilism. In simpler terms, the reasons for which the physicist chooses a theory are grounded 
in her good sense. However, the successful novel prediction will no doubt make the choice 
certain. 
 
Thus, Ivanova is mistaken in arguing that good sense does not provide justification. 
Fairweather’s hybrid reading is inadequate as well for it ignores the justification offered by a 
proper agent reliabilist reading of good sense. I argue that a proper agent reliabilism 
accommodates Duhem as a virtue epistemologist very well and shows us that good sense does 
offer justification for theory choice. Importantly, I have shown that it is certainly not a post hoc 
explanation but a part and parcel of Duhem’s overall views on the mind of the physicist. 
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There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation 
(Word count: 4998) 
 
Abstract: Callender and Cohen (2006) argue that there is no need for a special account of the 
constitution of scientific representation. I argue that scientific representation is communal 
and therefore deeply tied to the practice in which it is embedded. The communal nature is 
accounted for by licensing, the activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish a 
representation. A case study of the Lotka-Volterra model reveals how the licensure is a 
constitutive element of the representational relationship. Thus, any account of the 
constitution of scientific representation must account for licensing, meaning that there is a 
special problem of scientific representation.  
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1. Introduction 
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different 
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (2006), who argue that representation is the same across 
disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of scientific 
representation unexplained. To explain why scientific representation is dependent upon 
practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of representational 
vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists in accord with 
broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature of 
representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
2. Callender and Cohen’s View 
On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific representation has 
been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 67). Specifically, they think there is no reason for 
philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution question:” “What 
constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?” (2006, 68). In 
response to this question, they make a few observations. One is that it is “economical and 
natural to explain some types of representation in terms of other, more basic types of 
representation” (2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of 
how “entities other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent 
the very same targets that models represent” (2006, 71). For these reasons, they suggest that  
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“scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative representation” (2006, 
75). That is to say that the representational nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the 
same way that the representational nature of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In 
each case, and in every practice, the representational nature in question will be reduced to a 
more fundamental representational entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a 
painting, and a scientific model will each be explained in terms of the representational nature 
of mental states.  
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will 
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which delimit 
scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints are 
delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not a part 
of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the utility of 
these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that are 
representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se” (2006, 75). 
 If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive 
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there is 
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something special about representation in science.1 As one example among many, Mauricio 
Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His account 
takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation (what he 
calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be a scientific 
representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows competent and 
informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (2004, 773). If we accept 
Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many others like it do nothing 
more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies employed in delimiting 
representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).  
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation 
In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not been 
addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the 
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific 
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender and 
                                               
1
 For more accounts which answer the constitution question in a distinct way, see the work of 
Ronald Giere (1988, 2004), Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2008), RIG Hughes (1997), Steven 
French, James Ladyman, and Otávio Bueno (French and Ladyman 1999; Bueno and French 
2011), and Gabriele Contessa (2007). For an overview of these accounts of scientific 
representation among others, see Brandon Boesch (2015) and Mauricio Suárez (2015).  
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Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation, 
consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same 
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:2 
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A 
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and 
attributes some connection between X and Y.  
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of honeysuckle can 
be reminiscent of golfing, etc.  
 There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational nature 
of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental entities. 
For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of the mental 
state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it). Second, 
stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could draw a 
symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to buy bread from the store. 
The reminiscent relationship exists because of my stipulative act.  Finally, any limitations of 
reminiscent relationships will be made for pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for 
pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol on my hand look like a loaf of bread.  
                                               
2
 I should note that the account of reminiscence here is not meant as a detailed explanation of 
this concept, but only as an analogy to draw a point about representation.  
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 These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by 
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and Cohen’s 
perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the particular aims 
for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different aims alone are 
insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation and reminiscence: 
while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is necessarily communal. That 
reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that discussions of reminiscence can 
terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not 
someone is reminiscent of someone else. This is because reminiscence is agent-relative and 
so depends only upon some particular agent and her mental states.  
 Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued, “representation 
is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, and more 
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by 
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (2010, 99). 
Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is embedded. It is 
necessarily communal.3  The communal nature is demonstrated from the fact that 
representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and their mental 
                                               
3
 The view of representation argued for in this paper echoes many of the points made by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s in his ‘Private Language Argument’ where he argues that meaning is 
necessarily communal (1953/2009, 95e-111e).  
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states.4 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra model (which 
represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to genetic drift does not 
count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only because it does not 
(pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it ignores and discounts the 
autonomous elements of the model as understood by the broader scientific community.5 The 
autonomous elements are seen in the materiality or historicity of the representational vehicle; 
in its development, reception, and contemporary use. Understanding how and why the 
scientific object represents its target requires paying attention to these communal features. 
That is to say that the communal nature is partially constitutive of the representational 
relationship. Callender and Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently 
account for these constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below. 
4. Licensing 
Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention be given 
to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms of its 
                                               
4
 This point has already been made specifically with regard to models by Morrison and 
Morgan (1999). Here, I am extending a similar point to other representational vehicles,  
including things like diagrams and figures.  
5
 Of course, there may be disagreements and developments internal to the practice about how 
to use some representation, but these disagreements and developments are part of the 
practice.  
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development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific 
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of 
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a 
vehicle and its target. It is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship: it 
is a critical part in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing the 
sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the representational 
relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical development, reception, 
and use of actual instances of scientific representation.  
4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation 
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass on 
the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be helpful to draw an analogy to licensing in 
science.6 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an example. The 
mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of cyberbullying is 
clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how Guernica is 
representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s intentions within the 
environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was received by viewers in 
the years following its creation, and how it is understood today. With these features in mind, 
                                               
6
 It is somewhat contentious to draw conclusions about the nature of representation in science 
by appeal to art; see e.g. Bueno and French (2011). Nonetheless, it is a common technique in 
discussions of scientific representation; see e.g. Suárez (2004).  
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it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of the people of Guernica who had 
been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. 
The licensing here is a constitutive element of Guernica’s representational nature: without 
these features, it is not clear whether or how the painting would manage to represent anything 
at all. 
 Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic 
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not 
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the author 
Flannery O’Connor: 
[A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the significance of the 
Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant, but 
finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head.” (1988, 853) 
The Misfit is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to 
Find,” and, as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly 
representational. Her answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational 
target for the hat, there may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her 
authorial intent, but rather due to the views of the broader artistic community. 
 Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted 
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means of 
licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as if 
Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of Picasso, 
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audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding why it 
represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that there 
may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate one. A 
single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the target 
must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes as 
understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts are a 
critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat. 
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study 
The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is of a 
different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical role in 
establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of scientific 
representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a laborious art” 
(2014, 304).  Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the complexities of 
scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the complicated features 
seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any type of representational 
vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made by Bruno Latour (1999).  I 
will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its development exhibits interesting 
features, many of which have already been widely discussed by other philosophers (e.g. 
Knuuttila and Loettgers 2011, forthcoming).  
 As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent 
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -60-
 
 
scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of 
this model, it is important to pay attention to the licensing through its historical development. 
This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of the model by 
Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims. 
These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development reveal the partial 
autonomy of its representational nature. These features constitute the licensing which is itself 
partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model since understanding how and 
why the model represents its targets requires attending to these features. Let us now turn to 
examine these features in more detail. 
 Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by the 
goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in fishery 
statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 19). His aim to address a theoretical 
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the model 
historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider how 
Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description:  
Let us seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: 
afterwards let us translate these words into mathematical language. This leads 
to the formulation of differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be 
guided by the methods of analysis we are led much farther than the language 
and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry us and can formulate precise 
mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of observation. Rather 
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the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical results. 
(1928, 5)  
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of results (for 
both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to account for the 
population change of a single species. He then added additional species and modelled 
interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the same food and 
the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he demonstrated “three 
fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living together” (1928, 20). He then 
applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to the empirical case which had 
prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator populations during the decrease of fishing 
of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during World War I (1928, 21).  
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey 
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War I? 
It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and 
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims 
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature. 
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (forthcoming), the historical development of 
this model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two 
papers where he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target 
not by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive 
construction of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical 
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contexts and can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets 
because Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous 
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent? 
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra 
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra: 
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he developed 
a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling various kinds 
of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 13). He began by creating a very general 
equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among the 
several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 15). In two 
papers (1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and 
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question. For 
example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there would 
be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations (1920a, 414). 
Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but instead used his results 
to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which he then connected to 
theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First Principles (1920a, 414).  
 Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this 
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must 
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he 
applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is 
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constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of 
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey relationships. 
Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the general equation 
and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to specific targets. In so 
doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the model—he licenses it as a 
representation through activities in accord with the broader practice. 
 The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and complex. 
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the use 
of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey ratios 
rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time, was the 
use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death for the prey. 
These developments license new representational targets by expanding and altering the 
model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by removing 
idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions. Many other 
variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments. Additionally, 
the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory textbooks on ecology (see, 
e.g. Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational nature of the model in each of 
these cases is partially established by these features of the model which stand independent of 
any mental states of scientists and students alike. In short, the constitution of the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model relies deeply upon these historical 
features of licensing as understood by the broader scientific community.  
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Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these 
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose that 
they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that it 
represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It is 
not as if the star really is a scientific representation of predator-prey relations albeit a bad 
representation (because it does a poor job of meeting certain pragmatic constraints). Rather, 
the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Scientific representations are 
constructed to assist in answering certain questions, explaining certain phenomena, 
understanding certain target systems. It is through licensing that scientists build into the 
vehicle the features capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without licensing does not 
have this ability and so it is not just a bad representation. It is not a representation at all. 
Indeed, a discussion of the representational nature of vehicles which lack these features is 
either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the word ‘representation.’ A view of 
scientific representation which equally counts both the star and the Lotka-Volterra model as 
full scientific representations, even if it specifies one as good and one as bad, underestimates 
the role of these historical features of the model. They are not external to the representational 
nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an essential constitutive feature of this 
representational nature: without these features, the vehicle is not a scientific representation at 
all.  
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation  
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If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific representation 
which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s suggestion, we 
cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from questions of practice. 
A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is some stipulation and 
pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in which it was created, the 
application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness of and management of 
idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting for whether and how a 
scientific object represents its target will always require reference to these features which 
partially establish the representational nature.  Thus, there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender and 
Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are without 
any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument does 
indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is insufficient to 
account for scientific representation. Even if tomorrow we had a solid, universally accepted 
account of the representational nature of mental states, we would not yet have a complete 
account of scientific representation. We would still need an account of the deep reliance that 
it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus, while our discussion of the 
constitution of scientific representation might include reference to the representational nature 
of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have described here as the licensing 
by the practice.  
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A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I have 
identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a common 
feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested that it holds 
of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my argument, an account 
of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well, it does not indicate that 
it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the unique aims that mark off 
scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be correspondingly unique. 
That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the empirical world are special 
aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing. Scientific representation remains 
special because these features merit special attention.  
We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific representation 
as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that we understand the 
way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these representational 
devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different within different 
domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might be rather different 
from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad scale aims of the 
various domains, we can still say some general things about representation in science as a 
whole.  Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as it occurs in these 
more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop further insights 
about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific representational 
objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking hints and clues from 
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in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of science, e.g. those in Lynch 
and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al. (2014).  
6. Conclusion 
Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the constitution 
question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show why their 
account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by philosophers 
of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in which it is 
embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the way that 
science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities of 
licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing 
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any 
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve 
reference to licensing. Thus, there is a special problem of scientific representation.  
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Dissolving the missing heritability problem 
Abstract: Heritability estimates obtained in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are much 
lower than those of traditional quantitative methods. This has been called the “missing 
heritability problem”. By analyzing and comparing these two kinds of methods, we first show 
that the estimates obtained by traditional methods involve some terms that GWAS do not. 
Second, the estimates obtained by GWAS do not take into account epigenetic factors 
transmitted across generations, whilst they are included in the estimates of traditional 
quantitative methods. Once these two factors are taken into account, we show that the missing 
heritability problem can be largely dissolved. Finally, we briefly contextualize our analysis within 
a current discussion on how non-additive factors relate to the heritability estimates in GWAS.  
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1. Introduction.  
One pervasive problem encountered when estimating the heritability of quantitative traits is that 
the estimates obtained from Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are much smaller than 
that calculated by traditional quantitative methods. This problem has been called the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011). Take human height for example. Traditional 
quantitative methods deliver a heritability estimate of about 0.8, while the first estimates using 
GWAS were 0.05 (Maher 2008). More recent GWAS methods have revised this number and 
estimate the heritability of height to be at most 0.45 (Yang et al. 2010; Turkheimer 2011). Yet, 
half of the heritability is still missing. 
In quantitative genetics, heritability is defined as the portion of phenotypic variation in a 
population that is caused by genetic difference (Downes 2015). Traditionally, this portion is 
estimated by measuring the phenotypic resemblance of genetically related individuals without 
identifying at the molecular level (more particularly the DNA level) the genetic causes of 
phenotypic variation. GWAS have been developed in order to locate the DNA sequences that 
influence the target trait and estimate their effects, especially for common complex diseases 
such as obesity, diabetes and heart disease (Visscher et al. 2012; Frazer et al. 2009). As for height, 
almost 300 000 common DNA variants in human populations that associate with it have been 
identified by GWAS (Yang et al. 2010). Granted by many that the heritability estimates obtained 
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by traditional quantitative methods are quite reliable, the method(s) used in GWAS have been 
questioned (Eichler et al. 2010).  
A number of partial solutions to the missing heritability problem have been proposed, with 
most of them focusing on improving the methodological aspects of GWAS in order to provide 
a more accurate estimate (e.g., Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Some authors have also 
suggested that heritable epigenetic factors might account for part of the missing heritability. For 
instance, in Eichler et al. (2000, 488), Kong notes that “[e]pigenetic effects beyond imprinting 
that are sequence-independent and that might be environmentally induced but can be 
transmitted for one or more generations could contribute to missing heritability.” Furrow et al. 
(2011) also claim that “[e]pigenetic variation, inherited both directly and through shared 
environmental effects, may make a key contribution to the missing heritability.” Others have 
made the same point (e.g., McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008; Johannes et al. 2008). Yet, in the 
face of this idea one might notice what appears to be a contradiction: how can epigenetic factors 
account for the missing heritability, if the heritability is about genes?  
To answer this question as well as to analyze the missing heritability problem, we compare 
the assumptions underlying both heritability estimates in traditional quantitative methods and 
those in GWAS. We argue that a) the heritability estimates of traditional methods include some 
terms associated with broad-sense heritability (�²), as opposed to narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$); 
b) although GWAS are supposed to get ℎ$, ℎ$ relies on an evolutionary concept of the gene 
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that can include epigenetic factors while heritability estimates obtained from GWAS do not. 
With these two points being illustrated, we expect the missing heritability problem to be largely 
dissolved as well as setting the stage for further discussions. 
The reminder of the paper will be divided into three parts. First, we briefly introduce how 
heritability is estimated in two traditional methods, namely twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression. We show that the estimates obtained by each methods include some non-additive 
elements and consequently correspond neither to �² nor to ℎ$, but to a notion in between 
which we term “broader-sense heritability”. Second, we outline the basic rationale underlying 
GWAS and illustrate that they estimate heritability by considering solely DNA variants. By 
arguing that the notion of additive genetic variance does not necessarily refer to DNA sequences 
but can also refer to epigenetic factors in traditional quantitative methods, we show that the 
notion of heritability estimated in GWAS is more restrictive than that of traditional quantitative 
methods, and term this notion “DNA-based narrow-sense heritability”. Finally, in Section 4, 
based on the conclusions from Section 2 and Section 3, we claim that the gap between the 
heritability estimates of traditional quantitative methods and those of GWAS can be explained 
away in two major ways. One consists in recognizing that if non-additive variance was removed 
from the estimates obtained via traditional methods, they would be lower. The other consists in 
recognizing that if epigenetic factors were taken into account by GWAS, the heritability 
estimates obtained would be higher. We conclude Section 4 by showing how our analysis sheds 
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some light on a discussion about the role played by non-additive factors in the missing 
heritability problem. Because human height has been “the poster child” of the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011, 232), we will use this example to illustrate each of our 
points. 
 
2. Heritability in Traditional Quantitative Methods.  
According to quantitative genetics, the phenotypic variance (�& ) of a population can be 
explained by two components, its genotypic variance (�') and its environmental variance (�(). 
In the absence of gene-environment interaction and correlation, we thus have: 
�& = �' + �(  (1) 
From there broad-sense heritability (�$) is defined as: 
�$ =
+,
+-
   (2) 
�'  can further be portioned into the additive genetic variance (�.), the dominance genetic 
variance (�/) and the epistasis genetic variance (�0). We have: 
�& = �. + �/ + �0 + �(     (3) 
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where �. is the variance due to hypothetical genes making an equal and additive contribution 
to the trait studied (e.g., height). �/ is the variance due to interactions between alleles at one 
locus for diploid organisms, and �0 is the variance due to interactions between alleles from 
different loci. �/ and �0 together represent the variance due to particular combinations of 
genes of an organism. 
Since genotypes of sexual organisms recombine at each generation via reproduction, 
dominance and epistasis effects are not transmitted stably across generations, only additive 
genetic effects are. Therefore, �.  is the variance due to stably transmitted genetic effects. 
Narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) measures to what extent variation in phenotypes is determined 
by the variation in genes transmitted from parent(s) to offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 
123). It is defined as:  
ℎ$ =
+1
+-
                                                            (4) 
ℎ$ is important in breeding studies and is used by evolutionary theorists who are interested in 
making evolutionary projections of a trait within a population across generations. 
To know ℎ$, both �. and �& must be known. �&, for most quantitative traits (including 
height), can be directly estimated by measuring individuals. However, there is no direct way to 
estimate �. in traditional quantitative methods. The traditional way to estimate it requires two 
elements. First, one needs a population-level measure of a phenotypic resemblance of family 
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relative pairs1. This measure is obtained by calculating the covariance of the phenotypic values for 
those pairs. The choice of what sort of relatives to use depends on what data is available. The 
second element is the genetic relation between family pairs. It indicates the percentage of genetic 
materials the pairs are expected to share. With these two elements, one can estimate how much 
the genes shared contribute to the phenotypic resemblance. In a large population with different 
phenotypes, one can then estimate how much the additive genetic difference contributes to 
phenotypic difference in this population, which estimates ℎ$. 
For simplicity, traditional quantitative methods usually assume that there is neither gene-
environment interaction nor correlation (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 131). Thus the covariance 
between the phenotypic values (e.g., height) of pairs equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant and epistasis genetic covariance, plus the environmental covariance. A general 
equation for traditional quantitative methods can be written as follows: 
��� �6, �$ = ��� �6 + �6 + �6 + �6, �$ + �$ + �$ + �$ =
																														��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$  (5)          
where indexes “1” and “2” represent the two family members for each pair studied. 
��� �6, �$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one individual with the other. 
                                                
1
	 Or the mean values of  their class (e.g., offspring) depending on the particular method used.	
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� , � , �  and �  represent additive effects, dominant effects, epistasis effects and 
environmental effects respectively. 
The most commonly used traditional methods for estimating heritability are twin studies. 
In these studies one already knows that monozygotic twins share almost 100% of their genetic 
material while dizygotic twins about 50%. The environment is typically divided into the part of 
the environment that affects both twins in the same way (the shared environment, �) and the 
part of the environment that affects one twin but not the other (the unique environment, �) 
(Silventoinen et al. 2003). Hence, in the absence of interaction and correlation between � and 
�, we have:  
� = 	� + �     (6) 
Assuming epistasis effects to be negligible (a common assumption in twin studies), by inserting 
Equation (6) into Equation (5), we have: 
��� �>6, �>$ = ��� �>6 + �>6 + �>6 + �>6, �>$ + �>$ + �>$ + �>$ 	=
																						��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$   (7) 
where indexes “T1” and “T2” represent the two twins for each twin pair studied. 
��� �>6, �>$ 	is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other. 
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Because each twin’s unique environment by definition is independent of that of the other 
twin, ��� �>6, �>$  is zero for both monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Given that variance is 
a special case of covariance when the two variables are identical, and that for monozygotic twins 
�>6, �>6, and �>6equal to �>$, �>$, and �>$ respectively, we can formulate the equation 
from Equation (7) as follows: 
���?> �>6, �>$ = �. + �/ + �@      (8) 
where ���?> �>6, �>$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of monozygotic twin 
pairs studied. 
By contrast, dizygotic twins are expected to share half of their genes, which means that the 
covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other of dizygotic twin pairs 
studied (���/> �>6, �>$ ) is expected to be equal to half of the additive genetic variance, a 
quarter of dominant variance 2 , and all of the shared environmental variance (with 
��� �>6, �>$  also to be zero). We have: 
���/> �>6, �>$ =
6
$
�. +
6
B
�/ + �@      (9) 
It is classically assumed that �@  in Equation (8) and (9) is the same. That is to say, for both 
monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs, it is assumed that the shared environment would act in 
                                                
2  For each given gene with two alleles, the possibility that dizygotic twins have the same 
genotype is one quarter. 
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the same way if the pair has been reared together.3 �@  can be cancelled by subtracting Equation 
(9) from Equation (8). The heritability can then be estimated as follows:  
ℎCDE
$ =
$ @FGHD &DI,&DJ K@FGLD &DI,&DJ
+-
=
+1
+-
+
M
J
+L
+-
      (10) 
We call ℎCDE
$  broader-sense heritability (the index “b” is for “broader-sense”) from twin studies, 
because the resulting estimate (which is about 0.8 for height) provides an accurate estimate of 
neither �$ nor ℎ$, although it is closer to �$ than to ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 172). 
That is to say, it corresponds to a definition of heritability that includes some elements of broad-
sense heritability but not all of it. 
Another often used traditional quantitative method to estimate heritability involves a 
parent-offspring regression. This method also assumes neither gene-environment interaction 
nor correlation, the covariance between the height of parents (one or the mean of both) and the 
mean of their offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 164), equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant covariance (the epistasis covariance is assumed to be small and is not included), plus 
environmental covariance. Hence, Equation (5) can be formulated as follows:  
                                                
3 This assumption might be problematic because monozygotic twins are often treated more 
similarly by their parents than are dizygotic twins, and monozygotic twins are more likely to 
share a placenta than dizygotic twins. The difficulty can be mitigated by using adoption twin 
studies in which the environments for twins are random on average. But large adoption twins’ 
data are exceedingly difficult to get (Griffiths 2005). 
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��� �& , �N = ��� �& + �& + �& + �& , �N + �N + �N + �N =
																														��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N                  (11)                   
where indexes “P” and “O” represent the “parents” and the “offspring”.  
Two assumptions are then made. The first one is that there is no dominant effects 
transmitted from the parents to the offspring assuming the parents are unrelated (Doolittle 
2012, 178), which means ��� �& , �N  is nil. Another assumption is that there is no 
correlation between the parents’ environment and the offspring’s environment so that 
��� �& , �N  in Equation (11) is also nil. Given that on average, parents share in expectation 
50% of genes with their offspring (parents and offspring share half of their genes), it leaves 
Equation (11) with a result of half of additive genetic variance (
6
$
�.). Given �&, ℎ
$ can be 
estimated straightforwardly.  
But the above two assumptions are problematic. First, the assumption of unrelated parents 
might be violated because of assortative mating in humans resulting in parents to be more 
genetically similar than two randomly chosen individuals (Guo et al. 2014). Hence, 
��� �& , �N  is likely to be non-nil. Second, because the environments experienced by 
individuals are likely to be more similar within a family line, ��� �& , �N  might not be nil, 
either. If we take these two factors into consideration, the covariance of the parents and their 
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offspring is equal to half of additive genetic variance, plus a variance term representing effects 
due to dominance and similarities between environments. This can be written formally as:   
��� �& , �N = ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N =	
6
$
�. + �/&(@      (12) 
where �/&(@  represents the variance due to some dominance and environmental correlation 
effects between the parents and the offspring studied.                                        
The heritability can then be estimated by doubling the parent–offspring covariance in 
Equation (12) and dividing the total phenotypic variance of the population as follows: 
ℎC-PQ
$ =
$@FG &-,&P
+-
=
+1
+-
+
$+L&RS
+-
                                       (13) 
For similar reasons as with the heritability estimates from twin studies, we call ℎC-PQ
$  broader-
sense heritability (with the index “b” also being for “broader-sense”) from parent-offspring 
regression. Indeed, although it is often assumed that ℎC-PQ
$  represent ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 
1996, 147), the resulting estimate (also about 0.8 for height) is broader than ℎ$ as it can include 
a component led by dominance variance and environmental correlation between parent and 
offspring. 
To conclude this section, heritability estimates in both twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression include an extra term when compared to ℎ$, but they do not correspond to �². For 
this reason we regroup them under the term ℎC
$ for “broader-sense heritability”, such that: 
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ℎC
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$                                                     (14) 
where ℎFTUVW
$  is the part of heritability contributed by the extra component(s) representing 
non-additive variance. 
 
3. Heritability in GWAS.  
Although any two unrelated individuals share about 99.5% of their DNA sequences, their 
genomes differ at specific nucleotide locations (Aguiar and Istrail 2013). Given two DNA 
fragments at the same locus of two individuals, if these fragments differ at a single nucleotide, 
they represent two variants of a Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP). GWAS focus on SNPs 
across the whole genome that occur in the population with a probability larger than 1% which 
are called common SNPs. If one variant of a common SNP, compared to another one, is 
associated with a significant change on the trait studied, then this SNP is a marker for a DNA 
region (or a gene) that leads to phenotypic variation. For a polygenic trait like height, if we can 
detect all the SNPs that associate with it, then all the DNA difference makers that determine 
height difference can be located.  
The development of commercial SNP chips makes it possible to rapidly detect common 
SNPs of DNA samples from all the participants involved in a study. By using a series of 
statistical tests, it can be investigated at the population level whether each SNP associates with 
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that target trait. The choice of the statistical tests depends on the data available as well as the 
trait studied. For quantitative traits like height, the most common approach is to make an 
analysis of variance table and assess whether the mean height of a group with one variant at one 
nucleotide is significantly different from the group with another variant of the same SNP4 
(Bush and Moore 2012). With all the SNPs associated with height being detected, data from the 
HapMap project, which provides a list of SNPs that are markers for most of the common DNA 
variants in human populations (Consortium, International HapMap 3 2010), is used to map the 
associated SNPs with common DNA variants. These mapped DNA variants, to be 
distinguished from DNA variants that do not affect the target trait, have been called “causal 
variants” (Visscher et al. 2012).  
Based on the readings of SNP chips as well as further independent tests for SNPs, the 
effects of the associated SNPs (markers for causal DNA variants) on the trait can be calculated. 
By estimating the phenotypic variance contributed by these SNPs and the total phenotypic 
variance of the population, the heritability of causal DNA variants can be estimated as the ratio 
of the phenotypic variance caused by all the associated SNPs compared to the total phenotypic 
variance of the population (Weedon et al. 2008). Since it is common for biologists to assume 
                                                
4  For categorical (often binary disease/control) traits, the association test used involves 
measuring an odds ratio, namely the ratio of  the odds of  disease for individuals having a specific 
variant of  a SNP, and the odds of  disease for individuals who have another variant at the same 
locus. If  the odds ratio of  a common SNP is significantly different from 1, then that SNP is 
considered to be associated with the disease (Bush and Moore 2012). 
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that genes are only made up of pieces of DNA, it is thought that the variance obtained from all 
the causal DNA variants represent exactly the additive genetic variance, and the heritability 
estimated by GWAS should match narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) (Yang et al. 2010; Visscher et 
al. 2006). However, the assumption that additive genetic effects are solely based on DNA 
sequences is problematic when faced with the evidence of epigenetic inheritance. 
As was mentioned in Section 2, traditional quantitative methods for estimating heritability 
are based on measuring phenotypic values and genetic relations without reaching the molecular 
level. The genes are not defined physically, but functionally as heritable difference makers 
(Falconer and Mackay 1996, 123). In other words, they are theoretical units defined by their 
effects on the phenotype. With the discovery of DNA structure in 1953, it was thought that the 
originally theoretical genes were found in the physical DNA molecules. Since then, biologists 
commonly refer to genes as DNA molecules and this assumption is also made by researchers 
of GWAS. As [author] claim, this step was taken too hastily. If there is physical material, other 
than DNA pieces, that can affect the phenotype and be transmitted stably across generations, 
then it should also be thought to play the role that contributes to additive genetic effects. 
Many studies have provided evidence for epigenetic inheritance 5 , namely the stable 
transmission of epigenetic modifications across multiple generations and affect organism’s traits 
                                                
5 We use the notion of  “epigenetic inheritance” in the broad sense that refers to the inheritance 
of  phenotypic features via causal pathways other than the inheritance of  nuclear DNA 
(Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 112). 
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(e.g., Youngson and Whitelaw 2008; Dias and Ressler 2014). A classical example of this is the 
methylation pattern on the promoter of the agouti gene in mice (Morgan et al. 1999). It shows 
that mice with the same genotype but different methylation levels display a range of colors of 
their fur, and the patterns of DNA methylation can be inherited through generations causing 
heritable phenotypic variations. Epigenetic factors such as self-sustaining loops, chromatin 
modifications and three-dimensional structures in the cell can also be transmitted over multiple 
generations (Jablonka et al. 2014). Studies on various species suggest that epigenetic inheritance 
is likely to be ‘ubiquitous’ (Jablonka and Raz 2009).  
The increasing evidence of epigenetic inheritance seriously challenges the restriction of the 
concept of the gene in the evolutionary sense to be materialized only in DNA. Relying on 
traditional quantitative methods, it is impossible to distinguish whether additive genetic variance 
is DNA based or based on other material(s). Some transmissible epigenetic factors, which are 
not DNA based, might de facto be included into the additive genetic variance used to estimate 
ℎ². This extension of heritable units also echoes to the recent suggestion that genetic (assuming 
genes to be DNA based) and non-genetic heredity should be unified in an inclusive inheritance 
theory (Danchin 2013; Day and Bonduriansky 2010).  
To apply the idea that some epigenetic factors can lead to additive genetic effects, the 
additive variance of them (�.XYZ) should be added to the additive variance of DNA sequences 
(�.L[1) to obtain �.. Assuming there is no interaction between �.XYZ and �.L[1 , we have: 
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�. = �.L[1 + �.XYZ     (15) 
Inserting Equation (15) to Equation (4) leads to: 
ℎ$ =
+1L[1
+-
+
+1XYZ
+-
     (16) 
Here we term the first term on the right side of Equation (16) “DNA-based narrow-sense 
heritability” (ℎ/\.
$ ), and the second term “epigenetic-based narrow-sense heritability” (ℎV]^
$ ), 
we thus have: 
ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$        (17) 
 
4. Dissolving the Missing Heritability.  
As we mentioned it in Introduction, since the first successful GWAS was published in 2005 
(Klein et al. 2005), there have been a lot of proposals for methodological improvements in 
GWAS (Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Studies have been conducted according to 
those proposals that permit to obtain higher heritability estimates. Examples include increasing 
the sample sizes which has resulted in more accurate estimates (e.g., Wood et al. 2014), 
considering all common SNPs simultaneously instead of one by one which has increased the 
heritability estimates of height from 0.05 to 0.45 (see Yang et al. 2010), and conducting meta-
analyses which can lead to more accurate results when compared to single analysis (see Bush 
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and Moore 2012). Biologists have also suggested to search for SNPs with lower frequencies 
than 1% in order to account for a wider range of possible causal variants (Schork et al. 2009). 
Aside from these partial improvements, our analysis reveals two reasons explaining away 
the missing heritability problem: a) In traditional quantitative methods, the heritability estimates 
include extra terms which are not presented in GWAS; b) In GWAS, heritability is estimated 
solely from causal DNA variants, while in traditional quantitative methods the additive effects 
contributed by epigenetic difference (ℎV]^
$ ) are de facto included in the estimates. 
These two reasons can be shown formally. Using our terminology, missing heritability 
(��) equals to the estimates obtained by traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$ ) minus the 
estimates obtained by GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ), which are 0.8 and 0.45 respectively in the case of height. 
Thus we have: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$
      (18) 
Replacing ℎC
$ and ℎ/\.
$  by the right hand side of Equation (14) and (17), we obtain: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$ − ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$ = ℎFTUVW
$ + ℎV]^
$      (19) 
Which means that the missing heritability results from the part of heritability originating from 
epigenetic factors stably transmitted across generations, plus the part of heritability originating 
from non-additives factors. 
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Our point that part of the missing heritability can be dissolved by considering non-additive 
effects echoes to the claim that almost all GWAS to date have focused on additive effects might 
be a reason for the missing heritability (McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008). Although there is not 
enough data to confirm that non-additive effects do explain away some part of missing 
heritability, this claim appears again and again in discussions on the missing heritability problem 
(see for instance Maher 2008; Frazer et al. 2009; Gibson 2010; Kong 2010; Moore 2010). Yang 
et al. (2010, 565) disagree with this claim and respond that “[n]on-additive genetic effects do 
not contribute to the narrow-sense heritability, so explanations based on non-additive effects 
are not relevant to the problem of missing heritability.”  
We agree with Yang et al. (2010) that non-additive effects do not contribute to ℎ². That 
said, because the heritability estimates obtained from traditional quantitative methods do not 
strictly correspond to ℎ² but include some non-additive elements, non-additive effects cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant for the missing heritability problem, though probably they are relevant 
in a way that both Yang et al. (2010) as well as their opponents did not consider.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
We have provided two ways in which the missing heritability problem can be explained away. 
First, heritability estimates from traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$) are overestimated when 
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compared to ℎ$. The resulting estimates would be smaller if the non-additive elements were 
eliminated. Second, heritability estimates from GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ) are underestimated when 
compared to ℎ$ because they do not take into account the additive effects of epigenetic factors 
behaving like evolutionary genes. The resulting estimates would be larger if epigenetic factors 
were taken into account. We have voluntarily stayed away from the question of whether 
heritability should be defined strictly relative to DNA sequences or if it should encompass any 
factors behaving effectively like an evolutionary gene. Our inclination is that there is no 
principled reason to exclude non-DNA transmissible factors from heritability measures, but our 
analysis does not bear on this choice. 
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Abstract
Scientists are often asked to advise political institutions on pressing risk-
related questions, like climate change or the authorization of medical drugs.
Given that deliberation will often not eliminate all disagreements between sci-
entists, how should their risk assessments be aggregated? I argue that this
problem is distinct from two familiar and well-studied problems in the litera-
ture: judgment aggregation and probability aggregation. I introduce a novel
decision-theoretic model where risk assessments are compared with accept-
ability thresholds. Majority voting is then defended by means of robustness
considerations.
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1 Introduction
Scientists are often asked by political institutions to give expert advice on press-
ing questions. For instance, agencies that regulate medicines regularly resort to
expert panels, and national scientific academies give advice to the government or to
the assemblies. Even after discussing, scientific experts do not always agree on the
answer, and when they do, they may disagree on the justification for this answer.
How should decisions that involve risk assessments be taken and justified within sci-
entific expert panels? This is the central question studied in this paper. As a matter
of fact, many expert panels take decisions using the majority voting rule. This is
for instance the case in advisory committees in the European and in the American
agencies that grant medicines authorization, respectively the EMA and the FDA.1
But is it the best decision rule? Is majority voting on the final decision the best
way to aggregate different experts’ opinions, and to track their reasons? This paper
is restricted to cases in which the expert panel is asked to take a decision on only
one binary question, for instance to answer the question “Is the risk-benefit ratio
of some medicine worth it to be authorized for commercial use?”. This simple case
is already interesting as it corresponds to many real-life cases: some expert panels
are constituted on the sole purpose of answering one specific question, or are asked
to answer several but logically unrelated questions — e.g. decisions about different
medicines.
To study this problem, I introduce a novel decision-theoretic model. The true/false
decision is supposed to be taken by comparing a risk assessment a (typically, a prob-
ability) to a risk acceptability threshold t, e.g. “true” if and only if a < t. For sim-
plicity, a and t are supposed to be in [0, 1], but any quantity might go.2 It is assumed
that the n experts agree on the threshold value, but differ in their individual risk as-
sessments ak (k = 1, . . . , n) — or conversely, that they agree on the assessment, but
disagree on the threshold value. Typically, the question asked to the expert panel is
in the form “Is X’s risk below t?”. The problem studied in this paper is to determine
how the individual ak’s should be aggregated in comparison with t, so as to give the
group’s answer to this question (I shall speak equivalently of the group’s decision,
or of the group’s belief on whether the risk is below t). Compared to probability ag-
gregation theory which studies the aggregation of probabilistic opinions, the novelty
of this model lies (i) in the introduction of a threshold comparison which projects
probabilities into a binary space, and (ii) in the fact that the group has to take a
1Cf. Hauray and Urfalino (2007), Urfalino and Costa (2015).
2Real quantities can be mapped to the interval [0, 1], for instance with the function
x→ 1− 1/(1 + x)).
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stand on one binary question only, and not on a more complex agenda. Compared
to judgment aggregation theory which studies the aggregation of an interconnected
set of beliefs, the novelty is that individuals do not just have true/false beliefs but
probabilistic ones, even if the group is asked to express a true/false belief in the end.
The present problem can be considered as a first bridge between these two existing
frameworks. The best decision rule for our binary question is likely to depend on the
details of characteristics of the question, of the experts, of the available knowledge,
and on other details. My methodological approach is not to conduct a detailed study
of particular cases, but to look at features which most (interesting) cases share, so
as to find general properties of the best decision rule — what is meant by “best”
shall be discussed too.
The main claims of this paper are the following. I argue that the framework
of probability aggregation cannot help us solve the present problem (Section 2),
because the aggregation problems it considers are too general. For the aggregation
of scientific risk assessment on a specific question, a theory of its own is needed,
and I try to sketch one here. I then argue that robustness considerations clearly
legitimate majority voting on the final decision (Section 3). But when justifications
for the decisions are sought, majority voting can lead to inconsistencies and the
expert panel should aggregate on the reasons separately, before deriving logically its
decision (Section 4). Overall, the case for the majority rule is thus a mixed one.
2 Probability Aggregation and Beyond
A standard requirement for a scientific expert panel is that it provides justi-
fications for its decision. In the present model, the decision has to be consistent
with the comparison between the risk assessment and the threshold, so a minimal
justification is that the panel has a belief on the risk assessment (as all experts have
a belief on the risk assessment, it would be weird that the panel claims to refuse the
authorization while not being able to say that it believes that the risk assessment
is above the threshold). So, our problem includes as a first step the aggregation of
the individual risk assessments {ak}1≤k≤n into a single group assessment a — deeper
justifications for the group’s decision are contemplated in Section 4. The group’s
decision is supposed to be consistent with this assessment, so pragmatically the eas-
iest way to do so may be for the group to first aggregate the individual assessments,
and then compare the result to the threshold.
Majority voting on the decision itself is a standard way for expert groups to
take decisions, but it does not proceed in that way. Can it be objected that, within
our model, it lacks the requirement that the group should be attributed a belief
3
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on the risk assessment? No, for the following reason. The result of the majority
vote is “true” if and only if a majority of agents vote “true”, i.e. if and only if a
majority of agents have a numerical assessment below the threshold, i.e. if and only
if the median of the agents’ assessments is below the threshold. In other words, the
majority voting rule on the decision is equivalent to considering that the group’s
assessment is the median of the individual assessments. Hence, majority voting is in
the race. What are the other challengers? A standard way to aggregate probabilities
is to make averages. The linear average is defined as
∑
k ak, and it can be generalized
with weights ωk ≥ 0 and
∑
k ωk = 1, as
∑
k ωkak, to take into account unequal
degrees of expertise on the question.3 Other averages are the geometric average or
the harmonic average. Our problem is to determine which probability aggregation
rule, followed by the threshold, is the best one in our problem. It is easy to see that
these various probability aggregation rules can give different binary decisions for the
group.4
Pooling probability functions has been studied for several years in the theory
of probability aggregation (for surveys, cf. Dietrich and List forth., Martini and
Sprenger forth., section 3). Can its results be used to select the best aggregation
rule in our problem? I shall argue that unfortunately no. The framework of proba-
bility aggregation adopts an axiomatic method: it starts by stating several axioms
which appear as desirable properties for the pooling function and then studies which
function or aggregation rule, if any, satisfies them. The axioms considered in Dietrich
and List’s survey can be expressed in our case as:
• Independence: the group’s probability a only depends on the individual
probabilities ak.
• Unanimity preservation: if all agents’ probabilities ak are the same, then
the group’s probability a is this one too.
• Three Bayesian axioms: if some information is learned by all individuals,
then the group’s decision changes by conditionalization on that event.
3It is akin to the iterated Lehrer-Wagner model which, starting from respect weights agent have
to one another, provides a single probability for the group. However, the iterated Lehrer-Wagner
model, and even more its normative interpretation, have been subjected to many criticisms (for a
survey, cf. e.g. Martini and Sprenger forth. section 4). As a descriptive model, it is not useful for
the present discussion.
4Consider for instance the median and the linear average, with three experts with
a1 = a2 = 0.04, a3 = 0.10, and t = 0.05. A majority voting on the decision gives a “true” as
two experts on three assess the risk to be below the threshold. The linear average (with equal
weights) is 0.06, which is higher than t, so this gives a “false”.
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The Independence axiom is automatically satisfied here, because our problem con-
tains only one true/false answer, and there is no other probability on which a could
depend. The three Bayesian axioms make sense in cases where the expert panel
learns new information. In our problem, however, an extensive discussion has al-
ready taken place so no agent learns new information anymore, and the expert panel
is not making any new inquiry. So the Bayesian axioms are not relevant in our case,
and only the Unanimity preservation axiom expresses a desirable property for the
aggregation rule.
An essential point to note is that a very large number of aggregation rules sat-
isfy this axiom: the median, linear averaging, geometric averaging, and so on —
actually, any convex function of the ak. This illustrates the fact that a classical
uniqueness result from the probability aggregation literature does not hold any-
more: the well-known theorem by McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982, which states
that linear averaging functions are the only independent and unanimity-preserving
functions. The reason is that the theorem requires a set of at least three events,
whereas our problem only considers two — e.g. the product is risky, with probabil-
ity ak, and the product is not risk, with probability 1 − ak. Considering a simpler
agenda has widened the set of suitable aggregation rules, and no theoretical result
from the literature can be used to pick the best one. More generally, the uniqueness
and impossibility results from the theory of probability aggregation are useless for
our problem. So, how scientific expert panels should aggregate risk assessments is
not a simple problem that can be solved straightforwardly with the existing liter-
ature, which has focused on general problems with complex agendas, and has thus
neglected more specific yet important questions. In the next section, I discuss other
desiderata or axioms that we would like to impose on the aggregation rule.
3 Robustness Matters
Scientific risk assessment is supposed to meet some standards of reliability and
objectivity, and the aggregation of these assessments should follow alike standards.
In this spirit, I now introduce several new requirements for our aggregation rule.
The aggregation rule should be sensitive to the right features of our problem, and
not to the parasitic ones. It should favor objective features at the detriment of
idiosyncrasies or unwanted values (for an analysis of the concept of objectivity, cf.
Douglas 2004 — I refer to some of her distinctions below). In other words, the
aggregation rule should be robust to some changes that we regard as irrelevant.
In this section, I defend three dimensions of robustness that should be taken into
account: the risk metrics, the level of detail, and the presence of strategical agents.
5
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Several probability aggregation rules can be considered: linear averaging, geo-
metric averaging, harmonic averaging, among others. As the forthcoming robustness
discussion is similar for all the various averagings, I shall simplify it and consider
only linear averaging, which shall be contrasted with the median. Ra denotes the
aggregation rule that compares the threshold with the linear average (which thus
stands for other averages), and Rm the aggregation rule that compares the thresh-
old with the median of the individual assessments (which is equivalent to a majority
vote on the decision itself).
3.1 Metrics
The formal model I have introduced relies on a quantitative scale — a and t
are given numerical values in [0, 1]. How is this scale defined in real cases? My
talking about probabilities has been only a matter of simplicity given the reduction
of the problem to the [0, 1] interval, and typical cases do not bear on well-defined
probabilities or explicit scales. For instance, a standard question posed at an FDA
advisory committee is “Does the overall risk versus benefit profile for X support
marketing in the US ?”5. This question supposes that experts identify the risk versus
benefit profile, and determine the value of the threshold under which a marketing is
warranted. This can be done in a number of ways, and these are essentially value-
laden questions6 — what is acceptable or not has to do with extra-scientific values,
and may also reflect the fact that an expert is risk-averse or risk-seeking. Overall, it
makes sense to suppose that both the metrics scale and the threshold depend on the
experts. Conversely, as the aggregation procedure is supposed to take place when
the experts have extensively discussed, one can make the simplifying assumption
that the same facts are known to all, and thus that the risk assessment is the same
for all. In that way, our model actually applies in the setting in which a is common
to all experts, but each has her own threshold tk. The fact that the quantitative
risk scale is not uniquely defined can be approached from a mathematical viewpoint:
any scale can be reparametrized by applying any continuous bijection from [0, 1] to
[0, 1], such as x 7→ x2.
These points make a hard time for the rule Ra (and other non linear averagings).
First, from a practical viewpoint, the dependence of the risk scale metrics on the
expert prevents the use of rules which take as inputs the numerical values of the risk
assessments or of the threshold. For instance, is it even possible for a chairman to ask
her colleagues “Please tell me your overall risk versus benefit acceptability threshold”
5Cf. Urfalino and Costa (2015, p.183).
6On the role of values in science more generally, and a critic of the value-free ideal, cf. Douglas
2009.
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(or assessment), given that each expert may have her own scale? The rule Rm, as it
is equivalent to majority voting, needs not rely on input individual numerical values,
and is thus safe from this criticism. Second, even if these practical difficulties could
be overcome, some theoretical difficulties remain. Suppose a common scale has been
adopted so that all experts can express their tk. An aggregation rule that depends
on the metrics of that common scale can give different outcomes according to the
scale employed, as shown in Table 1. This dependence is a problem: which common
scale should be chosen? (This is another aggregation problem!) Note that a variant
of this problem exists even with a well-defined probability scale. For instance, let A
be the event that a certain risk (e.g. carcinogenic substances in food) is responsible
for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 1 year. The experts
estimate the probability of A, p(A). Consider now A′ the event that the risk is
responsible for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 10 years.
Call p(A′) its probability. If the cancer cases are independent along the years, then
p(A′) = 1− (1− p(A))10. Because the relation between p(A) and p(A′) is not linear,
taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A, and transforming it into
an assessment on A′, or taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A′,
does not give the same result. Which event A or A′ is the more “natural” is not
clear, and so much more for the right risk group assessment.
This gives good reasons to consider the following requirement: the aggregation
rule should be insensitive to the metrics used to describe the problem, i.e. the
assessment and the threshold. What should matter is just the relative position of
the a and tk, not their distance which can be due to some idiosyncratic value-laden
judgments. This is requiring that the aggregation rule is more objective, under the
sense of value-neutral objectivity as characterized by Douglas (2004, p. 460), which
does not mean “free from all value influence” (as judging whether a risk benefit
ratio is lower enough is bound to involve a value judgment), but takes a position
“that is balanced or neutral with respect to a spectrum of values” (here, the balance
is reached by taking into account only relative positions). The metrics robustness
excludes the rule Ra which employs a linear average — Table 1 has shown a counter-
t1 t2 t3 a Average t Ra Rm
x scale .01 .01 .1 .05 .04 False False
x2 scale 0.0001 0.0001 .01 0.0025 0.0034 True False
Table 1: Example in which the ruleRa gives different answers depending on the scale.
The three experts have different thresholds tk and a common risk assessment a.
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example — but not Rm which relies on the median.
7
3.2 Level of detail
Another argument for an aggregation rule that does not rely on a specific metrics
comes from considerations of the level of detail in which the problem is described. So
far, a continuous scale has been assumed, with numerical assessments in [0, 1]. Nu-
merical discrete scales could also be used or even qualitative assessments only — it
corresponds to decisions under uncertainty and not under risk. Consider for instance
the case of the well-known IPCC Assessment Reports, that formulate a synthesis of
existing scientific knowledge on climate change issues. The reports use a standard-
ized vocabulary to express uncertainties, with several scales: some are qualitative
(e.g. low/medium/high), others are quantitative (and use probabilities).8 The his-
torical trend has been to use more quantitative scales and less qualitative scales,
but the latter have the advantage of being easily understandable by non-technical
audiences, and thus should continue to be used in the future. Some qualitative
and quantitative scales are in an explicit correspondence, as illustrated on Table 2.
Writing an IPCC report involves synthesizing large amounts of scientific literature,
so co-authors of a chapter may have different beliefs on the uncertainties associated
with a finding. Whether they express their beliefs on a qualitative or on a quan-
titative scale, the way their beliefs are aggregated should be smooth and not vary
abruptly (some very precise yet qualitative scales are conceivable), all the more than
some explicit correspondence exist (Table 2). This is also a question of historically
7The comparability of scales is also discussed in Risse’s (2004) political philosophy work, who
also takes it as an argument for majority voting.
8Cf. e.g. the last report of the Working Group I, Stocker et al (2013, p. 138-142).
Term Likelihood of the Outcome
Virtually certain 99–100 % probability
Very likely 90–100% probability
Likely 66–100% probability
About as likely as not 33–66% probability
Unlikely 0–33% probability
Very unlikely 0–10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1% probability
Table 2: Likelihood terms associated with outcomes used in the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC (Stocker et al 2013, p. 142).
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consistency when switching from qualitative to quantitative scales.9 Thus, a sound
requirement is that the aggregation rule extends to formulations with discrete and
qualitative scales. As the average of non-numerical and qualitative values is not
defined, Ra does not satisfy this requirement. The median is defined on any kind of
scale, and Rm satisfies the requirement. So only Rm is robust for the level of detail.
3.3 Bias and strategical votes
Not all experts are moved by epistemic goals only, and conflicts of interests
can arise. For instance, numerous controversies have surrounded the FDA advisory
committees along the years (Urfalino and Costa 2015, p. 168-169.) If a better
selection of experts may be the solution, the decision rule used in the expert panel
can also reduce the impact of bias agents.10 With Ra, an expert can strategically
express a much lower risk of a medicine to influence the group’s average — with
a threshold at 10 %, she might express 0.1% instead of just 9%. The aggregation
rule should be insensitive to such a strategical vote manipulation, and this is all
the more important as the biased agent may have already influenced other agents
during the preceding discussion. Rm is clearly robust in this sense, as an agent has
the same influence whether her probability is just below the threshold or close to 0.
This is not so for Ra. This robustness requirement also makes the aggregation rule
more objective, in the sense of detached objectivity (Douglas 2004, p. 459): one’s
personal values (allegiance to a firm) should not prevail on evidence (e.g. that the
probability is 9%, as above).
Overall, the three robustness requirements considered here clearly favor Rm over
Ra. This provides a substantial justification for the traditional democratic rule in
expert panels confronted with a binary decision. This result is a real departure from
probability aggregation theory, in which linear averaging is justified on solid grounds.
Narrowing the agenda and introducing a threshold has changed the solution to the
aggregation problem.
9One may object that in the IPCC case the co-authors aggregate beliefs without a threshold
comparison for a binary decision. Actually, thresholds are implicit: a finding which confidence is
too low may not be mentioned. Anyway, the IPCC example can be seen as a mere illustration of
the level of detail problem.
10Biased and extremist agents have been much studied in the literature of opinion dynamics (cf.
for instance in Lorenz’s 2007 survey), but not so in the literature of opinion aggregation.
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4 Reasons
So far, a simplified model of scientific expert panels has been considered, one
in which the group is asked to give a binary decision. As argued, the first step in
justifying that decision consists for the panel to have a belief on the risk assessment,
which is given by the median of the individual assessments in the case of Rm. How-
ever, expert panels are often asked to provide a deeper justification. The question
then arises of how the panel should aggregate its members views on this justifica-
tion. In this section, I propose a novel but simple model for individual numerical
assessment justification, in line with my previous threshold model.
Perhaps the most typical interpretation of the risk assessment a is that of a
(subjective) probability. Suppose this probability is determined by m independent
factors (m ≥ 2). For instance, the risk associated with a medicine comes from m
unrelated secondary effects. Then a is the probability that at least one risk factor
triggers:
a = 1−
m∏
j=1
(1− aj). (1)
Each expert k is supposed to have her own assessment of each factor ak,j (j = 1, . . . ,m).
Our problem is then to aggregate the n×m matrix of probabilities ak,j, and to com-
pare that result with the threshold.
As the m factors are independent, a sound requirement is to aggregate the
individual assessments on them separately. How should that be done? Adapting the
arguments from the previous section, one is lead to the conclusion that the panel
should take the median of the individual assessments for each factor. However,
there is a fundamental limitation to this, due to the previously mentioned theorem
by McConway and Wagner’s (cf. Section 2). Here is why. Requiring as above
that the aggregation proceeds on each factor independently is just requiring the
classical independence axiom. Another legitimate requirement is the classical axiom
of unanimity preservation: if all experts agree on the risk assessment for one factor,
then the panel should take this value as its own. As m ≥ 2, all the conditions of
the theorem by McConway and Wagner are fulfilled11, so its conclusion apply: the
only probability aggregation rule on the set of factors and on the overall decision is
linear averaging. This reveals that, if groups use the median to determine both the
independence factors’ values and the overall risk (according to the above results),
then it does not give a probability function and inconsistencies can arise. Table 3
11Each of the m ≥ 2 factors can be triggered or not, so there are at least 4 events, which is
higher than the 3 required in the theorem.
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gives such an example. In other words, asking the expert panel to take stands on
the reasons for its majority decision can lead it to change its decision.
Does it mean that our robustness defense of the median should be discarded?
Not necessarily. The theorem by McConway and Wagner assumes that the experts
aggregate their views both on the independent factors and on the overall risk as-
sessment. But one can have the experts aggregate their views on the independent
factors only. The overall risk assessment is then computed according to Equation 1,
and the final decision is logically obtained from a comparison between this value
and the threshold. In that way, experts do not vote on the final decision directly.
This decision rule is a so-called premise-based rule.12 Then, the linearity result of
McConway and Wagner does not apply any more. The robustness considerations
from the previous section do apply at the level of independent factors, and they
recommend that the group takes the median of the individual assessments.
The present model of factors has assumed that there exists some common nu-
merical scale, so that taking the median of individual assessments makes sense.
However, the previous section has in part argued that such a scale may not always
exist. In these cases, the present model of independent factors cannot apply. The
theory of judgment aggregation offers a general framework for the aggregation of
non-numerical reasons or justifications, with true/false beliefs (for reviews, cf. List
2012, Martini and Sprenger forth.). Applying in detail this framework to our prob-
lem of scientific justification would require another paper. A general result from this
literature, however, is the discursive dilemma: majority voting on a set of true/false
beliefs related in a logical way (here: reasons for the decision) may generate incon-
sistent collective judgments. This echoes our own finding about the median, which
corresponds to majority voting in case of a threshold comparison. So whatever
12On this strategy more generally, see Cooke (1991), Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), Hartmann
and Sprenger (2012). Another solution to our problem could be the conclusion-based rule, i.e.
aggregate only the views on the conclusion, but this is just like the previous section that we are
trying to surpass.
Risk aspect a1 a2 a = 1− (1− a1) · (1− a2)
Agent #1 0.01 0.01 0.0199
Agent #2 0.02 0.01 0.0298
Agent #3 0.01 0.02 0.0298
Median 0.01 0.01 0.0199 or 0.0298 ?
Table 3: A case in which the rule of the median can lead to inconsistencies. With a
threshold at e.g. 0.025, the group’s decision could be either true or false.
11
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the scale, majority voting on all parts of the question is in great difficulty, and a
premise-based solution should be adopted.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the rationale for the majority rule that is often used
in scientific expert panels, when dissent persists after discussion, and has looked for
the best decision rule in this context. To this end, I have introduced a threshold
probability model for individual decisions. Three main points have been shown
in the paper: (1) the standard framework of probability aggregation is unable to
solve our problem of risk aggregation. (2) robustness considerations clearly favor
majority voting on the decision, i.e. comparing the threshold to the median of the
individual risk assessments. (The robustness axioms I have advocated, which have
been designed from considerations on scientific expert panel, could in return inspire
social choice theory). (3) when a justification of the panel’s decision is looked for,
the median rule (corresponding to majority voting) can lead to inconsistencies. The
promising route is to have the group aggregate on the reasons level, not on the final
decision one. This should encourage scientific expert panels to divide questions from
a logical viewpoints, and to take decisions on sub-problems instead of voting on the
final decision directly. Current practices in advisory committees of the FDA and of
the EMA could evolve in this respect. However, these claims have only been shown
in quite simple and idealized models of decision-making. Future work is needed
to investigate other models. These preliminary results have nonetheless cast some
serious doubts on the majority voting rule only applied on the final decision.
Note finally the generality of the proposed model, which goes well beyond sci-
entific expertise: the a and t variables can be interpreted as degrees of beliefs or as
utility measures, within an epistemology or an economy framework.
12
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Responsiveness and robustness in the David
Lewis signalling game
Carl Brusse and Justin Bruner
October 28, 2016
Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often
built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries
that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing
receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the
likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often
has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also
help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence
of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of
interest signalling games.
1 Signalling games and evolution
Common interest signalling games were introduced by David Lewis (Lewis,
1969) as part of a game theoretic framework which identified communicative
conventions as the expected solutions to coordination problems. In recent years,
this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication,
incorporating signalling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to
modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms,
2010; Skyrms, 1996).
As the basis for game theoretic modelling of such phenomena, David Lewis
signalling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes.
They are coordination games of common interest between world-observing senders
and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where
interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the stan-
dard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signalling game (hereafter
the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaller) observes that the world is in one of
two possible states (state1 or state2) and broadcasts one of two possible signals
(signal1 or signal2) which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions (act1 or act2). If the acts match the state of
the world (i.e. act1 if state1 or act2 if state2) then the players receive a greater
payoff than otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signalling systems where
senders condition otherwise arbitrary signalling behaviour on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals to secure the mutual payoff. The two
1
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systems only differ on which signal gets to be associated with each state of the
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain
conditions a signalling systems is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution to be discussed further in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is the degree
to which we have confidence in the interpretation and application of such a
highly idealised model to the more complex target systems. The obvious worry
is that by introducing more realistic features into the model one might break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signalling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signalling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur. Some devia-
tions from the standard Lewis signalling game include: more and varied states
of the world, the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals,
partial deviation in interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case and Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Godfrey-Smith (2015) mix signalling games of common interest and conflict of
interest. One complication of the Lewis signalling game (particularly important
for our purposes) is that signalling systems are not guaranteed in the simple
2x2x2 case when the world is biased. In other words, when the probabilities
of the world being in state1 or state2 are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in
which no communication occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily
possible.
2 Symmetry breaking
The focus here will be with the idealisation that sender and receiver are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signallers do on observing the state of the world is send a
signal, and the receivers must act as though the world is in one or other of the
sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers
which is the more problematic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signalling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behaviour for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signalling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signallers than
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’, where the receiver
plays act1 or act2 unconditionally.
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for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate a
fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behaviour’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically rel-
evant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that of
observing a strategically relevant artificial signal. All this leads to two concerns.
Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations are likely to exist between senders
and receivers. Receivers are likely to have locally reasonable options available
to them other than those relevant to signaller-observed states of the world, and
their responsiveness to the strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily mod-
elled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures of standard signalling games.
Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost implications of sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to
differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not
expect their update-responsiveness in any given game to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modelled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (Sterelny, 2012) concerns about Skyrms (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of
the receiver might undermine the evolution of signalling even when these third
options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of
a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy –
taking an action which pays off modestly, regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behaviour of vervets, who
have specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet
takes to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead
to total disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle.
Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a
modest payoff. Translated to signalling games, such a gambit may, in many
cases, be more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signalling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a
3
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -110-
This compliments the structural responsiveness concern: receivers (espe-
cially) might have other options of value which will stand in competition to
those assumed in the standard signalling game. Something like these hedgehog
strategies are plausible departures from the idealisation and should be expected
on the part of the receiver given a realistic demandingness of the role. The
question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog strategies might
undermine the robustness of evolution toward signalling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signalling situations – such as predator-
prey signalling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signallers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signalling games (as with games of com-
mon interest in general) the Red Queen effect should have no role to play. How-
ever any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signalling game makes it plausible
to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not the norm.
First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures employed by
senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems will admit to
different degrees of plasticity and evolvability – and will have a different set of
cross-cutting tasks and utilities that will place their own demands upon them.
Quick and easy signalling responses will have different pathways of update and
adaptation than the (typically) more complex set of systems which appropriate
receiver responses require.
The consideration of multiple use or adaptive reuse also makes the Red
Queen hypothesis salient: it is wildly implausible that entirely separate cog-
nitive systems would evolve to deal with competitive signalling situations and
coordination-style situations. Cognitive structures which underpin sender or
receiver behaviour will likely be subject to evolutionary pressures from compet-
itive as well as cooperative situations, and the responsive nimbleness of sender
and receiver strategies is therefore not guaranteed to be the same. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
mediocre payoff. Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are
general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signalling games. Thanks to [name redacted
for review] for helping us better see this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
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not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signalling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as a basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signalling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaller with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR). If the receiver’s action
matches the state of the world, then both signaller and receiver get a fixed
positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero. Signallers and receivers
both have four pure strategies available to them (see table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaller and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signalling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t+ 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t)
Fi
FS
where Xi is the ith sender strategy, Fi is the fitness of that strategy and FS
is the average sender strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t+ 1) = Yj(t)
Fj
FR
where Yj is the jth sender strategy, Fj is the fitness of that strategy and FR is
the average receiver strategy fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle
5
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into an evolutionarily stable arrangement. The update process is deterministic
and no randomising or mutations are allowed.
5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the Skyrms/Lewis idealisation have on the evolutionary stability of signalling
equilibria.
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signalling game, one of the two signalling
equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics. In our
notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of the world
(i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine this, with
an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling equilib-
ria. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signalling strategies
in the sender population. In such situations, receivers do best to simply per-
form the act that is most appropriate for the more likely state of the world.
The incentive for senders to adopt a signalling system then disappears and the
community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we found a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH , becomes significant. The hedgehog strategy R5
is an additional unilateral response, and is able to draw some initial populations
away from the signalling equilibria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average
payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in Figure
14.
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artefacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of hedgehog payoff on proportion of signalling equilibria.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in com-
bination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of H. The
H = 0 curve has the expected n-shape, with perfect signalling being degraded
as world-bias increases away from the mid-point of even bias between L and R.
The inclusion of significant (i.e. H ¿ 0.5) hedgehog payoffs decreases signalling
at even bias. As nature becomes increasingly biased, however, the proportion
of simulations that head to a signalling system does not go down. In fact we
observe a ‘plateau’ followed by a gradual increase in the proportion signalling
as nature becomes increasingly biased. However, once the bias becomes too
extreme, the traditional pooling equilibrium becomes increasingly likely as the
payoff associated with simply performing the appropriate act for the more likely
state of the world approaches 1. This results in a steep decline in the proportion
of simulations that result in signalling systems.
6 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signalling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order control the rate at which sender and
receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and receiver
populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t+ 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t)
Fi
FS
+Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t+ 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t)
Fj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
7
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on proportion of sig-
nalling equilibria.
Note that when both ZR and ZS are zero there is no deviation from the stan-
dard replicator dynamics. Rates of changes are slowed as their values increase;
for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change for sender strategies. ZR
(alone) being set to 1 means taht the composition of the receiver population
would not change over time, and only the sender population would evolve.
The result of introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and
receivers is that signalling is more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where senders (ZS) and
receivers (ZR) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds (with the other
population unaltered) as the bias of nature is varied.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population whose conditional signalling is
low will begin to gravitate to the act that matches the more likely state of the
world (and the threshold for ‘low’ is higher at higher bias). This evolution-
ary trajectory only reverses if conditional signalling increases rapidly enough
to tip the fitness balance toward its matching conditional response, before that
response is overpowered. Thus signalling becomes quite a remote possibility
when bias is high and senders are slow, occurring in less than 10% of simula-
tions for some parameter values. Slowing the evolutionary responsiveness of the
receiver population evolves has the opposite effect – as senders will have time to
adopt the best separating strategy given the mix of receiver strategies, and the
receiver population slowly adjusts and a robust signalling system establishes.
By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a quickly evolving sender population
also mitigates against the effect of hedgehog strategies.
8
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on proportion of
signalling equilibria.
7 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized
and simple Lewis signalling game typically considered in the literature. As
shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often
significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For
one, providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a
decent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size
of the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is
a remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However the interaction between hedgehog payoffs and bias shows that signalling-
undermining effects are not strictly additive. Likewise, the situation is much
less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace than receivers. Interestingly,
many scholars in the animal communications literature have noted a similar re-
sponse asymmetry between sender and receiver in conflict of interest and partial
conflict of interest signalling games. For instance, Owren, Rendall, and Ryan
(2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signalling behaviour while re-
ceivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced by senders that
are more difficult to change. Thus some have taken to think of signalling as
primarily involving the manipulation of receivers by senders.
But this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a conflict of interest
between sender and receiver, then what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behaviour of the senders? In other words,
what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver? These are the exact circumstances we would expect the red queen
hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form the basis of
9
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a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. When the interests of sender
and receiver are perfectly aligned it is actually in the interest of both parties for
the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial signalling
system. When the interests of sender and receiver significantly diverge, however,
we would expect this not to be the case since both parties now have reason to
adapt at a faster pace than the other.
Yet individuals who routinely interact rarely find themselves playing either
common interest or conflict of interest signalling games exclusively. As is well
known by any parent, not all signalling interactions between relatives are free
of conflict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be par-
tially opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common
interest signalling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point is that a
variety of strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver, and there
is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve perfect alignment
or sizable conflict. If so, then a proportion of signalling interactions between
sender and receiver may involve no conflict, a partial conflict, or a full conflict
of interest. When the proportion of no or low conflict signalling games is sig-
nificant, the generational asymmetry result from the previous section may hold
to some degree. Both sender and receiver will then profit from the sender pop-
ulation evolving at a faster rate than the receiver population, and receivers do
best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence
of informative signalling systems when their interests do overlap. Thus, while
it may appear puzzling as to why a receiver is not more responsive when her
interests diverge from that of the sender, this confusion might be resolved when
the interaction is put into context.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signalling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signalling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signalling
in realistic environments.
8 Acknoweldgements
We thank Kim Sterelny, Ron Planer and the audiences at the Sydney-ANU
Philosophy of Biology Workshop and the 2016 Meeting of the Philosophy of
Science Association.
9 Bibliography
Bruner, Justin, Cailin O’Connor, Hannah Rubin, and Simon M. Huttegger.
2014. “David Lewis in the Lab: Experimental Results on the Emergence of
Meaning.” Synthese, September, 1–19. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0535-x.
Dawkins, R., and J. R. Krebs. 1979. “Arms Races between and within
Species.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 205
(1161): 489–511. doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0081.
10
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -117-
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 1996. Complexity and the Function of Mind in Na-
ture. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter, and Manolo Mart´ınez. 2013. “Communication and
Common Interest.” PLoS Comput Biol 9 (11): e1003282. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003282.
Hobaiter, Catherine, and Richard W. Byrne. 2014. “The Meanings of Chim-
panzee Gestures.” Current Biology 24 (14): 1596–1600. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2014.05.066.
Huttegger, Simon M. 2007. “Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning*.”
Philosophy of Science 74 (1): 1–27. Lewis, David K. 1969. Convention: A
Philosophical Study,. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Martınez, Manolo, and Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2015. “Common Interest and
Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis.” http://petergodfreysmith.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Martinez-GS-paper2-Dynamic-Preprint.pdf.
Owren, Michael J., Drew Rendall, and Michael J. Ryan. 2010. “Redefining
Animal Signaling: Influence versus Information in Communication.” Biology
and Philosophy 25 (5): 755–80. doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9224-4.
Pawlowitsch, Christina. 2008. “Why Evolution Does Not Always Lead to
an Optimal Signaling System.” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1): 203–26.
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009.
Seyfarth, Robert M., and Dorothy L. Cheney. 2003. “Signalers and Re-
ceivers in Animal Communication.” Annual Review of Psychology 54 (1): 145–73.
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145121.
Skyrms, Brian. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. ———. 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Sterelny, Kim. 2012. “A Glass Half-Full: Brian Skyrms’s Signals.” Eco-
nomics and Philosophy 28 (01): 73–86. doi:10.1017/S0266267112000120.
Van Valen, Leigh. 1973. “A New Evolutionary Law.” Evolutionary Theory 1
(1-30). http://tmtfree.hd.free.fr/albums/files/TMTisFree/Documents/Biology/A
11
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -118-
Experimental Individuation and Retail Arguments 
Ruey-Lin Chen 
Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan 
 
Jonathon Hricko 
Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, National Yang-Ming University, 
Taiwan 
 
Abstract: Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that we ought to focus on retail arguments, 
which are arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical entities, as 
opposed to theoretical entities in general. However, scientists are the ones who put 
forward retail arguments, and it’s unclear how philosophers can engage with such 
arguments. We argue that philosophers can engage with retail arguments by providing 
criteria that they must satisfy in order to demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities. 
We put forward experimental individuation as such a criterion—when scientists 
experimentally individuate an entity, a realist conclusion about that entity is warranted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Magnus and Callender argue that we ought to abandon “wholesale arguments,” which are 
“arguments about all or most of the entities posited in our best scientific theories” (2004, 
321). Instead, we ought to embrace “retail arguments,” which are “arguments about 
specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance” (2004, 321). This shift in focus 
rules out standard scientific realism as well as various antirealist positions, and in Section 
2, we’ll argue that Magnus and Callender’s position is preferable to these other positions. 
However, we recognize that philosophers who choose to abandon wholesale 
arguments in favor of retail arguments face a potential problem. Dicken (2013) has 
argued that such philosophers will merely end up repeating the retail arguments that 
scientists offer. In that case, the turn to retail arguments may entail that no distinctively 
philosophical work remains to be done. In Section 3, we’ll argue that this is not the case. 
Not all retail arguments successfully demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities, and 
it can take some philosophical work to distinguish the ones that do from the ones that 
don’t. 
In Section 4, we’ll put forward a criterion for doing so, which we take from 
Chen’s (2016) work on experimental individuation. Chen suggests that “[i]f a scientist 
can realize the individuality of an object in a particular experiment, then she has provided 
the strongest evidence ... to warrant the reality of the object” (2016, 365). We’ll argue 
that retail arguments that demonstrate the experimental individuation of a theoretical 
entity succeed in showing that realism about that entity is warranted. 
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We’ll draw on three examples throughout the paper: Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of 
acidity, J. J. Thomson’s work on cathode rays, and Davy’s discovery of potassium. We’ll 
conclude, in Section 5, by applying our criterion to these three cases, with the result that 
the upshot of a retail argument can be either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding 
the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. 
 
2. The Turn to Retail Arguments 
 
We’ll now introduce Magnus and Callender’s position in a bit more detail, and indicate 
why we take it to be preferable to standard scientific realism (SSR) and antirealism. SSR 
is a position regarding theories in general—the success of our best theories warrants the 
claim that they are at least approximately true, as well as the claim that the theoretical 
entities that they posit exist. Antirealist positions come in a number of different forms, 
but they all typically endorse claims about theories in general, and deny that success 
warrants the two claims endorsed by proponents of SSR. 
According to Magnus and Callender, there is something that all of these positions 
have in common, namely, their proponents attempt to support these positions by engaging 
in wholesale arguments. They focus on two examples of such arguments. First of all, 
there is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of our best theories 
would be a miracle if those theories weren’t at least approximately true. Secondly, there 
is the pessimistic meta-induction, which uses past successful-but-false theories as an 
inductive basis for concluding that our current successful theories are false as well. The 
no-miracles argument is taken to support “[w]holesale realism,” which “seeks to explain 
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the success of science in general”; and the pessimistic meta-induction is taken to support 
“wholesale anti-realism,” which “seeks to explain the history of science in general” 
(2004, 321). However, Magnus and Callender argue that these arguments, and wholesale 
arguments in general, ought to be abandoned. This is because they embody the base rate 
fallacy, since they don’t take into account the base rate probability of any successful 
theory being true or false. For this reason, they maintain that wholesale realism and 
wholesale antirealism ought to be abandoned as well. 
Magnus and Callender propose that we ought to replace wholesale arguments 
with retail arguments. Unlike wholesale arguments, the scope of a retail argument is 
restricted to a particular theory and/or a particular kind of theoretical entity. By shifting 
the focus from theories in general to theories in particular, philosophers can dissolve the 
traditional realism debate, with the result that “realism and anti-realism are options to be 
exercised sometimes here and sometimes there” (2004, 337). This, in turn, opens up the 
possibility that “[t]here may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist 
about top quarks, and so on” (2004, 333). 
In order to show why this possibility represents an improvement over SSR and 
antirealism, we’ll now consider a case from the history of chemistry. This case concerns 
the composition of hydrochloric acid. Scheele was the first to decompose this acid, which 
he called “acid of salt,” and he identified its constituent substances as phlogiston and 
“dephlogisticated acid of salt” (1774/1931). However, it was a matter of some 
controversy whether he had succeeded in decomposing hydrochloric acid. According to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, all acids are composed of oxygen (the principle of 
acidity) and a radical, which can be either a simple substance or a compound (1789/1965, 
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65, 115). Neither Scheele nor any other chemist had been able to extract the oxygen from 
hydrochloric acid, which Lavoisier called “muriatic acid.”  And so Lavoisier held that it 
remained undecomposed, and, in accordance with his theory, he hypothesized that it must 
contain oxygen combined with what he called “the muriatic radical” (1789/1965, 71-72). 
As for Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt, Lavoisier held that it is a compound of 
muriatic acid and oxygen, which he called “oxygenated muriatic acid” (1789/1965, 73). 
Some years later, Davy argued that Scheele was correct, while Lavoisier was in error 
(1810, 236-37). On Davy’s view, muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and what he 
calls “oxymuriatic acid,” which is what Lavoisier called “oxygenated muriatic acid,” and 
what Scheele called “dephlogisticated acid of salt.”  Davy later went on to argue for the 
elementary nature of this latter substance, and proposed a new name for it: “Chlorine” 
(1811, 32). His approval of Scheele stems from the fact that Davy, like a number of 
latter-day phlogiston theorists, identified hydrogen with phlogiston.
1
  And the claim that 
hydrochloric acid is made up of hydrogen and dephlogisticated acid of salt, even if 
terminologically problematic, is essentially correct. Lavoisier, however, was in error 
since this acid contains no oxygen, thus falsifying his oxygen theory of acidity. 
Proponents of SSR, impressed by narratives of the Chemical Revolution 
according to which Lavoisier’s oxygen theory defeated the phlogiston theory, are often 
explicit that their realism applies to the oxygen theory but not to the phlogiston theory.
2
  
But in that case, SSR entails the implausible conclusion that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical 
exists, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt does not. It seems much better to 
																																																								
1
 See, e.g., Kirwan (1789, 4-5). 
2
 See, e.g., Hardin and Rosenberg (1982, 610) and Psillos (1999, 291). 
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conclude that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical doesn’t exist, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt does. 
Antirealism, at least of the Kuhnian variety, fares no better. Those influenced by 
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) views regarding incommensurability would claim that theoretical 
entities conceptualized by rival theories should be treated as different entities. However, 
chemists working in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shared a set of 
operations for producing the substance that was variously known as dephlogisticated acid 
of salt, oxymuriatic acid, and chlorine. It’s therefore implausible to maintain that, in light 
of the fact that these chemists held different theories, they were working with distinct 
theoretical entities. A trans-theoretical view of the substance that came to be known as 
chlorine is therefore preferable. 
By abandoning wholesale arguments in favor of retail arguments, we can sidestep 
these difficulties, and simply adopt realism about chlorine (whatever it was called and 
however it was conceptualized) and antirealism about Lavoisier’s muriatic radical. That 
said, by trading wholesale arguments for retail arguments, we face another difficulty, to 
which we’ll now turn. 
 
3. Can Philosophers Engage with Retail Arguments? 
 
Dicken (2013) has objected that those who abandon wholesale arguments in favor of 
retail arguments face a serious difficulty. In short, once one does so, it’s not clear that any 
“distinctively philosophical” issues remain to be addressed (2013, 564). Scientists are 
generally the ones who put forward retail arguments. And if the turn to retail arguments 
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amounts to merely repeating arguments scientists have offered first, then perhaps nothing 
distinctively philosophical remains to be done. Our goal in the remainder of the paper is 
to provide a way of engaging with retail arguments that is distinctively philosophical, and 
to thereby answer Dicken’s objection. 
We’ll start by considering how scientists demonstrate the existence of theoretical 
entities, and so we’ll now introduce another case from the history of science. This case 
concerns Thomson’s work on cathode rays and his determination of the mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the electron. According to the official website of the Nobel Prize, it was 
because of this work that Thomson “received the Nobel Prize in 1906 for the discovery of 
the electron, the first elementary particle.”
3
 Thomson (1897, 1906/1967) hypothesized 
that cathode rays are currents of “carriers of negative electricity” or “corpuscles”—what 
we now know as electrons.
4
 His hypothesis was not only about the nature of cathode rays, 
but also about the interaction among cathode rays and other theoretical entities such as 
electrostatic fields and electrons. In order to determine the mass-to-charge ratio, he 
measured the deflection of cathode rays passing through an electrostatic field, the 
strength of the electrostatic field, and other related magnitudes. He interpreted the value 
that he obtained for m/e in light of his hypothesis, and his experimental results confirmed 
that hypothesis. 
																																																								
3
 Retrieved January 27, 2016 from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/vacuum/experiment-1.html. See also 
Harré (2002) and Whittaker (1989). 
4
 For the identification of Thomson’s carriers with electrons, see the reprint of Thomson 
(1897) in Magie (1969), in which Magie makes the identification. 
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However, one might ask how it’s possible to infer from Thomson’s experimental 
confirmation of his hypothesis to the claim that he had thereby demonstrated the 
existence of the electron. Philosophers can engage with such a question. And regardless 
of the answers they provide, they must at least defend those answers by invoking some 
kind of criterion for concluding that the evidence that scientists have offered does or does 
not constitute a demonstration of the existence of a given entity. To take one example of 
such a criterion, Hacking (1983, 23) suggests manipulation: “if you can spray them then 
they are real.”  While Thomson manipulated cathode rays, he did not manipulate 
electrons, and so, according to Hacking’s criterion, Thomson did not offer evidence 
strong enough to demonstrate the existence of electrons. 
The important point, for our purposes, is that providing a criterion for granting the 
reality of a theoretical entity, and determining whether the evidence that scientists have 
offered satisfies that criterion, constitutes a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments. Scientists may be the ones who initially put forward retail arguments. But it is 
a distinctively philosophical task to determine a criterion that can distinguish those retail 
arguments that demonstrate the existence of a theoretical entity from those that do not. 
We thus have a way of answering Dicken’s objection, provided that, by invoking such a 
criterion, we are not thereby turning back to wholesale arguments. In the next section, 
we’ll introduce our criterion and argue that applying it does not amount to a wholesale 
argument. 
 
4. Ontological Commitment and Experimental Individuation 
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Our proposed criterion for granting the reality of theoretical entities is experimental 
individuation. A retail argument that demonstrates the experimental individuation of an 
entity is a good argument for realism about that entity. 
Individuation and ontological commitment are connected. When scientists are 
ontologically committed to the theoretical entities that they posit, this commitment 
involves not just a belief that the entities exist, but also a responsibility to demonstrate 
their existence. Demonstrating the existence of a posited entity requires scientists to find 
an individual instance or sample of that entity, and if a scientist posits a theoretical entity 
without individuating it, then her ontological commitment is empty. 
How do scientists individuate theoretical entities? Answering this question 
requires us to distinguish theoretical individuation from experimental individuation. 
Scientists theoretically individuate an entity if, in the course of theorizing, they describe a 
set of properties and behaviors of a posited entity by which they can identify it and 
distinguish it from other entities. However, these descriptions by which scientists 
theoretically individuate entities require evidence. Scientists can offer evidence for the 
existence of a theoretical entity if they produce an instance or sample of such an entity by 
performing an experiment. In doing so, they individuate an entity experimentally.
5
 
The relationship between theoretical individuation and experimental individuation 
is much the same as the relationship between theory and experiment more generally. 
																																																								
5
 Scientists may also individuate an entity observationally, by observing an instance or 
sample of such an entity. Since observation is itself a complex issue, and since 
participants in the realism debate rarely question the existence of entities that scientists 
have observed, we will not discuss observational individuation here. 
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Various worries about the theory-ladenness of experimentation are relevant here. If a 
theoretical hypothesis yields a prediction regarding some experimental result, the result 
may be interpreted in light of the hypothesis. Moreover, since a theoretical hypothesis 
may involve two or more theoretical entities and their interactions, it can be difficult to 
show that an experiment produces an instance or sample of the target entity, i.e., that it 
experimentally individuates that entity. And it can be difficult to judge whether an 
experiment produces a real individual, as opposed to a mere phenomenon that results 
from experimental apparatuses and their interactions with experimented objects. For 
these reasons, a criterion of experimental individuation that is sufficiently independent of 
theoretical interpretation is needed.  
Is there such a criterion for experimental individuation? One candidate is 
Hacking’s manipulation criterion, which we mentioned in Section 3. However, since 
experimenters can manipulate not just real individuals, but also mere phenomena, 
manipulation cannot singly serve as the criterion of experimental individuation. Chen 
(2016) takes Hacking’s criterion of manipulation, along with two other criteria, namely, 
separation and maintenance of structural unity, as jointly constituting a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the experimental individuation of a theoretical entity. In short, 
experiments that produce individuals are experiments that separate individuals from their 
surrounding environment, manipulate them, and maintain their structural unity 
throughout the process. Importantly, Chen’s further conditions ensure that the 
manipulated object is a real individual as opposed to a mere phenomenon. We take 
Chen’s criteria to offer a satisfactory account of experimental individuation. In Section 5, 
we’ll illustrate his criteria in terms of three retail arguments from the history of science, 
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and thereby provide some support for our claim that his criteria are satisfactory. 
For now, we wish to emphasize two points. First of all, experimental 
individuation is our proposed criterion for determining whether a retail argument 
successfully demonstrates the existence of some theoretical entity—it succeeds if it 
demonstrates the experimental individuation of that entity. Secondly, Chen’s three 
criteria provide an adequate account of what experimental individuation requires. 
Before moving on, we’ll discuss two potential problems with this proposal. First 
of all, some theoretical entities, like the chemical substances named by mass terms like 
‘water,’ ‘phlogiston,’ and ‘oxygen,’ are paradigm cases of non-individuals. It’s therefore 
not immediately obvious how we can appeal to the notion of experimental individuation 
when it comes to such entities. We propose to do so by considering the experimental 
individuation of samples of such substances, as we’ll illustrate in Section 5.1, in terms of 
Davy’s discovery of potassium. Since samples count as individuals, our criterion is 
applicable to cases involving non-individuals like chemical substances. 
Secondly, there’s the issue as to whether the application of our criterion amounts 
to a kind of wholesale argument. Whether a given retail argument demonstrates the 
experimental individuation of some theoretical entity is a local matter, grounded in the 
details of that argument. In contrast, wholesale arguments are not grounded in such local 
matters. Instead, they rely on claims regarding populations of theories in general, and it is 
for this reason that they embody the base rate fallacy. We’ve consciously avoided 
reasoning that may lead to the base rate fallacy. For example, we haven’t argued that the 
success of our best theories would be a miracle unless the entities they posit can be 
experimentally individuated. For these reasons, the application of our criterion to retail 
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arguments does not amount to a kind of wholesale argument. And in that case, we’ve 
provided a way of answering Dicken’s objection, since our criterion provides a way for 
philosophers to engage with retail arguments. 
 
5. Application of the Criterion to Three Retail Arguments 
 
Our goal at this point is to show how one can use the criterion we’ve proposed in order to 
engage with retail arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical 
entities. We’ll discuss three cases: Davy’s potassium, Lavoisier’s muriatic radical, and 
Thomson’s electron. 
 
5.1 A Realist Conclusion Regarding Davy’s Potassium 
 
To begin with, we’ll argue that Davy demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
potassium, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument for realism about 
that substance. 
 Davy first isolated potassium by decomposing potash, which he did by means of 
electrolysis (1808, 4-5). He was the first to decompose potash, though for some time, 
chemists suspected it to be a compound.
6
  Davy acted on a small piece of moistened 
potash with a Voltaic battery. As a result, at the negative surface of the battery Davy 
observed the appearance of “small globules having a high metallic lustre, and being 
precisely similar in visible characters to quicksilver” (1808, 5). In the lecture in which he 
																																																								
6
 See, e.g., Lavoisier (1965/1789, 156). 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -130-
reports these results, Davy goes on to write: “These globules, numerous experiments soon 
shewed to be the substance I was in search of, and a peculiar inflammable principle the 
basis of potash” (1808, 5). And later in the lecture, he proposes the name “Potasium 
[sic]” for the basis of potash (1808, 32). 
 While this experiment, on its own, does not demonstrate the experimental 
individuation of a sample of potassium, subsequent experiments that Davy conducted do, 
and he shows that potassium satisfies all three of Chen’s criteria. First of all, there is 
Chen’s separation condition: scientists must separate the entities that they produce “from 
their environments” (2016, 348), and “from the experimental instruments that may have 
helped produce [them]” (2016, 365). In order to determine whether his results depended 
on the platinum instruments that he used, Davy performed a number of experiments using 
a variety of other materials, including copper, silver, and gold (1808, 5). And in order to 
determine whether his results depended on the fact that he conducted his experiments in 
the open atmosphere, he performed similar experiments in a vacuum (1808, 5). In all of 
these cases, he obtained the same results. These experiments collectively show that Davy 
had separated potassium from its surrounding environment (including the atmosphere and 
the other components of potash), and from the instruments that he used, thereby 
satisfying Chen’s separation condition. 
 Secondly, there is Chen’s condition regarding the maintenance of structural unity. 
Chen understands structural unity as the idea that “the components of an individual are 
structured into a whole in some specific manner” (2016, 358). Davy encountered a 
number of difficulties when it came to maintaining the structural unity of the globules of 
potassium that he had produced because “they acted more or less upon almost every body 
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to which they were exposed” (1808, 10). One of the first things Davy notes about the 
globules is that they did not last long—the ones that did not explode immediately after 
forming soon lost their metallic luster and became “covered by a white film” (1808, 5). 
Davy identifies this film as pure potash, and explains how it attracts moisture from the 
atmosphere, converting the globule into a saturated solution of potash (1808, 7). 
Eventually, Davy discovered one substance on which potassium did not have much of an 
effect, namely, recently distilled naphtha (1808, 10). He used that fluid to preserve 
globules of potassium, and he was able to examine the properties of potassium in the 
atmosphere by covering the globules with a thin film of naphtha. This method allowed 
Davy to maintain the structural unity of potassium, thus satisfying Chen’s condition. 
 Thirdly, there is Chen’s manipulation condition. Chen understands this condition in 
terms of the “instrumental use” of an object “to investigate other phenomena of nature” 
(2016, 358). Towards the end of the lecture in which he reports the electrolytic 
decomposition of potash, Davy conjectures that the globules of potassium he isolated 
“will undoubtedly prove powerful agents for analysis; and having an affinity for oxygene 
[sic] stronger than any other known substances, they may possibly supersede the 
application of electricity to some of the undecompounded bodies” (1808, 44). Making 
good on this conjecture would amount to showing that chemists can use potassium to 
decompose previously undecomposed substances, thereby satisfying Chen’s manipulation 
condition. And in the following year, Davy made good on this conjecture by using 
potassium to extract the oxygen from a previously undecomposed substance, namely, 
boracic acid, thereby decomposing it (1809, 76-77). 
 In sum, Davy shows that samples of potassium satisfy all three of Chen’s criteria. 
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And by demonstrating the experimental individuation of these samples, Davy presents us 
with a successful retail argument for realism about potassium. 
 
5.2 An Antirealist Conclusion Regarding Lavoisier’s Muriatic Radical 
 
We’ll now argue that Davy shows why the experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s 
muriatic radical is not possible, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument 
for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
As we discussed in Section 2, Lavoisier hypothesized that hydrochloric acid, 
which he called muriatic acid, is composed of oxygen and a hypothetical substance that 
he called the muriatic radical. He thereby theoretically individuated the muriatic radical 
as that substance which combines with oxygen to form muriatic acid, which, in turn, is 
converted into oxymuriatic acid (i.e., chlorine) by means of combining with even more 
oxygen. But as we emphasized in Section 4, theoretical individuation is a mere belief, 
and beliefs require evidence. 
Davy (1810, 235-36) provides a retail argument that demonstrates that the 
experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s radical is not possible. He emphasizes the 
results of various experiments that he and other chemists performed, which show that 
oxymuriatic acid combines with hydrogen to form muriatic acid. And he goes on to 
discuss those experiments that seem to show the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid into 
oxygen and muriatic acid. Davy observes that in these experiments, water is always 
present. And he concludes that the oxygen that such experiments produce results from the 
decomposition of the water, not from the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid, which has 
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not been demonstrated. If oxymuriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen, and muriatic acid 
contains oxymuriatic acid and hydrogen, then muriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen 
either. To adopt Davy’s later terminology, the only components of muriatic acid are 
hydrogen and chlorine. Experimentally individuating the muriatic radical would involve 
separating it from the oxygen with which it combines to form muriatic acid and 
oxymuriatic acid. And since Davy showed that this is not possible, he gives us a 
successful retail argument for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
 
5.3 A Skeptical Conclusion Regarding Thomson’s Electron 
 
Finally, we’ll argue that Thomson neither demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
the electron, nor shows that it is impossible. Hence, we have an example of an 
inconclusive retail argument. The proper response to such an argument is skepticism 
regarding the entity in question, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument 
regarding the existence of that entity. 
Thomson (1897) designed a new type of cathode ray tube (figure 1) to perform a 
deflection experiment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Thomson’s cathode ray tube in 1897. Reproduced from Thomson 1969, 586. 
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This tube contains a cathode C, a cylindrical anode A with a slit, a cylindrical metal ring 
B with a slit, and a pair of plates D and E that produce an electrostatic field. A cathode 
ray is produced when the cathode discharges, and the ray passes through the slits in A and 
B before passing through the electrostatic field produced by D and E. Thomson’s goal 
was to determine whether the ray would be deflected in the field, and to thereby 
determine the composition of cathode rays. The basic idea was that, if cathode rays were 
made of ethereal waves, the rays would not be deflected by an electrostatic field; if, 
however, the rays were made up of negatively electrified bodies, then the rays would be 
deflected by an electrostatic field. 
Thomson’s thought was that a cathode would produce both electric currents and 
cathode rays when discharging, and that, in order to determine the composition of 
cathode rays, it would be necessary to eliminate the electric currents and experiment with 
purified cathode rays. Purification is the function of the cylindrical metal ring B, which 
absorbs the electric currents leaked from A and thus ensures that the ray passing through 
B is pure. Thomson found that the purified cathode ray was deflected when it passed 
between the plates D and E, thus confirming that cathode rays are made up of negatively 
electrified bodies. 
While Thomson satisfies Chen’s criteria when it comes to cathode rays, he didn’t 
thereby experimentally individuate the electrons that make them up. Thomson succeeded 
in separating cathode rays from currents; purifying them with the metal ring B, and thus 
maintaining their structural unity; and manipulating them by deflecting them with an 
electrostatic field. According to Chen’s criteria, one can say that Thomson 
experimentally individuated cathode rays and demonstrated that they are currents of 
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negative electricity. But Thomson presupposed rather than demonstrated that the currents 
consist of electrons. He did not demonstrate the existence of electrons, because he did not 
experimentally individuate them. Hence, the proper response to the retail argument that 
Thomson gives us is neither realism nor antirealism, but rather skepticism regarding the 
existence of electrons, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our goal in this paper has been to provide a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments, and thereby show that, even if we dissolve the traditional realism debate, 
there is still philosophical work to be done. We’ve put forward the criterion of 
experimental individuation in order to determine whether a given retail argument 
demonstrates the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. And we’ve applied 
that criterion to three cases, with the result that the upshot of a retail argument can be 
either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding the existence of a particular kind of 
theoretical entity. 
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Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in 
Neuroscience: 
Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down?1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various 
mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology 
and neuroscience (e.g. redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions 
originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering 
aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness; (2) formulating 
hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness; and (3) quantifying robustness. 
Furthermore, I argue that the significant disanalogies between brains and 
engineered artefacts raise important questions about the applicability of the 
engineering framework. I argue that the use of such concepts should be 
understood as a kind of simplifying idealization.  
 
 
“The brain is a physical device that performs specific functions; therefore, its 
design must obey general principles of engineering.” 
Sterling and Laughlin (2015:xv) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I discuss a cluster of issues around the understanding of 
robustness in neuroscience. Systems biologist, Hiroaki Kitano defines 
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robustness as, “a property that allows a system to maintain its functions 
against internal and external perturbations” (Kitano 2004, p.826). According 
to this definition, in order to determine whether or not a system is robust, one 
must specify its function, and also specify the kinds of perturbation it faces. 
Empirically determinable questions then follow about how exactly the system 
achieves its robustness. Various means for making systems robust have been 
discussed across biology and neuroscience: copy redundancy, fail-safes, 
degeneracy, modularity, passive reserve, active compensation, plasticity, 
decoupling, and feedback (see Figure 1). It is obvious, but still worth 
emphasising, that most of these notions originate from engineering.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The Engineering Framework for Robustness. A set of terms 
originating from engineering and control theory, which are applied to 
biological systems to explain how they achieve robust performance. 
 
In Section 2 of this paper I argue that the framework of concepts borrowed 
from engineering aids neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness by 
specifying functions of the system and determining possible sources of 
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perturbation; (2) formulating hypotheses about means for the system to 
achieve robustness; and (3) showing how robustness may be precisely 
quantified. This will be shown with examples of neuroscientific research 
which aims to measure robustness in a retinal circuit (Sterling and Freed 
2007), in the motor cortex (Svoboda 2015), and to develop models of 
homeostatic control (Davis 2006, O’Leary 2014).  
 
In Section 3 I argue that the use of the engineering framework in 
neuroscience gets stretched, perhaps to breaking point, when applied to 
systems where (1) there is no principled distinction between processes for 
robustness and processes which continually maintain the life of the cell; (2) 
where perturbations are a regular occurrence rather than anomalous events; 
and (3) where one should not conceive of the system as seeking to maintain a 
steady state. This point will be illustrated through examination of some 
recent work from Eve Marder’s laboratory, one of the key centres for research 
on robustness in neuroscience. 
 
I will argue that the limitations of the engineering notions are put into stark 
relief when one examines neural systems through the lens of the process 
approach to biology (Dupré 2012). The engineering perspective, to the extent 
that it treats biological systems as pre-specified objects with fixed functions, 
misses many of the features that make robust biological systems fascinating 
and which are highlighted by the process view. 
 
In Section 4 I will consider if it is necessary to re-engineer the concepts of 
robustness to be more in line with the dynamicism of biological systems; or 
alternatively, if we should accept the engineering perspective as it is, as one 
amongst many idealizing and simplifying heuristics for understanding 
complex systems like the brain. 
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2. PUTTING THE ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK TO USE 
 
The robustness of the brain is one of its many extraordinary attributes. By 
this I mean the fact that brains can undergo moderately severe external 
perturbations while still maintaining approximately normal function. 
Obviously, robustness has its limits and the brain’s characteristic patterns of 
resilience and fragility are an important target of research (Sporns 2010, 
chap. 10). In order to investigate robustness it is necessary first to specify 
what sorts of perturbations the system is robust to, and then to quantify how 
robust it actually is. Explanations of robustness can be developed by testing 
hypotheses concerning the exact mechanisms by which robust performance is 
achieved. The engineering framework can be put to effective use in each of 
these processes. 
 
For example, Sterling and Freed (2007) pose the question of how robust the 
retinal circuit is. They define robustness as the factor by which intrinsic 
capacity exceeds normal demand, which is the engineer’s notion of margin of 
safety (p.563). The idea can be illustrated through their comparison with 
bridge design. An engineer designing a road bridge will consider both the 
anticipated normal demand (e.g. commuter traffic) as well as the unusual 
demands that might occasionally be placed on the bridge (e.g. the passage of 
a 30 ton military vehicle). The unusual demand can be thought of as a 
“perturbation” in Kitano’s terms. A robust design will ensure that the system 
does not break when pushed beyond normal conditions. For a bridge this can 
be achieved with passive reserve (using thicker steel than is needed under 
normal conditions) and redundancy (including additional beams so that there 
are back-up structures if any parts are compromised). 
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Sterling and Freed take the bridge case to be analogous to the retinal circuit. 
Normal demand, for the retina, is the intensity of illumination that the eye 
will encounter under naturalistic stimulation conditions. The safety factor is 
calculated by experimental determination of the maximum illumination level 
under which neurons in the retina can maintain their ability to signal to 
downstream neurons. Sterling and Freed (2007, p.570) report that,  
“across successive stages in this neural circuit, safety factors are on the 
order of 2–10. Thus, they resemble those in other tissues and systems. 
Their similarity across stages also accords with the principle of 
symmorphosis—that efficient design matches capacities across stages that 
are functionally coupled….”  
 
Sterling and Freed’s explanation of robustness depends on the notion of 
passive reserve. For photoreceptor neurons, this is calculated as the number 
of vesicles of neurotransmitter available in their synapse for continuous 
signalling at high-rates without restocking of the vesicles (p.565-6). In 
arriving at their conclusion about retinal safety margins, they argue that 
there are at least twice as many vesicles as needed under normal stimulation 
conditions. In this case we have seen that a design approach borrowed from 
civil engineering plays a clear and striking role in these neuroscientist’s 
definition, operationalization and explanation of robustness in the retina.   
 
Another example comes from Davis’s (2006) review of work on homeostatic 
regulation2 in the nervous system. As he writes:  
                                                        
2 Note that Davis makes a conceptual distinction between robust properties 
and properties under homeostatic control: “In general, robustness describes a 
system with a reproducible output, whereas homeostasis refers to a system 
with a constant output” (2006, p.308). I will ignore this difference for the 
purposes of the paper since homeostatic systems conform to Kitano’s general 
definition robust systems.  
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“Homeostatic control systems are best understood in engineering theory, 
where they are routinely implemented in systems such as aircraft flight 
control. Recently, biological signaling systems have been analyzed with 
the tools of engineering theory….” (p.314)  
Accordingly, homeostatic control systems have a number of “required 
features”: 1) a set point which defines the target output of the system; 2) 
feedback; 3) precision in resetting the output back to the set point, following a 
perturbation; and (normally) 4) sensors which measure the difference 
between the actual output and the set point (p.309). 
 
Thus control theory offers neuroscientists clear and experimentally testable 
criteria for determining whether a system undergoes homeostatic regulation, 
by looking for these required features (e.g. the existence of a set point) in a 
system. The operating conditions of homeostatic regulation, and the 
biophysical mechanisms of feedback, sensors, etc., are also open to 
experimental investigation. Reported examples of properties under 
homeostatic control are muscle excitation at the neuromuscular junction 
(p.309) and bursting properties of invertebrate neurons (p.311). More 
recently, O’Leary et al. (2014, p.818) argue that ion channel expression in 
their simplified model of invertebrate neurons can be understood as an 
implementation of integral control, a standard control-theoretic architecture.  
 
Figure 2 (if space) schematic for integral control 
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3. CRASH TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
Before considering the question of whether the engineering framework 
becomes structurally unsound when applied to some kinds of neural systems, 
I would like to draw our attention to some of its features. The basic ideas are 
clearly illustrated in Sterling and Freed’s (2007) example of the bridge. When 
one considers the robustness of an engineered artefact like the bridge, it is 
presupposed that the system is built up from component parts in such a way 
as to achieve a specific function. The robustness of the bridge is conceptually 
distinct from its other designed features or functions, and it can trade off 
against some of them. For example, the more robust the bridge is to the 
passage of the occasional heavy vehicle, the more expensive it will be to build 
(because requiring more steel) (p.563). Moreover, the perturbations against 
which the system is robust are thought of as atypical events, also 
conceptually distinct from the normal operations of the system.  
 
There is also the tendency to think of robustness as allowing the system, 
following a perturbation, to return to its initial stable state. Some 
experiments specifically involve the operationalization of the robustness of a 
system as the reversion to a prior state. For example, reporting on an 
experiment in which mouse premotor cortex in one hemisphere was inhibited 
using optogenetics during the preparation period for the animal’s movement, 
Svoboda (2015)3 writes, that “[t]his preparatory activity is remarkably robust 
to large-scale unilateral optogenetic perturbations: detailed dynamics that 
drive specific future movements are quickly and selectively restored by the 
network.” This notion of robustness as the ability of the system to revert to a 
                                                        
3 To my knowledge, these results have not yet been published in a journal. I 
have contacted the author to find out if the study is under review or in press.  
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prior functional states is similar to the idea of homeostasis as the ability of a 
system to stabilize some quantity in spite of external changes.  
 
Figure 3 (if space) After Kitano (2004, Figure 1) 
 
Eve Marder’s laboratory has carried out a long term investigation into the 
ability of neurons to maintain stable electrophysiological properties despite 
continual turnover of the ion channels embedded in the cell membrane which 
are responsible for its electrical excitability. This research project is one of 
the central examples of the study of robustness in neural systems. Marder 
and her collaborators make ample use of the engineering framework when 
reviewing other results and reporting their findings. For example, O’Leary et 
al. (2013, p.E2645) write: 
“Both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that maintaining 
stable intrinsic excitability is accomplished via homeostatic, negative 
feedback processes that use intracellular Ca2+ concentrations as a sensor 
of activity and then alter[s] the synthesis, insertion, and degradation of 
membrane conductances to achieve a target activity level.”  
 
What is striking about the characterization of electrophysiological stability in 
the face of ion channel turnover as a kind of robustness in the face of a 
perturbation (e.g. p.E2651), is the fact that the turnover is just part of the 
normal physiology of the cell. There is no functional and stable state of the 
cell in which this turnover does not occur—a fact which these authors also 
highlight.4 This brings our attention to some strains in the application of the 
engineering framework to this biological system.  
                                                        
4 “neurons in the brains of long-lived animals must maintain reliable function 
over the animal’s lifetime while all of their ion channels and receptors are 
replaced in the membrane over hours, days, or weeks. Consequently, ongoing 
turnover of ion channels of various types must occur without compromising 
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In the basic engineering characterisation of robustness, sketched above, 
perturbations are different from the normal circumstances in which the 
system is expected to operate. “Perturbation” carries the everyday 
connotation of an event which throws the system off balance and is 
deleterious to its normal functioning. We cannot think of the events of ion 
channel turnover as perturbations in this sense; they are business as usual 
for the cell. 
 
Furthermore, it is not in the nature of the system to seek to return to a prior, 
stable arrangement of its parts. A crucial property of the nervous system is 
its plasticity: the tendency for its component parts and the connections 
linking them to be continually sculpted by experience. The homeostatic 
mechanisms which Marder and colleagues investigate need to be understood 
as maintaining specific properties (such as a cell’s Ca2+ concentration) at a 
certain point, but not (nor do these researchers claim it) some generalised 
operation for achieving system-wide internal stability (see §4.4). 
 
In the basic engineering conception of robustness, there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between the features of a system which allow it to carry out its 
intended function, and those which make the system robust (even if in reality 
one individual feature can serve both purposes). In the case of the neuron 
which has continual ion channel turnover and no definite stable state to 
return to following these “perturbations”, it is not clear that we can we make 
this distinction. A more natural way to think about this and other biological 
systems is as ones, unlike engineered artefacts, “designed” to keep changing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the essential excitability properties of the neuron” (O’Leary et al. 2013, 
p.E2645). 
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and “designed” to maintain functional stability in the midst of this constant 
change.5  
 
The tensions and strains associated with the application of the basic 
engineering framework to biological systems can be felt more sharply if we 
appeal to a process metaphysics of biological “things” (Dupré 2012). According 
to this view, organisms are not substances but processes—items whose 
existence depends on the taking place of certain changes. This highlights the 
fact that the life of organisms depends on a continual turnover of its 
component parts, and that the system as a whole, while living, persists longer 
than its parts. Yet features and functions of the organism remain relatively 
stable. For example, memories can endure for decades even though the 
neurons that form them have undergone material change. This stability must 
be achieved—somehow. And so processes for robustness are not cleanly 
distinct from the general maintenance processes which keep the organism 
alive. 
 
The processual nature of neurons is nicely described by Marder and Goaillard 
(2012, p.563): 
“each neuron is constantly rebuilding itself from its constituent proteins, 
using all of the molecular and biochemical machinery of the cell.”  
(and see F n 4) 
                                                        
5  This blurring of the lines between mechanisms for robustness and 
mechanisms for life is highlighted by Edelman & Gally (2001: 13763) in their 
discussion of the difference between redundancy and degeneracy in biological 
systems: “the term redundancy somewhat misleadingly suggests a property 
selected exclusively during evolution, either for excess capacity or for fail-safe 
security. We take the contrary position that degeneracy is not a property 
simply selected by evolution, but rather is a prerequisite for and an 
inescapable product of the process of natural selection itself.” They also 
discuss another disanalogy between engineered and biological systems—the 
applicability of “design” talk.  
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We can contrast this with the substance metaphysics that we usually assume 
when thinking about engineered artefacts. A bridge or an aeroplane is what 
it is because of the parts which comprise it. Its existence does not depend on 
the occurrence of any process. This is not to deny that an expert in the theory 
of matter might well argue that the steel of the bridge maintains its integrity 
because of some fundamental processes. The point is that when 
characterising the robustness of the bridge or the aeroplane we would not 
resort to such sophistication. Rather, we think of the bridge as a substance 
and not a process—a steel structure which, in order to maintain its function 
in the face of perturbation, must resist rather than effect the swapping 
around of its component parts.  
 
 
4. EXAMINING REASONS TO RE-ENGINEER 
 
Now that we have noted these disanalogies between biological organisms and 
engineered things, we ought to worry that the framework borrowed from 
engineering is misleading when thinking about robustness in the brain and 
other biological systems. Is it time to re-engineer our conceptual tools for 
thinking about robustness to make them more suitable for characterising 
living things? In this section I consider four possible answers to this question.  
 
4.1 No. The terms in the engineering framework are just words that are used 
to facilitate communication of the neuroscientific results.6   
 
One potential response to the concerns raised in the previous section is that 
they stem from a superficial fixation on the vocabulary neuroscientists use 
when writing about their research. Just because the authors discussed above 
                                                        
6 A response along these lines was suggested to me by Timothy O’Leary, in 
conversation.  
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have employed certain words first introduced by engineers, it does not follow 
that their understanding of neurophysiology is distorted by comparisons with 
engineering. For example, I mentioned that the word “perturbation” has a 
negative connotation which makes it seem inappropriate when describing 
non-pathological and frequent events like ion channel turnover. It could well 
be that in the context of this research the term takes on a different 
meaning—for example, as any event that the system cannot directly control,7 
such as changes in protein configuration due to thermal noise.  
 
I believe that this response is warranted by what we know of the 
methodology of some of the investigations discussed above, but not all of 
them. In the case of Sterling and Freed (2007) I was careful to show that the 
engineering conceptions directly shaped how these neuroscientists 
operationalized and quantified robustness, and how they identified 
mechanisms by which robustness is achieved. There is no indication that they 
used terms such as “safety factor” to mean something radically different in 
the context of neuroscience.   
 
A very explicit statement of the aim to apply engineering principles directly 
to the understanding of the premotor cortex comes from Svoboda (2015): 
“preparatory activity is distributed in a redundant manner across weakly 
coupled modules. These are the same principles used to build robustness 
into engineered control systems. Our studies therefore provide an example 
of consilience between neuroscience and engineering.”  
Thus the convergence between a neurophysiological and the engineering 
perspective on the mouse motor planning system is taken to be an important 
result of this study. This echoes Sterling and Laughlin’s (2015, pp. xiii-xv) 
proposal that enquiring to see how engineering principles are implemented in 
                                                        
7 I thank Timothy O’Leary for this suggestion.  
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neural systems, and the attempt thereby to reverse-engineer the brain, leads 
to insights not otherwise available through routine data collection.  
 
4.2 No. The inadequacies you point out with the engineering framework are 
based on a caricature of mechanical engineering, not the actual complex 
discipline.8 
 
My characterisation of the engineering framework assumes that mechanical 
engineering (the design of bridges, aeroplanes and such like) is paradigmatic 
of the engineering approach in general. But of course there are many 
different kinds of engineering, from mechanical to electronic to 
communications and chemical. It could well be that the mismatch between 
understanding the robustness of a highly dynamic entity like the brain, and 
the rather static conception of robust objects that falls out of the basic 
engineering framework is just an artefact of only focussing narrowly on the 
kind of engineering that is actually furthest away from neuroscience.   
 
It would take me beyond the scope of this short article (and well beyond my 
own knowledge of the subject) to sketch out the various possible frameworks 
associated with each field of engineering specifically, and to see which 
conception of robustness is most suitable for biology. However, what I will say 
is that there is evidence in the studies discussed above that neuroscientists 
themselves do sometimes draw from the mechanically based caricature. This 
is particularly true of Sterling and Freed (2007). In contrast, when Davis 
(2006) and O’Leary (2014) make direct appeal to engineering they refer 
specifically to models in control theory.9 This invites questions, still, about 
whether the paradigm examples of controlled systems (e.g. a car driven on 
                                                        
8 This concern was raised by Arnon Levy and Timothy O’Leary. 
9 See also Zhang and Chase (2015) on the physical control system perspective 
on brain computer interfaces for motor rehabilitation. 
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cruise control, a Watt governor, or an aeroplane flown on autopilot) are 
dynamical enough capture the processual nature of the nervous system.  
 
4.3 Yes. The brain is so different from an engineered artefact that the 
framework is misleading and inappropriate. 
 
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 I discussed two reasons for thinking that we should 
not be concerned about any radical disanalogy between robustness in 
biological and engineered systems. While I agree that these are important 
points to keep in mind, I do not think that they diffuse the fundamental 
concern that when neuroscientists borrow engineers’ terms in order to study 
robustness, they risk mischaracterising the brain as more like an engineered 
artefact than it actually is. Is the appropriate conclusion, then, that a neural 
circuit is so different from a bridge or an aeroplane that the engineering 
framework is simply misleading and should be discarded? 
 
The best way to make this strong negative case is to consider some historical 
examples in which reasoning by analogy with engineered systems seems to 
have lead neuroscientists and theorists astray. One example comes from von 
Békésy, a physicist and communications engineer who turned his attention to 
inhibition in the nervous system.  In his book Sensory Inhibition he notes 
that there are feedback loops everywhere in nervous system and he asks how 
it is that system manages to avoid ending up in a dysfunctional oscillatory 
state (1967, p.25). It seems that von Békésy is importing his understanding of 
systems containing feedback from engineering, and in that context 
oscillations are normally problematic and efforts must be made to dampen 
them. These days neuroscientists seek to understand how oscillations in the 
healthy brain  (i.e. its characteristic patterns of endogenous activity) are 
actually responsible for cognitive functions, and how these oscillations differ 
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from the ones associated with pathologies such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s 
disease.10  
 
Another example is the comparison of the effects of “noise” in brains and 
artificial signalling systems…… GET EXAMPLE 
 This is very different from how neuroscientists understand noise today, 
which begins with the idea that brains evolved under constraints imposed by 
noisy “components”, which has therefore shaped all aspects of neural 
computation (Faisal et al. 2008). It would be a mistake to think of the brain 
processing information in the same way as an electronic computer, but with 
added redundancy to offset the noisiness of individual processing streams. 
 
 
The cautionary tales just told give some concrete indications of how 
imposition of the engineering framework on to neural systems can lead to 
conclusions which in retrospect appear false and misguided. But it would be 
too hasty infer from these two examples that current work on robustness in 
neuroscience is of dubious standing whenever it appeals to the concepts of 
engineering. A more general argument is the following: the brain is not like a 
bridge (or a computer, or an aeroplane on autopilot….); therefore whenever 
neuroscientists appeal to terms borrowed from the analysis of such systems, 
they risk saying things that are simply false because they fail to notice 
relevant disanalogies. This lays all the sceptical cards on the table. In the last 
part of the paper I attempt to mitigate these worries.  
 
                                                        
10 For a scientific overview see Buzsáki (2006).  For discussion of 
philosophical implications, see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013). See also 
Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013, p.160) on a parallel difference across 
engineering and cell biology, where oscillations are found to have a functional 
role. 
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4.4 No. Use of the engineering framework should be thought of as a 
simplifying strategy. 
 
Neuroscientist Steven Rose (2012:61) writes that:  
“one of the most common but misleading terms in the biology student’s 
lexicon is homeostasis….[the] concept of the stability of the body’s internal 
environment. But such stability is achieved by dynamic responses; stasis 
is death, and homeodynamics needs to replace homeostasis as the relevant 
concept”11 
This seems to capture the problem that was first noted in Section 3, that we 
should not be mislead by the engineering framework into thinking of neural 
systems as seeking to maintain an initial stable state. But we also noted that 
the neuroscientists employing control-theoretic models of homeostatic 
mechanisms are not thinking of their systems as seeking stability in this very 
general way. Instead, they are modelling the stability of a specific variable—
in the case of O’Leary et al. (2014), the concentration of Ca2+—and 
investigating the mechanisms by which it is controlled. To this end, it is 
reasonable to interpret the system as an integral controller (p.818).12 Thus it 
is still useful to talk about homeostasis with respect to Ca2+ concentration, 
even while thinking of the system as a whole, and in reality, as a 
“homeodynamic” one. 
 
                                                        
11 Compare Sterling (2012) on the concept of allostasis – stability through 
change with an emphasis on predictive regulation. Day (2005) and O’Leary 
and Wyllie (2011), in contrast, argue that the concept of homeostasis easily 
accommodates these dynamic and predictive aspects, and that the term 
allostasis is therefore superfluous. It is an interesting question (but beyond 
the scope of this paper) whether the narrow or wide definition of homeostasis 
is currently more prevalent amongst biologists and neuroscientists.  
12 Note that O’Leary et al. (2014) study of homeostasis is via a model of a 
neuron. But the model is realistic enough that it is expected to shed light on 
actual biophysical mechanisms. 
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I think of neuroscientists whose investigation of robustness in the brain is 
scaffolded by the engineering framework as providing idealized mechanistic 
explanations. Their explanatory target is, for example, the process by which 
overall neuronal activity level is controlled via regulation of ion channel gene 
transcription through a Ca2+ sensitive feedback loop. This is standard fodder 
for mechanistic explanation. At the same time, the framework of 
engineering—in this case the schematic of the integral controller—serves to 
direct attention to specific parts and processes in the extremely complex 
cellular machinery and to interpret them in control theoretic terms (sensors, 
feedback loops, etc.), while bracketing other aspects not immediately relevant 
to the explanation of robustness.  
 
Bechtel (2015, p.92) has presented the case that: 
“mechanisms are [to be] viewed not as entities in the world, but as posits 
in mechanistic explanations that provide idealized accounts of what is in 
the world.” 
His example is the idealization (understood as “falsehood”) that scientists 
introduce by putting boundaries around putative mechanisms which in 
nature do not exist. In the cases explored in this paper, the idealization 
comes in through the analogical reasoning of treating a neuronal system as if 
it is an engineered artefact. This, like the positing of boundaries, is a useful 
way to simplify the explanandum. It enables neuroscientists to bracket some 
of the known facts about the brain’s messy, Heraclitean nature. But it means, 
perhaps, that there is a stark difference between the brain viewed sub specie 
aeternatis (what some neuroscientists call the “ground truth” of the brain) 
and viewed sub specie mechinae (in the guise of a machine).  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am greatly indebted to Timothy O’Leary, Nancy Nersessian and Peter 
Sterling for their feedback on this work. I would also like to thank the 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -157-
Chirimuuta (forthcoming)  Robustness in Neuroscience 
 
participants of the Fall 2015 workshop on Robustness in Neuroscience for 
discussion of the ideas behind this paper, and the audience at the Spring 
2016 Re-Engineering Biology conference for their questions and comments on 
it. Both of these events were hosted by the Philosophy of Science Center at 
the University of Pittsburgh.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2013). Thinking dynamically about 
biological mechanisms: Networks of coupled oscillators. Foundations of 
Science, 18:707–723  
 
Bechtel, W. (2015). Can mechanistic explanation be reconciled with scale-free 
constitution and dynamics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part 
C, 53: 84–93. 
 
von Békésy, G. (1967). Sensory Inhibition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
Buzsáki, G. (2006). Rhythms of the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Davis, G.W. (2006). Homeostatic control of neural activity: from 
phenomenology to molecular design. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 29, 307–323  
 
Day TA (2005). Defining stress as a prelude to mapping its neurocircuitry: no 
help from allostasis. Prog Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry 29, 1195–
1200  
 
Dupré, J. (2012) Processes of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -158-
Chirimuuta (forthcoming)  Robustness in Neuroscience 
 
Edelman GM, Gally JA (2001) Degeneracy and complexity in biological 
systems. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(24):13763–13768.  
 
Faisal, A., L. P. J. Selen and D. M. Wolpert (2008) Noise in the Nervous 
System. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 9:292-303. 
 
Kitano, H. (2004) Biological robustness. Nature Reviews Genetics. 5: 826-837. 
 
Knuuttila, T. and A. Loettgers (2013). Basic science through engineering? 
Synthetic modeling and the idea of biology-inspired engineering. Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science, Part C 48, 158–169.  
 
 
Marder, E. and Goaillard, J.-M. (2012) Variability, compensation and 
homeostasis in neuron and network function. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 
7:563-574 
 
von Neumann, J. (2000). The Computer and the Brain. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
 
O’Leary T, Williams AH, Caplan JC, Marder E (2013) Correlations in ion 
channel expression emerge from homeostatic tuning rules. PNAS. 110(28): 
809–821  
 
O’Leary T, Williams AH, Franci A, Marder E (2014) Cell types, network 
homeostasis and pathological compensation from a biologically plausible ion 
channel expression model. Neuron 82(4): E2645–E2654.  
 
O’Leary, T. and D. J. A. Wyllie (2011) Neuronal homeostasis: time for a 
change? J Physiol 589.20:4811–4826  
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -159-
Chirimuuta (forthcoming)  Robustness in Neuroscience 
 
 
Rose, S. (2012). The need for a critical neuroscience. In Critical Neuroscience: 
A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience, S. 
Choudhury and J. Slaby (eds.) Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Sporns, O. (2010). Networks of the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Sterling, P. and M. Freed (2007). How robust is a neural circuit? Visual 
Neuroscience, 24, 563–571.  
 
Sterling, P. (2012). Allostasis: A model of predictive regulation. Physiology & 
Behavior 106:5–15  
  
Sterling, P. and S. B. Laughlin (2015). Principles of Neural Design. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Svoboda, K. (2015). Probing Frontal Cortical Networks during Motor 
Planning. Abstract, Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition, 10 November 
2015. http://www.braininstitute.pitt.edu/event/probing-frontal-cortical-
networks-during-motor-planning 
 
Zhang, Y. and S. M. Chase (2015). Recasting brain-machine interface design 
from a physical control system perspective. J Comput Neurosci 39:107–118  
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -160-
Eight Myths about Scientific Realism 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Selective realist projects have made significant improvements over the last two decades. 
Judging by the literature, however, antirealist quarters seem little impressed with the results. Section I 
considers the selectivist case and its perceived shortcomings. One shortcoming  is that selectivist offerings 
are nuanced in ways that deprive them of features that—according to many—cannot be absent from any 
realism “worth  having”. Section II (the main part of the paper) considers eight features widely required of 
realist positions, none of them honored by selectivist projects. Modulo those requirements, even if 
selectivists managed to clear other shortcomings of their project selectivism would still not be a position 
worth considering. Next the historical background and present credentials of the requirements in question 
are examined. All are found to rest on myths and confusions about science and knowledge. If this is correct, 
realists and antirealists should reject the requirements. 
 
I. Background 
The antirealist waves of the 1980s stifled naïve realist projects, but they also gave rise to critical 
realist reactions, particularly a shift in the way theories are accepted at face value from whole 
constructs to selected “theory-parts” (existence claims, narratives and structures regarding 
features beyond the reach of unaided perception). Moves in this “selectivist” direction were 
variously developed in the 1980s and 1990s, most influentially by Leplin (1984), Worrall 
(1989b), Kitcher (1993), Leplin (1997), and Psillos (1999). Selectivists see in the history of 
science a past littered not just with failures but also clear successes, especially after the 
consolidation of methodologies focused on impressive novel prediction in the early 19th century. 
The successes selectivists point to involve law-like structures all over physics, functional (as 
opposed to formally “fundamental”) entities like the particles invoked by the kinetic theory of 
matter, numerous extinct species hypothesized by Darwin and his circle, structures and processes 
from microbiology, much in Mendelian genetics, myriads of  molecular structures, and most of 
the subatomic entities deemed well-established since the 1950s, along countless causal networks, 
histories and functional entities in virtually all theories with warrant in terms of impressive novel 
predictive success. Selectivists thus respond to skeptical readings of the history of science with 
optimistic readings, which they argue are better justified than Laudan (1981)’s skeptical appeals. 
History, Leplin (1984) noted early in the debate on selectivism, is not opposed to realism any 
more than our experience of ordinary objects is unambiguously veridical.  
In selectivist terms, successful scientific theories may provide imperfect representations 
of unobservable aspects of some of their intended domains, but they do get those aspects right to 
some significant extent—and that is what matters to a realist stance. Realism has to do with 
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having warranted augmentative inference at levels that reach into unobservables, i.e. beyond the 
level allowed by its contrast position—constructive empiricism. 
Developing selectivism into a mature project has not proved easy. The initial criteria 
proposed for identifying theory-parts worthy of realist commitment were either too vague or 
picked up through “retrospective” projection of current. As Kyle Stanford (2006) cautioned, 
mere retrospective projection of current science reflects limitations of human imagination as 
easily as it does truth-content and can be variously misleading; also, it can be self-serving, and 
worse still it severely weakens selectivism by giving up the traditional realist goal of identifying 
the truthful parts of a theory while the theory is still alive. Realists need to develop compelling 
criteria for prospective projection, applicable to theories in full flight, and over the last decade 
selectivists have moved imaginatively to respond to this challenge. One promising contribution 
is a stronger emphasis on impressive novel predictions as a marker of success and truth content. 
This trend is multiply developed in works that revisit in detail the cases most used by antirealists 
as springboard exemplars of gross epistemic failure, as well as studies of other seemingly 
germane cases from the last 200 years (e.g. Saatsi 2005, Saatsi & Vickers 2011, Votsis 2011, 
Vickers 2013, @@@). While the debate is far from over, upgraded proposals are on view in the 
selectivist analyses just cited. At the very least, the initial antirealist arguments from radical 
underdetermination and so-called “skeptical inductions” have been weakened by selectivist 
challenges to the antirealist arguments at work. Still, many critics join Stanford in thinking that 
selectivism lacks a convincing realist criterion for prospective identification of theory-parts. As 
said, promising selectivist developments seem on view in this regard, but there is something else.  
Something seems to be making the selectivist project intellectually unattractive in some 
quarters, independently of the issue about the criterion for theory-parts. There is, in particular, a 
perception (not least among many sympathizers of realism) that selectivism advances its case at 
the cost of diluting its realist import, resulting in a stance “not worth having.” By the lights of 
selective realism, an empirically successful theory T contributes significant truths about 
unobservables but  
(1) typically, what makes T approximately true is that abstract versions of some of its 
parts are truthful, making the realist stance applicable to selected fragments of T rather 
than the integral whole initially intended;  
(2) such truth as T contains need not have universal applicability;   
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(3) T need not offer literal truth at its most fundamental level;  
(4) the significance of T’s central terms is high in unificationist rather than epistemic 
terms;  
(5) T adds significantly to our knowledge of unobservables in the intended domain, but 
there is no reason to expect T to be “right for the most part” at any level (what matters is 
that it yields epistemic gain at theoretical levels). 
(6) T may not instantiate uniformly convergent progress towards any “final description;”  
(7) the intelligibility T confers to its intended domain is generally incomplete. 
 
Each of the above tenets clashes head on with widespread assumptions and expectations 
regarding a realist stance about theories. The latter, many believe, should (1) constitute integral 
wholes, (2) apply universally, (3) give correct theoretical description, (4) have central terms that 
refer, (5) be, at least, right for the most part. (6) display epistemic progress, and (7) offer 
substantial intelligibility of the intended domains, Behind these expectations about scientific 
theories and what theoretical claims amount to is a view on what a realist position worth having 
comprises: to be worth having, a realist position must encompass strong versions of most of the 
listed assumptions. Antirealists (and not a few realists) routinely take these assumptions for 
granted. This aspect of the debate needs discussion because, as noted, the assumptions in 
question are clearly at odds with the selectivist strategy, which—generalizing Worrall (2016) a 
bit—might be the only viable realist game in town.  
 
II. Taxing Assumptions  
There is a view, shared by numerous scientists, according to which scientific realism cannot be a 
position worth having unless it encompasses most of the traits listed at the end of the last section. 
One problem with those traits is that they provide antirealists with fodder for criticizing positions 
that embrace them and realists for dismissing positions that lack them. Let us consider the listed 
items in detail. 
 
(1) Theories as Integral Wholes. Selectivism rejects the view that theories and conceptual 
networks are intellectual constructs made of non-separable parts. The integral wholes vision 
commits realism to nothing less than complete theories. Motivations for it come from at least two 
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fronts. One includes linguistic holism and/or the statement view of theories, endorsed in the 
1960s and 1970s by thinkers as superficially different as Ernest Nagel and Thomas Kuhn. 
Another motivation, good for a weaker version of the vision, has been the presumption that some 
concepts are grounded in “metaphysical necessities,” a position widely held in natural science 
until the early 1900s. In the 19th century it was thought that breaking of a theory into 
independently assertible parts had drastic limits. A case in point was the need felt for positing an 
ether of light, as at the time waves were conceived of within a traditional metaphysics that 
regarded them as propagating disturbances and thus as ontologically dependent entities that 
required the existence of something being disturbed (@@@). Institutional deference towards 
similarly presumed conceptual necessities is massively lower now. One major inflection point 
was the acceptance of Einstein’s Special Relativity, which opened the road to changes in both the 
conception of light and the requirements of intelligibility in physics.  
Nobody thinks now that light is completely as Fresnel or Maxwell imagined, yet— 
having no conceptual links closed to the possibility of scientific revision— there is little question 
that Fresnel’s theory got many things right, e.g. what might be termed “Fresnel’s Core”: light is 
made of microscopic transversal undulations, and these undulations follow the Fresnel laws of 
reflection and refraction. Abstracted from reference to the wave substratum, this schematic part 
of the theory spells out a descriptive core that all subsequent theories of light have retained. Once 
conceptual networks are recognized as relations sustained by revisable inductive conjunctions, 
scientific “good sense” allows shifts in science towards theory-parts cut out from the rest. There 
is a historical supplement to this.  There has never been much serious allegiance to theory 
“unbreakability” in scientific practice. As scientists developed their ideas, virtually all took a 
realist stance towards just selected parts of a theory at hand while taking a non-realist stance 
towards other parts (e.g. Newton’s approach towards Kepler’s cosmology and Galileo’s 
mechanics; 19th century wave theorists towards particle theories of light, Einstein towards 
Fresnel’s Core, Einstein towards Newtonian mechanics, molecular geneticists towards 
Mendelian genetics, and so forth). Being selective about what to take at face value in a theory is 
exactly what selective realists do, also what we all do in ordinary life. The idea that proper 
theories are unbreakable integral wholes just rests on myth. 
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(2) Universality. Another widespread assumption is that, for realism, proper scientific theories 
must hold universally. We find this view expressed in e.g. van Fraassen (1980: 86): from a realist 
perspective, he claims, ‘‘a theory cannot be true unless it can be extended consistently, without 
correction, to all of nature’’  
This request rests on myth. There is no reason to think that interesting theories can be so 
extended even at the lowest phenomenal level. Generalizations limited to the observable level 
typically turn out to be true only over restricted ranges, just as with theoretical generalizations. 
The standards of acceptability should not be arbitrarily raised against scientific theories. So, past 
successful theories could not be extended consistently, without correction, to all of nature. 
However, as selectivists show, those theories made significant cognitive gains at significant 
levels, where various assortments of the theoretical descriptions they licensed remain both 
accurate and illuminating. The universality objection, it seems, burdens realism with a suicidal 
demand. 
 
(3) Truthful description. Realists are allegedly claim that what a theory T says about entities, 
properties, relations and processes should be construed literally; and to take a realist stance 
towards T is to believe that what it says is literally true. This view comprises three major lines: 
(3a) literalism, (3b) accuracy realism, and (3c) a methodological supplement.  
 
(3a) Like their biblical counterparts, theory-literalists think one mistake in a narrative is one 
mistake too many.  Phlogiston theory got some of its central claims wrong, as did also Fresnel’s 
theory, Mendel theory, Bohr’s 1913 theory of the hydrogen atom, and countless other theories, 
so those theories were all completely wrong.  
The antirealist uses of literalism are straightforward. If departures from literal accuracy, 
however small, make theories count as different, then the chances of a scientist  ever picking the 
right theory will be wretchedly small (argument of the bad lots). And the probability of 
conjecturing the one (and only one) truthful theory will be hopelessly small (problem of the base 
rate). And, so, at any given time, the chances that the one truthful theory is among the as yet 
“conceived alternatives” will be overwhelmingly low.  
Happily for realists, the expectations in (3a) belong in fairy-tales. Scientific theorizing is 
rarely strictly literalist. Scientists effectively abandoned literalism early in modern times, as they 
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began to articulate explanatory idealizations that carried an expectation that nothing in nature 
exactly realized them. For example, the aim of the kinetic theory of matter developed around 
1860 was to causally account for approximate empirical laws that had been gathered in the two 
previous centuries about the macroscopic behavior of gasses (e.g. PV = nRT ) and materials (e.g. 
thermal expansion).  Crucially, in the case of gases, the accounts invoked structureless point-
particles—the so-called “ideal gas”—that the theorists involved did not believe existed in nature. 
The ideal gas was explicitly an idealization, with a two-fold expectation at work: (i) actual gasses 
are made of non-ideal corpuscles moving at random  and  located at relatively large distances 
from one another “on average”; and (ii) the behavior of those actual corpuscles instantiated that 
of the ideal gas to a significant degree within a certain restricted domain. There was no question 
that ideal gasses literally construed had to be “real” in order to take the theory realistically. 
Scientific theories are likewise generally false in strictly literal fashion. As with maps, the point 
of realist interest is the extent to which a theory’s depictions match the intended domain. 
Theoretical representations of empirical domains resemble maps far more than they do assertions 
(e.g. Giere 2006). Selectivists proceed accordingly: taking a realist stance towards a theory T 
amounts to claiming only that some of the explanations and descriptions distinct to T are correct 
by acceptable standards.  
 
 (3b) In mathematized disciplines literalism easily ups its ante. According to a long lived 
assumption of quantitative exactitude, there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems 
have definite values, and in a correct theory the claims it makes correspond to the world with 
total accuracy. This ideal is found in early modern scientists, notably theorists with strong 
Platonist leanings such as Kepler.  
Dear though these expectations of divine accuracy and depth are, they rest on myth. Such 
correspondence as mathematized theories have to the world is not conditioned to radical 
accuracy. As Bertrand Russell noted on behalf of sound epistemology,  
 
“Although this may seem a paradox, all exact science is dominated by the idea of 
approximation. When a man tells you that he knows the exact truth about anything, you 
are safe in inferring that he is an inexact man. Every careful measurement in science is 
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always given with the probable error [...] every observer admits that he is likely wrong, 
and knows about how much wrong he is likely to be.” (1931: 42) 
 
More recently, in a more comprehensive vein, Paul Teller (2015) complains that “accuracy 
realism” assumes that the quantities invoked by a theory actually refer. But—he notes—this 
misunderstands the fabric of theoretical representation, because theories generally formulate 
idealizations that burden quantitative attributions with failure of specificity in picking concrete 
cases. In the narrowest literal sense, the claim “the meter-standard kept in Paris is 1 meter long” 
may be true only by definition—any attempt to check it with absolute precision against any 
external objective length would be frustrated by, to begin with,  ineliminable thermal and 
quantum mechanical fluctuations. The point is that one-to-one matching makes no sense as a 
goal in scientific language, given that so many descriptive words in science are intrinsically 
vague and/or refer to idealizations. Actual reference to lengths presumes just perspectivally 
acceptable (never absolute) accuracy. At the lowest empirical levels also, completely exact 
assertions are generally neither relevant nor true. This connects with a related point, namely, the 
irrelevancy of these literalist and accuracy assumptions to the actual realism/antirealism debate. 
Shaped by the discussions started in the 1980s, the dispute is now primarily about whether or not 
warranted augmentative scientific inferences reach into unobservable domains. Ordinary realism 
about chairs, cats and mountains fails the ideals of radical literalism and accuracy no less than 
scientific realism.  
 
(3c) The methodological supplement claims that science would be merely an instrumentalist 
affair unless theorists aim to produce a complete description of the way things are, with scientists 
as pursuers of God-like reportage (perfect “mirror reflection”): scientific theories advance 
towards the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth (see e.g. Sankey 2008’s discussion of 
this). Although this position lost much of its ancient appeal in the 18th century, to this day some 
top theoreticians continue to wax lyrical expressing it, especially in “editorials”. 
 
“The ‘theory of everything’ is one of the most cherished dreams of science. If it is ever 
discovered, it will describe the workings of the universe at the most fundamental level 
and thus encompass our entire understanding of nature. It would also answer such 
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enduring puzzles as what dark matter is, the reason time flows in only one direction and 
how gravity works. Small wonder that Stephen Hawking famously said that such a theory 
would be ‘the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then we should know the mind of 
God’ ”.  (New Scientists, 4 March 20101)   
 
This colorful supplement lacks warrant if, as selectivists claim, the realist stance can be 
consistently and fruitfully applied to selected theory-parts.  
 
The realist badge of honor is not awarded for telling the truth, all the truth, and nothing 
like the truth about anything—let alone reading the mind of God. It is a distinction for finite 
cognitive achievements forged with crooked tools. See also (6) below.  
 
(4). Realist Significance of the “Central Tenets” of a Theory. A related common assumption 
is this: Even if truthful description may have limits, taking a theory T realistically requires 
commitment to T’s central tenets (i.e. those about the entities, principles and laws that 
individuate T). In Laudan’s version, realism about T commits to the view that the T’s central 
terms successfully refer.  
There is little question that in numerous scientific theories the central terms fail to refer—
on this point we all have a debt of gratitude to Laudan. However, once theories are no longer 
approached as unbreakable wholes the emphasis on central terms wanes. If anything, the 
reference that matters is that of theory-parts. Then, on the explanatory side, the scientific focus is 
on the structures of possibilities of its intended domain D. As such, a theory is not exclusively 
about the entities and relations invoked at the level of its central terms. Primarily the theory is 
about D, whose relevant entities and structures include those that may be found at intermediate 
levels of description—like Fresnel’s Core. A theory may thus be individuated by its central 
tenets, but the latter do not exhaust the theory’s realist import. The appropriate realist focus is 
those theoretical claims derivable from the theory and for which there is strong evidence (and so 
a strong expectation of truthfulness), not whether the terms involved are “central”, 
“intermediate”, or “peripheral”.  
                                                 
1
  “Knowing the mind of God: Seven theories of everything”, New Scientists, 4 March 2010: 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18612-knowing-the-mind-of-god-seven-theories-of-everything/   
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(5). Being “right for the most part”. Another related assumption links the realist stance 
towards a theory with the claim that the theory is right “for the most part”. Michael Devitt, for 
example, voices this assumption when he defines scientific realism as the doctrine according to 
which “Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist 
mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science” (2005:  769). In 
his view, theories that are well-established theories by today’s methodological standards are right 
for the most part.   
This supposition sounds reasonable at first hearing but it too seems suicidal for realism. 
Virtually all the past theories realists want to be realist about seem to have turned out to be wrong 
“for the most part”—unless “being right” is granted with postmodern largesse.  Newtonian 
mechanics is “right” for a comparatively tiny regime of speeds and fields. Bohr’s theory of the atom 
gets impressive aspects right but otherwise is wrong for the most part of the entire quantum domain. 
Mendel’s theory invites a similar reaction. For all we know, our excellent present physics may be 
wrong for most of the total universe. So, scientifically successful theories seem “wrong for the most 
part”. But they have great realist import, nonetheless.  That import comes from the fact that they get 
right novel significant unobservable aspects of their intended domains. As David Bohm urged long 
ago, piecemeal caution needs to be exercised in one’s realist commitment to the entities, regularities 
and processes invoked by well-established current scientific theories (1957, Chapter V).  Two lines 
of reasoning in particular support this prudence (@@@): (1) Qualities, properties of matter, and 
categories of laws expressed in terms of some finite set of qualities and laws are generally applicable 
only within limited contexts (in terms of ranges of conditions and degrees of approximation). (2) 
There is no reason to suppose that new qualities and laws will always lead to mere correction 
refinements that converge in some simple and uniform way. This may occur in some contexts and 
within some definite range of conditions, but in different contexts and under changed conditions the 
qualities, properties and laws may be quite novel and lead to dramatic effects relative to what 
previous theorizing would have led to expect. For example, for bodies moving with speeds negligible 
compared to the speed of light, the laws of relativity lead to small corrections of the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics. But they also lead to such qualitatively new results as the “rest energy” of 
matter. Further laws yet to discover may be vastly more bizarre.  
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(6) Progress: The realist expectation that successful science achieves cumulative truth content 
about unobservables is frequently nailed to the idea that “modern science is converging on a 
single picture of the world”.  Claims along these lines come in several flavors, in particular (a) 
linear epistemic progressivism and (b) “metaphysical” realism. 
 
(6a) Convergent progress. Léo Errera expressed the idea in his Botanique Générale of 1908: 
“Truth is on a curve whose asymptote our spirit follows eternally2.” This expectation has 
recurrent mystical roots in science. John Herschel, for example, is cited by Marcel de Serres as 
saying “All human discoveries seem to be made only for the purpose of confirming more 
strongly the truths come from on high, and contained in the sacred writings3.” 
Convergent progressivism runs against a recurrent realization in modern science. As 
selectivists recognize, successful theories give knowledge but they usually err at numerous levels of 
description. Successful theories don’t give us everything there is to know about any intended domain, 
let alone ‘The World.’ Finite sets of simple laws can provide correct descriptions and predictions 
when we constrain their context enough, notes Bohm (1957), but we should expect unrestricted 
theories to be false. Many defenders of scientific objectivity have followed suit, stressing the shift 
from traditional searches for a comprehensive world-view to explicitly perspectival searches for 
piece-meal knowledge about domains of current scientific interest, leading to assertions of 
corresponding partiality. 
 
(6b) In no better shape is the claim that realism is committed to the existence of one true and 
complete description of the world, whose truth bears one-to-one correspondence to ‘mind-
independent reality, so that the purpose of science is to discover that description. Critics 
persuasively dismiss this brand or realism. But no knowledgeable realist has held such a position 
in generations. It is a thesis recalled from the grave in the late 1970s and 1980s by Hilary Putnam 
under the label “metaphysical realism,” a view he presented as an example of a hopelessly 
jumbled project (e.g. Putnam, 1978: 49, and 1990: Preface). 
                                                 
2
  Recueil d'Œuvres de Léo Errera: Botanique Générale (1908), 193. As translated in John Arthur Thomson, 
Introduction to Science (1911): 57 
 
3
  Marcel de Serres, 1845. “On the Physical Facts in the Bible Compared with the Discoveries of the Modern 
Sciences”. The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal (Vol. 38): 260.  [239-271] 
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(7) Intelligibility: Another claim often associated with realism is that science aims to provide 
truthful explanations that make the phenomena at hand intelligible. This condition comes in (a) 
radical and (b) moderate strengths. The radical version calls for explanations that leave the 
intellect content and with no further whys. The weak condition calls for explanations that make 
the target phenomena more but not necessarily fully intelligible. 
 
(7a) Leibniz’s rationalist objection to Newton’s Theory of Gravitation exemplifies the radical 
version. He complained that if gravity were thought as a real force, then its effect would be a 
mysterious action at a distance. Leibniz blamed Newton for introducing “occult” forces into 
science, and until the end of his life Newton hoped to produce a properly “intelligible” account 
of gravity involving only action by contact interactions—he did not succeed. Modern scientific 
theories do not provide radical intelligibility. Once Galileo gave up his initial hope of presenting 
inertial motion as uniform circular motion, the theory of free fall he accepted left open at least as 
many whys as it closed. Why or how Galileo’s mysterious mathematical structures arise in 
nature? The same goes for subsequent theorizing. Why or how the regularity given as Newton’s 
law of gravitation arises? Why or how Fresnel’s Core arise? Why or how the speed of light is a 
universal invariant?  Contemporary fundamental theories fail radical intelligibility just as clearly.   
Realists need not worry about this. Calls for radical intelligibility rest on views of 
cognition now widely recognized as mythical. Barring mystical insight and such, all actual 
understanding comes with opaque spots. At every scientific stage scientific warrant (and 
intelligibility) stops somewhere, albeit usually not at the traditional empiricist boundaries. 
Realism is compatible with suspending judgment about whether a certain theoretical claim 
correctly describes a fundamental or derivative aspect of nature. This is exemplified in the stance 
realists take towards e.g. Fresnel’s Core, the invariance of light’s speed, and fundamental 
principles in general.  
A theory that saves all the known phenomena but whose reliable parts comprise only 
structures and explanations at phenomenal levels, provides the lowest level of understanding. 
This makes for a constructive empiricist take, which escapes skepticism by accepting realism 
about just the theory’s empirical substructures. The point here is that radical theoretical 
intelligibility is not necessary for taking a realist stance towards a theory. From a selectivist 
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perspective, the key factor for taking a theory-part realistically is not the “intelligibility” it 
confers but its indispensability for maintaining the theory’s predictive power in the context of 
current background knowledge. Ptolemaic orbits were denied realist interpretation not primarily 
because they failed the intelligibility requirement—Ptolemaic constructions went out of their 
way to honor, of all requirements, intelligibility (then guided by the Principle of Uniform 
Circular Motion for heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian arguments for the fixity of the Earth). 
Rather, Ptolemaic orbits were refused realist interpretation because the epicycles, deferents and 
equants they invoked were grossly underdetermined by extant knowledge (i.e. available data and 
cosmological principles). Positive evidence for the orbits specifically proposed was lacking.  
None of this is not to question the realist relevance of theories that seek to achieve deep 
understanding. What is denied is that scientific realism must embrace radical intelligibility. 
Radical intelligibility is a trait realism about observables and every day affairs neither honors nor 
is expected to honor.  
 
(7b) This brings us to cogent versions of the moderate intelligibility condition. Selectivists take a 
realist stance only towards theory-parts deemed to be both indispensable for the theory’s success 
and free of compelling specific doubts against them (@@@). That is, the realist stance goes only 
to tenets for which there is strong positive evidence by modern scientific standards.  In all the 
cases highlighted by realists, the selections supported by the strongest level of evidence available 
make the target domain intelligible well beyond the observable levels. When, by contrast, the 
positive evidence for a theory does not reach the unobservable explanatory posits that make the 
relevant phenomena intelligible, then the best stance to take about the theory is not realism but 
constructive empiricism. This clarifies what introductory characterizations of scientific realism 
get right about the intelligibility condition: A good theory must not have just significant 
predictive power but must also make the relevant phenomena intelligible (Richard DeWitt 2010: 
72). If the theory parts that do this lack evidential warrant, then the reasonable stance towards 
them is constructive empiricism. 
 
(8) Realism Worth having. Topping the above assumptions, there is a popular notion to the 
effect that a realist stance failing to adhere to most of the above requirements is “not a realism 
worth having”. Against this idea, I have argued that none of the listed assumptions is worth 
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having. Every one of them lacks convincing warrant. Moreover, even if the assumptions did get 
proper warrant they face a deeper problem: the assumptions are irrelevant to the current 
realism/antirealism debate—they do not expose relevant contrasts between inferences limited to 
the phenomenal level and inferences that reach into theoretical levels.  
In modern science, virtually all interesting augmentative inferences violate the listed 
assumptions. So, the latter simply and arbitrarily raise the epistemological standards of 
acceptability against theoretical assertions. If the above considerations are correct, then, realists 
and antirealists should reject the assumptions examined in this paper—they all rest on 
counterproductive myths and confusions.   
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one organized whole (the model) fits another organized whole (the target). This approach 
is largely motivated by the implausibility of Michael Weisberg’s weighted feature-
matching account of the model-world relationship, where a set-theoretic conception of the 
structures of models is assumed. To show the failure of Weisberg’s account and the 
plausibility of my approach, a concrete model, i.e. the San Francisco Bay model, is 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One philosophical interest in the philosophy of modelling focuses on the problem of the 
model-world relationship, also known as the representation problem. Among many 
approaches to this problem, the similarity account has attracted much attention recently. 
Ronald Giere (1988, 1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2010), Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Michael 
Weisberg (2012, 2013) have made the most substantial contributions. 
  The core of this account, first developed by Giere, is a view of the model-world 
relationship: 
The appropriate relationship, I suggest, is similarity. Hypotheses, then, claim a 
similarity between models and real systems. But since anything is similar to anything 
else in some respects and to some degree, claims of similarity are vacuous without at 
least an implicit specification of relevant respects and degrees. The general form of a 
theoretical hypothesis is thus: Such-and-such identifiable real system is similar to a 
designated model in indicated respects and degrees. (Giere 1988, 81; author’s 
emphasis) 
  However, critics point out that this account is only schematic since it falls short of 
specifying the relevant respects and degrees (Suárez 2003). Moreover, Giere argues that a 
philosophical account of scientific representation should also take into consideration 
factors such as the roles played by scientists, and the intentions those scientists have 
when modelling (Giere 2004, 2010). Given these considerations, Weisberg develops a 
more sophisticated similarity account, called the weighted feature-matching account 
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(2012, 2013). The basic idea of his account comes from psychologist Amos Tversky’s 
contrast account of similarity, which states that the similarity of objects a and b depends 
on the features they share and the features they do not. In light of this, Weisberg proposes 
his own account: 
S (m, t) = 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm) 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm)+ αf(MaTa)+ ȕf(MmTm)+ Ȗf(TaMa)+ δf(TmMm)            (1) 
f(x) refers to the weighting function, α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ denote weighting terms 
(parameters), subscripts a and m stand for attributes and mechanisms,1 and M denotes the 
model and T the target. (Ma∩Ta) stands for attributes shared by the model and the target, 
(MaTa) attributes that the model has while the target does not, and (TaMa) attributes that 
the target has while the model does not. The same story goes for mechanisms m. 
Attributes and mechanisms as a whole are called features of the model and the target. 
      An interpretation for this equation is needed. First, there must be a feature set Δ, and 
the set of features of the model and the set of features of the target are defined as sets of 
features in Δ. The elements of Δ are determined by a combination of context, 
conceptualization of the target, and the theoretical goals of the scientist. Besides, the 
                                                          
1
 Properties and patterns of systems are termed attributes, and the underlying mechanisms 
generating these properties and patterns are termed mechanisms (Weisberg 2013, 145). 
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contents of Δ may change through time as science develops, which in turn might result in 
a reevaluation of the established model-world relationship (Ibid., 149). 
      Second, consider the values of weighting parameters α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ. On Weisberg’s 
account, different kinds of modelling require different weighting parameters. For example, 
if what interests us is the minimal modelling which concerns merely the mechanism 
responsible for bringing about the phenomenon of interest, the goal of this modelling is 
written as:2 
Mm∩Tm 
       ——————————————      1 
                                          Mm∩Tm+MaTa+MmTm                                          (2) 
Finally, consider the weighting function f(x), telling us the relative importance of each 
feature in the set Δ. Weisberg says scientists in most cases have in their mind some subset 
of the features in Δ, which they regard as especially important. Hence some features are 
weighted more heavily, while others are equally weighted. Besides, the background theory 
determines which features in Δ should be weighted more heavily. If the background theory 
is not rich enough, deciding which should be weighted more heavily is partly an empirical 
problem. 
 Having presented an outline of Weisberg’s account, I will now argue that this account 
fails to capture the relationship between concrete models and their targets. To illustrate this 
                                                          
2
 Weisberg also describes three other kinds of modelling requiring different weighting 
parameters: hyperaccurate, how-possibly and mechanistic modelling (2013, 150-52). 
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shortcoming (Sec. 3), I will first describe the San Francisco Bay model (Sec. 2). Sec. 4 will 
propose a holistic alternative to Weisberg’s account, suggesting that the model-world 
relationship be viewed as an overall structural fit where one organized whole fits another 
organized whole. Sec. 5 will examine a case where the organization of the whole can be 
treated as simply another feature. 
 
2. The San Francisco Bay Model 
 
John Reber worried about the fragility of the water supply in the San Francisco Bay area in 
the 1950s. To solve this problem, he proposed an ambitious proposal, namely, to dam up 
the Bay. Carrying out this plan would not only supply San Francisco with unlimited 
drinking water but also entirely change the area’s transportation, industrial, military and 
recreation landscape (Weisberg 2013, 1). However, his critics worried that Reber’s plan 
would only achieve its aims at the cost of destroying commercial fisheries, rendering the 
South Bay a brackish cesspool, creating problems for the ports of Oakland, Stockton, and 
Sacramento, and so on (Jackson and Peterson 1977; Cf. Weisberg 2013, 1).  
      To settle this dispute, the Army Corps of Engineers was charged with investigating the 
overall influence of the Reber plan by building a massive hydraulic scale model of the Bay 
(Weisberg 2013, 1-2). Once the model was built, it was adjusted to accurately reproduce 
several measurements of the parameters such as tide, salinity, and velocities actually 
recorded in the Bay (for details see Army Corps of Engineers 1963). After the adjustment, 
it was time to verify the model: 
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Agreement between model and prototype for the verification survey of 21-22 
September 1956, and for other field surveys, was excellent. Tidal elevations, ranges 
and phases observed in the prototype were accurately reproduced in the model. Good 
reproduction of current velocities in the vertical, as well as in the cross section, was 
obtained at each of the 11 control stations in deep water and at 85 supplementary 
stations. The salinity verification tests for the verification survey demonstrated that 
for a fresh-water inflow into the Bay system […], fluctuation of salinity with tidal 
action at the control points in the model was in agreement with the prototype 
(Huggins and Schultz 1967, 11). 
After the verification, modellers were in a good position to assess the Reber plan through 
the model built. The investigation showed that it would considerably reduce water-surface 
areas, reduce the velocities of currents in most of South San Francisco Bay, reduce the 
tidal discharge through the Golden Gate during the tidal cycle, and so forth (Huggins and 
Schultz 1973, 19). Given these disastrous consequences, the Army Corps then denounced 
Reber’s plan (Weisberg β01γ, 9). 
 
3. How Could Weisberg’s Account Shed Light on the Bay Model? 
 
I have argued elsewhere that Weisberg’s account cannot shed light on mathematical 
models due to its atomistic conception of features and its assumption of the set-theoretic 
approach to model structures (citation anonymized). I find that the same charges can be 
raised in the case of concrete models. 
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        Consider the first charge: Weisberg’s account is committed to an atomic conception 
of features. The key of Weisberg’s account is the claim that the similarity of objects a and 
b depends on the features they share and the features they do not share. Let us take a closer 
look at the equation (1). The numerator invites us to weight features shared, and the 
denominator asks us to weight all features involved (including three feature subsets: 
features shared, features possessed by the model but not the target, and features possessed 
by the target but not the model). Each feature is weighted independently and only once, 
with it falling into one of the three feature subsets. The numerator is the weighted sum of 
features shared, the denominator is the weighted sum of features shared and unshared, and 
the similarity measure is the ratio of the numerator to the denominator. 
  However, features in the Bay model are not atomistic and independent of each other. 
As Huggins and Schultz put it explicitly, “Among the problems to be considered were the 
conservation of water […]; […] the tides, currents and salinity of the Bay as they affect 
other problems […]. None of these problems can be studied separately, for each affects the 
others” (1973, 12). The reason why none of these problems can be studied separately is 
because factors involved in these problems cannot be studied separately. 
  Consider, for instance, the relationship between two key features in the model: tide and 
salinity. Salinity levels vary along an estuary depending on the mixing of freshwater and 
saltwater at a site. An estuary “is the transition between a river and a sea. There are two 
main drivers: the river that discharges fresh water into the estuary and the sea that fills the 
estuary with salty water, on the rhythm of the tide” (Savenije 2005, Preface ix). 
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  To illustrate this “rhythm of the tide”, consider the effect of the spring-neap tidal cycle 
on the vertical salinity structure of the James, York and Rappahannock Rivers, Virginia, 
U.S.A.: 
 Analysis of salinity data from the lower York and Rappahannock Rivers (Virginia, 
U.S.A.) for 1974 revealed that both of these estuaries oscillated between conditions of 
considerable vertical salinity stratification and homogeneity on a cycle that was 
closely correlated with the spring-neap tidal cycle, i.e. homogeneity was most highly 
developed about 4 days after sufficiently high spring tides while stratification was 
most highly developed during the intervening period. (Haas 1977, 485) 
This short report shows not only that characteristics of salinity (such as stratification and 
homogeneity) are influenced by characteristics of the tide, but also that there is a phase 
connection (or synchronization) between tidal cycle and salinity oscillations. The former is 
a causal relationship while the latter is a temporal relationship. The phase connection 
among features was also emphasized by the Army Corps when verifying the Bay model, 
saying “These gages were installed in the prototype and placed in operation several months 
in advance of the date selected to collect the primary tidal current and salinity data required 
for model verification, since it was essential to obtain all data simultaneously for a given 
tide over at least one complete tidal cycle of 24.8 hours” (196γ, 50; my emphasis). 
Moreover, the same story goes for tide and tidal currents (for details see Army Corps 1963, 
20). 
  In short, features in a model bear not only causal relationships, but also temporal 
relationships to one another. This implies that, when verifying the model, features of the 
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model causally interact with each other in producing certain outputs (e.g. predictions, 
effects, phenomena, etc.), rather than that they individually or separately produce outputs. 
So although outputs of key features in the Bay model can be identified and measured 
separately, they are not produced separately. 
  It is important to note that the causal interaction among features may lead to a different 
kind of interaction, i.e. a “similarity interaction”,3 wherein features interact with one 
another in producing the similarity value. That is, one feature’s contribution to the 
similarity value depends on other feature(s)’ contribution to that value.4 The difference 
between causal and similarity interaction is that the latter is a statistical relationship among 
measured features, and can be viewed as a reflection of the former when coupled with an 
assumption that there might be such an underlying causal structure.5 For example, a 
similarity interaction is shown by the verification of salinity in the Bay model, where the 
measurement of salinity (as a measurement of one feature’s contribution to the similarity 
                                                          
3
 I thank X for suggesting this term for me. 
4
 This point can be best illustrated with the curve fitting example: when computing the fit 
of a straight line y=ax+b to a cloud of points, a and b will depend on each other to produce 
the best fit (I thank X for giving me this example). 
5
 This assumption is important because there are cases where the fact that there is 
similarity interaction cannot guarantee that there is also causal interaction, because some 
randomly generated data set may also show interaction among features. In other words, 
causal interaction can lead to similarity interaction and the reverse is not true (I thank Y for 
letting me know this). I will discuss this assumption, called “precondition” later, in Sec. 4. 
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value from Weisberg’s perspective) depended on other features in the way in which other 
features were kept constant: “salinity phenomena in the model were in agreement with 
those of the prototype for similar conditions of tide, ocean salinity, and fresh-water inflow” 
(Ibid., 54; my emphasis). 
  The way that similarity interaction reflects causal interaction, when coupled with the 
assumption mentioned above, can be expressed as follows: if what is under verification is a 
causal structure to which modellers do not have direct access (so the structure cannot be a 
feature in Weisberg’s formula), then the coherent behavior of features (i.e. their similarity 
interactions such as phase connections) is a way of verifying, or at least indicating, the 
causal interactions in the underlying causal structure.6 That is the reason why it was so 
essential to obtain all data simultaneously within a complete tidal cycle for the Bay model, 
and why all other features must be kept constant when verifying salinity (or other features). 
  Given features’ causal interactions in the model and their similarity interactions when 
measuring them, it seems that assessing the relationship between a model and its target 
cannot be simply achieved in the way suggested by Weisberg’s equation, for features’ 
contribution to the similarity relationship is not additive but interactive. That is, to assess 
the relationship between a model and its target, one cannot measure each feature’s 
contribution independently and then add them together. 
 
4. Set-Theoretic or Non-Set-Theoretic? A Holistic Alternative 
 
                                                          
6
 I thank X for bringing this point to my attention. 
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Now we arrive at the problem of why Weisberg’s account is deeply committed to an 
atomistic conception of features. As I have argued elsewhere, this problem ultimately 
comes down to Weisberg’s understanding of the structure of models (citation anonymized). 
Weisberg says models are interpreted structures (2013, 15), so concrete models are 
interpreted concrete structures. At first glance, I have no quarrel with this understanding. 
On closer inspection, however, it can be shown that Weisberg’s account on the model-
world relationship assumes a set-theoretic approach to the structure of models.7 This is 
because Weisberg’s similarity measure can be derived from the Jaccard similarity 
coefficient between two sets, a coefficient assuming a set-theoretic conception of objects 
(citation anonymized). 
  The key to the set-theoretic approach to structures is its assumption that elements of 
objects (i.e. models and targets) are independent of each other, just as elements of a set are 
independent of each other. In other words, it construes both the model and the target as a 
set of independent elements, the similarity between which consists in the ratio of the 
number of elements shared to the number of all elements (citation anonymized). However, 
as discussed in Sec. 3, features are not independent. More importantly, their causal 
interactions may result in a similarity interaction among features. 
  This similarity interaction undermines Weisberg’s account, for it cannot properly 
capture the dependence relationship of features’ contribution to the overall similarity 
                                                          
7
 Note that Weisberg explicitly objects to the set-theoretic approach to models (2013, 137-
42). However, I think it is compatible to claim that someone implicitly assumes what 
someone explicitly rejects. 
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measure between a model and a target. Nonetheless, there is still a way to save the very 
intuitive notion of similarity, by abandoning the set-theoretic conception of structures. That 
is, if the structure of a model is viewed as an organized whole in which each component of 
the whole is interconnected to other component(s) (directly or indirectly) in such a way 
that they interact with one another in producing certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). 
Under such an understanding, therefore, assessing the relationship between a model and its 
target cannot be simply achieved by assessing each individual feature’s relationship and 
then adding them together. Nor can this be done by assessing each connection among two 
or more features and then adding them together, even if connections (causal or non-causal) 
are also interpreted as features. On the other hand, however, the notion of similarity can be 
minimally preserved by claiming that assessing the similarity or fit (I will use fit hereafter) 
between a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit between the 
model and its target. 
  Generally speaking, structural fit means the structure of the model fits the structure of 
the target as an organized whole. That said, nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is 
no univocal meaning for the term “structural fit” that could encompass all circumstances, 
nor can a single equation or formula capture all situations. This is largely due to the 
heterogeneity of modelling practice and its multifarious goals. On the other hand, however, 
instructive points can still be asserted. In what follows I will elaborate some basics 
regarding the conception of “structural fit”. 
      Structural fit in mathematical modelling means different things than in concrete 
modelling. For example, in a very simple case of curve fitting where a straight line y=ax+b 
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is fitted to a cloud of points, features a and b will interact with each other to produce the 
best fit. That is, what fits the cloud of points is the overall structure, not the additive sum of 
each individual feature. As I have argued elsewhere, in more complicated mathematical 
modelling such as the maximum likelihood estimation, the fit is usually achieved through 
comparing the predicted data set derived from the model as a whole to the observed data 
set derived from the target system (citation anonymized). Individual features of the model 
simply disappear, and causally related features, as constituting a whole, that co-occur in the 
data set are what really matters. 
    In the case of concrete modelling, admittedly, the claim that assessing the fit between 
a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit seems to be less 
apparent. On closer examination, however, the same claim still holds. Let us go back to the 
verification of the Bay model. At first glance, it seems the verification of the model was 
achieved by independently verifying the output (i.e. data sets) of each individual feature, as 
the report showed (see Sec. 2 for the verification report). That is, it seems that by verifying 
that each feature in the model fits its counterpart in the target, scientists made the judgment 
that the model fits the target system. 
  Underlying this seemingly plausible reasoning, however, there remains the problem of 
why we are allowed to confirm the verification of the model by means of only verifying 
several outputs of individual features. Or, to put it slightly differently, in terms of what 
does the fit of features guarantee the judgment about the fit of the model to the target? I 
take it that it is more than the fit of individual features themselves that makes sense of the 
reasoning that the model fits the target. There must be a precondition for this reasoning 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -187-
   
(remember the “assumption” made in the last section). After all, there are many cases in 
which the fit of features does not guarantee the fit of the model itself to the target. For 
instance, a drawing of Tom’s face may accurately capture all features of his face, e.g., nose, 
eyes, mouth, etc., but still falls short of fitting his face, because of the wrong organization 
of these features, e.g., putting the mouth in between the eyes and nose (Weisberg would 
argue that the organization could be a feature. I will discuss this point in Sec. 5.). 
  So if the fit of features is insufficient to vindicate the fit of a model to its target, what 
could provide this vindication? My claim is, contrary to Weisberg, that it is the overall 
structural fit of the model to the target system that warrants the fit judgment about the 
model and its target. In other words, the fit of individual features can only succeed in 
supporting the fit of the model to the target by the precondition that these features can be 
organized into the whole (i.e. the assumption that there is such an underlying causal 
structure), not the other way around. 
  To understand this “holistic reasoning”, let me articulate the specifics involved step by 
step. We first build a concrete model, i.e. a concrete structure, wherein features are 
interconnected with one other in such a way that they have the potential to interactively 
produce certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). Before verifying the model, we need 
to adjust key features to make sure the model works very well. Note that any adjustment 
will not simply be the adjustment of individual features but also of their interconnections, 
resulting in the adjustment of the overall structure of the model. Finally, we verify the 
model by comparing the outputs of the model to the outputs of the target. As with 
mathematical models, this verification is also usually made via comparing data sets, as 
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shown in the Bay model. Note that though these outputs can be identified, derived and 
measured independently, it is causally connected features that interact in producing them. 
In other words, although you verify each feature separately, the support provided by a 
single feature is not confined to that feature of the model, but confirms all aspects of the 
model that are involved in generating that output. 
  Thus understood, therefore, the gist of verifying a concrete model such as the Bay 
model can be captured as follows. The verification of each feature, as a component of a 
whole, is simply the verification of one aspect of the structure. So the verification of 
different features is the verification of the same structure from different perspectives. Thus, 
if the model is an organized whole, then the more features that are independently verified 
the more likely it is that the model resembles the reality. On the other hand, if what is 
under verification is not an organized whole but an aggregation of independent items, then 
the verification of each lends no credence to other parts of the aggregated whole—because 
these items are not causally linked, the verification of each item is only the verification of 
that item itself. 
  In sum, the relationship between a concrete model and its target is a holistic matter 
wherein an organized whole fits (to a certain degree) or fails to fit another organized whole. 
Though it seems at first blush that the verification of the whole results from the sum of the 
verification of each component, the real picture is just the reverse: the whole is always in 
place and the component can gather force in supporting the verification of the whole only 
when it can be organized into the whole. 
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5. Organization and Features 
 
As mentioned above, Weisberg would argue that the organization could be a feature, so a 
drawing of Tom’s face capturing accurately not only his nose, mouth, eyes but also their 
organization can be a good model of Tom’s face. A holistic account agrees that 
organization could be a feature, but disagrees with the way that organization is treated in 
Weisberg’s similarity measure. Intuitively, we may say that a drawing of one person’s face 
is a good model if it has the right features: such as a nose, a mouth, eyes, and the 
organization of all of these. So it seems that if you get each individual feature right, then 
you get the whole model right. That is, features additively contribute to the goodness of the 
model. 
      This intuitive way of understanding scientific modelling, however, obscures the fact 
that features may interact in producing the fit of a model, as shown in Sec. 4. To reiterate 
this point and to draw a connection to our current discussion, consider another ordinary 
example.8 Suppose Anne’s face is an ideal one which scientists want to model. Anne has 
an ideal nose, which is straight, in contrast to a non-ideal nose, which might be bumped or 
concave. She also has an ideal nostril, which is round, in contrast to a non-ideal one, which 
might be triangular or square. Scientist A draws a face for Anne that has a round nostril 
and a concave nose, while scientist B draws a face that has a triangular nostril and a 
bumped nose. Drawing A has an ideal feature (the round nostril), but neither feature of 
drawing B is ideal. Now we ask which drawing better fits Anne’s face. It is likely that we 
                                                          
8
 I thank X for giving me this nice example. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -190-
   
will say that B is better because our contemporaries’ taste tells us that there is no face so 
ugly as one with a round nostril and a concave nose, though a round nostril itself is ideal. 
Hence we see a case wherein the nostril and nose interact to produce the fit of a model to a 
target. 
      This discussion leads to a more general question: what are features? In Weisberg’s 
account, a model can more or less fit a target, but features are either shared or not. Yet as 
Wendy Parker points out, “relevant similarities often seem to occur at the level of 
individual features, not just at the level of the model” (β015, β7γ). This is because features 
themselves can be objects such that they more or less fit each other.9 Weisberg may argue 
that this problem can be fixed by the assumption that a feature can be redescribed as a set 
of sub-features, so the similarity between two features can be measured as the result of the 
similarity between their sub-features. However, I see this treatment as a non-starter, for the 
similarity between sub-features may also be a matter of degree such that it should be 
measured as the result of the similarity between their sub-sub-features, and between their 
sub-sub-sub-features, and so on. 
      On the other hand, a holistic account does not encounter this problem: if a feature is an 
object, then it can be viewed as an organized whole. So the relationship between a feature 
in a model and a feature in a target also consists in their structural fit. Take a minimal 
model for instance. Most minimal models primarily attempt to represent repeatable 
patterns of behavior largely insensitive to underlying microscopic details (Batterman 2002, 
27). Suppose we are interested in the buckling behavior of struts, and write a 
                                                          
9
 I thank X for bringing this to my attention. 
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phenomenological formula, called Euler’s formula, to characterize it (see Batterman β00β 
for details). It seems the pattern of behavior is the only feature involved in this case, i.e., a 
dependence relationship among several parameters. So assessing the fit between the model 
and the target comes down to assessing the fit between the feature in the model and the 
feature in the target. For this, a holistic account can easily come through: the relationship is 
an overall structural fit, wherein a dependence relationship as a feature fits another 
dependence relationship. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the assumption of a set-theoretic approach to structures makes 
Weisberg’s account fail to shed light on the San Francisco Bay model. Alternatively, a 
holistic approach to models, viewing the model-world relationship as an overall structural 
fit, fares better not only in capturing the Bay model, but more generally in making sense of 
modelling practice. 
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PROBABILISTIC ACTUAL CAUSATION
LUKE FENTON-GLYNN
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ABSTRACT. Actual (token) causes – e.g. Suzy’s being exposed to asbestos –
often bring about their effects – e.g. Suzy’s suffering mesothelioma – prob-
abilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to tackle one of the thornier
difficulties for traditional accounts of probabilistic actual causation: namely
probabilistic preemption.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Actual (token) causation is the relation that obtains when, for example, Suzy’s being exposed
to asbestos causes her to suffer mesothelioma. A number of theorists (e.g. Halpern and Pearl
2001, 2005; Hitchcock 2001, 2007; Weslake 2016) have deployed structural equations mod-
els (SEMs) in developing novel solutions to difficulties confronting traditional accounts of
this relation. These theorists have focused on deterministic actual causation (DAC).1 I draw
on probabilistic causal models (PCMs) – analogues of deterministic SEMs – to provide an
account of probabilistic actual causation (PAC). I don’t attempt to show that my account can
handle the full battery of test cases discussed in the literature. I simply demonstrate that it
yields an elegant treatment of one very central case – probabilistic preemption – with a view
to motivating further investigation of formal approaches to PAC.
2. PROBABILITY-RAISING
Probability-raising is central to the account developed here – as on traditional accounts of
PAC.2 To explain how I will understand that notion a bit of stage-setting is required.
I take the relata of the actual causal relation to be variable values. Adopting Goldszmidt
and Pearl’s (1992, 669–70) notation, P(W = w|do(V = v)) represents the probability forW =
w that would obtain if V were set to V = v by an ‘intervention’ (Woodward 2005, 98). This
is liable to diverge from the conditional probability P(W = w|V = v): witness the difference
between the probability of a storm conditional upon the barometer needle pointing toward the
1Cf. Halpern and Pearl (2005, 852); Hitchcock (2007, 498).
2Reichenbach (1971, 204); Suppes (1970); Lewis (1986, 175–84); Menzies (1989). The
deficiencies of these accounts have been demonstrated by e.g. Salmon (1984, 192–202);
Menzies (1996, 85–96); Hitchcock (2004).
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word ‘storm’ and the probability of a storm if I had intervened upon the barometer needle to
point it toward ‘storm’.
Variable X taking value X = x (rather than X = x ′) raises the probability of Y = y in the
relevant sense iff:3
(1) P(Y = y|do(X = x))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′))
Appealing to interventionist probabilities means avoiding probability-raising relations be-
tween independent effects of a common cause, such as the barometer reading and the storm
(cf. Lewis 1986, 178).
Probabilistic preemption cases illustrate that straightforward probability-raising is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for causation (Menzies 1989, 1996).
3. PROBABILISTIC PREEMPTION
The following example is inspired by Anscombe (1971).4
3Here and throughout, the probabilities (chances) should be taken to be those obtaining
immediately after the interventions bringing about the variable values specified in the scope
of the do(·) function have occurred (cf. Lewis 1986, 177).
4The probabilities involved (except the decision probabilities) are quantum and therefore
objective and able underwrite causal relations. (If you’re worried that the decision probabil-
ities are not objective, the example could be complicated so that the decisions are made on
the basis of outcomes of quantum measurements.) I find it plausible that the probabilities of
many high level sciences are also objective (cf. e.g. Loewer 2001; Ismael 2009).
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(ProbPre) Someone (neither you nor I) has connected a Geiger counter to a bomb so that the
bomb will explode if the Geiger registers above a threshold reading. I place a place a chunk
of U-232 (half-life = 68.9 years; decays by α-emission) near the Geiger. By chance, enough
U-232 atoms decay within a short enough interval for the Geiger to reach the threshold read-
ing so that the bomb explodes. Unbeknownst to me, you’ve been standing nearby observing.
You have a chunk of Th-228 (half-life = 1.9 years; decays by α-emission), which contains
many more atoms than my chunk of U-232. You’ve decided that you’ll place your Th-228
near the Geiger iff I fail to place my U-232 near the Geiger. There’s a negligible chance that
you won’t follow the course of action you’ve decided on. Seeing that I place my U-232 near
the Geiger, you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger.5
Let M, D, Y , T , and E be binary variables which, respectively, take value 1 if the following
things occur (and 0 otherwise): I place my U-232 near the Geiger; you decide to place your
Th-228 near the Geiger iff I don’t place my U-232 near the Geiger; you place your Th-228
near the Geiger; the threshold reading is reached; the bomb explodes.
My act (M= 1) was an actual cause of the explosion (E = 1). Yet plausibly the following
inequality holds:
(2) P(E = 1|do(M = 1))< P(E = 1|do(M = 0))
5The range of α-particles is 3-5 cm. Suppose that, for each of us, a decision to place our
chunk ‘near’ the Geiger counter is a decision to place it < 5cm away and a decision not to
place it nearby is a decision to place it nowhere near (≫ 5cm away).
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That is, my placing my U-232 near the Geiger lowers the probability of the bomb exploding
because it strongly lowers the probability of your placing your more potent Th-228 near the
Geiger. Probability-raising is therefore unnecessary for actual causation.
Your decision (D = 1) was not an actual cause of the explosion, since you don’t place
your Th-228 near the Geiger. Yet provided there’s some chance thatM = 0, the following
inequality holds:
(3) P(E = 1|do(D= 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
Inequality (3) holds because your decision raises the probability that the bomb will still ex-
plode in the scenario in whichM = 0.6 Probability-raising is therefore insufficient for actual
causation.
Actual causation therefore can’t be identified with probability-raising. In developing a
more nuanced analysis, it is helpful to appeal to PCMs.
4. PCMS
A PCM, M , is a 5-tuple 〈V ,C ,Ω,F ,do(·)〉. V is a set of variables. Suppose R de-
notes a function from elements of V to sets of values: for all V ∈ V , R(V ) is the range of
V . In Halpern and Pearl’s (2005, 851–2) terminology, a formula Vi = vi, for Vi ∈ V and
vi ∈ R(V ), is a primitive event. C is the set of all those possible conjunctions of primitive
6D= 0 is multiply realizable: there is more than one alternative to the decision that you in
fact make. E.g. you could decide that you will place your Th-228 near the Geiger no matter
what, or that you will not do so no matter what. We can stipulate that the latter alternative is
much more probable.
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events, V1 = v1& . . .&Vn = vn, such that Vi ∈ V and vi ∈ R(Vi) and such that, for no pair of
conjuncts Vi = vi, Vj = v j is Vi ≡ Vj, and where no two elements of C differ only in the per-
mutation of their conjuncts. Such a conjunction is denoted V = v (primitive events and the
null event are limiting cases of such conjunctions). Abusing notation, the fact that vi ∈ R(Vi)
for each primitive event Vi = vi in the conjunction V = v, is abbreviated v ∈ R(V) and the set
of variables that appear in V = v is denoted V.
Call a conjunction V = v maximal if it contains a conjunct of the form Vi = vi for each
Vi ∈ V . Ω is the set of all maximal conjunctions of primitive events. F is a sigma algebra
on Ω. Finally, do(·) is a function from elements of C to probability distributions on F (cf.
Pearl 2009, 70, 110): for each element V = v of C , P(·|do(V = v)) is the probability (chance)
distribution on F that would obtain if interventions were performed to bring about V = v.
A PCM can be represented graphically by taking the variables in V as nodes and draw-
ing a directed edge from Vi to Vj (Vi,Vj ∈ V ) iff, where S = V \Vi,Vj, there is some assign-
ment of values s ′ ∈ R(S), some pair of values vi,v
′
i ∈ R(Vi) (vi 6= v
′
i) and some value v j ∈
R(Vj) such that P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = vi&S = s
′)) 6= P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = v
′
i&S = s
′)).
In constructing a PCM, MPre, of (ProbPre) we might take the variable set to be VPre =
{D,M,Y,T,E}. The range of each variable in VPre is the pair {0,1}. CPre, ΩPre, and FPre
are generated by VPre and RPre in the way described above. For each element of CPre, the
function do(·) returns the chance distribution on FPre that would obtain if interventions were
performed to bring about that element of CPre. The graph for MPre is given as figure 1.
M E
D Y
T
FIGURE 1
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A directed path in a graph is an ordered sequence of nodes, 〈V1,V2, . . . ,Vn〉, such that there is
a directed edge from V1 to V2, and a directed edge from V2 to . . .Vn. 〈M,Y,T,E〉 is an example
of a directed path in the graph of MPre.
5. APPROPRIATE MODELS
In Section 6, I provide a definition of what it is for X = x (rather than X = x′) to count as
an actual cause of Y = y relative to a PCM. I then define a non-model-relativized notion of
actual causation by saying that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause of Y = y
simpliciter provided that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause Y = y relative
to at least one appropriate PCM.7 A similar strategy is commonly adopted by those analyzing
DAC in terms of SEMs (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503; Weslake 2016). This requires an
account of ‘appropriate’ models.
Many of the criteria for an appropriate SEM for evaluating DAC carry over to PCMs,
including the following three:
(Partition) For all V ∈ V , the elements of R(V ) should form a partition (Halpern and Hitch-
cock 2010, 397–8; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
(Independence) For no two variables V,W ∈ V should there be elements v ∈ R(V ) and
w ∈ R(W ) such that the states of affairs represented by V = v andW = w
are logically or metaphysically related (Hitchcock 2001, 287; Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 397)
7As the parentheses indicate I define a contrastive relation of actual causation. Where
variables are binary – as in MPre – this is inconsequential and I will typically suppress such
parentheses. But it becomes important in cases of multi-valued variables (see Halpern and
Pearl 2005, 859).
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(Naturalness) For all V ∈ V , R(V ) should include only values that represent reasonably
natural and intrinsic states of affairs. (Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
The analysis of actual causation proposed below takes all and only values of distinct variables
to be potential causal relata. (Partition) insures that we don’t thereby miss actual causal rela-
tions because they obtain between the values of a single variable. (Independence) insures that
we don’t mistake stronger-than-causal relations for causal relations. (Naturalness) insures that
unnatural or non-intrinsic states of affairs do not get counted as causes and effects (see Lewis
1986, 190, 263; Paul 2000, 245).8
A further condition is that a model is appropriate for evaluating whether X = x is an ac-
tual cause of Y = y in world θ only if it satisfies (Veridicality):
(Veridicality) For any conjunction V = v ∈ C taken as an input, the probability distribu-
tion P(·|do(V = v)) yielded as an output by do(·) should be the objective
chance distribution over F that wouldθ result from interventions setting V = v.
(‘Wouldθ ’ indicates that what is required is that this counterfactual be true in
θ .)
(Veridicality) is an analogue – for PCMs – of the requirement that SEMs encode only true
counterfactuals (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503).
In the DAC/SEMs literature another condition on model appropriateness is typically
added:
(Serious Possibilities) V should not be such as to generate elements of Ω that represent pos-
sibilities “that we consider to be too remote” (Hitchcock 2001, 287;
8If absences are unnatural states of affairs (cf. Lewis 1986, 189–93), we might instead
require that each variable have at most one value representing such a state of affairs.
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cf. Woodward 2005, 86–91, Weslake 2016, Blanchard and Schaffer
2016).
We likely need this requirement too. A discussion of whether the vagueness and subjectivity
thereby introduced is problematic would take us too far afield.9 Still, it doesn’t put the present
account in any worse shape than its deterministic analogues. Moreover, traditional accounts
of actual causation – which don’t appeal to causal models – also stand in need of appeal to
‘serious possibilities’ (Woodward 2005, 86–8).
A final requirement – similar to one imposed in the DAC/SEM literature – for a model
M to be an appropriate one for evaluating whether X = x is an actual cause of Y = y in world
θ is:
(Stability) There is no model M ∗ (satisfying Partition, Independence, Naturalness, Veridi-
cality, and Serious Possibilities) with a variable set V ∗ such that V ∗ ⊃ V relative
to which X = x (rather than X = x′) is not an actual cause of Y = y. (Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 394–5; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016; Halpern 2014; Hitchcock
2007, 503).
The idea is that an appropriate model is a sufficiently rich representation of causal reality that
moving to a richer representation would not reveal an apparent actual causal relation to be
spurious.10
The converse requirement – that a negative verdict about actual causation should not be
overturned in a richer model – isn’t needed. This is because actual causation (simpliciter)
is defined in terms of actual causation relative to at least one appropriate model. A model
relative verdict that X = x is not an actual cause of Y = y thus automatically fails to translate
9See Woodward (2005, 86–91).
10(Stability) renders the notion of an appropriate model relative to the causal claim being
evaluated.
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into a verdict that X = x is not an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y if there is a richer (and
otherwise appropriate) model relative to which X = x is an actual cause of Y = y.
We can now state a definition of actual causation in terms of appropriate PCMs that han-
dles (ProbPre).
6. PAC
Actual causation simpliciter is defined in terms of actual causation relative to an appropriate
PCM. Model-relative actual causation is then defined.11
AC(S)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y ∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause
(simpliciter) of Y = y in world θ iff X = x (rather than X = x ′) is an actual cause of Y =
y relative to at least one model M (with X ,Y ∈ V ) that is appropriate for evaluating
whether X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y in θ .
11Those familiar with Halpern and Pearl’s (2001, 2005) analyses of DAC are invited to see
an analogy with AC(M-R). AC(M-R) was partly inspired by thinking about how a counter-
part of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis might be developed that is adequate to the probabilistic
case. Ultimately, I’m optimistic that an adequate account of DAC will fall out of an adequate
account of PAC as the special case where all probabilities are 1 or 0. This is why my defini-
tions take the definiendum to be ‘actual cause’ rather than ‘probabilistic actual cause’.
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AC(M-R)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause of Y = y
relative to a model M (with X ,Y ∈V ) in world θ iff there is a partition (Z,W) of V \X ,Y
and some setting W = w ′ of the variables in W such that the do(·) function associated
with M entails that, for all subsets Z′ of Z (where, for each such subset, Z′ = z∗ are the
values that the variables in Z′ have in θ ):
(IN) P(Y = y|do(X = x&W = w ′&Z′ = z∗))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′&W = w ′))
AC(M-R) counts M = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre (and the world
described in (ProbPre)). Consider the partition of VPre\M,E such that W = {D,Y} and Z =
{T}. And consider the assignment {D= 1,Y = 0} of values to the variables in W. AC(M-R)
is satisfied because (IN) holds for both subsets of Z ( /0 and {T}), as shown by (4) and (5):
(4) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
(5) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&T = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
Inequality (4) indicates that my action raises the probability of the explosion under the con-
tingency – i.e. holding fixed – that (you make your decision but) don’t place your Th-228 near
the Geiger. The existence of this contingent probability-raising reflects the fact that there is a
path – 〈M,T,E〉 – along which M = 1 promotes E = 1 (becauseM = 1 raises the probabil-
ity of E = 1 when we hold fixed the values of all variables off that path). It is the existence of
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such a path – representing the process via whichM= 1 produces E = 1 – that appears to drive
our intuitions about actual causation in this case (cf. Hitchcock 2001).
Inequality (5) indicates that, again holding fixed D = 1 and Y = 0, the probability of
E = 1 is higher if I place my U-232 near the Geiger and the threshold reading is reached than
if I’d simply never placed my U-232 near the Geiger in the first place. As will be seen, this
requirement ensures that, not only is there a potential process via whichM = 1 threatens to
bring about E = 1, but that process is complete.
Since AC(M-R) implies thatM = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre, AC(S)
yields the (correct) result thatM = 1 is an actual cause (simpliciter) of E = 1 provided that
MPre is appropriate. MPre is appropriate. Clearly it satisfies (Partition) and (Independence).
It satisfies (Naturalness) because all of the states that its variables represent are reasonably
natural. It was stipulated that the do(·) function associated with MPre is such that (Veridi-
cality) is satisfied. MPre does not represent the sort of ‘non-serious’ possibility that (Serious
Possibilities) is introduced to rule out (cf. Hitchcock 2001; Woodward 2005, 86–91).
Finally, (Stability) is satisfied because the causal process from my action to the explo-
sion is complete. Holding fixed Y = 0, the probability of the explosion ifM = 1 and part(s)
of this process occur(s) is higher than the probability of the explosion if simplyM = 0. Any
variable (whose values represent reasonably natural states, form a partition, and are logically
and metaphysically independent from the variables in VPre) that might be added to VPre either
represents part of this process or it doesn’t. If it does, its actual value represents the occur-
rence of part of the process. So, if it is added to VPre, including it in Z will not prevent (IN)
from holding for all subsets Z′ of Z. If it doesn’t, then adding it to VPre, including it in W,
and holding it fixed at its actual value as part of the assignment W = w ′ will not make a dif-
ference to the fact that (IN) holds for all subsets Z′ of Z, since holding fixed Y = 0 as part of
W = w ′ is already sufficient to ensure this.
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AC(M-R) gives the verdict that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
Consider the partition of VPre\D,E such that W = {M} and Z = {Y,T}. Observe that:
(6) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 0))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(7) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
Thus, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of E = 1 is higher if D= 1
than if D= 0. So D= 1 contingently raises the probability of E = 1.12 That’s because there’s
a path – 〈D,Y,E〉 – along which D= 1 promotes E = 1.
AC(M-R) nevertheless entails that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to
MPre. Consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:
(8) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(9) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 1))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
That is, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of the explosion is no
higher if you make your decision but don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger than if you’d
12The obtaining of just one of (6) or (7) would suffice to show this.
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never made that decision in the first place. Thus (IN) does not hold for every subset of Z for
this partition of variables no matter what values we assign to the variables in W. This re-
flects the fact that, because you didn’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, there is no com-
plete causal process by which your decision produces the explosion. Your non-placement of
your Th-228 ‘neutralizes’ the danger of your decision causing the explosion.
Is there an alternative partition (W, Z) of VPre and assignment W = w
′ such that (IN)
holds for all subsets Z′ of Z? (There need only be one for AC(M-R) to be satisfied.) There
isn’t. Assigning Y to W instead of Z won’t help, since the value of Y ‘screens off’ D from
E. So, where Y ∈ W, no assignment W = w′ will be such that, holding fixed W = w′, the
probability of E = 1 is higher when D = 1 (and the variables in /0 ⊆ Z are set to their actual
values) than when D= 0. So (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets Z ′ of Z for any such partition.
On the other hand, if we leave Y in Z and also assignM to Z, then there are no variables
in W to hold fixed. Now consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:13
(10) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
So, with M assigned to Z it remains the case that (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets of Z.
So there’s no partition of VPre\D,E such that (IN) is satisfied for all subsets of Z when
we consider D = 1 as a putative cause of E = 1. AC(M-R) therefore doesn’t count D = 1 as
an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
But for AC(S) to count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 simpliciter, there need only be
one appropriate model relative to which AC(M-R) counts D = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1.
Is there such a model? There isn’t. Suppose a candidate such model includes Y . Because D
is only relevant to E because of its relevance to Y , the value of Y ‘screens off’ the value of D
13Note: the fact that Y = 0 due to an intervention doesn’t makeM = 1 more likely.
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from that of E. This means that, if Y is included in W in the partition (W, Z) of the model’s
variable set and held fixed (either at 1 or 0) as part of the assignment W = w′, then (IN) won’t
be satisfied for the empty subset of Z. Alternatively, if Y is included in Z then, no matter what
other variables are included in the model and assigned to W, (IN) won’t be satisfied for the
subset {Y} of Z. Specifically, because D = 1 only threatens to bring about E = 1 because it
threatens to bring about Y = 1, no matter what we hold fixed by inclusion on both sides of
(IN), the probability of E = 1 is no higher if D= 1 and Y = 0 than if simply D= 0.
So AC(M-R) doesn’t count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to any appropriate
model with Y in its variable set. This means that any otherwise appropriate model relative to
which D = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 can be expanded to a model in which D = 1 isn’t an
actual cause of E = 1 simply by the addition of Y . Provided the expanded model is appropri-
ate, the original model violates (Stability) and is inappropriate. So AC(S) will correctly not
count D= 1 as an actual cause simpliciter of E = 1.
Since the values of Y form a partition and represent natural states of affairs, (Partition)
and (Naturalness) will be satisfied by the expanded model if they were satisfied by the orig-
inal model. With regard to (Veridicality), it should be noted that there are multiple ways of
expanding the original model via the addition of Y , each associated with a different do(·)
function from elements of C ∗ to probability distributions over F ∗ (where C ∗ and F ∗ are
generated by the expanded variable set in the way described in Section 4). In looking for an
apt expanded model, we just select the one with the do(·) function that returns the objec-
tive chances on F ∗ that would obtain as a result of interventions bringing about the various
elements of C ∗. With regard to (Serious Possibilities) note that, given your decision, your
placing and your not placing your Th-228 near the Geiger are both salient possibilities in
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(ProbPre). So it doesn’t seem that the expanded model could represent any non-serious pos-
sibilities if the original model doesn’t. (Independence) is a little trickier. Might not the origi-
nal model include a variable whose values are logically or metaphysically related to those of
Y? Given that the variables in the original model are assumed to satisfy (Partition) it seems
that any variable logically or metaphysically related to Y – e.g. Y ′, which takes value Y ′ = 0 if
you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, Y ′ = 1 if you place it 2.5-5cm from the Geiger,
and Y ′ = 2 if you place it 0-2.5cm from the Geiger – will also be such that its actual value
neutralizes the threat of D = 1 bringing about E = 1, so that AC(M-R) is not satisfied in the
original model. The exception to this would be if the original model included a variable that
represents a gerrymandered states of affairs – e.g. Y ′′, which takes value Y ′′ = 1 if you place
your Th-228 near the Geiger or Obama is US president, and Y ′′ = 0 otherwise – in which case
the original model will violate (Naturalness).
7. CONCLUSION
Drawing upon PCMs, an account of PAC has been given that gives a correct treatment of
probabilistic preemption on intuitive grounds. Traditional accounts of PAC misdiagnose this
central test case (Menzies, 1989, 1996; Hitchcock 2004). Examination of whether PCMs can
help tackle some of the other outstanding problems of PAC is warranted.
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Abstract
Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
I consider two arguments in favor of this claim. The first says that
insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not
have had under triple-blind review, an injustice is committed against
certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit
this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are
affected by information they would not have had under triple-blind
review, it will negatively affect the quality of published papers. I
distinguish between two kinds of biases that an editor might have. I
show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the other
a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive
or negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general.
However, I do endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I
argue that the positive effect does not apply.
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1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By
making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and
which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given
attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be
informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to
publish a particular paper? Under a single- or double-blind reviewing proce-
dure, the editor has access to information about the author, whereas under a
triple-blind reviewing procedure she does not. So in other words the question
is: should journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-blind reviewing.
One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of
argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to
(partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information (such as the gender
of the author, or whether or not the editor is friends with the author). This
harms the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument focuses on the effect on the journal and its
readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity
information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that
as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to
accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that
a departure has been made from a putative “objectively correct” decision.
This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.
Here I provide a philosophical discussion of the reviewing procedure to
assess these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the editor’s
judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed to her. First,
the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does
not know. Second, the editor may treat authors differently based on their
membership of some group (e.g., gender bias). My discussion focuses on the
2
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following three claims.
My first claim is that the first kind of differential treatment the editor may
display (based on whether she knows a particular author) actually benefits
rather than harms the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a
reduction in editorial uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers when
she knows their authors. I construct a model to show in a formally precise
way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly, no assumption that the
scientists the editor knows are somehow “better scientists” is required—and
I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this
benefit only applies in certain fields. I argue that in other fields (in particular,
mathematics and the humanities) no significant reduction of uncertainty—
and hence no benefit to the readers—occurs (section 2).
My second claim is that either kind of differential treatment the editor
may display (based on whether she knows authors or based on bias against
certain groups) harms authors. I argue that any instance of such differential
treatment constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007)
against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just,
she should prevent such differential treatment, which can be done through
triple-blind reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds
I identified above: triple-blind reviewing is preferable because not doing so
harms authors (section 3).
My third claim is that whether differential treatment also harms the jour-
nal and its readers depends on a number of factors. Differential treatment
by the editor based on whether she knows a particular author may benefit
readers, whereas differential treatment based on bias against certain groups
may harm them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the
strength of the editor’s bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and
other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general
endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-blind reviewing is preferable
because readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse
3
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this argument for fields like mathematics and the humanities, where I claim
that the benefits of differential treatment (based on uncertainty reduction)
do not apply (section 4).
Note that, in considering the ethical and epistemic effects of triple-blind
reviewing, a distinction is made between the effects on the author and the
effects on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding
that in order to study the social epistemology of science, what is good for
an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider
scientific community (Kitcher 1993, Strevens 2003, Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the
number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he
does not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions and the uncertainty she
faces. Economists have studied models in which editor decisions play an im-
portant role (Ellison 2002, Faria 2005, Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have
not distinguished between papers written by scientists the editor knows and
papers by scientists unknown to her, and neither have they been concerned
with biases the editor may be subject to. And some other economists have
done empirical work investigating the differences between papers with and
without an author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003,
Smith and Dombrowski 1998, more on this later), but they do not provide a
model that can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the
literature.
2 A Model of Editor Uncertainty
As I said in the introduction, journal editors have a certain measure of power
in a scientific community because they decide which papers get published.1
An editor could use this discretionary power to the benefit of her friends or
1Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors
make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define “the editor” to
be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
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colleagues, or to promote certain subfields or methodologies over others. This
phenomenon has been called editorial favoritism. If anecdotal evidence is to
be believed, this phenomenon is widespread. Some systematic evidence of
favoritism exists as well. Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe
editorial favoritism to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage
claiming to have perceived it firsthand. Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross
(1992) find that, controlling for citation impact and various other factors,
papers whose author has a connection to the journal editor are allocated
more journal pages than papers by authors without such a connection.2
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to
accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not
know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989, Bailey
et al. 2008a,b). In both of the studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were
asked to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by
editors and reviewers, this disapproval was shown (using a factor analysis) to
be part of a general and strong disapproval of “selfish or cliquish acts” in the
peer review process. Thus it appears that the reason for the disapproval of
editors publishing papers by their friends and colleagues is that it shows the
editor acting on private interests, rather than displaying the disinterestedness
that is the norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, if connection bias was a serious worry for authors,
one would expect this to be a major consideration for them in choosing
where to submit their papers (i.e., submit to journals where they know the
editor), but Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case.3
2Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the
paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is
accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure
the influence of a relationship between the author and the editor on acceptance decisions
directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not
available in these kinds of studies.
3In particular, authors who know an editor and thus could expect to profit from con-
5
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Moreover, despite working scientists’ disapproval, there is some evidence that
connection bias improves the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and
Piette 1994, Medoff 2003, Smith and Dombrowski 1998). Does that mean
scientists are misguided in their disapproval?
As indicated in the introduction, I distinguish between the effects of ed-
itors’ biases on the authors of scientific papers on the one hand, and the
effects on the readers of scientific journals on the other hand. In this section,
I use a formal model to show that these two can come apart: connection
bias may negatively affect scientists as authors while positively affecting sci-
entists as readers. Note that in this section I focus only on connection bias.
Subsequent sections consider other biases.
Consider a simplified scientific community consisting of a set of scientists.
Each scientist produces a paper and submits it to the community’s only
journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that
this suitability for publication can be measured on a single numerical scale.
For convenience I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral
on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of
the epistemic value of the paper (which is perhaps an aggregate of multiple
relevant criteria), or as the number of times the paper would be cited in
future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each
member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it.4
nection bias would find knowing the editor and the composition of the editorial board more
generally to be important factors in deciding where to submit, contrary to Ziobrowski and
Gibler’s evidence (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in importance in a list
of sixteen factors that might influence the decision where to submit). Similarly, authors
who do not know an editor would find a lack of (perceived) connection bias and the com-
position of the editorial board to be important factors, but these rank only seventh and
twelfth in importance in Ziobrowski and Gibler’s study. In a similar survey by Mackie
(1998, chapter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her
preferences is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
4For more on potential difficulties with interpreting the notion of quality, see Bright
(2015).
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Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time
it is submitted. The aim of this section is to show how uncertainty about
quality can lead to connection bias. To make this point as starkly as possible,
I assume that the editor cares only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate
of the quality of a paper and publishes those and only those papers whose
quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. Since there
is uncertainty about the quality, qi is modeled as a random variable. Since
some scientists are more likely to produce high quality papers than others,
the mean µi of this random variable may be different for each scientist. I
assume that quality follows a normal distribution with fixed variance: qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to
keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the dis-
tribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution
of reviewers’ estimates of the quality of a paper. I see no reason to expect
the results I present below to be different when any of these assumptions are
changed.
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the av-
erage quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming
that the editor knows the value of µi. For scientists she does not know, the
editor is uncertain about the average quality of their work. All she knows is
the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community, which
I also assume to be normal: µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc).
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: the
scientific community is split in two groups (those known by the editor and
those not known by the editor) but average paper quality follows the same
distribution in both groups. If I assumed instead that scientists known by
the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively
similar to those I present below. If scientists known by the editor write worse
7
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papers on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal
editors are relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967), this would be
an implausible assumption except perhaps in isolated cases.
The editor’s prior beliefs about the quality of a paper submitted by some
scientist i reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist
she knows the value of µi, and so her prior is π(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu). If the
editor does not know scientist i she only knows the distribution of µi, rather
than its exact value. Integrating out the uncertainty over µi yields a prior
π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc) for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. In the
context of this model, the main purpose of the reviewer’s report is to provide
an estimate of the quality of the paper. But, I assume, even after reading the
paper its quality cannot be established with certainty. Thus the reviewer’s
estimate ri of the quality qi is again a random variable. I assume that the
reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality qi of the
paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect the uncertainty:
ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv).
5
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update her
beliefs about the quality of scientist i’s paper. I assume that she does this
by Bayes conditioning. Thus, her posterior beliefs about the quality of the
paper are π(qi | ri) if she does not know the author, and π(qi | ri, µi) if she
does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose
5The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged
opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which
case the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs
about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text can be used to cover
any of these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of
reviewers used. If the number of reviewers is frequently different for different papers (and
in particular when this difference correlates with the existence or absence of a connection
between editor and author) the assumption of a fixed variance in the reviewer’s report is
unrealistic because a report from multiple reviewers may be thought to give more accurate
information (reducing the variance) than a report from a single reviewer.
8
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -220-
mean is a weighted average of ri and the prior mean, as given in proposition 1
(for a proof, see DeGroot 2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers
Bayesian statistics).
Proposition 1.
π(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
π(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ,
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi.
When does the editor choose to publish a paper? Here I assume that she
publishes any paper whose posterior mean is above some threshold q∗. So
a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is published if µUi >
q∗ and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is published if
µKi > q
∗. This corresponds to being at least 50% confident that the paper’s
quality is above the threshold. Other standards could be used (risk-averse
standards might require more than 50% confidence that the paper is above
some threshold, while risk-loving standards might require less; in these cases
the threshold value needs to be adapted to keep the total number of accepted
papers constant) but for my purposes here it does not much matter.
Now compare the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist i
unknown to the editor is published to the probability that the paper of an
arbitrary scientist known by the editor is published. For this purpose it is
useful to determine the probability distribution of the posterior means (see
appendix A for proofs of this and subsequent results).
9
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -221-
Proposition 2. The posterior means are normally distributed, with µUi ∼
N (µ, σ2U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Here,
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
and σ2K =
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
.
Moreover, if σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0, then σ
2
U < σ
2
K.
The main result of this section, which establishes the existence of con-
nection bias in the model, is a consequence of proposition 2. It says that
the editor is more likely to publish a paper written by an arbitrary author
she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary author she does not know,
whenever q∗ > µ (for any positive value of σ2sc and σ
2
rv). Since q
∗ = µ would
mean that exactly half of all papers gets published, the condition amounts
to a requirement that the journal’s acceptance rate is less than 50%. This
is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a notable
exception). When acceptance rates are above 50% editorial favoritism is also
much less of a concern in the first place.
Theorem 3. If q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the acceptance probability
for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability for
authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 3 shows that in the model I presented, any journal with an
acceptance rate lower than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus
I have established the surprising result that an editor who cares only about
the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers
by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her
friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.
Why does this surprising result hold? The theorem follows immediately
from proposition 2, which says that the distribution of µUi is less “spread
out” than the distribution of µKi (σ
2
U < σ
2
K). This happens because µ
U
i is a
10
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -222-
weighted average of µ and ri, keeping it relatively close to the overall mean µ
compared to µKi , which is a weighted average of µi and ri (which tend to
differ from µ in the same direction).
Because the editor treats papers by authors she knows differently from
papers by authors she does not know, authors unknown to the editor are
arguably harmed. I pick up this point in section 3 and argue that this
constitutes an epistemic injustice against those authors.
What I have shown so far is that an editor who uses information about the
average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows in her acceptance
decisions will find that scientists she knows produce on average more papers
that meet her quality threshold. This is a subjective statement: the editor
believes that more papers by scientists she knows meet her threshold. Does
this translate into an objective effect? That is, does the extra information
the editor has available about scientists she knows allow her to publish better
papers from them than from scientists she does not know?
In order to answer this question I need to compare the average quality of
accepted papers. More formally, I want to compare the expected value of the
quality of a paper, conditional on meeting the publication threshold, given
that the author is either known to the editor or not.
Proposition 4. If σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the average quality of accepted
papers from authors known to the editor is higher than the average quality of
accepted papers from authors unknown to the editor, i.e., E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] >
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
Proposition 4 shows that the editor can use the extra information she
has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers
published in her journal. In other words, the surprising result is that the
editor’s connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of
the journal. It is thus fair to say that, in the model, the editor can use her
connections to “identify and capture high-quality papers”, as Laband and
11
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Piette (1994) suggest.6
To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality
is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors
using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the model
is seen to yield an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due
to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor
knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the
other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting
for publication papers written by authors she knows even though they do
not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by
authors the editor knows should (presumably) be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality of a paper,7 a
simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with
an author-editor connection have a higher or a lower average quality than
papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a
number of times, and the results univocally favor the hypothesis that editors
use their connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband
and Piette 1994, Smith and Dombrowski 1998, Medoff 2003).
Note that in the above results, nothing depends on the sizes of the vari-
ances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv. This is because these results are qualitative. The
variances do matter when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers
are compared quantitatively. For example, reducing σ2rv (making the re-
viewer’s report more accurate) makes the differences in the acceptance rate
and average quality of papers smaller.
6This result applies to connection bias only. Below I consider other biases the editor
might have, which yields more nuanced conclusions.
7Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be inter-
preted. If quality is simply defined as “the number of citations this paper would get if it
were published” the connection between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other
interpretations of quality, citations have frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure
(Cole and Cole 1967, 1968, Medoff 2003). This practice has been defended by Cole and
Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989) and Heesen
(forthcoming).
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Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ2sc and σ
2
rv are
positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ2rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the re-
viewer’s report describes the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In
this case the “extra information” the editor has about authors she knows is
not needed, and so there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality
based on whether the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to
expect reviewer’s reports to be this accurate.
If σ2sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers
produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not
tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work.
In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the
quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So
here also there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based
on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected
to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper?
This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of
the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can
increase or decrease the editor’s confidence that the experiments were per-
formed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible
to describe in such a paper. In a scientific paper, “[a]s long as the conclu-
sions depend at least in part on the results of some experiment, the reader
must rely on the author’s (and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author
really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out
as reported” (Easwaran 2009, p. 359).
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and some or all of the
humanities, there is no need to rely on the author’s reputation. This is
because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to
judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created. Easwaran
13
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(2009) discusses this in detail for mathematics, and briefly (in his section 4)
for philosophy. And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should
be judged: “Papers will rely only on premises that the competent reader
can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that the
competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration.”
(Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the advantage (see theorem 3 and proposition 4) conferred
by revealing identity information about the author to the editor applies only
in certain fields. The relevant fields are those where part of the information
in the paper is conferred on the authority of testimony, in particular those
where experimental results are reported. Even in those fields, of course, what
is being testified is supposed to be reproducible by the reader. But this is still
different from the case in mathematics and the humanities, where a careful
reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument. In these
latter fields there is no relevant information to be learned from the identity
of the author (i.e., σ2sc = 0), or, at least, the publishing norms in these fields
suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about
paper quality. The first main result, theorem 3, established the existence of
connection bias in this model: authors known by the editor are more likely
to see their paper accepted than authors unknown to the editor. The second
main result, proposition 4, showed that connection bias benefits the readers
of the journal by improving the average quality of accepted papers.
Despite the benefit to the readers, I claim that authors are harmed by
connection bias. In this section I argue that an instance of connection bias
constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007). Then I argue
that the editor is likely to display other biases as well, and that instances of
14
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these also constitute epistemic injustices.
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice.
Fricker (2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where
a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and
epistemically culpable, rather than being due to innocent error.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls “the central case of testimonial injustice” (Fricker
2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and
one or more attributes, where this association embodies a gen-
eralization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective
investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many
different social spheres.
Applying this to the phenomenon of connection bias, it is clear that this is
not an instance of the central case of testimonial injustice. This would entail
that there is some negative stereotype associated with scientists unknown to
the editor, as a group, which is not normally the case. So I set the central
case aside (I return to it below) and focus on the question whether connection
bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
Suppose scientist i and scientist i′ tend to produce papers of the same
quality, which is above average in the population (µi = µi′ > µ). Suppose
further that the actual papers they have produced on this occasion are of the
same quality (qi = qi′) and have received similar reviewer reports (ri = ri′).
If scientist i is not known to the editor, but scientist i′ is, then the paper
15
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written by scientist i′ is likely to be evaluated more highly by the editor.8
If the publication threshold q∗ is somewhere in between the two evaluations
then only scientist i′ will have her paper accepted.
In this example, the scientists produced papers of equal quality that were
evaluated differently. So scientist i suffers a credibility deficit. This deficit
is not due to innocent error, as it would be if, e.g., random variation led to
different reviewer reports (i.e., ri < ri′). The deficit is also not due to the
editor’s use of generally reliable information about the two scientists, as it
would be if there was a genuine difference in the average quality of the papers
they produce (i.e., µi < µi′).
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, as I stressed in section 2,
the editor is simply making maximal use of the information available to her.
It just so happens that she has more information about scientists she knows
than about others. But that is hardly the editor’s fault: she cannot be
expected to know everyone’s work. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know
the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove
all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by
using a triple-blind reviewing procedure, in which the editor does not know
the identity of the author, and hence is prevented from using information
about scientists she knows in her evaluation. Using such a procedure, at
least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a
given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted.
So a credibility deficit occurs which harms scientist i: her paper is re-
jected. Moreover, it harms her specifically as an epistemic agent: the rejec-
tion of the paper reflects a judgment of the quality of her scientific work. And
8The editor’s posterior mean for the quality of scientist i’s paper is µUi and her posterior
mean for scientist i′’s paper is µKi′ = µ
K
i , with µ
U
i < µ
K
i′ whenever σ
2
sc(ri − µi) < (σ
2
qu +
σ2rv)(µi − µ). The claim in the text is then justified by the fact that Pr(σ
2
sc(ri − µi) <
(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)(µi − µ) | µi > µ) > 1/2, assuming σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
16
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -228-
this harm could have been prevented by the editor by using a triple-blind
reviewing procedure.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for this
credibility deficit, and hence a testimonial injustice is committed against
scientist i. However, one may insist that it cannot be the case that the
editor is committing a wrong simply in virtue of using relevant information
that is available to her. An evidentialist in particular may say that it cannot
possibly be an epistemic wrong to take into account all relevant information.
I disagree, for the reasons just given, but I need not insist on this point.
Even if it is granted that the editor does not commit an injustice by using
the information that is available to her, the end result is still that scientist i
is harmed as an epistemic agent. She has produced a paper of equal quality
to scientist i′’s, and yet it is not published.
Moreover, the presence of scientist i′ is irrelevant. Any time a paper
from an author unknown to the editor is rejected which would have been
accepted had the editor known the author (all else being equal), that author
is harmed. So even if one insists that differential editorial treatment resulting
from connection bias is not culpable on the part of the editor, connection bias
still harms authors whenever it influences acceptance decisions.
In the model of section 2, and the above discussion, I assumed that con-
nection bias is the only bias journal editors display. The literature on im-
plicit bias suggests that this is not true. For example, “[i]f submissions are
not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women’s work
will probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of the same qual-
ity” (Saul 2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wennerås and
Wold (1997), Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Budden
et al. (2008), and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012).9 So women scientists are at
9These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various
ways. None of them focus specifically on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim
unless it is assumed that journal editors as a group are significantly less biased than other
academics.
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a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases exist
based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists’ identity, such as race or sex-
ual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013, for a critical survey of various biases in
the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: “The editorial
process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has ex-
cluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige
institutions”.
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. Any time a paper is
rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have been accepted
if the relevant part of the author’s identity had been different, all else being
equal), a testimonial injustice occurs for the same reasons outlined above.
Moreover, here the editor is culpable for having these biases.
Unlike instances resulting from connection bias, testimonial injustices
resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central case of tes-
timonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative
identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women’s
work, even when the person judging does not consciously believe in these
stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work
objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than
less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007, Stewart and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar
claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation. Bi-
ases based on academic affiliation are not usually due to negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes, as these do not generally affect other aspects of the
scientist’s life.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices
against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that authors are
harmed when journal editors do not use a triple-blind reviewing procedure.
This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-blind reviewing which
I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based on these consid-
18
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erations.
4 The Effect of Bias on Quality
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that
failing to use triple-blind reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because
it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2 I argued
that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average
quality. In this section I complicate the model to include identity bias.
Recall that the editor displays identity bias if she is more or less likely
to publish papers from a certain group of scientists based on some aspect of
their identity, e.g., their gender. I incorporate this in the model by assuming
the editor consistently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the
others). More precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced
by any scientist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it
really is by some constant quantity ε. Conversely, the average quality of
papers written by any scientist not belonging to this group is raised by δ.10
So the editor has a different prior for the two groups; I use πA to denote her
prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and
πF for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may be familiar with a given scientist’s work (i.e.,
she knows the average quality of that scientist’s papers) or not. So there
are now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the
stigmatized group the editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s
paper is πA(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi− ε, σ
2
qu). If scientist i is known to the editor but
is not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi | µi) ∼ N(µi + δ, σ
2
qu). If
10This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple
groups of different strengths, or biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases
which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016). However,
the assumption in the main text suffices to make the point I want to make. It should be
fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just
described.
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scientist i is not known to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior
is πA(qi) ∼ N(µ− ε, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc). And if scientist i is not known to the editor
and not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi) ∼ N(µ+ δ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc).
11
The next few steps in the development are analogous to that in section 2.
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the
quality of the paper, yielding the following posterior distributions.
Proposition 5.
πA(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKAi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKFi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πA(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUAi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUFi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µKAi = µ
K
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, µKFi = µ
K
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
µUAi = µ
U
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, µUFi = µ
U
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean (µKAi , µ
KF
i , µ
UA
i ,
or µUFi ) exceeds the threshold q
∗. The respective distributions of the posterior
11Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized
group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is
not triple-blind, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who sub-
mits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty
the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to expect the editor
to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely, because negative
identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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means determine how likely this is. These distributions are given in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6. The posterior means are normally distributed, with
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
This yields the within-group acceptance rates and the unsurprising result
that the editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased
against.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the acceptance probability for
authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance probability
for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not the
editor knows the author). That is,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors
that are subject to a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype are less likely to
see their paper accepted than authors who are not. As I argued in section 3,
whenever a paper is rejected due to identity bias this constitutes a testimonial
injustice against the author.
Now I turn my attention to the effect that identity bias has on the average
quality of accepted papers. In the current version of the model there is both
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connection bias and identity bias. Connection bias has been shown to have
a positive effect on average quality (see section 2). Whether the net effect of
connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative depends on various
parameters, as I illustrate below.
The benchmark for judging the average quality of accepted papers under
a procedure subject to connection bias and identity bias is a triple-blind
reviewing procedure under which the editor is not informed of the identity
of the scientist. As a result, she is both unable to use information about
the average quality of a given scientist’s papers and unable to display bias
against scientists based on their identity.
Under this triple-blind procedure, the editor’s prior distribution for the
quality of any submitted paper is π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu+σ
2
sc), i.e., the prior I used
in section 2 when the author was unknown to the editor. Hence, under this
procedure, the posterior is π(qi | ri), the posterior mean is µ
U
i ∼ N(µ, σ
2
U),
the probability of acceptance is Pr(µUi > q
∗) and the average quality of
accepted papers is E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
In contrast, I refer to the reviewing procedure that is subject to connection
bias and identity bias as the non-blind procedure. The overall probability that
a paper is accepted under the non-blind procedure depends on the relative
sizes of the four groups. I use pKA to denote the fraction of scientists known to
the editor that she is biased against, pKF for the fraction known to the editor
that she is biased in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists biased against, and
pUF for unknown scientists biased in favor of. These fractions are nonnegative
and sum to one.
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the non-
blind procedure. The overall probability of acceptance under this procedure
is
22
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Pr (Ai) = pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers can then be written as E[qi | Ai]. I
want to compare E[qi | Ai] to E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗], the average quality of accepted
papers under a triple-blind procedure.12
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such
that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal
to µ. In other words, her bias against the stigmatized group is canceled
out on average by her bias in favor of those not in the stigmatized group,
weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
(pKA + pUA) ε = (pKF + pUF ) δ.
I use the above equation to fix the value of δ, reducing the number of free
parameters by one. The equation amounts to a kind of commensurability
requirement for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor
perceives the average quality of submitted papers to be the same regardless
of whether or not a triple-blind procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the
parameter values that determine whether the non-blind procedure or the
triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers.
The question I will explore now, using some numerical examples, is how
biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to
outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the
12Expressions for Pr(Ai) and E[qi | Ai] using only the parameter values and standard
functions are given in lemma 11 in appendix A. These expressions are used to generate
the numerical results below.
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parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q∗ = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in
this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv, I
choose a “small” and a “large” value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that there is no correlation
between whether the editor knows an author and whether the editor has a
bias against that author (so, e.g., the percentage of women among scientists
the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the
editor does not know). I consider two cases for the editor’s identity bias:
either she is biased against half the set of authors (and so biased in favor
of the other half) or the group she is biased against is a 30% minority.13
Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of all scientists
submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30% of them.
As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (23 choices for
the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes). Whether the triple-blind
procedure or the non-blind procedure is epistemically preferable depends on
the value of ε (and the value of δ determined thereby).
It follows from proposition 4 that when ε = 0 the non-blind procedure
helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average
quality relative to the triple-blind procedure. If ε is positive but relatively
small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the non-blind procedure
harms the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers
under the non-blind procedure decreases continuously as ε increases (I do
not prove this, but it is easily checked for the 32 cases I consider).
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big
does the editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity
bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
13Bruner and O’Connor (forthcoming) note that certain dynamics in academic life can
lead to identity bias against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority.
Here I consider both the case where the stigmatized group is a minority (and is possibly
stigmatized as a result of being a minority, as Bruner and O’Connor suggest) and the case
where it is not (and so presumably the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype has some
other source).
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I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published
papers under the non-blind procedure and the triple-blind procedure is the
same for each of the 32 cases. But reporting these numbers directly does not
seem particularly useful, as ε is measured in “quality points” which do not
have a clear interpretation outside of the model.
To give a more meaningful interpretation of these values of ε as measur-
ing “size of bias”, I calculate the average rate of acceptance of papers from
authors the editor is biased against and the average rate of acceptance of
papers from authors the editor is biased in favor of.14 The difference be-
tween these numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it
measures (in percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the
editor accepts from authors she is biased in favor of, compared to those she
is biased against.
This difference is reported for the 32 cases in figure 1. To provide a sense
of scale for these numbers, I plot them against the acceptance rate that the
triple-blind procedure would have for those values of the parameters, i.e.,
Pr(µUi > q
∗).
Already with this small sample of 32 cases, a large variation of results
can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases in detail.
First, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 1 and σ
2
rv = 4. In this extreme case
the triple-blind procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72%. If the
groups are all of equal size (pKA = pKF = pUA = pUF = 1/4) then under the
non-blind procedure the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in
favor of needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for
authors the editor is biased against, in order for the average quality under
14These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not.
In particular, the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased against is
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
pKA + pUA
, and
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
pKF + pUF
is the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased in favor of.
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Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs
of the non-blind procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point
difference in acceptance rates), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the ac-
ceptance rate of the corresponding triple-blind procedure.
the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a
journal that only accepts less than 1% of papers. If the bias is any less than
that there is no harm to the readers in using the non-blind procedure.
Second, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 4 and σ
2
rv = 1. Then the triple-
blind procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66%. If, moreover, the editor
knows relatively few authors (pKA = pKF = 0.15, pUA = pUF = 0.35) then
the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be
only 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased
against, in order for the quality costs of the non-blind procedure to outweigh
its benefits. For a journal accepting about 23% of papers that means that
even if the identity bias of the editor is relatively mild the journal’s readers
are harmed if the non-blind procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are un-
likely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the non-blind procedure
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or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of pub-
lished papers for any particular journal.15 So in general it is not clear that
an argument that the non-blind procedure harms the journal’s readers can be
made. At the same time, a general argument that the non-blind procedure
helps the readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recom-
mend a triple-blind procedure for all journals because not doing so harms
the authors.
If there was reason to believe that the editor’s bias was very small, there
might be a case for the non-blind procedure using considerations of average
quality. Based on the empirical evidence I cited in section 3, it seems unlikely
that any editor could make such a case convincingly today. But if identity
bias were someday to be eliminated or severely mitigated, this question may
be worth revisiting.
So far I have argued in this section that in the presence of the positive
effect of connection bias on quality, the net effect of connection bias and
identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive
effect of connection bias may only exist in certain fields. In fields where
papers rely partially on the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the
identity of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and some
of the humanities testimony is not taken to play a role—the paper itself
constitutes the contribution to the field—and so arguably there is no value
in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but
there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for
the triple-blind procedure emerges, as the non-blind procedure harms both
authors and readers.
15Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this
question, as they do not directly compare the triple-blind and the non-blind procedure.
Their evidence supports a positive epistemic effect of connection bias, but not a verdict
on the overall epistemic effect of triple-blinding.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-blind re-
view: one based on the consequences for the author and one based on the
consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the non-blind procedure introduces differential treat-
ment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish
papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 3) and less likely
to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereo-
types to (identity bias, theorem 7). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result
of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is
committed against the author. This is an argument in favor of triple-blinding
based on consequences for the author.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed. Generally speak-
ing connection bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers
and identity bias a negative one. Thus whether the readers are better off
under the triple-blind procedure depends on how exactly these effects trade
off, which is highly context-dependent, or so I have argued. This yields a
more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994),
who focus only on connection bias, or by the argument for triple-blinding
based on the consequences for the readers, which focuses only on identity
bias.
However, in mathematics and some of the humanities there is arguably
no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s
other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative
effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’
perspective. In this situation, considerations concerning the consequences for
the author and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers
point in the same direction: in favor of triple-blind review.
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A The Acceptance Probability and the Aver-
age Quality of Papers
Proposition 2. µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Moreover, σ
2
U < σ
2
K
whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. First consider the distribution of ri. Since ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv), qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu), and µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc), it follows that ri | µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
and ri ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv).
The latter can be used straightforwardly to determine the distribution
of µUi . Since ri − µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv) it follows that
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) ∼ N
(
0,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
∼ N
(
0, σ2U
)
.
The result follows because µ is a constant and
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) + µ.
Determining the distribution of µKi is slightly trickier because there are
two random variables involved: ri and µi. As noted above, ri | µi ∼
N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv). Thus, writing Xi =
σ2
qu
σ2
qu
+σ2
rv
(ri − µi),
Xi | µi ∼ N
(
0,
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
Since
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi = Xi + µi
it remains to determine the convolution of Xi and µi. This can be done using
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the moment-generating function and the law of total expectation. Recall
that the moment-generating function of an N(m, s2) distribution is given by
M(t) = exp{mt+ 1
2
s2t2}. So the moment-generating function of µKi is
E[exp{tµKi }] = E[exp{t(Xi + µi)}]
= E[E[exp{tXi + tµi} | µi]]
= E[exp{tµi}E[exp{tXi} | µi]]
= exp
{
0t+
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
E[exp{tµi}]
= exp
{
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2 + µt+
1
2
σ2sct
2
}
= exp
{
µt+
1
2
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
,
which is exactly the moment-generating function of the desired normal dis-
tribution.
Finally, note that
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
,
σ2K =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv) + σ
2
scσ
4
rv
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
.
So σ2U < σ
2
K whenever σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0 (and σ
2
U = σ
2
K otherwise, assuming
the expressions are well-defined in that case).
Theorem 3. Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
if q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. It follows from proposition 2 that
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Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σK
)
and Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σU
)
,
where Φ is the distribution function (or cumulative density function) of a
standard normal distribution. Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument,
and σK > σU by proposition 2, the theorem follows immediately.
In order to prove proposition 4 a number of intermediate results are
needed.
Lemma 8.
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
Proof. Because µUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri, it follows
that
qi | µ
U
i ∼ qi | ri ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
.
The distribution of qi | µ
K
i is a little trickier to find, because µ
K
i is a linear
combination of two random variables, ri and µi, and it is not obvious that
learning µKi is as informative as learning both ri and µi. But using the known
distributions of qi | µi and µ
K
i | qi, µi and integrating out µi it can be shown
that
qi | µ
K
i ∼ qi | ri, µi ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
The important point here is that E[qi | µ
x
i ] = µ
x
i both for x = U and x = K.
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish that
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E[qi | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[E[qi | µ
x
i ] | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[µxi | µ
x
i > q
∗],
for x = U,K.
Let X ∼ N(µ, σ2) be a normally distributed random variable. Then
X | X > a follows a left-truncated normal distribution, with left-truncation
point a. As a result of lemma 8 I am interested in the mean of left-truncated
normal distributions. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994, chapter 13,
section 10.1), this mean can be expressed as
E[X | X > a] = µ+ σR
(
a− µ
σ
)
. (1)
Here
R(x) =
φ(x)
1− Φ(x)
for all x ∈ R, where φ is the probability density function of the standard
normal distribution, and Φ is its distribution function. R is the inverse of
what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
R′(x) = R(x)2 − xR(x). (2)
Proposition 9 (Gordon (1941)). For all x > 0, R(x) < x
2+1
x
.
Proposition 9 can be used to establish the next result.
Proposition 10. If X ∼ N(µ, σ2) and Y ∼ N(µ, s2) with s > σ > 0 then
E[Y | Y > a] > E[X | X > a].
Proof. It suffices to show that the derivative ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] is positive for
all σ > 0. Differentiating equation (1) (using equation (2)) yields
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∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] =
((
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1
)
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)2
.
Since R
(
a−µ
σ
)
> 0, ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] > 0 if and only if
(
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
> 0.
This is true whenever a−µ
σ
≤ 0 because then both terms in the sum are
positive. Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever a−µ
σ
> 0 as well.
Proposition 4. E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] > E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] whenever σ2sc > 0, and
σ2rv > 0.
Proof. By lemma 8,
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
By proposition 2, µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K), with σU < σK . Hence
the conditions of proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows.
Proposition 6.
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
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Proof. Since µKAi and µ
KF
i are simply µ
K
i shifted by a constant (see propo-
sition 5) they follow the same distribution as µKi except that its mean is
shifted by the same constant. Similarly µUAi and µ
UF
i are just µ
U
i shifted by
a constant. So the results follow from proposition 2.
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined
by
qKA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, qKF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
qUA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, qUF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Proof. For the first inequality, note that
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
< 1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
= Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
.
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established
in proposition 6. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly
increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
< 1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
= Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
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Lemma 11.
Pr (Ai) = pKA
(
1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
))
+ pKF
(
1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ pUA
(
1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
))
+ pUF
(
1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
E [qi | Ai] = µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
Proof. The expression for Pr(Ai) follows immediately from the distributions
of the posterior means established in proposition 6.
To get an expression for E[qi | Ai], consider first the average quality of
scientist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in
the group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against.
This average quality is
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
= E
[
qi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= E
[
µKi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
,
where the first equality simply rewrites the inequality µKAi > q
∗ in a more
convenient form, the second equality uses lemma 8, and the third equality
uses equation 1. Similarly,
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E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers E[qi | Ai] is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers
that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, au-
thors known to the editor that she is biased against form a pKA Pr(µ
KA
i >
q∗)/Pr(Ai) proportion of accepted papers. Hence
E [qi | Ai] =
1
Pr (Ai)
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
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Abstract 
I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems biology that are 
driven by mathematics as much as mechanistic detail. Analysis of differential 
equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of network motifs drives 
the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering drive the third. I 
also distinguish three abstraction types: aggregations, which simplify by 
condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by generalizing 
information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing information. 
Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust perfect 
adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli—I argue that each strategy invokes 
a different combination of abstraction types and that each targets its 
abstractions to different mechanistic details.  
 
 
1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The currently dominant paradigm for understanding explanation in biology puts 
mechanism at center stage (Nicholson 2012; Levy 2013). Leading accounts of 
mechanistic explanation, while differing in the particulars of their analysis of 
mechanism, agree that mechanistic explanations explain by alluding to mechanisms or 
models thereof (Machamer, Darden, Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005).  
 
There is a small publishing industry devoted to discerning the scope of mechanistic 
explanation in scientific practice. Some claim to identify biological explanations that do 
not allude to mechanisms (Wouters 2007; Huneman 2010; Rice 2015). Fans of 
mechanistic explanation tend to resist making scope concessions, preferring instead to 
accommodate the putative explanations as mechanistic despite initial appearances, to 
broaden the scope of mechanistic explanation or the analysis of mechanism, or else to 
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 2 
deny that the putative explanations are explanations at all (Craver 2006; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013). 
 
I set aside questions about what qualifies as an explanation as well as questions about 
whether only mechanisms—or models thereof—carry explanatory power. I focus, 
instead, on explanatory strategies, understood as patterns of reasoning directed toward 
providing explanations. I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems 
biology that are driven by mathematics as much as, if not more than, mechanistic detail. 
Analysis of differential equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of 
network motifs drives the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering 
drive the third.  
 
Systems biologists use these strategies to supplement the explanatory power of 
traditional molecular mechanisms (see Brigandt et al forthcoming). My aim is to identify 
how the strategies differ from each other, rather than how they differ from standard 
mechanistic explanations or what might unify them in those differences (for which see 
Green and Jones 2016). Doing so helps with understanding relations among the 
strategies, their tactics for integrating mechanistic detail, and explanatory affordances 
of their mathematical elements. 
 
They key to my analysis is a distinction among three abstraction types: aggregations, 
which simplify by condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by 
generalizing information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing 
information. Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust 
perfect adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli (Barkai and Leibler 1997; Ma et al 
2009; Yi et al 2000)—I argue that each strategy invokes a different combination of 
abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different mechanistic details. I 
begin with the typology of abstraction. 
 
 
2 Abstraction Typology 
 
I am interested in abstractions as representational rather than metaphysical. 
Abstractions, as I understand them, are ontologically innocent, so that characterizing 
features of representations as abstractions over some parts of reality carries no 
implication that features correspond to abstract objects (see also Cartwright 1989, 353-
354; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 243). So, for example, representing the relation between a 
person, a hotel, and a date range as a reservation does not entail that some abstract 
object, a reservation, eǆists; Ŷor does represeŶtiŶg the ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s 
ĐoŶstitueŶts as the ŵotioŶ of the oďjeĐt’s ĐeŶter of ŵass eŶtail that soŵe aďstraĐt 
object, a center of mass, exists. 
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Levy and Bechtel characterize a representation as abstract insofar as a more concrete 
representation is possible (2013, 242).  Brigandt and colleagues suggest that biologists 
use aďstraĐtioŶs to ͞eluĐidate sǇsteŵ-level patterns of organization that may not be 
ǀisiďle at the leǀel of ŵoleĐular details͟ ;forthcoming). I concur. I understand 
abstractions as representing only some of the many elements—objects, relations, 
parameters—associated with their targets, thereby making apparent patterns obscured 
by more detailed representations. I add to these insights that biologists produce (at 
least) three types of abstraction. 
 
Following Ordorica, I call the first aggregation (2015, 163-164). An aggregation 
represents some relationship among multiple elements of a representational target as a 
higher-level object, or multiple elements of the target as a single, composite object. (See 
Figure 1a.) Paradigm cases of aggregations include representations of person-hotel-date 
relations as reservations; of costs of services and costs of goods as costs; and of the 
ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s parts as the motion of a center of mass (from Ordorica 2015, 
164). Aggregations abstract from plurality to individual, ignoring differences among 
many in order to make salient some integrated unity among the elements of a 
representational target. They thereby simplify representations by condensing 
information about representational targets.  
 
Following Pincock, I call the second abstraction type generalization (2015, 864). A 
generalization represents some element of a representational target as a class of 
elements, where potential instances of the class might include elements not present in 
the target. (See Figure 1b.) For example, because the class of solution measures includes 
all soap-bubble-like surfaces, such as the cellular froth surrounding radiolarian protozoa, 
representing a soap-bubble surfaĐe as a ͞solution measure͟ is a geŶeralizatioŶ ;PiŶĐoĐk 
2015, 864). Generalizations abstract from an instance to a class thereof, ignoring 
differences between instances of the class in order to make salient some more general 
unity. They thereby simplify representations by generalizing from information about 
representational targets. 
 
I call the third abstraction type structuration. A structuration represents some element 
of a representational target as a position in a structure, such that potential occupants of 
the position might include elements not present in the target. (See Figure 1c.) I follow 
Haslanger in understaŶdiŶg struĐtures as ͞Đoŵpleǆ eŶtities ǁith parts ǁhose ďehaǀior is 
ĐoŶstraiŶed ďǇ their relatioŶ to other parts͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, ϭϭϴͿ. Paradigm cases of 
structurations include representating Barack Obama as President of the United States of 
America, or representing AIneias as son of Anchises and Aphrodite. Structurations 
abstract to a position in a structure, from an occupant of the position, ignoring intrinsic 
features of the occupant unrelated to its position in order to make salient the 
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oĐĐupaŶt’s role relatiǀe to occupants of other positions in the same structure. They 
thereby simplify by contextualizing information about representational targets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Visualizing Abstraction Types. (a) Aggregation A represents elements 
e1, e2, and e3 (and relations therein) as a single object. (b) Generalization C 
represents I1(c) as a class, instances of which also include I2(c) and I3(c). (c) 
Structuration p1 represents element o1 as a position in larger structure that also 
includes p2, p3, and p4. 
 
I understand aggregations as distinct from both generalizations and structurations, by 
virtue of being many-to-one, rather than one-to-one, simplifications. I also understand 
being a generalization as insufficient for being a structuration. For representations of 
positions carry information about functional relationships between their occupants and 
other positions in the same structure; but representations of classes do not. Finally, 
insofar as classes are sets, I understand being a structuration as insufficient for being a 
generalization. For, sometimes, representing target elements as classes carries some 
information about intrinsic features of those elements apart from their functional 
relations to elements occupying other positions in the same structure; but representing 
target elements as positions in structures never carries such information.  
 
 
3 Robust Perfect Adaptation of E.coli Chemotaxis 
 
My central claim is that different explanatory strategies from recent systems biology 
differ from each other, at least in part, by virtue of appealing to different abstraction 
types. I support this claim by considering a case in which multiple strategies target the 
same explanandum. Doing so minimizes confounds that confuse differences due to the 
nature of each explanatory strategy with differences due to the nature of each 
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explanatory target. I focus on a particular explanandum known as robust perfect 
adaptation of bacterial chemotaxis, following others who consider this a paradigmatic 
target for non-ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ ;Braillard ϮϬϭϬ; BrigaŶdt, GreeŶ, aŶd O’MalleǇ 
forthcoming; Matthiessen forthcoming). 
 
3.1 Explanadum Context 
Escherichia coli (E.coli) is popular model organism in biological research. It is very 
sensitive to small chemical changes over a very large range of background 
concentrations. It also has a simple and well-understood signal transduction network 
(Wadhams and Armitage 2004). 
 
E.coli manages two kinds of motion (Berg 2003). It runs by rotating its flagellar motor 
counterclockwise. This aligns all of its flagella into a synchronized bundle, resulting in 
movement in a straight line for about 1 second. E.coli also tumbles by rotating its 
flagellar motor clockwise. This breaks flagellar alignment, and the asynchronized flagella 
produce stationary changes of direction lasting for about 0.1 second. E.coli are randomly 
reoriented after each tumble. Moreover, while these tumbles occur with regular 
frequency, E.coli  with higher concentrations of CheR protein tumble more frequently 
(Spudich and Kochland 1975). 
 
E.coli’s ŵotioŶ iŶ a uŶiforŵ eǆterŶal eŶǀiroŶŵeŶt reseŵďles a raŶdoŵ ǁalk. E.coli has 
no ability to control or select its direction of motion, and its straight runs are subject to 
Brownian motion because of eddies. However, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant—amino acids such as serine or aspartic acid, or sugars such as maltose or 
glucose— E.coli taxis toward the attractant. This taxi behavior involves less frequent 
tumbles, leading to longer runs and so gradual motion toward the attractant. (There is 
an opposite behavior for repellants such as metal ions or leucine.) 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for E.coli chemotaxis is well-understood. When an 
environmental attractant attaches to a receptor, the receptor lowers the activity of the 
CheW-CheA protein complex. Less activity from this complex reduces the rate of CheY 
phosphorylation, which results in less phorphorylated CheY diffusing to the flagella. 
Because CheY induces clockwise rotation of the flagellar motor, the outcome is less 
frequent tumbling. 
 
3.2 Explanadum Question 
 
Alon and colleagues have experimental verification that, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant mixed uniformly into the environment at a constant concentration, E.coli 
chemotaxis perfectly adaptive (Alon et al 2009). After a brief period of decreased 
tumbling frequency, the frequency of E.coli tumbles increases toward and returns to the 
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exact frequency prior to the introduction of the attractant. The effect of the attractant, 
accordingly, becomes entirely forgotten despite its continuing presence. 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for the adaptiveness of chemotaxis for E.coli is also well-
understood. Some time after a new attractant has been detected by receptors, the 
lower activity of the CheW-CheA complex induces less CheB activity. This reduces the 
rate for removing methyl groups from the CheW-CheA complex and, together with 
continual methylation of the CheR receptor, CheW-CheA methylation increases. More 
methylation means more CheW-CheA activity, which in turn induces more CheY 
phosphorylation. This eventually results in more phosphorylated CheY diffusing to the 
flagellar motor, which increases clockwise motor rotation and thereby raises tumbling 
frequency.   
 
Alon and colleagues have further experimental verification that this perfectly adaptive 
chemotaxis of E.coli is robust across ranges of CheR concentrations 0.5 to 50 times 
higher thaŶ ĐoŶĐeŶtratioŶ leǀels iŶ ͞ǁild tǇpe͟ E.coli (Alon et al 2009). (By contrast, 
E.coli’s adaptatioŶ tiŵe—the time to return to 50% of its pre-stimulus tumbling 
frequency—is not robust to different CheR concentrations, because more CheR entails 
longer adaptation times.) This is the explanandum of interest: why is the perfect 
adaptation of E.coli chemotaxis, in the presence of a well-distributed chemical 
attractant, robust to CheR protein concentrations?  
 
There are (at least) three strategies for answering this question in recent systems 
biology literature. (For a fourth, see Kollman et al 2005.) I consider each in turn, first 
sketching the general strategy and then making explicit the abstractions at work.  
 
 
4 Distinguishing Explanatory Strategies through Abstraction Types 
 
4.1 Dynamical Modeling 
I call the first strategy dynamical modeling. This strategy begins by constructing a 
chemotaxis network for E.coli. This network represents the mechanism for E.coli 
chemotaxis, including specific biochemical details about when and how relevant 
proteins affect each other. (See Figurer 2.) For example, Barkai and Leibler (1997) 
construct a model according to which, among many other specifics, CheB demethylates 
only the active form of the CheW-CheA complex and CheR works only at saturation.  
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 Figure 2. Mechanistic network for E.coli chemotaxis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
The dynamical modeling strategy proceeds by constructing a dynamical model—
typically a set of differential equations—from the network (see Jones and Wolkenhauer 
2012). One then demonstrates, via mathematical proof or simulation, that this model 
predicts perfect adaptation in the presence of a well-distributed chemical attractant for 
CheR concentration values varying over several orders of magnitude. (Raerinne 2013 
calls this sensitivity analysis.) The demonstration supports the inference that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation because of its biochemical specifics. 
 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) call the product of this strategy a dynamical 
mechanistic explanation. I set aside the issue of whether the dynamical modeling 
strategǇ produĐes eǆplaŶatioŶs. But I eŶdorse BeĐhtel aŶd AďrahaŵseŶ’s iŶsight that 
the dynamical modeling strategy produces accounts that are mechanistic, by virtue of 
depending upon mechanistic details, as well as dynamical, by virtue of analyzing 
ŵatheŵatiĐal ŵodels ďuilt upoŶ those details. For eǆaŵple, Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ 
mathematical analysis is relevant to E.coli chemotaxis only insofar as their network 
details are relevant; and analysis of the network apart from the model cannot produce 
an inference about the robustness of E.coli’s perfeĐtlǇ adaptiǀe Đheŵotaǆis. 
 
Let’s treat the dǇŶaŵiĐal model driving this explanatory strategy as an initial baseline for 
evaluating the number and severity of abstraction in various explanatory strategies. The 
model is abstract in various ways. But we shall treat it as a recipient of further 
abstractions, in the way a vehicle receives freight. Just as we can determine the weight 
of the freight indirectly by subtracting the gross weight of vehicle and freight from the 
͞tare ǁeight͟ ;the ǁeight of ǀehiĐle aloŶeͿ, ǁe shall determine abstraction variety and 
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severitǇ/eǆteŶt for ŵodels driǀiŶg other eǆplaŶatorǇ strategies ďǇ ͞suďtraĐtiŶg͟ their 
total aďstraĐtioŶ ǀarietǇ aŶd seǀeritǇ froŵ the ͞tare͟ aďstraĐtioŶ. 
 
4.2 Topological Analysis 
I call the second explanatory strategy topological analysis. This strategy begins by 
identifying all possible minimal adaptation networks capable of predicting robust 
perfect adaptation for E.coli chemotaxis. These networks, like the networks for 
dynamical modeling, represent mechanisms for E.coli chemotaxis. Yet, unlike the 
networks for dynamical modeling, these networks are minimal: they contain the fewest 
possible nodes and links that suffice for robustly perfectly adaptive chemotaxis. The 
procedure for identifying all possible minimal networks of this sort is brute 
computational search. It turns out that there are exactly three, each of which has 
exactly three nodes and no more than three links (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy proceeds by identifying a chemotaxis network known 
to predict robust perfect adaptation. This strategy thereby relies upon the dynamical 
modeling strategy, but only for mathematical results. The biochemical details of the 
chosen chemotaxis network turn out to be largely irrelevant, because the topological 
analysis strategy proceeds by demonstrating that a reduced form of the chosen network 
is topological equivalent to one of the minimal adaptation models. Reduced forms for 
mechanistic networks functional equivalents for node groups, group nodes or 
equivalents into modules, and ignore links within modules in favor of links between 
modules. 
 
Consider, for example, one of the three minimal adaptation networks Ma and 
colleagues (2009) discover for E.coli chemotaxis. (See Figure 3.) The network has an 
input activating node A, A inhibiting being activated by B, A also activating C, and C 
aĐtiǀatiŶg soŵe output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues shoǁ that Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ŵodel 
for E.coli chemotaxis reduces to this minimal network. Barkai and Leibler have an input 
and CheR activating, and CheB inhibiting, receptors; these receptors activating the 
CheW-CheA complex; the complex activating CheB and CheY; and CheY activating some 
output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues reĐoŶĐeptualize Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s Ŷetǁork iŶto oŶe ǁhere 
the input activates a receptor complex; this complex activates CheY, which activates the 
output; the complex also activates CheB, which inhibits a methylation level also 
activated by CheR.; and this methylation level activates the receptor complex. Then, in a 
second reconceptualization that produces one of their minimal adaptation networks, 
they group the receptor complex and CheB into module A, group CheR and the 
methylation level into module B, and rename CheY module C.  
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Figure 3: Network topology for E.coli chemotaxis (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy infers, from the topological equivalence between a 
minimal adaptation network and the reduced form of a network known to predict 
robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis, that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because of the topology of its chemotaxis network. Huneman (2010) calls the 
product of this strategy a topological explanation. Regardless of whether analyses such 
as Ma aŶd Đolleagues’s are eǆplaŶatorǇ, theǇ are topologiĐal ďǇ ǀirtue of demonstrating 
some consequence about the topological properties of a network. This means that, even 
if the mechanistic details of E.coli’s Đheŵotaǆis Ŷetǁork ǁere differeŶt, aŶd eǀeŶ if the 
biochemical specifics of the network chosen for reduction were different, the product of 
the topological analysis strategy would remain the same provided that the alternative 
networks preserve topological equivalence with the originals (see also Jones 2014).  
 
The topological model driving this second explanatory strategy is more abstract than the 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodel driǀiŶg our iŶitial ;͞tare͟Ϳ strategǇ. The topologiĐal ŵodel ĐoŶtaiŶs 
more aggregations. For example, it represeŶts CheY aŶd Che) as ͞the ŵotor rotation 
group;͟ it represents CheA and CheW as "the receptor complex;" and it represents the 
receptor complex aŶd CheB as ͞the phosphorǇlatioŶ group.͟ The topologiĐal ŵodel also 
contains more structurations. For example, it represents the phosphorylation group as 
͞A͟ aŶd the ŵotor rotatioŶ group as ͞C.͟ These representations abstract entirely from 
any intrinsic marks that might distinguish instanĐes of ͞A͟ froŵ iŶstaŶĐes of ͞C," relǇiŶg 
instead upon extrinsic relations to distinguish the nodes from each other. So, for 
example, "A" but not "C" inhibits "B," "A" activates "C," and so on.  
 
4.3 Organizational Design 
I call the third explanatory strategy organization design. This strategy begins with a 
proof to the effect that systems exhibit robust perfect adaptation if and only if they 
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satisfy the characteristic equation for Integral Feedback Control (IFC). The proof is 
purely mathematical, well-known from control engineering theory in contexts involving 
mechanical systems that exhibit IFC such as thermostats. I am not aware of a complete 
and published version of this proof, but Yi and colleagues (2000) provide a sketch with 
relevant details. The organizational design strategy proceeds by inferring that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation if and only if it satisfies the characteristic 
equation for IFC, and further inferring that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because it satisfies the characteristic equation for IFC. (For better 
explanatory details regarding this specific case, Braillard 2010; Green and Jones 2016.) 
 
The organizational design strategy invokes neither mechanistic specifics about the 
chemotaxis network for E.coli nor topological details about the structure of that 
network. The strategy takes the explanandum phenomenon as given, using a 
mathematical equivalence result to identify a principle both necessary and sufficient for 
the phenomenon. The strategy thereby has affinities with explanatory strategies that 
appeal to organizing principles (Green and Wolkenhauer 2013) and design principles 
(Green 2015).  
 
For siŵpliĐitǇ, let’s ͞reset͟ our aďstraĐtioŶ ͞tare͟ to the topologiĐal ŵodel, ďeĐause the 
model driving the organizational design strategy—call it the design model—is abstract in 
all the ways the topological model is abstract and more besides. The simplification 
thereby focuses attention on ways in which the design model differs from the 
topological model—and, by extension, from the initial dynamical model.  
 
Compared to the topological model, the design model contains more aggregations. For 
example, the design model represents CheY phosphorǇlatioŶ aŶd CheB aĐtiǀatioŶ as ͞k-
ďoǆ output.͟ This aggregation is, at the same time, a generalization and a structuration. 
For example, "k-box output" is a class, with instances biological as well as mechanical. 
The standard example of a mechanical instance is heater activation in a thermostat. The 
k-box representation is also a structuration, akin to the "A", "B," and "C" 
representations from the topological model. For the k-box represents whatever has 
such-and-such input and output (a position in a structure). (See Figure 4.) 
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Figure 4 Organizational design for bacterial Đheŵotaǆis…aŶd therŵostats (Yi et al 
2000). 
 
The topological model is more abstract than the dynamical model, by virtue of 
containing various abstractions over protein identities. The design model, in turn, is 
more abstract than the topological and dynamical models, by virtue of also containing 
various abstractions over protein interactions. We can, therefore, arrange the various 
explanatory strategies along a continuum of abstraction type and severity. The 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodeliŶg strategǇ, as our ďaseliŶe, oĐĐupies the ͞loǁ͟ eŶd of our ĐoŶtiŶuuŵ. 
Next is topological analysis, which involves aggregations of and structurations from 
protein identities (or aggregations thereof). Then there is organizational design, which 
also involves aggregation of protein interactions as well as generalization and 
structuration of protein identities (or aggregations thereof). 
 
 
5 Confirming the Analysis 
 
I consider the foregoing to establish that each explanatory strategy invokes a different 
combination of abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different 
mechanistic details. Whether this result generalizes beyond my chosen case study 
awaits future research. There is some reason to expect an affirmative result. For if 
dynamical, topological, and design explanatory strategies differ as I claim—specifically, 
along dimensions of number and severity of generalizations and structurations—then 
we should expect the more abstract strategies to have wider scope. For the more 
general models likely have more instances, and the more structural models likely have 
more position occupants.  
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We find confirmation of this prediction for the case of robust perfect adaptation of 
Bacillus subtilis (B.subtilis) chemotaxis. Details of the organization design strategy for 
explaining why E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation also apply for 
explaining why B.subtilis chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation. But details of 
the corresponding dynamical mechanistic strategy do not. The organization design 
strategy, as we know, involves more generalization and structuration than the 
dynamical mechanistic strategy. This confirms our prediction. 
 
Allow me to be brief with the details. Rao and Ordal (2007) develop a dynamic 
mechanistic explanation for the perfect robustness of chemotaxis for B.subtilis. Their 
eǆplaŶatorǇ strategǇ folloǁs the saŵe patterŶ as Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s iŶ the Đase of 
E.coli. But details differ. For example, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ŵodel, CheB iŶ 
E.coli demethylates only active receptor complexes; according to Rao and Ordal, CheB in 
B.subtilis deŵethǇlates iŶaĐtiǀe oŶes too. AgaiŶ, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s 
model, without CheY E.coli runs but does not tumble; according to Rao and Ordal, 
without CheY B.subtilis tumbles but does not run. One more: according to Barkai and 
Leiďler’s ŵodel, E.coli without CheB cannot run; according to Rao and Ordal, B.subtilis 
without CheB can run. See Figure 5. 
 
 
 Figure 5: Chemotaxis network for B.subtilis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
 
“o Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ does Ŷot applǇ for the Đase of 
B.subtilis. But Yi aŶd Đolleague’s orgaŶizatioŶal desigŶ strategǇ does. For B.subtilis, like 
E.coli, exhibits robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis if and only if it satisfies the 
characteristic equation for integral feedback control.  
 
 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -267-
 13 
6 Toward Abstractive Mechanistic Explanation and its Affordances 
 
Systems biological strategies for explaining the robust perfect adaptation of bacterial 
chemotaxis (in E.coli, B.subtilis, etc) apply mathematical techniques to network models. 
Dynamical, topological, and design strategies apply different techniques to explain the 
same phenomenon. Each explanatory strategy, moreover, applies its mathematical 
techniques to network models that embody different kinds and severities of these 
abstractions such as aggregations, generalizations, structurations. These abstraction 
types, accordingly, help to explain how these systems biological explanatory strategies 
differ from each other.  
 
These abstraction types also provide a foundation for unifying various explanatory 
strategies from systems biology under the banner of mechanistic explanation. Let’s 
consider well known kinds of mechanistic explanation as standard. Let’s also folloǁ 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) by considering dynamical mechanistic explanation as a 
mathematized species of standard mechanistic explanation.  
 
Then let an abstract network be any network representation obtained by aggregating, 
generalizing, or structurating mechanistic details of the sort familiar in standard 
mechanistic explanation. Also let an abstractive mechanistic explanation be any 
explanation driven by applying mathematical techniques to an abstract network. See 
Figure 6. 
 
 
 Figure 6. Relating standard and abstractive mechanistic explanation. 
 
Then topological and organizational design explanatory strategies are mechanistic 
strategies—albeit abstractive ones. Topological explanations apply topological analysis 
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to aggregated and generalized mechanism networks. Organizational design explanations 
apply control systems engineering to aggregated, generalized, and structurated 
mechanism networks.  
 
Both kinds of explanation are mechanistic, by virtue of being grounded upon 
mechanistic details. But both also provide explanatory affordances unavailable through 
standard mechanistic explanations, by virtue of being abstract. For example, by virtue of 
using generalizations, topological explanations should have a greater scope than their 
standard mechanistic counterparts. By virtue of using generalizations and 
structurations, organizational design explanations should have still greater scope.  
 
That these abstractive mechanistic strategies use novel mathematical techniques is a 
side effect of their using novel abstractions (in comparison with standard mechanistic 
explanations and their dynamical cousins). These techniques, of course, support more 
general conclusions, with wider scope, than the kind of differential equation analysis 
available for dynamical mechanistic explanations. But the techniques do not explain why 
the strategies have broader scope. 
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How the Diachronic Theoretical Virtues Make an Epistemic Difference
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Abstract. Among the virtues of good theories are those appropriately labeled diachronic: durability, fruit-
fulness, and applicability—the last of which is insufficiently recognized. Diachronic theoretical virtues
cannot be instantiated in the original construction of a theory; subsequent development is required. By
contrast,  one  can assess  the  degree  to  which  a  theory  exhibits  the  following  nine  non-diachronic
theoretical virtues in a theory’s  original  construction: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory
depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, and  unification.
The distinction between diachronic and non-diachronic virtues is important for understanding the role and
epistemic standing of each theoretical virtue.
Keywords. Theoretical virtues, durability, fruitfulness, prediction, and science-technology relations.
1. Introduction. Theoretical virtues are the traits of a theory that show it is probably true or worth accept-
ing. Although the identification, characterization, classification, and epistemic standing of theory virtues
are debated by philosophers and by participants in specific theoretical disputes, many scholars agree that
these virtues help us to infer which rival theory is the best explanation (Lipton 2004). The most widely ac-
cepted theories across the disciplines usually exhibit many of the same theoretical virtues listed below.
Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive
disclosure or expansion. In another forthcoming essay (Keas 2017) I argue for this new systematization of
the theoretical virtues. In the present essay I focus on the diachronic class of virtues in contrast with the
non-diachronic virtues.  One can assess the degree to which a theory exhibits the non-diachronic virtues
from the time a theory is initially framed. However, no theory, in its original construction, can instantiate
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the diachronic virtues: durability, fruitfulness, or applicability. These virtues are instantiable only as a the-
ory is later refined or applied.
Evidential virtues
1. Evidential accuracy: A theory (T) fits the empirical evidence well (regardless of causal claims).
2. Causal adequacy: T’s causal factors plausibly produce the effects (evidence) in need of explanation. 
3. Explanatory depth: T excels in causal history depth or in other depth measures such as the range of
counterfactual questions that its law-like generalizations answer regarding the item being explained.
Coherential virtues
4. Internal consistency: T’s components are related to each other logically. 
5. Internal  coherence:  T’s  components  are  coordinated  into  an  intuitively  plausible  whole;
T lacks ad hoc hypotheses—theoretical components merely tacked on to solve isolated problems.
6. Universal coherence: T sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs.
Aesthetic virtues
7. Beauty: T evokes aesthetic pleasure in properly functioning and sufficiently informed persons.
8. Simplicity: T explains the same facts as rivals, but with less theoretical content.
9. Unification: T explains more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theoretical content.
Diachronic virtues
10. Durability: T has survived testing by successful prediction or plausible accommodation of new data.
11. Fruitfulness:  T has  generated  additional  discovery by  means  such as  successful  novel  prediction,
unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration.
12. Applicability: T has guided strategic action or control, such as in science-based technology.
We will survey the first nine virtues only to the brief extent needed to recognize how one can assess the
degree to which a theory exhibits these theoretical virtues in its original construction. This will, by con-
trast, enable us to appreciate the unique temporal character of the diachronic theoretical virtues.
2.  Non-Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues. We begin  with  the  first  three  virtues.  Evidential  accuracy,
which is how well a theory fits the relevant data, can be assessed from the theory’s original construction.
Often a theory will also, from its inception, specify causally adequate mechanisms to produce the phe-
nomena in question. Such is not necessarily the case, as Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift illus-
trates. His theory enjoyed considerable evidential accuracy despite its lack of a plausible cause to move
the continents. Explanatory depth is also instantiated in a theory’s initial formulation if, for example, the
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theory answers a large range of counterfactual questions about a kind of phenomenon using the resources
of its law-like generalizations.
The  remaining  six  non-diachronic  theoretical  virtues  likewise  can  be  exhibited  in  the  initial
formation of a theory. A theory may be constructed in a logical manner so as to produce internal consis-
tency. Beyond that, the theoretical components might be well coordinated into an intuitively plausible
whole (avoiding ad hoc hypotheses), thus generating the theoretical virtue of  internal coherence. If the
theory sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs, then it possesses the virtue
of universal coherence. A new theory might even evoke aesthetic pleasure in the minds of experts, which
constitutes theoretical  beauty. The closely related virtues of simplicity and unification also might be in-
stantiated in the initial formation of a theory: explaining the same facts as rival theories but with less theo-
retical content (simplicity), and explaining more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theo-
retical content (unification).
Much more could be said about the first nine virtues outlined above (Keas 2017), but this is suffi-
cient to recognize them as a group of theoretical virtues that can, in principle, be instantiated in a theory’s
original formation. This common trait remains characteristic of these virtues even (largely) under the dis-
parate accounts found in the literature of how to characterize each virtue. Let us now explore the chief di-
achronic theoretical virtues in contrast to the non-diachronic virtues.
3.  Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues.  Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability, which I recognize as the
chief diachronic theoretical virtues, can only be instantiated as a theory is cultivated after its origin. This
necessarily extended temporal dimension of the diachronic virtues is, arguably, of considerable epistemic
importance. But even if one endorses the arguments that discount the epistemic significance of this tem-
poral component (Mayo 2014), one still should acknowledge a group of virtues that (unlike the other the-
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oretical virtues) can only be instantiated in a theory after its initial formulation. Time is of their essence in
a manner that goes beyond the trivial truth that all human endeavor is temporal. McMullin (2014) has lead
the way in articulating the epistemic significance of two of the three main diachronic virtues: durability
and fruitfulness (I recognize McMullin’s  third diachronic virtue of  “consilience”  as a mode of fruitful-
ness). Applicability, largely overlooked as a theory virtue, is another important member of this diachronic
category, as I shall demonstrate.
   3.1. Durability.  Durability, a virtue term McMullin (2014) recommended, refers to the favorable epis-
temic condition of a theory that has survived testing by successful prediction or by plausible accommoda-
tion of new unanticipated data (or both). Popular or long-lived theories are not necessarily durable in the
epistemic sense in view here. Equating durability with popularity or tradition is fallacious. While testabil-
ity is a pragmatically admirable trait of a theory, it is not an intrinsic epistemic characteristic of a theory;
many testable theories have failed too many tests to be acceptable. Steel (2010, 18) notes that the “more
precise and informative a theory’s empirical predictions are, the greater its testability.” The more testable
a theory is, the more durable it would prove itself to be if it passes the tests. A theory that scores low in
testability has little potential to exhibit durability.
Despite the leading role of  predictive success in many areas of science, it is less prominent in
some reputable scientific theories that are, nevertheless, well endowed with other virtues. Successful pre-
diction is very frequently part of explaining “how things work,” but less routine in explaining “how things
originated”—as in theories about the history of the cosmos, earth, and life (Cleland 2011, but Winther
2009 argues otherwise). Successful historical theories typically enjoy other forms of durability, most no-
tably a track record of plausible accommodation of new data that, although not predicted, came to light af-
ter the theory’s origin.  The durability of a theory suffers if one or more of its predictions are disconfirmed
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or when theorists respond to disconfirming evidence by modifying the theory with ad hoc hypotheses—
theoretical components merely “tacked on” to solve isolated problems. Although initially a theory may
exhibit a high degree of evidential accuracy (or any other of the first nine virtues in my systematization),
it is impossible for a newborn theory to instantiate the virtue of durability—this takes time in a sense not
required by the non-diachronic virtues. A similar necessary temporal dimension characterizes fruitfulness.
   3.2. Fruitfulness.  Fruitfulness, also known as fertility or fecundity, is another diachronic theoretical
virtue. A theory is fruitful if, over time, it generates additional discovery by means such as successful
novel prediction, unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration. While durability is about conserva-
tion (a theory passing tests to survive), fruitfulness is about innovation (a theory stimulating further dis-
covery). When a prediction formulated in the context of a theory’s construction is later verified, this suc-
cessful predictive outcome increases the virtue of durability in that theory. By contrast, a novel prediction
is one that was not conceived in conjunction with a theory’s construction, but that nevertheless follows
reasonably from it. When such a novel prediction is confirmed by observation, a theory exhibits more
fruitfulness.
The closely related diachronic character of durability and fruitfulness is well illustrated in the dis-
covery of the first two planets beyond Saturn. Soon after Friedrich William Herschel unexpectedly dis-
covered Uranus in 1781, astronomers noted that its observed motion strayed from what contemporary
Newtonian mechanics predicted of such a planet. However, given the overall theoretically virtuous status
of Newtonian physics up through that time (including its durability due to its success in testing), most as-
tronomers expected a forthcoming way to make Uranus compliant with established theory. Even rejecting
the anomalous data as “inaccurate” seemed reasonable early on. By the 1830s, however, the possibility of
a perturbing planet beyond Uranus became a more reasonable and popular speculation, despite the ab-
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sence of a precise novel prediction of where to find such a planet. By this time many astronomers were
modestly confident in the accumulated data of Uranus’ positions in the sky.
This brings us to the celebrated successful novel prediction of 1845-1846. Based principally on
Newtonian physics and the well-known irregularities in Uranus’ motion, two astronomers independently
predicted where another unknown perturbing planet (later called Neptune) was likely located. Le Verrier’s
estimate of the planet’s location was the most accurate (correct within one degree), as confirmed by a Ger-
man astronomer on September 23, 1846. The (fruitful) novel prediction of Neptune was born within the
context of a  durable Newtonian orbital  mechanics research tradition and the unexpected discovery of
Uranus with its anomalous motions. The sensational success of this novel prediction (the discovery of
Neptune)  also rendered Uranus a  Newtonian-compliant  planet—thus further vindicating  earlier  provi-
sional toleration of Uranus’ anomalies, a toleration that had been justified by yet earlier Newtonian dura-
bility and fruitfulness. 
Smith’s (2010; 2014) landmark study of gravity theory from Newton to the present further illumi-
nates the durability and fruitfulness of this research tradition, and it includes the case histories of Uranus
and Neptune. Smith was surprised that the principal kind of question being tested was not “Do the calcu-
lated motions [e.g., of Uranus] agree with the observed motions?”  Rather it was:  “Can robust physical
sources compatible with Newtonian theory be found for each clear, systematic discrepancy between the
calculated and the observed motions?” Neptune (as novelly predicted) turned out to be such a robust phys-
ical source. However scientists failed over a half century to find a robust (detectable) physical source for
the Newtonian-defying behavior of Mercury—a tiny anomaly in the precession of its perihelion. But this
failure, which Einstein solved by way of theory replacement, does not completely diminish the enduring
epistemic significance of two centuries of Newtonian durability and fruitfulness, as Hanson (1962) inac-
curately suggested. Smith notes: “All the other discrepancies ended up revealing some detail of our plane-
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tary system, the least subtle of which was Neptune, that theretofore had not been taken into account in the
calculations” (2010, 552).
Such  serial  Newtonian  problem  solving  became  (almost  always)  ever  more  empirically  con-
strained in a spiral of upward progress. For example, Uranus’ temporarily Newtonian-defying behavior
“would have been masked if the significantly larger gravitational effects of Saturn on Uranus had not been
included in the calculation first.” Smith explains further:
So, the discovery of Neptune provided evidence not only for Newton’s theory, but also for the
specific aspects of Saturn that entered into calculating its effects on Uranus, for these were no
less presupposed in the anomaly that emerged than Newton’s theory was. The point general-
izes. Each time a discrepancy emerges and a robust physical source for it is found, that source
is  incorporated  into the new calculations,  and the process  is  repeated,  typically  with still
smaller discrepancies emerging that were often theretofore masked in the calculations.  So,
what was being tested each time when a new discrepancy emerged and a physical source for it
was being sought was not only Newtonian theory, but also all the previously identified details
that make a difference and the differences they were said to make without which the further
systematic discrepancy would not have emerged. (2010, 552-53)
On display is an interlocking of durability (passing tests to survive) and fruitfulness (stimulating further
discovery) that is supportive of scientific realism. “This shows that increasingly strong evidence was ac-
cruing to Newtonian theory over the first two hundred years of orbital research based on it,” Smith con-
cludes. This point (with some qualification) extends even to Einstein’s theoretical innovation that was
partly justified by the unruly perihelion of Mercury. Einstein’s achievement was, to some degree, a con-
tinuation of this same progressive spiral, as Smith deftly explains: 
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As is well known, Einstein required Newtonian gravitation to hold in an asymptotic limit as
he developed his new theory of gravity—specifically in a static, weak-field limit. That he did
so was just as well because the 43 arc-seconds per century anomaly in the perihelion of Mer-
cury that was initially the sole evidence for his theory presupposes Newtonian gravity…. As a
matter of historical fact, all of the details singled out as making detectable differences during
the two centuries of prior research carried over intact into post-Einstein orbital mechanics.
Save for some qualifications concerning levels of precision, the same details are still making
the same differences as before…. So, Newtonian theory must still have some sort of claim to
being knowledge. (2010, 556-57)
Smith’s continuity-of-knowledge claim invites comment. While much of the metaphysics associated with
Newtonian theory has been repudiated, we nevertheless see an impressive degree of fruitful scientific con-
tinuity from Newtonian to modern physics (at least in the particular ways that Smith documents). In sum,
Newtonian orbital mechanics enjoyed increasingly impressive interlocking durability and fruitfulness over
multiple centuries, and its approximate legitimacy (not counting discarded Newtonian metaphysics) re-
mains similarly well-grounded today under the revisionary umbrella of modern physics.
Though some philosophers have argued to the contrary (Collins 1994; Harker 2008), many scien-
tists and philosophers think that predictive success—especially novel predictive success—is a stronger in-
dicator of likely approximate truth than a theory’s accommodation of data (Douglas and Magnus 2013).
According to my systematization (which illuminates but does not settle this thorny issue), data accommo-
dation refers to a theory’s initial instantiation of the evidential virtues (evidential accuracy, causal ade-
quacy,  and  explanatory  depth),  and  a  theory’s  subsequent  instantiation  of  certain  diachronic  virtues,
namely non-predictive durability (plausibly making sense of new unanticipated data) and non-predictive
fruitfulness (especially non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of new unanticipated data).
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   3.2.1 Unification as a Mode of Fruitfulness. Fruitful theory elaboration, whether by means of successful
novel prediction or non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of unanticipated evidence, often
also makes sense of new kinds of data, and thus is additionally recognized as increasing a theory’s unifica-
tion. Earlier we encountered unification as a non-diachronic (aesthetic) theoretical virtue. The diachronic
increase of unification differs somewhat from its non-diachronic cousin. The historian and philosopher of
science William Whewell (1794–1866) called diachronic unification “consilience.” When a theory ex-
plains a new domain of facts in a surprising way, then it is fruitful in a consilient manner. McMullin
writes in this regard:
A good theory will often display remarkable powers of unification, making different classes of
phenomena “leap together” over the course of time. Domains previously thought to be dis-
parate  now become one, the textbook example,  of course,  being Maxwell’s unification of
magnetism, electricity, and light. Examples abound in recent science, a particularly striking
one being the development of the plate-tectonic model in geology. Assuming that this unifying
power manifests itself over time, it testifies to the epistemic resources of the original theory
and hence to that theory’s having been more than mere accommodation. (2014, 505)
McMullin contrasts diachronic unification with its non-diachronic counterpart:  “If the unification was
achieved by the original theory, however, the virtue involved would no longer be diachronic.” Instead, it
would count (in my systematization) as an aesthetic theoretical virtue that I simply call “unification,” and
that Lipton calls  “variety”  (and yet others call  “broad scope”). Lipton favors the assumption that such
“heterogeneous evidence provides more support than the same amount of very similar evidence” (Lipton
2004, 168). Despite my own inclination to accept Lipton’s point, I recognize this as a somewhat debatable
assumption about the epistemic significance of an aesthetic property. However, when unification increases
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over time, especially by means of surprising convergences, then unification is less likely the result of the
idiosyncratic aesthetic predispositions and clever accommodating skills of a theorist during theory forma-
tion. Thus fruitful diachronic unification has greater confirmatory power than a theory’s initial degree of
aesthetic unification.
   3.2.2 The Role of Prediction in the Diachronic Virtues. Drawing from Douglas’ work on the relationship
of prediction to inferring the best explanation, I argue that predictive success (in the first two diachronic
virtues explored above) extends the epistemic work of many non-diachronic theoretical virtues such as
causal adequacy, explanatory depth, beauty, simplicity, and unification. These latter theory traits, which
she collectively labels as “explanatory,”
appeal to us, not just because we are aesthetically driven creatures but because such virtues
help us to use the explanation to think and, in particular, to think our way through to new pre-
dictions, new tests, new rigors for our beautiful explanation. (2009, 460)
Douglas also notes:  
Predictions are valuable because they force us (when followed through) to test our theories,
because they have the potential to expand our knowledge into new realms and because they
hold out the possibility (if successful) of gaining some measure of control over natural pro-
cesses. (2009, 455)
Transposing Douglas’ insights into my taxonomic terms, predictions are valuable because they figure into
all three of the major diachronic virtues: durability (testing theories successfully), fruitfulness (expanding
“our knowledge into new realms”), and applicability (which includes “gaining some measure of control
over natural processes”). Moreover, the operation of prediction (“saying before” at least in a logical if not
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temporal sense) in these three theoretical virtues further supports my classification of them as diachronic.
Lets us now explore the last major diachronic virtue of applicability.
  3.3. Applicability.  Applicability refers to when a theory is used to guide successful action (e.g., prepare
for a natural disaster) or to enhance technological control (e.g., genetic engineering). High degrees of the
virtue of applicability obtain when a theory that is used to guide such action or control provides more ef-
fective outcomes than what is possible in the absence of the theory. Successful scientific theories consti-
tute knowledge of the world (knowing that), not control over the world (which is mainly knowing how)
for practical (non-theoretical) purposes. In this regard Strevens (2008, 3) notes: “If science provides any-
thing of intrinsic value, it is explanation. Prediction and control are useful … but when science is pursued
as an end rather than as a means, it is for the sake of understanding.” But even after the intrinsic good of a
theoretically virtuous explanation is in hand, one of several possible additional confirmatory diachronic
(predictive or controlling) virtues might be acquired by a theory, including applicability. In such cases a
good theory just gets better—even more confidence in its probable truth is justified.
Although scientific experiments use technological control, they do so to test scientific theories—
so the main function is still to understand nature, not to control it. However, especially in the case of theo-
ries supported by experimentally verified prediction, such foreknowledge and laboratory control might be
exploited to achieve practical aims such as device fabrication or medical intervention. But in any case,
one cannot apply scientific knowledge until after one first obtains it. This necessary time lapse makes ap-
plicability diachronic.
To obtain scientific knowledge we search for a theory that (initially) exhibits many of the non-di-
achronic theoretical virtues. Subsequent work aimed at theory testing and elaboration might produce the
additionally confirming presence of the diachronic virtues of durability and fruitfulness. At some point in
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this dance of virtue-driven theory assessment and refinement, sufficient confidence in a particular theory
might spur attempts to apply it as the basis for a new or improved technology. If the derived science-based
technology actually works, then the “applied theory” has acquired the additional theoretical virtue of ap-
plicability. Because this requires additional time after initial theory formation, the diachronic classifica-
tion of applicability is appropriate.
Although the application of scientific theories constitutes one aspect of technology, most of tech-
nology involves the empirical discovery of “know how” knowledge without crucially presupposing or im-
mediately applying any particular scientific theory. Indeed, the relation between science and technology is
not a simple one-way linear affair (Radder 2009; Douglas 2014). But this “emancipation” of technology
from subordination to science, accomplished by historians and philosophers of technology between 1960
and 1990 (Houkes 2009, 310), should not obscure the epistemic significance of instances of technological
innovation made possible, in part, by applied scientific theory.
This point is in harmony with the so-called demise of the “pure vs. applied science” dichotomy.
Understanding and controlling nature are closely related, as our study of the diachronic theoretical virtues,
including applicability, indicates. Douglas (2014, 62) surfaces some of the subtlety of this argument when,
on the one hand, she proclaims: “With the pure vs. applied distinction removed, scientific progress can be
defined in terms of the increased capacity to predict, control, manipulate, and intervene in various con-
texts.” But then, on the other hand, in a footnote she recoils partially: “To be clear, while I think this is a
useful rubric for scientific progress, it is not a remotely sufficient account for how one should assess sci-
entific theories.”  Other (non-diachronic) theoretical virtues that are complementary to, but less weighty
epistemically than, prediction and control also play important roles in theory assessment, she suggests.
Consideration of the nine major non-diachronic theoretical virtues systematized in Sections 1 and 2 drives
this point home.
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How exactly is applicability a diachronic theory trait that is epistemic (helping to indicate likely
truth) in view of the obvious  pragmatic orientation of  technological application?  Agazzi observes that
some technological projects “are designed or projected in advance, as the concrete application of knowl-
edge provided by a given science or set of sciences” (Agazzi 2014, 308). If a project of this kind actually
works as predicted, then this reinforces our confidence in the theory base that helped guide such action in
the world. Agazzi further notes:
The predictions  ‘contained’ in the project actually are the predictions made by the scientific
theories which have permitted the proposal of the complex noema that constitutes the project,
and contains not only prescriptions as to the way of realising the structure of the machine but
also as to its functioning. This functioning is something that happens; it is a state of affairs
that constitutes a confirmation of the theories used in projecting the machine. (309)
Although Agazzi’s scientific realism overstates the epistemic reach of applicability, it is helpful nonethe-
less as a corrective to other philosophical errors:
A mature science is a science that has given rise to a significant technology. This means, for
example,  that  we can  provisionally  admit  certain  theories  that  are  ‘empirically  adequate,’
without admitting their truth as van Fraassen says, until we have significant predictions con-
firming them. This fact (especially in conjunction with other ‘virtues’ discussed in the litera-
ture) already justifies attributing truth and ontological reference to them, but the existence of
technological applications is the last decisive step that assures that they have been able to ade-
quately treat those aspects of reality they intended to treat. These last words are very impor-
tant. They underline the fact that technological success does not eliminate the partial or lim-
ited scope of scientific theories. The fact that we can use classical mechanics in creating many
machines or for sending rockets into space certainly means that this mechanics is true of its
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objects and therefore ‘tells a true story’ about certain aspects of reality. This can also be ex-
pressed by saying that this theory is partially true of reality, but only if we mean that it does
not speak about the totality of the attributes of reality, and that, consequently, it can speak
properly only of such referents that possess these attributes. In other words, it is not correct to
say that this mechanics is true regarding the whole of reality because other aspects of reality
exist that must be accounted for by means of other theories which, in turn, can be used as a
basis for different technologies. (310-11)
To nuance Agazzi’s insightful but somewhat inflated epistemic role for applicability, we can observe that
this theoretical virtue is not commonly operative in certain scientific domains. For example, scientific the-
ories of “how things originated” (history of nature) lead to fewer technological applications than scientific
theories of “how things work.” Part of the reason for the infrequent applicability of origins theories is the
smaller role that experimentally controlled prediction plays in such theorization. For example, much of
the data that allows us to reconstruct the history of earth’s surface is collected by means of passive field
observations, rather than by laboratory experiments that make precise predictions and technological con-
trol more feasible.
4. Conclusion. The diachronic theoretical virtues possess a temporal dimension that is absent from the
other theoretical virtues. They can only be instantiated  after a theory’s initial formulation—when it has
had opportunity to be tested, elaborated, and applied. Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability build upon
the initial theory assessment process governed by the non-diachronic virtues (the evidential, coherential,
and aesthetic theoretical virtues). The cumulative result, when successful, is a mature theory with an even
greater probability of being true than an infant theory that has not yet had the opportunity to show whether
it will possess the diachronic theoretical virtues (anti-realists are invited to interject their own alternative
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to this realist understanding of the theoretical virtues). So, the distinction between diachronic and non-di-
achronic virtues is important for an adequate account of theory evaluation.
 The three major diachronic theoretical virtues are also better understood when they are recognized
as related to each other in the following progressive sequence. Durability is instantiated as a theory passes
more rigorous tests in a series of encounters with the world, especially by successful prediction and plau-
sible  accommodation  of  new  evidence.  Fruitfulness  discloses  a  theory’s  resourcefulness  yet  further
through innovation—stimulating additional discovery by successful novel prediction, unification, non ad
hoc theoretical elaboration, and other means. At last, applicability expands the epistemic accountability of
a theory into the final frontier: the vast domain of practical action. This virtue is instantiated when a the-
ory helps us to interact with the world successfully, most notably by technological control. Together, these
diachronic theoretical virtues provide an ongoing and epistemically intensified means of theory develop-
ment that complements the non-diachronic virtue assessment process that begins in a theory’s original
construction.
Applicability, as a theoretical virtue, has not received the attention it deserves. Surprisingly, it is
absent  from every theoretical  virtue  list I  have encountered.  My work sketches  a  way to understand
applicability in relation to the other  diachronic virtues, and the larger group of non-diachronic virtues.
This endeavor promises to illuminate, among other things, discussion of realism vs. anti-realism, science-
technology relations, and inference to the best explanation.
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Abstract
The debate between Fraser and Wallace (2011) over the foundations of
quantum field theory (QFT) has spawned increased focus on both the axiomatic
and conventional formalisms. The debate has set the tone for future foundational
analysis, and has forced philosophers to “pick a side”. The two are seen as
competing research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in
how each handles renormalization. In this paper I argue that the terms set by the
Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading. AQFT and CQFT should be viewed as
complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis. Further, the
focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly misleading.
Though their methods differ, both axiomatic and conventional QFT seek to use the
same physical principles to explain the same domain of phenomena.
1
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1 Introduction
Foundational invesitgation into quantum field theory (QFT) has emerged as a flourishing
enterprise in philosophy of science, thanks largely to work done in axiomatic QFT
(AQFT), particularly the C∗-algebraic approach enocoded by the Haag-Kastler axioms
(Haag and Kastler 1964). Despite the methodological disconnect with ‘conventional’
approaches to QFT (CQFT), AQFT has been defended by Fraser (2009) as supplying a
firmer foundation from which to conduct philosophical analyses. Though this is one of
few explicit defenses of AQFT, the widespread use of algebraic methods in philosophical
literature on QFT would lead one to believe that Fraser is merely making explicit the
assumptions in her field. Recently, Wallace (2006; 2011) has questioned the focus on
AQFT, arguing that CQFT is the better candidate for analysis. Since CQFT is the
theory that has been emprically successful—the Standard Model of particle physics is
built from CQFTs—and AQFT has yet to reproduce these results, Wallace argues that
we should focus analysis on CQFT rather than AQFT. Fraser’s (2011) reply has set up
what is now known as the Fraser-Wallace debate over the foundations of QFT. The
debate has set the tone for future foundational analysis, and seems to force philosophers
to “pick a side”—you either work in AQFT or CQFT. The two are seen as competing
research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in how each handles
renormalization. AQFT requires strict Poincare´ covariance at arbitrarily small length
scales, while the renormalization group (RG) methods in CQFT allow for a small-scale
cutoff, below which QFTs needn’t be well-defined.
In this paper I argue that the terms set by the Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading.
One needn’t view AQFT and CQFT as rival research programs; in fact, this view is
2
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detrimental to understanding the history and methodology of QFT. AQFT and CQFT
should be viewed as complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis.
Further, the focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly
misleading: AQFT can accommodate cutoffs and RG methods, and CQFT does not
explicitly require cutoffs. The focus on cutoffs as essential to CQFT could mistakenly be
taken to mean that CQFT depends on cutoffs actually being physical, in the same way
that cutoffs are physical in condensed matter physics (CMP). I will argue that this is not
the case: cutoffs needn’t be physical in any sense. Even if cutoffs are physically
significant, that does not entail that the cutoffs are themselves physical. Specifically, RG
methods provide no principled grounds for thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of
signifying a breakdown of field theories generally. Since Wallace (2011) set the terms of
the debate, the bulk of the arguments in this paper will be in reference to that paper. I
do not claim that Wallace holds all (or even most) of the views against which I argue;
rather, I use his paper to clarify potential misconceptions that could arise from the
debate. Renormalization is not central to the physical content of QFT, and the different
ways of handling renormalization do not mark AQFT and CQFT as different research
programs. We should instead view the formalisms as complementary: though their
methods differ, both seek to use the same physical principles to explain the same domain
of phenomena.
3
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -291-
2 Renormalization and the relationship between AQFT and
CQFT
Wallace (2011) emphasizes the ineliminable dependence on cutoffs in CQFT, along with
the success of RG methods for providing a physical motivation for cutoffs, as the wedge
which drives AQFT and CQFT apart. For Wallace, AQFT cannot deal with physical
cutoffs. Since RG methods have physically legitimized cutoffs, AQFT and CQFT have
differing physical content and must therefore be considered a different research program
(2011, Sec. 2). I disagree with this characterization on two fronts. First, AQFT has the
resources to incorporate RG methods when needed. Though typical axioms make no
metion of scaling behaviour, even the most rigid of axiomatic approaches—algebraic
QFT as codified in the Haag-Kastler axioms—can incorporate something like RG flows.1
Second, the calculational dependence on cutoffs in CQFT may not signal the physical
existence of cutoffs.
So, are cutoffs really that problematic for AQFT? Many axiomatic approaches to QFT
make no recourse to cutoffs, either explicitly or implicitly. An explicit forbidding of
cutoffs would mean that one of the axioms/postulates of the theory claimed that the
theory is empirically adequate at all spacetime length scales. Even if any axiomatization
contained such an axiom (none do), it would be hard to imagine what sort of work it
would do in derivations. Presumably, such a system could be modified to remove the
guilty axiom, without spoiling any physically useful theorems. One should therefore not
be concerned with an explicit ban on cutoffs in AQFT.
The more interesting case is when cutoffs are implicitly rejected by a particular theory.
1See Buchholz and Verch (1995) for an example of scaling algebras playing the role of RG flows.
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There are two common assumptions in AQFT that are problematic for handling cutoffs:
strongly continuous implementations of Lorentz invariance, and the association of
algebras with arbitrarily small open bounded regions of spacetime. Though the latter is
not common to all axiomatic QFTs (the Wightman axioms deal directly with quantum
fields, rather than algebras), the dominant axiomatization in terms of C∗ algebras—the
Haag-Kastler axioms—define QFTs in terms of algebras of observables corresponding to
open, bounded regions of spacetime.2 It is implicit that for any open bounded spacetime
region, no matter how small, one can define an algebra of observables satisfying the other
axioms defining QFT. If cutoffs are physical, one might conclude that there should be a
principled limit to the size of regions on which we can define algebras corresponding to
observables in QFT. If the cutoff scale is physically relevant, and only CQFT predicts its
existence, we might be tempted to conclude that the two are different, competing
theories. However, there are several possibilities for reconciling AQFT and cutoffs, which
I will outline below. These remedies are largely independent of one another, and
organized in terms of increasing foundational disagreement with Wallace’s view of
cutoffs. The “quick fixes” proposed first lead to further conceptual worries, and I
therefore endorse the option in Sec. 2.3, which is the biggest departure from taking
cutoffs as physical in CQFT. Nevertheless, all the options sketched below are
more-or-less viable. Section 2.4 outlines reasons for thinking that both AQFT and CQFT
suffer the same conceptual challenges if cutoffs really are physical.
2Since algebraic QFT is prima facie the most problematic, I will deal primarily with algebraic QFT in
this paper. The reader can take AQFT to stand for axiomatic QFT or algebraic QFT for the remainder
of this paper. The reader should also note that constructive QFT is another important strand of rigorous
QFT. Though it is conceptually distinct from AQFT, the two projects often overlap.
5
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2.1 Possibilities for cutoffs in AQFT
Just because we need to associate an algebra with any arbitrary open bounded region of
spacetime, we are not therefore compelled to make this algebra interesting. One way
that cutoffs could be introduced into AQFT is to specify that regions smaller than some
4-volume Λ are to be uniformly assigned trivial algebras, i.e., algebras containing only
multiples of the identity. Such assignments would be consistent with the demand that all
open bounded regions of spacetime be assigned an algebra, but it would make the cutoff
physically relevant, since no information about local parameters would be contained in
regions smaller than Λ.
Though this solution is available, it is admittedly somewhat ad hoc. Even worse, it
violates one of the crucial Haag-Kastler axioms: that of weak additivity. The axiom of
weak additivity states that, for every closed, bounded region O of Minkowski spacetime
M, the C∗ norm closure of the algebras A(O + α) for α ∈ R4 is just the quasilocal
algebra for the whole spacetime, A(M).3 There are two reasons why this is a problem
for introducing cutoffs in the way described above. First, we run into the problem that
the quasilocal algebra corresponding to the whole of M can be constructed from any
algebra corresponding to any closed, bounded region O. The norm closure of extensions
of a trivial algebra will not produce any interesting algebra as a result, so regions smaller
than the cutoff Λ will violate weak additivity. Second, extensions of an arbitrary region
O by some α < Λ should not be physical if Minkowski spacetime breaks down at scales
below Λ. In the spirit of the first ad hoc axiom modification, weak additivity could be
modified to exclude regions Osmall < Λ, and arbitrary extensions αsmall < Λ. However,
3See Ruetsche (2011), especially chapters 4 and 5 for an introduction to algebraic QFT. For a more
comprehensive review of algebraic QFT, see Halvorson and Mu¨ger (2007).
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there seems to be no principled reason for choosing a specific value of Λ, and one may
question the naturalness of such axioms. This makes the solution of simple axiom
modification less tempting, and forces us to admit that AQFT—at least in its current
guise—is in conflict with approaches to QFT that take cutoffs as physically meaningful,
since the basic axioms are currently in direct conflict with the introduction of cutoffs. If
we admit that there is currently no room in the formalism of AQFT for cutoffs, are we
doomed to take AQFT as (incorrectly) positing its own validity at all energy scales?
2.2 No cutoffs? No problem
If QFT methods are only applicable up to some cutoff energy, and we expect QFT to
incorporate this fact, we are saying that a good theory should signal its own demise. The
formal necessity of cutoffs in the formalism of CQFT has lead to the idea that our best
theories will continue to be an increasing hierarchy of effective field theories. Each field
theory requires cutoffs to be implemented at a certain energy scale, and this signals the
field theory’s domain of applicability. If supplanted by a successor field theory, one
expects that the new theory’s low energy regime reduces to the old theory, and further
that the new theory will itself have a higher energy cutoff. Following this approach, the
conventional formalism of field theories would allow us to climb higher and higher up the
ladder of energy scales, but we would never reach the top. We would require a theory of
a fundamentally different formal type in order to end the ladder of cutoffs. This is
presumably the view that Wallace holds, as he claims that if we replace one field theory
with another applicable at higher energies, “that field theory in turn will need some kind
of short-distance cutoff” (2011, p. 118).
As great as it may be to have a framework in which theories limit their own domain of
7
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applicability, this is certainly not a necessary condition that any good formalism need
satisfy. Even if AQFT does not contain cutoffs explicitly, this does not make it at odds
with CQFT. Many theories that have been useful in the past do not signal their ultimate
demise; on the contrary, most are mathematically well-defined well beyond their domain
of applicability. For example, classical theories of fluid dynamics treat fluids as classical
continua, and these continua are uniform to arbitrary precision. Classical continuum
fluid dynamics is a useful theory, and compatible with classical point mechanics, even
though classical point mechanics leads one to believe that the continuum is only an
approximation—at some point fluid dynamics must break down. There is nothing within
the formalism of fluid mechanics that signals its eventual breakdown; rather, the physical
systems we model using classical fluid dynamics, as well as the complementary formalism
of classical point particles, give us a physical motivation for the eventual breakdown of
the formalism. Deeper theories, such as quantum mechanics, also provide grounds for
believing in the limited applicability of both of the complementary classical formalisms.
Similarly, we can view AQFT as a complementary picture to the formalism of CQFT.
Both formalisms rely on the same general physical principles, though they are
implemented in different ways. Though the AQFT formalism does not demarcate its
domain of applicability in the form of explicit cutoffs, the necessity of some form of
cutoff in CQFT provides reason to believe that the AQFT formalism is only
approximately mapping the actual physics. Further, whatever extratheoretical grounds
we have for taking cutoffs to be physical—typically in the guise of speculative physics
beyond the Standard Model—can inform the scale at which we lose faith in the
predictions of both the AQFT and CQFT formalisms. When one does not view AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs, the two can work together to provide a deeper
8
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physical understanding of high energy physics, and the role of cutoffs is made clearer.
2.3 Physical significance versus being physical
Are cutoffs really that central? The arguments in the previous section assume that the
cutoffs required to generate predictions in CQFT are physical, in the sense that they
signal a breakdown of QFT. The fact that perturbative calculations within a particular
model diverge when the integrals are unbounded does not entail that field theoretic
methodology loses physical significance near these bounds. Undoubtedly we have
extratheoretical reasons for supposing that the QFTs making up the Standard Model are
not accurate to arbitrary energies—at some point gravity will surely play an important
role, to say nothing for possible unknown physics at higher energy scales—but this
needn’t signify a breakdown of QFTs in general beyond a cutoff. Nor is this notion built
in to the conceptual apparatus of RG methods, as Wallace claims.4 It remains entirely
possible that a QFT built with more terms in its Lagrangian could describe all relevant
physics and be well-defined at all energy scales. In fact, the renormalization group
procedure presupposes a theory given in terms of a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian with an
arbitrary number of terms. These terms are shown to go to zero in the low energy limit
(Wilson and Kogut 1974). We know—using the RG methods to determine the flow of
coupling constants—that for non-Abelian gauge theories, interactions become weaker at
higher energy scales. Total asymptotic freedom would be one way to eliminate cutoffs at
4“Wilsons explanation of the renormalisation procedure relies upon the failure of the QFT to which it
is applied at very short distances. It is then intriguing to ask how to put on a firm conceptual footing
a theory which relies for its mathematical consistency on its own eventual failure”. (Wallace 2006, 34,
emphasis added) Again, this passage can be read in a way that agrees with the arguments of this section.
I am attempting to argue against a naive reading, which takes the failure of one QFT (i.e., a single form
of interaction, encoded in a particular Lagrangian) to signal the failure of QFT methods in general.
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high energies. A successor QFT, such as a grand unified theory or supersymmetry, could
therefore unite the strong and electroweak coupling constants, while remaining
well-defined to arbitrarily high energies.5 All that RG methods rely on conceptually is
the ability to average out behaviour at high energy scales, and this is compatible with
many options for high-energy behaviour. First, our theories could be low-energy
approximations that break down at higher energy scales. This could be due to a
fundamental granularity or discreteness in the more fundamental theory, or due to the
absence of terms in the Lagrangian modelling high energy dynamics. Second, we could
have a well-defined high energy dynamics that is unimportant at the energy scales with
which we are concerned. In any case, RG methods provide no principled grounds for
thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of signifying a breakdown of field theories
generally. Unlike the breakdown of classical fluid mechanics—for which we have a more
fundamental successor theory (quantum mechanics) providing grounds to reject the
continuum as merely an approximation—there is as of yet no (empirically successful)
fundamental successor theory for which QFT can be considered a continuum
approximation.
One of the major reasons for thinking that cutoffs in QFT mark a regime beyond which
the methods of QFT can no longer be applied is the success of RG methods originating
from CMP (Wallace 2011, Sec. 1). RG methods were initially developed to investigate
long range correlations in materials approaching a phase transition. Long range
interactions are those most relevant to global transitions of a material, and so RG
5Whether a theory can be made well defined for arbitrarily high energies is a distinct issue from the
accuracy of that theory’s predictions at high energies. It may turn out that Standard Model QFTs can
be extended in a consistent way, but that the high energy predictions turn out to be false. This is the
case that is argued in Section 2.2 regarding AQFT.
10
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methods average out the unimportant short range behaviour near a critical point. The
apparatus of non-relativistic QFT (i.e., functional integrals using Galilean invariant
Lagrangians) is used in CMP as an approximation to the discrete atomic (or ionic)
physical makeup of bulk systems. Given the the CMP field theories are explicitly
constructed as approximations to a known underlying lattice model, we know that the
field theoretic methods must break down within CMP. RG flow equations are derived by
separating field variables ϕ into low- and high-momentum components ϕ = ϕlow + ϕhigh
(where the cutoff from low to high is chosen arbitrarily) and averaging over the high
momentum modes. The resulting Lagrangian L′(ϕlow) is then manipulated to fall into
the same form as the original Lagrangian L(ϕ). This process is repeated and generates
discrete recursive relations between the rescaled coupling parameters in the (n+ 1)th
Lagrangian in terms of the nth one. In the limit where the rescalings are continuous,
these become differential equations determining the flow of coupling constants under RG.
As the flows are taken to zero frequency—equivalent to the infinite spatial limit—only
those parameters relevant to phase transitions will remain in the renormalized
Lagrangian. One of the most qualitatively interesting features of successively averaging
out short distance (and therefore high energy) degrees of freedom is that, no matter how
complicated the initial field dynamics are (encoded as a Lagrangian), only the
renormalizable terms will contribute to the low energy dynamics of the theory. This
implies that a very broad class of higher energy Lagrangians can “reduce” to the relevant
dynamics at lower energy scales.
The success of RG methods in CMP lead to their quick application in QFTs (Wilson
1983)6, since the relevant formalism is shared between the two disciplines. If we choose
6Wilson even forms the QFT/statistical mechanics analogy explicitly, though the source analog in that
11
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to endow the RG methods with similar physical significance in QFT, then we can
interpret the high energy cutoffs required as marking the domain at which we expect
new physics to occur. The problem is that, because RG flows tell us that our low-energy
(effective) QFTs are largely insensitive to the dynamical details at higher energies, they
provide little insight our guidance into the high energy physics. Though the path to the
successor theory isnt apparent given our current QFTs, the up side is that our best
QFTs are protected from the details of our ignorance of high energy dynamics.
Where Wallace might be read to err is in the jump from believing that cutoffs have
physical relevance in QFTs to believing that cutoffs are physical :
“This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the
renormalization problem: it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of
quantum field theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence
of that failure is appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes
unproblematic, and indeed predictively powerful in its own right” (Wallace
2011, p. 119).7
The difference is subtle. Cutoffs can be physically relevant in that they signal the
breakdown of the particular theory or model beyond a certain energy scale, but whether
cutoffs themselves are physical depends on the precise nature of the breakdown. If the
case is a classical Ising model (Wilson and Kogut 1974). Fraser (2016) has provided an in-depth analysis
of the elements of the analogies between QFT and the Ising model, as well as the process of describing
RG flow.
7Or at least this is a jump he is sometimes guilty of. In other places he is more careful to elaborate
on this view, and it appears that he at least appreciates the fact that field theoretic methods may not
break down at all (Wallace 2006, pp. 43-4). As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is not a critique
of Wallace’s view explicitly, but of the misleading way of framing AQFT and CQFT as rivals based on
their differing treatments of the arbitrarily small; for this reason I aim to clarify the mistakes in a “naive”
reading of Wallace.
12
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breakdown can be remedied by adding new terms in the Lagrangian—effectively
changing the particular theory, but retaining the field theoretic framework—then the
cutoffs signal new physics, but are not themselves physical. If the breakdown is due to
the inapplicability of field theoretic methodology beyond that scale, then the cutoffs are
themselves physical.8 Even if one takes the cutoffs to have physical significance, cutoffs
needn’t be physical in this stronger sense.
One possible reason for thinking that cutoffs are physical is based off of reading too
much into the analogy with CMP. We know that field theoretic methods are
approximations in bulk matter systems—the atomic theory implies that macroscopic
matter is composed of discrete components. The analogy between QFT and CMP is
based on the use of the same field theoretic formalism in both disciplines, not on a
well-grounded physical similarity.9 Cutoffs are physical in CMP field theory because field
theoretic methods have been introduced as an approximation. Given that discrete
quantum mechanics of 1023 particles is intractable, we sacrifice (a surprisingly small
amount of) precision in order to apply the more soluble methods developed in QFT. But
the fact that cutoffs signal the breakdown of field approximations in CMP does not
imply that the same is true in QFT. The reasons we treat cutoffs as physical in CMP are
absent in QFT; there is no empirically successful theory that claims QFT breaks down
due to an underlying discreteness of physics near cutoff scales. Speculative physics may
posit some underlying structure for which quantum fields are merely an approximation,
8Presumably, the failure of field theoretic methodology in general would require some physical granu-
larity at high energies. This is what I mean by the cutoff being physical and is in direct analogy with the
case of non-relativistic QFT in CMP.
9Fraser (2016) and Fraser and Koberinski (2016) provide two concrete examples of fruitful formal
analogies between QFT and CMP. In the former case, it is the RG flow that is formally analogous,
while the latter deals with the formal similarities between spontaneous symmetry breaking within the two
theories.
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but until any of these theories make successful empirical predictions their significance for
interpreting QFTs must be limited.
2.4 Why physical cutoffs are also a problem for CQFT
Even though, as I have argued, there is currently no physically motivated reason for
supposing cutoffs to be physical, it may be the case that we find such a reason in the
future. Perhaps we will need radically different methods from those of field theory to
describe physics beyond the Standard Model. There is no shortage of candidates that
claim to radically alter our picture of the world—from 11-dimensional string theory to
discrete spacetime to the emergent spacetime of loop quantum gravity. Though
experimental support for any of these speculative theories would mean that the axioms
of any AQFT must be at best only approximations, this does not mean that CQFT
would escape unscathed. Any observed violation of Lorentz invariance would signal bad
news for both AQFT and CQFT, and the extent to which we choose to reject or salvage
the former, we should do the same for the latter.
Though its importance is not encoded in a set of axioms, Poincare´ invariance is of
central importance to the physical content of CQFT. In constructing QFTs, one starts
by writing down a classical Lagrangian to encode the physical content of the theory. The
two major constraints on the form of candidate Lagrangians are renormalizability (dealt
with above) and Poincare´ invariance. Since the Lagrangian is a scalar, it must remain
strictly invariant under the action of the Poincare´ group on its component fields. All of
the fundamental forces—as described by the Standard Model—are encoded in
Lagrangians obeying strict Poincare´ invariance. If anything qualifies as physically
relevant to CQFT, the Lagrangian certainly does; it is the starting point for building a
14
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QFT, and determines the types of fields, their masses, and the particulars of their
interactions. A violation of Poincare´ invariance at a more fundamental level—be it in a
particular physical process or in the structure of some new spacetime picture—undercuts
to the same extent the physical significance of any and all theories that depend on
Poincare´ invariance for their formulation. Thus, despite the lack of rigid and precise
axioms demanding Poincare´ invariance, the physical content of CQFT stands or falls
with AQFT.10
Once again, the major difference between AQFT and CQFT lies in the formalism.
Though the physical content of CQFT is built upon Poincare´ invariance11, the formalism
is indifferent to the constraints placed upon the Lagrangian. The success of field
theoretic methods in CMP is evidence of the flexibility of the formalism; in CMP the
Galilean group is taken as the appropriate symmetry group, given the low energies dealt
with. In contrast, the formalisms of various AQFTs are constructed around the axioms.
Any theorems that rely on exact Poincare´ invariance will only hold in the real world if
nature is Poincare´ invariant.12 The greater precision of the formalism in AQFT makes it
more rigid in this regard.
If violations of Poincare´ invariance are problematic for all variants of QFT, should
investigators into the foundations of QFT fret if such violations are experimentally
10CQFT methods could still be useful, but the theoretical framework of CQFT—as encoded in the
Standard Model—depends on Poincare´ invariance.
11Depending on how one views Poincare´ invariance, this may seem odd. The specific transformation
properties of scalars, vectors, and tensors under the Poincare´ group are undoubtedly formal properties
of the particular field representations. However, the physical symmetries represented in this way have a
physical basis (e.g., rotation invariance implies that the physical system can be modelled the same way
when rotated).
12Though it isn’t always possible, proofs of the form “If Minkowski spacetime then x” are strengthened
and made more robust by also showing “If approximately Minkowski spacetime then approximately x.
Given that our best current theories lead us to believe that spacetime is only locally Minkowski, these are
the results for which we can have a high degree of confidence in their robustness.
15
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confirmed? No; the experimental success of QFT implies that the world is at least
approximately Poincare´ invariant, and any evidence revealing the limits of that
approximation has no bearing on the theory itself. We have good reason to believe that
the QFTs in the Standard Model are not the final story: General Relativity implies that
strong gravitational effects distort spacetime, and that our spacetime is only ever
Minkowski in small patches where gravity is negligible. Though this approximation
seems to hold for experiments at the LHC, if we want a theory that gets spacetime
symmetries exactly correct, QFTs relying on Poincare´ invariance will not do the trick.
Rather than abandoning foundations of QFT for being approximate at best,
investigation should proceed given that QFTs are highly successful within the energy
domain currently testable. To this extent, we are justified in viewing the world as
approximately described by QFTs, and should content ourselves with investigating an
incomplete (though highly accurate) picture of nature. Whether we are dealing with a
formalism that encodes Poincare´ invariance into its axiomatic framework, or a formalism
in which Poincare´ invariance has been used indirectly to construct empirically successful
theories, we should not take violations of Poincare´ invariance as signalling the failure of
either approach. Any robust results obtained within either formalism will still hold
approximately, and should be equally subject to foundational analysis.
3 Conclusions
I have tried to show that cutoffs do not provide physical grounds for separating AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs. First, RG methods can be incorporated into
AQFT without major issue, and cutoffs can be introduced as well—though explicit
16
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -304-
cutoffs provide a more pressing conceptual revision to AQFT. Second, we needn’t take
AQFT to be an exact description of the world. In the same way that classical fluid
dynamics is compatible with classical point mechanics, AQFT defined to arbitrary
precision can be compatible with a CQFT that requires cutoffs. The apropriate lesson is
that we should take AQFT to be approximately true in sufficiently low energy domains.
Finally, even if cutoffs are of physical significance, they don’t require a breakdown of
continuum methods in general. This idea stems from pushing an analogy with CMP,
which appears to be unjustified.
Though the Fraser-Wallace debate has spawned increased investigations into the
foundations of QFT, it has set the boundaries of the debate in such a way as to create a
false dichotomy: one is forced to choose whether to immerse oneself in the AQFT or
CQFT formalisms. When we discard the false dichotomy and recognize AQFT as
complementary to CQFT, we open the door to the synthesis of axiomatic methods with
Lagrangian QFT. In this way the general features of QFTs can be investigated rigorously
in AQFT, and we can be confident that—insofar as the axioms of AQFT capture the
physical assumptions of CQFT—the results carry over to CQFT.
Though it is true that there do not yet exist AQFT models that incorporate interactions
in four-dimensional spacetime, the successes of AQFT have been compatible with
CQFT. Free field theories and φ4
2
interaction theories constructed in AQFT give
predictions in agreement with comparable CQFTs. Insofar as AQFT is a successful
formalism, its results should be thought of as complementary to those of CQFT: one
uses the same physical principles to construct differing formalisms.
In essence, I advocate for a position similar to Wallace’s earlier view (though note that
in this passage he refers only to specific results of AQFT, such as the spin-statistics
17
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theorem):
the foundational results which have emerged from AQFT have been of
considerable importance in understanding QFT and in general they apply
also to Lagrangian QFTs. This paper should be read as complementary to,
rather than in competition with, these results (2006, p. 35).
The particular choice of formalism will depend on the scope of the foundational
investigation. If the goal is to prove general results applicable to any relativistic QFT,
then AQFT is the appropriate formalism; if the goal is to determine the consequences of
specific physical interactions, then CQFT should be used.
18
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On	Epistemically	Detrimental	Dissent:		
Contingent	Enabling	Factors	v.	Stable	Difference-Makers.	
	
Soazig	Le	Bihan	and	Iheanyi	Amadi	
	
Abstract.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	(2015)	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	
context	of	science.		We	argue	that	the	presence	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	severe	
non-epistemic	consequences	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	conditions	for	EDD	
to	obtain.		We	clarify	their	role	by	arguing	that	they	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	
not	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	
difference-makers	are	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	
and	effective	public	dissemination.		
	
	
Introduction.		
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	context	of	
science	(2015).		We	follow	their	lead	in	taking	‘dissent’	to	be	a	particular	kind	of	
criticism,	i.e.	the	act	of	objecting	to	a	widely	held	conclusion.		When	done	properly,	
dissent	is	welcome	within	scientific	practice.		As	Helen	Longino	has	clearly	
established,	“scientific	knowledge	is	produced	collectively	through	the	clashing	and	
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -309-
	 2	
meshing	of	a	variety	of	points	of	view	(1990,	69).		Criticism,	when	done	properly,	is	
integral	to	the	collective	advancement	of	science.1		Dissent,	when	an	instance	of	
proper	criticism,	is	thus	epistemically	valuable	in	the	context	of	science.			
Now	there	are	some	instances	of	dissent	that	come	out	as	epistemically	detrimental.		
That	is	to	say,	some	instances	of	dissent	seem	to	impede,	not	promote,	the	collective	
advancement	of	science.		Many	examples	come	to	mind,	that	have	been	well	
described	in	the	recent	literature	(Oreskes	and	Conway	2010,	Biddle	and	Leushner	
2015,	Harker	2015).		Roughly	speaking,	EDD	is	about	manufacturing	controversy	in	
a	particular	scientific	field.		The	typical	story	goes	something	like	the	following.		The	
research	involved	has	some	severe	non-epistemic	consequences	in	terms	of,	on	one	
side,	industry	profit,	and,	on	the	other	side,	public	welfare;	large	amounts	of	money	
are	invested	by	industry-related	groups	to	(1)	produce	some	skewed	research,	(2)	
largely	publicize	the	results	through	the	media,	(3)	produce	an	atmosphere	of	
confusion	and	doubt	within	the	public,	(4)	launch	some	campaign	against	the	lead	
scientists	of	the	field	in	the	media	and	political	world	(often	through	personal	
attacks	and	threats);	this	results	in	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	scientists	
subjectively	feel	a	lot	of	pressure	and	discomfort,	and	also	objectively	waste	
precious	time	and	limited	resources	to	address	the	well-publicized	skewed	research.		
At	this	point,	the	collective	advancement	of	science	is	clearly	impeded.		We	have	an	
instance	of	EDD.		
																																																								
1	Longino	(1990)	offers	an	account	of	some	of	the	various	kinds	of	epistemically	
beneficial	criticism	within	science.		
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The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	properly	distinguish,	in	that	story,	between	(1)	
contingent	enabling	factors,	and	(2)	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	
EDD.		Our	most	contentious	claim	is	that	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	
presence	of	severe	non-epistemic	risks	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	not	stable	
difference-makers	for	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	difference-makers	are	core	
to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	and	effective	public	
dissemination.		
In	Section	1,	we	offer	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	straightforward	argument	for	the	
claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	in	the	production	of	
EDD:	it	may	lead	to	EDD	only	if	it	leads	to	skewed	science.		In	Section	2	we	argue	
that	it	is	not	necessary	either.		Section	3	is	devoted	to	a	clarification	of	the	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	in	EDD	on	the	basis	of	a	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers.		Section	4	investigates	the	
consequences	of	our	analysis	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	proposed	by	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).	
	
Section	1.	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	sufficient	for	EDD	
That	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	to	the	production	of	EDD	
has	been	discussed	by	Wilholt	(2009),	and	Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).		Roughly,	
the	point	is	simply	that,	unless	intrusion	of	background	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
such	that	the	work	produced	fails	to	satisfy	some	of	the	conventional	standards	for	
proper	science,	there	is	no	problem.	We	offer	here	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	
straightforward	argument	for	this	point.			
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As	the	community	of	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	come	to	recognize,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	is	quite	common	(Douglas	
2009).		Now	obviously,	that	does	not	necessarily	result	in	skewed	science.		If	a	
scientist	defends	a	conclusion	C	on	the	basis	of	evidence	E,	the	fact	that	some	
background	non-epistemic	values	enters	in	her	reasoning	does	not	matter	if	(1)	she	
can	publicly	produce	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	C,	and	if	(2)	that	reasoning	can	be	
assessed	as	adequate	scientific	reasoning	by	her	peers,	including	peers	who	do	not	
share	the	same	background	non-epistemic	values.		If	these	two	conditions	are	met,	
then	the	conventional	standards	for	proper	science	are	met,	and	we	do	not	have	a	
case	of	skewed	science.		Now	if	proper	scientific	work	was	produced,	there	is	no	a	
priori	reason	to	think	that	her	work	cannot	partake	in	the	collective	advancement	of	
scientific	knowledge.		It	might	do	so	at	various	degrees,	but	that	will	depend	on	its	
heuristic	value,	which	is	a	priori	unrelated	to	whether	or	not	there	was	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	values.		
Let	us	push	this	line	of	argument	a	little	further.		It	is	important	here	to	underline	
the	fact	that	the	reasoning	rendered	public	by	the	scientist	might	not	be	the	actual	
reasoning	through	which	she	came	to	accept	either	E	or	its	relevance	with	regard	to	
C.		From	a	subjective	point	of	view,	for	example,	she	might	well	have	had	accepted	C	
well	before	she	produced	E	and	the	reasoning	defending	the	relevance	of	E	as	
supporting	C.		She	might	well	have	accepted	C	for	non-epistemic,	value-laden,	
reasons.		However,	such	considerations	over	the	subjective	state	of	scientists	do	not	
matter.		The	collective	assessment	of	scientific	research	is	not	in	the	business	of	
mind	reading.		No	matter	what	kind	of	reasoning	(or	non-reasoning)	actually	
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -312-
	 5	
brought	a	scientist	to	believe	C,	the	relevant	question	is	whether	she	is	capable	of	
producing	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	E	and	its	relevance	with	regard	to	C	that	can	be	
publicly,	and	positively,	assessed	by	the	experts	in	her	field.		To	put	it	bluntly:	the	
most	biased	and	ill-intentioned	scientists	are	a	priori	capable	of	producing	good	
scientific	work.2			
This	line	of	argument	applies	to	the	production	of	dissenting	views.	Dissenting	
claims	proposed	by	scientists	motivated	by	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	lead	to	skewed	science	and	hence	to	of	EDD.		If	a	reasoning	can	be	
publicly	produced,	and	if	the	members	of	the	scientific	community,	including	
members	of	that	community	who	do	not	share	the	same	values	as	the	dissenting	
views’	proponents,	assess	that	reasoning	as	scientifically	adequate,	then	we	do	not	
have	an	instance	of	skewed	dissent.		As	an	instance	of	work	that	satisfies	the	agreed-
upon	standards	of	proper	scientific	practice,	the	dissenting	view	could	well	
participate	in	the	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge.		It	could	do	so	at	various	
degrees,	depending	on	how	important	the	dissenting	views	are,	but	that	would	not	
depend	on	whether	or	not	the	dissenting	views	are	the	product	of	scientists	with	
non-epistemic	agendas.		Considerations	about	the	subjective	intentions,	or	
background	beliefs,	of	the	scientists	are	irrelevant,	unless	one	can	show	that	skewed	
science	was	produced.		
																																																								
2	This	is	not	denying	the	actuality	of	implicit	bias.		By	definition,	implicit	bias	is	still	
bias.		As	such,	it	can	be	recognized	by	the	scientific	community	for	what	it	is.		What	
is	implicit	about	it	is	that	the	biased	author	(and	possibly	some	of	her	peers	as	well)	
is	not	even	realizing	her	own	bias.			
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Section	2	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	necessary	for	EDD	
At	this	point,	we	have	shown	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	result	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Note	that	EDD	does	not	require	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	either.		What	would	it	take	to	have	a	case	of	EDD	
without	any	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas?		We	know	that	EDD	is	about	
manufacturing	controversy	within	a	scientific	field.		First,	the	controversy	is	
“manufactured”,	not	genuine,	because	the	dissenting	view	is	not	based	on	proper	
science;	it	violates	some	of	the	commonly	accepted	standards	for	proper	scientific	
practice;	it	is	an	instance	of	skewed	science.		Now	skewed	science	can	come	to	be	in	
many	ways.		It	does	not	have	to	result	from	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		
One	can	imagine	the	case	of	a	scientist,	say	Jack,	who	is	genuinely	interested	in	
partaking	in	the	collective	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	is	also	a	poor	
scientist.		One	can	imagine	that	Jack	is	very	wealthy,	and	thus	has	both	the	time	and	
financial	resources	to	pursue	his	research,	and	produce	a	large	amount	of	work	
challenging	the	commonly	held	views	in	a	given	scientific	field.		Jack,	albeit	
misguided	in	many	ways,	could	conceivably	do	all	of	this	with	the	“purest”	goal	in	
mind.	
Now	one	immediately	sees	that	the	production	of	bad	science	is	not	enough	to	
produce	EDD.		Jack’s	research	is	likely	to	be	simply	ignored	by	the	scientific	
community.		So	what	would	it	take	to	“manufacture”	a	controversy	on	the	basis	of	
Jack’s	research?		The	answer	seems	rather	straightforward:	Jack’s	research	needs	to	
be	effectively	disseminated,	so	that	scientists	feel	pressured	to	respond	to	Jack’s	
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challenges.		The	standard	avenues	for	dissemination	of	scientific	research,	i.e.	peer-
reviewed	publication,	however,	are	not	likely	to	be	an	option	for	Jack,	since	his	work	
is	widely	recognized	by	the	community	as	being	of	poor	scientific	quality.		He	must	
then	bypass	these	avenues,	and	manage	to	effectively	disseminate	his	research	
among	the	public.		Mass	media	would	be	a	likely	option	for	this.		This	in	turn	forces	
scientists	in	the	field	to	waste	time	and	resources	to	address	Jack’s	research.		Hence	
a	case	of	EDD,	with	the	purest	epistemic	goal	at	its	source.		
The	case	above	might	seem	far-fetched.		One	objection	could	be	that,	unless	some	
non-epistemic	values	were	at	stake,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	media	and	the	public	
would	get	interested	in	Jack’s	research,	and	Jack	would	fail	to	be	able	to	
manufacture	the	controversy.		It	might	be	unlikely,	but	it	is	surely	conceivable.		If	
Jack’s	public	dissemination	machinery	is	effective	enough,	(mis-)	understandings	
over	the	state	of	research	in	the	field	of	concern	could	well	have	serious	
repercussions	on	public	funding.		Jack	could	well	have	a	very	strong	network	of	
communication	–	he	could	well	be	the	owner	of	a	very	large	cable	and	press	
network.		Repeated	reporting	on	public	funding	of	supposedly	controversial	science	
could	well	spur	outrage	in	the	public.		“Debates”	on	mass	media	would	ensue.		As	
soon	as	the	scientists	would	engage	in	that	conversation,	Jack’s	claims	would	gain	in	
credibility.3		At	the	end,	Jack’s	campaign	could	well	be	so	effective	that	scientists	
																																																								
3	This	is	a	point	that	Hannah	Arendt	made	clear	in	her	insightful	analysis	of	
controversy-	and	doubt-manufacturing	in	a	completely	different	context,	i.e.	the	
(non-)issue	of	the	reality	of	the	Holocaust	during	WWII	(1966/2010).	
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would	indeed	be	forced	to	repeatedly	address	his	research	to	defend	their	own.		So,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	necessary	to	the	production	of	EDD.		
	
Section	3.	Stable	Difference-Makers	v.	Contingent	Enabling	Factor	
From	the	discussion	above,	we	conclude	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD.		Such	a	conclusion	might	
strike	many	as	unsatisfactory,	however.		Isn’t	it	the	case	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	was	an	important	factor	in	the	production	of	the	common	cases	
of	EDD	that	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	50	years?		Some	may	even	want	to	
claim	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	in	all	of	the	cases	we	know	of	in	recent	history,	no	EDD	
would	have	occurred	if	it	were	not	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		This	
is	an	important	intuition,	and	arguably,	any	satisfactory	account	of	EDD	ought	to	
make	sense	of	it.		Fortunately,	we	believe	there	is	a	way	to	do	so,	that	is,	by	
appealing	to	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	
difference-makers	as	discussed	by	Thomson	(2003)	and	Woodward	(2010).		
Thomson	(2003)	makes	the	point	(contra	many	theories	of	causation)	that	just	
because	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’,	it	does	not	follow	that	‘C	has	caused	
E’.		She	argues	that	the	proposition	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’	only	
entails	that	‘C	was	physically	necessary	for	E’.		Consider	her	example.		John	built	a	
bridge	over	the	Rapid	River.		The	Rapid	River	is	notoriously	wild,	and	only	John,	a	
master-builder,	could	have	done	it.		From	the	bridge	being	built,	it	ensues	that	Smith	
crosses	the	river.		Now	John’s	building	the	bridge	was	physically	necessary	to	
Smith’s	crossing	the	Rapid	River,	but	most	would	agree	that	it	is	misguided	to	take	it	
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as	a	cause	for	it.		John’s	building	the	bridge,	even	if	“physically	necessary”	in	the	
whole	process,	remains	largely	irrelevant	to	Smith’s	crossing	the	river.		It	belongs	to	
the	background	conditions,	or	environmental	conditions,	that	make	Smith’s	crossing	
possible,	without	causing	it	in	any	genuine	sense	of	causation.		In	Thomson’s	
vocabulary,	it	is	only	an	enabling	factor.	
Woodward	(2010)	is	interested	in	analyzing	a	similar	distinction	between	the	core	
difference-makers	and	the	background	conditions.		His	analysis	is	useful	to	flesh	out	
some	of	the	characteristics	of	enabling	factors	à	la	Thomson.4		One	of	intuitions	
Woodward	is	trying	to	capture	is	that	some	causal	relationships	are	robust,	i.e.	
insensitive	to	environmental	change,	while	others	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	
a	specific	environment.		To	do	so,	he	articulates	the	notions	of	“stability”.5		A	causal	
relationship,	according	to	Woodward,	is	stable	if	and	only	if	it	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	background	conditions.		Some	examples	might	be	useful	at	this	point.		
																																																								
4	Note	that	we	do	not	claim	(and	neither	does	Woodward)	to	have	unveiled	the	set	
of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	factors	to	qualify	as	enabling	factors	by	
contrast	to	stable	difference-makers.		We	will	only	claim	that	being	enabling	factors	
are	typically	unstable,	and	hence,	that	lack	of	stability	serves	as	a	good	indicator	for	
a	factor	to	be	only	enabling,	not	causing.	
5	Two	other	notions	are	articulated	in	the	article.		The	notion	of	proportionality	
serves	to	address	the	issue	of	the	proper	levels	of	explanation.		The	notion	of	
specificity	serves	to	address	the	issue	of	coarse	v.	fine-grain	causal	influence.		
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A	paradigmatic	example	of	an	unstable	relation	would	be	the	following.6		“Star”	
professor	P	writes	a	letter	of	recommendation	for	Jane,	thanks	to	which	Jane	gets	a	
job	at	university	U.		She	would	not	have	gotten	the	job	without	it.		Jane	meets	Joe	at	
U,	they	get	married,	and	have	children.		Challenged	by	the	difficulties	of	coupling	an	
academic	career	with	quality	parenting,	Jane	goes	into	depression.		Now	consider	
the	following	claim:	‘P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	caused	Jane's	depression’.		Given	the	
story	that	is	given,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	enabled	
Jane's	suffering	from	depression,	but	there	is	also	a	strong	sense	in	which	it	is	
misguided	to	take	it	as	a	cause	for	it.		The	reason	is	that	the	relation	between	P’s	
writing	the	letter	and	Jane’s	suffering	from	the	disease	would	cease	to	hold	under	
many	small,	contingent,	changes	in	the	background	conditions	for	the	story	(Jane	
and	Joe	could	not	have	met,	they	could	have	decided	to	not	have	children,	U	could	
have	had	a	very	progressive	parental	leave	policy,	etc.).		The	causal	relationship	
between	the	letter	and	the	depression	is	thus	highly	unstable	because	it	holds	only	
in	a	very	specific	environment.	
Now	contrast	this	with	a	paradigmatic	example	of	a	stable	relation.		I	turn	on	the	
heat	under	my	closed	pressure	cooker	(with	some	water	in	it).		The	pressure	goes	
up	and	the	valve	shuts	down.		Clearly,	heating	up	the	pressure	cooker	is	a	stable	
cause	of	the	pressure	valve	to	shut	down.		Many	of	the	most	stable	causal	relations	
are	backed	up	by	what	the	kind	of	generalizations	that	we	take	to	be	the	laws	of	
physics,	or	chemistry.		These	generalizations	hold	over	a	wide	range	of	background	
conditions.	
																																																								
6	This	example	is	inspired	by	Woodward	(2010)	himself	inspired	by	Lewis	(1986).	
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There	are	obviously	various	degrees	of	stability	in	between	these	two	extreme	
cases.		Stability	is	not	an	all	or	nothing	affair.		It	might	also	be	difficult	to	figure	out	
which	causal	relationships	are	more	or	less	stable.		That	said,	it	could	also	be	worth	
the	effort	looking	into	it,	because,	how	stable	a	factor	is	could	be	a	measure	of	how	
well	we	can	target	change	by	targeting	that	factor	in	a	given	situation.		As	
Woodward	explains	(2010,	315):	“other	things	being	equal,	causal	relationships	that	
are	more	stable	are	likely	to	be	more	useful	for	many	purposes	associated	with	
manipulation	and	control	than	less	stable	relationships.”		Applied	to	our	case,	if	
ultimately	we	hope	to	be	able	to	alter	the	manufacturing	of	controversy	and	EDD,	it	
could	turn	out	to	be	very	useful	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	behind	EDD	by	
distinguishing	between	the	contingent	enabling	factors	and	the	more	stable	
difference-makers.			
Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	analyses	are	clearly	related.		Thomson’s	bridge	
example	is	a	clear	case	of	a	very	unstable	causal	relationship:	it	holds	only	under	
very	specific	background	conditions	(The	Rapid	River	could	have	been	gently,	Smith	
could	have	decided	not	to	cross	the	bridge,	etc.)	Some	unstable	causal	relationships	
as	discussed	by	Woodward	are	so	at	least	partially	because	they	are	relationships	of	
contingent	“physical	necessity”	à	la	Thomson.		So,	a	causal	factor	may	be	highly	
unstable,	despite	being	‘necessary’	to	the	causal	process,	if	its	influence	on	the	
process	is	highly	contingent	on	a	specific	environment.		No	matter	how	“necessary”	
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in	that	sense	a	factor	F	is,	F	being	unstable	points	F	being	a	enabling	factor,	not	a	
stable	difference-maker.7		
The	discussion	above	allows	us	to	bring	home	two	important	points.		First,	it	allows	
us	to	identify	two	stable	difference-makers	for	the	production	of	EDD:	the	
production	of	skewed	scientific	research	and	its	effective	public	dissemination.		That	
the	combination	of	these	two	factors	produces	an	instance	EDD	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	conditions.		What	changes	in	background	conditions	would	make	that	
causal	relation	to	fail?	First,	one	could	think	of	a	world	in	which	scientists	could	
ignore	even	well-advertised	skewed	science.		For	example,	that	could	possibly	be	
the	case	in	a	world	in	which	production	of	scientific	research	would	not	depend	on	
getting	public	founding,	or	in	a	world	in	which	the	public	is	generally	knowledgeable	
about	(the	philosophy	of)	science,	and	hence,	is	able	to	recognize	that	the	well-
																																																								
7	Two	points	of	clarification	are	in	order.	First,	Woodward	convincingly	argues	that	
the	extent	to	which	a	cause	is	stable	is	related,	but	not	equivalent	to,	its	
distal/proximate	character	vis	à	vis	the	effect.		Second,	Woodward	also	argues	that	
stability	is	not	dependent	on	the	level	of	explanation:	degrees	of	stability	are	not	
necessarily	to	how	“reductive”	the	explanation	is.		So,	our	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	is	not	trivial	in	the	sense	
that	the	most	stable	difference-makers	would	always	be	the	most	proximate	causes	
described	at	the	level	of	fundamental	particles.		
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advertised	science	is	skewed.		Arguably,	these	do	not	qualify	as	small	changes	in	the	
background	conditions	for	scientific	practice.8			
The	second	point	is	a	clarification	of	the	role	played	by	the	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
not	a	stable	difference-maker	for	the	production	of	EDD.		This	is	because	there	is	a	
large	range	of	conditions	under	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
result	in	EDD.		These	include	the	conditions	for	all	the	cases	in	which	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	agendas	do	no	result	in	skewed	science.		If	we	take	seriously	recent	
work	on	science	and	value,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	is	actually	the	rule,	not	
the	exception	within	the	practice	of	science	(Douglas	2009,	Intemann	2001,	2015,	
and	references	therein).		Note	that,	if	our	take	on	Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	
analyses	is	correct,	then	the	claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	a	
stable	difference-maker	but	only	a	contingent	enabling	factor	is	consistent	with	the	
fact	that	it	has	been	“physically	necessary”	in	many	of	the	well-known	instances	of	
EDD.		One	can	consistently	say	that,	while	not	a	stable	difference-maker,	it	has	been	
an	important	enabling	factor	for	the	production	of	well-publicized	skewed	science.		
Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	has	been	necessary	for	some	groups	to	develop	
an	interest	in	funding	the	production	and	public	dissemination	of	skewed	research.		
																																																								
8	There	is	also	a	possibility	that	some	cases	of	EDD	could	come	out	of	seemingly	
proper	science	“distracting”	the	public	from	the	most	widely	held	views	within	the	
scientific	community.		We	believe	that	even	in	these	cases,	dissenting	views	do	not	
entail	EDD	unless	there	is	violation	of	some	conventional	standards	for	proper	
science.		This	interesting	issue	belongs	to	another	paper.		
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That	said	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	factors	that	are	characterized	by	
this	kind	of	‘necessity’	(the	bridge	or	letter	kind	of	necessity)	and	factors	that	are	
true	stable	difference-makers.		It	is	all	the	more	important	that,	if	one	of	our	goals	is	
to	alter	the	production	of	EDD,	then	our	analysis	suggests	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	is	not	the	proper	target.		Once	again,	non-epistemic	values	are	the	
common	rule	within	the	practice	of	science.		A	more	efficient	approach	in	the	
prevention	of	EDD	would	be	to	understand	the	various	ways	skewed	science	may	be	
produced.		This	includes	the	important	discussion	on	the	distinction	between	
legitimate	and	illegitimate	use	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	(Hicks	
2014,	Intemann	2015).		This	in	turn	includes	an	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	by	
which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	does	result	in	skewed	science.		Implicit	bias	
might	one	of	these	mechanisms.		Inductive	risk	bias,	as	we	shall	explain	in	the	next	
section,	is	another	one.		Before	we	turn	to	this	point,	let	us	take	stock.		
We	have	clarified	the	causal	landscape	for	the	production	of	EDD.		We	have	
identified	two	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science	and	its	
effective	public	dissemination;	and	we	have	characterized	the	important	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	within	science	as	contingent	enabling	factors	for	
the	production	and	dissemination	of	skewed	research,	hence	for	EDD.		
	
Section	4.	Consequences	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	have	articulated	what	they	call	the	“inductive	risk	account”	of	
EDD	(2015).		According	to	this	account,	the	following	set	of	conditions	are	jointly	
sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD	(2015,	273):		
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Dissent	from	a	hypothesis	H	is	epistemically	detrimental	if	each	of	the	following	
obtains:	
(1) The	non-epistemic	consequences	of	wrongly	rejecting	H	are	likely	to	be	severe	
(2) The	dissenting	research	that	constitutes	the	objection	violates	established	
conventional	standards.		
(3) The	dissenting	research	involves	intolerance	for	producer	risks	at	the	expense	
of	public	risks.		
(4) Producer	risks	and	public	risks	fall	largely	upon	different	parties.		
Biddle	and	Leushner	admit	that	these	conditions	are	not	necessarily	related	to	the	
production	of	EDD	(275):	
“We	are	not	arguing	that,	in	all	possible	worlds,	research	that	meets	the	conditions	
of	the	inductive	risk	account	inhibits	the	progress	of	science.	It	is	possible,	for	
example,	to	organize	science	and	to	regulate	industry	in	such	a	way	that	dissent	that	
meets	these	conditions	is	not	widely	disseminated,	does	not	acquire	political	
authority,	and	is	not	used	to	attack	mainstream	scientists.		But	this	is	not	the	way	in	
which	science	and	society	are	currently	organized.		Dissent	that	meets	the	
conditions	of	the	inductive	risk	account	is,	given	current	societal	arrangements,	
likely	to	inhibit	knowledge	production,	particularly	because	of	the	success	of	
political,	economic,	and	ideological	interests	in	structuring	the	dissemination	of	
research.”	
We	think	that	the	framework	used	in	Section	3	can	help	clarify	the	causal	landscape	
for	the	production	of	EDD	offered	in	the	Inductive	Risk	Account.		Our	contention	is	
that	Biddle	and	Leuschner,	by	focusing	on	inductive	risk,	have	identified	a	
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particular,	important,	but	still	contingent,	enabling	factor,	but	have	failed	to	clearly	
distinguish	the	proper	core	of	stable	difference-makers,	for	the	production	of	EDD.		
Let	us	make	that	point	in	more	details.		
The	four	conditions	above	can	be	seen	as	dividing	into	three	groups.		Condition	(2)	
identifies	one	of	the	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science.		
Conditions	(1)	and	(4)	together	specify	some	particular	enabling	conditions	for	the	
formation	of	non-epistemic	agendas	–	the	presence	of	severe	and	opposing	non-
epistemic	consequences	(SONEC).		Condition	(3)	identifies	a	mechanism	by	which	
intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	may	enable	the	production	of	
skewed	science.		In	other	words,	the	inductive	risk	account	of	EDD	identifies	an	
important	series	of	enabling	causes	leading	to	one	of	the	two	stable	difference-
makers	we	have	identified	in	Section	1-3,	i.e.	production	of	skewed	science.		That	
series	of	cause	is	something	like	this:	from	the	presence	of	SONEC	to	biased	
inductive	risk	reasoning,	and	to	skewed	science.		This	is	an	important	contribution	
to	the	understanding	of	EDD	precisely	because	it	not	only	identifies	some	particular	
enabling	factors	(the	presence	of	SONEC)	for	the	formation	of	epistemic	agendas,	
but	also	a	mechanism	by	which	intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	
may	enable	the	production	of	skewed	science	(via	inductive	risk	bias).		Now	it	is	also	
important	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	and	recognize	that	fulfillment	of	Condition	
(2)	is	the	stable	difference-maker	which	fulfillment	of	Conditions	(1),	(4),	and	then	
(3)	enable	as	a	matter	of	contingent	fact.		Biddle	and	Leuschner	seem	to	have	missed	
that	useful	distinction.		
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If	our	analysis	in	Section	3	is	correct,	they	also	have	failed	to	include	the	second	
stable	difference-maker	for	EDD,	i.e.	effective	public	dissemination.		As	they	admit	in	
the	paper	(see	quote	above),	the	presence	of	SONEC	obviously	does	not	imply	that	
effective	public	dissemination	will	ensue.		Conversely,	as	Jack’s	case	shows,	effective	
public	dissemination	could	well	be	obtained	without	the	presence	of	SONEC.		How	
(un-)likely	this	is	obviously	is	an	empirical	question.		No	matter	how	unlikely,	
however,	it	is	important	for	our	understanding	of	EDD	to	mention	effective	public	
dissemination	as	a	core	stable	difference-maker.		The	inductive	risk	account	fails	to	
do	so.		Let	us	underscore,	however,	that	Biddle	and	Leuschner	once	again	have	
identified	an	important	mechanism	by	which	presence	of	SONEC	enables	effective	
public	dissemination	and	the	manufacturing	of	controversy:	the	presence	of	SONEC	
not	only	enables	the	production	of	skewed	science,	but	also	the	establishment	of	
“sophisticated,	private-funded	network	for	disseminating	[dissenting]	results”	
(2015,	275).		
This	brings	us	to	our	conclusion	on	the	Inductive	Risk	Account:	Biddle	and	
Leuschner	have	successfully	identified	an	important	contingent	enabling	factor	for	
EDD,	i.e.	the	presence	and	influence	of	SONEC.		That	said,	they	have	failed	to	
distinguish	between	the	different	roles	that	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	play	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	hope	to	have	clarified	the	situation.		
	
Conclusion		
Well-known	cases	of	EDD	seem	to	have	in	common	various	forms	of	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic,	often	SONEC-related,	agendas	within	the	science.		We	have	argued	
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that	such	intrusion	is	not	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	neither	necessary	nor	
sufficient,	it	is	also	not	a	stable	difference-maker.		We	have	clarified	its	causal	role:	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	a	contingent	enabling	factor.		Reduced	to	its	
core,	EDD	is	just	well-advertised	bad	science.	Because	it	is	well	advertised,	it	has	an	
impact	on	the	collective	building	of	scientific	knowledge.		Because	it	is	bad	science,	it	
does	not	advance	that	endeavor,	but	any	case	negatively	impacts	it	instead.	
To	make	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	is	important	for	at	least	three	reasons.		First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	
causal	landscape	that	leads	to	the	production	of	EDD,	as	it	simply	increases	our	
understanding	of	EDD.		Second,	it	might	suggest	more	efficient	avenues	for	targeting	
change.		Finally,	it	is	crucial	to	make	room	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	
within	the	science	without	it	being	epistemologically	detrimental.		As	the	
community	of	philosophers	of	science	comes	to	recognize	that	such	intrusion	is	the	
rule	rather	than	the	exception,	one	must	leave	conceptual	room	for	a	distinction	
between	“legitimate”	and	“illegitimate”	role	for	non-epistemic	values	within	science	
(Hick	2014,	Intemann	2015).		
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Abstract
The problem of motion in general relativity is about how exactly
the gravitational field equations, the Einstein equations, are related
to the equations of motion of material bodies subject to gravitational
fields. This paper compares two approaches to derive the geodesic mo-
tion of (test) matter from the field equations: ‘the T approach’ and
‘the vacuum approach’. The latter approach has been dismissed by
philosophers of physics because it apparently represents material bod-
ies by singularities. I shall argue that a careful interpretation of the
approach shows that it does not depend on introducing singularities
at all, and that it holds at least as much promise as the T approach. I
conclude with some general lessons about careful vs. literal interpre-
tations of scientific theories.
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1 Introduction
It is a bit of an irony that one of the most widely embraced definitions of
what it means to be a scientific realist is due to the arch-anti-realist Bas van
Fraassen. His definition starts by stating that “Science aims to give us, in its
theories, a literally true story of what the world is like”.1 And indeed, scien-
tific realists often see themselves as committed to ‘taking scientific theories at
face value’: if the best theories of particle physics say that quarks exist, then
we should believe that they exist; if general relativity tells us that gravity
is really just an aspect of spacetime structure, then we should believe it; if
quantum mechanics tells us that the world is at its core non-deterministic,
then we should believe that too.
The problem is that scientific theories, or at least the theories of modern
physics, are not that straightforward with us. They may seem so at first,
but if you listen to the details of their respective stories, if you take your
time to look under the surface, what exactly we should take them to tell
us about the world is far from clear. Murray Gell-Mann, the inventor of
the concept of quarks, for a long time did not think that quarks should
be interpreted as literally existing; neither did Richard Feynman. Albert
Einstein passionately resisted the interpretation of general relativity that says
that the gravitational force field of Newtonian theory is ontologically reduced
to the geometry of spacetime in general relativity. And of course, there is
a long-standing battle in foundations of physics about whether quantum
mechanics really does tell us that the world is non-deterministic.2
In this paper I shall introduce a new case study that provides further
evidence for the position that, whether you are a realist or not, the literal
interpretation of a scientific theory, especially in physics, can be rather mis-
leading. I will argue that what we should aim for is a careful interpretation;
1Van Fraassen [1980], p.8.
2For a discussion of different interpretations of the quark concept see Pickering [1999],
for Einstein’s opposition to interpreting general relativity as a geometrization of gravity see
Lehmkuhl [2014], and for debate on whether quantum mechanics is really indeterministic
see e.g. Saunders et al. [2010].
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an interpretation of the theory or model or formalism that engages with its
details, both with the details of its mathematical structure and with how it
is applied to the natural world. Philosophy of science must be willing to look
under the hood.
The case study I want to look at is the so-called problem of motion in
the general theory of relativity (GR). It asks about the precise relationship
between the two sets of equations that are at the very heart of GR. On the
one hand there are the Einstein field equations, which give us the dynamics
of the gravitational potential (the metric tensor) gµν :
Rµν −
1
2
gµν = κETµν . (1)
On the other hand, we have the geodesic equation that determines which
paths through spacetime are geodesics of the connection Γνµσ compatible
with the metric gµν :
d2xτ
ds2
+ Γτµν
dxµ
ds
dxν
ds
= 0. (2)
In GR, material bodies subject only to gravitational fields are supposed to
move on the geodesics determined by equation (2).3 The problem of motion
in GR is the question of whether the equations of motion of matter subject to
gravitational fields (2) can be derived from the gravitational field equations
(1).
Einstein himself, in his first publication on the topic, a paper co-written
with Jakob Grommer and published in 1927, compares different classes of
attempts to give such a derivation. In particular, Einstein and Grommer
distinguish between two classes of attempts at deriving the geodesic motion
of matter from the gravitational field equations, which I will term the T
approach and the vacuum approach, respectively. The T approach starts from
the realization that the field equations (1) imply the conservation condition,
namely that the covariant divergence of the energy-momentum tensor Tµν
vanishes:
∇
µTµν = 0 . (3)
3It is a big question which systems are actually included under ‘material bodies’ here.
The minimal position is that only test particles are referred to: particles with negligible
extension, spin, and self-gravity. However, many actual bodies can be approximated well
by test particles in this sense; planets orbiting a star are an example, as we shall see below.
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From this, together with certain conditions on the energy-momentum
tensor Tµν , the T approach derives that material particles move on time-
like geodesics. It is this kind of approach to the problem of motion that
philosophers have engaged with almost exclusively up to now.4
Einstein and Grommer end up dismissing the T approach, and suggest an
alternative path to deriving geodesic motion instead. It is a particular version
of a vacuum approach to the problem of motion. Einstein and Grommer start
from the vacuum form of the Einstein field equations,
Rµν = 0 , (4)
and attempt to derive that the equations (4) imply that material particles
move on geodesics.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have quickly dismissed it because it seems to model material bodies
by singularities in spacetime; while singularities, by definition, are not even
part of spacetime. However, in this paper I shall argue that this dismissal
was far too fast, and that indeed the vacuum approach deserves at least as
much attention by philosophers as the T approach. The vacuum approach,
despite first appearances, engages more closely with some of the most major
predictions of GR: both the prediction of the perihelion of Mercury and
the prediction of light bending by the Sun utilise the vacuum approach to
the derivation of motion of material systems. Indeed, even the prediction
of gravitational waves resulting from a binary black hole merger that was
recently confirmed rests on the vacuum field equations, for black holes are
described by vacuum solutions.5
My argument in this paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will argue
that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion promises certain ad-
vantages that the T approach lacks. Second, I will argue that the problems
of the vacuum approach for which it has been dismissed are artefacts of a
too literal interpretation of the formalism and its application to the problem
at hand. Third, I will argue that a careful interpretation makes the prob-
lems disappear; I will argue that the approach does not need to interpret
singularities as representing material bodies.
4For a comprehensive review of the early history of this approach see Havas [1989]
and Kennefick [2005]; for two particularly beautiful exemplars from within this class of
proofs see Geroch and Jang [1975] and Ehlers and Geroch [2004], which are investigated
by Brown [2007], Malament [2012], and Weatherall [Forthcoming, 2011].
5See Abbott et al. [2016] and references therein.
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2 A critical comparison of the two research
programmes
I said above that the T approach to the problem of motion proceeds via
the fact that the Einstein field equations (1) imply the conservation con-
dition (3), which in turn implies the geodesic motion of matter. However,
as Malament [2012] pointed out, the conservation condition by itself is not
sufficient to prove that the geodesic equation is the equation of motion of ma-
terial particles. One of the most general proofs from within the T approach,
proposed by Geroch and Jang [1975] and further generalised by Ehlers and
Geroch [2004], rests not only on the conservation condition (3), but also on
the strengthened dominant energy condition, which states:
Given any timelike covector ξµ at any point in M , T
µνξµξν ≥ 0
and either T µν = 0 or T µνξµ is timelike.
The first clause is effectively the weak energy condition, which states that
the mass-energy-momentum density associated with the body in question is
always non-negative. The second clause states that every observer will judge
the mass-energy-momentum of the body to propagate along time-like curves
only.6
It would be rather attractive if we did not have to presume that mate-
rial particles move on time-like curves to then show that these curves are
actually time-like geodesics, and if we did not have to presume that matter
cannot have non-negative mass-energy. These are weak assumptions about
the nature of matter, but they are assumptions.
The vacuum approach to the problem of motion, on the other hand, aims
to make no assumptions about the nature of matter and its properties at all,
and to still derive that matter moves on geodesics. It starts from the question
of whether just knowing the exterior gravitational field of a material body,
and how this gravitational field interacts with the gravitational field of its
surroundings, is enough to derive that the body will move on a geodesic of the
metric surrounding it. Arguably, this programme is far more ambitious than
the T approach, for it starts with fewer assumptions.7 And yet, if successful,
it would really fit much better the virtues that philosophers have associated
6For more on the interpretation of the strengthened dominant energy condition
seeWeatherall [2011], Weatherall [Forthcoming] and especially Curiel [Forthcoming].
7One might be tempted to argue that despite first appearances the vacuum approach
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with the geodesic theorem(s) in the first place: deriving the inertial motion
of matter from knowledge of the dynamics of gravitational fields alone.8
Einstein was deeply skeptical of the role of the energy-momentum ten-
sor in GR. Throughout the decades, he emphasised that Tµν provides only
a ‘phenomenological representation of matter’.9 In Einstein and Grommer
[1927], Einstein elaborates that general relativity with an energy-momentum
tensor as a source term on the right-hand side of (1) is just not a com-
plete theory: it does not tell us what kind of matter is present, only that
it has a certain mass-energy distribution. This perspective on GR was fur-
ther strengthened by Tupper [1981, 1982, 1983], who showed that knowing
the energy-momentum tensor of a material system does not suffice to tell
us what kind of matter is present. For example, one and the same mass-
energy-momentum distribution Tµν featuring on the right-hand side of the
Einstein equations, and solving the Einstein equations for the same metric,
can correspond either to an electromagnetic field or a viscous fluid. Knowing
the energy-momentum tensor is just not sufficient to know which of these
two material systems it is that interacts with the metric field.
Einstein’s aim is then to instead start with the vacuum field equations
starts with more demanding assumptions than the T approach. For the vacuum Einstein
equations (4) logically imply that the strengthened dominant energy condition (SDEC)
holds for the Ricci tensor Rµν . The opposite is not true, so that demanding Ricci flatness is
clearly a stronger constraint on the Ricci tensor than demanding that it obeys the SDEC.
But concluding from this that the vacuum approach starts from stronger assumptions than
the T approach would be a mistake. For the T approach assumes i.) the full Einstein field
equations (1); and ii.) that the energy-momentum tensor (and thus the Einstein tensor)
adheres to the SDEC. The vacuum approach only assumes the vacuum Einstein equations
(4), and thus starts with weaker assumptions than the T approach. However, it might
well be that depsite starting with weaker assumptions than the T approach, a particular
manifestation of the vacuum approach might end up with stronger assumptions than
a particular manifestation of the T approach. For example, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer
vacuum approach, discussed below, involves, among other demands, a so-called equilibrium
condition which is supposed to relate solutions to the non-linear field equations to solutions
of the linearized field equations in a particular way; no such demand is included in, say,
the Geroch-Jang version of the T approach. Thus, further analysis might well show that
Einstein and Grommer use stronger assumptions than Geroch and Jang. Einstein himself
would likely have been content with that, as long as it allowed him to avoid the introduction
of Tµν , for reasons discussed below.
8Cf. Brown [2007], p. 141 and 163.
9See, for example, Einstein [1922], Einstein to Michele Besso, 11 August 1926 (EA-7-
361), and Einstein [1936].
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(4), treat material particles as singularities in the metric field,10 and derive
that they move on geodesics of a metric gµν that solves the vacuum field
equations (4) in the region through which the particle moves.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have already dismissed it at this point. The main criticism is that
the very idea of the approach is flawed: A singularity is not even part of
spacetime. How should it be possible to describe its motion in said spacetime?
Both Torretti and Earman essentially answer that this is not possible and
that the whole programme is ill-conceived. Earman [1995], p. 12, writes:11
[S]ingularities in the spacetime metric cannot be regarded as tak-
ing place at points of the spacetime manifold M. Thus, to speak
of singularities in gµν as geodesics of the spacetime is to speak in
oxymorons.
The most detailed discussion of the Einstein-Grommer paper in the philo-
sophical literature is due to Tamir [2012]. After quoting the above statement
by Earman, Tamir goes on to write (p.142):
The proponent of such a “vacuum-cum-singularity” technique is
faced with the rather paradoxical challenge of explaining in what
sense we can say that a singular curve (ostensibly constituted
by the missing points in the manifold) is actually a geodesic of
the spacetime from which it is absent. Not only is no metric
defined at the singularity, but also technically there are not even
spacetime points there: the geodesic does not exist.
Tamir then mentions a key ingredient of the Einstein-Grommer approach,
namely the distinction between an ‘inner metric’ and an ‘outer metric’.12
Einstein and Grommer aim to show that the particle characterized by a
10In recent years, the adequate definition of a singularity in GR has been a subject of
extensive debate, see e.g. Earman [1995] and Curiel [1999]. For Einstein’s thoughts on
singularities see Earman and Eisenstaedt [1999]; in the context of the Einstein-Grommer
paper Einstein clearly thinks of a singularity in the metric field gµν as a region where the
components of the metric tend to infinity.
11For similar statements see Torretti [1996], section 5.8.
12There is an interesting relationship between Einstein and Grommer’s distinction be-
tween inner and outer metric (discussed further in section 3) on the one hand and the later
distinction between interior and exterior black hole solutions on the other. I do believe
that bringing together results and concepts developed in the context of black hole solu-
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singular inner metric moves on geodesics of the non-singular outer metric.
Tamir states that the “suggested implication” is that we are to compare
a second spacetime whose metric is that of the regular outer metric with
the singular first spacetime, and identify the regular geodesic of the second
spacetime with the singular curve of the first one. He then argues that the
thought that the second singularity-free spacetime can teach us anything
about the singular original spacetime is “spurious”.
My point in the following will be this. Even if this argument were con-
vincing, its premise (the ‘suggested implication’ that Einstein and Grommer
intended to deduce something about a singular spacetime by comparing it
to a non-singular spacetime) is not. I shall argue that by looking at the de-
tails of the Einstein-Grommer approach we come to a different interpretation
of the approach, one that sheds a completely different light on the alleged
presence of singularities. We will see that a careful (rather than literal) in-
terpretation of the vacuum approach, and the Einstein-Grommer paper in
particular, does not actually depend on introducing singularities at all.
3 The vacuum approach to the problem of
motion
3.1 Two ways of looking at Einstein’s model of the
Sun-Mercury system
In a way, the story of the vacuum approach to the problem of motion starts
in 1915, with Einstein’s treatment of the orbit of Mercury around the Sun
in the context of GR. It is a two-body problem: a small body (Mercury)
with a comparatively small mass orbits a large body (the Sun). Einstein
seems to postulate (more on the ‘seems’ below) that the Sun be represented
by what would soon be recognized as an approximation to the Schwarzschild
metric. He definitely postulates (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic of said
metric.13 In a way, the problem of motion in GR is about the question of
tions (a special case of vacuum solutions) on the one hand and the vacuum approach to the
problem of motion on the other hand is very promising indeed. I will have to postpone a
detailed discussion to a later paper; it will include the problem of motion of a binary black
hole, the black hole equivalent of the Sun-Mercury two-body system discussed below.
13For a careful analysis of Einstein’s Mercury paper and how it rests on the Einstein-
Besso manuscript see Earman and Janssen [1993], and Janssen’s Editorial Note on the
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whether this second postulate is really necessary.
If we now look at Einstein’s Mercury paper and recall the kind of criticism
that was launched against the vacuum approach to the problem of motion,
we may find ourselves feeling puzzled. After all, the Schwarzschild metric is a
solution to the vacuum field equations, and it has a singularity at its center.14
If representing material bodies by singular metrics is so problematic, how
does it come about that Einstein [1915] successfully predicted the perihelion
motion of Mercury? Why is it not problematic to represent the Sun by the
singular Schwarzschild metric?
The answer lies in denying the premise of the question. Einstein’s treat-
ment of the Sun-Mercury system should not be interpreted as involving him
representing the Sun by (an approximation of) the Schwarzschild metric. We
know that the Sun is a material body with non-vanishing mass-energy, and
that it does not have a spacetime singularity at its center. What Einstein
really does is to convert the two-body problem Sun-Mercury into a one-body
problem, where one body (Mercury) is subject to an external gravitational
field. It is the exterior gravitational field of the Sun, not the Sun itself, that
is represented by the Schwarzschild metric. And that is enough to predict
the perihelion of Mercury: we don’t need to know what the Sun is made of
or what happens in its interior; all that matters is the exterior gravitational
field that Mercury is subject to.
Thus, worrying about the singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild
metric just misses the point: we do not have to interpret the interior part of
the Schwarzschild metric literally, at least not in this application.
In the following I shall argue that we should interpret the appearance of
singularities in the Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the problem of
motion in a similar vein.
3.2 The Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the
problem of motion
The general scheme of the Einstein-Grommer approach proceeds as follows.15
Einstein-Besso manuscript in Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (CPAE).
14For the history and interpretation of the Schwarzschild metric and its analytic exten-
sions see Eisenstaedt [1989] and Bonnor [1992].
15The genesis of the Einstein-Grommer approach has been a bit of a mystery up to now,
as pointed out by Kennefick [2005]. However, the work on the 15th volume of Einstein’s
collected papers has revealed the context and correspondence leading up to that paper,
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1. Reformulate the vacuum Einstein equations in terms of a surface in-
tegral over a three-dimensional hyper-surface such that we can ask
whether gravitational energy-momentum represented by the pseudo-
tensor tτα passes through the surface.
16
2. Pick a curve that is supposed to represent the path of a material par-
ticle.
3. Impose the linear approximation according to which gµν = ηµν + γµν ,
i.e. assume that, at least close to the curve, the metric deviates from
Minkowski spacetime only slightly.
4. Realise that not all solutions to the linearized field equations will corre-
spond to solutions of the non-linear field equations that the linearized
field equations approximate. Argue that in the case where an ‘equilib-
rium condition’ for the energy-pseudo-tensor of the gravitational field
holds, the γµν of the linearized field equations will solve the full non-
linear equations reformulated as a surface integral.17
5. Now split the γµν in the immediate neighborhood of the particle into
the ‘inner metric γ¯µν that the particle itself gives rise to and the ‘outer
metric γ¯µν that is due to other sources (or lack thereof). Observe that
the ‘outer metric’ is entirely regular, even if extended to the point at
which the material particle is supposed to be located.
6. Integrate the surface integral that is equivalent to the vacuum field
equations ‘around’ the curve that is supposed to represent the path
of a material particle. For the case where the integration surface is a
sphere, the equilibrium condition for tτα simplifies to
∂γ¯44
∂xσ
= 0.
and how it fits into Einstein’s overall research program. It is a fascinating story; alas, it
will have to wait for a separate paper.
16There has been a long debate on whether gravitational energy can be adequately
represented by a pseudo-tensor; I will not be able to do it justice here. For some details
see the introduction to Volume 8 CPAE for the debate between Einstein, Klein, Levi-Civita
and Lorentz, for conceptual analysis Hoefer [2000] and especially Trautmann [1962].
17This step is very intricate and it would take me a few pages to do it justice. This point
of the Einstein-Grommer paper has not been adressed by the literature at all (neither in
physics nor in philosophy); I will argue elsewhere that it sheds new light on Einstein’s
later doubts as to whether the gravitational wave solutions of the linearized equations
correspond to gravitational wave solutions in the full non-linear theory.
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7. Conclude that the curve that represents the path of a material particle
is a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν .
18
4 Interpreting the Einstein-Grommer approach
to the problem of motion
The reader might think that the argument presented in the last section cannot
be a faithful representation of the Einstein-Grommer approach; after all,
where is the claim that the material particle is represented by a singularity,
the reason the approach was dismissed by Earman and Tamir? Indeed, I
have omitted that after step 5 of the argument Einstein and Grommer do
say that one could assume that the inner metric γ¯µν is given by what is
effectively a three-dimensional counterpart of the Schwarzschild metric: it is
spherically symmetric and has a singularity at the center. And yet, Einstein
and Grommer never use this assumption in their argument. They call the
material particle ‘the singularity’ all the time, but their argument does not
depend on assuming any particular form for the inner metric, let alone one
that is necessarily singular. As a matter of fact, they do not even mention a
concrete candidate metric for the outer metric γ¯µν ; all they need is that γµν
is split into the inner metric γ¯µν and the outer metric γ¯µν in such a way that
γ¯µν is non-singular everywhere.
Note that this does not mean that we know that the inner metric γ¯µν
is non-singular. We don’t know anything about the inner metric, for the
argument is independent of γ¯µν having any particular form, just like the
derivation of Mercury’s perihelion was independent of whether there is a
singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild metric that represented the
exterior field of the Sun.
With regard to the Sun-Mercury system I argued that we should not
interpret the Schwarzschild metric as representing the Sun, but as represent-
ing its exterior gravitational field. The part of the Sun that is within the
event horizon, including the singularity at the center, should not be taken
18Einstein and Grommer then go on to generalise this result to the ‘non-stationary case’,
i.e. the case where it is not demanded that the external gravitational field, to which the
particle is subject to, does not change in time. They conclude that in this case, too, the
particle will move on a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν that is a solution to the field
equations. For the following this generalisation does not make a difference; I will thus
refer only to the stationary scenario described above.
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as a representation of the actual interior of the Sun, but as a placeholder
or a blind spot within the current description of the Sun-Mercury system: a
docking station for a theoretical model of the Sun not included in Einstein’s
Sun-Mercury model.19
Likewise, we should interpret the inner metric γ¯µν in the Einstein-Grommer
approach as a placeholder for a representation of matter not included in the
current theoretical approach. Sure, you can set γ¯µν to be a Schwarzschild-like
metric with a singularity at the center. But you don’t have to do that to
make the Einstein-Grommer argument work, and even if you do make that
assumption, you should still take this particular inner metric with a singu-
larity at its center as a placeholder for a representation or theory of matter
not yet provided.20
But now wait a minute. You might have disliked the occurence of sin-
gularities as representations of particles, but at least the singularity (in lieu
of a non-vanishing energy-momentum tensor) gave you an idea of where in
spacetime the particle was supposed to be. True, Earman and Tamir rightly
pointed out that the singularity is not actually part of spacetime, and so it
can hardly serve to localize the particle in spacetime. Still, you might think
that we’re throwing the baby out with the bath water by not choosing any
inner metric. After all, is it not the case then that the curve we have been
focusing on is just any curve, without any reason to think of this curve as
the curve of a material particle?21
Again, I think we can counter this criticism by comparing the Einstein-
Grommer approach to Einstein’s treatment of the Sun-Mercury system in
19Note that there are interior extensions of the Schwarzschild metric that model the
interior of the Sun by solutions of the non-vacuum field equations (1), for example by an
incompressible perfect fluid. See Bonnor [1992], section 5.
20If I had given more historical details, I could have, I believe, shown that Einstein
himself saw the occurence of a singularity in the inner metric in exactly this way. This
exegetical argument would have started with evidence that, from early on, he saw GR as a
theory of the pure gravitational field without any constraints on what kinds of matter give
rise to the gravitational field. Furthermore, I would have argued that even in the Einstein-
Grommer paper he clearly forbids singularities outside of material particles (where the
theory is supposed to give an adequate and deterministic representation of gravitational
fields) but has no problem with them appearing inside of material systems, where the
theory can provide at best phenomenological placeholders for a future ‘proper’ theory of
matter anyhow. Thus, for Einstein energy-momentum tensors as alleged representatives
of material systems were on a par with singularities: both were only placeholders for a
proper theory of matter.
21I thank Jim Weatherall for putting this question to me.
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Einstein [1915]. What Einstein did there was to assume that Mercury would
move on some geodesic of the exterior gravitational field produced by the
Sun. He calculated an approximation to the external gravitational field of a
static, spherically symmetric and asymptotically flat body; this gravitational
field he saw as represented by the connection components Γνµσ of a metric
gµν which deviated only slightly from the flat Minkowski metric. He then
inserted these gravitational field components Γνµσ into the geodesic equation
(2). He showed that this law contained Newton’s first law and Newton’s
second law with a gravitational potential giving rise to a force as a limiting
case, and showed how the resulting Keplerian laws for orbits differ in his
theory as compared to its Newtonian limit. In the end, he obtained that
according to the new theory the perihelion ǫ of any geodesic orbit around
the Sun is given by
ǫ = 24π3
a2
T 2c2(1− e2)
(5)
Here a denotes the length of the semimajor axis of the orbit in question, e
its eccentricity, c the speed of light, and T the orbital period of the planet in
question. Einstein then takes the astronomically known values for Mercury,
plugs them into equation (5), and thereby predicts that Mercury’s perihelion
changes by 43” per century.
Note that there is nothing in the theoretical description that singles out
any particular path as that of Mercury. There is no theoretical representation
of Mercury, no model. All that is there is the assumption that Mercury will
move on one of the geodesics of the affine connection determined by the
spherically symmetric field of the Sun. A general equation that all possible
geodesic orbits have to fulfil is derived. And then external knowledge is used
to single out one of these orbits as that of Mercury. Einstein trusts that
the astronomers have measured the orbital period, the semimajor axis and
the eccentricity of Mercury correctly. It is this external knowledge, plugged
into his theoretical model, which does not in itself contain a representation
of Mercury or its path, that produces the prediction.
In many ways, the whole vacuum approach to the problem of motion
is about the question as to whether in this kind of scenario we really have
to assume the geodesic equation as the equation of motion of matter over
and above the gravitational field equations. Indeed, let us look at the Sun-
Mercury system within the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach. The problem
of motion, then, is the question whether Einstein really had to introduce the
13
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gravitational field equations (to describe the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun) and the geodesic equation (to describe the path of Mercury subject
to this gravitational field) as separate assumptions.22 Could he have only
assumed the gravitational field equations and derived that Mercury moves
on a geodesic of the exterior field of the Sun? My point is that, just like
in Einstein’s 1915 treatment, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach does not
need to commit to a theoretical model that allows us to localise Mercury
internally. It is fine to ask whether the exterior gravitational field around
a given curve ‘forces’ that curve to be a geodesic. Just like in the 1915
treatment, Einstein and Grommer could then use external knowledge about
whether that particular curve is actually the curve of a material object, or
of Mercury in particular. No inner metric, no singularity to represent the
material body, is actually needed.
Let us take a step back though, for there is an important difference be-
tween the structure of Einstein’s 1915 treatment of Mercury on the one hand
and the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach on the other. In the Mercury case
Einstein had assumed (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic, i.e. a special
kind of curve, and model-external knowledge about the period, eccentricity
and semimajor axis of Mercury could then be used to determine which of
the many geodesics of the Schwarzschild metric corresponded to the path
of Mercury. But in the case of the Einstein-Grommer argument, what is in
question is whether we can prove that the path of Mercury, say, is a geodesic.
Thus, at first sight it looks as if while the 1915 argument only needed ex-
ternal knowledge to determine which geodesic is that of Mercury, appeal to
external knowledge in the Einstein-Grommer case would have to determine
a.) that this curve is a geodesic and b.) that it is the curve of a material
body.
Einstein and Grommer did not aim to derive both a.) and b.). Instead,
while Einstein in 1915 used external knowledge at the end of his argument,
Einstein and Grommer in 1927 use it at the beginning. They start out by
assuming that a given curve is the curve of a material particle, and then
ask whether having a regular outer metric (which solves the vacuum field
equations) around the curve means that the curve of this material particle,
22Interestingly, Einstein did not yet have the final gravitational field equations in the
Mercury paper; he found them a week later, in his fourth paper of November 1915. How-
ever, the approximation of the Schwarzschild metric that he uses in the Mercury paper is
an approximative solution of both the field equations from the Mercury paper, and of the
final Einstein field equations.
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given the further conditions summarized in section 3.2, must be a geodesic.
Rather than finishing the argument by appeal to external knowledge (as
in Einstein 1915), the Einstein-Grommer argument starts with an appeal to
external knowledge, which singles out a particular curve as that of a material
body.23
Either way, both in Einstein’s 1915 treatment and in the Einstein-Grommer
approach there is no reason to interpret the singularity (appearing in the
Schwarzschild metric or the inner metric, respectively) literally. In both
cases, the singularity should be interpreted to signify a placeholder or a blind
spot of the theoretical treatment, rather than something that should be inter-
preted literally, as referring and approximately true. Indeed, both Einstein’s
1915 treatment of the Sun-Mercury system and Einstein’s and Grommer’s
treatment of an arbitrary material particle subject to an external gravita-
tional field work just as well if, in the former case, no interior metric (to
describe the interior of the Sun) or, in the latter case, no inner metric (to
represent the location of the particle on the curve), is ever specified.
5 Conclusion
I started out by saying that whether we are realists or antirealists, we should
aim for a careful interpretation, rather than a literal interpretation, of the
scientific theory that we want to be realists or anti-realists about. As a case
study, I argued that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion in GR,
and the Einstein-Grommer approach in particular, is far more sensible and
promising if we interpret the singularities not as representing material bodies
but as placeholders for a representation of material bodies that is not included
in the model. Indeed, I argued that the approach does not even need the
23There is a further disanalogy between Einstein’s 1915 derivation of the perihelion of
Mercury and the Einstein-Grommer argument of 1927. In the former the choice of (an
approximation) the Schwarzschild metric to represent the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun does important work in the derivation of Mercury’s perihelion. In the Einstein-
Grommer approach, no choice of a concrete outer metric is necessary to derive that the
curve of the particle which is surrounded by the outer metric must be a geodesic. The
reason for this difference is that the Einstein-Grommer approach aims to be more general;
it only aims to derive that a material body moves on some geodesic of the outer metric.
However, note that it is not the case that any outer metric is allowed by the approach:
the class of outer metrics that the approach can work with is heavily constrained by steps
2 and 3 of the Einstein-Grommer argument (see section 3.2).
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introduction of singularities to represent material bodies; their introduction
does not do any work in answering the question at hand.24
Given that in their paper Einstein and Grommer seem to take the singu-
larities as representing material bodies, one might wonder whether this al-
legedly more careful interpretation does not fall prey to the criticism that the
careful interpreter presumes to understand the theory/formalism in question
better than its originators. This might seem at odds with the realist tenet
of taking scientists and science ‘seriously’. I do indeed think that putting
the Einstein-Grommer paper into its proper historical context by analysing
Einstein’s correspondence leading up to the paper and by relating it to his
overarching research project at the time would convincingly show that he
subscribed to something very much like the ‘placeholder interpretation’ I de-
fended above. Showing this in detail will have to wait for a much longer
paper, and I do not ask the reader to just take my word for it. So let us say,
for the sake of the argument, that Einstein and Grommer did indeed intend
the singularities as representatives of material objects in a rather straight-
forward way. I believe that we should not take their word for it either. And
neither did Einstein. Just a few years after the Einstein-Grommer paper, in
his famed 1933 Spencer lectures at the University of Oxford, Einstein told
us in his opening words: “If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist
anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following
advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements.”25
In philosophy of science, I believe there is no better way of examining a
scientist’s achievements than by looking for the best possible interpretation
24The argument that we should thus not see a realist as comitted to being a realist about
the singularities appearing in the Einstein-Grommer paper resonates well with selective
or posit realism as introduced by Vickers [2013]. The idea there is that we should only
be realists with respect to components of a prediction that ‘fuel the success’ of the pre-
diction, i.e. that are indispensable in the derivation of what is predicted. Using Vickers’
distinction the introduction of a singular inner metric in the Einstein-Grommer approach
is an idle rather than a working posit. However, note that the call for careful rather than
literal interpretations with which I started is independent of / complementary to aiming
for identification of the idle posits in a derivation. For even if we had found that the
introduction of the singular inner metric did do work in the derivation of geodesic mo-
tion could we have argued (with less force) that the singularity should be interpreted as
a placeholder for a future theory of matter, as a temporary measure within an effective
theory, and thus not as something that we should interpret as possesing as much ‘reality’
or ‘referring power’ as the regular outer metric governed by the field equations.
25See Einstein [1934], and van Dongen [2010] for a detailed analysis of the text.
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of his or her theories. To do that, we have to not just listen to the words
of the scientist who created or discovered it; we have to see what the theory
does in practice, how it is used ; which of its parts really do the work.
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Holism, or the Erosion of Modularity –  
a Methodological Challenge for Validation 
 
Draft to be presented at PSA 2016 
Johannes Lenhard, Bielefeld University 
 
abstract 
Modularity is a key concept in building and evaluating complex simulation models. My main 
claim is that in simulation modeling modularity degenerates for systematic methodological 
reasons. Consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to accessing how representational (inner 
mathematical) structure and dynamical properties of a model are related. The resulting problem 
for validating models is one of holism. 
The argument will proceed by analyzing the techniques of parameterization, tuning, and 
kludging. They are – to a certain extent – inevitable when building complex simulation models, 
but corrode modularity.  As a result, the common account of validating simulations faces a major 
problem and testing the dynamical behavior of simulation models becomes all the more 
important. Finally, I will ask in what circumstances this might be sufficient for model validation. 
 
1. Introduction 
For the moment, imagine a scene at a car racing track. The air smells after gasoline. The pilot of 
the F1 racing car has just steered into his box and is peeling himself out of the straight cockpit. 
He puts off his helmet, shakes his sweaty hair, and then his eyes make contact to the technical 
director with a mixture of anger, despair, and helplessness. The engine had not worked as it 
should, and for a known reason: the software. However, the team had not been successful in 
attributing the miserable performance to a particular parameter setting. The machine and the 
software interacted in unforeseen and intricate ways. This explains the exchange of glances 
between pilot and technical director. The software’s internal interactions and interfaces proved to 
be so complicated that the team had not been able to localize an error or a bug, rather remained 
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suspicious that some complex interaction of seemingly innocent assumptions or parameter 
settings was leading to the insufficient performance. 
The story happened in fact
1
 and it is remarkable since it displays how invasive computational 
modeling is into areas that smell most analogous. I reported this short piece for another reason, 
however, namely because the situation is typical for complex computational and simulation 
models. Validation procedures, while counting on modularity, run against a problem of holism. 
Both concepts, modularity and holism, are notions at the fringe of philosophical terminology. 
Modularity is used in many guises and is not a particularly philosophical notion. It features 
prominently in the context of complex design, planning, and building – from architecture to 
software. Modularity stands for first breaking down complicated tasks into small and well-
defined sub-tasks and then re-assembling the original global task with a well-defined series of 
steps. It can be argued that modularity is the key pillar on which various rational treatments of 
complexity rest – from architecture to software engineering. 
Holism is a philosophical term to a somewhat higher degree and is covered in recent compendia. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia, for instance, includes (sub-)entries on methodological, 
metaphysical, relational, or meaning holism. Holism generically states that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, meaning that the parts of a whole are in intimate interconnection, such 
that they cannot exist independently of the whole, or cannot be understood without reference to 
the whole. Especially W. V. O. Quine has made the concept popular, not only in philosophy of 
language, but also in philosophy of science, where one speaks of the so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis. This thesis is based on the insight that one cannot test a single hypothesis in isolation, but 
that any such test depends on “auxiliary” theories or hypotheses, for example how the 
measurement instruments work. Thus any test addresses a whole ensemble of theories and 
hypotheses. 
Lenhard and Winsberg (2010) have discussed the problem of confirmation holism in the context 
of validating complex climate models. They argued that “due to interactivity, modularity does 
not break down a complex system into separately manageable pieces.” (2010, 256) In a sense, I 
want to pick up on this work, but put the thesis into a much more general context, i.e. pointing 
                                                
1
 In spring 2014, the Red Bull team experienced a crisis due to recalcitrant problems with the 
Renault engine, due to a partial software update. 
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out a dilemma that is built on the tension between modularity and holism and that occurs quite 
generally in simulation modeling. The potential philosophical novelty is debated controversially 
in philosophy of science, for instance Humphreys (2009) vs. Frigg and Reiss (2009). The latter 
authors deny novelty, but concede issues of holism might be an exception. My paper confirms 
that holism is a key concept when reasoning about simulation. (I see more reasons for 
philosophical novelty, though.) 
My main claim is the following: According to the rational picture of design, modularity is a key 
concept in building and evaluating complex models. In simulation modeling, however, 
modularity erodes for systematic methodological reasons. Moreover, the very condition for 
success of simulation undermines the most basic pillar of rational design. Thus the resulting 
problem for validating models is one of (confirmation) holism. 
Section 2 discusses modularity and its central role for the so-called rational picture of design. 
Herbert Simon’s highly influential parable of the watchmakers will feature prominently. It 
paradigmatically captures complex systems as a sort of large clockwork mechanism. This 
perspective suggests the computer would enlarge the tractability of complex systems due to its 
vast capacity for handling (algorithmic) mechanisms. Complex simulations then would appear as 
the electronic incarnation of a gigantic assembly of cogwheels. This viewpoint is misleading, I 
will argue. Instead, I want to emphasize the dis-analogy to how simulation models work. The 
methodology of building complex simulation models thwarts modularity in systematic ways. 
Simulation is based on an iterative and exploratory mode of modeling that leads to a sort of 
holism that erodes modularity.  
I will present two arguments for the erosion claim, one from parameterization and tuning 
(section 3), the other from klu(d)ging (section 4). Both are, in practice, part-and-parcel of 
simulation modeling and both make modularity erode. The paper will conclude by drawing 
lessons about the limits of validation (section 5). Most accounts of validation require, if often not 
explicitly, modularity and are incompatible with holism. In contrast, the exploratory and iterative 
mode of modeling restricts validation, at least to a certain extent, to testing (global) predictive 
virtues. This observation shakes the rational (clockwork) picture of design and of the computer. 
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2. The rational picture 
The design of complex systems has a long tradition in architecture and engineering. At the same 
time, it has not been much covered in literature, because design was conceived as a matter for 
experienced craftsmanship rather than analytical investigation. The work of Pahl and Beitz 
(1984, plus revised editions 1996, 2007) gives a relatively recent account of design in 
engineering. A second, related source for reasoning about design is the design of complex 
computer systems. Here, one can find more explicit accounts, since the computer led to complex 
systems much faster than any tradition of craftsmanship could grow. A widely read example is 
Herbert Simon’s “Sciences of the Artificial” (1969). Still up to today, techniques of high-level 
languages, object-oriented programming, etc. make the practice of design change on a fast scale. 
One original contributor to this discussion is Frederic Brooks, software and computer expert (and 
former manager at IBM) and also hobby architect. In his 2010 monograph “The Design of 
Design”, he describes the rational model of design that is widely significant, though it is much 
more often adopted in practice than explicitly formulated in theoretical literature. The rational 
picture starts with assuming an overview of all options at hand. According to Simon, for 
instance, the theory of design is the general theory of search through large combinatorial spaces 
(Simon 1969, 54). The rational model then presupposes a utility function and a design tree, 
which are spanning the space of possible designs. Brooks rightly points out that these are 
normally not at hand. Nevertheless, design is conceived as a systematic step-by-step process. 
Pahl and Beitz aim at detailing these steps in their rational order. Also, Simon presupposes the 
rational model, arguably motivated by making design feasible for artificial intelligence (see 
Brooks 2010, 16). Wynston Royce, to give another example, introduced the “waterfall model” 
for software design (1970). Royce was writing about managing the development of large 
software systems and the waterfall model consisted in following a hierarchy (“downward”), 
admitting to iterate steps on one layer, but not with much earlier (“upward”) phases of the design 
process. Although Royce actually saw the waterfall model as a straw man, it was cited positively 
as paradigm of software development (cf. Brooks on this point). 
Some hierarchical order is a key element of the rational picture of design and presumes 
modularity. Let me illustrate this point. Consider first a simple brick wall. It consists of a 
multitude of modules, each with certain form and static properties. These are combined into 
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potentially very large structures. It is a strikingly simple example, because all modules (bricks) 
are similar. 
A more complicated, though closely related, example is the one depicted in figure 1 where an 
auxiliary building of Bielefeld University is put together from container modules.  
 
Figure 1: A part of Bielefeld University is built from container modules. 
 
These examples illustrate how deeply ingrained modularity is in our way of building (larger) 
objects. Figure 2 displays a standard picture for designing and developing complex (software) 
systems. 
 
Figure 2: Generic architecture of complex software, from the AIAA Guide for the Verification and 
Validation of Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations (1998). Modules of one layer might be used by 
different modules on a higher layer. 
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Some complex overall task is split up into modules that can be tackled independently and by 
different teams. The hierarchical structure shall ensure the modules can be integrated to make up 
the original complex system. Modularity not only plays a key role when designing and building 
complex systems, it also is of crucial importance when taking account of the system. Validation 
is usually conceived in the very same modular structure: independently validated modules are 
put together in a controlled way for making up a validated bigger system. The standard account 
of how computational models are verified and validated gives very rigorous guidelines that are 
all based on the systematic realization of modularity (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, see also Fillion 
2017). In short, modularity is key for designing as well as for validating complex systems.  
This observation is paradigmatically expressed in Simon’s parable of the two watchmakers. You 
find it in Simon’s 1962 paper “The Architecture of Complexity” that has become a chapter in his 
immensely influential “The Sciences of the Artificial” (Simon 1969). There, Simon investigates 
the structure of complex systems. The stable structures, so Simon argues, are the hierarchical 
ones. He expressed his idea by telling the parable of the two watchmakers named Hora and 
Tempus (1969, 90-92). P. Agre describes the setting with the following words: 
“According to this story, both watchmakers were equally skilled, but only one of them, Hora, 
prospered. The difference between them lay in the design of their watches. Each design involved 
1000 elementary components, but the similarity ended there. Tempus' watches were not 
hierarchical; they were assembled one component at a time. Hora's watches, by contrast, were 
organized into hierarchical subassemblies whose "span" was ten. He would combine ten 
elementary components into small subassemblies, and then he would combine ten subassemblies 
into larger subassemblies, and these in turn could be combined to make a complete watch.” 
(Agre 2003) 
Since Hora takes additional steps for building modules, Tempus’ watches need less time for 
assembly. However, it was Tempus’ business that did not thrive, because of an additional 
condition not yet mentioned, namely some kind of noise. From time to time the telephone rings 
and whenever one of the watchmakers answers the call, all cogwheels and little screws fall apart 
and he has to re-start the assembly. While Tempus had to start from scratch, Hora could keep all 
finished modules and work from there. In the presence of noise, so the lesson goes, the modular 
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strategy is by far superior. Agre summarizes that modularity, he speaks of the functional role of 
components, comes out as a necessary element when designing complex systems: 
“For working engineers, hierarchy is not mainly a guarantee that subassemblies will remain 
intact when the phone rings. Rather, hierarchy simplifies the process of design cognitively by 
allowing the functional role of subassemblies to be articulated in a meaningful way in terms of 
their contribution to the function of the whole. Hierarchy allows subassemblies to be modified 
somewhat independently of one another, and it enables them to be assembled into new and 
potentially unexpected configurations when the need arises. A system whose overall functioning 
cannot be predicted from the functionality of its components is not generally considered to be 
well-engineered.” (Agre 2003) 
Now, the story works with rather particular examples insofar as watches exemplify complicated 
mechanical devices. The universe as a giant clockwork has been a common metaphor since the 
seventeenth century. Presumably, Simon was aware the clockwork picture is limited and he even 
mentioned that complicated interactions could lead to a sort of pragmatic holism.
2
 Nonetheless, 
the hierarchical order is established by the interaction of self-contained modules. 
There is an obvious limit to the watchmaker picture, namely systems have to remain manageable 
by human beings (watchmakers). There are many systems of practical interest that are too 
complex – from the earth’s climate to the aerodynamics of an airfoil. Computer models open up 
a new path here, since simulation models might contain a wealth of algorithmic steps far beyond 
what can be conceived in a clockwork picture.
3
 From this point of view, the computer appears as 
a kind of amplifier that helps to revitalize the rational picture. Do we have to look at simulation 
models as a sort of gigantic clockworks? In the following, I will argue that this viewpoint is 
seriously misleading. Simulation models are different from watches in important ways and I 
                                                
2	This kind of holism hence can occur even when modules are “independently validated”, since 
these modules when connected together could interact with each other in unpredicted ways. This 
is a strictly weaker form of holism than the one I am going to discuss.	
3
 Charles Babbage had designed his famous „Analytical Engine“ as a mechanistic computer. 
Tellingly, it did encounter serious problems exactly because of the mechanical limitations of its 
construction. 
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want to focus on the dis-analogy.
4
 Finally, we will learn from the investigation of simulation 
models about our picture of rationality. 
 
3. Erosion of modularity 1: Parameterization and tuning 
In stark contrast to the cogwheel picture of the computer, the methodology of simulation 
modeling erodes modularity in systematic ways. I want to discuss two separate though related 
aspects, firstly, parameterization and tuning and, secondly, kluging (also called kludging). Both 
are, for different reasons, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling; and both make modularity of 
models erode. Let us investigate them in turn and develop two arguments for erosion. 
Parameterization and tuning are key elements of simulation modeling that stretch the realm of 
tractable subject matter much beyond what is covered by theory. Furthermore, simulation models 
can make predictions even in fields that are covered by well-accepted theory only with the help 
of parameterization and tuning. In this sense, the latter are success conditions for simulations. 
Before we start with discussing an example, let me add a few words about terminology. There 
are different expressions that specify what is done with parameters. The four most common ones 
are (in alphabetical order): adaptation, adjustment, calibration, and tuning. These notions 
describe very similar activities, but also valuate differently what parameters are good for. 
Calibration is commonly used in the context of preparing an instrument, like calibrating a scale 
one time for using it very often in a reliable way. Tuning has a more pejorative tone, like 
achieving a fit with artificial measures, or fitting to a particular case. Adaptation and adjustment 
have more neutral meanings. 
Atmospheric circulation is a typical example. It is modeled on the basis of accepted theory (fluid 
dynamics, thermodynamics, motion) on a grand scale. Climate scientists call this the “dynamical 
core” of their models and there is more or less consensus about this part. Although the employed 
theory is part of physics, climate scientists mean a different part of their models when they speak 
of “the physics”. It includes all the processes that are not completely specified from the 
dynamical core. These processes include convection schemes, cloud dynamics, and many more. 
                                                
4
 There are several dis-analogies. One I am not discussing is that clockworks lack multi-
functionality. 
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The “physics” is where different models differ and the physics is what modeling centers regard 
as their achievements and try to maintain even if their models change into the next generation. 
The physics acts like a specifying supplement to the grand scale dynamics. It is based on 
modeling assumptions, say which sub-processes are important in convection, what should be 
resolved in the model and what should be treated via a parameterization scheme. Often, such 
processes are not known in full detail, and some aspects (at least) depend on what happens on a 
sub-grid scale. The dynamics of clouds, for instance, depends on a staggering span of very small 
(molecular) scales and much larger scales of many kilometers. Hence even if the laws that guide 
these processes would be known, they could not be treated explicitly in the simulation model. 
Modeling the physics has to bring in parameterization schemes.
5
 
How does moisture transport, for example, work? Rather than trying to investigate into the 
molecular details of how water vapor is entrained into air, scientists use a parameter, or a scheme 
of parameters, that controls moisture uptake so that known observations are met. Often, such 
parameters do not have a direct physical interpretation, nor do they need one, like when a 
parameter stands for a mixture of processes not resolved in the model. The important property 
rather is that they make the parameterization scheme flexible, so that the parameters of such a 
scheme can be changed in a way that makes the properties of the scheme (in terms of climate 
dynamics) match some known data or reference points. 
From this rather straightforward observation follows an important fact. A parameterization, 
including assignments of parameter values, makes sense only in the context of the larger model. 
Observational data are not compared to the parameterization in isolation. The Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC acknowledges the point that “parameterizations have to be understood in the 
context of their host models” (Solomon et al. 2007, 8.2.1.3) 
The question of whether the parameter value that controls moisture uptake (in our oversimplified 
example) is adequate can be answered only by examining how the entire parameterization 
behaves and, moreover, how the parameter value in the parameterization in the larger simulation 
model behaves. Answering such questions would require, for instance, looking at more global 
properties like mean cloud cover in tropical regions, or the amount of rain in some area. Briefly 
                                                
5
 Parameterization schemes and their more or less autonomous status are discussed in the 
literature, cf. Parker 2013, Smith 2002, or Gramelsberger and Feichter 2011. 
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stated, parameterization is a key component of climate modeling and tuning is part-and-parcel of 
parameterization.
6
 
It is important to note that tuning one parameter takes the values of other parameters as given, be 
they parameters from the same scheme, or be they parts of other schemes that are part of the 
model. A particular parameter value (controlling moisture uptake) is judged according to the 
results it yields for the overall behavior (like cloud cover). In other words, tuning is a local 
activity that is oriented at global behavior. Researchers might try to optimize parameter values 
simultaneously, but for reasons of computational complexity, this is possible only with a rather 
small subset of all parameters. A related issue is statistical regression methods that might be 
caught up in a local optimum. In climate modeling, skill and experience remain to be important 
for tuning (or adjustment). 
Furthermore, tuning parameters is not only oriented at the global model performance, it tends to 
blur the local behavior. This is because every model will be importantly imperfect, since it 
contains technical errors, works with insufficient knowledge, etc. – which is just the normal case 
in scientific practice. Now, tuning a parameter according to the overall behavior of the model 
then means that the errors, gaps, and bugs get compensated against each other (if in an opaque 
way). Mauritsen et al. (2012) have pointed this out in their pioneering paper about tuning in 
climate modeling. 
In climate models, cloud parameterizations play an important role, because they influence key 
statistics of the climate and, at the same time, cover major (remaining) uncertainties about how 
an adequate model should look like. Typically, such a parameterization scheme includes more 
than two dozens of parameters; most of them do not carry a clear physical interpretation. The 
simulation then is based on the balance of these parameters in the context of the overall model 
(including other parameterizations). Over the process of adjusting the parameters, these schemes 
become inevitably convoluted. I leave aside that models of atmosphere and oceans get coupled, 
which arguably aggravates the problem. 
                                                
6
 The studies of so-called perturbed physics ensembles convincingly showed that crucial 
properties of the simulation models hinge on exactly how parameter values are assigned 
(Stainforth et al. 2007). 
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Tuning is inevitable, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling methodology. It poses great 
challenges, like finding a good parameterization scheme for cloud dynamics, which is a recent 
area of intense research in meteorology. But when is a parameterization scheme a good one? On 
the one side, a scheme is sound when it is theoretically well motivated, on the other side, the key 
property of a parameterization scheme is its adaptability. Both criteria do not point into the same 
direction. There is, therefore, no optimum; finding a balance is still considered an art. I suspect 
that the widespread reluctance against publishing about practices of adjusting parameters comes 
from reservations against aspects that call for experience and art rather than theory and rigorous 
methodology. 
I want to maintain that nothing in the above argumentation is particular to climate. Climate 
modeling is just one example out of many. The point holds for simulation modeling quite 
generally. Admittedly, climate might be a somewhat peculiar case, because it is placed in a 
political context where some discussions seem to require that only ingredients of proven physical 
justification and realistic interpretation are admitted. Arguably, this expectation might motivate 
using the pejorative term of tuning. This reservation, however, ignores the very methodology of 
simulation modeling. Adjusting parameters is by no means particular to climate modeling, nor is 
it confined to areas where knowledge is weak. 
Another example will document this. Adjusting parameters is also occurring thermodynamics, an 
area of physics with very high theoretical reputation. The ideal gas equation is even taught in 
schools, it is a so-called equation of state (EoS) that describes how pressure and temperature 
depend on each other. However, actually using thermodynamics requires to work with less 
idealized equations of state than the ideal gas equation. More complicated equations of state find 
wide applications also in chemical engineering. They are typically very specific for certain 
substances and require extensive adjustment of parameters as Hasse and Lenhard (2017) describe 
and analyze. Clearly, being able to process specific adjustment strategies that are based on 
parameterization schemes is a crucial success condition. Simulation methods have made 
applicable thermodynamics in many areas of practical relevance, exactly because equations of 
state are tailored to particular cases of interest via adjusting parameters. 
One further example is from quantum chemistry, namely the so-called density functional theory 
(DFT), a theory developed in the 1960s that won the Nobel prize in 1998. Density functionals 
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capture the information of the Schroedinger equation, but are much more computationally 
tractable. However, only many-parameter functionals brought success in chemistry. The more 
tractable functionals with few parameters worked only in simpler cases of crystallography, but 
were unable to yield predictions accurate enough to be of chemical interest. Arguably, being able 
to include and adjust more parameters has been the crucial condition that had to be satisfied 
before DFT could gain traction in computational quantum chemistry, which happened around 
1990. This traction, however, is truly impressive. DFT is by now the most widely used theory in 
scientific practice, see Lenhard (2014) for a more detailed account of DFT and the development 
of computational chemistry. 
Whereas the adjustment of parameters – to use the more neutral terminology – is pivotal for 
matching given data, i.e. for predictive success, this very success condition also entails a serious 
disadvantage.
7
 Complicated schemes of adjusted parameters might block theoretical progress. In 
our climate case, any new cloud parameterization that intends to work with a more thorough 
theoretical understanding has to be developed for many years and then has to compete with a 
well-tuned forerunner. Again, this kind of problem is more general. In quantum chemistry, 
many-parameter adaptations of density functionals have brought great predictive success but at 
the same time render the rational re-construction of why such success occurs hard, if not 
impossible (Perdew et al. 2005, discussed in Lenhard 2014). The situation in thermodynamics is 
similar, cf. Hasse and Lenhard (2017). 
Let us take stock regarding the first argument for the erosion of modularity. Tuning, or adjusting, 
parameters is not merely an ad hoc procedure to smoothen a model, rather it is a pivotal 
component for simulation modeling. Tuning convolutes heterogeneous parts that do not have a 
common theoretical basis. Tuning proceeds holistically, on basis of global model behavior. How 
particular parts function often remains opaque. By interweaving local and global considerations, 
and by convoluting the interdependence of various parameter choices, tuning destructs 
modularity. 
Looking back to Simon’s clockmaker story, we see that its basic setting does not match the 
situation in a fundamental way. The perfect cogwheel picture is misleading, because it 
presupposes a clear identification of mechanisms and their interactions. In our examples, we saw 
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 There are other dangers, like over-fitting, that I leave aside. 
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that building a simulation model, different from building a clockwork, cannot proceed top-down. 
Moreover, different modules and their interfaces get convoluted during the processes of mutual 
adaptation. 
 
4. Erosion of modularity 2: kluging 
The second argument for the erosion of modularity approaches the matter from a different angle, 
namely from a certain practice in developing software known as kluging (also spelled kludging)
8
. 
“Kluge” is a term from colloquial language that became a term in computer slang. I remember 
when back in my childhood our family and another, befriended one drove towards holidays in 
two cars. In the middle of the night, while crossing the Alps, the exhaust pipe of our friends 
before us broke, creating a shower of sparks where the pipe met the asphalt. There was no 
chance of getting the exhaust pipe repaired, but the father did not hesitate long and used his 
necktie to fix it provisionally.  
The necktie worked as a kluge, which is in the words of Wikipedia “a workaround or quick-and-
dirty solution that is clumsy, inelegant, difficult to extend and hard to maintain, yet an effective 
and quick solution to a problem.” The notion has been incorporated and become popular in the 
language of software programming and is closely related to the notion of bricolage. 
Andy Clark, for instance, stresses the important role played by kluges in complex modular 
computer modeling. For him, a kluge is “an inelegant, ‘botched together’ piece of program; 
something functional but somehow messy and unsatisfying”, it is—Clark refers to Sloman—“a 
piece of program or machinery which works up to a point but is very complex, unprincipled in its 
design, ill-understood, hard to prove complete or sound and therefore having unknown 
limitations, and hard to maintain or extend”. (Clark 1987, 278) 
Kluges carried forward their way from programmers’ colloquial language into the body of 
philosophy guided by scholars like Clark and Wimsatt who are inspired both by computer 
                                                
8
 Both spellings „kluge“ and „kludge“ are used. There is not even agreement of how to 
pronounce the word. In a way, that fits to the very concept. I will use “kluge“, but will not 
change the habits of other authors cited with “kludge“. 
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modeling and evolutionary theory.
9
 The important point in our present context is that kluges may 
function for a whole system, i.e. for the performance of the entire simulation model, whereas it 
has no meaning in relation to the submodels and modules: “what is a kludge considered as an 
item designed to fulfill a certain role in a large system, may be no kludge at all when viewed as 
an item designed to fulfill a somewhat different role in a smaller system.“ (Clark 1987, 279) 
Since kluging stems from colloquial language and is not seen as a good practice anyway, 
examples cannot be found easily in published scientific literature. This observation 
notwithstanding, kluging is a widely occurring phenomenon. Let me give an example that I know 
from visiting an engineering laboratory. There, researchers (chemical process engineers) are 
working with simulation models of an absorption column, the large steel structures in which 
reactions take place under controlled conditions. The scientific details do not matter here, since 
the point is that the engineers build their model on the basis of a couple of already existing 
modules, including proprietary software that they integrate into their simulation without having 
access to the code. Moreover, it is common knowledge in the community that this (unknown) 
code is of poor quality. Because of programming errors and because of ill-maintained interfaces, 
using this software package requires modifications on the part of the remaining code outside the 
package. These modifications are there for no good theoretical reason, albeit for good practical 
reasons. They make the overall simulation run as expected (in known cases); and they allow 
working with existing software. The modifications thus are typical kluges. 
Again, kluging occurs in virtually every site where large software programs are built. Simulation 
models hence are a prime instance, especially when the modeling steps of one group build on the 
results (models, software packages) of other groups. One common phenomenon is the increasing 
importance of “exception handling”, i.e. of finding effective repairs when the software, or the 
model, performs in unanticipated and undesired ways. In this situation, the software might 
include a bug that is invisible (does not affect results) most of the time, but becomes effective 
under particular conditions. Often extensive testing is needed for finding out about unwanted 
behavior that occurs in rare and particular situations that are conceived of as “exceptions”, 
indicating that researchers do not aim at a major reconstruction, but at a local repair, 
                                                
9
 The cluster of notions like bricolage and kluging common in software programming and 
biological evolution would demand a separate investigation. See, as a teaser, Francois Jacob’s 
account of evolution as bricolage (1994). 
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counteracting this particular exception. Exception handling can be part of a sound design 
process, but increased use of exception handling is symptomatic of excessive kluging. 
Presumably all readers who ever contributed to a large software program know about 
experiences of this kind. It is commonly accepted that the more comprehensive a piece of 
software gets, the more energy for exception handling new releases will require. Operating 
systems of computers, for example, often receive weekly patches. Many scientists who work 
with simulations are in a similar situation, though not obviously so. 
If, for instance, meteorologists want to work on, say, hurricanes, they will likely take a meso-
scale (multi-purpose) atmospheric model from the shelf of some trusted modeling center and add 
specifications and parameterizations relevant for hurricanes. Typically, they will not know in 
exactly what respects the model had been tuned, and also lack much other knowledge about 
strengths and weaknesses of this particular model. Consequently, when preparing their hurricane 
modules, they will add measures into their new modules that somehow balance out undesired 
model behavior. These measures can also be conceived as kluges. 
Why should we see these examples as typical instances and not as exceptions? Because they 
arise from practical circumstances of developing software, which is a core part of simulation 
modeling. Software engineering is a field that was envisioned as the “professional” answer to the 
increasing complexity of software. And I frankly admit that there are well-articulated concepts 
that would in principle ensure software is clearly written, aptly modularized, well maintained, 
and superbly documented. However, the problem is that science in principle is different from 
science in practice. 
In practice, there are strong and constant forces that drive software development into resorting to 
kluges. Economic considerations are always a reason, be it on the personal scale of research 
time, be it on the grand scale of assigning teams of developers to certain tasks. Usually, software 
is developed “on the move”, i.e. those who write it have to keep up with changing requirements 
and a narrow timeline, in science as well as industry. Of course, in the ideal case the 
implementation is tightly modularized. A virtue of modularity is that it is much quicker 
incorporating “foreign” modules than developing them from scratch. 
If these modules have some deficiencies, however, the developers will usually not start a 
fundamental analysis of how unexpected deviations occurred, but rather spend their energy for 
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adapting the interfaces so that the joint model will work as anticipated in the given 
circumstances. In common language: repair, rather than replace. Examples reach from 
integrating a module of atmospheric chemistry into an existing general circulation model up to 
implementing the new version of the operating system of your computer. Working with complex 
computational and simulation models seems to require a certain division of labor and this 
division, in turn, thrives on software traveling easily. At the same time, this will provoke kluges 
on the side of those that try to connect software modules. 
Kluges thus arise from unprincipled reasons: throw-away code, made for the moment, is not 
replaced later, but becomes forgotten, buried in more code, and eventually fixed. This will lead 
to a cascade of kluges. Once there, they prompt more kluges, tending to become layered and 
entrenched.
10
  
Foote and Yoder, prominent leaders in the field of software development, give an ironic and 
funny account of how attempts to maintain a rationally designed software architecture constantly 
fail in practice. 
“While much attention has been focused on high-level software architectural patterns, what is, in 
effect, the de-facto standard software architecture is seldom discussed. This paper examines this 
most frequently deployed of software architectures: the BIG BALL OF MUD. A big ball of mud 
is a casually, even haphazardly, structured system. Its organization, if one can call it that, is 
dictated more by expediency than design. Yet, its enduring popularity cannot merely be 
indicative of a general disregard for architecture. (…) 2. Reason for degeneration: ongoing 
evolutionary pressure, piecemeal growth: Even systems with well-defined architectures are prone 
to structural erosion. The relentless onslaught of changing requirements that any successful 
system attracts can gradually undermine its structure. Systems that were once tidy become 
overgrown as piecemeal growth gradually allows elements of the system to sprawl in an 
uncontrolled fashion.” (Foote and Yoder 1999, ch. 29) 
I would like to repeat the statement from above that there is no necessity in the corruption of 
modularity and rational architecture. Again, this is a question of science in practice vs. science in 
principle. “A sustained commitment to refactoring can keep a system from subsiding into a big 
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 Wimsatt (2007) writes about “generative entrenchment” when speaking about the analogy 
between software development and biological evolution, see also Lenhard and Winsberg (2010). 
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ball of mud,” Foote and Yoder concede. There are even directions in software engineering that 
try to counteract the degradation into Foote’s and Yoder’s big ball of mud. The movement of 
“clean code“, for instance, is directed against what Foote and Yoder describe. Robert Martin, the 
pioneer of this school, proposes to keep code clean in the sense of not letting the first kluge slip 
in. And surely there is no principled reason why one should not be able to avoid this. However, 
even Martin accepts the diagnosis of current practice. 
Similarly, Richard Gabriel (1996), another guru of software engineering, makes the analogy to 
housing architecture and Alexander’s concept of “habitability”, which intends to integrate 
modularity and piecemeal growth into one “organic order”. Anyway, when describing the 
starting point, he more or less duplicates what we heard above from Foote and Yoder. 
Finally, I want to point out that the matter of kluging is related to what is discussed in philosophy 
of science under the heading of opacity (like in Humphreys 2009). Highly kluged software 
becomes opaque. One can hardly disentangle the various reasons that led to particular pieces of 
code, because kluges are sensible only in the particular context at the time. In this important 
sense, simulation models are historical objects. They carry around – and depend on – their 
history of modifications. There are interesting analogies with biological evolution that have 
become a topic when complex systems had become a major issue in discussion computer use. 
Winograd and Flores, for instance, come to a conclusion that also holds in our context here: 
“each detail may be the result of an evolved compromise between many conflicting demands. At 
times, the only explanation for the system's current form may be the appeal to this history of 
modification.“ (1991, 94)
11
 
Thus, the brief look into the somewhat elusive field of software development has shown us that 
two conditions foster kluging. First, the exchange of software parts that is more or less motivated 
by flexibility and economic requirements. This thrives on networked infrastructure. Second, 
iterations and modifications are easy and cheap. Due to the unprincipled nature of kluges, their 
construction requires repeated testing whether they actually work in the factual circumstances. 
Kluges hence fit to the exploratory and iterative mode of modeling that characterizes 
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 Interestingly, Jacob (1994) gives a very similar account of biological evolution when he writes 
that simpler objects are more dependent on (physical) constraints than on history, while history  
plays the greater part when complexity increases. 
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simulations. Furthermore, layered kluges solidify themselves. They make code hard or 
impossible to understand; modifying pieces that are individually hard to understand will 
normally lead to a new layer of kluges – and so on. Thus, kluging makes modularity erode and 
this is the second argument why simulation modeling systematically undermines modularity. 
 
5. The limits of validation 
What does the erosion of modularity mean for the validation of computer simulations? We have 
seen that the power and scope of simulation is built on the tendency toward holism. But holism 
and the erosion of modularity are two sides of the same coin. The key point regarding 
methodology is that holism is driven by the very procedure that makes simulation so widely 
applicable! It is through adjustable parameters that simulation models can be applied to systems 
beyond the control of theory (alone). It is through this very strategy that modularity erodes. 
One ramification of utmost importance is about the concept of validation. In the context of 
simulation models the community speaks of verification and validation, or “V&V”. Both are 
related, but the unanimous advice in the literature is to keep them separate. While verification 
checks the model internally, i.e. whether the software indeed captures what it is supposed to, 
validation checks whether the model adequately represents the target system. A standard 
definition states that “verification [is] the process of determining that a model implementation 
accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description of the model and the solution to the 
model.” While validation is defined as “the process of determining the degree to which a model 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the 
model.” (Oberkampf and Trucano 2000, 3) Though there is some leeway of defining V&V, you 
get the gist of it from the saying: verification checks whether the model is right
12
, while 
validation checks whether we have the right model. 
Due to the increasing usage and growing complexity of simulations, the issue of V&V is itself a 
growing field in simulation literature. One example is the voluminous monograph by Oberkampf 
and Roy (2010) that meticulously defines and discusses the various steps to be included in V&V 
procedures. A first move in this analysis is to separate model form from model parameters. Each 
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 This sloppy saying should not obscure that the process of verification comprises a package of 
demanding tasks. 
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parameter then belongs to a particular type of parameter that determines which specific steps in 
V&V are required. Oberkampf gives the following list of model parameter types: 
“  - measurable properties of the system or the surroundings, 
- physical modeling parameters, 
- ad hoc model parameters, 
- numerical algorithm parameters, 
- decision parameters, 
- uncertainty modeling parameters.” (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, section 13.5.1, p.623) 
My point is that the adjustable parameters we discussed are of a type that is evading the V&V 
fencing. These parameters cannot be kept separate from the model form, since the form alone 
does not capture representational (nor behavioral) adequacy. A cloud parameterization scheme 
makes sense only with parameter values already assigned and the same holds for a many-
parameter density functional. Before the process of adjustment, the mere form of the functional 
does not offer anything to be called adequate or inadequate. In simulation models, as we have 
seen, (predictive) success and adaptation are entangled. 
The separation of verification and validation thus cannot be fully maintained in practice. It is not 
possible to first verify that a simulation model is ‘right’ before tackling the ‘external’ question 
whether it is the right model. Performance tests hence become the main handle for confirmation. 
This is a version of confirmation holism that points toward the limits of analysis. This does not 
lead to a complete conceptual breakdown of verification and validation. Rather, holism comes in 
degrees
13
 and is a pernicious tendency that undermines the verification-validation divide.
14
  
Finally, we come back to the analogy, or rather dis-analogy between computer and clockwork. In 
an important sense, computers are not amplifiers, i.e. they are not analogous to gigantic 
clockworks. They do not (simply) amplify the force of mathematical modeling that has got stuck 
                                                
13
 I thank Rob Muir for pointing this out to me. 
14
 My conclusion about the inseparability of verification and validation is in good agreement 
with Winsberg’s more specialized claim in (2010) where he argues about model versions that 
evolve due to changing parameterizations, which has been criticized by Morrison (2015). As far 
as I can see, her arguments do not apply to the case made in this paper, which rests on a tendency 
toward holism, rather than a complete conceptual breakdown. 
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in too demanding operations. Rather, computer simulation is profoundly changing the setting of 
how mathematics is used.  
In the present paper I questioned the rational picture of design. Also Brooks did this when he 
observed that Pahl and Beitz had to include more and more steps to somehow capture an 
unwilling and complex practice of design, or when he refers to Donald Schön who criticized a 
one-sided “technical rationality” that underlies the Rational Model (Brooks 2010, chapter 2). 
However, my criticism works, if you want, from ‘within’. It is the very methodology of 
simulation modeling, and how it works in practice, that challenges the rational picture by making 
modularity erode. 
The challenge to the rational picture has quite fundamental ramification because this picture 
influenced so many ways we conceptualize our world. I will spare the philosophical discussion 
of how simulation modeling is challenging our concept of mathematization and with it our 
picture of scientific rationality for another paper. Just let me mention the philosophy of mind as 
one example. How we are inclined to think about mind today is deeply influenced by the 
computer and by our concept of mathematical modeling. Jerry Fodor has defended a most 
influential thesis that mind is composed of information-processing devices that operate largely 
separately (Fodor 1983). Consequently, re-thinking how computer models are related to 
modularity invites to re-thinking the computational theory of the mind. 
 
I would like to thank … 
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Abstract
Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism
appear to have a signicant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals.
They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to
decrease the inaccuracy of ones beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that
conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of mea-
sures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in
the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditional-
ization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from
which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based ap-
proach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.
A central concern of epistemology is uncovering the rational constraints
on an agents credences, both at a time and over time. At a time, it is typi-
cally maintained that an agents credences should conform to the probability
axioms, and over time, it is often maintained that an agents credences should
conform to conditionalization. How could such norms be justied? The tra-
ditional approach is to show that if your credences violate these norms, then
there is a set of bets, each of which you consider fair, but which collectively
are such that if you accept them all you will lose money whatever happens.
Since you do not want to be a money pump, you should adopt coherent cre-
dences. However, this Dutch book strategy rests on controversial assumptions
concerning prudential rationality and its connection to epistemic rationality.
The prudential elements may not be essential to the Dutch book approach
(Vineberg 2012). But even so, it would be better to be able to derive prob-
abilism and conditionalization from a clearly epistemic basic norm. A more
1
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recent approach seeks to do precisely that: to derive probabilism and condi-
tionalization from the intuitive epistemic norm that you should endeavor to
make your credences as accurateas close to the truthas possible. Drawing
on the work of Joyce (1998; 2009), Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Predd et
al. (2009), Pettigrew (2013) argues that the accuracy-based approach vindi-
cates both probabilism and conditionalization. We argue that this conclusion
is too strong: at present, the accuracy-based approach can vindicate either
conditionalization or probabilism, but not both.
Our argument turns on the features of various proposed measures of accu-
racy. The accuracy-based approach is predicated on the assumption that the
accuracy of your credences can be measured. Pettigrew (2013, 905) argues
that it is a strength of the accuracy-based approach that conditionalization
and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures, so that it doesnt
matter which measure is used to assess the accuracy of an agents credences.
Our counter-argument is that it does matter: of the known measures, some
vindicate conditionalization, and some vindicate probabilism, but there is
no known measure of inaccuracy from which both conditionalization and
probabilism can be derived.
1 Accuracy and conditionalization
First, let us briey run through the argument via which conditionalization
and probabilism are claimed to follow from considerations of accuracy, start-
ing with conditionalization. Suppose you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where the propositions form a parti-
tion, i.e. they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, so that exactly one of
them is true. The accuracy approach takes it that your primary epistemic
goal is having credences that are as accurate as possible, where complete ac-
curacy is a credence of 1 in the true proposition and a credence of 0 in each
of the false propositions. The closer your credences are to complete accuracy,
the better.
For this epistemic goal to make sense, we need a measure of closeness. In
what follows we will discuss several such measures, expressed as measures of
inaccuracy: the larger the measure, the further your credences are from the
truth. Hence your goal is to minimize the value of this inaccuracy measure.
By far the dominant measure in the literature is the quadratic rule or Brier
rule, which takes the square of the di¤erence between your credence in each
2
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proposition and its truth value, and sums the results. So for a partition, if
Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true, then the
Brier rule can be expressed as follows:1
Simple Brier rule: Ii(b) = (1  bi)
2 +
P
j 6=i b
2
j :
The Brier rule has been defended by epistemologists (Joyce 2009, 290; Leitgeb
and Pettigrew 2010, 219), and is frequently cited as the prime example of an
inaccuracy measure (Greaves and Wallace 2006, 627; Pettigrew 2013, 899).
Suppose you obtain evidence E that is consistent with some but not
all of the propositions X. How should you distribute your credence over
the remaining propositions? If your goal is to minimize your inaccuracy,
presumably the best you can do is to minimize your expected inaccuracy
given your prior credences b. So suppose that after you learn E, you shift
your credence in proposition Xi from bi to x. If Xi is true, the contribution
of this new credence to your overall inaccuracy is (1  x)2, and if Xi is false,
the contribution is x2. Given your prior credences b, you judge that the
chance that Xi is true is bi, and the chance that Xi is false is
P
E i bj, where
the notation E   i indicates that the sum is over all propositions consistent
with E except Xi. That is, the total contribution C of this new credence to
your expected inaccuracy is given by:
C = (1  x)2 bi + x
2
P
E i bj:
Your goal is to minimize C. So consider where dC=dx = 0:
dC
dx
=  2 (1  x) bi + 2x
P
E i bj
=  2bi + 2x
P
E bj;
where the sum in the last line is now over all propositions consistent with E.
This expression is zero when
x =
biP
E bj
:
1We call the version of the Brier rule applicable to a partition the simple Brier rule
only for ease of reference (and similarly for the simple log rule and simple spherical rule
to be introduced later).
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But note that this value for x is just your prior credence in Xi conditional
on E:
c(XijE) =
c(Xi ^ E)
c(E)
=
biP
E bj
:
That is, conditionalizing on E minimizes your expected inaccuracy.2 So if
your epistemic goal is to minimize inaccuracy, you should conditionalize on
new evidence.
Greaves and Wallace (2006) generalize this proof to cover measures of
inaccuracy other than the Brier rule. In particular, they show that condi-
tionalization minimizes expected inaccuracy for any measure of inaccuracy
Ii(b) satisfying strict propriety:
Strict propriety: For any distinct probabilistic credences b and b0,
P
i biIi(b) <P
i biIi(b
0).
Strict propriety says that the expected inaccuracy of your current credences
b is lower than the expected inaccuracy of any alternative credences b0 you
might adopt, where the expectation is calculated according to your current
credences. If it fails, then the injunction to minimize inaccuracy makes your
beliefs pathologically unstable: you can lower your expected inaccuracy by
shifting your credences, even in the absence of new evidence. Hence strict
propriety serves as a reasonable constraint on measures of inaccuracy. The
Brier rule is strictly proper, as are several other proposed inaccuracy mea-
sures to be discussed below.
Greaves and Wallace begin by introducing some terminology. They say
that a set of credences b recommends a set of credences b0 i¤ the expected
inaccuracy of b0 is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of b, where the
expectation is calculated using credences b:
Recommendation: b recommends b0 i¤
P
i biIi(b) 
P
i biIi(b
0)
Note that if the inaccuracy measure Ii(b) satises strict propriety, then b
only recommends itself.
They further dene quasi-conditionalization as a belief updating rule
that stipulates that your credences on learning E should be some set rec-
ommended by your prior credences conditional on E. They then prove
2This proof is a simplied version of the one in Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010).
4
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -374-
that quasi-conditionalization is always optimal: whatever measure of inac-
curacy you choose, strictly proper or not, the expected inaccuracy of quasi-
conditionalizing is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of any other
updating rule. Then if your measure of inaccuracy is strictly proper, con-
ditionalization itself is optimal, since for strictly proper measures, credences
only recommend themselves. In fact, since the inequality in strict propriety
is strict, conditionalization is strictly better than any other updating rule:
it uniquely minimizes expected inaccuracy. As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes,
this is a strong result: any inaccuracy measure satisfying strict propriety can
be used to vindicate conditionalization, and strict propriety is a constraint
we would expect any reasonable inaccuracy measure to obey anyway.
2 Accuracy and probabilism
Now let us turn to the arguments that your credences at a time should obey
the probability axioms. So far, we have been assuming that the propositions
we are interested in form a partition. But the probability axioms include
constraints on your credences in disjunctions, and to model such constraint
we need to allow that more than one of the propositions you are considering
can be true. To that end, suppose that you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where now the set of propositions
forms a Boolean algebra, i.e. it is closed under negation and disjunction. So
now we can no longer model a possible world simply as an index (picking
out the unique true proposition); instead, we need to label each proposition
separately as either true or false. That is, a possible world is specied by
! = (!1; !2; : : : !n), where !i = 1 when Xi is true and !i = 0 when Xi is
false. In this context, the Brier rule can be rewritten as follows:
Symmetric Brier rule: I(!;b) =
P
i (bi   !i)
2 :
As before, the inaccuracy of your beliefs according to the Brier rule is given
by the sum of the squares of the distance of each belief from the relevant
truth value. That is, the Brier rule is symmetric, in the sense that distance
from the truth for a true proposition plays the same role as distance from
falsity plays for a false proposition. This property will be important later.
The general strategy for defending probabilism based on accuracy goes as
follows. Suppose that your current credences are incoherentthat is, they
5
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Figure 1: De Finettis construction for a two-element partition (Joyce 1998,
582).
violate the probability axioms. Then one can appeal to a measure of inaccu-
racy to show that there are coherent credences that dominate your current
credencesthat are more accurate than your current credences whatever the
truth values of the propositions concerned. If your goal is to minimize in-
accuracy, this gives you a clear reason to avoid incoherent credences: there
are always coherent credences that are more accurate, whatever the world is
like.
De Finetti (1974, 87) constructs a dominance argument of this kind based
on the Brier rule.3 For illustration, consider the simple case of a proposi-
tion and its negation: that is, the propositions under consideration are just
(X;:X). In this case the space of possible credences forms a plane, as shown
in gure 1: your credence inX is the horizontal coordinate, and your credence
in :X is the vertical coordinate. The two possible worlds are represented by
the points (1; 0) and (0; 1), and your credences obey the probability axioms if
and only if they lie on the straight line that connects these two points, since
along this line your credences in X and :X sum to 1.
Suppose that your credences are incoherent: they are represented by a
point c = (c1; c2) that lies o¤ this diagonal. And suppose rst that the
3As Joyce (1998, 580) notes, de Finetti sets up this argument in terms of bets. However,
as Pettigrew (2013, 901) points out, it can be redescribed as an accuracy-based argument.
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actual world is represented by the bottom-right corner (1; 0)i.e. X is true
and :X is false. Then the inaccuracy of your credences according to the
Brier rule is I(!; c) = (1   c1)
2 + (c2)
2. Note that this is just the square of
the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (1; 0). That is, every point on the
circle segment C has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point between C
and (1; 0) has a lower inaccuracy. Now suppose instead that the actual world
is represented by the top-left corner (0; 1)i.e. X is false and :X is true.
Then the inaccuracy of your credences is I(!; c) = (c1)
2 + (1  c2)
2the
square of the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (0; 1). That is, every
point on the circle segment C 0 has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point
between C and (0; 1) has a lower inaccuracy.
Consider the area enclosed by the circle segments C and C 0. The cre-
dences represented by the points in this area have a lower inaccuracy than c
if X is true and :X false, and a lower inaccuracy than c if X is false and :X
true. That is, they have a lower inaccuracy whatever the world is like. And
this area includes part of the diagonal that represents coherent credences.
So for any incoherent set of credences, there is a coherent set that is less
inaccurate whatever the world is like. In this simple case, accuracy gives you
a motive to adopt coherent credences.
In the general case, the space of possible credences is n-dimensional, where
there are n propositions in the Boolean algebra. Each possible assignment
of truth values to the n propositions is represented by a point in this space,
and the set of coherent credences consists of these points plus the points
on the straight lines that connect them, the points on the straight lines
that connect those latter points, and so on. This set is called the convex
hull V + of the possible truth value assignments V . Via a generalization
of the construction of gure 1, de Finetti shows that if your credences are
represented by a point that lies outside V +, then there are points in V +
that are more accurate (according to the Brier rule) whichever point in the
space represents the actual truth values of the propositions. Hence if you
have incoherent credences, there are always coherent credences with a lower
inaccuracy as measured by the Brier rule.
Predd et al. (2009) generalize this proof strategy to cover a wider range
of inaccuracy measures. Their proof relies on two assumptions. The rst is
additivity:
Additivity: I(!;b) can be expressed as
P
i s(!i; bi), where s is a continuous
function of your credence in proposition Xi and its truth value.
7
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Additivity states that the inaccuracy of your beliefs in a set of propositions is
just the sum of your inaccuracies in the propositions taken individuallythat
is, s(!i; bi) is the inaccuracy of your belief in proposition Xi, and I(!;b) is
just the sum of these inaccuracies for all the propositions you are considering.
Note that it also contains the requirement that the inaccuracy measure should
be continuous. The Brier rule is obviously additive, since it is expressed as
a sum over propositions.
The second assumption is a version of strict propriety. For an additive
inaccuracy measure, strict propriety can be expressed in terms of your inac-
curacy function for a single proposition s(bi; !i) as follows:
Strict propriety (for an additive measure): bis(x; 1)+(1  bi)s(x; 0) is
uniquely minimized at x = bi.
Predd et al. (2009) prove that any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy
measure entails probabilism. De Finettis construction appeals to the natural
distance measure implicit in the Brier rulethe Euclidean distance between
two points in the space of your possible credences. But in the current case
we have no explicit measure of inaccuracy, so Predd et al. appeal to a
generalized distance measure4 called the Bregman divergence, dened for
a strictly convex function (x) as d(y;x) = (y) (x) r(x)  (y x).
They show that if the inaccuracy measure s(bi; !i) for a single proposition
Xi is strictly proper, then the function '(bi) =  bis(bi; 1)   (1   bi)s(bi; 0)
is strictly convex. In terms of this function, Predd et al. show that for
any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy measure, I(!;b) = d(!;b), where
(!) =
P
i '(!i) and (b) =
P
i '(bi).
The set of coherent credences forms a closed, convex subspace V + of
the space of all possible credences. It is a fact from the theory of Bregman
divergences that for any point c outside V +, there is a unique point c in
V + such that d(c
; c)  d(y; c) for all y in V
+. That is, c is the unique
closest point in V + to c, using the Bregman divergence as a distance measure.
It is a further fact that d(y; c
)  d(y; c)   d(c
; c) for all y in V + and
c outside V +. Note in particular that V + contains every possible world !,
since a consistent truth value assignment is also a coherent set of credences.
So setting y = !, we have d(!; c
)  d(!; c)   d(c
; c). Since d is a
positive-valued function, d(c
; c) > 0, so d(!; c
) < d(!; c), and hence
4The reason for the scare quotes is that the Bregman divergence is not symmetric, and
distance measures are typically symmetric.
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I(!; c) < I(!; c). That is, for any incoherent set of credences c, there is a
coherent set c that is less inaccurate than c in every possible world.
As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes, this is a strong result: any inaccuracy
measure satisfying strict propriety and additivity can be used to vindicate
probabilism, and while additivity is perhaps not forced on us in the way
that strict propriety is, it is certainly intuitive. As we shall see, there are
several available measures satisfying additivity and strict propriety, so it
initially looks like the accuracy-based program can justify both probabilism
and conditionalization based on minimal premises. Our purpose in this paper
is to argue that matters are not so straightforward.
3 Measures of inaccuracy
Let us return to the argument for conditionalization. This argument restricts
inaccuracy measures to those that are strictly proper. Note that strict pro-
priety is only a condition on expected inaccuracy. But expected inaccuracy is
calculated on the basis of the actual inaccuracy that the measure in question
ascribes to credences, and presumably there are a number of constraints any
such measure must obey if it is to genuinely measure epistemic inaccuracy
rather than something else. For example, if one of your credences shifts to-
wards the truth, while your other credences stay the same, then clearly your
actual inaccuracy should decrease. We wish to focus on one such constraint.
The constraint can be motivated by thinking about elimination cases.
Suppose you are considering a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
propositions, and suppose that your credences are coherent and that you
conditionalize on evidence. You acquire some evidence that eliminates one
false propositionyour credence in it becomes zerobut is uninformative
regarding the other hypothesesyour credences in them remain in the same
proportions. How does this a¤ect the accuracy of your credences?
It seems obvious that your beliefs have become more accurate. If you
believe that Tom, Dick or Harry might be the murderer (when in fact Tom
did it), and you eliminate Harry while learning nothing about Tom or Dick,
then you have made epistemic progress towards the truth, or at least away
from falsity. It is true that your credence in the false proposition Dick did
it goes up, but only by the same proportion that your credence in the true
proposition Tom did it goes up.
Unfortunately, the simple Brier rule does not always concur. Let X1 be
9
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Tom did it, X2 be Dick did it, and X3 be Harry did it, where unknown
to you X1 is true. Suppose that your initial credences in (X1; X2; X3) are
b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7). Then according to the simple Brier rule, your initial
inaccuracy is 54=49 = 1:10. Now suppose you acquire some evidence that
eliminates X3, but is uninformative regarding X1 and X2. That is, your
credence in X3 becomes 0 and your credences in X1 and X2 stay in the
same proportions, so that your nal credences are b = (1=4; 3=4; 0). Then
according to the simple Brier rule, your nal inaccuracy is 18=16 = 1:13.
That is, the Brier rule erroneously says that the inaccuracy of your beliefs
has gone up.
For a measure to genuinely measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs,
it should not be susceptible to counterexamples of this kind; it should count
elimination cases as epistemically positive. That is, measures of inaccuracy
should obey the following principle:
M: For coherent credences over a partition, if b assigns a zero credence
to some false proposition to which b0 assigns a non-zero credence, and
credences in the remaining propositions stay in in the same ratios, then
b is epistemically better than b0.
The simple Brier rule, as the example shows, violates M, and hence does not
plausibly measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs.5
Fortunately, though, there are alternative inaccuracy measures for parti-
tions we can appeal to. The two most frequently mentioned are the simple
log rule and the simple spherical rule:
Simple log rule: Ii(b) =   ln bi
Simple spherical rule: Ii(b) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j :
As before, Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true.
Both of these measures satisfy M, and hence are not susceptible to elimination
counterexamples.6 Hence each can plausibly be claimed to measure epistemic
inaccuracy. Furthermore, each is strictly proper, and so each can be used to
5One might reasonably think that acceptable measures of accuracy should obey a
stronger principle than M; see (reference removed).
6This is trivial for the log rule, and easily proven for the spherical rule. See (reference
removed).
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underwrite conditionalization via the above argument strategy. So there
are some inaccuracy measures that vindicate conditionalization, but not all
strictly proper measures do so. In particular, the simple Brier rule cannot
be used to vindicate conditionalization.
But what about probabilism? The simple log rule and simple spherical
rule are not applicable to a Boolean algebra, and so cannot be used to prove
probabilism as they stand. Perhaps the most straightforward way to general-
ize them is simply to sum the contribution given by the simple rule for each
true proposition in the Boolean algebra, while ignoring the false propositions
in the algebra:
Asymmetric log rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0 and
F (1; bi) =   ln bi.
Asymmetric spherical rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0
and F (1; bi) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j .
Both these rules are asymmetric, in the sense that inaccuracy is calculated
di¤erently for true and false propositions. These rules satisfy principle M:
for coherent credences, if your credence in a false proposition goes down and
your remaining credences stay in the same ratios, then your credence in each
true proposition goes up, and so your inaccuracy according to the relevant
asymmetric rules goes down. Hence the asymmetric log and spherical rules
are immune from elimination counterexamples.
But these rules do not satisfy the combination of additivity and strict
propriety required for the proof of probabilism. The asymmetric spherical
rule is not additive: F (1; bi) is not a function of bi alone. The asymmetric
log rule is additive, but it is not strictly proper in the required sense: F (1; bi)
is strictly proper, but F (0; bi) is not. Indeed, it is straightforward to show
directly that these rules cannot be used as the basis of a dominance argu-
ment for probabilism. Consider, for example, a two element partition, and
the incoherent credence assignment (1; 1). The asymmetric log rule counts
these incoherent credences as perfectly accurate (since the credence in the
false proposition is ignored), so no coherent credences can dominate them.
According to the asymmetric spherical rule, multiplying all credences by a
constant has no e¤ect on inaccuracy, so this assignment has the same inaccu-
racy as the coherent credence assignment (1=2; 1=2). If coherent assignments
cannot be dominated, then neither can the initial incoherent assignment.
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But if coherent assignments can be dominated then the dominance proof of
probabilism fails anyway.
So the asymmetric versions of the log rule and the spherical rule cannot
be used to prove probabilism. But for a Boolean algebra, the log rule and
the spherical rule are usually given a formulation that is symmetric between
truth and falsity:
Symmetric log rule: I(!;b) =
P
i  ln j(1  !i)  bij
Symmetric spherical rule: I(!;b) =
P
i 1 
j(1  !i)  bijp
b2i + (1  bi)
2
(see e.g. Joyce 2009, 275). These measures are additive, and each term in
the sum is individually strictly proper, so they can each be used to prove
probabilism via the proof of Predd et al.
But unfortunately, in their symmetric forms all three rulesBrier, log and
sphericalare subject to elimination counterexamples. For the Brier rule, the
counterexample is the same as before, since the symmetric Brier rule reduces
to the simple Brier rule when applied to a partition.7 That is, consider a
credence shift from b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7) to b = (1=4; 3=4; 0) when X1 is true.
According to the symmetric Brier rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1:10, and
your nal inaccuracy is 1:13, so your inaccuracy goes up. And this example
works equally well against the symmetric spherical rule: according to this
rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1.24 and your nal inaccuracy is 1.37, so your
inaccuracy goes up. This particular counterexample does not work against
the symmetric log rule, but a similar one does. Suppose your initial credences
are b = (1=13; 6=13; 6=13), and your nal credences are b = (1=7; 6=7; 0).
Then according to the symmetric log rule your initial inaccuracy is 3.80, and
your nal inaccuracy is 3.89: your inaccuracy goes up. Hence the symmetric
measures all violate principle M, and so none of them can be used to prove
conditionalization.
7Strictly, applying these rules to a Boolean algebra requires including credences in the
negations :X1, :X2 and :X3, plus the tautology X1 _ X2 _ X3 and the contradiction
:(X1 _ X2 _ X3). But for coherent credences the inaccuracies of the tautology and the
contradiction are zero, and for symmetric rules the inaccuracy of :Xi is the same as that
of Xi, so the inaccuracy calculated over the entire Boolean algebra is simply twice the
inaccuracy over the partition (X1; X2; X3).
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4 The extent of the problem
Let us sum up. The simple Brier rule cannot be used to prove conditionaliza-
tion, but the simple log and spherical rules can. The obvious generalizations
of the simple log and spherical rules to a Boolean algebrathe asymmetric
log and spherical rulescannot be used to prove probabilism. The symmet-
ric Brier, log and spherical rules can be used to prove probabilism, but none
of them underwrites conditionalization. So we have found no measure that
can be used to prove both conditionalization and probabilism.
Could there be such a measure? Perhaps, although it is worth noting
that one can prove that any inaccuracy measure that satises additivity,
strict propriety and a plausible symmetry principle is subject to elimina-
tion counterexamples. The symmetry principle is precisely the one discussed
abovethat the inaccuracy measure treats truth the same as falsity, in the
sense that it is a function of the distance between each credence and its
respective truth value. For an additive inaccuracy measure, the symmetry
principle can be expressed in terms of the inaccuracy function for a single
proposition s(!i; bi) as follows:
Symmetry: s(!i; bi) = s(j1  !ij ; j1  bij):
It is certainly highly plausible that this is part of what it means for s to
measure your distance from the truth, and as discussed above, the typical
Boolean algebra forms of the Brier rule, log rule and spherical rule all satisfy
it.
Let us see how this symmetry principle, together with additivity and strict
propriety, lead to elimination counterexamples. Consider a single proposition
Xi in which your credence is bi = 1=2. According to strict propriety, the
quantity (1=2)s(1; x) + (1=2)s(0; x) must be uniquely minimized at x = 1=2.
In particular, the value of this expression for x = 1=2 must be lower than its
value for x = 1:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1) + (1=2)s(0; 1);
and for x = 0:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 0) + (1=2)s(0; 0):
Adding these:
s(1; 1=2)+ s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1)+(1=2)s(0; 1)+(1=2)s(1; 0)+(1=2)s(0; 0):
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But by symmetry, s(1; 1=2) = s(0; 1=2), s(1; 1) = s(0; 0) and s(0; 1) = s(1; 0).
Substituting:
2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0):
Now consider your credences in three exhaustive and mutually exclusive
propositions X = (X1; X2; X3). Consider in particular the credence shift
from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to b = (0; 1; 0) for truth values ! = (1; 0; 0). By
separability, I(!;m) = s(1; 0) + 2s(0; 1=2), and I(!;b) = s(1; 0) + s(0; 1) +
s(0; 0). So since 2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0) it follows that I(!;m) <
I(!;b): your inaccuracy goes up. But the shift from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to
b = (0; 1; 0) is an elimination case: a false proposition is eliminated, and your
credences in the remaining hypotheses stay in the same proportions. And lest
one worry about the fact that your initial credence in the true proposition
is zero, we can modify the example. Consider the credence assignments
m0 = (=(2 + ); 1=(2 + ); 1=(2 + )) and b0 = (=(1 + ); 1=(1 + ); 0). For
small  these are close to m and b, and hence by the continuity clause of
additivity, the inaccuracy of m0 remains lower than that of b0. Again, the
transition fromm0 to b0 is an elimination case, and now your credence in the
true proposition is non-zero.
So elimination counterexamples a­ict any inaccuracy measure that satis-
es additivity, strict propriety and symmetry. That is, any symmetric mea-
sure that satises the assumptions of Predd et al.s proof of probabilism
violates principle M, and hence cannot be used to prove conditionalization.
Symmetry is not a premise in the Predd argument, so it is possible that an
asymmetric measure might allow the derivation of both probabilism and con-
ditionalization. But the only plausible asymmetric measure in the literature
is the log rule (Bernardo 1979), and we have seen that the asymmetric log
rule does not vindicate probabilism.
5 Conclusion
Pettigrew notes that conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide
range of measures of inaccuracy, and the implication is that it doesnt much
matter which measure you pick. But we think it does matter. There are mea-
sures that vindicate conditionalization, and there are measures that vindicate
probabilism, but nobody has yet identied a measure that vindicates both.
Hence the accuracy-based approach does not, as yet, give us the justication
we might want for the constraints on our credences.
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Can Typicality Arguments Dissolve
Cosmology’s Flatness Problem?
C.D. McCoy∗
20 February 2016
Abstract
The flatness problem in cosmology draws attention to a surprising fine-tuning of the spatial geometry of
our universe towards flatness. Several physicists, among them Hawking, Page, Coule, and Carroll, have
argued against the probabilistic intuitions underlying such fine-tuning arguments in cosmology and instead
propose that the canonical measure on the phase space of Friedman-Robertson-Walker spacetimes should
be used to evaluate fine-tuning. They claim that flat spacetimes in this set are actually typical on this
natural measure and that therefore the flatness problem is illusory. I argue that they misinterpret typicality
in this phase space and, moreover, that no conclusion can be drawn at all about the flatness problem by
using the canonical measure alone.
For several decades now cosmologists have maintained that the old standard model of cosmology, the highly
successful hot big bang (HBB) model, suffers from various fine-tuning problems (Dicke and Peebles, 1979;
Linde, 1984). They claim that the spacetimes on which the HBB model is based, the Friedman-Robertson-
Walker (FRW) spacetimes, require seemingly “special” initial conditions, such that when they are evolved
forward in time by the dynamical law of the general theory of relativity (GTR) they yield presently observed
cosmological conditions. For example, the flatness problem depends on the existence of special initial
conditions in the HBB model which are required to explain the observationally-inferred spatial flatness of
the universe. Due to their extreme precision or intuitive “unlikeliness,” these initial conditions are thought
to be unduly special, such that many cosmologists have felt that the initial conditions themselves are in need
of explanation and, moreover, present a significant conceptual problem for the HBB model.
Although physical fine-tuning could be interpreted in a variety of ways, cosmologists typically under-
stand it to mean that observationally-required initial conditions are in some sense unlikely (Smeenk, 2013;
McCoy, 2015). In order to substantiate this interpretation, one must show that initial conditions in the HBB
model which reproduce present conditions are in fact unlikely. This task presupposes that there is a justi-
fiable way of assessing the likelihoods of cosmological models (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page,
1988). Many arguments found in the cosmological literature, however, rely on ad hoc, unjustified likelihood
measures. Gibbons et al. (1987) propose a “natural” measure (hence the GHS measure) on the set of FRW
spacetimes (with matter contents represented by a scalar field) as a natural and justified way of evaluating
likelihoods. The GHS measure is simply the canonical Liouville measure associated with the phase space of
FRW spacetimes when GTR is put into a Hamiltonian formulation and in a precise sense “comes for free”
with the phase space.
While I would maintain that the GHSmeasure cannot be successfully used to make arguments about fine-
tuning in cosmology quite generally, I argue here only for its inapplicability to the flatness problem. Some
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authors (Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010) have attempted to make probabilistic arguments,
in analogy to familiar probabilistic arguments in statistical mechanics, by making the GHS measure into a
probability measure. However, as the total measure of the FRW phase space is infinite, there is no canonical
choice of probability measure with which to make probabilistic arguments, a point that has been recognized
already by some (Hawking and Page, 1988; Schiffrin and Wald, 2012). Accordingly, any justification of a
particular probability measure is completely independent of the justification of the GHS measure—in short,
these probability measures are not in any substantive sense the GHS measure. On the other hand, one
might try to use the GHS measure by itself to make typicality arguments in analogy to typicality arguments
in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012). Carroll in particular advocates this approach and, interestingly,
claims that the GHS measure alone tells us that almost all spacetimes are spatially flat (Carroll and Tam,
2010; Remmen and Carroll, 2013; Carroll, forthcoming)—that there is in fact no flatness problem (Hawking
and Page (1988, 803-4) and Coule (1995, 468) suggest the same). Carroll’s claim, however, rests on a subtle
mistake in interpreting typicality. I claim, on the contrary, that the GHS measure cannot tell us anything
about likelihood without substantive additional assumptions such as those made in statistical mechanics,
e.g. a partition of phase space into “macroproperties” or similar. These necessary assumptions, however, are
doubtfully justifiable in the cosmological context. Thus I ultimately conclude that the GHS measure cannot
be used to clarify the nature of fine-tuning in cosmology.
1 The Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart Measure
An adequate view of what the GHS measure is and can do relies on understanding the details of how it is
introduced. For this reason I develop here the measure with considerably more care than other accounts
in the literature, which tend to jump straight to a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian formulation of GTR without
elucidating the geometrical origin of their variable choices and the relations between physical parameters.
My starting point is the initial value formulation of GTR, in which the “position” initial data of space-
time are represented by the spatial metric hab on a spacelike Cauchy surface Σ and the “momentum” initial
data by the extrinsic curvature πab (Wald, 1984; Malament, 2012). FRW spacetimes are spacetimes with
homogeneous and isotropic spacelike hypersurfaces, so one can foliate the spacetimes by a one-parameter
family of these spacelike hypersurfaces Σt that are orthogonal to a smooth, future-directed, twist-free, unit
timelike field ξa on M, where I define ξa = ∇at.For FRW spacetimes the extrinsic curvature of an initial data
surface Σt is Hhab, where H is the so-called Hubble parameter.Thus the initial data for an FRW spacetime are
completely represented by two objects: (1) the spatial metric hab and (2) the Hubble parameter H associated
with a spatial hypersurface Σ.
The space of initial data is therefore the product of the set of homogeneous and isotropic Riemannian
manifolds Σ (with metric hab) and the set of (real-valued) Hubble parameters H. Homogeneous and isotropic
Riemannian manifolds have constant curvature κ. Complete, connected Riemannian manifolds of constant
sectional curvature are called space forms. It is a theorem that every simply-connected three-dimensional
space form is isometric to the sphere S 3(
√
(1/κ)) if κ > 0, R3 if κ = 0, or the hyperbolic space H3(
√
(1/κ)) if
κ < 0 (Wolf, 2010). The standard metrics on each of these manifolds is understood to be the metric induced
on them by embedding them in R4. Every Σ is therefore isometric to one of these three classes of space
forms. Spaceforms of each of the three kinds are moreover homothetic, i.e. they are isometric up to the
square of a scale factor a (McCabe, 2004). Accordingly one has the means to represent curvature κ as a
function of the scale factor; in particular, for any Σ, a2κ is some constant k. Hence one can set any spatial
metric hab = a
2γab, where γab is the standard metric on the appropriate space form. This is useful in the
initial value formulation of FRW spacetimes because all time dependence of hab is thereby located solely in
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the scale factor rather than in the radius of curvature of the space form.
The Einstein equation reduces to two constraint equations and two evolution equations in the initial value
formulation (Geroch, 1972):
R − (π aa )2 + πabπab = −16πTabξaξb; (1)
Dcπ
c
a − Daπ cc = 8πTmrhmaξr; (2)
£ξ(πab) = 2π
c
a πcb − πccπab + Rab − 8πh ma hnb(Tmn −
1
2
Thmn); (3)
£ξ(hab) = 2πab, (4)
where R is the Ricci scalar of Σ, Rab is the Ricci tensor of Σ, and Da is the derivative operator on Σ. For
FRW spacetimes, these equations simplify to the following three (the second equation from above is trivial
since πab does not vary across Σ:
R − 6H2 = −16πρ; (5)
H˙hab =
(
− H2 − 4π
3
(ρ + 3p)
)
hab; (6)
h˙ab = 2Hhab, (7)
where ρ is the energy density and p the pressure of the matter. The first two equations are known as the
Friedman equations. Since hab = a
2γab, h˙ab = 2aa˙γab, and 2Hhab = 2Ha
2γab, it follows from the third
equation above that
H =
a˙
a
, (8)
which is the usual definition of the Hubble parameter H. To simplify matters somewhat and to make contact
with the literature, I shall henceforth take the matter contents of spacetime to be a scalar field φ in a potential
V which evolves according to the coupled Einstein-Klein Gordon equation.1 Then one has the following
equations of motion (Hawking and Page, 1988, 790):
R − 6H2 = −16π
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
(9)
H˙ = −H2 − 8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
(10)
φ¨ + 3Hφ˙ + V ′(φ) = 0, (11)
where V ′ is the derivative of the potential with respect to φ.2 (The third equation can be derived from the
previous two, and so is in fact redundant.)
For FRW spacetimes the spatial Ricci scalar is R = −6κ. As noted before, one can cast κ in terms of the
scale factor and a constant k: κ = k/a2. By using the scale factor a to replace κ, one has introduced a constant
k which has no physical significance beyond identifying whether the space form is flat, positively-curved, or
negatively-curved. One therefore usually takes equivalence classes of curves according to these three cases
and chooses k = +1, 0, and −1 as representatives. Then one may write R = −6k/a2, so that one finally has
Friedman’s equation in its usual form (for a scalar field in a potential):
(
a˙
a
)2
=
8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
− k
a2
. (12)
1The scalar field is meant to be the inflaton, the field that drives inflation in the early universe.
2If our interest were solely in assessing the HBB model’s fine-tuning, one could do the following analysis for perfect fluid matter
contents. The results would be qualitatively similar however, as shown by Carroll and Tam (2010, §4.2).
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The foregoing indicates that our FRW initial data hab and πab are equivalently representable in the space
{a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. This space is not the space of initial data, however, since the previous equation is a constraint
that must be satisfied by initial data. One must also keep in mind that k is an index for three separate copies
of the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙}. There is no continuous path between the three spaces.
Have identified the relevant spaces for representing FRW space forms, I next put the theory into a Hamil-
tonian formulation (Wald, 1984, Appendix E) in order to obtain a symplectic structure and, hence, the canon-
ical measure. I begin with the Lagrangian for our theory of FRW spacetimes with a scalar field as the matter
contents, where I have re-introduced the lapse function N as a Lagrange multiplier:
L = √−g
(
R
16π
+
1
2N2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
. (13)
In terms of the variables I have chosen, this is
L = − 1
8π
(
3
N
aa˙2 − 3Na3 k
a2
) +
1
2N
a3φ˙2 − Na3V(φ), (14)
in agreement with (Hawking and Page, 1988; Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010). The
momenta of a and φ are
pa ≡ ∂L
∂a˙
=
−3aa˙
4πN
; pφ ≡ ∂L
∂φ
=
a3φ˙
N
. (15)
The Hamiltonian on this phase space is
H = paa˙ + pφφ˙ − L = N
(
− 2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
)
, (16)
from which one recovers (after setting N = 1) our constraint (the Friedman equation) as the Hamiltonian
constraint C:
C ≡ −2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
= 0. (17)
The phase space γ of our system is thus the four-dimensional space {a, pa, φ, pφ} equipped with the canonical
symplectic form
ωpa,a,pφ,φ = dpa ∧ da + dpφ ∧ dφ. (18)
The dynamically accessible phase space points are constrained to be on the three-dimensional hypersur-
face C. Thus it would be inappropriate to use ω for constructing a canonical volume measure on phase space.
One can, however, pull the symplectic form back onto the constraint surface by first solving the constraint
for pφ:
3
pφ = a
3
(
4π
3
p2a
a4
+
3
4π
k
a2
− 2V(φ)
)1/2
. (19)
Following Carroll and Tam, I also switch coordinates from pa to H, so that
pφ = a
3
(
3
4π
(H2 + k/a2) − 2V(φ)
)1/2
(20)
3The scalar field can have positive or negative momentum, so strictly speaking there should be a ± in the following equation. The
reader is welcome to annotate the equations that follow.
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and
dpa = − 3
4π
(
2aHda + a2dH
)
. (21)
The differential of pφ is then
dpφ =
(3/4π)a3HdH − a3V ′dφ + 6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)da
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (22)
Substituting these into ω then gives the pullback of the symplectic form onto C. The result is the following
(pre-symplectic) differential form:
ωa,H,φ = ΘHa(dH ∧ da) + ΘHφ(dH ∧ dφ) + Θaφ(da ∧ dφ), (23)
where
ΘHa = − 3
4π
a2; (24)
ΘHφ =
(3/4π)a3H
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 ; (25)
Θaφ =
6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (26)
This form is not symplectic (it is degenerate), so one cannot construct a natural volume measure on C.
Ideally, the “real” phase space of our system would be given by “solving the dynamics,” and then taking
equivalence classes of phase points that are part of the same trajectory. In this way one would obtain the
space of motions, onto which one could then pull back the degenerate form to obtain a new symplectic form
(of degree two less than ω) and construct a canonical measure. This is quite complicated in general due to
the differential equation that must be solved. The usual approach to take instead is to set H to some value
H∗ in the differential form and define their measure accordingly, i.e. set
dΩ = ωa,H,φ|H=H∗ = Θaφ|H=H∗dadφ. (27)
One may do this because surfaces of constant Hubble parameter in phase space are transverse to temporal
evolution, and the measure is preserved under translation of these surfaces along the Hamiltonian flow.
Finally, one may naturally define the GHS measure µGHS on Lebesgue measurable sets U by
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
a2
(3H2∗ + 2k/a
2)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + k/a2) − 2V)1/2
dadφ. (28)
This expression of the GHS measure is equivalent to those derived in (Carroll and Tam, 2010; Schiffrin and
Wald, 2012).4
4There are some complications with the k = 1 case. See (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012, 8) for the details. I have however chosen not
to set 8πG = 1, but rather maintained consistency with the rest of this dissertation’s use of “geometrical units” by only setting G = 1.
Gibbons et al. (1987) use a simplifying, but less transparent coordinate choice. They also choose to investigate only the special case
where V = m2φ2/2. It can be shown with some work that their expression is equivalent to this one as well with this potential.
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2 The Flatness Problem
The GHS measure clearly diverges for large scale factors, a point originally recognized by Gibbons et al.
(1987, 745); it also converges to 0 for small scale factors. Due to the divergence, one may readily say that,
given any choice of Hubble parameter H∗, almost all spacetimes will have a “large” scale factor. More
precisely, pick any scale factor a∗; the set of spacetimes with a < a∗ is a negligible set: the total measure of
this set is finite whereas the total measure of its complement is infinite. What is the significance of this fact
about the GHS measure, specifically for the flatness problem?
Hawking and Page (1988, 803-4) suggest the following:
“Thus for arbitrarily large expansions (and long times), and for arbitrarily low values of the en-
ergy density, the canonical measure implies that almost all solutions of the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker scalar equations have negligible spatial curvature and hence behave as k = 0 models. In
this way a uniform probability distribution in the canonical measure would explain the flatness
problem of cosmology...”
By “arbitrarily large expansions” (and “arbitrarily low values of energy density”), they appear to mean
the following. Pick any arbitrary a∗ (and any arbitrary φ∗).5 According to the GHS measure almost all
spacetimes have a > a∗ (and φ > φ∗), or, equivalently, the spacetimes with a < a∗ (and φ < φ∗) compose a
negligible set. Furthermore, since this holds for any choice of a∗, one may infer that almost all spacetimes
are arbitrarily close to having κ = 0 (since κ = k/a2) in exactly the same sense. It is perhaps somewhat
misleading to say that curved FRW spacetimes with large scale factors “behave as k = 0 models;” the
curvature does not change in such models. It is, however, surely false to say that a “uniform probability
distribution” with respect to the GHS measure would explain the flatness problem of cosmology. There is in
fact no such uniform probability distribution, since the GHS measure is not finite. Moroever, there is also no
canonical probability distribution ρ at all which would make U 7→
∫
U
ρdΩGHS into a probability measure—
one has to make a choice in order to obtain a probability measure in the case of infinite total measure, a
choice which appears completely arbitrary in this context.
Carroll and Tam (2010, 14) invite us to consider the question in more “physically transparent” terms by
looking at the curvature κ, which I previously exchanged in favor of the scale factor a when deriving the
GHS measure. One can recast the scale factor a as the curvature κ using the relation from before, namely
κ = k/a2. (Note especially that this switch maps the entire set of scale factors for the k = 0 case to the single
point κ = 0.) One then defines the GHS measure (at least for curved FRW spacetimes) by the map
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
1
|κ|5/2
(3H2∗ + 2κ)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + κ) − 2V)1/2
dκdφ. (29)
It is clear that the measure diverges for small values of curvature, i.e. curvatures close to flat, due to the
curvature term in the denominator. This is pointed out by Carroll and Tam (2010, 15). They suggest the
following interpretation of this fact:
“Considering first the measure on purely Robertson-Walker cosmologies (without perturba-
tions) as a function of spatial curvature, there is a divergence at zero curvature. In other words,
curved [FRW] cosmologies are a set of measure zero—the flatness problem, as conventionally
understood, does not exist.”
5Gibbons and Turok (2008, 6) point out that φ is always bounded given H∗, so it is not really necessary to pick an arbitrary φ∗.
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As stated these claims are highly suspect.
Firstly, Carroll and Tam assert that all values of their curvature coordinate Ωk (essentially equivalent to
κ) can be integrated over. While this is perhaps true, portraying the phase space in terms of curvature is
misleading. For curved FRW spacetimes, it is true that the measure diverges for small values of curvature
κ, as I indicate above and as Hawking and Page suggest in the passage from their paper quoted above. The
recast measure, however, is infinite at zero curvature because the entire set of k = 0 scale factors is mapped
to κ = 0. The GHS measure diverges for large scale factors in the case of flat FRW spacetimes just as it
does for curved FRW spacetime. Thus it is misleading to describe a “divergence at zero curvature;” there is
nothing special going on in flat FRW spacetimes (at least in this respect).6
Secondly (and relatedly), curved FRW spacetimes are clearly not a set of measure zero—at least accord-
ing to the GHS measure. The initial data of FRW spacetimes is representable in the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. The
curvature constant k serves as an index for three different phase spaces, each of which has an infinite total
measure—even after taking into account constraints and choosing a hypersurface in the constraint surface
according to GHS’s procedure. The unboundedness of the total phase space measure for each kind of FRW
spacetime is due, again, to the unbounded range of the scale factor Schiffrin and Wald (2012, 11).7 This is
quite plain when one expresses the GHS measure in terms of the scale factor. Transforming to the curvature
coordinate κ should not change the fact that the total measure of each phase space is infinite. So, while it
is true that the GHS measure attributes infinite measure to flat FRW spacetimes (as Carroll and Tam appear
to recognize), it also does so both to positively curved FRW spacetimes and to negatively curved space-
times. Therefore it is false that the curved FRW cosmologies are a set of measure zero according to the GHS
measure; hence one cannot conclude on this basis that the flatness problem does not exist.
One might try to rescue Carroll and Tam’s claim about the flatness problem by interpreting flatness
more broadly, namely by including “nearly flat” curved spacetimes. This requires specifying what the set
of “nearly flat” curved spacetimes is to be, e.g. a specification of the set of spacetimes with curvature less
than some κ∗ (at some time corresponding to Hubble parameter H∗). Almost all spacetimes will have a
“small” curvature κ in comparison to this curvature κ∗. In other words, the set of spacetimes with κ > κ∗ is a
negligible set. Since our universe’s spatial curvature is thought to be “nearly flat,” i.e. it should be less than
κ∗ (whatever it is), it follows from this argument that our universe is actually typical, contra what is assumed
in the flatness problem. Unfortunately this argument does not follow from the GHS measure alone, since one
had to make an independent choice in choosing κ∗, a choice that is not natural in any clear sense whatever.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that there is any reasonable argument to justify a choice of κ∗—an explication of
“close to flat” in the context of FRW models; it appears to be a completely arbitrary choice.
Here is a slightly different tack into the same stiff headwind. Suppose κ∗ is the (non-zero) spatial curva-
ture of our universe at the present time. The GHS measure can be used to infer that almost all spacetimes
with the same Hubble parameter will have flatter spatial curvatures. In such circumstances, one might be in-
clined to wonder “Why is my universe’s spatial curvature so large? It seems like it ought to be much smaller
if my universe is typical!” On this line of thought, it seems like one actually has a curvature problem rather
than a flatness problem. Of course one would say this for any κ∗ whatsoever, regardless of its magnitude,
6Carroll and Tam appear to equivocate several times between there being a divergence at κ = 0 and the measure diverging as κ → 0:
“The integral diverges near [κ = 0], which is certainly a physically allowed region of parameter space” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17);
“The measure diverges on flat universes” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 28).
7Besides in (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012), this fact is correctly pointed out in (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page, 1988). While
Carroll and Tam (2010, 20-1) observe that “this divergence was noted in the original GHS paper, where it was attributed to ‘universes
with very large scale factors’ due to a different choice of variables,” they object to this as an interpretation: “This is not the most
physically transparent characterization, as any open universe will eventually have a large scale factor.” For this reason they exchange
the scale factor for curvature; it is not clear, however, how this characterization is more physically transparent since it amounts to the
same thing.
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so it is not clear how one would ever be in the position to be satisified with one’s curvature in an FRW
universe—at least insofar as one expects things in our universe to be typical (in accord with Copernican
principle-style reasoning). No matter. The measure suggests this question. What is the answer?
The answer is that the curvature depends on the actual dynamical history of the universe, and so it has no
explanation within the context of the HBB model (apart from one depending on an initial condition). That
answer may be unsatisfying, but the question is a bad one anyway, driven by misleading intuitions. There is
no such thing as a typical FRW spacetime, and the GHS measure is not going to explain why the universe’s
curvature is what it is. This kind of thinking is clearly motivated by supposing that the GHS measure can be
used as a likelihood measure, as Carroll and Tam clearly do:
“When we consider questions of fine-tuning, however, we are comparing the real world to what
we think a randomly-chosen history of the universe would be like” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 11).
Some popular, specious conceptions (in physics and beyond) of statistical mechanics encourage this line
of thought. Putatively successful typicality arguments in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012) depend,
however, not only on having a phase space measure, but also on both the dynamics of the system and on
a specification of macroproperties or macrostates (defined as regions of phase space) (Frigg, 2009; Frigg
and Werndl, 2012). Accordingly, any claim of fine-tuning in FRW spacetimes on the sole basis of the GHS
measure (which does at least incorporate the FRW dynamics) is bound to miss the mark without additional
assumptions (such as a well-motivated standard of flatness).
Gibbons and Turok (2008) take a different approach from Carroll and Tam. They correctly observe that
universes with large scale factors are universes with small spatial curvatures. They then claim that the scale
factor is neither “geometrically meaningful” nor “physically observable” and therefore propose to identify
all the “indistinguishable” nearly flat spacetimes on the surface identified by H∗.8 They do so by effectively
choosing a “cutoff” curvature κ∗ and throwing out all the spacetimes with curvatures smaller than it. The
advantage to doing this is that the total measure of FRW spacetimes with curvatures larger than κ∗ is finite,
so that one can then define a probability measure in a natural way.
The disadvantage is that this makes no sense. Carroll and Tam (2010, 20) comment, “to us, this seems to
be throwing away almost all the solutions, and keeping a set of measure zero. It is true that universes with
almost identical values of the curvature parameter will be physically indistinguishable, but that doesn’t affect
the fact that almost all universes have this property.” Indeed, doing what Gibbons and Turok do is throwing
away almost all the solutions (although the remaining set has finite measure, not measure zero as Carroll
and Tam claim). They are also right to point out that if nearly flat universes are physically indistinguishable,
so are “nearly-κ” universes for almost any κ. Gibbons and Turok do not throw out these universes however
(else they would not have been left with any universes at all). Their justification for an additional assumption
therefore fails.
Ironically, Carroll and Tam make essentially the same error as Gibbons and Turok, by identifying the
flat and nearly flat spacetimes. Instead of throwing out all the flat and nearly flat spacetimes like the latter
pair, however, the former pair throws out the complement of the flat and nearly flat spacetimes by assigning
them zero measure. They then triumphantly conclude that all FRW spacetimes are essentially flat! Carroll
and Tam propose to tame the remaining divergence in the GHS measure by regularizing the integral, in
effect making the measure finite. The problem with doing this is that, since the GHS measure is not finite,
8It is not clear what they mean by “geometrically meaningful.” The scale factor is clearly geometric in the relevant sense, since
it relates spaceforms of the same kind by scalings. It is moreover physically meaningful because space is expanding (or contracting)
in FRW spacetimes. The precise value of a does not matter, as it can be re-scaled, but that does not undermine its meaningfulness.
It is also unclear how the fact that a is physically unobservable should matter, since most features of spacetime are not observable,
e.g. the metric g, the spatial curvature κ, etc. The physically relevant content of these, including the scale factor, can be inferred from
observations and appropriate assumptions.
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regularizing the measure makes it no longer the GHS measure, in which case any justification the measure
had by its “naturalness” is lost since a choice was made.9 In short, one may as well have just assumed the
probability distribution they end up with from the very beginning.Their stated justification for this move is
pragmatic: “This non-normalizability is problematic if we would like to interpret the measure as determining
the relative fraction of universes with different physical properties” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17). However
this is obviously an inadequate justification for the propriety of their measure.
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Abstract
In this paper I assess the ‘Invariance Principle’, which states that only quantities
that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue,
contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s sym-
metries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to
the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symme-
tries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to the quantity
in question. In the process of this discussion, I address the related but importantly
distinct issue of when symmetries can be said to prompt a mathematical reformulation
of the relevant theory.
1 Introduction
Take the Invariance Principle to be the principle that only quantities that are
invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real.1 It is a
doctrine with a distinguished pedigree: acclaimed theorists as diverse as the
physicist Paul Dirac, the mathematician Hermann Weyl, and the philosopher
Robert Nozick were all apparent signatories during their respective lifetimes.2
Prima facie, however, it is something of a mystery as to how and why the
principle is supposed to work. Nevertheless, there appear to be at least some
uncontroversial cases where it—or something very close to it—does work.
One such example can be found in Newtonian Gravitation Theory (NGT),
i.e., the theory comprising Newton’s three laws, plus his inverse square gravita-
tional law, governing the behaviour of point particles in Newtonian spacetime.
As is well known, this theory is Galilean invariant. This implies, among other
things, that if one takes any solution to NGT and “boosts” it—that is, uniformly
alters the absolute velocity of each point particle by the same amount through-
out its history—one will invariably get back a solution to NGT. Boosts, in other
words, are a symmetry of NGT: they are transformations that invariably map
solutions of the theory to solutions.
1I draw the term from Saunders (2007). Compare also Dasgupta’s (forthcoming)
“symmetry-to-reality inference”.
2See, e.g., Dirac (1930, vii), Weyl (1952, 132), and Nozick (2001, 82).
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Which quantity varies under this particular symmetry? The answer is obvi-
ous: absolute velocity. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we should
conclude that absolute velocity is not a genuine physical quantity. Conversely,
which quantities are invariant under this particular symmetry? Again, the an-
swer is obvious: relative (inter-particle) distance and velocity, temporal inter-
vals, and absolute acceleration. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we
should conclude that NGT’s boost symmetry does not threaten these quantities’
status as genuinely physical.
As it turns out, one can successfully purge Newtonian theory of the spacetime
structure required to make absolute velocity a physically meaningful quantity.
More specifically, one can move to Galilean spacetime. (Sometimes also called
“Neo-Newtonian spacetime”.)3 Here, the Newtonian posit of persisting points
of absolute space—persisting points which, crucially, allow for the notion of ab-
solute velocity to be physically meaningful—is done away with, but an affine
structure is nevertheless preserved, which defines the “straight” or force-free (in-
ertial) paths through spacetime. Absolute velocity is therefore not a physically
meaningful quantity in Galilean spacetime, as it is in Newtonian spacetime.
Nevertheless, all other Newtonian notions, including the notion of absolute ac-
celeration, remain well-defined in Galilean spacetime. To the extent that one
opts for Galilean over Newtonian spacetime, then, one has excised an ostensibly
odious piece of theoretical structure from NGT.
Three important caveats are worth noting, however. First, and most obvi-
ously, none of this is to say that Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime
is therefore the true and complete theory of the world. (It isn’t.) Second, nor
is this to say that by moving to Galilean spacetime one has thereby purged
Newtonian theory of all its “variant” structure. (One hasn’t. The symmetry
group of Newtonian theory is actually wider than the Galilean group: it has
additional symmetries.)4 Third, nor is this even to say that the invariant quan-
tities one ends up with following such an application of the Invariance Principle
will invariably be preserved in future theories. (For instance, there is no notion
of “relative spatial distance” simpliciter in special relativity.) Given all of these
caveats, however, one might well ask: What good is the Invariance Principle,
exactly? What purpose, in particular, does it serve?
As I see it—and, I take it, as many other contemporary theorists also see
it—the purpose of the Invariance Principle is essentially comparative. That is, it
is simply supposed to lead you to a better theory—or a better interpretation, or
characterisation, of the same theory—than the one you started with. To take the
case at hand: Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime is a better theory than
Newtonian theory set in Newtonian spacetime. It is a theory which possesses
all of the theoretical virtues of its rival, but lacks any apparent ontological
commitment to the unwanted variant quantity in question.
In summary, the Galilean invariance of NGT, in conjunction with the In-
variance Principle, is supposed to indicate that neither absolute velocity nor
3See, e.g., Earman (1989, §2.4).
4See, e.g., Knox (2014). I discuss this point further in Section 4 below.
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any corresponding persisting points of absolute space are genuinely real. Now
to lay my cards on the table: I actually think that something very close to
this general kind of inference—that is, from the variance of a quantity under
symmetries to that quantity’s nonreality—is legitimate. The devil, however, is
in the details. In particular, I don’t believe that the mere Galilean invariance
of NGT is enough to establish absolute velocity’s nonreality. And in general, I
don’t believe that the mere variance of a quantity under symmetries is enough to
establish that quantity’s nonreality. These beliefs, as far as I can determine, put
me in the minority camp in the contemporary philosophical literature on sym-
metries. Nevertheless, I think they are correct beliefs—and they are precisely
the ones that I will attempt to argue for in the remainder of this paper.
2 Interpretational vs Motivational
In arguing for the above claims, it will prove extremely useful first to distinguish
between two very different ways of thinking about symmetries.
Close cousins of the distinction that I have in mind have already been drawn
in the literature. Thus, Greaves and Wallace write:
There is a widespread consensus that two states of affairs related
by a symmetry transformation are really just the same state of affairs
differently described. That is, if two mathematical models of a physical
theory are related by a symmetry transformation, then those models
represent one and the same physical state of affairs. (Greaves and
Wallace 2014, 60)
They continue:
Although we agree with this consensus [...] even those who do not
agree that symmetry-related states of affairs are identical at least
agree that they are empirically indistinguishable from one another.
(Greaves and Wallace 2014, 60, fn 1)
To illustrate the difference between these two ways of thinking about symme-
tries, consider again the example of boosts in NGT. According to the “widespread
consensus” view alluded to, and endorsed by, Greaves and Wallace, boosted
models of NGT are to be taken to represent the same physical state of affairs
even when the theory is putatively set in Newtonian spacetime. In other words,
according to this view, one needn’t make the move to Galilean spacetime in or-
der not to be committed to absolute velocities; there is a way of understanding
boosted models’ physical equivalence, and their associated noncommitment to
the notion of absolute velocity, prior to making this move.5
Things are very different according to the second conception of symme-
tries described, and rejected, by Greaves and Wallace. According to this view,
boosted models of NGT are to be regarded as physically inequivalent: they are
not to be construed as representing the same physical state of affairs. Instead,
5See, e.g., Healey (2007, 114-7), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
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such models are taken to represent physically distinct scenarios, which differ in
what absolute velocity they ascribe to the world’s total material content. Never-
theless, such models still represent empirically indistinguishable states of affairs:
in a Newtonian universe, no experiment could ever help an observer determine
what her absolute velocity actually is. Such boosted models therefore represent
physically distinct ways for the world to be, albeit ones that are indiscernible
on the basis of measurement.6
As previously mentioned, this distinction between different ways of thinking
about symmetries is close, but not identical, to the one that I want to draw.
The key reason why it is not identical is because Greaves and Wallace say
nothing to the effect that the person who subscribes to the second conception
of symmetries—that is, who believes that symmetry-related models invariably
represent empirically indistinguishable, but not necessarily physically equiva-
lent, states of affairs—should still be motivated to seek an alternative theory, or
an alternative interpretation or characterisation of the same theory, according
to which such models do not merely represent empirically indistinguishable sce-
narios, but rather represent physically equivalent states of affairs.7 Moreover, I
claim, it is precisely this notion of motivation which plays a central role in cor-
rectly understanding the philosophical significance of symmetries in the general
case.8
Here, then, is what I take to be the appropriate distinction between these
two different ways of thinking about symmetries:
• Interpretational: Symmetries allow us to interpret theories as being com-
mitted solely to the existence of invariant quantities, even in the absence
of a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is
alleged to underlie symmetry-related models.
• Motivational: Symmetries only motivate us to find a metaphysically
perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
symmetry-related models, but they do not allow us to interpret that theory
as being solely committed to the existence of invariant quantities in the
absence of any such characterisation.
The central claim of this paper may now be neatly summarised: the (orthodox)
interpretational view is mistaken; the (unorthodox) motivational view is correct.
Drawing the distinction in the way that I have done, however, invites the
rather obvious question: What, precisely, is meant by a “metaphysically per-
spicuous characterisation” of reality? This is the question addressed in the next
section.
6See, e.g., Maudlin (1993, 192), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
7Compare (again) Maudlin’s (1993, 192) discussion in the Newtonian context.
8Note that I do not intend any of this as a criticism of Greaves and Wallace’s paper.
Indeed, as Greaves and Wallace (2014, 60, fn 1) are careful to remark, the distinction they
draw is orthogonal to the central topic of their paper, namely the issue of which symmetries
have “direct empirical significance” (i.e., have analogues to Galileo’s ship).
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3 More on Metaphysical Perspicuity
In intuitive terms, a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of reality is one
which corresponds to, or “limns”, reality’s structure in some suitably faithful
way. To use another common (Platonic) metaphor, a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of reality is one which “carves nature at its joints”. (In
comparative terms: a description of reality is more metaphysically perspicuous
than another precisely to the extent that it corresponds to, or limns, reality’s
structure more faithfully than its rival does.)
As many readers will be aware, such a notion is frequently alluded to, and
made use of, in contemporary analytic metaphysics.9 But metaphysical per-
spicuity is also, I think, a notion that is reasonably serviceable in physical (rather
than “merely metaphysical”) contexts. One particularly illustrative example—
albeit a slightly misleading one, for reasons that I will soon explain—drawn
from physics may plausibly be found in classical electromagnetism.10 As is well
known, this theory may be formulated in two different ways.11 According to
one such formulation, EM1, the theory is expressed in terms of the Faraday
tensor, Fab, satisfying the (Maxwell) equations ∇[aFbc] = 0 and ∇aF
ab = Ja,
where Ja is a vector field representing the charge current density. According to
the second formulation, EM2, however, the theory is expressed in terms of the
vector potential, Aa, satisfying the equation ∇a∇
aAb −∇b∇aA
a = Jb.
These two formulations of electromagnetism are related to one another.
In particular, any model 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 of EM2 corresponds to a unique model
〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, via the equation Fab = ∇[aAb]. The converse, however,
is not true. That is, a typical model of EM1 does not typically correspond to
a unique model of EM2. More specifically, if 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 is a model of EM2
corresponding to a model 〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, then so will any other model of
EM2 〈M,ηab, A
′
a〉, where A
′
a is related to Aa by a “gauge transformation” A
′
a
= Aa + ∇aχ, where χ is some smooth scalar field.
It is EM1 which, I take it, constitutes the metaphysically perspicuous charac-
terisation of this theory. That is, it is the tensor Fab which faithfully represents
the fundamental ontology of the theory, namely the electromagnetic field. Not so
EM2. This second formulation may, of course, be useful for various calculational
or heuristic purposes. But the key point is that the vector potential Aa does not
directly represent a genuinely real field: rather, it is merely a mathematically
convenient “shorthand” way of characterising and determining the values of the
Faraday tensor, which is taken to represent the genuine material ontology of
the theory.12 Moreover, it is precisely by construing the vector potential in this
9See, e.g., O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens (1995, 154-7).
10Here and below, I take this theory to be set in Minkowski spacetime. Thus, the spacetime
models of this theory are of the form 〈M,ηab〉, where M is a four-dimensional differentiable
manifold, and ηab is the Minkowski metric.
11For a recent, intriguing study of the relationship between these two different formulations
of electromagnetism, see Weatherall (forthcoming). I draw heavily on his discussion over the
next couple of paragraphs.
12Modulo, that is, certain concerns that arise as a result of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. See,
e.g., Healey (2007).
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way which plausibly allows us to explain and understand, in a fully transpar-
ent way, gauge-symmetry models’ physical equivalence in EM2—namely, for the
reason that they are merely notationally distinct ways of representing the same
fundamental physical ontology.
As mentioned above, I think this example of metaphysical perspicuity is apt
to be slightly misleading, at least when taken on its own. This is because this
example might make it seem as though having a metaphysically perspicuous
characterisation of the (putative) reality underlying symmetry-related models
crucially relies upon one having to mathematically reformulate the relevant the-
ory (or at least upon having such a mathematical reformulation already in hand),
and in particular upon having to reformulate the theory so as to remove any
relevant representational redundancy. However, I think this is incorrect. That
is, I believe that one can, in fact, be in possession of a metaphysically perspicu-
ous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even in
the absence of any mathematical (re-)formulation of the theory which removes
the relevant representational redundancy.
Let me illustrate this point with two simple examples. First, consider the
case of shift symmetry in NGT. This symmetry is subtly different from the case
of boost symmetry, discussed above. Here, instead of uniformly altering the
absolute velocity of each particle throughout its history, one enacts a global,
time-independent repositioning of all matter in space. Thus, for instance, in the
shifted world all of the world’s material content will (prima facie) be located
three metres to the left of where it is in the original world. The basic idea
behind the “Leibniz shift” argument—the famous argument associated with
this symmetry—is that the substantivalist’s admission of points of space as
primitive objects (allegedly) has the undesirable consequence of committing her
to regarding shifted worlds as physically distinct, yet nevertheless empirically
indistinguishable:13 in intuitive terms, everything would look, feel, taste, touch
and sound the same in the two (putatively distinct) shifted worlds, just as in
the case of boosted worlds.
It will prove helpful to express all of this in terms of the models of the theory.
Thus, take a generic model of NGT to be of the formM = 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉,
where M is a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, tab is the temporal metric,
hab is the spatial metric, σa is the timelike vector field whose integral curves rep-
resent the persisting points of absolute space, and ρ and φ represent the matter
density and the gravitational potential field respectively.14 A shift symmetry
can then be characterised as the application of the appropriate diffeomorphism
(corresponding to a spatial translation) d so as to yield a new model Mstatic =
〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, d∗ρ, d∗φ〉. It is then alleged thatM andMstatic differ precisely
13Though see Maudlin (1993), who notes that there is an interesting (epistemological) sense
in which shifted worlds in NGT are not indiscernible after all.
14Note that the canonical presentations of Newtonian spacetime (e.g., Earman 1989, §2.5)
take the affine connection as ideologically primitive. I find such presentations unsatisfactory for
historical rather than for philosophical reasons: in particular, it threatens to make the move
to Galilean spacetime seem almost trivial, and the associated timelike vector field trivially
superfluous. For more on this point, see Pooley (MS, §4.4-§4.5).
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insofar as they each represent the world’s matter content as being located at
distinct places in absolute space. More specifically, such Leibniz-shifted scenar-
ios are alleged to differ precisely with regard to which particular points of space
are underlying various parts of the matter fields.
For a second example, consider diffeomorphism symmetry in general relativ-
ity (GR). Here, similarly, the existence of this symmetry is alleged to commit
the substantivalist to a plurality of physically distinct possibilities that are nev-
ertheless empirically indistinguishable. In terms of the models of the theory:
taking a generic model of GR to be of the formM = 〈M, gab, Tab〉 and applying
an arbitrary diffeomorphism d to yield a new model Mdiff = 〈M,d
∗gab, d
∗Tab〉
(where M is again a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, gab is the metric
tensor, and Tab is the stress-energy tensor which, roughly speaking, represents
the model’s matter content), the two scenarios represented are alleged to differ
with regard to which particular points of the spacetime manifold are underlying
various parts of the metric and matter fields.15
It is my contention that neither the shift symmetry of NGT, nor the diffeo-
morphism symmetry of general relativity, by themselves motivate any mathe-
matical reconstrual of the respective theories. This is because I believe there
is a perfectly transparent, anti-haecceitist, “modestly structuralist”—but nev-
ertheless fully substantivalist—way of understanding such models’ representa-
tional equivalence even in the absence of any such mathematical reformulation.
On this view, spacetime points are construed as genuinely real, fundamental
entities. However, they are “contextually individuated”: they are not to be
understood as being anything more—or less—than “nodes” in the relational,
geometrical structures in which they are embedded. Shifted models in NGT
and diffeomorphically-related models in GR are thus to be understood as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs precisely because the exact same
pattern of relational, geometrical structures is represented as obtaining in each
case. Moreover, this view denies that there are any primitive, singular (“haec-
ceitistic”) facts about spacetime points which would even allow for a distinction
between shifted or diffeomorphically-related scenarios to be coherently drawn.16
Whence the difference, then, between the case of gauge symmetry in electro-
magnetism on the one hand, and shift and diffeomorphism symmetry in NGT
and GR on the other? I think the answer is straightforward. In the latter cases,
the models in question are isomorphic: they represent worlds which differ at
most with regard to which particular objects are playing which qualitative roles,
i.e., they represent at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. Hence,
adopting modest structuralism (which implies anti-haecceitism) about space-
time transparently collapses the number of possibilities represented by these
models to one. In the former such case, however, the relevant models are not
isomorphic—read “literally”, gauge-related models of EM2 assign qualitatively
distinct arrangements of the vector field over spacetime—hence adopting a mod-
estly structuralist ontology does not by itself collapse the number of represented
15For further details see, e.g., Earman (1989, §9).
16For further defence of this view—which is sometimes also called sophisticated substanti-
valism in the literature—see, e.g., Saunders (2003), Ladyman (2007), and Pooley (2013).
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possibilities to one. In order to transparently understand such models’ physical
equivalence, then, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
To summarise the claims made thus far: according to the motivational view
of symmetries, one is invariably only motivated to regard symmetry-related
models as physically equivalent; moreover, one is justified in regarding such
models as physically equivalent only insofar as one is in possession of a meta-
physically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
them. However, it is possible to be in possession of a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even
in the absence of a mathematical formulation of the theory which removes the
relevant representational redundancy. Such a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation is possible just in case the symmetry-related models in question are
isomorphic, or are naturally understood as representing at most haecceitistically
distinct possibilities. In brief: symmetry-related, isomorphic models invariably
do not motivate a mathematical reformulation of the relevant theory (modest
structuralism invariably suffices); but symmetry-related, non-isomorphic models
invariably do.17
4 In Defence of the Motivational View
Let us return once more to the case of NGT. As alluded to in Section 1, the
symmetry group of this theory is quite large. For not only does it include trans-
formations corresponding to global velocity boosts of solutions’ matter content,
but it also includes transformations corresponding to time-dependent transla-
tional accelerations of such content (so long as the gravitational potential field
is also appropriately transformed). Thus, read “literally”, the symmetries of
this theory include transformations that map solutions to solutions that repre-
sent physically distinct, but nevertheless empirically indistinguishable, states of
affairs in which a given material system is:
1. Force-free and stationary with respect to absolute space.
2. Force-free and moving at constant absolute velocity.
3. Absolutely accelerating under a gravitational force-field.
According to the interpretational conception of symmetries, we may legit-
imately take all of these symmetry-related solutions to in fact represent the
same physical state of affairs—despite the fact that they are naturally under-
stood as representing radically distinct physical situations. Things are very
different, however, according to the motivational conception of symmetries. On
this view, we are merely motivated to regard all such solutions as representing
the same physical state of affairs, the motivation arising from the general Oc-
camist principle that, other things being equal, our preferred scientific theories
should not allow for solutions that represent physically distinct but nevertheless
empirically indistinguishable possible worlds. According to the motivational
17See also Pooley (2013, 576-7) and Weatherall (forthcoming) for recent, related arguments
to this effect.
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view, then (and to repeat slightly), absent a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation of the reality underlying these symmetry-related models, we have
no choice but to regard them as representing physically distinct states of affairs.
For our purposes, the crucial thing to note about all of these models is
that none of them are isomorphic—naturally understood, they do not represent
at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. According to the criterion
laid down in the previous section, then, in order to be able to transparently
understand how it could be that such models may be said to represent physically
equivalent scenarios, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
As it turns out, such a mathematical reformulation of the theory is pos-
sible. In brief, in this reformulation one replaces the vector field σa with a
new kind of dynamical inertial connection ∇NC , with models of the formMNC
= 〈M, tab, h
ab,∇NC , ρ〉. Up to isomorphism, any two symmetry-related mod-
els of NGT correspond to a unique model of Newtonian gravity geometrised
in this way. Thus, it is said, by moving to this “Newton-Cartan” theory one
successfully removes the undesirable “gauge-redundancy” inherent in all non-
geometrised versions of Newtonian gravitation theory.18
What might the defender of the interpretational view of symmetries say in
defence of her view—in this context, that the move to Newton-Cartan theory
is not required in order to be able to legitimately regard all symmetry-related
solutions of NGT as physically equivalent?
I anticipate two likely lines of response. First, she might attempt to establish
the preferability of her view over the motivational view by noting that the
defender of the motivational view is committed, at least prior to the appropriate
theory’s reformulation (in the context of NGT), to the existence of in principle
undetectable (symmetry-variant) matters of fact. Moreover, the defender of
the interpretational view might argue, this is an unpalatable consequence, one
which we would do best to avoid—and one which, she might point out, the
interpretational view does in fact avoid.
I agree that the admission of such in principle undetectable facts is an un-
desirable consequence of the motivational view. However, I do not think that
this admission is sufficiently unpalatable so as to be capable of refuting the
motivational view, or even of establishing the preferability of the interpreta-
tional view over the motivational view. After all, prohibitively strong versions
of verificationism aside, there is nothing obviously absurd about admitting in
principle undetectable facts into one’s ontology; nor is there any obvious reason
why we should always be capable of discovering a theory, or a perspicuous char-
acterisation thereof (the case of isomorphic models excepted), which succeeds
in transparently explaining such solutions’ empirical equivalence by virtue of
18For further details, see, e.g., Knox (2014). Note also the important point that moving
to Newton-Cartan theory is not by itself sufficient for one to be able to transparently under-
stand as physically equivalent all symmetry-related models of Newtonian theory set in flat
spacetime. This is because—as mentioned above—such symmetry-related models will typi-
cally correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan theory only up to isomorphism. Thus,
in order to have a fully transparent understanding of how it is that symmetry-related models
of Newtonian theory set in flat spacetime can correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan
theory, a modestly structuralist conception of spacetime ontology is also required.
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their actual physical equivalence; nor indeed is there even any obvious way of
guaranteeing that there will always be such a theory or characterisation (again,
isomorphic models excepted) waiting in logical space to be discovered.
Furthermore, although it is to be admitted that the Newtonian who sub-
scribes to the merely motivational view of symmetries might indeed be com-
mitted to the possibility of there being facts beyond her epistemic grasp, it
nevertheless bears emphasising that for such a Newtonian there is a perfectly
good explanation as to why such facts are epistemically inaccessible: they are in-
accessible precisely because the world is in fact accurately described by the laws
of NGT, with associated models of the form 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉, and because
all any Newtonian observer ultimately has empirical access to are the relative
distances and velocities between material entities. For such a Newtonian, then,
the empirical phenomena underdetermine the genuine physical facts; but the
theory itself is able to provide a perfectly transparent explanation of the re-
ality behind the phenomena in terms of which the underdetermination can be
straightforwardly understood.
The Newtonian who adopts the interpretational construal of symmetries,
however, would appear to lose this explanatory transparency. In other words,
she might know that she may legitimately regard all symmetry-related solutions
as physically equivalent; but the reality in terms of which this physical equiv-
alence is to be understood will (absent a reformulation of the theory) remain
opaque to her; she is offered no immediate explanation as to how such physical
equivalence is to be construed, or how it could even be said to arise.
These considerations naturally suggest a second possible line of response for
the defender of the interpretational view. In particular, she might claim that
she does, in fact, have a transparent understanding of the reality underlying
NGT’s symmetry-related models, and that such a transparent understanding is
in fact attainable prior to the move to Newton-Cartan theory.19
Such a response evidently leads into deep philosophical waters very quickly.
(After all, what does it mean to be in possession of a “transparent under-
standing” of anything?) But let me make a brief remark as to why I find this
particular claim to be implausible. For note that in NGT the persisting points
of absolute space are not merely “idly turning wheels” that can simply be ex-
punged from the theory without explanatory loss: they are not “explanatorily
idle” posits. This is for two main reasons. First, such points play a crucial
role in the metaphysical explanation of what quantities like relative velocity and
absolute rotation and absolute acceleration truly are: for the Newtonian, facts
about particular inter-particle velocities and absolute rotations and absolute ac-
celerations are naturally understood as being grounded in particular facts about
(rates of change of) absolute velocities.20 Second, such points provide the cru-
cial transtemporal standard which is required in the realist’s causal explanation
of the observable effects of noninertial motion (e.g., Newton’s famous “bucket
experiment”): a standard without which Newton’s laws simply cannot be formu-
19Dewar (2015, esp. 322)—who is a recent, explicit defender of the interpretational view—is
plausibly read as making this claim.
20Cf. Pooley (MS, 118).
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lated (at least, absent any other way of construing the transtemporal structure
required to underwrite the distinction between inertial and noninertial motion).
In short—and to the extent that the interpretational view is not supposed to
reduce to a rather uninteresting form of scientific instrumentalism—it is simply
not clear what causal-explanatory, realistic picture of the world is being pro-
pounded by the defender of the interpretational view, at least in this particular
(Newtonian) context; it is simply opaque what, according to her, the world is
really like.
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The information loss paradox is often presented as an unavoidable consequence of
well-established physics. However, in order for a genuine paradox to ensue, not-trivial
assumptions about, e.g., quantum effects on spacetime, are necessary. In this work
we will be explicit about these additional, speculative assumptions required. We will
also sketch a map of the available routes to tackle the issue, highlighting the, often
overlooked, commitments demanded of each alternative. In particular, we will display
the strong link between black holes, the issue of information loss and the measurement
problem.
1 Introduction
The so-called information loss paradox is usually introduced as an unavoidable conse-
quence of standard, well-established physics. The paradox is supposed to arise from a
glaring conflict between Hawking’s black hole radiation and the fact that time evolution
in quantum mechanics preserves information. However, the truth is that, in order for a
genuine paradox to appear, a sizable number of additional, non-standard assumptions
is required. As we will see, these extra assumptions involve thesis regarding the fun-
damental nature of Hawking’s radiation, guesses regarding quantum aspects of gravity
and even considerations in the foundations of quantum theory.
In this work, we will be explicit about the additional assumptions required for
a genuine conflict to arise and delineate the available options in order to tackle the
issue. In particular, we will stress the connection between information loss and the
measurement problem, and display the often non-trivial commitments that each of the
available alternatives to solve the information loss issue demands.
1
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2 The classical setting: black holes hide informa-
tion
We start by reviewing some properties of classical black holes. Gravity, being always
attractive, tends to draw matter together to form clusters. In fact, if the mass of a
cluster is big enough, nothing will be able to stop the contraction until, eventually, a
black hole will form. That is, the gravitational field at the surface of the body will
be so strong that not even light will be able to escape and a region of spacetime from
which nothing is able to emerge will form. The boundary of such a region is called the
event horizon and, according to general relativity, its area never decreases.
In general, the collapse dynamics that leads to the formation of a black hole can, of
course, be very complicated. However, it can be shown that all such systems eventually
settle down into one of the few stationary black hole solutions, which are completely
characterized by the mass, charge and angular momentum of the the Kerr-Newman
spacetimes. In fact, the so-called black hole uniqueness theorems guarantee that, as
long as one only considers gravitational and electromagnetic fields, then these solutions
represent the complete class of stationary black holes. Moreover, the so-called no-hair
theorems ensure that the set of stationary solutions does not grow, even if one considers
other hypothetical fields.
The above mentioned results seem to suggest that when a cluster collapses to form a
black hole, a large amount of information is lost. That is, details such as the multipole
moments of the initial mass distribution, or the type of matter involved, seem to be
altogether lost when the black hole settles. Note however that such apparent loss of
information corresponds only to that available to observers outside of the black hole.
While at early times there are Cauchy hypersurfaces1 completely contained outside
of the black hole, at later times all Cauchy hypersurfaces have parts both inside and
outside it (see Figure 1). Therefore, using data located both outside and inside of the
black hole, the whole spacetime can always be recovered. We conclude that, in the
classical setting, information is not really lost. All that happens is that, when a black
hole forms, a new region of no escape emerges and some of the information from the
outside of the black hole moves into such new region. One could still argue that, since
there are points inside of the horizon which are not in the past of future null infinity,2
1A Cauchy hypersurface is a subset of spacetime which is intersected exactly once by every inex-
tensible, non-spacelike curve.
2Future null infinity is the set of points which are approached asymptotically by null rays which
2
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then it is impossible to reconstruct the whole spacetime by evolving backwards the
data on it. However, future null infinity is not a Cauchy hypersurface so one should
not expect to reconstruct the whole spacetime from such data.
I
−
I
+Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 1: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body. I+ and I− denote past and
future null infinity.
3 QFT on a fixed curved background: black holes
radiate
The most dramatic change in our understanding of black hole physics came as a result
of Hawking’s famous analysis. What this analysis showed was that the formation of
a black hole would modify the state of any quantum field in such a way that, at late
times, there would be an outgoing flux of particles carrying energy towards infinity.
Moreover, Hawking showed that the flux was characterized by the surface gravity κ of
the resulting asymptotic stationary state of the black hole. This discovery transformed
our perception of the formal analogy, originally pointed out in Bekenstein (1972),
between the laws of black hole dynamics, and the standard laws of thermodynamics
(see Wald (1994) for a discussion). In particular, it led to the view that the surface
gravity is in fact a measure of the black hole’s temperature T = κ
2pi
, and that the event
horizon’s area A is a measure of the black hole’s entropy S = A/4.
Hawking’s result is probably the most famous of the effects that arise from the
natural extension of special relativistic quantum field theory to the realm of curved
spacetimes. It imposes a dramatic modification on the classical view of black holes as
can escape to infinity.
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absolutely black and eternal regions of spacetime. It is important to stress, though,
that Hawking’s calculation, being a result pertaining to quantum field theory on a
fixed spacetime, does not encompass back-reaction effects. These are in fact notoriously
difficult to deal with and a general framework for doing so is lacking. At any rate, some
straightforward physical considerations, which have rather dramatic consequences, are
often brought to bear in this context.
4 Back-reaction and first quantum gravity input:
black holes evaporate
As can be expected, Hawking’s result also suggests a dramatic modification in our
expectation for the ultimate fate of a black hole. That is, while before Hawking’s
discovery, one would have expected that, once formed, a black hole would be eternal,
the fact that the radiation is caring energy away, assuming overall energy conservation,
leads one to expect that the mass of the black hole will start diminishing. The context
in which this problem is standardly set is that of asymptotically flat spacetimes, for
which we have a well defined notion of overall energy content given by the ADM mass3
of the spacetime, a quantity which is known to be conserved.
As we noted, Hawking’s calculation cannot deal with back-reaction. However, our
confidence on energy conservation in the appropriate situations is so robust that it is
difficult not to conclude that, as the radiation carries away energy, the black hole mass
will have to diminishing. If this takes place, the surface gravity of the black hole—which
is no longer really stationary, but can be expected to deviate from stationarity only to a
very small degree—would change as well. As it turns out, the surface gravity is inversely
proportional to the black hole’s mass, so the black hole temperature can be expected to
increase, leading to a ever more rapid rate of energy loss and a correspondingly faster
decrease in mass.
The run away picture for the evaporation process suggests a complete disappearance
of the black hole in a finite amount of time. Of course, we cannot really be sure about
this picture because, in order to perform a solid analysis, we would need to deploy
a, currently lacking, trustworthy theoretical formalism adept to the challenge. The
3The ADM mass is a quantity associated with the asymptotic behavior of the induced spatial
metric of a Cauchy hypersurface. In asymptotically flat spacetimes, it is known to be independent of
the hypersurface on which it is evaluated (see Arnowitt et al. (1962)).
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problem is that, by the removal of energy from the black hole, one can expect to
eventually reach a regime where quantum aspects of gravitation become essential to
the description of the process. At such point, one might contemplate the possibility
that, as a result of purely quantum gravitational aspects, the Hawking evaporation of
the black hole will stop, leaving a small stable remnant. This, in turn, might open
certain possibilities regarding the information issue. For the time being, though, we
will ignore such an option.
Then, in order to simplify the discussion at this point, we will ignore the possibility
of remnants and assume that there is nothing to stop the Hawking radiation. Then,
if the black hole’s mass decreases in accordance with energy conservation, one expects
that the black hole to simply disappear and the spacetime region where it was located
to turn flat (see Figure 2).
I
−
I
+
Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 2: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body, taking into account Hawk-
ing’s radiation.
At this point, we seem to come face to face with an information loss problem: the
original massive object that collapses, leading to the formation of a black hole, might
have required an incredibly large amount of detail for its description. However, the
final state that results from the evaporation is simply described in terms of the thermal
Hawking flux, followed by an empty region of spacetime. More to the point, even if
the initial matter that collapses to form a black hole was initially in a pure quantum
state, after the complete evaporation of the black hole there would be a mixed one,
corresponding to the thermal Hawking flux. These considerations seem to indicate
that, even at the fundamental level, we have a fundamental loss of information. The
final state, even if described in full detail, does not encode the information required
to retrodict the details of the initial one. At the level of quantum theory, we would
5
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be facing a non-unitary (and non-deterministic) relation between the initial and final
states of the system, a situation that seems at odds with the unitary evolution provided
by the Schrödinger equation.
There are, however, various caveats to the above conclusion. The first one is opened
up by the possibility of the evaporation eventually stopping, leading to a stable rem-
nant. The mass of said remnant can be estimated by considering the natural scales at
which the effects of quantum gravity are expected to become important. This leads to
an estimate of the order of Plank’s mass (≈ 10−5 gr). Then, if one wants the remnant
to encode all the information present in the initial state, one is led to the conclusion
that such a small object would have a number of possible internal states as large as
that of the original matter that collapsed to form the black hole, which can, of course,
have had a mass as large as one can imagine. It is hard, then, to envisage what kind of
object, with such rather unusual thermodynamical behavior, would this remnant have
to be. For this reason, this possibility is usually not considered viable (although we
acknowledge that these considerations might be overturned; for a discussion of these
issues see Banks (1994)). At any rate, we will not consider this possibility any further.
We should also mention another proposal which uses the idea that, while curing
singularities, quantum gravity might open paths to other universes, which could be
home to the missing information. Such information would be encoded either in a
new universe or in correlations between it and ours. Besides the dramatic ontological
burden, such proposal leaves open the possibility of these alternative universes emerging
even in ordinary processes (which could, e.g., involve virtual black holes), leading
to information loss in such standard scenarios. Alternatively, the information could
be preserved, but impossible to retrieve in principle. We will also not consider this
possibility any further.
A much more important caveat is the following: we have very solid results indicat-
ing that, associated with the formation of a black hole, there is always a singularity
of spacetime appearing withing it. The strongest results in this regard are a series of
theorems proved by Hawking (see Hawking and Ellis (1973)) showing that, under quite
general conditions, and assuming reasonable properties for the energy and momentum
of the collapsing matter, the formation of singularities is an inevitable result of Ein-
stein’s equations. The issue is that, at the classical level, these singularities represent
a breakdown of the theory and, in fact, a failure of the spacetime description. The
singularities are, therefore, to be thought of as representing boundaries of spacetime,
rather that points within it. Once a spacetime has additional boundaries, it is clear
6
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that the issue of information has to be confronted on a different light. Of course, if one
considers the description of the system at an initial Cauchy hypersurface and wants a
final hypersurface to encode the same information, one has to make sure that the final
one is also Cauchy.
The formation of singularities then implies that, if we want to have spacetime
regions where the system’s state could be thought of as encoding all the information,
then we must surround the singularities by suitable boundaries. In other words, if the
singularities force us to include further boundaries of spacetime, then the comparison of
initial and final information has to be done between the initial Cauchy hypersurface and
the late-time collection of surfaces that, together, act as a Cauchy hypersurface. That
collection could naturally include asymptotically null future, but also the hypersurfaces
surrounding the singularities. The same kind of calculation as the one done by Hawking
would then show that all the information present on the initial hypersurface would also
be encoded in the state associated with this late-time Cauchy hypersurface. That is,
if we include the boundary of spacetime that arises in association with the singularity,
then there is no issue regarding the fate of information. We conclude that, under these
circumstances, still there is no information loss.
5 Second quantum gravity input: black holes do
not involve singularities
As we noted above, singularities represent a breakdown of the spacetime description
as provided by general relativity and thus indicate the need to go beyond such theory.
The expectation among theorists is that quantum gravity is going to be the theory
that cures these failures of classical general relativity, replacing the singularities by
a description in the language appropriate to quantum gravity. This is, in fact, what
occurs with various other theories that are known to be just effective descriptions of
a physical system’s behavior in a limited context, but that have to be replaced with a
more fundamental description once the system leaves that regime. Think for instance
of the description of a fluid by, say, the Navier-Stokes equations. We know that this
description works very well in a large variety of circumstances, but that a breakdown of
such description occurs, for instance, when there are shock waves or when other types
of singularities are formed. However, under such circumstances, the underlying kinetic
theory, including the complex inter-molecular forces, is expected to remain valid. The
7
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point is that, just as in those cases, one expects the emergence of singularities in general
relativity to indicate the end of the regime where the classical description of spacetime
is valid and, therefore, where a quantum gravity description would have to take over
(see Figure 3 and Ashtekar and Bojowald (2005) for details).
I
−
I
+
Figure 3: “Quantum spacetime diagram” for a black hole.
Of course, if quantum gravity does in fact cure the singularities, and removes the
need to consider, in association with the corresponding regions, a boundary of space-
time, the issue of the fate of information in the Hawking evaporation of black holes
resurfaces with dramatic force. So, do we finally have a genuine paradox in our hands.
Not quite yet; a few elements are still missing. In order for a paradox to arise, we need
to couple a genuine loss of information with a fundamental theory which does not allow
for information to be lost.
6 A paradox?
When is it, then, that the Hawking radiation by a black hole leads to an actual paradox?
We are finally in a position to enumerate the various assumptions required in order to
construct a genuine conflict:
1. As a result of Hawking’s radiation carrying energy away from the black hole, the
mass of the black hole decreases and it either evaporates completely or leaves a
small remnant.
2. In the case where the black hole leaves a small remnant, the number of its internal
degrees of freedom is bounded by its mass in such a way that these cannot possibly
encode the information contained in an arbitrarily massive initial state.
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3. Information is not transfered to a parallel universe.
4. As a result of quantum gravity effects, the internal singularities within black
holes are cured and replaced by something that eliminates the need to consider
internal boundaries of spacetime.
5. The outgoing radiation does not encode the initial information.
6. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
We have already discussed the arguments in support of assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4
and saw that, although by no means conclusive, they are reasonable. But what about
5 and 6? Well, in order to avoid a paradox, and assuming the first four assumptions
to be true, at least one of them has to be negated. In order to explore the motivations
and consequences of doing so, we must think clearly about how to interpret Hawking’s
calculation in a context in which 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the case.
As we remarked above, Hawking’s calculation is performed in the setting of a quan-
tum field theory over a fixed curved background. What one finds there is that an initial
pure state of the field evolves into a final one which, when tracing over the inside re-
gion, reduces to a mixed thermal state. The key question at this point, then, is how
to interpret such a final mixed state in a setting in which i) the black hole is no longer
there, so there is no interior region to trace over, and ii) in which there is no singularity
(or parallel universe) for the information to “escape into.” As far as we can see, there
are two alternatives: either one assumes that the mixed state arises only as a result
of tracing over the interior region and maintains that the outgoing radiation somehow
encodes the initial information—which amounts to negating 5; or one takes Hawking’s
result seriously and maintains that, even in this scenario, information is lost—which
amounts to negating 6. Below we explore each option in detail.
6.1 The outgoing radiation encodes information
In the last couple of decades, the community’s position on the information loss subject
has been strongly influenced by developments in String theory. Such framework has
permitted exploration of questions, regarding black holes, using settings where event
horizons and singularities play no relevant roles. This is possible due to the AdS/CFT
correspondence (see e.g., Strominger (2001)), which allows the mapping of compli-
cated spacetime geometries in the “bulk” of asymptotically Anti-de Sitter spacetimes,
9
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including ones involving black holes, onto corresponding states of an ordinary quantum
field theory living on the Anti-de Sitter boundary (which is, in fact, a flat spacetime).
These considerations have led people to conclude that, as a breakdown of unitarity is
not expected to take place in the context of a quantum field theory in flat spacetimes,
there should be no room for a breakdown of unitarity in the corresponding situation
involving black holes either.4
The proposal, then, is that unitarity is never broken and that information is never
lost. As a result, Hawking’s calculation has to be somehow attuned to assure consis-
tency. In particular, the proposal is that the outgoing radiation must encoded all of
the initial information. There is, however, a high price to pay in order to achieve this.
As has been shown in Almheiri et al. (2013), in order for the outgoing radiation to
encode the necessary information, each emitted particle must get entangled with all
the radiation emitted before it. However, due to the so-called, “monogamy of entan-
glement,” doing so entails the release of an enormous amount of energy, turning the
event horizon into a firewall that burns anything falling through it. The upshot then,
is a divergence of the energy-momentum tensor of the field over the event horizon and
a radical breakdown of the equivalence principle over such a region.
6.2 Unitarity is broken
The discovery of the Hawking radiation was initially taken as a clear indicative of
information loss at the fundamental level. In fact, Hawking (1976) even introduced
a notation for this general type of evolution which was supposed to account for the
transformation from (possibly pure) initial states ρi into final mixed ones ρf . Hawking
denoted the general linear, non-unitary, operator characterizing such transformation
by the sign $, i.e., ρf = $ρi. Likewise, Penrose pointed out that, in order to have a
consistent picture of phase space for situations involving black holes in thermal equilib-
rium with an environment, one has to assume that ordinary quantum systems undergo
something akin to a self-measurement, by which he meant quantum state reduction
that was not the result of measurement by external observers or measuring devices
(see Penrose (1981)). Penrose (1999) further argued that quantum state reduction is
probably linked to aspects of quantum gravity.
The early assessments of these ideas in Banks et al. (1984) indicated that they
4Note however that the argument can be easily reversed to show exactly the opposite. Since
Hawking’s result shows that unitarity breaks when black holes are present, one must conclude that
quantum evolution cannot be unitary even in a quantum field theory on flat spacetimes.
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where likely to lead to a very serious conflict with energy and momentum conservation
or to generate unacceptable non-local features in ordinary physical situations. However,
further analysis in Unruh and Wald (1995) showed that these assessments where not
that solid and that there where various possibilities to evade the apparently damning
conclusions.
In (omitted references) we have explored the viability of breaking unitarity both
qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, we have successfully adapted objective
collapse models, developed in connection with foundational issues within quantum
theory, in order to explicitly describe the transition from the initial pure state into
a mixed one. Our view on the subject is based on the conviction that, contrary to
the prevailing opinion in the community working on the gravity/quantum interface,
there are good reasons to think that quantum theory requires modifications to deal
with its basic conceptual difficulties. Below we discuss these issues and explore their
consequences for the information loss paradox.
7 Information loss and the measurement problem
Most discussions of black holes and information loss do not implicate foundational
issues of quantum theory. Of course, ignoring such issues, particularly with pragmatic
interests in mind, is often acceptable. However, when deep conceptual questions are
involved, such as in the present case, the pragmatic attitude might not be the right
way to go.
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics involves a profoundly instru-
mentalist character, with notions such as observer or measurement playing a crucial
role. Such an instrumentalist trait becomes a problem as soon as one intends to re-
gard the theory as a fundamental one, useful not only to make predictions in suitable
experimental settings, but also to be applied to the measurement apparatuses, to the
observers involved, or to non-standard contexts such as black holes or the universe as a
whole. The resulting problem, often referred to as the measurement problem, has been
discussed at length in numerous places and many different concrete formulations of it
have been given. A particularly useful way to state it, given in Maudlin (1995), is as
a list of three statements that cannot be all true at the same time:
A. The physical description given by the quantum state is complete.
B. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
11
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -418-
C. Measurements always yield definite results.
Maudlin’s formulation of the measurement problem is noteworthy because of its
generality and its preciseness. Moreover, it is extremely useful in order to motivate
and classify strategies to solve the problem. For example, by negating A, one arrives
at so-called hidden variable theories, such as Bohmian mechanics; by removing B,
one gets so-called objective collapse theories, such as GRW; and by discarding C,
Everettian interpretations emerge. Of these three options, the last one is, by far, the
most contentious. Among its most urgent matters, we can mention the problem of
the preferred basis, the one of making sense of probabilities in the theory and the
general and basic issue of establishing a clear and precise link between the abstract
mathematical objects of the theory and concrete empirical predictions. Of course, brave
attempts to deal with these and other issues within Everettian frameworks abound.
However, be believe that, at least for the time being, they are far from being successful.
Returning to the measurement problem and its relation to the information loss
issue, we note that assumptions 6 and B are in fact identical. Therefore, the strategy
one decides to adopt in order to avoid complications regarding the information loss
issue (e.g., negating 5 or 6 above) has implications with respect to what one must
say regarding the measurement problem (e.g., negating A, B or C). In particular, if
regarding the information loss, one decides to maintain the validity of 6 (and thus
to hold that the outgoing radiation encodes all of the initial information), then one
necessarily has to either negate A or C (i.e., either to entertain a hidden variables theory
or an Everettian scenario). In other words, insisting on a purely unitary evolution,
not only demands a violation of the equivalence principle and a divergence of the
energy-momentum tensor, but also a commitment either with many worlds or with an
acknowledgment that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. On the other hand,
if regarding the information loss problem, one decides to abandon unitarity, the same
move automatically not only avoids a breakdown of the equivalence principle, but also
guarantees success with respect to the measurement problem. The upper hand of the
second option seems evident to us.
8 Conclusions
Since the publication of Hawking’s analysis, more than forty years ago, the issue of black
hole information loss has been a central topic in theoretical physics. The AdS/CFT
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correspondence, proposed almost twenty years latter, came to further propel an already
notorious debate. Yet, even after all these years, the discussion is often engulfed by
confusion and misunderstanding among participants. The objective of this work is to
develop a clear analysis of some of the key conceptual issues involved. Our hope is
that, by doing so, significant progress on this important topic could soon be achieved.
We have presented the basic theoretical setting of the black hole information issue,
paying special attention to elements, arising from not yet well-established physics, that
presently have to be regarded merely as reasonable assumptions. Moreover, we have
argued that the information loss issue is closely related to the measurement problem,
and claimed that it is precisely within the context of certain proposals put forward to
deal with the latter that the former finds one of its most conservative resolutions.
References
Almheiri, A., Marolf, D., Polchinski, J., and Sully, J. (2013). Black holes: complemen-
tarity or firewalls? JHEP, 62.
Arnowitt, R., Deser, S., and Misner, C. (1962). The dynamics of general relativity. In
Witten, L., editor, Gravitation: an introduction to current research. Wiley.
Ashtekar, A. and Bojowald, M. (2005). Black hole evaporation: a paradigm. Class.
Quant. Grav., 22(3349).
Banks, T. (1994). Lectures on black hole information loss. Nucl. Phys. Proc., 41.
Banks, T., Susskind, L., and Preskin, M. E. (1984). Difficulties for the evolution of
pure states unto mixed states. Nucl. Phys. B, 224(125).
Bekenstein, J. D. (1972). Black holes and the second law. Lett. Nuovo Cim., 4(737).
Hawking, S. W. (1976). Breakdown of predictability in gravitational collapse. Phys.
Rev. D, 14(2460).
Hawking, S. W. and Ellis, G. F. R. (1973). The large scale structure of spacetime.
Cambridge University Press.
Maudlin, T. (1995). Three measurement problems. Topoi, 14.
13
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -420-
Penrose, R. (1981). Time asymmetry and quantum gravity. In Isham, C. J., Penrose,
R., and Sciama, D. W., editors, Quantum Gravity II. Clarendon Press.
Penrose, R. (1999). The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and
the Laws of Physics. Oxford University Press.
Strominger, A. (2001). The AdS/CFT correspondence. JHEP, 0110(034).
Unruh, W. G. and Wald, R. M. (1995). On evolution laws taking pure states to mixed
states in quantum field theory. Phys. Rev. D, 52:2176–2182.
Wald, R. M. (1994). Quantum Field Theory in Curved Spacetime and Black Hole
Thermodynamics. University of Chicago Press.
14
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -421-
The Causal Homology Concept
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Abstract
This presentation proposes a new account of homology, which de-
fines homology as a correspondence of developmental or behavioral
mechanisms due to common ancestry. The idea is formally presented
as isomorphism of causal graphs over lineages. The formal treatment
not only clears the metaphysical skepticism regarding the homology
thinking, but also provides a theoretical underpinning to the concepts
like constraints, evolvability, and novelty. The novel interpretation of
homology suggests a general perspective that accommodates evolu-
tionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary approaches to understand evo-
lution, facilitating further empirical and theoretical researches.
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1 Introduction
The homology thinking, the idea that the same anatomical structure repeat-
edly appears in different species or parts of the same organism, has a long
history in biology (Amundson, 2005). While the existence of such anatomi-
cal similarities among or within species is now explained by the descent from
a common ancestor, the conceptual issues surrounding the notion have in-
vited philosophical as well as methodological debates and skepticism. Owen
famously defined homology as “the same organ in different animals under ev-
ery variety of form and function,” but this definition is perplexing rather than
enlightening: what characterizes and warrants the sameness of “organs,” if
not their form or function? What, in other words, is the unit of homology?
There are three conceptual problems. The first and foremost problem is
its definition: what exactly is homology? Evolutionary theory tells us that
homology is identity due to a common origin, but an identity of what? Is
it morphological characters, activities, clusters of properties, or genetic net-
works that are regarded to be same? And what is the criterion to judge
whether or not two such things are actually the “same”? The second prob-
lem is metaphysical. As Ghiselin (1997) points out, the homology-as-identity
partitions the whole tree of life into equivalence classes. But doesn’t the sup-
position of such universal classes, reminiscent of Aristotelian essence, commit
us to an anti-evolutionary thinking? And thirdly, there is a pragmatic ques-
tion: why do we care about homology at all? Some neo-Darwinians such
2
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as G. C. Williams see homologs as mere “residues,” i.e. a relic of the past
common ancestry not yet washed out by natural selection (Amundson, 2005,
pp. 237-8). If that is the case homology by itself would have no explanatory
role in evolutionary theory, and the quest for its definition, however well-
defined and metaphysically sound, becomes a mere armchair exercise with
no scientific value.
There is at least one usage of the concept free from these issues: homology
of DNA sequences. Here the “sameness” is well-defined by matching bases
that can be one of the four chemical kinds, G, C, T, A. Moreover, the scien-
tific importance of orthologs and paralogs is undeniable in reconstructing the
evolutionary history and predicting gene function, to name a few. Things
become different for phenotype, in particular complex phenotypes like mor-
phological or behavioral traits. First of all, there is no clear-cut definition of
“phenotypic units” as that for nucleotides. Continuous traits such as height
or weight usually lack objects breakpoints by which we classify them into
discrete equivalence classes. In sum, there seem to be no non-arbitrary and
non-controversial units for phenotype of which we can talk about the same-
ness, and thus homology.
Our first task, therefore, is to identify the units on which the pheno-
typic homology relationship can be defined. This presentation proposes that
this purpose is best served by causal graphs which formally represent de-
velopmental or behavioral mechanisms. Homology is thus defined as graph
isomorphism over lineages, or conservation of the underlying causal structure
3
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over evolutionary history (Section 2). I will argue in Section 3 that the for-
mal treatment of homology (i) solves the philosophical as well as empirical
puzzles and criticisms regarding the homology concept; (ii) provides clear
meanings to some key but elusive concepts such as constraints, evolvabil-
ity, and novelty; (iii) and suggests a broad perspective that accommodates
evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary research projects. Section 4 compares
the present approach to other existing accounts of homology, and discusses
its relative strengths, challenge, and philosophical implication. As will be
stressed there, the primary objective of this presentation is to facilitate or
open up new empirical as well as theoretical questions. The last section con-
cludes with some of these research prospects that are prompted by the new
homology concept.
2 Defining homology with graphs
The idea of characterizing homology in terms of causal structures is not
new. Various biologists have suggested, albeit in different fashions, that the
developmental or behavioral mechanisms underlying phenotype can or should
serve as a unit of homology (e.g. Riedl, 1978; Wagner, 1989, 2014; Gilbert
and Bolker, 2001; Mu¨ller, 2003). These proposal, however, are mostly based
on independent examples or qualitative descriptions, and the lack of a unified
treatment has blurred their philosophical as well as theoretical implications.
4
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The aim of this section is to give a formal representation to the ideas of
developmental sameness by using causal graphs, in view of exploring the
conceptual nature of homology in the later sections.
A causal graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a set of phenotypic or
genetic variables of organisms and E is a set of edges representing causal
relationships among these traits. Development is understood as a causal web
connecting embryological, morphological, and behavioral traits, and the set
of edges E characterizes these causal links. Note that such connections may
remain invariant even under considerable modifications in phenotypic values
or the functional form that determines the quantitative nature of each edge.
The same set of E is consistent with a variety of phenotypic states and forms
of causal production; it only defines the qualitative feature of the causal
networks, i.e. which causes which.
Once modeled in this way, it becomes meaningful to compare causal struc-
tures of different organisms. A causal graph G1 = (V1,E1) is isomorphic
to another G2 = (V2,E2) if they have the same structure, or more for-
mally if there is a bijection f : V1 → V2 such that if (v, w) ∈ E1 then
(f(v), f(w)) ∈ E2. Likewise, isomorphism can be defined for subgraphs,
which are just parts of the causal graphs restricted to a subset V′ ⊂ V. We
write G1 ∼ G2 if two (sub)graphs are isomorphic. It is easy to see ‘∼’ is
symmetric, reflexive, and transitive, and thus defines a equivalence class.
Each individual is assigned one causal graph that models a particular
part of its developmental or behavioral mechanism. Let us denote the causal
5
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structure of an organism a by G(a). Collectively, G(A) is a set of causal
structures for a set of organisms A. We assume usual ancestor/descendant
relationships over a set of organism Ω (which may include more than one
species). If b is an ancestor of a, the lineage between b and a is a set of every
individual between them. Given this setup homology is defined as follows.
For two sets of organisms A,B ⊂ Ω, let G ′ be a subgraph of all
g ∈ G(A), and G ′′ be a subgraph of all g ∈ G(B). Then G ′ and
G ′′ are homologous iff
1. G ′ ∼ G ′′;
2. there is a set of common ancestors C ⊂ Ω of A and B1; and
3. for every d in all the lineages from C to A and C to B, G(d)
has a subgraph G ′′′ such that G ′′′ ∼ G ′ ∼ G ′′.
The definition explicates the idea that homology is the identity between
causal structures due to common ancestry. Two (sets of) organisms share
a homologous causal structure if, in addition to the graph isomorphism, ev-
ery individual on the lineage connecting them shares the same causal graph,
capturing the idea that the structure has been conserved through the evolu-
tionary history.
The same treatment applies to serial homology, i.e. the homology re-
lationship among parts of the same organism, such as teeth, limbs, or tree
1Note that C may be A or B themselves. Also note the condition 1 is redundant if a
lineage includes the both ends. But here it is retained for clarity.
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leaves. We can just set A = B, and compare different but isomorphic sub-
parts G ′,G ′′ of the same overall structure G(A). Then the homology hy-
pothesis is that there is an organism c in which the mechanism in question
was duplicated, and the lineages from c to A have conserved the duplicated
structures.
The above definition is illustrated with a case of special homology in figure
1, which depicts a particular region of the tree of life for (groups of) organisms
A to G. Two mutationsM1,M2 on the developmental mechanism occurred in
the lineage leading to F , in which one causal edge V1 → V3 was first removed
and then restored. In this example, the causal structure G(D) of population
D is homologous to G(E), for they are both inherited from the ancestral graph
G(B) and G(A). In contrast, it is not homologous to G(F ) even though they
are graph-isomorphic. This is because the lineages connecting D and F do
not conserve the causal structure in question: particularly it is not shared
by C.
The example, though too simplistic to capture any real biological phe-
nomena, makes explicit the idea that homology is a concordance of devel-
opmental mechanisms due to common ancestry. Note the criterion makes
no reference to the resulting phenotype represented by particular values or
distributions of variables. It does not require or forbid that, for example, two
populations E and D show similar morphological distributions. Nor does it
assume the graphs consist of the variables of the same nature. If the causal
graphs in figure 1 represent a genetic network, kinds of genes/variables that
7
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
∗
M1(V1 ̸→ V3)
∗
M2(V1 → V3)
Genealogy Causal graphs
V3
V2 V1
V3
V2 V1
Figure 1: Illustration of graph homology. On the left is a genealogy tree for
hypothetical populations A,B,C,D,E, F,G, while the graphs on the right
describe causal structures of these populations over three characters, V1, V2,
and V3. Two asterisks (∗) on the tree denote mutation events on the causal
structure. See text for explanation.
constitute the network may vary across populations, as long as they serve the
same causal roles within the overall structure. It is structural, rather than
material, identity that defines homology. Theoretical as well as philosophical
implications of this view will be explored in the following sections.
3 Conceptual advantages of the view
The above account is intended to provide a theoretical platform to formulate
and evaluate hypotheses or explanations regarding homology. This section
explicates the conceptual benefits of thinking homology in terms of causal
graphs. Discussions on the empirical adequacy are differed to the next sec-
8
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tion.
As discussed in the introduction, the major obstacle in defining homology
is the absence of definite phenotypic units. Homology is an identity rather
than similarity relationship (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997; Mu¨ller, 2003; Wagner, 2014),
whereas no two or more phenotypic characters are identical in a strict sense
— there are always subtle differences in, say, shape or size. The problem
could be solved if we could find a natural and non-arbitrary way to factorize
the phenotypic space into discrete regions so that two phenotypes within the
same region are regarded “identical” despite their apparent differences. This
is a difficult task, especially because we do not know the topological feature
of the phenotypic space (Wagner and Stadler, 2003). To solve this issue the
present analysis adopts a different strategy: instead of trying to impose a cer-
tain structure on the phenotypic space, it takes the generative mechanisms as
basic units. Once these mechanisms are represented by causal graphs, which
by nature are discrete mathematical entities, the desired identity relation-
ship is given by graph isomorphism regardless of differences in the resulting
morphology/phenotype. The graphical representation thus provides natural
units prerequisite to define homology.
It is granted that a graph representation is not determined uniquely, be-
cause the same developmental mechanism can be modeled in various levels of
abstraction, yielding causal graphs of different complexities. However, I take
this to be a strength rather than weakness of my view, because homology
too is often treated as description-dependent. Teleost fins and tetrapod limbs
9
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are said to be homologous as paired vertebrate appendages, but not as fins
or limbs. In contrast, our hands and pectoral fins of the whale are homol-
ogous not only as appendages but also as limbs. One tempting hypothesis
is that such degrees of homology relationship correspond to isomorphisms of
causal structures described at different granularities. In the above example,
it is hypothesized that teleost fins and tetrapod limbs are represented by the
same, but rather course-grained, causal graph, while tetrapod species share
the causal structure to much finer details.
Fixing the level of abstraction determines not only the equivalent classes
but also the degree of similarity between these classes. Two distinct causal
graphs may be closer or further depending on the number of changes required
to obtain one from the other. If G ′′ is obtained by removing one edge from G ′
which in turn lacks one of the edges of G, G ′′ is one step further than G ′ from
the original G. Each such deletion or addition of causal connection is called
novelty. Novelty in this framework is a modification of the causal graph, and
as such creates a new equivalence class of causal graphs, namely homology.
Evolutionary novelty also comes in different degrees. In general, a single
modification in abstract graphs will correspond to multiple edge additions
or deletions in detailed ones, and thus is weighted more. In this regard a
change in the causal graph shared both by teleosts and tetrapods will count
as a significant novelty and possibly a creation of a new “bauplan.”
This brings us to one of the central contentions in today’s evolutionary
biology, namely the alleged inadequacy of the Modern Synthesis framework,
10
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in particular population genetics, to incorporate macro-scale evolutionary
phenomena uncovered by evolutionary developmental biology (e.g. Pigliucci
and Mu¨ller, 2010). It has been claimed that homology (macro-scale conser-
vatism) and novelty (a large phenotypic change) not only resist explanations
by the Neo-Darwinian gradualism, but also constrain evolutionary trajec-
tories as modeled in population genetics (e.g Amundson, 2005; Brigandt,
2007). The theoretical relationship between Evo-Devo and population ge-
netics, however, remains elusive, which makes difficult to evaluate the call
for the “new synthesis.”
The present approach, by expressing homolgy and novelty in terms of
graph equivalence and modification, suggests a perspective on this connec-
tion and a way to turn these claims into empirical hypotheses. Because causal
models induce evolutionary changes as studied in population and quantita-
tive genetics (Otsuka, 2015, 2016), the graphical representation allows one to
analyze how developmental structures generate and constrain evolutionary
dynamics. In particular, topological features of the graph such as modularity
yield, via the so-called Markov condition, patterns of probabilistic indepen-
dence on the phenotypic distribution and determine possible evolutionary
trajectories or evolvability. The causal graph approach thus supports the
view that a homolog constitutes a unit of morphological evolvability (Brig-
andt, 2007).
The graph structures that yield population dynamics are usually not
study objects of population genetics. They rather serve as background frame-
11
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works in which evolutionary models are build to study changes in genetic or
phenotypic frequencies. These frameworks, however, must come from some-
where, and this evolutionary process is a primary interest of Evo-Devo. Stud-
ies on homology and novelty — graph stasis and change — amount to “higher
order” evolutionary analyses that deal with changes in the theoretical frame-
work used in population genetics to predict local population dynamics. The
graphical conception of homology thus suggests a broad perspective that ac-
commodates these different, and sometimes seen antagonistic, research fields
as complementary approaches to understand evolution.
Finally, let us turn to the metaphysical problem. As seen above, homol-
ogy is defined as an equivalence class over a set of causal graphs. But to
what do such classes correspond, if not some ideal types or essences? Ho-
mology thinking has been criticized as anti-evolutionary due to its alleged
commitment to essentialism. These critics thus re-interpret homology as a
lineage that connects individual parts, rather than as a universal class to be
instantiated by its members/homologs (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997). A detailed ex-
amination of this criticism must await another occasion, but here I just want
to propose a different way to look at the issue. A metaphysical implication
from the present study is that homology stands to concrete parts of organ-
isms not as a universal to individuals, nor as a whole to parts, but rather as a
model to phenomena to be modeled. A homology hypothesis is based on an
observation that two or more individuals or parts thereof can be modeled by
12
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the same causal graph.2 Hence the proper relationship is not instantiation or
mereology, but representation (Suppes, 2002). Once conceived in this way,
the metaphysical ghost of essentialism vanishes away. Just like the same
oscillator model characterizes various kinds of pendulum clocks, homology-
as-model is a mathematical entity (directed graph) that may represent more
than one actual individual, but that does not force us to commit to any form
of essentialism.
The individual-universal distinction has also cast a shadow on the prag-
matic issue regarding the epistemic role and significance of the concept of
homology. It has been argued that the study of homology cannot be any
more than a historiography since there is no such thing as a law for in-
dividuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A very different picture, however, emerges from
the present thesis. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis regarding
causal isomorphism— that two or more (sets of) organismal parts can be rep-
resented by the same causal model — and as such makes various predictions.
For example, it supports extrapolations from model organisms, predicting
that homologous organs will respond in the same or similar fashion to phys-
iological, chemical, or genetic interventions. In addition, since isomorphic
developmental structures will generate similar patterns of phenotypic vari-
ation (see above), their evolutionary changes are expected to follow similar
trajectories. Establishing homologous relationships therefore is not a mere
2This, in turn, implies these individuals would respond in a more or less same fashion
to hypothetical interventions (Woodward, 2003). Hence homology statements eventually
boil down to counterfactual claims.
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historical description, but has predictive implications both on physiological
and evolutionary studies.
4 Comparisons and possible objections
This section compares the present proposal with some of the existing ac-
counts of homology and also discusses possible objections. A number of
philosophers and biologists have recently proposed to define homology as a
homeostatic property cluster, a cluster of correlated properties maintained by
“homeostatic mechanisms” (e.g. Boyd, 1991; Rieppel, 2005; Brigandt, 2009;
Love, 2009). Since clustering and correlations are a matter of degree, homol-
ogy according to this view is not an identity but a similarity relationship. It
thus confronts with the boundary problem — to what extent properties must
be clustered to form a homolog? The underlying “homeostatic mechanism”
is supposed to clarify this boundary, but without a clear definition of what
it is such an attempt only leads to a circularity. In particular, if it is defined
as “those causal processes that determine the boundary and integrity of the
kind (Brigandt, 2009, p.82),” the charge of circularity cannot be avoided.
This kind of problem will not arise if the generative mechanisms are de-
fined explicitly in terms of causal graphs. While my approach proposes a
formal framework to represent these mechanisms, it does not make any as-
sumption or restriction on their structure: in particular it does not require
the mechanism to be homeostatic, circumventing the criticism that a home-
14
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ostatic mechanism by definition cannot evolve (Kluge, 2003). Moreover, the
reference to “clusters” or even properties becomes superfluous, because the
variational properties of phenotype are mere derivatives of the underlying
causal graph. Of course, covarying traits suggest some ontogenetic connec-
tions, and thus may serve as a useful heuristics for finding homologs. They
are, however, only “symptoms” — what define homology are not properties,
clustered or homeostatic, but rather generative mechanisms.
The present approach has a closer affinity to the so-called biological ho-
mology concept that attempts to explain the phenomena of homology on the
basis of a particular feature of the underlying causal structure, such as gene
regulatory networks (e.g. Wagner, 1989, 2014). Indeed, one motivation of
this presentation is to give a formal platform for these empirical hypotheses
to elucidate their theoretical as well as philosophical implications. An impor-
tant empirical challenge to the biological homology concept, and any other
attempts to identify a homolog with a certain developmental structure, is the
well-known fact that morphological similarity does not entail developmental
sameness (Wagner and Misof, 1993). It has been reported that apparently
homologous characters in related species may develop from different genes,
cell populations, or pathways — the phenomena called developmental system
drift (True and Haag, 2001). Although these phenomena present a challenge
to my account as well, not all of them count as counter evidence. If, for
example, “drift” concerns only genetic or cell materials, topological features
of the causal network may remain invariant. Descriptive levels also matter.
15
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Even if two causal structures differ at a fine-grained description, they may
coincide at a more abstract level. Finally, my view does not require the en-
tire developmental system to be conserved: if causal graphs share some part,
they may still be homologous in that aspect. Indeed, it would be surprising if
two apparent homologs turn out to share no developmental underpinnings at
all. Some degree of flexibility may be expected, but so is inflexibility. Rep-
resenting and comparing homologs in terms of the underlying causal graphs
will serve as a heuristics to identify which part of the overall developmental
system is responsible for generating similar morphological patterns.
From a philosophical perspective, a distinguishing feature of my account
is its explicit reference to models. Homology has traditionally considered to
be a relationship among concrete biological entities or properties thereof: it
is organs or phenotypic features that are said to be homologous. In contrast,
homology in my view is a relationship among abstract entities, i.e. causal
graphs. How and why does such an abstract relationship reveal anything
interesting about the concrete evolutionary history? That scientific theories
and concepts should directly describe actual phenomena is a predominant
view of science both in lay and scholarly circles. Under this conception
logical positivists made it their primary task to define theoretical terms by
the observable. In the same vein philosophers of biology have tried (not
successfully in my view) to justify the concepts like homology or species by
identifying necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of visible or directly
verifiable features of organisms.
16
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This apparently intuitive picture, however, has been criticized to be an
overly simplistic view on the relationship between a scientific theory and
reality (e.g. Suppes, 1967; Cartwright, 1983; Suppe, 1989). According to the
critics the primary referents of scientific theories, concepts, and laws are not
actual phenomena but idealized models. These models are not exact replicas
of reality, but extract only certain features that are supposed to play essential
roles in the scientific problem at hand. The present analysis is in line with this
tradition. Causal graphs are highly idealized and thus possibly incomplete
representations of complex causal interactions in living systems, but it is this
idealization that affords explanatory power and general applicability. That
is, on the condition that a model extracts the common causal structure of a
population can it be used to predict the population’s evolutionary trajectory
or consequences of hypothetical interventions.
Most of these models, however, are still idiosyncratic to particular popula-
tions — e.g. population geneticists usually build, customize, or parameterize
their model for each study object.3 Homology thinking aims at even higher
generality: its core idea is that some distinct species or organs allow for the
same treatment/model in the analyses of their evolutionary fate or physiolog-
ical performance. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis as to why
such a unified explanation is possible at all. That is, it justifies the use of the
same causal model based on evolutionary history, i.e. by the descent of the
3Models of adaptive evolution, however, may be extrapolated to the same or similar
environmental conditions. In this regard, the analogical thinking and homological thinking
represent two distinct ways to generalize evolutionary models.
17
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causal graph from common ancestry. Hence homology is far from “residual,”
but has a significant explanatory value in biology — it allows an extrapo-
lation of an evolutionary or physiological model to other contexts, and thus
provides a basis for the highest-level generality in biological sciences.
5 Conclusion
The concept of homology presupposes phenotypic units on which identity
relationships can be defined. The present analysis identified these units with
causal graphs representing developmental or behavioral mechanisms and de-
fined homology as graph isomorphism over lineages. The advantage of this
formal concept is that it acknowledges the distinctive role of the study of ho-
mology while suggesting its connection to the traditional population genetics
framework. That is, it not only provides definite meanings to such con-
cepts like constraints, evolvability, and novelty, but also presents homology
as a historical account or justification of the generalizability of evolutionary
or physiological models. This is paralleled with the shift in the ontological
nature of what can be said to be homologous: homology is a relationship
between theoretical models, rather than concrete biological entities such as
organs. Hence the proper relationship between homology to actual biological
phenomena is not instantiation, but representation. Once conceived in this
way the metaphysical problem of the alleged essentialism fades away.
The new account of homology prompts empirical, theoretical, and philo-
18
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -439-
sophical researches on various topics, including the study of novelty and
evolvability, the interplay between Evo-Devo and population genetics, im-
plications of developmental flexibility, and the generalizability of biological
models, to name a few. Another interesting philosophical question not men-
tioned above is the possibility of extending the current approach to another
vexing concept in evolutionary biology, namely species. If homology is a par-
tial matching of the causal structures between distinct species, it is tempting
to define species by the whole causal structure — so that two organisms
belong to the same species if their entire ontogeny and life history are rep-
resented by the same causal graph. This is a big question that requires an
independent analysis, but will be briefly discussed in the presentation if time
permitted.
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Abstract  
The unpredictability of the development and results of a research program is often invoked in 
favor of a free, desinterested science that would be led mainly by scientific curiosity, in 
contrast with a use-inspired science led by definite practical expectations. This paper will 
challenge a crucial but underexamined assumption in this line of defense of scientific 
freedom, namely that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
results. We will propose conditions favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course 
of a scientific investigation and then establish that use-inspired science actually scores better 
in this area.  
  
1. Introduction 
“I didn’t start my research thinking that I will increase the storage capacity of hard drives. 
The final landscape is never visible from the starting point.” This statement made by the 
physicist Albert Fert (2007), winner of the 2007 Noble Prize for his work on the giant 
magnetoresistance effect, expresses a very common belief, especially among scientists, about 
the unpredictable nature of the development and results of a research program. Such 
retrospective observations feed a type of “unpredictability argument” often invoked in favor 
of a pure, disinterested science led by scientific curiosity, in contrast with a use-inspired or 
applied science led by practical considerations. Polanyi gave a somewhat lyrical form of this 
kind of unpredictability argument in his classical essay “The Republic of Science” (1962). 
Science, says Polanyi (1962, 62), “can advance only by unpredictable steps, pursuing 
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problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances will be incidental and hence 
doubly unpredictable. … Any attempt at guiding research towards a purpose other than its 
own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of science… You can kill or mutilate the 
advance of science, but you cannot shape it.” In Polanyi’s view, claims about the 
unpredictable nature of scientific development go hand in hand with a plea for an internal 
definition of research priorities: a problem should be considered important in light of 
considerations internal to a field of scientific inquiry and not (at least not primarily) in light of 
external considerations, such as practical utility. The orientation of the inquiry by practical 
objectives is then deemed epistemically counter-productive and vain: one should not attempt 
to predict the unpredictable.  
 In response to this line of defense of free science, some authors emphasize the 
epistemic fecundity of use-inspired science (Stokes 1997, Wilholt 2006, Carrier 2004) 
showing that the presence of practical objectives does not run counter to the building of 
fundamental knowledge: more fundamental knowledge may be needed to achieve some 
particular practical ends. Industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s 
is a telling example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce applicable 
results but which nevertheless produced, along the way, new fundamental knowledge 
(Wilholt 2006). 
 Our aim in this paper is to develop another line of defense of the epistemic fecundity 
of applied science, by challenging a crucial but often implicit assumption in the traditional 
defense of scientific freedom based on scientific unpredictability (such as Polanyi’s or Fert’s), 
namely the assumption that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
facts. But what are actually the conditions favoring the emergence of novelty in the course of 
a scientific investigation? This important issue has not received much epistemological 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -445-
	 3	
attention.1 We will fill this gap by first distinguishing two kinds of unpredictability arguments 
often mixed when debating on scientific freedom, to wit, unpredictability as unforeseen 
practical applications and unpredictability as serendipity (cases, as we will explain in more 
details, where unexpected facts open up new lines of inquiry). Focusing on the latter, we will 
propose two conditions that favor the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course of a 
scientific investigation. In light of these two criteria we will then compare pure, disinterested 
science and applied science as regards their capacity to generate novelty.  
 
2.Two types of unpredictability arguments 
Appeals to the unpredictability of scientific results actually refer to various kinds of 
situations, which need to be clearly distinguished. First, the notion of unpredictability of 
scientific results can designate unforeseen practical applications of fundamental knowledge. 
Second, it can refer to a serendipitous dynamics of scientific progress: a line of research may 
sometimes lead to a totally unexpected, surprising result, which opens a new direction of 
inquiry. These two kinds of unpredictability give rise to distinct arguments in favor of 
scientific freedom, unfortunately often mixed in discussions about the relative merits of pure 
science and application oriented science.  
 
2.1 Unpredictability as unforeseen practical applications 
When unpredictability refers to unexpected applications, the argument is the following: 
freedom of research should be preserved since a free, disinterested science is needed to 
generate a reservoir of fundamental knowledge, which then can be used to develop 
																																																								
1 Wilholt and Glimell (2011, 353) do touch upon this issue when discussing the link made by 
proponents of the autonomy of science between freedom of research and diversity of 
approaches favoring the epistemic productivity of science. But they just note that it is a strong 
assumption and do no further discuss its validity. 
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applications. This argument was typically developed by Vannevar Bush who appealed to the 
now classically called linear model of innovation: 
 
“Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the 
fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New 
products and new processes do not appear full-grown" (1945, 20). 
 
The development of the H-bomb in the frame of the Manhattan project is a paradigmatic case, 
also invoked by Bush: “basic discoveries of European scientists" (1945, 20) about the 
structure of the matter is what made possible the military application. Another frequently 
cited example of unpredictable application is the invention of the laser, a widely-used 
technological device nowadays, made possible by pure theoretical developments in quantum 
physics during the first half of the XXth century.  
We will not in this paper discuss further this first version of the unpredictability 
argument. Let us just mention that its underlying linear model of innovation linking pure 
science and practical applications has already been challenged on several grounds by various  
authors (e.g. Brooks, 1994; Leydesdorff, 1997; Edgerton, 2004; Rosenberg, 1992). We rather 
want to focus on the second (and also widespread) type of unpredictability arguments, whose 
validity has been much less scrutinized.   
 
2.2 Unpredictability as serendipity 
This second type of argument appeals to unpredictability in the sense of serendipity: an 
unexpected observation or result opens up a new line of research leading to a fundamental 
discovery. A very well known historical episode illustrating such a serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the invention of the first antibiotic by Flemings, after he had accidentally 
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observed the effect of a fungi (Penicilium) on bacteria colonies (Flemings, 1929). Also often 
cited is the discovery of radioactivity by Henri Becquerel (1896): when working with a crystal 
containing uranium, Becquerel noted that the crystal had fogged a photographic plate that he 
had inadvertently left next to the mineral. This observation led to the hypothesis that uranium 
emitted its own radiations. Another, perhaps less cited instance of serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the discovery of the chemotherapeutic cisplatine molecule by scientists initially 
working on the effects of an electric field on bacteria growth (Rosenberg et al.,1967). They 
observed that cell division was inhibited because of the unexpected formation of a chemical 
compound with the Platinum atoms contained in the electrode. This chemical compound, 
which they named cisplatine, was then successfully tested as an anti-proliferative agent 
against tumoral cells.  
When unpredictability refers to such serendipitous discoveries, freedom of research is 
defended on the grounds that scientists should be able to freely change the direction of their 
research or open up new lines of inquiry, in order to be able to follow up on unexpected 
results, thereby generating new knowledge (which in turn will possibly lead to new 
applications). But to properly work as an argument favoring free, disinterested research over 
applied research, this “serendipity argument” actually presupposes that the occurrence of 
surprising facts is more likely to happen in the first system of science than in the second. For 
increasing the production of new knowledge (and possibly new applications) does not only 
depend on being able to freely follow up on unexpected facts, it also (obviously) depends on 
whether occurrences of unexpected facts are favored, to start with. Two types of 
considerations are thus mixed in the serendipity argument: considerations on the occurrence 
of unexpected facts and considerations on the (institutional, material) possibility to follow up 
on them.   
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We will not for the moment discuss the second type of considerations and focus on the 
first, which has been largely neglected in the literature on scientific freedom, namely the 
conditions that favor the occurrence of surprising facts. Our central issue is thus the 
following: is a use-inspired science less likely to generate unexpected results than a free 
science mainly fuelled by curiosity? After having clarified the notion of unexpected result, we 
will propose two criteria that, we will argue, favor the occurrence of such results and in light 
of which free science and applied science can be compared.   
 
3. Conditions of emergence of unexpected facts 
By “unexpected facts” occurring in the course of an inquiry, we simply mean here results 
(observations, outcomes of an experiment, etc.) that cannot be accounted for within the 
theoretical or, more largely, the epistemic framework in which the empirical inquiry has been 
conceived and conducted. This kind of “exteriority” is what leads scientists to move away 
from the initial explanatory framework and open up new lines of inquiry in search of an 
alternative one that could accommodate the unexpected results. 
 
3.1 Isolation and purification of phenomena 
It is now a well-known feature of contemporary experimental sciences that many of 
their objects under study are “created” in the laboratory rather than existing “as such” in the 
real world. When drawing our attention to this epistemologically important feature, Hacking 
(e.g. 1983, chap. 13) specified that we should not read this notion of “creation” of phenomena 
as if we were making the phenomenon, suggesting instead that a phenomenon is “created” in 
the laboratory to the extent that it does not exist outside of certain kinds of apparatus. This is 
typically the case for a phenomenon like the Hall effect: it did not exist “until, with great 
ingenuity, [Hall] had discovered how to isolate, purify it, create it in the laboratory” (Hacking 
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1983, 226, our italics). In other words, Hall created in 1879 the material arrangement  - a 
current passing through a conductor, at right angles to a magnetic field –, for the effect to 
occur and “if anywhere in nature there [were] this arrangement, with no intervening causes, 
then the Hall effect [would] occur” (1983, 226, our italics). Isolation, purification, control of 
intervening causes (i.e. control of physical parameters) are noticeable features of an 
experimental protocol that have a straightforward consequence directly relevant for our 
philosophical interrogation on serendipity: they tend to limit the number of causal pathways 
which can influence the response of the object or phenomenon under study experimentally. 
Unknown causal pathways existing in the real world are thus inoperant (or less operant) in 
laboratory conditions, thereby limiting the occurrence of unexpected results. Hence our first 
criterion to evaluate whether a certain system of science favors surprising results: the more 
the phenomena under study in that system are isolated, purified in highly regimented 
experimental conditions, the less likely the occurrence of unexpected results is.   
Moreover, isolation, purification of phenomena often go hand in hand with another 
noticeable feature of laboratory sciences, described by Hacking as follows: “as a laboratory 
science matures, it develops a body of types of theory and types of apparatus and types of 
analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other” (1992, 30). In particular, a given theoretical 
framework determines the type of questions that can be probed experimentally, guides the 
design of apparatus and defines the type of data produced. Consequently, “data 
uninterpretable by theories are not generated” (Hacking 1992, 55). This process of mutual 
constraints is well illustrated for instance by recent experimental inquiries in particle physics, 
such as the quest for the Higgs Boson. Its existence was postulated in the frame of the 
Standard Model of theoretical physics (Higgs, 1964) and complex experimental apparatus 
have been developed with the explicit goal of “discovering” it (LEP, 2003). The “discovery” 
occurred in 2012 (ATLAS, 2012) but the high degree of tailoring of the apparatus to the 
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theory postulating the particle can be considered as imposing some kind of a priori structure 
on the phenomenon, so that particles such as the Higgs boson are not so much “discovered” 
than “manufactured” (Falkenburg, 2007, 53). In any case, the “discovery” of the Higgs boson 
was hardly a surprise and illustrates Hacking’s more general contention about experimental 
inquiries typical of contemporary laboratory sciences as opposed to real-world experiments: 
“[their] results are more often expected than surprising” (1992, 37, our italics).  
 
3.2 Theoretical unifying ambition  
Another relevant characteristic of an experimental inquiry is the degree of generality of its 
theoretical framework. Scientists working within a theoretical framework with a large 
unifying scope will be reluctant to “leave” it and search for an alternative one when facing an 
unexpected result, and for good epistemological reasons: there is (obviously) a high epistemic 
cost of abandoning a theoretical framework that provides explanations for a large set of 
phenomena. The right move is rather to try to accommodate the surprising result by adopting, 
if necessary, ad hoc hypothesis or tinkering with some ingredients of the existing theoretical 
framework, so that the result looses its “exteriority” and ends up being integrated. And 
because of this well-known “plasticity” and integrative power of well-established theoretical 
frameworks with a large unifying scope2, when a (at first sight) surprising result occurs, it 
rarely leads to the opening up of a new line of inquiry in search of an alternative explanatory 
framework, but rather gets integrated within the existing one, thereby losing its 
unexpectedness. 
 There is another reason why a high degree of theoretical generality does not favor the 
occurrence of unexpected results, which is linked to our previous remarks on the process of 
																																																								
2 Classical references on these ideas of plasticity or integrative power are of course Kuhn’s 
description (1962) of scientists being busy working on resolving anomalies in normal science 
and Lakatos’ concept of “protective belt” of a research program (1978). 
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mutual adjustment between theoretical ingredients, apparatus and data. By constraining the 
type of experimental procedures developed and the type of data generated, a theoretical 
framework with a large unifying scope tends to homogenize the experimental works 
conducted to probe the various phenomena that it accounts for. And since a diversity of 
experimental approaches increases the possible sources of emergence of surprising facts, we 
can conclude that by reducing this diversity, theoretical generality makes the occurrence of 
unexpected facts less likely to happen.  
 The case of the etiology of cancer provides interesting illustrations of these two 
unexpectedness-diminishing effects of theoretical generality. The classical theory of cancer, 
the Somatic Mutations Theory (SMT), has been challenged for fifteen years or so by a new 
theoretical approach, the Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT) (Sonnenschein and Soto, 
2000). First developed in the 1970's, the SMT rapidly became the dominant research 
theoretical framework on carcinogenesis (Mukherjee, 2010). This hegemony led to a high 
degree of homogenization of the experimental inquiries:  the experimental procedures were all 
dedicated to the very standardized search for genetic mutations, in the context of molecular 
biology. Moreover, many, if not all surprising observations were made compatible with SMT 
by using ad hoc hypothesis (Soto, 2011). For instance, it was observed that various types of 
cancer were exhibiting large-scale disorganization of the genome. This observation was 
unexpected to the extent that it could not fit with SMT’s fundamental postulate of punctual 
mutations. To integrate it in the frame of SMT, the existence of an original genetic instability 
of the cancer cells was then postulated (Rajagopalan, 2003).  
 
4 Use-inspired science, pure science, and unexpected facts 
In light of the criteria that we proposed above, how does pure, disinterested science score 
compared to applied science when it comes to favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts? A 
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helpful starting point is provided by Martin Carrier’s insightful characterization of applied 
science: 
 
“Three methodological features can be observed whose combined or marked 
appearance tends to be characteristic of applied science: local models rather than 
unified theories, contextualized causal relations rather than causal mechanisms, real-
experiments rather than laboratory experiment conducted for answering theoretical 
questions" (2004, 4). 
 
4.1 Local models 
Let us start with the contrast between local models and unified theories. Whereas pure science 
often aims at providing comprehensive and unifying theoretical frameworks (think of the 
Standard Model in particle physics or the Big Bang model in cosmology), use-inspired 
research is characterized by the coexistence of numerous local models, each determining the 
development of specific experimental procedures. An extreme case of this locality are for 
instance the design-rules used in the industry, which are built as laws guiding action (Wilholt, 
2006). They are experimentally confirmed rules providing relations among different relevant 
parameters to manufacture industrial products. These rules are extremely specific: they apply 
to a very few number of situations and each of them determines a singular experimental 
practice. The use of local models is also widespread in the biomedical sciences, a typically 
use-inspired field of research. We will again draw on oncology to illustrate our point. 
Consider for instance the case of the development of radiotherapy protocols in the first half of 
the XXth century. The aim was to intervene on cancer to cure it, without any general model 
describing the mechanism of carcinogenesis. This program promoted the development of a 
variety of exploratory approaches using X-rays against cancer (Pinell, 1992). As there were 
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no standardized protocols, many experimental procedures were tested, changing the density of 
X-rays received, the distance of emission, the frequency of the radiotherapy sessions. In order 
to improve the efficiency of the therapeutic methods, scientists tried to build various local 
models describing the action of X-rays on cancer, corresponding to the variety of 
experimental procedures implemented. Grubbe (1949) formulated a model based on the 
inflammatory reaction to explain the effects of radiotherapy on cancer: the inflammation of 
the surrounding tissue beyond the effects of X-rays is responsible for the decrease of tumoral 
mass. This model is applicable to his specific use of X-rays: he applied very high doses, 
necessary to generate an inflammatory response. In parallel, Tribondeau and Bergonié, using 
more moderate doses, developed a model based on the proliferation of the cells in tumoral 
context, which led to the "Bergonié law": X-rays have a higher impact on proliferating cells 
(Tribondeau, 1959).  
 What lessons can be drawn from this first contrast between local models and unified 
theories? The answer is rather straightforward, given the link spelled out in the previous 
section between the level of generality of theoretical models and the occurrence of 
unexpected facts (our second criterion): by promoting the use of a diversity of local models 
and heterogeneous experimental protocols, applied science favors the occurrence of 
unexpected facts, whereas the penchant of pure science for comprehensive unifying 
theoretical frameworks, hence homogenized experimental protocols, does not.    
 
4.2 Causal incompletness 
Let us compare now pure science and applied science in light of our first criterion based on 
the degree of isolation and purification of the phenomena under study. A directly relevant 
feature of applied science is the use of what Carrier calls “contextualized causal relations” 
rather than full causal chains. Use-inspired science typically aims at directly intervening on a 
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process or phenomenon often disposing only of a partial knowledge of the causal chains 
involved and without being able to isolate it from various causal influences exerted by the rest 
of the physical world. A direct consequence of this feature of applied science is the low 
degree of control of its experimental protocols. By contrast, since pure science aims primarily 
at answering fundamental theoretical questions, it designs highly regimented experimental 
procedures that isolate and purify phenomena in order to be able to get empirical answers 
about the specific fundamental processes questioned in the theoretical investigation3. 
Moreover, building highly regimented experimental procedures requires knowledge of full 
causal chains in order to be able to better control the response of the system under study. The 
outcome of the application of our criterion is then again straightforward: compared with pure 
science, applied science favors the occurrence of unexpected facts to the extent that its 
experimental procedures are less controlled and based only on partial knowledge of the causal 
influences exerted on the phenomenon under study.  
 The etiology of cancer provides again interesting illustrations of our claim. Indeed, 
many current cancer therapies built in the frame of use-inspired research are based on 
contextualized causal relations. Typically, if a cellular agent is found to be massively 
expressed in cancer cells, drugs are designed to inhibit it, even if the whole causal chain 
determining its action is not known. For instance, a large amount of proteins promoting 
angiogenesis (the growth of blood vessels), notably VEGF (Vascular Endothelial Growth 
Factor), was found in tumoral cells, leading to the design of anti-VEGF molecules (Sitohy, 
																																																								
3 Carrier sums up this contrast as follows: “Empirical tests often proceed better by focusing on 
the pure cases, the idealized ones, because such cases typically yield a more direct access to 
the processes considered fundamental by the theory at hand. But applied science is denied the 
privilege of epistemic research to select its problems according to their tractability (...). 
Practical challenges typically involve a more intricate intertwinement of factors and are thus 
harder to put under control". (2004a, 4) In the life sciences, this focus on “pure cases” means 
using “model organisms” or a limited  number of well spread cell lines (e.g.  the HeLa cells or 
the Saccharomyces Cerevisiae yeast) to elucidate fundamental biological mechanisms. And 
the use of such standardized objects tends to homogenize the experimental protocols.  
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2012). These molecules are used without considering the complete causal chain in which the 
VEGF is embedded. Only their known action on angiogenesis is considered. The clinical tests 
have led to unexpected observations: the use of an anti-VEGF molecule (Avastin) can 
stimulate tumor growth (Lieu et al., 2013)4. This example shows that the use of 
contextualized causal relations promotes the appearance of surprising facts by allowing 
unknown mechanisms to intervene in the experimental procedure.  
 
 
5. Concluding discussion 
 
Our previous analysis has established that several features of pure, disinterested science make 
it less hospitable than use-inspired science to the occurrence of unexpected facts. For all that, 
it does not follow that proponents of freedom of science cannot appeal anymore to 
unpredictability in the sense of serendipity to make their case. For the issue of which 
conditions favor the occurrence of unexpected facts is only half of the story. The other half is 
the possibility to actually follow up on these occurrences and open new lines of inquiry. And 
this other half raises different issues. What are the institutional, social structures of science 
that make it easier for scientists to re-orient their research when needed? To what extent an 
initial orientation of a scientific investigation by “external” practical needs is less compatible 
with the opening of new lines of inquiry than an initial orientation by epistemic considerations 
internal to the dynamics of a scientific field? When appealing to the serendipity argument, 
																																																								
4 Interestingly, this observation led to new use-inspired research programs, aiming at 
identifing the molecular causal pathways giving rise to this tumoral resistance phenomenon. It  
has notably strongly oriented the research toward the precise understanding of the VEGF 
pathways (Moens, 2014). For instance, the study of the mechanisms of expression in cancer 
cells of various kinds of  VEGF agents is becoming an important program of research (Li, 
2014) and these works allow to build new fundamental knowledge about the action of the 
VEGF proteins.  
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proponents of free, disinterested science not only presuppose that it is the best system of 
science to generate unexpected facts to start with – a contention that we have challenged in 
this paper – but also that it actually gives more freedom to scientists to follow up on 
unexpected results. In other words, the issue of scientists’ given possibility to change the 
direction of their research when needed is somewhat mixed, confused with the normative 
issue of what the aims of science should be (in short, increase knowledge following 
considerations internal to science vs. answer external practical needs). But it seems to us that 
the two issues should be kept separate. After all, one can very well conceive a system of 
science whose aims are primarily to answer society needs but which nevertheless leaves 
scientists free to choose the lines of inquiry that seem to them the most promising ways of 
fulfilling these needs (which includes changing research directions if needed). Otherwise put, 
one can very well conceive a use-inspired science which is not a programmed science in 
which scientists are asked to plan every step of their inquiry in order to achieve a given aim. 
And note that a pure, disinterested science may be as much programmed as a use-inspired 
science: the fact that scientists are left free to choose the aims of their research does not 
protect them from having to plan every step to reach these aims. In any case, our purport in 
this paper was not to attack pure, disinterested science. There are, no doubt, many good 
reasons to defend it, but the widespread, traditional one grounded on the unpredictability of 
scientific inquiry is certainly not the most epistemologically cogent and solid one.  
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Abstract
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a 
significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process.  A question that 
naturally arises is: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose 
values should be used?  A common answer to this  question turns to political 
values — i.e. the values of the public or its representatives.  In this paper, I argue 
that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively 
requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with.  I 
conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.
1.  Values in Science and the Political View
By now, most philosophers of science probably agree that there is an important place for 
so-called contextual (i.e. personal, ethical, political) values in core parts of the scientific process, 
especially in areas where science is connected to policy-making.  Values may appropriately play 
a role in evaluating evidence (Douglas 2009), choosing scientific models (Elliott 2011), 
structuring quantitative measures (Reiss 2013, ch. 8; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010; Hausman 
 For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Alex Rajczi and the students in a seminar on science and values at 1
Claremont McKenna College.  For discussions on related topics, I thank Gil Hersch, Daniel Steel, and Branwen Williams. This 
work was supported in part by a research grant from the Claremont McKenna College Center for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship.
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2015), and/or in preparing information for presentation to non-experts (Elliott 2006; Hardwig 
1994; Resnik 2001; Schroeder 2016).  The natural follow-up question has received less sustained 
attention:  when scientists should make use of values, which (or whose) values should they use?   2
In some cases, philosophers of science criticize a value choice on substantive ethical 
grounds (e.g. Shrader-Frechette 2008; Hoffmann and Stempsey 2008).  This suggests that the 
values to be used are the objectively correct ones.  A second common view gives scientists 
latitude to choose whatever (reasonable) values they prefer or think best, usually supplemented 
by a requirement of transparency.  This is suggested by many existing codes of scientific ethics, 
which impose few constraints on scientists in making such choices.   Finally, a third view says 3
that scientists ought to use the appropriate political values — that is, the values held or endorsed 
by the public or its representatives — at least when those values are informed and substantively 
reasonable.   The most straightforward argument for this view grounds it in considerations of 4
democracy or political legitimacy.  If certain value choices are going to ultimately influence 
policy, then the public or its representatives have a right to make those choices (Douglas 2005; 
Intemann 2015; cf. Steele 2012; Kitcher 2001).
There are, of course further possibilities, and these views can be combined in more 
complex ways (e.g. requiring scientists to use political values in some domains, while permitting 
them to use their personal values in others).  But if, for simplicity, we stick to these three primary 
 In some cases, the justification for incorporating values into the scientific process dictates an answer.  Feminist critiques of 2
historically androcentric fields, for example, suggest that non-androcentric values are needed as a corrective.  I set aside such 
cases in this paper.
 Mara Walli, Matthew Wong, and I discuss this at length in a work-in-progress.3
 I set aside, then, cases where the values, say, of a policy-maker are unreasonable, in the sense that they lie outside the range of 4
values that ought to be tolerated in a liberal society.  In such cases, an advocate of the political view may permit or require 
scientists to reject those unreasonable values.  (See e.g. Resnik 2001.)  Also, in this paper I will set aside the important question 
of what the political view ought to say when the values of the public diverge from the values of policy-makers.  The answer to 
this question, I think, will depend on one’s theory of political representation.
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options, I think the third, which I will call the political view, is the most attractive.  More 
precisely, I think that in most cases where values are called for in core parts of the scientific 
process, scientists should privilege political values.   The most obvious concern with this view, 5
and one that has received much attention from its advocates, is that it doesn’t seem practical.  It 
isn’t feasible to ask citizens or policy-makers to weigh in at every point in the scientific process 
where values are required, and even if we could, non-experts often will not have the scientific 
background to fully understand the options before them.  Substitutes for actual participation on 
the part of policy-makers or the public, such as asking scientists to predict what the public would 
choose or to determine what values policy-makers would hold upon reflection, seem to place 
unreasonable epistemic demands on scientists.
Douglas (2005), Intemann (2015), Guston (2004), and others have argued that these 
problems aren’t insurmountable, by suggesting specific ways that the concerns of policy-makers 
and the public can be brought into the scientific process.  And Kevin Elliott (2006; 2011) has 
suggested a more general way we might make progress.  The political view goes hand-in-hand 
with a view of the relationship between science and policy that is widely-held:  that the role of a 
scientist is to promote informed decision-making by policy-makers.   Bioethicists have 6
extensively discussed how health care professionals can promote informed decision-making on 
the part of patients and research subjects.  Theoretical and empirical research has led to a range 
of suggestions for how physicians can promote informed decision-making, even in cases where a 
patient’s values may be uncertain, different research subjects may hold different values, and so 
 This, of course, is proposed as a principle of professional ethics - not e.g. a legal requirement.5
 See also Resnik (2001), Martin and Schinzinger (2010), and Schroeder (2016) for theoretical defenses of this idea, which is 6
consonant with the mission statements of many scientific organizations and associations.
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forth.  Elliott’s hope is that many of these suggestions can be adapted to the scientific case, or at 
least a parallel research program could be carried out, informed by the work of bioethicists.7
It is, of course, far from established that these proposals will work, but the range of 
options on the table strikes me as cause for optimism.  And even if these solutions don’t work in 
all cases, there is still bite to the political view, since it could still tell scientists to use political 
values when they can determine those values.  Accordingly, in this paper I would like to describe 
a different and I think deeper concern with the political view, one which has been conspicuously 
absent from the literature thus far.  In requiring scientists to guide certain aspects of their work 
by political values, we will sometimes in effect ask that they support political causes they may 
personally oppose and bar them from fully advocating for their preferred policy measures.  We 
are, then, depriving scientists of important political rights possessed by the general public.  In the 
remainder of this paper, I will spell out this objection more fully and explain why I think it has 
significant moral force.  In the end, I will suggest that although there is reason to think that the 
objection doesn’t ultimately undermine the political view, it nevertheless constitutes a significant 
cost that accompanies that view, which its proponents need to acknowledge.
2.  Two Cases Where the Political View Seems Troublesome
The literature on values in science is vast and diverse, and so it will be useful to have 
some particular examples in mind.  First, consider Douglas’s (2000; 2009) argument that 
scientists should or must appeal to value judgments when resolving certain uncertainties that 
arise during the scientific process.  Scientists conducting research into the potential carcinogen 
dioxin, for example, were faced with liver samples which had tumors that could not clearly be 
 See also Schroeder (2016) for how this might go.7
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categorized as malignant or benign.  In resolving such borderline or ambiguous cases, Douglas 
argues that scientists should appeal to contextual values, when the constitutive norms of science 
don’t dictate any resolution.  In this case, health-protective values would lead scientists to 
classify borderline samples as malignant; while concerns about overregulation would lead 
scientists to classify those same samples as benign (Douglas 2000).  
Second, consider the many choices that scientists have to make when preparing their 
results for presentation.  How should uncertainty be characterized?  (Should 90% or 95% 
confidence intervals be used?)  Which study results should be highlighted?  (Which drug side 
effects should be discussed at length, and which included as part of a long list?)  How should 
statistics be summarized?  (As means or medians?  Should results be broken down by gender, or 
presented only in aggregate?)  In making choices like these, scientists frequently must appeal to 
values — to decide, for example, which pieces of information are important and which are not.8
It is, I presume, fairly uncontroversial that these value choices — how to resolve 
uncertainties in the research process and how to present results — can influence policy in 
foreseeable ways.  Douglas, for example, argues that this is the case in the dioxin studies.  
Classifying borderline samples as malignant will make dioxin appear to be a more potent 
carcinogen, likely leading policy-makers to regulate it more stringently (2000, 571).  Keohane, 
Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014) show how a presentation choice made by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change led to poor policy outcomes, which likely could have been avoided by 
presenting information differently.  More generally, we know from a wealth of studies in 
psychology and behavioral economics that the way information is presented to someone can 
strongly influence her subsequent choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), and there have been 
 For discussions, see Elliott (2006), Hardwig (1994), Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014), Resnik (2001), and Schroeder 8
(2016).
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several influential commentaries calling for scientists to more carefully “frame” their results 
(Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Lakoff 2010).  So it seems straightforward that the value choices 
made by scientists can predictably affect policy.
If these value choices can influence policy, then in directing scientists to make them in 
accordance with political values — as opposed to the scientists’ personal values — we are asking 
scientists to characterize policy-relevant material in a way that may promote an outcome they 
strongly disfavor.  For example, suppose the scientists in Douglas’s dioxin study value public 
health much more than they value keeping industry free from overregulation, but the public and 
its elected representatives have the opposite view.  Further, suppose both views are substantively 
reasonable, in that they are within the range of policies eligible for adoption through democratic 
processes.  In this case, the political view would tell the scientists to categorize borderline 
samples as benign, since that would better cohere with the public’s values.  This could make 
dioxin appear to have minimal carcinogenic effects, predictably leading to less regulation than 
would have occurred had the scientists classified borderline samples according to their own, 
health-protective values.  Similarly, suppose an environmental economist conducting an impact 
study of a proposed construction project is herself deeply committed to the preservation of 
natural spaces.  Nevertheless, if the public is strongly committed to economic development, the 
political view would require her to put front-and-center a detailed breakdown of the economic 
consequences of construction, while describing the ecological costs more briefly or in a less 
prominent place — likely frustrating her desire for preservation.
Notice that the concern here is not simply that scientists are being asked to provide 
information that will lead to an outcome they disfavor.  I take it that any reasonable approach to 
scientific ethics will require that scientists communicate honestly, even in cases where that 
!6
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promises to yield policies they don’t like.  Similarly, I presume that scientists must also be 
forbidden from presenting information in ways that, though technically accurate, are nevertheless 
misleading.  The problem here is that Douglas’s scientists are being asked to characterize results 
in one way (as benign) that could, with equal scientific validity, have been characterized 
differently (as malignant).  And our environmental economist is being asked to present her 
results in one way (highlighting economic benefits), when an alternate presentation (one 
highlighting ecological costs) would be equally honest, accurate, objective, transparent, clear, 
and so forth.  In each case, then, we have a collection of underlying data which can be described 
or characterized in different ways, neither of which appears to be more scientifically valid than 
the other.  The political view insists that scientists choose the description grounded in values they 
don’t accept and which seems likely to promote policy outcomes they disfavor.  In this respect, 
the political view requires scientists to in effect advocate for, or at least tilt the playing field 
towards, political views they disagree with.9
3.  Elliott and The Principle of Helpfulness
This seems clearly to be a significant imposition on scientists and thus a cost of the 
political view.  It is therefore surprising that, so far as I can tell, philosophers who have argued 
for the political view have not commented on it.  This is most striking in Elliott’s work.  Elliott, 
recall, argues that scientists should aim to promote informed decision-making among policy-
makers, in something like the way physicians should aim to promote informed decision-making 
among patients.  Standard accounts in bioethics say that it is the patient’s values that carry the 
 Can’t we let the scientists advocate for their preferred positions in other ways?  We could let scientists present their preferred 9
interpretation separately.  But if the political view is to have bite, presumably these alternate results will have to be clearly 
designated so and offered in a less prominent place (e.g. in an appendix or online supplement).  And we should of course permit 
scientists to advocate for their views outside of their scientific papers/reports.  But it seems likely that these (private) statements 
will carry much less policy weight than their scientific ones.
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day: in normal cases, the physician’s job is to help a patient make decisions that cohere with her 
own values.  If the scientific cases is analogous, then the scientist’s job is to help policy-makers 
make decisions that cohere with their (or the public’s) values.  This, in turn, suggests that 
scientists should use political values when resolving uncertainties, presenting results, and so 
forth.  In other words, Elliott’s proposal seems to imply the political view.10
The main defense Elliott offers for this view, however, relies on Scanlon’s “Principle of 
Helpfulness”:
Suppose I learn, in the course of conversation with a person, that I have a piece of 
information that would be of great help to her because it would save her a great deal of 
time and effort in pursuing her life’s project.  It would surely be wrong of me to fail 
(simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is no compelling 
reason not to do so.11
Elliott sums up the idea this way:  “[I]n situations where one can significantly help another 
individual by engaging in an action that requires little sacrifice, it is morally unacceptable not to 
help” (2011, 139).  If the political view, however, requires characterizing data or presenting 
information in ways that promote policy choices a scientist strongly opposes, then this Principle 
doesn’t apply.  When the pro-health scientist is required to classify ambiguous samples as 
benign, that does involve a sacrifice.  A refusal to do so — which would hinder the pro-industry 
policy-maker’s ability to make an informed regulatory decision — would not be done “simply 
out of indifference”.  It would be done out of the scientist’s desire to protect public health.  
 In some work, Elliott appears to suggest that transparency about values may be enough (Elliott and Resnik 2014).  That is, he 10
doesn’t seem to place (many) constraints on scientists’ value choices, so long as they are open about those choices.  If that is 
Elliott’s view — and it is not clear to me that it is — it strikes me as in tension with his insistence that scientists promote 
informed decision-making.  Surely I can better help you make a decision that coheres with your values by working from your 
values, rather than by working from my own values (even if I am open about what I am doing).  Further, even if scientists are 
open about their value choices, policy-makers frequently won’t have the technical expertise to be able to reinterpret a scientific 
study, replacing one set of values (the scientist’s) with another (their own).  (If values could so easily be swapped out by non-
specialists, then much of the debate about values would be unimportant.  Transparency is all we would require.)
 Scanlon (1996, 224), quoted in Elliott (2011, 139).11
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(Similar things, obviously, can be said about the environmental economist asked to highlight the 
economic aspects of a proposed construction project.)
Scanlon’s Principle of Helpfulness is a quite weak one, applying only in cases where the 
agent in question can put forward no significant burden of compliance.  That Elliott uses it to 
justify his informed decision-making framework, and implicitly the political view, suggests that 
he thinks that such a view doesn’t impose significant burdens on scientists.  But if what I’ve said 
has been correct, that is wrong.  Even if the political view is justified — and, as I’ve said, I think 
it is — we need to recognize that it asks a lot of scientists in cases where their values diverge 
from those of the relevant political body.
4.  Physicians vs. Scientists
This, however, brings up an interesting question.  If Elliott is right that the scientific case 
is analogous to the biomedical case, then shouldn’t informed consent requirements in medicine 
be treated as similarly burdensome?  Few bioethicists, though, would have sympathy for a 
physician who claimed that seeking informed consent constituted a significant ethical burden.  
(They may have sympathy for the claim that seeking informed consent is burdensome in more 
mundane ways — e.g. too time-consuming — but those complaints seem very unlike the 
scientists’.)  I think that there is an important difference between the cases, which will help us to 
more clearly understand why the scientist is often burdened in a way that carries moral weight, 
while the physician normally is not.
We can see this by constructing a case which seems to put a physician in a position like 
the scientist’s.  Consider Jane, a doctor who strongly believes that the end of life for terminal 
patients is greatly enhanced by effective pain management, even if doing so shorten’s the 
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patient’s life or impairs his consciousness.  For this reason, Jane has chosen palliative care as her 
specialty, making it her life’s work to help dying patients avoid unnecessary pain.  One of her 
patients, John, has continually insisted that he wants to remain as lucid as possible, even if that 
means agony.  As he lies here, in agony, Jane suspects that if she framed the information properly 
— highlighting a medication’s ability to relieve pain, while downplaying its cognitive effects — 
she might be able to get John to accept it.  And accepting the medication, Jane strongly believes, 
would be much better for John.  Nevertheless, standard interpretations of informed consent 
forbid her from doing so.  Knowing that John is especially concerned about lucidity, she is 
ethically bound to highlight that information when informing him of his options.  Unsurprisingly, 
John declines the pain medication and experiences what Jane regards as an awful death — 
precisely the kind of thing she went into palliative care to prevent.
Like our pro-health scientist, Jane has been asked to present information in a way that 
ultimately frustrates her deeply-valued goals.  But imagine Jane complains to the ethics board at 
her hospital, arguing that it is burdensome to ask her to highlight to John the effects of pain 
medication on lucidity, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-held values.  This complaint 
doesn’t strike me as at all compelling.  Why?  Because Jane’s values shouldn’t hold any sway 
over John’s medical choices.  John has the right to reject pain medication, whatever Jane (or just 
about anyone else) thinks about it.  Put another way, John has no obligation to take Jane’s wishes 
into consideration, when he makes his decision.  His decision is ultimately his.
Now, imagine our pro-health scientist complains to her ethics committee, asserting that it 
is burdensome to ask her to present her data in a pro-industry light, when it could with equal 
scientific validity be presented in a pro-health light, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-
held concern for public health.  Or imagine the environmental economist complaining about 
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having to foreground the economic benefits of the proposed construction project, since doing so 
will make it more likely that the project is approved and another natural space will be bulldozed.  
If we assume that the scientists are citizens of the society in question, then their situation is 
different from Jane’s.  As citizens in a democracy, their views should hold some sway over their 
government’s policy choices.  A government does have an obligation to take its citizens’ views 
into consideration when making policy decisions.  And when the government ultimately acts, it 
does so on the scientists’ behalf.  The decision is, in part, the scientists’.
The scientists, then, are stakeholders and even part-decision-makers in the associated 
policy-decisions, in a way that Jane is not a stakeholder in John’s decision.  This is true even if 
Jane cares more about John’s decision than our scientists care about the policy decisions.  We can 
see, then, that the political view isn’t burdensome simply because it directs scientists to promote 
or advocate for outcomes they disfavor.  It is burdensome because it sometimes directs scientists 
to promote or advocate for disfavored views, on matters that they have a right to speak on, to a 
body that purports to act on their behalf.  This is what gives their burden its moral significance.12
5.  Justifying the Burdens of the Political View
Some scientists have recognized the burdens that even neutrality — let alone the political 
view — would impose on them.  
Conservation biology is inescapably normative. Advocacy for the preservation of 
biodiversity is part of the scientific practice of conservation biology.  If the editorial 
policy of or the publications in [the journal] Conservation Biology direct the discipline 
toward an “objective, value-free” approach, then they do not educate and transform 
society…  To pretend that the acquisition of “positive knowledge” alone with avert mass 
extinctions is misguided…  Without openly acknowledging such a perspective, 
 What about cases where the scientists are not citizens of the society in question?  In some cases, we can still make out a 12
stakeholder claim.  (When it comes to climate change, for example, we are all stakeholders in U.S. climate policy.)  But such 
cases raise complications which I unfortunately can’t discuss in a short paper like this one.
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conservation could become merely a subdiscipline of biology, intellectually and 
functionally sterile and incapable of averting an anthropogenic mass extinction.  (Barry 
and Oelschlaeger 1996)13
Most conservation biologists enter that field because of a strong commitment to the value of 
biodiversity and the preservation of nature (Marris 2006).  Similar things are surely true of other 
scientific disciplines.  (My experience has been that public health researchers and economists 
studying inequality disproportionately share certain political values.)  To the extent that these 
values diverge from the values of the public and its representatives, the political view would 
require these scientists to continually characterize their results in ways structured by a value 
system they find unacceptable.  (In this respect, things would be quite different for, say, climate 
scientists.  Although their work is controversial, it nevertheless is founded on values that are 
widely shared.  The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change are ones that 
virtually everyone cares about.  Climate change deniers typically object to the empirical claims 
made by climate scientists - not to the basic values they hold.)
Is it fair, then, to tell a conservation biologist, who perhaps entered the field because of 
her love for natural spaces and has spent the bulk of her life collecting information that she hopes 
can be used to preserve them, that she is nevertheless ethically bound to resolve uncertainties in 
her research in ways favorable to economic growth, or to present her results in ways that 
highlight the economic value (as opposed to, say, the private or aesthetic value) of undeveloped 
land?  I don’t have a full answer to this question — such an answer would require more 
empirical information, as well as a fuller discussion of political philosophy — but I think we can 
see how the argument would go.  There are a range of situations in which we impose significant 
 This article was followed by a collection of commentaries, most of which generally supported the authors’ views.  Similar 13
proposals seem to crop up frequently among conservation biologists, and are generally endorsed by those in the field (Marris 
2006).
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restrictions on speech and advocacy for people in important social positions.  The Code of 
Conduct for U.S. judges, for example, bars judges from publicly endorsing candidates for 
political office and from making speeches for political organizations.   Uniformed U.S. military 14
personnel are not permitted to participate in political fundraising, speak at political events, or 
display political signs, even on their private vehicles.   Other constraints on speech and 15
advocacy seem ethically appropriate for politicians, police officers, lawyers, and others.  
So, if there is an important public good served by constraining scientists’ advocacy, it 
doesn’t seem in principle problematic to do so.  Two arguments along these lines seem 
promising.  First, a distinctly political approach might argue that although imposing this burden 
on scientists does restrict important political rights of speech and advocacy, it is done in order to 
expand the political rights of others.  By requiring scientists to work from the values of the 
public, the ability of the public to make informed policy choices and to effectively advocate for 
their own positions is enhanced.  Thus, although the political view constitutes a loss of political 
freedom to scientists, that loss is more than balanced by the gain in political freedom to the 
public as a whole.  (A view like this seems generally consistent with an approach to democracy 
like Brettschneider’s (2007).)
Second, a straightforwardly consequentialist argument could point out the terrible 
consequences that threaten to follow if the public and/or policy-makers distrust scientific results.  
One of the primary arguments that has been put forward in favor of informed-consent approaches 
in bioethics has been that it promotes trust on the part of patients.  Similarly, Elliott’s informed 
decision-making approach — which implies the political view — seems like a promising way to 
 http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges14
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf15
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promote trust in science (Elliott 2011, 133-6; cf. Hardwig 1994; Resnik 2001).  If, then, the 
political view proves to be an effective way of promoting public trust in science, which in turn 
heads off the problems that ensue when policy-makers disregard science, that could justify 
imposing significant burdens on scientists.
Neither of these defenses, of course, is anywhere near complete.  But both do strike me as 
quite reasonable, and so I don’t think the concerns I’ve discussed in this paper should lead 
proponents of the political view to give up that position.  That said, it is important to note the 
form that these defenses take.  Neither attempts to show that the burden on scientists is not 
morally significant (as, perhaps, we might be inclined to say about the complaint of the palliative 
care physician).  Instead, they each point to compensating benefits — not necessarily enjoyed by 
the scientists in question — which morally outweigh the scientists’ burden.  This means that the 
political view, even if it is justified, comes at a real cost to scientists, which is something its 
proponents need to acknowledge.  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Two Roads Diverge in a Wood: Indifference to the Difference Between ‘Diversity’ and
‘Heterogeneity’ Should Be Resisted on Epistemic and Moral Grounds
Anat Kolumbus*, Ayelet Shavit* and Aaron M. Ellison
,,,
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference
from The Road Not Taken, by Robert Frost (1916)
Abstract: 
We argue that a conceptual tension exists between “diversity” and “heterogeneity” and that
glossing over their differences has practical, moral, and epistemic costs. We examine how 
these terms are used in ecology and the social sciences; articulate a deeper linguistic 
intuition; and test it with the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The 
results reveal that ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ have conflicting rather than 
interchangeable meanings: heterogeneity implies a collective entity that interactively 
integrates different entities, whereas diversity implies divergence, not integration. 
Consequently, striving for diversity alone may increase social injustice and reduce 
epistemic outcomes of academic institutions and governance structures. 
* Equal main contributors. 
Key words: collectivity, diversity, ecology, heterogeneity, injustice, institutional diversity.
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1. Introduction: Diversity in the Ecological and Social Sciences
The concepts of diversity and heterogeneity are two basic types of dissimilarity that are 
implicitly and commonly assumed to hold interchangeable meanings by scholars and 
laymen alike. However, when we examined their actual usage, a surprising conceptual 
discrepancy – in fact a tension – emerged. In this article we call attention to this tension 
between ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’1 and we argue that there are non-trivial epistemic, 
moral, and practical costs to science and society when this difference is glossed over. 
Our critical examination is part of a large body of literature on the benefits of 
diversity for science and society. There exist strong epistemic (Shrader-Frechette 2002; 
Longino 2002; Solomon 2006b) and moral (Haraway 1979; Fricker 2007; Douglas 2009, 
2015) arguments for diversity in institutions, governance structures, and ecological systems
1  In this article, we use the analytic tradition of concept notation. If quoting the 
concept’s usage, it will appear as “X” (e.g., Fisher’s “diversity” is defined as…), when 
explicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as X (e.g., the concept of diversity is…), 
and when implicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as ‘X’ (e.g., ’heterogeneity’ here 
describes…). 
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(“ecosystems”). For example, empirical evidence shows that diversity improves academic 
performance (Gurin et al. 2004; Freeman and Huang 2015; Page 2014), because diverse 
individuals hold different values (Longino 1990; Harding 1991), situated knowledge 
(Haraway 1989), socio-gender locations (Code 2006), research styles and specialities 
(Gerson 2013) and conflicting theoretical scaffolds (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007). There 
also are costs associated with diversity, including feelings of isolation and alienation 
leading to reduced academic achievements of minorities (Armor 1972; Holoien 2013) and 
unbridgeable disagreements among researchers that disintegrate research groups (Gerson 
2013; Shavit and Silver, accepted for publication).
There also are societal costs of divergence between scientists and non-scientists. 
Within the social realm, increased divergence from scientific worldviews may facilitate 
public manipulation by spreading ignorance – agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) 
– and untrue and/or unjust environmental outcomes (Shrader-Frechette 2002). Within the 
scientific realm, divergence exempts scientists from responsibility for not assessing 
carefully enough social risks of generalizing their recommendations outside the laboratory, 
field, or model (Douglas 2009). Given the increasing science-society divergence, it is often
non-experts who engage with the public – e.g., journalists teaching politicians about 
climate change or students teaching the underprivileged – which further widen the 
separation and may also silence local knowledge (Fricker 2007), e.g. by leading 
experienced mothers not to consider their comprehensive understanding and information as
‘knowledge’ compared to a young psychology student who never held a child, or depriving
those living all their life near a spring to “know” their local flow rate compared to an 
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ecology student or governmental regulator who read published results taken at random 
from nearby streams (Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication).
Given the fine line between the costs and benefits of constructive and destructive 
dissimilarities, interrogating the most basic concepts and measurements of dissimilarity 
seems important and timely. This paper aims for a step in that direction.
2. Definitions of Dissimilarity
Fundamental to both diversity and heterogeneity is the concept of “variance” (Fisher 1918, 
1925). Briefly, measurable properties (“variables”) of a group of individual entities (a 
“population” of cells, organisms etc.) are rarely identical. Rather, they will take on a range 
of values y = {y1, y2, y3, … yn}, where the value of the variable measured for the i
th 
individual is denoted yi. When graphed as a histogram (Tukey 1977), these values are 
distributed, with the most frequent values clustered around the most common one and rarer
values towards the edges.
The average value of the distribution of the measured variables (its expected value 
E(y) or its mean value y´ ), equals the sum of all the individual measurements divided by
the number of individuals, n: y´=∑
i=1
i=n y i
n
. The variance, or “spread” of the distribution is 
the sum of the squared differences between each individual measurement and the mean:
σ
2=∑
i=1
i=n
( y i− y´)
2
. The standard error of the mean ( √σ
2
n
)  provides intuitive estimates 
of how variable the set of measurements is. Under reasonable assumptions, ≈63% of the 
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measurements fall within ± 1 standard error of the mean, and ≈95% fall within ± 2 standard
errors of the mean.2
In statistics (and hence in nearly all the social and natural sciences), means and 
variances are characteristics of single populations (groups of measurements), but 
heterogeneity usually is a composite property of a group of measurements taken from more
than one population. For example, the classic analysis of variance (ANOVA) developed by 
Fisher (1918) is used to determine if two or more populations differ in their average 
measured traits (e.g., height). A basic assumption of ANOVA is that the variances of the 
populations being compared are equal; this is referred to as “homogeneity of variance” or 
“homoskedasticity”. In contrast, if variances are unequal (heterogeneous or 
heteroskedastic), mathematical transformations of the data must be done to ensure that 
variances are homogeneous prior to comparing populations using ANOVA.3 Note that 
‘heterogeneity’ here describes only the variance as a problem to overcome in order to allow
a common basis for comparison. Throughout the rest of this article, however, the concept 
of heterogeneity describes entities within a collective. “Diversity”, if it is used at all in 
statistics, refers simply to describe a collection of datasets that describe a wide range of 
different, often incommensurate, variables.
In contrast, diversity is used widely in ecology (e.g., McGill et al. 2015) and the 
social sciences (e.g., Page 2011). Unlike variance or heterogeneity, diversity is not a 
simple, one-dimensional predicate. McGill et al. identified at least 15 different kinds of 
2 Ellison and Dennis (2010) provide a full discussion of the assumptions behind these 
estimates and calculation of associated confidence intervals.
3 See Gotelli and Ellison (2012) for details and another example of a “cost” of 
heterogeneity.
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ecological diversity; differences among them reflect the number of variables or populations
that are measured (one or more), the spatial scale of measurement (local or regional), and 
whether it is measured within or between populations. Unlike ‘variance’ or ‘heterogeneity’ 
– both of which are interpretable on their own – ‘diversity’ has little meaning to an 
ecologist unless it is associated with an object. For example, the concept of alpha diversity 
refers to the number of different species in a locality, the concept of gamma diversity to the
number of different species in a region [a collection of localities], and beta diversity 
measures population change between localities.4  
In the social sciences, Page (2011) makes similar distinctions between three kinds of 
diversity: (1) variation, or diversity within a type, referring to quantitative differences in a 
specific variable; (2) diversity of types, referring to qualitative differences between types; 
and (3) diversity of composition, or the way types are arranged. Page’s variation is directly 
analogous to an ecologist’s alpha diversity, and his diversity of types and diversity of 
composition are analogous to different dimensions of an ecologist’s beta diversity. Most 
social scientists use “diversity” as a catchall phrase not attached to any particular measured
process (Page, personal communication), but we suggest that more attention should be paid
to the dimensions of beta diversity. 
Although ‘diversity’ appears to be used abstractly in common parlance and is 
implicitly assumed to mean something very similar to ‘heterogeneity’, when we examined 
deeply rooted linguistic intuitions of certain core examples, and tested these intuitions in 
large databases of linguistic usage, an interesting distinction between ‘diversity’ and 
4 Each of these can be unweighted (i.e., simple counts of different species) or weighted 
by their abundance or sizes (Chao et al. 2014).
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‘heterogeneity’ was revealed, with relevance for understanding and improving civil society
and its institutions. 
3. A Conceptual Tension Between Diversity and Heterogeneity
Whereas scientific language may seem indecisive or vague, artistic language can be precise
and revealing. For example, Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken beautifully highlights 
diverging dimensions of a difference (i.e., ‘diversity’), whereas the etymology of 
‘heterogeneous’ implies something quite the opposite: an integration of multiple other (Gr.:
hetero) kinds (Gr. genus) within a single whole. 
We argue that attributing heterogeneity to something (e.g., a cell, computer, etc.) 
implies attributing an integration of mutual interactions among different entities that all 
belong to the same collective, whereas attributing diversity to a collection of objects or 
entities entails neither interactions nor a common collective.
An examination of English idiomatic constructions reveals clear distinctions in usage
of diversity and heterogeneity. We would say that the parts of a cell or a clock are 
heterogeneous, but not that they are diverse. In contrast, we recognize a diverse collection 
of wall decorations or tools. There is an apparent semantic distinction here: cells and 
clocks are collectives whose functioning entails the integration of a number of interacting 
parts, whereas walls or garages function independently of the collection of items hanging 
on them.  In other aspects of common usage, however, many objects in daily speech, 
including communities, populations, or universities, are called diverse or heterogeneous 
interchangeably.
The Corpus of Contemporary American English (henceforth: COCA; Davies 2008) 
provides a resource with which to examine common usage of diversity and heterogeneity 
in more detail. COCA contains more than 520 million words of texts, including scholarly 
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writing, fiction and nonfiction, newspapers and spoken recordings, and has tools to 
conduct complex searches for occurrences of words, phrases, parts of speech, other 
linguistic forms, and any combination thereof. Compilations of lists of co-occurrences (i.e.,
all types of words [adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.] or specific words that appear near a target
word) that can be used to infer intended meanings of predicates such as diverse or 
heterogeneous. 
Sabar (2016) used COCA to infer motivations underlying regular co-occurrences of 
words. By identifying partial intersection of words that regularly co-occur more than 
expected by chance alone, Sabar identified communicative strategies: the choices of 
specific linguistic forms that best contribute to their intended message (e.g., “look” and 
“carefully” form the phrase “look carefully” that calls for visual attention). Thus, the 
generality of a communicative strategy that is evident in a particular example is established
via a quantitative prediction of a non-random co-occurrence (“look” and “carefully” occur 
together and in sequence more frequently than expected by chance alone, and Sabar (2016)
confirmed that “look” and “see” differ in meaning as a feature of attention by showing that 
“look” co-occurred more frequently with words such as “notice” than did “see”). 
 We searched COCA and the Wikipedia Corpus (Davies 2015) for frequencies of 
“diverse” and “heterogeneous” and tested our hypotheses regarding differences in meaning
between them using chi-square tests for non-random frequencies. “Diverse” occurred 12-
30 times more frequently than “heterogeneous” in the corpora. In line with our hypothesis, 
“homogeneous”, “collective”, “whole”, “integration” and “interaction” co-occurred 
significantly more frequently with “heterogeneous” than with “diverse” (improved 
prediction by, respectively, 58, 24, 8, 11, and 11%). Antonyms of these words (“single”, 
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“individuals”, “division”, “separation”) showed only random patterns of co-occurrence 
when they co-occurred at all (see tables 1-7 in the Appendix). A possible explanation for 
the latter findings is that while concepts of a collective whole seem to be more explicitly 
related to ‘heterogeneity’, words and meanings of singularity are relevant to both terms (in 
the case of heterogeneity they could relate both a single whole or to its parts). Nonetheless,
it is evident that there is empirical support for our semantic intuition regarding 
‘heterogeneity’ as interactions among diverse entities within a collective whole, and, 
perhaps more importantly, the empirical lack of a collectivist meaning for ‘diversity’.
The attribute of diversity does not correctly describe collective entities because its 
meaning and reference are much wider than the concept of heterogeneity. A heterogeneous 
entity may be composed physically of nothing more than diverse entities, but as a 
collective, it entails multiple direct and indirect interactions, and feedbacks, among these 
entities. All reproducing biological groups (genomes, cells, metapopulations, etc.) are 
heterogeneous in the collective sense. Hence, additional information that refers to internal 
interactive processes improves models of heterogeneous entities and systems (Wade 1978; 
Roughgarden, accepted for publication). Some human groups – e.g., families, football 
teams or kibbutzim – would best be described as heterogeneous, whereas others – e.g., 
people waiting to pay the cashier – would not (Shavit 2008). There may be grave costs 
associated with failing to identify the goals of certain human groups as diverse or 
heterogeneous, as the next section portrays. 
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4. Illustrating the Diversity-Heterogeneity Trade-Off
4.1 Moral costs  
Many – perhaps most – readers of this essay would say that promoting diversity is a social 
good because it is a stepping-stone to heterogeneity and thus to social justice. Although we 
may not yet have achieved a just and heterogeneous society, we should nonetheless 
promote diversity as much as possible and not dwell on the semantic particularities of 
distinguishing the concepts of diversity from heterogeneity. We think this line of thinking 
is misleading, and that the continuous focus on racial, ethnic, or gender ‘alpha diversity’ 
(i.e., headcounts) and use of the results of these measurements as a sufficient basis for 
discourse and policy, creates a vicious circle that may hinder social change in many of our 
institutions, in particular in our schools, colleges, and universities.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that segregation of African-American and Caucasian students in 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. One outcome of this 
decision was transporting students of different racial backgrounds into different school 
districts (“busing”) to achieve diverse, “integrated” schools. This was intended to provide 
equal opportunities, academic aspirations, and achievements for all students and to 
improve relations among different races (Armor 1972). Unfortunately, according to some 
of its strongest supporters, busing did not improve academic aspirations or achievements 
(St. John 1975), sometimes decreased them and often worsened interracial relations: 
“integration … enhances ideologies that promote racial segregation, and reduces 
opportunities for actual contact between the races.” (Armor 1972, 13). 
In higher education, diversification is primarily done through “affirmative action”. 
Many scholars support affirmative action (e.g., Bowen and Bok 2000; Rothstein and Yoon 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -485-
2008), but others have argued that it leads to similar or worse outcomes than would have 
occurred in its absence (e.g., Sander 2004; Sander and Taylor Jr. 2012). For example, 
between 1988 and 2007, faculty of color made up only 17% of total full-time faculty, and 
that there had been little change in this number since the 1980’s (Turner, González, and 
Wood 2008). Similar findings have been reported for the number of earned PhDs (NSF 
2013). 
However one thinks about affirmative action, we suggest that in the interest of 
promoting social justice that institutions should not measure diversity alone – how many 
people of different backgrounds are found at a certain time and place – nor wait for it “to 
work its magic” and reduce injustice. Smith (2015) identifies three problems with current 
mechanisms for promoting diversity in higher education: (1) responding to calls to improve
diversity reactively rather than proactively, often by producing an internal quantified 
response to an external standardized requirement; (2) failure to include people from the 
many interacting parts of a university – faculty, staff, students, etc. – in discussions about 
diversity; and (3) making diversification into a specific program rather than an integral 
institutional function and goal. All of these common methods of “working towards 
diversity” are problematic precisely because they increase diversity but reduce 
heterogeneity. They track and magnify difference and divergence rather than encourage 
and enhance mutual interaction among all different co-occurring identity groups. 
A more positive approach was reported by Walton and Cohen (2011), who conducted
a very brief intervention in one’s sense of social belonging (SOB) to a selective, largely 
Caucasian, college. After three years, there was a significant increase in the GPA (grade 
point average) of African-American students relative to control groups. SOB is central to a 
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heterogeneous community as it is a psychological aspect of being a part of an integrated 
collective.   
We suggest that a trade-off exists between tracking diversity and building 
heterogeneity, which may result in a vicious circle leading to blaming those afflicted with 
social inequality for their under-representation. Since we are better at measuring discrete 
variables such as grades and gender than at measuring interactions such as SOB and 
research cooperation, we invest more effort in creating changes we can easily track rather 
than those that demand more complex, “beta type”, measurements (e.g., institutional SOB, 
type of contacts with colleagues or task composition in the lab). As a result of neither 
measuring these latter dynamics nor investing in their visible change, alienation and lower 
academic achievements may persist among minority students and scholars (Syed, Azmitia, 
and Cooper 2011) even while their “diversity” increases. If this processes continues, a 
dangerous positive feedback may emerge, where not only will one’s self-image and 
achievements be worsened, but also his/her social identity comes out worse than before 
affirmative action took place. 
4.2. Epistemic Benefits
Aiming for heterogeneity rather than diversity often has epistemic benefits. Human 
collectives – as well as individual agents – have a variety of epistemic perspectives 
(Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication). These perspectives differ in 
multiple inter-related ways, involve different backgrounds and experiences, and vary in 
ways of perceiving, explaining, and evaluating information about the world. Perspectives 
direct our attention to track a wide range of phenomena, promote diverse models to explain
them (Griesemer 2014) and encourage adaptive-reflection by employing “…a variety of 
social perspectives, often…by taking the perspective of others” (Bohman 2006, 180).
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Information is distributed asymmetrically between agents, so that some of it is 
known in general, some exclusive to certain groups, and some idiosyncratic to specific 
individuals (Sunstein 2003; Andesron 2006; Solomon 2006a; Gerson 2013); lack of 
interaction keeps pieces of information latent.5 Diversity alone will not ensure that 
information is shared and provides fewer opportunities for agents to reflect on information 
that they can access only through interactions with others (Longino 2002; Tollefsen 2006). 
Integrative working interaction across specialties – unlike the typical diverse-one-
way adoption of ideas from one disciplinary to another – “includes coordinated efforts to 
pose and solve new research problems that can redefine specialty boundaries” (Gerson 
2013, 516), and leads to developing new specialties. Tollefsen (2006) interweaves 
individual and collective knowledge in a way that demonstrates the benefits of epistemic 
heterogeneity. She suggested a framework of splitting a group that shares a common goal 
(e.g., works on a related set task or problems) into sub-groups; heterogeneity is manifested 
on an inter-sub-group level. Each sub-group is responsible for a different task, has its own 
sub-goals, and devises its own strategies and solutions. Mutual interactions result when the
sub-groups return to the original group setting to present their suggestions and give 
feedback to other sub-groups. They encounter dissenting perspectives of out-groups and 
are forced to consider them and examine their own perspective closely. This self-scrutiny 
and actual encounters with critiques by other groups reveals problems, such as 
inaccuracies, leaps and gaps, and uncertainties, allowing the sub-groups and the integrated 
collective opportunities for self-correction (Tollefsen 2006). 
5 There is an on-going discussion regarding the epistemic efficacy of deliberation, 
which is beyond the scope of this article.
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Since all sub-groups are part of a larger community that shares a common goal, they 
both depend on other sub-groups and are depended upon by them. This framework is 
heterogeneous rather than diverse as the common goal and the inter-sub-group interactions 
serve to integrate the group. It also maintains differences, thus reducing the danger of 
group cohesiveness leading to unanimity and conformism, without promoting divergence. 
Such a framework increases the chances of achieving accurate results and obtaining a more
just process of decision-making.    
5. Conclusion
Diversity is not heterogeneity, and a continued focus on the former is not increasing the 
latter; instead, there is often a trade-off and tension between them. We illustrated how 
heterogeneity can better advance academic institutions and governess structures by 
integrating different people, identities, perspectives, and sources of information; it 
facilitates interactions among them, which have constructive epistemic and moral 
implications. Conversely, diversity alone often leads to divergence, is insufficient to resist 
social injustice and it misses epistemic opportunities that result from integrative working 
interactions. Institutions are often unaware of the diversity-heterogeneity tension or remain
indifferent to it. They invest efforts in promoting diversity while neglecting heterogeneity, 
thus paying the costs of the trade-off and not reaping its benefits. Tracking alpha and 
disregarding beta diversity maintain this trade-off and obscures it. For moral and epistemic 
reasons we suggest noting this conceptual and practical difference and aiming for 
heterogeneity.
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Appendix
Table 1. Wikipedia Corpus total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
30967 1096
Table 2. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “interaction”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”-“interaction” > “diverse”-“interaction”. 
Interaction present Interaction absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 11 18 1085 7
Diverse 49 82 30918 93
Total 60 100 32003 100
P<.001
Table 3. COCA total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
16685 1305
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Table 4. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “collective”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “collective” > “diverse”- “collective”.
Collective present Collective absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 5 31 1300 7
Diverse 11 69 16674 93
Total 16 100 17974 100
P<.001
Table 5. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “whole”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “whole” > “diverse”- “whole”.
Whole present Whole absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 7 15 1298 7
Diverse 40 85 16645 93
Total 47 100 17943 100
P<.05
Table 6. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “integration”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”- “integration” > “diverse”- “integration”.
Integration present Integration absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 6 18 1299 7
Diverse 28 82 16657 93
Total 34 100 17956 100
P<.05
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 Table 7. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “single”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “single” < “diverse”- “single”.
Single present Single absent
N % N %
Diverse 77 97 16608 93
Heterogeneous 2 3 1303 7
Total 79 100 17911 100
P>.05
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Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation
Abstract
My starting points are the claims that explanations are answers to why-questions, and that
to answer the question why some event E occurred one must provide reasons why E oc-
curred. The idea that all explanations of events are causal then becomes the theory that
the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. My main thesis in this paper is that
many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should
distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why
those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a second-level
reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level reason is
not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be first-level reasons; nor (on my theory)
need they be causes. Along the way I use the distinction between levels to diagnose the
appeal of, and one main flaw in, the DN model of explanation.
1
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1 A New Causal Theory of Explanation
It is obvious that some explanations of some phenomena speak of the causes of those phe-
nomena. Simple examples come immediately to mind: the bridge collapsed because the wind
reached a certain intensity, electrons flew off the metal because light shone on it. Much more
controversial is the claim that every explanation of why some event happened must say some-
thing about the causes of that event. What’s more, not only is it controversial whether this
claim is true, it is also controversial how the claim should be understood. I have a new way
of understanding the idea that all explanations of events invoke causes, one that, I think, is the
most natural way to understand it. I also think that the idea, understood my way, is true (with
one qualification1), and can be defended against the repeated claim that there exist non-causal
explanations.
My theory starts with the idea, which has been held by many others, that explanations
are answers to why-questions.2 A theory of explanation, then, should say what it takes for
a proposition to be an answer to a why-question. Now one standard form answers to why-
questions take is “P because Q”: “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” answers
“Why is the tide high?” But there is another form answers to why-questions can take. The other
form is “A/The reason why P is that Q.”3 Now because-answers and reasons-why answers are,
in some sense, equivalent. “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” and “The reason
why the tide is high is that moon is overhead” in some sense convey the same information. But
I think that, for theoretical purposes, it is better to focus on reasons-answers. (I argue for this
claim in (Skow 2016).)
A theory built around reasons-why answers will fill in the schema
1See footnote 6.
2Among those who hold that explanations are answers to why-questions are Hempel
(1965)—with some qualifications, Bromberger (1992), and Van Fraassen (1980).
3I ignore here the forms used to give “teleological” explanations; I extend my theory to
cover teleological explanations in (Skow 2016).
2
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1. A reason why P is that Q iff . . .
What should the claim that “explanations of events are causal” look like, if put into the form
(1)? Let “P” hold the place for a sentence that describes the occurrence of an event. (I won’t try
to say anything useful about which sentences do this.) Here is my proposal:4
(T) A reason why P is that Q if and only if the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P.5
The same kinds of examples that lend credence to the idea that explanations of events are causal
lend credence to its translation (T) into the language of reasons. The lighting of the fuse caused
the bomb to go off; sure enough, it is also true that the reason why the bomb went off is that
the fuse was lit. The electron’s passing through a magnetic field caused it to accelerate; sure
enough, the reason why it accelerated is that it passed through a magnetic field.
On the other hand, the same examples philosophers have thought are counterexamples to
the idea that explanations of events are causal also threaten to be counterexamples to (T).
A bunch of these examples, I think, are based on the same mistake. There is a distinction
to be made between “levels” of reasons. The examples fail because they confuse the two levels.6
My aim in this paper is to introduction the distinction, and show how it can be used to defuse
some examples. I will look, in particular, at Elliott Sober’s claim that equilibrium explanations
are non-causal, and Marc Lange’s claim that “distinctively mathematical” explanations are non-
causal (Sober 1981, Lange 2013).
4There are other theories of explanation that try to capture the idea that all explanations of
events are causal—for example, (Salmon 1984) and (Lewis 1986). I do not have space here to
explore the differences between their theories and mine.
5For stylistic convenience I sometimes speak of causation as a relation between facts, and
sometimes as a relation between events. I remain neutral on which, if either, of these ways of
speaking gets us closer to causation’s “fundamental nature.”
6I should say that there is one kind of counterexample that I think succeeds against (T):
examples of “grounding” explanations. My true view is that every reason why a given event
occurred is either a cause or a ground of its occurrence. But I will ignore grounding explanation
in this paper.
3
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2 Levels of Reasons
The distinction I want to introduce is that between
• a fact R being a reason why some event E occurred—then R is a “first-level” reason; and
• a fact F being a reason why R is a reason why E occurred—then F is a “second-level”
reason, a reason why something else is a reason.
Reasons on the two different levels appear in answers to different why-questions. The first-level
reasons are the facts that belong in the complete answer to the question why E occurred. The
second-level reasons, on the other hand, belong in the answer to a different why-question: the
question, concerning some reason R why E occurred, of why R is a reason why E occurred.
It is easy to come up with examples of first-level reasons. If I strike a match and, by
striking it, cause it to light, then one reason why the match lit is that I struck it. What about an
example of a second-level reason? We can find one by looking for the answer to the question of
why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit. One answer (there are others)
is: one reason why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit is that there was
oxygen in the room at the time. In general, background conditions to a cause’s causing its effect
are, I hold, reasons why the cause is a reason why its effect happened. (Background conditions
are not, however, the only kind of second-level reason; more on this in a bit.)
3 Second-Level Reasons Need Not Be First-Level Reasons
Here is the thesis about levels of reasons that I will defend in this paper:
A fact can be a second-level reason without being a first-level reason. A fact F can
be a reason why R is a reason why E happened, without F itself being a reason why
E happened.
I say that F need not itself be a reason why E happened; I do not say that it cannot. The example
I gave earlier shows that sometimes F is also a reason why E happened. The presence of oxygen,
4
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besides being a reason why the striking of the match is a reason why the match lit, is also itself
a reason why the match lit. But it is not always like this.
Here is an example in which a second-level reason is not also a first-level reason. Jill
throws a rock at a window, Joan sticks out her mitt and catches the rock, and the window
remains intact. The fact that Joan stuck out her mitt is a reason why the window remained
intact. There is the first-level reason. Why is it a reason? The reason why it is a reason is that
Jill threw a rock at the window. (You can test this with a counterfactual: if Jill hadn’t thrown,
certainly Joan’s sticking out her mitt would not have been a reason why the window remained
intact. The window wouldn’t have “needed” Joan’s help.) But this second-level reason is not
also a first-level reason: that Jill threw a rock is not a reason why the window remained intact.7
In this case, the second-level reason that is not also a first-level reason is a fact that
“corresponds” to the occurrence of an event: Jill’s throwing of the rock. According to my theory
(T), first-level reasons why events occur all correspond to events, since they are all causes.
But not all second-level reasons are like the two examples we’ve seen so far (Jill’s throw, the
presence of oxygen); not all second-level reasons correspond to events.
In fact, I hold that laws of nature are second-level reasons that are not also first-level
reasons. If I drop a rock from one meter above the ground, and it hits the ground at a speed
of 4.4 m/s, the fact that I dropped it from one meter up is a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4
m/s. The law relating impact speed s to drop height d, namely s =
√
2dg (assuming drag is
negligible and d is small), is a second-level reason: it is a reason why my dropping the rock
from one meter up is a reason why the rock was going 4.4 m/s when it landed. But it is not, in
my view, also a first-level reason. It is not a reason why the rock is on the ground at 4.4 m/s.
Mentioning laws of nature probably brings to mind Carl Hempel’s DN model of expla-
nation, which says (I’m sure this is familiar) that an explanation of a fact F is a conjunction of
facts that (i) entail F, and (ii) essentially contains a law among its conjuncts (Hempel 1965).
7This is also the kind of example many take to show that causation is not transitive; see for
example (Hitchcock 2001).
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Hempel’s theory is not framed as a theory of the reasons why facts obtain, but it is natural to in-
terpret it as committed to the thesis that whenever there are any reasons why some fact obtains,
at least one of the reasons is a law of nature. I, along with many others, reject Hempel’s theory,
but I have a new diagnosis of where it goes wrong. Its mistake is to take certain second-level
reasons, laws of nature, to also be first-level reasons.
I asserted without argument that laws are second-level reasons; but this is a natural view
to have, on certain approaches to causation. One approach to causation takes laws to be central:
whenever you have a cause and effect C and E, there are some laws connecting C to E—and C
is a cause of E because of those connecting laws.8 But that is just to say that whenever C is a
cause of E, some law is a reason why C is a cause of E. Now I hold that when some fact F is a
reason why C is a cause of E, then F is also a reason why C is a reason why E happened. So it
follows from this theory of causation that laws are second-level reasons. If you start here, and
in addition think that second-level reasons are always also first-level reasons, you head toward
the characteristic thesis of the DN model, the thesis that among the reasons why some event
happens is always at least one law. But this line of thought is fallacious, because second-level
reasons need not be first-level reasons; and, on my view, laws that are second-level reasons are
never first-level reasons.
I admit that I have given no direct argument that laws are not first-level reasons. I’d like
to put the burden on the other side: why think the are? They are certainly second-level reasons:
they are certainly reasons why causes are reasons why their effects happen. But as the Joan
and Jill example shows, second-level reasons are not always first-level reasons. So why think
they are in the case of laws? Certainly we have a sense that laws are “explaining something”;
my view captures this sense, by assigning them the role of explaining why causes explain their
effects. Why isn’t that enough?
8Hempel endorses something like this idea about causation; see (Hempel 1965: 349). It has,
of course, had many other defenders.
6
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4 How The Levels Can Get Confused
I said that the flaw in the DNmodel is that it mis-classifies laws, which are second-level reasons,
as first-level reasons. I also sketched an argument (with a false premise) that leads to this mis-
classification: “laws are second-level reasons, and second-level reasons are always first-level
reasons, so laws are also first-level reasons.” But I’m not saying that Hempel or anyone else
ever entertained this argument explicitly. Is there anything else to be said about how and why
supporters of the DN model might have come to mis-classify laws as first-level reasons?
Yes, there is. Pragmatic effects, effects of the rules of conversation on information ex-
change, can produce “data” that misleadingly suggest that laws are first-level reasons.
The reasons why an event happened are the parts of the answer to the question of why it
happened. So if we come across a conversation in which one person asks “Why did E happen?,”
and another person answers this question by citing some fact F; and if that answer strikes us as
correct; then we have some good evidence that F really is a reason why E happened.
Some of the evidence that laws are (first-level) reasons why events happen appears to fit
this pattern (but I will argue it does not). Imagine someone walks into the room just as the rock
hits the ground at 4.4 m/s, and she sees that it hit at this speed (maybe the rock fell onto a device
that measures impact speeds). A curious person, she asks me why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s. I
respond,
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg (and of course
√
2 · 1 · 9.8 ≈ 4.4).
Haven’t I answered her question? And doesn’t the law that s =
√
2dg appear in my answer? If
so, then the law is a reason why the rock hit the ground at 4.4 m/s—isn’t it?
If the answers to these questions are “yes, yes, and yes,” then, at least in some cases, a
law is a reason why an event occurred. It’s not hard to get from this conclusion to the claim
(characteristic of the DN model) that this is so in all cases, and that when someone answers a
7
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why-question without mentioning a law, her answer is incomplete.9
But the answers to these questions are not “yes, yes, and yes.” To explain what I think is
going on I need to introduce another distinction: the distinction between a good response to a
question and an answer to a question. If someone asks a question, obviously one good way to
respond is to answer the question. But not every good response is an answer.
A simple example suffices to establish this. Sally asks whether Caleb is coming to the
party. I know he’s supposed to go to the party. I respond by saying “He’s sick.” This is a good
response. But it is not an answer. The only two possible answers are “yes (he’s coming)” and
“no (he’s not coming).” I didn’t say either of those things.
There is a theoretical reason why we should expect there to be good responses that are not
answers. The notion of an answer is a semantic one. The relation between a proposition and a
question, in virtue of which that proposition is an answer to that question, is a semantic relation.
But the notion of a good response is a pragmatic one. Whether a response to a question is good
is a matter of what a cooperative speaker should say. In some circumstances, a cooperative
speaker should respond to a question by doing something other than, or something more than,
answering the question. In the simple example, I know that if I just answer the question by
saying “no,” then Sally will immediately ask me why he’s not coming. Since I can foresee
that she’ll ask that, and since I know the answer to this question too, I respond to her explicit
question not by answering it, but by answering the expected follow-up question. It is okay in
this case not to explicitly answer the question she asked, because what I do say, my answer to
the expected follow-up, conversationally implies that the answer to her explicit question is no.
I did not, however, need to be so indirect. I could have responded by answering both
questions. I could have said, “no, he’s sick.” Here my response is good, but again it contains
information that is not part of the answer to the question she explicitly asked. What keeps
it from being a bad response is that the additional information is relevant to the topic of our
9This “incompleteness” defense is most fully developed by Railton (1981). For one thorough
argument against it, see (Woodward 2003: chapter 4).
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conversation; and it is relevant because, though it is not an answer to her question, it is an
answer to an expected follow-up question.
I think the same thing is going on in the dropped rock example. I responded to the question
by saying
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg.
My response is a good one, but (as we’ve seen) it does not follow that every part of my response
is part of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the first part of my response—“I dropped
it from one meter”—is an answer to the explicit question (“why did the rock hit the ground at
4.4 m/s?”), but the second part, the law, is not; it, instead, is an answer to an unasked follow-
up why-question, a follow-up question I can anticipate would be asked immediately if I only
answered the explicit question. The follow-up is, of course, why is the fact that I dropped it
from one meter up a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s?
In summary: it is often a good thing to include a second-level reason in a response to the
question why some event happened; but the fact that this is good thing to do is compatible with
that second-level reason not being a reason why that event happened.
5 Equilibrium Explanations
I now have two distinctions: that between first- and second-level reasons, and that between a
good response to a why-question an answer to a why-questions. The two together provide the
key to defusing many problem cases for (T), the thesis that the reasons why something happened
are its causes.
Elliott Sober argued that equilibrium explanations are not causal explanations. His main
example of an equilibrium explanation was R. A. Fisher’s answer to the question of why the ratio
of males to females in the current adult human population is very close to 1:1 (Fisher 1931).
“The main idea” of Fisher’s answer, Sober reports, “is that if a population ever departs from
9
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equal numbers of males and females, there will be a reproductive advantage favoring parental
pairs that overproduce the minority sex. A 1:1 ratio will be the resulting equilibrium point”
(201). Parents who overproduce the minority sex are likely to have more grandchildren. So if
males outnumber females in the population, the fitter trait is to be disposed to have more female
children than male; being the fitter trait, this disposition should increase in frequency, with the
result that the sex ratio is pushed from male-biased toward equality. The opposite happens if
females outnumber males. Now Sober claims that this is not a causal explanation, since
a causal explanation...would presumably describe some earlier state of the popu-
lation and the evolutionary forces that moved the population to its present con-
figuration...Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in
fact produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have occurred
regardless of which of a variety of causal scenarios actually transpired. (202)
In other words: Fisher’s explanation does not say, for example, that the sex ratio in the year 1000
was such-and-such, and that this caused the sex ratio in the year 1100 to be such-and-such, and
so on. Instead it consists of a bunch of conditional facts: for each year in the sufficiently distant
past, if the sex-ratio in that year had had any “non-extreme” value (non-extreme meaning not
all males or females), then the sex ratio today still would have been 1:1.
The first thing I want to say is that Sober makes a claim about what the causes of the
current sex ratio are that I reject. He thinks that the only relevant causes of the fact that the sex
ratio is currently 1:1 are facts of the form the sex ratio at time T is m:n. I’m with those who
reject this claim. The fact that the sex ratio in 1000 was m:n is “too specific” to be a cause
of the current sex ratio. There is a less specific fact, the fact that the percentage of males in
1000 was not 0 or 100%, that is as well placed to be the cause. The less specific fact is “better
proportioned” to the effect than the more specific one; so it gets to be the cause.10
10A “proportionality requirement” on causation is defended in Yablo (1992) and Strevens
(2008). The claim that examples of explanations that, like Fisher’s, abstract away from the nitty-
10
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My disagreement with Sober might not seem to help much. Isn’t Fisher’s explanation still
a counterexample to (T)? Even if the cause of the current sex ratio is that the sex ratio in the past
was never extreme, Fisher’s explanation doesn’t cite this cause either; his explanation instead
contains a bunch of other facts, namely the conditional facts described earlier. Doesn’t it follow
that these conditional facts, which are not causes, are reasons why the sex ratio is 1:1, and thus
that (T) is false?
I deny that those conditional facts that Fisher offers up are reasons why the sex ratio is
1:1. But I can’t just say this; for when Fisher offered those facts up in response to the question
of why the sex ratio of 1:1, everyone celebrated his response, they did not reject it. How can his
response be something to celebrate, if it didn’t answer the question?
The distinctions I introduced earlier show why. Fisher’s response was something to cel-
ebrate, because it was a good response to the question. But it can be a good response without
containing an answer; in fact that’s exactly what I think is going on.
I think that the reason why the sex ratio is now 1:1 is that the sex ratio in the past was
never extreme. But this is not something anyone would believe, or even be able to come to
know, without an accompanying answer to the question of why that is the reason. So a good
response to the question of why the sex ratio is now 1:1 must include an answer to the question
of why the fact that the sex ratio was never extreme in the past is a reason why it is 1:1 now.
And that’s the question that the conditionals in Fisher’s response constitute an answer to. Those
conditional facts are second-level reasons why some other fact is a reason why the sex ratio is
1:1.
gritty details of the causal process that produced the event being explained count as non-causal is
repeated by Batterman in, for example, (Batterman 2000: 28) and (2010: 2). Batterman assumes
that abstracting away from the details takes you away from the causes; but the proportionality
requirement shows that in some cases at least this is not so. Less specific facts may be better
proportioned to an effect than more specific ones.
11
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6 “Distinctively Mathematical” Explanations
Marc Lange has recently described a class of explanations that he calls distinctively mathemat-
ical explanations, and argued that they are not causal explanations (Lange 2013). My interest
is not in whether his examples qualify as non-causal by his criteria, but in whether they are
counterexamples to (T). Here is one of the examples:11
Why did a given person [say, Jones] on a given occasion not succeed in crossing all
of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once (while remaining always on land or on a
bridge rather than in a boat, for instance, and while crossing any bridge completely
once having begun to cross it)?...[Because] in the bridge arrangement, considered
as a network, it is not the case that either every vertex or every vertex but two is
touched by an even number of edges. Any successful bridge-crosser would have to
enter a given vertex exactly as many times as she leaves it unless that vertex is the
start or the end of her trip. So among the vertices, either none (if the trip starts and
ends at the same vertex) or two could touch an odd number of edges (488-89).
Here is what Lange says about why explanations like this one not causal explanations:
these explanations explain not by describing the world’s causal structure, but roughly
by revealing that the explanandum is more necessary than ordinary causal laws are
(491).
There is definitely something right, and deep, in what Lange says. But I do not think that his
examples are counterexamples to (T).
Let P be the property of bridge-arrangements that a bridge-arrangement has if and only if
either every land-mass or every land-mass but two is met by an event number of bridges. The
(supposed) answer to the question of why Jones failed that Lange presents boils down to this:
11This example is also discussed in detail by (Pincock 2007).
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(2) The bridges of Königsberg lacked P; and, necessarily, if a bridge arrangement lacks P,
then no one can cross all the bridges exactly once.12
Now if (2) really is the answer to the question, then my theory is false. So is (2) the answer?
There are two parts to (2). First is the fact that the bridges lacked P. Now it is no problem for
my theory to recognize that this fact is a reason why Jones failed. For this fact is certainly a
cause of his failure. The challenge to my theory comes if the second fact in (2) is a reason why
Jones failed. For the second fact, that necessarily, no one can cross all the bridges exactly once,
if the bridges lack P, cannot be a cause of Jones’ failure.
I want to say the same thing about this example that I’ve said about the others. (2), I
maintain, is not an answer to the question of why Jones failed. (2) contains an answer as a
part—the fact that the bridges lacked P. But it has another part, the necessary truth, that is not
part of the answer. How is this compatible with the evident fact that (2) is a really good thing
to say in response to the question of why Jones failed? Because the part of (2) that is not an
answer to this question is an answer to an obvious follow-up why-question, namely, why is it
that the bridges’ lacking P is the reason why Jones failed?
Lange’s diagnosis of this example, and the others he discusses, is quite sophisticated,
and I don’t have the space here to go in to all the things he says about them. Let me at least,
however, mention one further thing he says. At one point he writes, “Even if [these examples]
happen to appeal to causes, they do not appeal to them as causes...any connection they may
invoke between a cause and the explanandum holds not by virtue of an ordinary contingent law
of nature, but typically by mathematical necessity” (496). I am quite taken by this idea that an
answer to a why-question might appeal to causes but not appeal to them as causes. What might
this mean, in terms of reasons why? Here is a natural suggestion: maybe in some cases a cause
is a reason why its effect happened, but it is false that the reason why the cause is a reason why
its effect happened is that it is a cause. The suggestion continues: cases like that are examples
12I’m going to take Lange’s qualifications about always remaining on land etc. as given.
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of “non-causal explanations.”
I think the suggestion is plausible: if there truly are cases like that, they should be coun-
terexamples to my theory. They are not, however, counterexamples to my theory as stated. I
should amend my theory to make it more vulnerable:
(T2) A reason why P is that Q if and only if (i) the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P, and
(ii) the reason why the fact that Q is a reason why P is that the fact that Q is a cause of the
fact that P.
Now the question is whether the Königsberg example, or any other example, is a counterexam-
ple to (T2). I have a lot of thoughts about this, but can only be brief here. Lange’s idea is that
since the “connection” between the bridges’ lacking P, and Jones’ failure, is secured by a math-
ematical truth (a theorem of graph theory), the bridges’ lacking P, while a reason, is not a reason
because it is a cause. I reject this claim. Even if the connection is secured by a mathematical
truth, the cause is still a reason because it is a cause. This assertion requires defense, but I don’t
have the space to defend it here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a new causal theory of explanation that says that the reasons why
an event occurred are its causes. I also drew two distinctions: that between the reasons why E
happened, and the reasons why those reasons are reasons; and that between an answer to a why-
question, and a good response to a why-question. I used these distinctions to defend the theory
against the claim that equilibrium explanations and distinctively mathematical explanations are
non-causal; and I believe the distinctions can be used to defend it against a wide variety of other
examples.
14
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -512-
References
Batterman, Robert (2000). “Multiple Realizability and Universality.” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 51: 115-45.
— (2010). “On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science.” British Journal
for Philosophy of Science 61: 1-25.
Bromberger, Sylvain (1992). On What We Know We Don’t Know. The University of Chicago
Press and CSLI.
Fisher, R. (1931). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Dover.
Hempel, Carl (1965). “Aspects of Scientific Explanation.” In Aspects of Scientific Explanation
and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press, 331-496.
Hitchcock, Christopher (2001). “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and
Graphs.” The Journal of Philosophy 98: 273âA˘S¸299.
Lange, Marc (2013). “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64: 485-511.
Lewis, David (1986). “Causal Explanation.” In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Pincock, Christopher (2007). “A Role for Mathematics in the Physical Sciences.” Nous 41:
253-75.
Railton, Peter (1981). “Probability, Explanation, and Information.” Synthese 48: 233âA˘S¸256.
Salmon, Wesley (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton
University Press.
Skow, Bradford (2016). Reasons Why. Oxford University Press.
Sober, Elliott (1983). “Equilibrium Explanation.” Philosophical Studies 43: 201-10.
Strevens, Michael (2008). Depth. Harvard University Press.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.
Woodward, James (2003). Making Things Happen. Oxford University Press.
15
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -513-
Yablo, Stephen (1992). “Mental Causation.” The Philosophical Review 101: 245-80.
16
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -514-
 
1 
 
In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race 
Abstract. In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new 
metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative 
classificatory issues.”  Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-
substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics.  However, I show 
that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race.  
One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics. 
1. Introduction 
 In David Ludwig’s (2015, 44) recent article “Against the New Metaphysics of Race,” he 
argues for the provocative thesis that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.”  Furthermore, to continue to engage in such a 
“methodologically dubious metaphysics of race” is, in Ludwig’s (2015, 262) opinion, “a bad 
idea.”  Key to Ludwig’s critique is that he defines “metaphysicians of race” as “committed to the 
ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” much like other metaphysicians engaged in 
mainstream analytic metaphysics (Ludwig 2015, 245).  Furthermore, for Ludwig, “the new 
metaphysics of race” consists of disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race” (Ludwig 
2015, 245).  In his critique, Ludwig focuses on two debates in the new metaphysics of race.  
The first is the debate about whether races exist according to the one fundamental 
meaning of ‘race’ in current, ordinary English in the United States (Ludwig 2015, 257).  I’ll call 
this the US race debate*.1  According to Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 256, 260), some interlocutors 
                                                          
1
 The asterisk is intentional.  I’m calling this debate ‘the US race debate*’ because I think 
Ludwig has changed the focus of the relevant debate.  I borrow the convention of using an 
asterisk to flag when the meaning of a term has been changed from Joshua Glasgow (2009, 140). 
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in the US race debate* are Anthony Appiah, Joshua Glasgow, Michael Hardimon, Sally 
Haslanger, Quayshawn Spencer, and Naomi Zack.   
The second debate in the new metaphysics of race is about whether humans have races 
according to the one fundamental meaning of ‘race’ in the life sciences (Ludwig 2015, 254).  I 
will call this the biological race debate*.  Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 259) claims that, among 
others, the interlocutors of the biological race debate* are Robin Andreasen, Bernard Boxill, 
A.W.F. Edwards, Adam Hochman, Jonathan Kaplan, Koffi Maglo, Armand Leroi, Massimo 
Pigliucci, Neven Sesardic, and Alan Templeton. 
Ludwig defends his thesis using an argument premised on the claim that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics 
from contemporary metametaphysics: one from Eli Hirsch, one inspired from Theodore Sider, 
and one from Ludwig himself.  The relevant background here is that recent metametaphysics has 
been preoccupied with what constitutes a “substantive” metaphysical dispute, which, roughly, is 
a dispute that is really about metaphysics as opposed to some other topic, like how we use 
language (Hirsch 2005, 67). 
While I agree with Ludwig that to engage in a metaphysics of race that confuses 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues is a bad idea, and while I think that the new 
metaphysics of race (as Ludwig defines it) might be based on such a confusion, I will show that 
the work that actual metaphysicians of race are doing involves no such confusion.  In other 
words, the point of this paper is show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of the 
actual metaphysics of race. 
For clarity, by ‘actual metaphysicians of race’, I’m talking about the same group of 
scholars that Ludwig is talking about in his critique, and by ‘actual metaphysics of race’ I’m 
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talking about the same body of work that Ludwig is talking about in his critique.2  However, 
unlike Ludwig (2015, 245), I will not require actual metaphysicians of race or actual metaphysics 
of race to be “committed to the ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” even with respect to 
a particular linguistic context.   
I will begin by clarifying Ludwig’s argument and his defense of each premise.  Second, I 
will show that even if Ludwig’s argument is a good critique of the new metaphysics of race, it’s 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  Finally, I will provide closing remarks where, 
among other things, I will clarify how the actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in the philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.  As for 
objections, I will respond to them along the way. 
2. Ludwig’s Argument and Its Defense 
2.1 The Basic Argument 
 Though Ludwig does not state his argument explicitly, a charitable reconstruction of it is 
below:  
(1) If the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive, then it is based on a  
confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues. 
(2) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(3) So, the new metaphysics of race is based on a confusion of metaphysical  
and normative classificatory issues. 
                                                          
2
 For instance, like Ludwig (2015, 244), I consider Joshua Glasgow to be an actual 
metaphysician of race, and, like Ludwig (2015, 263), I consider Glasgow’s actual metaphysics of 
race to consist of work like his book A Theory of Race and his article “On the New Biology of 
Race.” 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -517-
 
4 
 
Ludwig states (3) as his thesis in the first paragraph of his opening remarks.3  Ludwig states (2) 
in his opening remarks as well and at several points throughout his paper.4  Ludwig also treats 
(2) as a reason for adopting (3).5  However, since there is a logical gap between (2) and (3), it’s 
charitable to add (1) as a suppressed premise.6   
2.2 Ludwig’s Defense of His Premises 
Though Ludwig takes the truth of (1) for granted, he offers three, in-depth defenses of (2) 
that utilize three different notions of non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s first defense of (2) 
is the following: 
(4) The new metaphysics of race is substantive only if there is exactly one  
allowable and fundamental ontology of race for each of its race debates. 
(5) If there is a plurality of legitimate biological subdivisions below the  
species level or a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ for 
each race debate in the new metaphysics of race, then there is a plurality 
of allowable ontologies of race for each race debate in the new 
metaphysics of race. 
(6) The antecedent of (5) is true. 
(7) So, it’s not the case that the new metaphysics of race is substantive. 
Ludwig claims (4) in section 3.1 and justifies his constraint on substantive metaphysics 
from how he defines ‘a metaphysics of x.’  For Ludwig (2015, 245, 251), a project on the 
                                                          
3
 See Ludwig (2015, 244). 
4
 See Ludwig (2015, 245, 260-262). 
5
 See, especially, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4 in Ludwig (2015). 
 
6
 [removed for blind review] 
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“metaphysics of x” assumes that metaphysicians of x are committed to “one fundamental 
ontology” of x that rules out “a plurality of equally allowable ontologies” of x, at least for the 
relevant linguistic context.7  Since a substantive metaphysics of x must at least be a metaphysics 
of x, it follows that a substantive metaphysics of x requires exactly one allowable and 
fundamental ontology of x.  Substituting ‘race’ for ‘x’ gives us (4).   
 As for (5), Ludwig states that the first disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s 
consequent in section 2.  Here Ludwig (2015, 247) follows Kaplan and Winther (2013) in 
arguing that if there is a plurality of equally legitimate but distinct ways of subdividing species 
into “legitimate biological kinds,” then “[e]mpirical evidence underdetermines the ontological 
status of race,” which in turn, permits a plurality of allowable ontologies of race (Ludwig 2015, 
246-247).  In particular, Ludwig (2015, 245, 247-249) argues that “both racial realism and 
antirealism” are allowable ontologies of race given different equally legitimate ways of 
subdividing a species, and even in the same race debate.  An example is how Zack (2002) uses 
the fact that humans have no subspecies to defend racial anti-realism in the US race debate*, 
while Spencer (2014) uses the fact that humans have a population subdivision that matches the 
current US census racial scheme to defend racial realism in the same race debate.   
 Ludwig states that the second disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s consequent in 
section 3.1.  In his words, “If there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’, 
there is also a plurality of equally allowable ontologies of race” (Ludwig 2015, 251).  
Interestingly, Ludwig never defends this assertion because he takes it to be obviously true.   
                                                          
7
 See Ludwig (2015, 251) for (4) and see Ludwig (2015, 245) for Ludwig’s view on the 
metaphysics of x. 
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 Next, Ludwig defends (6) by defending the truth of each disjunct in the antecedent of (5).  
As for the first disjunct, Ludwig (2015, 246-247) argues that there is a plurality of legitimate 
biological divisions below the species level (e.g. population subdivisions, monophyletic levels, 
subspecies, etc.) because, first, legitimate biological kinds are interest dependent, and, second, 
there is a plurality of “explanatory interests” among biologists in different research contexts (e.g. 
population genetics, phylogenetic systematics, etc.).  As for the second disjunct, Ludwig reaches 
it by making an induction from what’s going on in the two most popular race debates in the new 
metaphysics of race: which are the US race debate* and the biological race debate*. 
Ludwig (2015, 254) argues that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of 
‘race’ in the biological race debate* since biologists in different research programs use ‘race’ in 
different ways that suit their needs.  For instance, Ludwig (2015, 254) points out that ‘race’ is 
often used as a synonym for ‘subspecies’ in systematic biology, but often used as a synonym for 
‘ecotype’ in ecology.  As for the US race debate*, Ludwig takes a more circuitous route to the 
conclusion that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ in that debate.  
First, Ludwig (2015, 255) appeals to Glasgow et al.’s (2009) empirical research on how 
Americans use ‘race’ to argue that ‘race’ is “polysemous” in the current US.  Next, Ludwig 
(2015, 257-258) argues that the context for the US race debate* has not been “sufficiently 
specified” to narrow the debate to “exactly one fundamental candidate meaning of ‘race’ in the 
United States.”  Hence, according to Ludwig, from induction, the second disjunct of (6) holds as 
well. 
Ludwig’s second defense of (2) utilizes Hirsch’s notion of non-substantive metaphysics.  
The second defense is below: 
(8) A dispute is merely verbal if each side can plausibly interpret the other  
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side as speaking a language in which the latter’s asserted sentences are 
true. 
(9) A dispute is non-substantive if it is merely verbal. 
(10) Each side can plausibly interpret the other side as speaking a language in  
which the latter’s asserted sentences are true in the new metaphysics of 
race. 
(11) Thus, the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(8) is a direct quote from Ludwig (2015, 259), which is itself a summary of Hirsch’s (2005; 
2008) view on non-substantive metaphysics.   
Hirsch defends his distinction between merely verbal disputes and ones that aren’t with 
several examples from the history of science and philosophy.  For instance, Hirsch (2005, 73) 
shows that the dispute among classical physicists about whether a projectile’s final velocity is 
equal to its initial velocity on Earth was not a merely verbal dispute because physicists on both 
sides could not charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true.  In other words, both sides 
were using the same meanings of ‘projectile’, ‘velocity’, ‘Earth’, etc., and what they disagreed 
about were the laws of motion.  In contrast, Hirsch (2008, 407-408) shows that the dispute 
between John Locke and Joseph Butler about whether a tree can survive a change in its parts was 
merely verbal since either side could charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true using 
the other’s meaning of ‘identity’.  In short, a merely verbal dispute for Hirsch is one where the 
disputants are either talking past one another or merely arguing about how we do (or should) use 
language. 
As for (9), we can infer that it’s a premise from how Ludwig (2015, 259-260) uses 
‘merely verbal’ and ‘nonsubstantive’ at this point in his paper.  Furthermore, Ludwig’s 
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vocabulary here is uncontroversial since it’s the same vocabulary that Hirsch (2005, 67) uses.  
As for (10), Ludwig endorses it when he says the following: 
Realists like Andreasen, Edwards, Leroi, Sesardic, and Spencer can interpret 
antirealists as speaking the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to 
subspecies, populations with visible traits that mark relevant biological 
differences, populations with cognitive differences, and so on.  Antirealists like 
Glasgow, Lewontin, Hochman, Maglo, and Zack can interpret realists as speaking 
the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to genetic clusters, patterns of 
mating, clades, and so on (Ludwig 2015, 259-260). 
Finally, Ludwig defends (2) in a third way using his interpretation of Sider’s notion of 
non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s third defense of (2) is below: 
(12) A dispute about an expression E is non-substantive if its disputants are 
endorsing multiple, equally joint-carving candidate meanings for E. 
(13) The new metaphysics of race is a dispute that is non-substantive according 
to (12). 
 (14) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(12) is directly from Ludwig (2015, 261), and is a rough summary of Sider’s (2011, 46-49) view 
of non-substantive metaphysics.  Sider defends the non-joint-carving condition in his definition 
of ‘non-substantivity’ from his stipulation of what metaphysics is about.   
For Sider (2011, vii) the “central task” of metaphysics is “to discern the ultimate or 
fundamental reality underlying the appearances.”  We are supposed to describe this reality using 
a privileged language, so-called Ontologese, which is privileged exactly because all of its 
expressions (e.g. terms, quantifiers, etc.) are “joint-carving,” which means that they carve out the 
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world’s fundamental structure (Sider 2011, vii).8  So, naturally, when we find that one or more of 
the expressions that we’ve used to formulate a question Q does not have exactly one, best joint-
carving meaning, it’s likely that a debate about Q is not about the fundamental structure of the 
world, and thus, is not a substantive metaphysical debate in Sider’s sense.   
With that said, it’s important to note that Ludwig’s summary of Sider is rough, and does 
not reflect Sider’s (2011, 49) “revised” definition of a non-substantive dispute.  What Ludwig 
presents is Sider’s unrefined view, which occurs at the beginning of section 4.2 in chapter 4 of 
Sider’s Writing the Book of the World.  However, later on in section 4.2, after Sider considers 
multiple problems with his unrefined view, he settles on what he calls his “revised” definition.9  
Nevertheless, since Ludwig uses Sider’s unrefined notion of non-substantivity in his critique, 
that’s what I’ll focus on as well.  However, for clarity, I’ll say that (12) expresses Sider-style 
non-substantivity as opposed to Siderian non-substantivity. 
In any case, Ludwig (2015, 261) asserts and defends (13) when he says that Spencer’s, 
Leroi’s, Pigliucci’s, and Hochman’s biological definitions of ‘race’ are all “equally joint-carving 
candidates” for ‘race’ because they are all “objective ways of distinguishing between populations 
below the species level.”  Furthermore, Ludwig (2015, 261-262) bolsters his support for (13) 
when he says that Hardimon’s, Glasgow’s, Feldman and Lewontin’s, and Appiah’s biological 
definitions of ‘race’ are also equally joint-carving candidates for ‘race’ because they are all “non-
joint-carving” meanings.  
3. Why Ludwig’s Argument is an Irrelevant Critique of Actual Metaphysics of Race 
                                                          
8
 For Sider’s clarification of “Ontologese,” see Sider (2011, 171-173). 
 
9
 For Sider’s “revised” definition, see Sider (2011, 49). 
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Even though Ludwig has provided a valid argument that may be sound as well, it turns 
out that Ludwig’s critique does nothing to undermine the actual metaphysics of race.  The latter 
is partially because Ludwig’s critique is not about the actual metaphysics of race, it’s about a 
hypothetical metaphysics that he calls ‘the new metaphysics of race’.   
Remember that the new metaphysics of race is, according to Ludwig (2015, 245), and by 
definition, constituted by disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race.”  Furthermore, 
remember that Ludwig claims that people like Glasgow, Haslanger, Appiah, and Spencer are 
engaged in one such dispute, the US race debate*, and people like Andreasen, Pigliucci, Kaplan, 
and Templeton are engaged in another such dispute, the biological race debate*.  However, these 
last two claims are simply false.   
For one, the term ‘fundamental ontology’ is not even a phrase used in actual metaphysics 
of race.  For instance, it does not appear once among the actual metaphysics of race that Ludwig 
(2015, 263-265) cites, and he cites 40 such publications.  Second, some actual metaphysicians of 
race embrace a pluralist ontology for the nature of race in the relevant context.  For example, at 
the beginning of Spencer’s (2014, 1026) article on the “national” meaning of ‘race’ in the US, he 
concedes that ordinary Americans are using multiple “geographic” and “ethnic” meanings of 
‘race’.  In fact, Spencer (2014, 1026) explicitly says, “Hence, I acknowledge upfront that there 
are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.”   
However, Ludwig could object here.  Specifically, Ludwig (2015, 257) interprets 
Spencer’s focus on the national meaning of ‘race’ in the US as an endorsement of it being “the 
only relevant candidate meaning for philosophical debates about the referent of “race” in the 
United States.”  While the latter is a possible interpretation of Spencer’s project, it’s not the most 
charitable one given how he presents his project at the beginning of his article.  Spencer (2014, 
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1025) begins by saying upfront that his project is merely “to debunk” the idea that “folk racial 
classification has no biological basis.”  Spencer attempts to accomplish that goal by showing that 
‘race’, in its national meaning in the current US, is a directly referring term for a biological 
entity—a set of particular human populations—that presently happens to be biologically real in 
virtue of being a level of human population structure.  Thus, given how Spencer (2014, 1026) 
presents his own project, his race theory is compatible with there being a pluralist nature of race 
in the current US context.  Furthermore, this interpretation best explains why Spencer (2014, 
1026) says that “there are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.” 
There are other actual metaphysicians of race who embrace pluralism about the nature of 
race as well.  For instance, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1162-1163) are happy to grant that both 
the ecotype and the subspecies are equally legitimate ways of dividing a species into biological 
races.  It’s just that they believe that humans have ecotypes, but not subspecies.  In fact, Pigliucci 
and Kaplan (2003, 1163) explicitly say, “Races, then, can be defined and picked out in a number 
of ways.” 
Finally, there are plenty of actual metaphysicians of race who do not embrace pluralism 
about the nature of race, but who do entertain pluralism as a metaphysical possibility, which is 
enough to show that they do not presuppose that there is a single fundamental ontology of race in 
the relevant context.  For instance, after obtaining messy results about how ordinary Americans 
use ‘race’ and race terms in a widely distributed survey, Glasgow (2009, 75) entertains the 
possibility that ordinary Americans are sometimes “talking past each other” when they use 
‘race’, much like we sometimes do when we use ‘jade’.  In fact, Glasgow (2009, 75) explicitly 
says, “So maybe ‘race’ is used in some contexts to refer to a social kind of thing and in other 
contexts to a biological kind of thing.”  That doesn’t sound like somebody who presupposes that 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -525-
 
12 
 
there is a single fundamental ontology of race in the US context.  Now, even though Ludwig’s 
argument is not about actual metaphysics of race, it could still be a relevant critique of actual 
metaphysics of race.  So to that I now turn. 
In order to know whether Ludwig’s argument succeeds in critiquing the actual 
metaphysics of race, we need to know more about the debates among actual metaphysicians of 
race.  Clearly, the US race debate* and the biological race debate* are not debates among actual 
metaphysicians of race.  However, the US race debate and the biological race debate are.  The US 
race debate is the debate about the nature and reality of race according to what ‘race’ means in 
the ordinary discourse of contemporary Americans, but only when ‘race’ is used to classify 
humans.  The latter debate actually exists because all of the individuals that Ludwig places in the 
US race debate* have expressed an interest in the focus I’ve just articulated.10  The biological 
race debate is the debate about whether humans have any races in a nontrivial biological sense of 
‘race’.  The latter debate actually exists as well.11  These are the two race debates that Ludwig 
was attempting to critique, and given these distinctions, we can see that Ludwig’s argument 
really isn’t relevant to these two debates. 
For one, neither the US race debate nor the biological race debate satisfies Hirsch’s 
criterion for a non-substantive dispute.  The US race debate is not a merely verbal dispute 
because racial realists in that debate, such as Haslanger and Spencer, cannot plausibly interpret 
racial anti-realists in that debate, such as Appiah and Glasgow, as speaking a language in which 
                                                          
10
 For evidence, see Appiah (1996, 42), Glasgow (2009, 15), Haslanger (2012, 133), and Spencer 
(2014, 1025). 
11
 For evidence, see Andreasen (1998, 200-201, 205), Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1161-1164), 
Maglo (2011, 362-363), and Templeton (2013, 262-263). 
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anti-realist race theories are true, and vice versa.  For instance, if Glasgow (2009, 33) is correct 
about (H1*) being part of the non-negotiable semantic content of ‘race’ in the ordinary discourse 
of Americans, then Spencer (2014, 1026) is incorrect about ‘race’ directly referring to a set of 
human populations in the national racial discourse of Americans, and vice versa.12  The 
biological race debate is not a merely verbal dispute either.  For instance, if Pigliucci and Kaplan 
(2003, 1165) are correct that humans subdivide into “biologically significant” ecotypes, then 
Hochman (2013, 347) is incorrect that humans do not subdivide into “meaningful biological 
units,” and vice versa. 
Next, even if the US race debate or the biological race debate is non-substantive in a 
Ludwigian or Sider-style sense, that fact does not imply a “confusion about metaphysical and 
normative classificatory issues” as (1) claims.  This is because actual metaphysicians of race are 
adopting a different view of substantive metaphysics—namely, one that does not require 
metaphysical disputes about race to presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race or 
anything about joint-carving.  Thus, while Ludwig’s argument is relevant to the hypothetical new 
metaphysics of race, it doesn’t make contact with actual metaphysics of race. 
Interestingly, when Ludwig defines ‘the new metaphysics of race’, he anticipates the 
worry that his focus on it may mischaracterize actual metaphysics of race.   In response, Ludwig 
(2015, 245) says, “However, I do not want to engage in a verbal dispute about the meaning of 
“metaphysics of race”… this article only challenges a certain type of metaphysics of race while 
proposing an alternative deflationist and normative metaphysics of race.”  However, this reply is 
                                                          
12
 (H1*) is the claim that a race is, at least, a group of human beings that is distinguished from 
other groups of human beings by visible physical features, of the relevant kind, that the group 
has to some significantly disproportionate extent (Glasgow 2009, 33). 
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perplexing because if the new metaphysics of race is a purely hypothetical metaphysics that does 
not describe the disputes in actual metaphysics of race (as I’ve shown), and, in addition, if the 
disputes in actual metaphysics of race already do away with monist and fundamentalist 
assumptions about race (as I’ve shown), it’s hard to imagine what the purpose is for lodging 
Ludwig’s critique in the first place.  In any case, we can rest assured that actual metaphysicians 
of race are immune to Ludwig’s critique because they’ve already been vaccinated against monist 
and fundamentalist assumptions about race. 
5. Closing Remarks 
In this paper, I’ve shown that Ludwig’s critique of the new metaphysics of race is 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  However, I’ve said little about the conditions of 
substantivity that actual metaphysicians of race adopt.  In addition to the bare minimum of “not 
talking past one another” (Glasgow 2009, 28), actual metaphysicians of race embrace disputes 
about how certain linguistic communities actually use ‘race’ (e.g. Pigliucci and Kaplan 2003, 
1162-1163; Glasgow 2009, 6), and embrace disputes about how certain linguistic communities 
should use ‘race’ (e.g. Haslanger 2012, 221-247; Hochman 2014, 80).  However, actual 
metaphysicians of race do not embrace disputes that have unimportant social and scientific 
consequences.  For instance, Haslanger (2012, 300) motivates the US race debate by pointing out 
that engaging in it will help us frame and evaluate social policies and appropriately address 
stubborn inequalities in health.  Also, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1170) point out that engaging 
in the biological race debate can help biologists debunk hereditarian hypotheses about race and 
intelligence, yield insights into human evolutionary history, and yield insights into human 
migration history. 
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Interestingly, the criteria for substantive metaphysics that actual metaphysicians of race 
adopt make the metaphysical disputes in the actual metaphysics of race more akin to 
metaphysical disputes in the philosophy of science (e.g. the species debate, the nature of natural 
kinds, the ontic structural realism debate, etc.) than those in mainstream analytic metaphysics 
(e.g. debates about the nature of fundamentality, grounding, modality, substantivity, etc.).  For 
instance, Matthew Slater’s (2015) stable property cluster theory of natural kinds has a real shot at 
explaining why some kinds support epistemically reliable inductions in a domain while others 
don’t, which could help systematic biologists achieve more agreement about how they should 
classify organisms into species and higher taxa.  So, much like disputes in the actual metaphysics 
of race, there are practical payoffs to science or society for engaging in metaphysical disputes in 
the philosophy of science.  However, mainstream analytic metaphysics does not guarantee a 
payoff for science or society.  For instance, what exactly is the payoff for science or society in 
debating about “the” nature of substantive metaphysics?  
Perhaps Sider (2011, 47) sums up my point best when he says, “… this concept is not 
intended to apply to everything that might justly be called “nonsubstantive”.  For example, it 
isn’t meant to apply to equivocations between distinct lexical meanings (as in a dispute over 
whether geese live by “the bank”, in which one disputant means river bank and the other means 
financial bank)… Nor is it meant to capture the shallowness of inquiry into whether the number 
of electrons in the entire universe is even or odd (an inquiry that is substantive in my sense, but 
pointless).” 
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Measurement of Statistical Evidence: Picking Up Where Hacking (et al.) Left Off 
 
Abstract Hacking’s (1965) Law of Likelihood says – paraphrasing– that data support 
hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 
1. But Hacking (1972) noted a seemingly fatal flaw in the LR itself: it cannot be interpreted 
as the degree of “evidential significance” across applications. I agree with Hacking about the 
problem, but I don’t believe the condition is incurable. I argue here that the LR can be 
properly calibrated with respect to the underlying evidence, and I sketch the rudiments of a 
methodology for so doing. 
 
Introduction  
The “likelihoodist,” or “evidentialist,” school of thought in statistics is well known among 
philosophers, more so perhaps than among scientists or even statisticians, in large part due to 
Hacking (1965). One way to distinguish evidentialism from the other major schools – 
frequentism and Bayesianism – is to note that evidentialism alone focuses on the assessment 
of statistical evidence as its principal task, rather than decision-making or the rank-ordering 
of beliefs.
1
  
																																																								
1	Hacking himself generally prefers the term “support” over “evidence,” as does Edwards 
(1992), but other representatives of this school (Good 1950; Barnard 1949; Royall 1997) 
refer to an equivalent concept as “evidence.”	I prefer “evidence,” since this is the familiar, 
albeit vague, word for what we are trying to illuminate; and I prefer “evidentialist” over 
“likelihoodist” as the name of the school, since the former highlights a key distinction 
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It might be thought, therefore, that evidentialism would be the predominant approach to 
statistical inference in science, where quantifying evidence is usually the main objective. (If 
you don’t agree, try getting scientists to stop using the p-value as a measure of the strength of 
the evidence!) But frequentism, and to a lesser extent Bayesianism, predominate in the 
scientific literature, while evidentialism is virtually unseen.  Why is this? I’m going to argue 
here that the fault lies with evidentialism’s failure thus far to address the problem of 
calibrating the units in which evidence is to be measured. Since meaningful calibration is the 
sine qua non of scientific measurement, this turns out to be the loose thread that causes the 
cloth to unravel when we pull on it.  
Before proceeding it may be worth noting some things I will and will not be talking about. 
First, I am concerned only with statistical evidence, and will not be considering the concept 
of evidence as it appears in other contexts, e.g., in legal proceedings. Second, I will treat 
statistical evidence as a relationship between data and hypotheses under a model that can be 
expressed in the form of a likelihood (as defined below). On this view, data do not possess 
inherent evidential meaning on their own, but only take on meaning in the context of their 
relationships to particular hypotheses, with the nature of those relationships governed by the 
form of the likelihood.  I will not be concerned here with measurement problems associated 
																																																																																																																																																																												
between this school and the others. By contrast, likelihood features prominently in all 
modern statistical frameworks.	
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with the data themselves.
2
  Third, I am interested here solely in addressing the question of 
whether this relationship between data and hypotheses can be rigorously quantified.  If the 
answer is yes, then presumably the degree of evidence could play a role in decision making 
(deciding how strong is strong enough when it comes to evidence) or in guiding belief, but I 
will not be addressing these topics here.  It is one hallmark of evidentialist reasoning that 
statistical evidence is treated independently of these matters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section (1) I articulate the central 
evidence calibration problem (ECP), and suggest reframing it in measurement terms. In 
section (2), I consider ways in which evidentialism’s preoccupation with so-called “simple” 
hypotheses (as defined below) has constricted the theory, masking the true nature of the 
underlying measurement problem, and also obscuring the solution. In section (3) I illustrate a 
methodology for beginning to address the ECP once the restriction to simple hypotheses is 
relaxed.  In section (4) I briefly consider what changes would be required to axiomatic 
foundations in order to accommodate this methodology while remaining true to the spirit of 
evidentialism’s original motivating arguments. 
 
(1) The Evidence Calibration Problem (ECP) 
At the heart of evidentialism is Hacking’s (1965) familiar Law of Likelihood, which says 
in essence that data support one statistical hypothesis H1 over another hypothesis H2 
																																																								
2	In common usage “evidence” is often used to refer to what I am calling data, but “evidence” 
also has this other sense of being a relationship between data and hypotheses. In order to 
maintain this distinction, I will call the data “data” and the relationship “evidence.”  
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whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 1. But Hacking (1972) pointed out 
a problem in assigning any particular interpretation to the magnitude of the LR. In his review 
of Edwards (1992, orig. 1972), he says: 
“Now suppose the actual log-likelihood ratio between the two hypotheses is r, and 
suppose this is also the ratio between two other hypotheses, in a quite different 
model, with some evidence altogether unrelated to [the original data]. I know of no 
compelling argument that the ratio r ‘means the same’ in these two contexts.”
3
 (p. 
136)  
Thus we can say that, for one experiment, data support hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 
with LR = 2, and, for another experiment, that a different set of data support  H3 over H4 with 
LR = 20; but we cannot saying anything definite about how much more the second set of data 
supports H3 over H4 relative to the amount by which the first set supports H1 over H2.  
Edwards was well aware of this problem, saying expressly that “we shall not be attempting to 
make an absolute comparison of different hypotheses on different data.” (p. 10).  But 
Hacking’s point cuts deep. If the numerical value of the LR cannot be meaningfully 
compared across applications, in what sense is it meaningful in any one application? 
																																																								
3	Here Hacking is using “evidence” in the sense of what I am calling data; however, he goes 
on to describe what he has in mind in terms of levels of “evidential significance.” He refers 
to the log LR as this is the form preferred by Edwards. Note that Hacking already appears to 
have been alluding to this problem in Hacking (1965), vide p. 61.	
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Hacking’s criticism points to a fundamental problem for evidentialists, who appear to be 
able to say whether given data support H1 over H2, but not by how much they support H1.
4
 
This is on the face of it metaphysically perplexing, but also, it leaves a gap between support, 
as Hacking’s Law defines it, and a truly quantitative weight of evidence, which would be far 
more useful scientifically if only we could work out how to evaluate it.  
 Following the core arguments in Barnard (1949), Hacking (1965) and Edwards (1992), I 
will assume that the LR is the key quantity in any cogent theory of statistical evidence. But 
the Law of Likelihood is more specific than this assumption: it assigns a particular 
importance to one very narrowly conceived aspect of the LR, a fact that is obscured by 
evidentialism’s focus on simple hypotheses, to which I turn next.  
 Before doing so, I note that resolving Hacking’s problem requires unpacking his phrase 
‘means the same’.  I think that this must be understood as ‘means the same with respect to 
the underlying evidence,’ a locution that lands us solidly in measurement territory. We must 
be able to think in terms of the underlying evidence, as something we can – at least in the 
abstract – conceive of independently of how we measure it. The question then becomes: How 
do we establish meaningful measurement units for evidence, so that a given measurement 
value always ‘means the same’ with respect to the evidence? This is the ECP. 
And here, in a nutshell, is the evidentialist’s difficulty in addressing the ECP. The LR for 
a simple hypothesis comparison (see below) is a single number, thus, the evidentialist is lured 
																																																								
4	Royall (1997) is the only one as far as I know who argues that the magnitude of the LR 
does express strength of evidence in a comparable manner across applications. But I think his 
arguments on this point fail for reasons articulated in Forster & Sober (2004).	
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into the claim that “the LR is the evidence.” To see the danger here, consider a mercury 
thermometer reading 80°F. We might say, “the temperature is 80°,” but this is a 
circumlocution for “80 is the numerical value we assign, on the Fahrenheit scale, to the 
underlying temperature.” Now suppose that rather than degrees, only units of volume V are 
annotated on the sides of the glass. We might be tempted to say “V is the temperature,” but 
now this statement is not merely a circumlocution, it is also an error.  V alone does not tell us 
the temperature; we must, at the least, also take into account the pressure. To insist that 
temperature can be represented by volume alone, or by pressure alone, or by any other single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, is to mistake the nature of temperature. Just 
so, I am going to argue that the simple LR mistakes the nature of evidence, by obscuring the 
fact that the evidence itself is not a number, and moreover, that the evidence is not any single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, but instead, it is a function of (at least) two 
measurable things.  
 
(2) The Insidiousness of Simple Hypotheses 
To begin with, we need to define likelihood: 
“The likelihood, L(H|R), of the hypothesis H given data R, and a specific model, is 
proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality being arbitrary.” Edwards (1992) 
(p. 9) 
Two key points are familiar: (i) likelihood represents a feature of an hypothesis given data, 
not the other way around; and (ii) likelihood is related to but not the same as probability, 
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since it is defined only up to an arbitrary multiplicative factor and therefore does not follow 
the Kolmogorov axioms. I will not rehearse the advantages of likelihood in spelling out a 
theory of statistical evidence, but suffice it to say that likelihood enables inferences to 
proceed independently of what are, arguably, extraneous features of study design, including 
the sampling distribution of all those observations that might have occurred but didn’t.   
There is a third important feature of this definition as well, and this regards the nature of 
the hypotheses to which the definition is intended to apply. Edwards is, as always, explicit: 
“An essential feature of a statistical hypothesis is that its consequences may be described 
by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to each of which a definite 
probability is attached.”  (p. 4) 
This precludes consideration of likelihoods involving composite hypotheses. For instance, in 
the context of a coin-tossing experiment in which x independent tosses have landed heads 
and y have landed tails, and letting θ=P(heads), one can write the likelihood L(θ=0.1|x, y), or 
L(θ=0.2|x, y). These likelihoods involve “simple” hypotheses, in which θ is assigned a single 
numerical value, so that the corresponding probability P(x, y|θ) returns a single number on 
the probability scale for each possible outcome (x, y).  But one can not write L(θ=0.1 or 
θ=0.2|x, y), because the latter involves a “composite” hypothesis, which does not assign a 
definite probability to the observed outcome. To know the probability of observing (x, y) 
under the hypothesis “θ=0.1 or θ=0.2,” we would need not only to know the probability of (x, 
y) for each θ, but also, we would need to know the prior probabilities of θ=0.1 and θ=0.2.  As 
these prior probabilities lies outside the likelihood, they are not admissible on the 
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evidentialist view. 
But even the simplest examples of statistical reasoning generally involve hypotheses that 
appear on the face of things to be composite; e.g., we might be interested in whether the coin 
is biased toward tails or fair, which would appear to involve the improperly formed 
hypothesis θ<0.5. This situation is handled by treating composite hypotheses “solely on the 
merits of their component parts” (Edwards, p. 5). Thus in forming the LR corresponding to 
‘coin is biased toward tails’ vs. ‘coin is fair,’ we would need to consider separately the 
(infinitely many) simple LRs in the form L(θ=θi|x, y)/L(θ=0.5|x, y), for each possible i
th
 value 
of θ≤0.5. Now the LR is a function of θ, not a single number (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 LR as a function of θ for x = 2, y = 8. 
 
 
In practice it seems that what is important is not so much the proscription against 
composite hypotheses, but rather the prescription for how they may be interpreted.  We can 
graph the LR as a function of θ, as if we were admitting composite hypotheses, but we can 
only make statements like “θ=0.2 is supported over θ=0.5, on given data, by LR=6.9,” while 
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“θ=0.1 is supported over θ=0.5, on those same data, by LR=4.4.”
5
  But as a practical matter, 
the graph is not a sufficiently concise summary for general scientific applications. We still 
need some way to reduce the function LR(θ) to a single number summarizing the strength of 
the evidence.  
And this is where we get into trouble, because focus shifts naturally to the maximum LR 
(MLR), which occurs over the best supported value – the maximum likelihood estimate 
(m.l.e.) – of θ. Indeed, given that we are only allowed to make statements about one simple 
hypothesis comparison at a time, the MLR, itself a ratio of two simple likelihoods, appears as 
the best single constituent LR to use as a summary feature of the LR graph. (Below I 
consider how relaxing the requirement that hypotheses must be simple frees us up to consider 
other features.) We have now successfully summarized the function LR(θ) as a single number, 
the MLR, but this summary is tethered to the m.l.e.. We appear to have answered the 
question: How well supported is the m.l.e. compared to (one or more individual) alternative 
values of θ?  But that is not the question we asked initially, which was about the evidence.
6
 
The m.l.e. of θ arrives on the scene as a seemingly innocuous point of special interest, the 
value that corresponds to the maximum support, but it rapidly takes over, embroiling us in a 
downward spiral of increasingly perplexing difficulties. One immediate issue with relying on 
the MLR to summarize the evidence (continuing to focus for ease of discussion on the coin-
																																																								
5	Moreover we can only make such statements when both the data and the form of the 
likelihood are the same in the numerator and the denominator of the LR, for only in such 
cases will the constants of proportionality cancel. 
6
 Hacking (p. 28 ff.) makes clear the conceptual reasons for keeping estimation and evidence 
(or support) separate.  
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tossing example, in which maximization occurs only in the numerator of the LR), is that 
MLR≥1: the MLR can only show evidence in favor of the numerator but never in favor of the 
denominator. This is problematic, like using a thermometer in which the mercury is 
prevented from receding. 
Another problem with the MLR is that it begs the question of measurement scale in a 
particularly obvious way, because its evidential meaning would appear to require some kind 
of adjustment to compensate for the maximization itself. The more parameters we maximize 
over (again, for ease of discussion, assuming maximization occurs only in the numerator), the 
larger the MLR becomes. How are we to separate the portion of the MLR reflecting the 
evidence from the portion representing an artifact of the process of maximization?  It 
becomes particularly hard to retain the fiction that the numerical value of the maximum LR 
has some prima facie meaning with respect to the underlying evidence, regardless of the 
number of parameters over which the LR is maximized.  
There is a third, more subtle but at least as damaging, difficulty with summarizing 
evidence via MLRs. Simple LRs can be multiplied across two data sets, but MLRs can not be 
multiplied. Rather, to obtain the MLR based on two sets of data, we first combine the data to 
find the new m.l.e., which is a kind of weighted average of the two original m.l.e.s, and then 
we find the new MLR with respect to this average m.l.e. on the combined data. Now consider 
a situation in which data set D1 favors H2 by some substantial amount, and D2 also favors H2, 
but by a lesser amount. In such situations it is not uncommon for the combined support for 
H2 to be less than the original support on D1 alone.  But this is not how evidence behaves: 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -541-
Veronica	J	Vieland	
Philosophy	of	Science	Assoc	Biennial	Meeting	2016	
strong evidence for H2 followed by weaker evidence also supporting H2 ought to lead to 
stronger evidence for H2, not intermediate evidence. (A blood type match following a DNA 
match does not lessen the evidence that the defendant was at the crime scene.
7
) This means 
that we cannot in practice differentiate between situations in which new data are truly 
diminishing the evidence, and situations in which the evidence is in fact increasing but the 
MLR at the average m.l.e. goes down anyway. This tendency of the MLR to “average” 
across combined data is entirely due to its dependence on the m.l.e.; simple LRs do not share 
this defect.
8
 	
Of course none of this need surprise unreconstructed evidentialists, who, after all, 
disavowed composite hypotheses – and therefore any need for maximization – from the start.  
But then beyond the simplest of examples, we are left with an irreducible graph of the 
component simple LRs, not a single number.  This is true already in single-parameter cases;  
the problem is only exacerbated in higher dimensions.  
There is also the matter of masking the nature of the real problem: by focusing initially 
only on those situations in which the LR is a single number, we missed Hacking’s 
measurement question, how do we ensure that this number always ‘means the same’? It is 
only when we consider composite hypotheses that it becomes clear we were never warranted 
																																																								
7	This example was suggested by Hasok Chang. 
8	This issue plays a salient role in the current “crisis” of non-replication of statistical findings 
in the biomedical and social sciences, where the tendency of p-values and MLRs to “regress 
to the mean” upon attempts to replicate initial findings is widely interpreted as meaning that 
the evidence has gone down. In the absence of a properly behaved evidence measure, 
however, this conclusion is entirely unwarranted.	
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in the first place in assuming that the face value of the LR for a simple vs. simple hypothesis 
comparison is the evidence. Composite hypotheses force us to think in terms of the LR graph, 
which, precisely because it is not a single number, immediately raises the issue of which 
feature(s) of the graph might be relevant to the evidence. Composite hypotheses are crucial, 
not only because they are scientifically relevant, but also, because they beg a question all but 
hidden as long as we focus only on simple hypotheses.  
The urge to sidestep the problem of the evidential interpretation of the MLR is the reason 
evidentialists have been reluctant to admit composite hypotheses into their formalism in the 
first place.  But it is fair to say that they have failed to provide any viable alternative to the 
MLR as the summary measure of evidence strength in practice. The preoccupation with 
simple hypotheses has entailed inherent difficulties for the program, and it has also masked a 
basic underlying calibration issue.  The good news, I believe, is that it has also been masking 
the possibility of a solution.  
 
 (3) Towards a Solution to the Measurement Calibration Problem  
Consider again the coin-tossing experiment and LR(θ) as shown in Figure 1. Let us 
suppose, following the spirit if not the letter of the Law of Likelihood, that all of the 
evidential information is captured, somehow, in this graph. What feature(s) of the graph 
should we take as representing the degree of evidence?   
The MLR of course is one possibility, but I have already stated some objections to this 
option.  An alternative would be to use the area under the graph (ALR). (Note that this is 
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only possible if we allow ourselves to consider the truly composite hypothesis θ<0.5, because 
the ALR requires simultaneous consideration of all of the constituent simple hypotheses.
9
) 
But while we’re at it, why not also consider using sets of features of the graph?  For instance, 
the evidence might be a function of the both the MLR and the ALR, e.g., their product, or 
their ratio.  What we need is a methodology for figuring out which among the many 
possibilities is the correct one. 
The methodology I propose is quite simple, at least to begin with. Let’s consider the 
behavior of candidate evidence measures in situations where we have clear intuitions 
regarding the behavior of evidence, and see which of our candidate measures behaves like the 
object of measurement, the evidence. Here I will illustrate using coin-tossing “thought 
experiments” to discover patterns of behavior of the evidence with changes in data, 
considering the evidence that the coin is either biased toward tails or fair. I propose that, 
perhaps with a little persuasion, I could convince you that the following patterns capture 
what we mean when we talk about statistical evidence in this context. (Here I summarize the 
data in terms of n=the number of tosses, and x/n=the proportion of tosses that land heads.)  
(i) Evidence as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For any given value of x/n, the 
evidence increases as n increases. The evidence may favor bias (e.g., if x/n = 0.05) or no 
bias (e.g., if x/n = ½), but in either case it gets stronger with increasing n.  
																																																								
9	The ALR is proportional in this simple example to the Bayes factor under a uniform prior 
on θ, which is sometimes interpreted in Bayesian circles as a measure of evidence strength; it 
is also proportional to the relative belief (Evans 2015), another Bayesian proposal for 
measuring evidence. But the ALR itself does not involve a prior, so I see no prima facie 
reason for the evidentialist to balk at this suggestion, once composite hypotheses are allowed.	
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(ii) Evidence as a function of changes in x/n for fixed n  If we hold n constant but allow 
x/n to increase from 0 up to, say, 0.20, the evidence favoring ‘coin is biased’ diminishes: 
i.e., the evidence for bias is stronger the further x/n is from ½. But we have also already 
noted that when x/n is close to ½ the evidence favors ‘coin is fair.’ Therefore, as x/n 
continues to approach ½, at some point the evidence will shift to favoring ‘coin is fair,’ 
and from that point, the evidence for ‘coin is fair’ will increase the closer x/n is to ½.  
(iii) Rate of evidence change as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For given x/n, as n 
increases the evidence increases more slowly with fixed increments of data. E.g., consider 
evidence in favor of bias with one additional tail (T), following T, or TT, or TTT. When 
the number of tails in a row is small (i.e., when there is weak evidence favoring bias), each 
subsequent T makes us that much more suspicious that the coin is biased. But suppose we 
have already observed 100 Ts in a row: now one additional T changes our sense of the 
evidence hardly at all, as we are already quite positive that the coin is not fair.
10
  
 (iv) x/n as a function of changes in n (or vice versa) for fixed evidence It follows from (i) 
and (ii) that in order for the evidence to remain constant, n and x/n must adjust to one 
another in a compensatory manner. E.g., if x/n increases from 0 to 0.05, in order for the 
evidence to remain the same n must increase to compensate; otherwise, the evidence 
would go down, following (ii) above. By the same token, it is readily verified that if (i) 
																																																								
10	This underscores the point made above that evidence is not inherent in the data (say, a 
single toss T), but rather, evidence is a relationship between the data and the hypotheses that 
depends on context. 
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and (ii) hold, then as x/n continues to increase, at some point n must begin to decrease in 
order to hold the evidence constant as the evidence shifts to favoring ‘coin is fair.’  
Note that at this point we have not mentioned probability distributions, likelihoods,  or 
parameterization of the hypotheses. These patterns characterize evidence in only a very 
informal, vague manner. However, by the same token, they exhibit a kind of generality: they 
derive from our general sense of evidence, from what we mean by statistical evidence before 
we attempt a formal mathematical treatment of the concept.  
Can we find a precise mathematical expression that exhibits these patterns? As  
illustrated in Figure 2, the ratio RLR=MLR/ALR exhibits all of the expected behaviors. By 
contrast, neither MLR nor ALR shows all four of these patterns. For instance, MLR, as 
already noted, cannot show increasing evidence in favor of H2 because it can never favor H2 
in the first place; and both MLR and ALR increase exponentially in n for fixed x/n rather 
than showing the concave-down pattern in 2(a).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Patterns of behavior of RLR for coin-tossing thought experiments: (a) Patterns (i) 
and (iii); (b) Pattern (ii); (c) Pattern (iv).  
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Of course none of this proves that RLR is the correct, or optimal (or properly calibrated) 
measure of evidence. But this style of reasoning buys us an important methodological tool. 
Whichever features of the LR graph we consider and however we combine them, we must be 
able to show that the resulting evidence measure behaves like the evidence. When proposing 
candidate evidence measures anything goes, but only those candidates that behave 
appropriately remain on the ballot. And even in this very simple example, two obvious 
candidates – the MLR and the ALR – have already dropped out of contention.  
Of course, there is no reason to assume that what works in this simple case (RLR) will 
work in more complicated cases, nor have we yet resolved the ECP’s fundamental calibration 
issue. Establishing that a measure behaves like the object of measurement is only a first step, 
but it is a vital step not previously taken. It provides an “empirical” measurement scale, not 
an absolute scale, much as early thermoscopes provided good experimental tools while 
falling short of proper, absolute, calibration (Chang 2004).
11
  Projecting an empirical 
measure onto an absolute scale requires a broader theoretical foundation, but one needs the 
empirical measure first.  My point here is simply that confronting the ECP head on, and in 
the context of composite hypotheses, opens the door for the first time to the possibility of 
establishing a proper measurement scale for statistical evidence.   
Note too that the coin-tossing exercise suggests the existence of an equation of state 
involving the three quantities (n, x/n and the evidence), such that fixing any one quantity 
																																																								
11	Indeed, the ECP poses what Chang calls a “nomic” measurement problem, much like the 
nomic problem of temperature measurement. What I am describing here is a necessary but 
not sufficient stage in resolving a nomic problem. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -547-
Veronica	J	Vieland	
Philosophy	of	Science	Assoc	Biennial	Meeting	2016	
while allowing a second one to change requires a specific compensatory change in the third. 
This in turn suggests a new, and potentially very powerful, way to think about the laws 
governing the behavior of LRs. I’m not aware of any evidentialist work that considers such 
equations, but I see no reason that an evidentialist-at-heart should be prohibited from 
pursuing their study. 
  
(4) Relaxing the Foundations To Include Composite Hypotheses 
In order to tackle the ECP in the terms of the preceding section, we need to amend the 
foundations of evidentialism, but only slightly. I propose the following changes. First, let’s 
retain Edwards definition of likelihood, as quoted above, but insert the word “simple” (which 
is tacit in Edwards’ original statement): “The likelihood, L(H|R), of a simple hypothesis H 
given data R, and a specific model, is proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality 
being arbitrary.” Second, we can again add the word “simple” to his characterization of a 
statistical hypothesis: “An essential feature of a simple statistical hypothesis is that its 
consequences may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to 
each of which a definite probability is attached.”  But we can now add a definition of 
likelihood for a composite hypothesis: “A composite hypothesis H given data R, and a 
specific model, is the set of all constituent simple hypotheses, defined up to a single constant 
of proportionality.” Thus the essential feature of a composite hypothesis is that each of its 
constituent simple hypotheses may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive 
outcomes, to each of which a definite probability is attached.  We can now use this definition 
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of a composite hypothesis to define the corresponding composite likelihood, as the set of all 
constituent simple likelihoods. 
Under my proposal, the spirit of the Law of Likelihood can be retained: We can say that 
all of the evidential information conveyed by given data regarding a comparison between two 
hypotheses on a particular model is contained in the LR, where, under the expanded 
definition of hypotheses, the LR is understood to be a function of all unknown parameters, or 
better still perhaps, a graph. This can equivalently be read as a definition of evidential 
information, as whatever changes the LR graph.
12
  But the idea that the (simple) LR itself 
expresses the degree or weight of the evidence must be abandoned. What I have attempted to 
argue here is that there is at least the possibility of replacing this notion with something more 
useful.   
 
Discussion   
Evidence is a general and vague term in science. Statistical evidence is a narrower concept, 
but it still inherits some of this vagueness.  One way to tackle a general and vague term is by 
seeking a precise definition that maintains full generality, but of course, this might not be 
possible. Weyl (1952) has suggested another approach: 
“To a certain degree this scheme is typical for all theoretic knowledge: We begin with 
some general but vague principle, then find an important case where we can give that 
																																																								
12	I borrow this idea from Frank (2014), who defines information as whatever changes a 
probability distribution. 
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notion a concrete precise meaning, and from that case we gradually rise again to 
generality… and if we are lucky we end up with an idea no less universal than the one 
from which we started. Gone may be much of its emotional appeal, but it has the same or 
even greater unifying power in the realm of thought and is exact instead of vague.” (p. 6) 
Can evidentialism be redeemed and made truly useful to science? Of course I have not 
proved that the answer is yes. But in section (3) I illustrated a case in which we appear to be 
able to give the vague concept of statistical evidence a concrete, precise meaning, via the 
quantity RLR=MLR/ALR. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to rise again to 
generality from this first step. But for those of us who agree with most of what Barnard, 
Hacking and Edwards have to say on the subject, it seems worthwhile to see how far we can 
take this line of reasoning. This also seems to be a singular opportunity for philosophers of 
science to step into the breach and at least try to solve a problem that has long stood between 
one of the needs of science – for well-behaved quantitative measures of evidence – and the 
capabilities of conventional statistical methodologies. 
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What Basic Emotions Really Are  
Encapsulated or Integrated?  
Abstract: While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions (BEs) and 
about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that 
BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the 
products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this 
assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that 
evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications 
of these claims for debates about the existence of basic emotions in humans. 
1. Introduction 
It is widely held among emotion theorists that there is some theoretically interesting 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. On this picture, basic emotions 
(BEs) are primarily structured by evolution whereas higher cognitive emotions are 
substantially structured by either culture or individual experience. While there is ongoing 
debate about the existence of BEs and about their status as natural kinds, these debates 
usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that 
encapsulation is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products 
of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumptions is entirely unwarranted, that 
there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to 
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expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the distinction between basic and higher cognitive 
emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications of these claims for the existence of basic 
emotions in humans.  
In the following section, I characterize the received view of BEs, which holds (among 
other things) that BEs are solutions to basic life problems in our evolutionary past. Then I 
consider and reject some of the reasons to think that BEs are cognitively encapsulated. In the 
second section, I provide an example of a BE in rodents that bears the marks of cognitive 
integration (as opposed to encapsulation). The basic life problem that likely shaped this 
emotion appears to demand substantial cognitive integration. In the third section, I draw out 
the implications for a current debate in emotion theory concerning the existence of BEs in 
humans.  
2. Basic Emotions 
BEs – including anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise (for an extended list, 
see Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) – are thought to be human-typical behavioral syndromes that 
include involuntary facial expressions of emotion, physiological changes (e.g. in heart rate, 
blood pressure, and hormone levels), and changes in bodily posture (including bodily social 
displays and orienting responses). According to BE theory, these syndromes have a similar 
kind of evolutionary explanation and similar neural and psychological mechanisms.  
Specifically, they each evolved to address basic life problems or adaptive problems (such as 
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resource competition, avoidance of predators and avoidance of poisons and parasites). Some 
of these basic life problems are ones that we share with non-human animals.  
Moreover, the elicitation and production of these syndromes (including the 
coordination of various response components) are supposed to be explained by automatic 
appraisal mechanisms and affect programs, respectively (Ekman, 1977, 1999). For instance, 
affect programs explain phenomena observed in experiments that ask people to distinguish 
photographs of facial expressions of emotions, connect these expressions with emotion 
terms, or rate their appropriateness in response to vignettes (for an overview, see Ekman, 
2003). They are also supposed to explain the results of experiments that connect facial 
expressions with changes in physiological response components (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). To generalize, affect programs are 
introduced to explain the observed coordination of various response components and the 
cross-cultural production of these various syndromes (which is thought to explain widespread 
recognition of facial expressions across cultures). 
3. Unwarranted Assumptions Concerning Cognitive Integration 
Many emotion theorists claim that BEs lack cognitive integration. In this section, I argue that 
these claims are based on unwarranted assumptions.  
Assumption 1: Cognitively Integrated only if Informationally Integrated 
In most cases, questions about the integration of emotions with cognition concern the 
possibility that emotions are modular in Fodor’s (1983) sense. This depends (among other 
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things) on whether they can store information that cognitive systems cannot access 
(informational encapsulation); or whether information from other cognitive systems can 
interfere with the operations of an emotion (cognitive penetrability); or whether people have 
conscious access to emotional processes or merely their outputs (opacity); or whether the 
information that an emotion provides is general as opposed to specific (which would imply 
shallow outputs). These are some of the more well-known marks of cognitive integration or 
its absence, encapsulation. 
Philosophers and psychologists alike usually proceed under the assumption that 
integration with cognition depends entirely on whether information is integrated in these 
ways. These assumptions translate to discussions about BEs, where evidence for lack of 
informational integration is sometimes used as evidence for lack of cognitive integration 
simpliciter: 
Three other types of evidence suggest that [basic] emotion processes can operate 
independently of cognition. Emotions have been induced by unanticipated pain…, 
manipulation of facial expressions…, and changing the temperature of cerebral blood… 
In all these conditions the immediate cause of the emotion was noncognitive. (Izard, 
1992, p. 563, see also his 2007) 
Here, Izard apparently assumes that the impenetrability of BEs constitutes evidence that BEs 
operate independently of cognition. The fact that they respond to low level inputs or 
processes to which other systems have limited access certainly suggests that emotional states 
can respond to information that is not integrated with cognition. In addition, there is evidence 
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that people cannot fully control facial expressions of BEs (Ekman, 1972; Friesen, 1973), 
suggesting that BEs are cognitively impenetrable. Overall, BEs appear to lack informational 
integration. 
Nevertheless, the realm of the cognitive picks out not only informational states, but 
also includes a broader range of internal states that function as causal intermediates between 
stimulus and response, perception and action (Rey, 1997). Cognitive states so understood 
include not only informational states (such as beliefs) but also motivational states (such as 
desires). Moreover, questions about cognitive integration may be asked about either 
informational or motivational states. If so, the possibility arises that the two forms of 
cognitive integration are independent of one another. If so, any inference from the one to the 
other is invalid.  
This becomes clear when we consider hunger. Hunger may very well be akin to 
desire (a paradigmatic case of a cognitively integrated state) in the sense that it can interact 
with other cognitive systems to produce flexible or novel behaviors, as when rodents take 
novel “short cuts” to get to a food box in a maze (Olton, 1979; Tolman, 1948). Short cut 
behaviors suggest that hunger is a motivational state that can incline rodents to the pursuit of 
an end (e.g. food consumption) by selecting from a range of different means, perhaps by 
interacting with informational states that relate means to ends (e.g. means-ends beliefs). Even 
so, hunger may be cognitively impenetrable in that it may be triggered by low level stimuli 
and processes (e.g. low-level detection of changes in blood sugar). Moreover, when one feels 
hungry, one cannot interfere with the feeling of hunger by thinking about it (e.g. by noticing 
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that the amount of energy one’s body has stored in fat deposits is more than enough to 
sustain oneself). One can even imagine that it is informationally encapsulated: it might store 
information (e.g. about which foods are more calorically dense) that other systems cannot 
directly access. 
These conceptual possibilities suggest that questions concerning the integration of 
informational states are conceptually independent of questions concerning the integration of 
motivational states. Hunger may be informationally encapsulated while retaining a degree of 
integration as a motivational state. Wholesale encapsulation, therefore, does not follow from 
informational encapsulation. If this is correct, then inferences like the one Izard draws above 
are invalid: having non-cognitive inputs is not a reason to think that emotions operate 
independently of cognition. They might very well operate in concert with cognition on the 
output side or as motivational states. Before I raise that possibility, consider another reason to 
rule it out at the outset: that BEs are not integrated with propositional attitudes, including 
beliefs and desires. 
Assumption 2: Integration with Beliefs and Desires is the Criterion for Cognitive 
Integration  
Contrary to the previous assumption, this one respects the distinction between motivational 
and informational integration. Nevertheless, I argue that it sets the bar for cognitive 
integration too high. 
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To see this, consider Griffiths’ (Griffiths, 1997, 2004) views on the distinction 
between basic and higher cognitive emotions. First, he draws on some of the same evidence 
as Izard to conclude that BEs are opaque and informationally encapsulated. Since they have 
these and other marks of modularity, Griffiths thinks BEs have “limited involvement” with 
higher cognitive processes, which are “…the processes in which people use the information 
of the sort they verbally assent to (traditional beliefs) and the goals they can be brought to 
recognize (traditional desires) to guide relatively long-term action and to solve theoretical 
problems.” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 92) Here, Griffiths may be making the same faulty assumption 
as Izard (that informational encapsulation implies cognitive encapsulation more broadly). 
However, let us grant that he may have additional reasons to think that emotions are not 
integrated on the output side or qua motivational states.  
From this, Griffiths draws a broader conclusion: that BEs are not “flexible [or] 
integrated with long-term, planned action” and are instead “restricted to short-term, 
stereotyped responses” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 241). The apparent assumption is that if BEs are 
not integrated with beliefs, desires and long-term planning, then the only alternative is that 
they are similar to fixed action patterns, being inflexible and stereotyped. Griffiths makes no 
explicit argument for this assumption, perhaps at the time it was widespread enough to make 
further argument otiose. 
Nevertheless, it has become a tendentious assumption for several reasons. First, the 
phenomena of intelligent action are much broader than deliberate, “long-term, planned 
action” mediated by beliefs and desires. For instance, Ginet (1990) argues that many clear 
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cases of actions (as distinct from mere behaviors, such as reflexes or fixed action patterns) 
are not plausibly mediated by conscious beliefs, desires or intentions: involuntarily crossing 
one’s legs, kicking a door in anger, impulsively pulling a loose thread from one’s clothes, 
and slamming on the brakes to avoid hitting a dog. These actions are not mere behaviors or 
reflexes. That is, they appear to be purposive and guided by the agent, but it is difficult to 
find belief-desire style explanations that render them intelligible.1 Why not think that BEs 
can influence actions more akin to this variety than to “long-term, planned actions”? Griffiths 
never raises this question, neither does he give reason to rule out the possibility that BEs 
cause actions intermediate between long-term planned action and stereotyped behavioral 
responses. 
Second, if we ask what might explain the other varieties of action that Ginet picks 
out, it may be that such actions are guided by other representational states, aside from 
conscious or verbally reportable beliefs, desires and intentions. For instance, in the last 
twenty years, cognitive scientists have begun to emphasize the role of unconscious or non-
conceptual representational states in generating flexible and intelligent behavior (Bermúdez, 
2003). Informational states aside from beliefs include perceptual representations, map-like 
spatial representations and representations of affordances. Motivational states aside from 
desires include drives, incentives and feedback mechanisms.  
                                                     
1 See also Hursthouse (1991). 
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The flexibility and intelligence of these representational states becomes clear when 
we consider animal behavior. Nonhuman animals display forms of intelligent or purposive or 
instrumental behavior (see e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998), even while lacking 
linguistically mediated propositional attitudes. This suggests that instrumental behaviors in 
non-human animals are underwritten by a different form of cognitive integration. Consider 
what Susan Hurley calls holistic flexibility: 
The holistic flexibility of intentional agency contributes a degree of generality to the 
agent’s skills: a given means can be transferred to a novel end, or a novel means adopted 
toward a given end. The end or goal functions as an intervening variable that organizes 
varying inputs and outputs and allows a degree of transfer across contexts. (Hurley, 2003, 
pp. 237–38) 
Where this sort of flexibility is found, it suggests that behavior is best explained with 
reference to informational states which represent the means available to an organism (e.g. 
affordances) and motivational states that represent its ends (e.g. drive states), which can 
interact interchangeably in order to bring about the same end by various means or to deploy a 
single means to bring about various ends.  
Nevertheless, these informational and motivational states may sometimes lack 
inferential integration with beliefs and desires. Even in humans, phenomena like “blind-
sight” suggest that perceptual representations can flexibly guide behavior without being 
integrated with verbally reportable states. That is, even though these perceptual states are not 
verbally reportable or consciously accessible, these informational states mediate goal-
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directed behaviors (e.g. putting a plate in a slot) rather than just reflexes and fixed action 
patterns (see e.g. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). All this suggests that Griffiths’ 
requirements on cognitive integration are too stringent. Verbal reportability and conscious 
accessibility of a representational state is not necessary for such a state to influence flexible 
behaviors. To my knowledge there is no evidence that BEs fail to meet less stringent 
requirements on cognitive integration such as holistic integration. 
Once the full range of representational states is expanded in this way (beyond beliefs 
and desires), it becomes possible that BEs have some degree of motivational integration with 
other representational states aside from conscious beliefs and desires to produce behaviors 
that are more flexible and purposive than stereotyped behaviors. Griffiths provides no reason 
to rule out this possibility.  
4. Evidence of Integration in a Basic Emotion 
In fact, there is some reason to rule it in. Consider the instinctive patterns of territorial 
behavior of rodents. These behaviors have been investigated in great detail using a resident-
intruder experimental paradigm (for an overview, see D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984, 
2003) add it Adams RRR) in which resident (who have occupied a cage or colony for a few 
weeks) will attack unfamiliar male intruders introduced into their cage. The attacks of the 
resident and the defensive maneuvers of the intruder comprise sets of stereotyped behaviors. 
Each attack behavior of the resident is paired with a matching defensive maneuver of the 
intruder. The resident adopts a set of stereotyped postures and attacks aimed at biting the 
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dorsal surfaces of the intruder. On the other hand, the intruder adopts a distinctive set of 
stereotyped behaviors aimed at avoiding or blocking the resident’s attempts to bite its back.  
While these behaviors are certainly stereotyped, they are not brittle or reflexive. For 
instance, attacks of residents vary depending on the defensive strategy adopted by the 
intruder, and they seem to be governed by a motive to approach and attack that persists the 
entire time that the intruder is present.  By contrast, the intruder rat’s whole suite of 
behaviors seems to be governed by a persistent motive to escape and avoid. 
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Figure 1 Confrontation and avoidance behaviors (e.g. facial expressions, postures and 
maneuvers) of resident and intruder mice (respectively). From Defensor and Corley (2012), 
p. 683 permission pending © Elsevier. Originally published in Physiology and Behavior. 
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What scientists have discovered about these behaviors (the flexibility of these 
behaviors and their coherent aims) indicates that they are produced by two underlying 
motivational systems, what I call the confrontation and avoidance systems (D. C. Blanchard 
& Blanchard, 1984, 2003; D. C. Blanchard, Litvin, Pentkowski, & Blanchard, 2009). The 
confrontation system is tuned to bring about a specific end state, repeated back-biting. 
Moreover, this motive does not depend on learning: rats which have been socially isolated 
from birth will still attempt to bite the back of an intruder (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1961). So far, the 
focus has been on cases in which a given rodent is purely motivated by confrontation or 
avoidance, but aggressive encounters in the wild usually involve a mix of offensive and 
defensive postures. This suggests that these motivational systems can be activated 
simultaneously or in close succession to produce mixed patterns of behavior. 
Regardless, these systems have many of the characteristics of affect programs in 
humans. They are posited to explain a coordinated suite of behaviors and physiological 
changes that may include facial expressions, cardiovascular changes, and endocrine 
responses (Defensor, Corley, Blanchard, & Blanchard, 2012; Fokkema, Koolhaas, & van der 
Gugten, 1995). Moreover, these systems are tailored to solve basic life problems. 
Specifically, the confrontation system solves the problem of defending territories from other 
males for breeding purposes (and without fatally injuring kin in the process), whereas the 
avoidance system solves the problem of avoiding occupied territories and failing that, 
defending against the attacks of residents. For these reasons, we have all the same reasons to 
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postulate BEs in rodent that we have in humans. Let us suppose then that the confrontation 
and avoidance systems are BEs in rodents.  
Interesting for my purposes, under certain conditions, the presence of the unfamiliar 
male can produce highly flexible and novel behaviors. In the bound-intruder task, an intruder 
is tied down on a Plexiglas plate with only its ventral surfaces (belly-side) exposed and 
placed in the cage of a resident, so that the resident cannot easily bite the back of the intruder. 
As a result, the resident will sometimes bite at the bands that tie down the intruder or dig 
under the intruder so that the resident can bite the intruder’s back (R. J. Blanchard, 
Blanchard, Takahashi, & Kelley, 1977). In contrast, none of these behaviors are adopted 
when the intruder is tied down with his back exposed.  
These instrumental behaviors are clearly not stereotyped forms of attack, rather they 
are forms of flexible behavior adjustment to achieve the aim of biting the intruder’s back: 
they exhibit holistic integration. In this case, the same end can be achieved by several, novel 
means. Attempts to bite the intruder’s bonds or to dig underneath the intruder are novel 
means toward the end of biting the back of the intruder. Moreover, some of a resident’s 
means can be deployed toward novel ends. Digging is an element of the rat’s behavioral 
repertoire that is ordinarily used for an entirely different purpose: constructing burrow 
systems for shelter and nesting (Boice, 1977). This suggests that there are informational 
states, representations of means (e.g. motor representations of digging, biting, lateral attack, 
etc.), that can interact interchangeably with motivational states, representations of various 
ends (e.g. nesting, back-biting, eating etc.), in order to produce flexible behaviors. 
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Importantly, the confrontation system seems to be involved in coordinating flexible 
back-biting behavior. Moreover, this is something we would predict if it is a solution to the 
basic life problem of defending a territory from intruders. Flexibility is required to 
successfully repel an intruder because it is not in the intruder’s best interest to be repelled 
easily or to act predictably. For instance, the intruder would be sure to fare poorly if it acted 
in a way that accommodates the attacks of the resident. So a single fixed action pattern or 
even a whole suite of fixed action patterns on the part of the resident would not tend to be 
successful against the most likely strategy of the intruder. It is more adaptive to have a 
flexible motivational state that leads to repeated back biting across a wide range of strategies 
or postures that the intruder might adopt. Rather than leading only to inflexible, stereotyped 
responses, it appears that solutions to basic life problems sometimes require some degree of 
motivational integration. 
 
5. Implications for Emotion Theory 
If we understand BEs in this way, this changes the shape of an ongoing debate in emotion 
theory concerning the existence of BEs in humans. In the past, this debate has carried on 
under the assumption that if an emotion is biologically basic, then one should predict that the 
various response components of the emotion will have a high degree of coherence; that for 
example “all instances of anger should have a characteristic facial display, cardiovascular 
pattern, and voluntary action that are coordinated in time and correlated in intensity.” 
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(Barrett, 2006, p. 29) This high degree of coherence is not observed across many emotions 
(Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). For 
instance, when anger is elicited in experimental settings, it is uncommon to observe facial 
expressions in conjunction with the other putative components of BE anger.  
One way of defending the basicality of an emotion against this criticism is to reassess 
what patterns of emotional response are predicted by BE theory. As we saw in the section 
above the motivational component of a basic emotion can select novel, instrumental 
behaviors. Moreover, the motivational component can be indispensable for solving a basic 
life problem. I think we can add to this the possibility that other response components are not 
as indispensable as the motivational state. To see this, suppose that anger in humans is a 
solution to basic life problems of deterring conspecifics from challenges and insults. If so, it 
may be that the only reliable requirement of successful deterrence (at least in our lineage) is a 
flexible motivation to retaliate against perceived wrongs (e.g. McCullough, Kurzban, & 
Tabak, 2012). For instance, a reliable disposition to garner a reputation for revenge (e.g. by 
avenging personal offenses) appears to be a highly reliable strategy for deterrence (e.g. Daly 
& Wilson, 1988; Frank, 1988), perhaps more so than any facial expression or physiological 
responses. If revenge can be served cold, then anger may not always require anything more 
than a motivation to avenge. If so, then we might expect that the only reliably occurring 
component of anger is the relevant motivational state. But if this is correct, then evidence of 
low coherence is not evidence against the existence of BE anger. While this is a just-so story 
that may or may not end up being true, it shows that the expected level of coherence in a BE 
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depends on which basic life problem shaped that emotion. In some cases, we might expect 
the motivational state to be the only component that does not significantly vary across the 
situations in which these problems arise. In that case, contextually variable responses will be 
the norm rather than the exception. 
 
6. Conclusion: What Basic Emotions Really Are 
So what are basic emotions? Like other theoretical terms, part of the theoretical function of 
basic emotions is to place selective stress on competing theories (e.g. Kroon, 1985). In this 
case, BEs and competing conceptions of emotion allow us to discriminate between 
evolutionary theories of emotion in competition with radical social constructivist theories 
(e.g. Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013).  
BEs help distinguish these theories by specifying an architecture for emotion 
production predicted by evolutionary considerations. The distinguishing factor is whether 
emotion production is categorical or dimensional (see figure 2). If each BE is a solution to a 
different basic life problem, then when a BE is elicited, we should see emotional responses 
that are relevant to that basic life problem and distinct from the responses manifested by 
other BEs. Emotion production is categorical in the sense that the behavioral responses are 
controlled by a single emotional state (as distinct from other emotional states that might 
control a distinct pattern of response). By contrast, if all emotions are socially constructed as 
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some theorists claim, we might expect to see emotional behaviors controlled directly by 
multiple dimensions of appraisal (as in the bottom half of figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Competing architectures for emotion production. Top diagram is a categorical 
architecture, whereas the bottom is dimensional. From Moors (2012), p. 266 permission 
pending © John Benjamins Publishing Company. Originally published in Zachar and Ellis 
(2012). 
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Until the present, contextual variability of emotional responses has played a decisive 
role in distinguishing between these two architectures for emotion production. If flexible 
motivational states are not included among the components of BEs, then discrete emotion 
production predicts insensitivity to context subsequent to elicitation (though emotion 
regulation processes can perhaps inhibit or augment emotional responses according to 
context). However, once flexible motivational states are possible, categorical emotion 
production is compatible with a greater amount of contextual variability. 
Admittedly, this added complexity makes it more difficult to test whether humans 
have BEs. Nevertheless, it is not impossible. For instance, in the case of anger, researchers 
have developed a neurological measure of approach motivation (for a review, see Carver & 
Harmon-jones, 2009). If this motivational state is a component of anger, we can measure 
whether approach motivation itself is better predicted by contextual variables subsequent to 
anger elicitation or rather by contextual variables prior to or during elicitation. If contextual 
variables prior to elicitation do not independently predict approach motivation as BE theory 
might lead us to expect, then we would have evidence against the existence of BE anger. 
I have argued against prevailing assumptions that BEs lack cognitive integration. In 
the past, evidence against cognitive integration has been concerned with informational 
integration, and motivational integration has not been considered. Moreover, the assumed 
requirements for integration concern interaction with verbally reportable or consciously 
accessible states, and integration with other representational states is ignored. Moreover, BEs 
in rodents exhibit a form of motivational integration that plausibly hinges on interaction with 
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a wider variety of representational states. Properly understood, BEs are more likely to refer to 
emotional states in humans.  
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Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies
Abstract
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization 
and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) iluminating discussion
of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this 
renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an 
important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent 
grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization 
of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, 
intuitions notwithstanding, the terms in which their recommendation has been 
put make it impossible to folow, while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting 
their desideratum virtualy guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching 
of grains, what multiple realization realy requires is a principled method for 
adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. Shapiro’s (2000) work on multiple 
realization can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a method.
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1. Introduction
The multiple realization (“MR”) hypothesis asserts, at its baldest, that the same 
psychological state may be realized in neurologicaly distinct substrates (Polger 
2009). Hilary Putnam’s (1967) ingenious suggestion that pain is likely to be a 
multiply realized kind (“MR kind”) rather neatly captures the thought here—
while both mammals and moluscs presumably experience pain, they’re likely to 
instantiate it in neurological systems of a very diferent sort.
MR was played against a popular philosophical theory of mind in the 1960s 
which atempted to identify mental states with neural states. Since MR implies a 
many-to-one mapping from neural states to mental states, if it is in fact true that 
mental states are multiply realized, it folows that no clear identity relation can 
hold between them. As Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 176) frame the issue, “[o]ne 
corolary of this rejection of the identity thesis is the contention that information 
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about the brain is of litle or no relevance to understanding psychological 
processes.” When the MR hypothesis irst came to prominence, its critics by and 
large accepted it as empiricaly correct, and merely denied its touted 
antireductionist implications. In recent years the debate has struck a new note, 
with many philosophers caling the empirical hypothesis itself into question. 
Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) inluential paper, folowed quickly at the heels by 
Shapiro’s (2000) penetrating analysis of functions, perhaps did most to reignite the 
old controversy and drag MR back into the philosophical limelight. Bechtel and 
Mundale express what seems to be an important insight about multiple 
realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing 
kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization of psychological kinds are 
vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, intuitions notwithstanding, the 
terms in which their recommendation has been put make it impossible to folow, 
while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting their desideratum virtualy 
guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching of grains, what MR realy 
requires is a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. 
Shapiro’s (2000) work on MR can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a
method.
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2. Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement
Bechtel and Mundale appeal to “neurobiological and cognitive neuroscience 
practice” in the hope of showing how claims that psychological states are multiply 
realized are unjustied. Intuitively, theirs is an argument from success: cognitive 
neuroscience’s method assumes MR is false, and the success of that method is 
evidence that MR is false. They argue that it is “precisely on the basis of working 
assumptions about commonalities in brains across individuals and species that 
neurobiologists and cognitive neuroscientists have discovered clues to the 
information processing being performed” (1999, 177).
Bechtel and Mundale examine both the “neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological practice of carving up the brain.” What they believe this 
examination reveals is, irstly, that the principle of psychological function plays an 
essential role in both disciplines, and secondly, that “the cartographic project itself 
is frequently carried out comparatively—across species” (1999, 177), the opposite 
of what one would expect if MR were “a serious option.” It is the very similarity 
(or homology) of brain structure which permits generalization across species; and 
similarity in the functional characterization of homologous brain regions across 
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species only makes sense if the claims of MR are either false or greatly 
exaggerated. For instance, “[e]ven with the advent of neuroimaging, permiting 
localization of processing areas in humans, research on brain visual areas remains 
fundamentaly dependent on monkey research…” (1999, 195). “The clear 
assumption is that the neural organization in the macaque wil provide a 
defeasible guide to the human brain” (1999, 183). Brodmann’s famous brain maps 
were based upon comparisons of altogether 55 species and 11 orders of mammals. 
If MR were true, “one would not expect results based on comparative 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological studies to be particularly useful in 
developing functional accounts of human psychological processing” (1999, 178). 
They also argue that the ubiquity of brain mapping as a way of decomposing 
cognitive function points to the implausibility of the MR thesis. The understanding
of psychological function is increasingly “being fostered by appeal to the brain and
its organization” (1999, 191), again, the opposite of what one would expect “[i]f the
taxonomies of brain states and psychological states were as independent of each 
other as the [MR] argument suggests” (1999, 190-91).
In light of such considerations, Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 178-79, 201-04) 
resort to grains as a way of making sense of what they perceive to be the 
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entrenched, almost unquestioning consensus prevailing around MR. They think 
that it can be traced to the practice of philosophers appealing to diferent grain 
sizes in the taxonomies of psychological and brain states, “using a coarse grain in 
lumping together psychological states and a ine grain in spliting brain states.” 
When Putnam went about colecting his various specimens of pain, he ignored the 
many likely nuances between them. At the same time, he had few compuctions 
about declaring them diferent at a neurological level. His contention that pain is 
likely to be an MR kind can only command our respect if we can be sure that when
he was comparing his specimens from a neurological point of view he was careful 
to apply no less lenient a standard of diferentiation than he applied when 
comparing his specimens from a psychological point of view. Bechtel and Mundale
maintain that when “a common grain size is insisted on, as it is in scientic 
practice, the plausibility of multiple realizability evaporates.” As their examples of 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological practice atest, scientists in these ields 
typicaly match a coarse-grained conception of psychological states with an 
equaly coarse-grained conception of brain states. Despite the habit of 
philosophers individuating brain states in accordance with physical and chemical 
criteria, a habit no doubt originating with Putnam, this is not how neuroscientists 
characterize them. The notion of a brain state is “a philosopher’s iction” (1999, 
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177) given that the notion neuroscientists actualy employ is much less ine-
grained, namely “activity in the same brain part or conglomerate of parts.”
A not unrelated factor is that the MR hypothesis often gets presented in a 
“contextual vacuum.” The choice of grain is always determined by context, with 
“diferent contexts for constructing taxonomies” resulting in “diferent grain sizes 
for both psychology and neuroscience.” The development of evolutionary 
perspectives, for instance, in which the researcher necessarily adopts a coarse 
grain, contrasts with the much iner grain that wil be appropriate when assessing 
diferences among conspecics:
One can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain, but as long as one uses a 
comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the mapping between 
them wil be correspondingly systematic. For example, one can adopt a 
relatively coarse grain, equating psychological states over diferent 
individuals or across species. If one employs the same grain, though, one 
wil equate activity in brain areas across species, and one-to-one mapping is
preserved (though perhaps further taxonomic reinement and/or 
delineation may be required). Conversely, one can adopt a very ine grain, 
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and diferentiate psychological states between individuals, or even in the 
same individual over time. If one similarly adopts a ine grain in analyzing 
the brain, then one is likely to map the psychological diferences onto brain 
diferences, and brain diferences onto psychological diferences. (1999, 202)
At least among some philosophers Bechtel and Mundale’s message has 
evidently been wel received (Couch 2004; Polger 2009; Godfrey-Smith, personal 
communication; see also tacit approval in Aizawa and Gilet 2009, 573). Polger 
(2009) explains the motivation for the grain requirement in an iluminating way. 
Neuroplasticity has in recent times been thought to provide compeling evidence 
for the MR of mental states. He concludes that “contrary to philosophical 
consensus, the identity theory does not blatantly ly in the face of what is known 
about the correlations between psychological and neural processing” (2009, 470). 
The grains argument igures prominently in his reasoning. As he points out, it 
might be tempting to regard a phenomenon like cortical map plasticity—where 
diferent brain regions subserve the same function at diferent times in an 
individual’s history, say, after brain injury or trauma—as an existence proof of MR.
But not if the point about grains is taken to heart. It al comes down to what we 
mean by “diferent brain regions” subserving “the same function.” Consider that 
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recovered functions are frequently suboptimal. Genuine MR would indeed require
the same psychological state to be underwriten by diferent neurological states; 
but suboptimality is evidence of diference underlying diference, not diference 
underlying sameness, as MR requires:
It’s true that this kind of representational plasticity involves the “same” 
function being mediated by “diferent” cortical areas. But here one faces the
chalenge leveled by Bechtel and Mundale’s charge that defenses of [MR] 
employ a mismatch in the granularity of psychological and neuroscientic 
kinds. If we individuate psychological processes quite coarsely—by gross 
function, say—then we can say that functions or psychological states are of 
the same kind through plastic change over time. And if we individuate 
neuroscientic kinds quite inely—by precise cortical location, or particular 
neurons—then we can say that cortical map plasticity involves diferent 
neuronal kinds. But this is clearly a mug’s game. What we want to know is 
not whether there is some way or other of counting mental states and brain 
states that can be used to distinguish them—no doubt there are many. The 
question is whether the sciences of psychology and neuroscience give us 
any way of registering the two taxonomic systems. (2009, 467, my emphasis)
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -585-
3. Problems with the grain requirement: imprecise, impracticable, and 
misleading
But now the question is this: what, precisely, can it mean to use a “comparable” 
grain, or to keep a grain size “constant,” across both psychological and 
neurophysiological taxonomies? Polger’s motivation makes a lot of sense, to be 
sure, but talk of “registering” taxonomies (as of aligning classicatory regimes, or 
rendering distinct scientic descriptions commensurable, or however else one might 
care to put it) doesn’t shed any light on how the desideratum for consistent grains 
can actualy be met. Since it is intended to serve in part as a methodological 
prescription, it’s important to know what to make of this requirement—metaphors
won’t help us here. How, in concrete terms, is an investigator meant to satisfy such 
a condition as this on their research?
Perhaps it means this. Suppose you have two tokens of fruit. The science of 
botany (say) could deliver descriptions under which the two are classied the 
same (e.g. from the point of view of species), but also descriptions under which 
they come out as diferent (e.g. from the point of view of varieties). The irst 
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description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Now imagine 
economics coming into the picture. The science of economics can likewise deliver 
descriptions under which both tokens are classied the same (e.g. both are forms 
of tradable fresh produce) or diferent (e.g. one, being typicaly the crunchier and 
sweeter variety, has a lower elasticity of demand than the other). Once again, the 
irst description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Perhaps, 
then, we could take it that botany and economics deliver descriptions at the same 
grain of analysis when their judgments of sameness or diference cohere in a given
case. In the example, botanical descriptions via species classication would be 
furnished at the same grain as economic descriptions via commodity classication,
so that species descriptions in botany are “at the same grain” as commodity 
descriptions in economics. By the same logic, variety descriptions in botany would 
be comparable to elasticity descriptions in economics. Fine. But if that is al that 
“maintain a comparable grain” amounts to, it realy does beg the question, for this 
is simply type-type identity by iat. Of course such a recommendation wil ensure 
that the mapping between psychology and neuroscience wil be “systematic” (to 
use Bechtel and Mundale’s term), because on this account yielding concordant 
judgments of similarity or diference across taxonomies is what it means to apply 
the same grain. So we haven’t solved the problem: this version of the grain 
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requirement makes type-type identity a fait accompli, efectively obliterating al 
MR kinds from the natural order.
It’s just as wel that I don’t think this is what Bechtel and Mundale had in 
mind when they made their move to grains; supposing otherwise would serve 
only to trivialize an important aspect of their analysis. Stil the construal is by no 
means far-fetched: “[o]ne can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain,” they tel us, 
“but as long as one uses a comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the 
mapping between them wil be correspondingly systematic” (note that—it wil 
be!). This sounds like someone with the utmost conidence in the grain 
requirement, which is of course what one would have if one thought grains could 
be legitimately matched in just this way. My guess is that, while they do have 
something important to tel us about MR, a beguiling metaphor has led them to 
suppose that MR is easier to refute than it actualy is. (I’l support this contention 
with a few examples in a moment.)
Of course maters aren’t much helped by the reasonable suspicion that MR 
is the result of pairing inconsistent grains. For what is neuroscience if not a ine-
grained description of psychology, and psychology if not a coarse-grained 
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description of neuroscience? It is surely plausible that the neural and 
psychological sciences line up in something like this way, given that talk about the 
mind is realy talk about the brain from a somewhat more abstract point of view.
What Bechtel and Mundale are ultimately trying to convey through their 
discussion of grains is the thought that claims of MR cannot be advanced wily-
nily—that there is an objective and standard way to go about verifying the 
existence of MR kinds and arbitrating disputes involving them. For the reasons 
just canvassed, however, it strikes me that talk of grains doesn’t serve their 
purposes at al wel. In fact they would have been nearer the mark had they said 
that what MR requires is some sort of principled mismatching of grains.
So far I’ve tried to indicate in what respects Bechtel and Mundale’s grain 
requirement is imprecise and impracticable. Before I can show that the grains 
strategy is also misleading, and indeed often gets things wrong, I need to set it 
against an account which demonstrably gets things right.1 Shapiro (2000) expresses
with enviable lucidity what I think is the crucial insight towards which Bechtel 
1 It is an account which even its detractors concede gets at least the essential point of interest to us 
here right, e.g. Gilet (2003).
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and Mundale were uneasily groping. Interestingly, some philosophers—e.g. Polger
(2009)—write as if the grain requirement and Shapiro’s own formula for MR were 
efectively interchangeable. This is a mistake: the two approaches deliver diferent 
judgments in nontrivial cases (as I’l ilustrate in a moment).
As Shapiro reminds us:
Before it is possible to evaluate the force of [the MR thesis] in arguments 
against reductionism, we must be in a position to say with assurance what 
the satisfaction conditions for [the MR thesis] actualy are. (2000, 636)
For him, “[t]he general lesson is this. Showing that a kind is multiply realizable, or 
that two realizations of a kind are in fact distinct, requires some work” (2000, 645). 
Furthermore, “[t]o establish [the MR thesis], one must show that the diferences 
among purported realizations are causaly relevant diferences” (2000, 646). 
Shapiro’s concerns revolve around what motivates ascriptions of diference, and 
therefore sameness. The issue is important because the classic intuition pump that 
asks us to conceive a mind in which every neuron has been replaced by a silicon 
chip depends on our ascription of an interesting diference between neurons and 
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silicon chips, apparently even where silicon chips can be made that contribute to 
psychological capacity by one and the same process of electrical transmission. His 
answer too, like Bechtel and Mundale’s, depends ultimately on context—in 
particular, the context set by the very inquiry into MR itself.
Shapiro (2000, 643-44) argues that “the things for which [the MR thesis] has 
a chance of being true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or
contribution to some end.” This is the reason why carburetors, mousetraps, 
computers and minds are standard fare in the literature of MR. They are deined 
“in virtue of what they do,” unlike, say, water, which is typicaly deined by what 
it is, i.e. its constitution or molecular structure, and accordingly not an MR kind. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” Truly distinct (indeed multiple) realizations are those that “difer
in causaly relevant properties—in properties that make a diference to how [the 
realizations] contribute to the capacity under investigation.” Two corkscrews 
difering only in color are not distinct realizations of a corkscrew, because color 
“makes no diference to their performance as a corkscrew.” Similarly, the diference
between steel and aluminium is not enough to make two corkscrews that are alike 
in al other respects two diferent realizations of a corkscrew “because, relative to 
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the properties that make them suitable for removing corks, they are identical.” In 
this instance, diferences of composition can be “screened of.” Naturaly there 
may be cases where diferences of composition wil be causaly relevant (and it 
turns out that this wil be important to the broader point I make below about 
where the grains strategy goes wrong). Perhaps rigidity is the alegedly MR kind 
in question. In that event, compositional diferences wil necessarily speak to how 
aluminium and steel achieve this disposition. The crucial thing to note here is that 
MR is the context, and MR makes function the relevant consideration, i.e. the 
specic point of view from which we wil compare a set of tokens in the irst 
instance (not phenomenology, not behavioral ecology, or anything else for that 
mater). Explanatory considerations may of course ine-tune the sort of function 
that captures our atention (cork-removal, rigidity, vision, camera vision, etc.). But 
function here is our key preoccupation, and having setled on a specic function 
which a set of tokens can be said to perform, the al-important question on 
Shapiro’s analysis is how the two tokens bring that function about. Each case must 
be judged on its own merits. Thus unlike the two corkscrews identical in al 
respects save color, which do not count as distinct realizations, waiter’s corkscrews
and winged corkscrews are enabled to perform the same task in virtue of diferent 
causaly relevant properties, and therefore do count as genuinely distinct 
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realizations of a corkscrew, one based on the principle of simple leverage, the other
relying on a rack and pinions (Fig. 1).
(a) (b)
Figure 1. A waiter’s corkscrew (a) and a winged corkscrew (b). Each contributes to the capacity of 
cork-removal in diferent ways.
Notice that to the extent Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion envisages 
certain realizing properties being “screened of” from consideration in the course 
of inquiry, there is a sense in which the taxonomies of realized and realizing kinds 
may be said to be “commensurable” or “registrable” (no doubt explaining why 
some philosophers have simply confused commensurability with causal 
relevance). Thus when comparing the cork-removing properties of two waiter’s 
corkscrews, compositional diferences wil not feature in the realizing taxonomy (if
we accept Shapiro’s characterization of the problem). So we have cork-removal, 
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which features in what we may regard as a coarse-grained taxonomy, realized by 
two objects described by a “science” of cork-removal in which microstructural 
variations do not mater, hence which might also be regarded as a coarse-grained 
taxonomy. If on the other hand we were comparing the same corkscrews for 
rigidity, where one was made of steel and the other of aluminium, compositional 
diferences would feature in the realizing taxonomy. Here we would have rigidity, 
which features in what we could wel regard as a more ine-grained taxonomy 
than that encompassing cork-removal, realized by two objects described by a 
science in which microstructural variations realy do mater (namely metalurgy), 
and which might also be regarded as a ine-grained taxonomy, at least more ine-
grained than the ictitious science of cork-removal. But my point is this: 
commensurability nowhere appears as an independent criterion of validity in 
Shapiro’s account of MR, for it is an artifact of the causal relevance criterion, not a 
self-standing principle. Taxonomic commensurability is in fact an implicit 
requirement of the causal relevance criterion in the sense that it’s taken care of 
once the proper question is posed. As an explicit constraint it is a wil-o’-the-wisp.
Armed with this analysis, let’s examine how Bechtel and Mundale atempt 
to refute the status of hunger as an MR kind. Putnam (1967) had compared hunger
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across species as diverse as humans and octopuses to ilustrate the likelihood that 
some psychological predicates are multiply realizable. On the basis of their grains 
critique, however, Bechtel and Mundale suggest that hunger wil not do the work 
Putnam had cut out for it; for “at anything less than a very abstract level,” hunger 
is diferent in octopuses and humans (1999, 202). The thought is that a iner 
individuation of hunger refutes the existence of a single psychological kind, 
hunger, which can be said to cross-classify humans and octopuses. Thus they essay
to chalenge the cognitive uniformity which MR requires at the level of 
psychology.
Perhaps we might irst note that when identifying a single psychological 
state to establish the necessary conditions for MR, nothing Bechtel and Mundale 
say actualy precludes the choice to go abstract. If context is what ixes the choice of 
grain (as they are surely right to point out), who’s to say that context couldn’t ix 
the sort of grain that makes hunger relevant in an abstract sense? It may be 
tempting to think that a more detailed description of something is somehow more 
real. But there is of course nothing intrinsicaly more or less real about a chosen 
schema relative to others that might have been chosen. There is no reason to 
suspect, for instance, that a determinate has any more reality than a determinable.
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And yet there is a deeper problem with Bechtel and Mundale’s deployment 
of the grains strategy here. To repeat their complaint: “at anything less than a very 
abstract level,” hunger is diferent in octopuses and humans. But now why should 
this be relevant? Who would deny it? They themselves seem to be oblivious to the 
context which the very inquiry into MR makes paramount. They are not right to 
alege, as they do, that “the assertion that what we broadly cal ‘hunger’ is the 
same psychological state when instanced in humans and octopi has apparently 
been widely and easily accepted without specifying the context for judging 
sameness” (1999, 203). The reason why hunger, pain, vision and so on were al 
taken for granted—assumed to be uniform at the cognitive level—is because MR 
made function the point of view from which tokens were to be compared. As 
Shapiro reminds us, “the things for which [the MR thesis] has a chance of being 
true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or contribution to 
some end.” It was understood that, say in the case of pain, regardless of 
phenomenal, ecological or behavioral diferences between human and octopus 
pain (I doubt any of which were lost on Putnam), al instances of pain in these 
creatures had something like detection and avoidance in common. This might be to 
cast pain at “a very abstract level,” but this just happens to be the context which 
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the inquiry into MR itself sets. A similarly abstract feature is what unites al 
instances of hunger: let’s cal it nutrition-induction. It is not that decades of 
philosophers had simply forgoten to specify the point of view from which these 
psychological predicates were being considered: it is rather that they simply didn’t
need to, since al of them had read enough of Putnam and the early functionalists 
to know what they were about. Phenomenal and other diferences that one might 
care to enumerate between these predicates come a dime a dozen. But the whole 
point of functionalism was to abjure the inquiry into essences and focus instead on
the causal role of a mental state within the life of an organism. Yes, this is to 
compare tokens from an “abstract level,” but that’s what made functionalism 
intriguing to begin with. And if Shapiro’s analysis is any guide, it is realy the next 
step in the endeavor to verify the existence of an MR kind that is the crucial one. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” So the folow-up question concerns how the relevant organisms 
achieve their detection and avoidance function, or nutrition-induction function, or 
whatever the case may be. It is in fact only by asking this next question that we can
appreciate just how badly the grains strategy fares. The atempt to individuate 
hunger more inely does not refute the multiple realizability of hunger as between 
humans and octopuses. For, relative to the shared function of nutrition-induction, 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -597-
it is extremely likely that humans and octopuses realize this capacity in diferent 
ways. The atempt to individuate pain more inely would likewise not refute the 
multiple realizability of pain as between humans and octopuses. For, relative to the
shared function of detection and avoidance, it is extremely likely that humans and 
octopuses realize this capacity in diferent ways. So we see that the grains strategy, 
to the extent that it involves ine-graining psychological states in order to 
undermine the cognitive uniformity required by MR, sets itself a very easy job 
indeed, and mischaracterizes the nature of MR by its neglect of function. Moreover
Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion—which honors the core concerns motivating 
Bechtel and Mundale’s resort to grains—does not demonstrate that hunger (or 
pain) is type-reducible.
A good ilustration of the grains strategy in action is provided by Couch’s 
(2004) atempt to refute the claim that the human eye and the octopus eye are 
distinct realizations of the kind eye. Conceding diferences at a neurobiological 
level, the strategy again involves chalenging the aleged uniformity at the 
cognitive level. As he explains, “[e]stablishing [MR] requires showing that…the 
physical state types in question are distinct [and] that the relevant functional 
properties are type identical. Claims about [MR] can be chalenged at either step” 
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(2004, 202). Reminding us that psychological states “are often only supericialy 
similar,” and that “at a detailed level the neural diferences make for functional 
diferences” (2004, 203), he states:
Psychologists sometimes talk about humans and species like octopi sharing 
the same psychological states. However, they also recognize that there are 
important diferences involved depending on how inely one identies the 
relevant features..Establishing multiple realization requires showing that 
the same psychological state has diverse realizations. But we can always 
disagree with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological 
diferences at another level of description. (2004, 203)
Thus he relates that while the two types of eyes have similar structure in certain 
respects, both consisting of a spherical shel, lens and retina, they use diferent 
kinds of visual pigments in their photoreceptors, as wel as having diferent 
numbers of them, the octopus having one in contrast to the human eye which has 
four. They also have diferent retinas. The human retina, with rods and cones, 
focuses light by bending the lens and so changing its shape. The octopus eye, with 
rhabdomeres instead of rods and cones, focuses light by moving the lens 
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backwards and forwards within the shel. Al these factors show up as diferences 
in output, not just structure. The octopus, having only a single pigment, is 
colorblind, while its receptor’s unique structure alows it to perceive the plane of 
polarized light. Retinal diferences likewise make for functional diferences, with 
very litle information processing occurring on the octopus’s retina, unlike the case
of the human retina. This produces diferences in stimuli and reaction times. So 
the two eyes might be similar, but when described with a suitably ine grain, he 
contends, they come out type distinct. In the result they are both physicaly and 
cognitively diverse, and so not genuine examples of MR.
Notice again that, contrary to what is claimed, it has not been demonstrated
that type-type identity prevails here after at al (on the understanding that the 
kind camera eyehuman reduces to its distinct neural type, and the kind camera 
eyemolusc in turn reduces to its distinct neural type). If anything what this foray into 
molusc visual physiology succeeds in showing is that, relative to the kind camera 
eye, human camera eyes and octopus camera eyes count as distinct realizations(!), 
for, assuming Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion applies, human camera eyes 
achieve the function of camera vision diferently to the way octopus camera eyes 
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achieve this function. Were we to atend to the original inquiry, which concerned 
whether human eyes and octopus eyes count as distinct realizations of the kind 
eye, Shapiro’s own response, for what it’s worth, is clear (2000, 645-46): here we do 
seem to confront a genuine case of type-type identity, as Putnam himself assumed,
because, relative to the function of vision (not camera vision), both humans and 
moluscs achieve the function the same way (namely, by camera vision!). 
Diferences that would be relevant at the neural level between humans and 
moluscs when asking how camera vision is achieved can be conveniently screened
of when the question is how vision, as distinct from camera vision, is achieved. 
Again if pain or hunger were the kind in question, it seems more likely than not 
that we would confront a case of MR (unlike with vision), as we conjectured earlier.
Explanatory context dictates the function of interest, and the function is one that 
we have to assume is common to the tokens in question in order to get the inquiry 
into MR of the ground. Indeed if Shapiro’s analysis is correct, with MR we’re 
always asking how some common function is achieved by diferent tokens that do 
that thing. Where there is no common function the question of MR cannot so much 
as arise. The fact that the question does arise in al the cases we’ve considered is a 
powerful indication that we’re dealing with functions which al the relevant tokens
actualy share. The grains strategy confuses maters by suggesting that in many 
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cases involving putative MR kinds, psychological states can be individuated using 
a iner grain of description. But if what I have been saying is right, this is not the 
proper way to refute a putative case of MR.
That mine is the correct assessment of the situation is not only atested to by
Shapiro’s analysis of MR, but also by the fact that it avoids the very mug’s game 
Polger sought to eschew by embracing the grains strategy in the irst place. If for 
any putative MR kind I am free to cavil with the choice of your size of grain (“oh, 
that’s far too coarse for psychology,” or “now that’s realy not coarse enough for 
neuroscience”), how is the resulting game any less of a mug’s game than the one 
we were trapped in at the start? I myself have played a few of these games with 
philosophers. No one wins. Couch’s remarks are teling: “we can always disagree 
with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological diferences at 
another level of description.” So the game goes on.
4. Conclusion
In sum, I think there’s a genuine problem with the grain requirement. The central 
diculty is that in the terms in which it’s been put it is largely unworkable, and at 
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best no more than a loose metaphor. For a recommendation intended to serve at 
least in part as a methodological reform, this is clearly unsatisfactory. I don’t deny 
that Bechtel and Mundale were onto something. But whatever value their insight 
into MR might have has been obscured by their unfortunate formulation of the 
issue. Moreover, as I have tried to show, the formulation is unfortunate not just 
because it happens to be unworkable. More worryingly, the argument from grains 
distorts the truth about MR by encouraging the view that mind-brain identity 
comes for free once we invoke the “same grain” of description across both realized
and realizing kinds. But when the insight to which this locution seems to point is 
expressed in terms that are inteligible and empiricaly tractable (namely, Shapiro’s
causal relevance criterion), mind-brain identity seems anything but a fait accompli.
Grains talk makes it tempting to think MR is easier to refute than it in fact is. It is 
certainly true, as Bechtel and Mundale acknowledge, that context ixes the choice 
of grain (where by “grain” we mean the respect under which we seek to compare a
set of tokens); but we are not ipso facto obliged to employ a consistent grain across 
realized and realizing kinds (since this is just about meaningless as far as a 
researcher into these maters would be concerned and raises a host of diculties 
beside). Rather than matching grains, what MR realy behooves us to do is to 
apply a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens of a 
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functional kind. Shapiro’s work on MR shows us how to approach this important 
task.
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Abstract
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a
serious candidate for application in physics. This dismissal is related to
the problematic assumption that physical causation is entirely a matter
of dynamical evolution. In this paper, I offer a fresh look at the interven-
tionist account of causation and its applicability to thermodynamics. I
argue that the interventionist account of causation is the account of cau-
sation which most appropriately characterizes the theoretical structure
and phenomenal behavior of thermodynamics.
1 Introduction
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a serious
candidate for application in physics. For example, a dismissal of this sort is
evident in the words of theoretical physicist Peter Havas:
We are all familiar with the everyday usage of the words “cause” and
“efect”; it frequently implies the interference by an outside agent
(whether human or not), the “cause”, with a system, which then
experiences the “efect” of this interference. When we talk of the
principle of causality in physics, however, we usually do not think
of speciic cause-efect relations or of deliberate intervention in a
system, but in terms of theories which allow (at least in principle)
the calculation of the future state of the system under consideration
from data speciied at a time t0 (Havas 1974, 24).
And worries about the relevance of the interventionist account of causation in
physics come not only from physicists, but also from philosophers—even those
who favor interventionism:
There are important diferences between, on the one hand, the [in-
terventionist] way in which causal notions igure in common sense
and the special sciences and the empirical assumptions that underlie
their application and, on the other hand, the ways in which these
notions igure in physics (Woodward 2007, 67).
1
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The reasons for dismissals and worries like those above are related to a
common (but problematic) assumption that causation in physics has something
to do with the dynamical evolution of a closed system. The problem is that,
in our preoccupation with dynamical evolution and closed systems, we tend to
forget and/or neglect those areas of physics for which we do not have complete
equations of motion or for which it doesn’t make sense to consider entirely closed
systems. And it is in those areas that the dynamical view of physical causation
makes less sense and interventionism inds its home.
In this paper, I propose to take a fresh look at the interventionist account of
causation and its applicability to one of those neglected areas of physics: ther-
modynamics. I will argue that an interventionist analysis of thermodynamics
succeeds where the dynamical view of physical causation fails. As I will show, all
theorizing in thermodynamics requires careful deinition of the “system” under
consideration, which necessarily involves attending to the boundaries that en-
close the system and the conditions imposed on those boundaries. Once bound-
aries are adequately speciied, we end up with a strong distinction between the
internal properties and processes of the system and those external inluences
that constrain the internal dynamics. It is in the distinction between internal
properties and external inluences that the natural it between the structure of
thermodynamic theorizing and the interventionist account of causation becomes
apparent.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I show that interventionist
reasoning is inseparable from the structural foundation of thermodynamic the-
ory. In section 3, I show how “driving forces” and their conjugate luxes provide
a rich basis for meaningful interventionist causal claims in thermodynamics. In
section 4, I use the success of interventionist causal analysis in thermodynamics
to make some broader concluding remarks.
2 The centrality of manipulated equilibrium
Thermodynamic theorizing is structured around the characterization of equi-
librium states and the processes by which systems move from one equilibrium
state to another. But just what is a thermodynamic equilibrium state?
A thermodynamic equilibrium state is the state of a system that is not un-
dergoing a change (thermal, mechanical, or chemical). However, an equilibrium
state is not a spontaneous occurrence. Natural thermodynamic systems are in
constant lux. They engage in all sorts of interactions: they transfer heat, push
and pull on one another, change their volume, and chemically react. The very
idea of a thermodynamic “system”, which can only be deined by the location
and/or nature of its boundaries, is in itself a theoretical concept that we impose
on the world in order to do thermodynamic “bookkeeping” (Dill and Bromberg
2011, 93). In order for a thermodynamic system to achieve an equilibrium
state, the system must have been allowed to relax for a suicient amount of
time without the disturbing external inluences of uncontrolled contact with
other systems. And such a condition requires boundaries that isolate it—or
2
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otherwise control exchanges—from other systems. Often those boundaries are
put in place artiicially, by human intervention.
Consider, for example, the air in an ordinary room. If we deine our ther-
modynamic system in relation to the walls and doors of the room, we can say
that the system has a ixed volume. If no massive weather change is currently
occurring, we can assume that the air pressure in the room is approximately
constant (not by isolation, but by contact with an external system whose pres-
sure is approximately constant). If some kind of air conditioning system is in
place and has been running for some time, we can also say that the temperature
of the room is approximately constant. We can say that most of the chemical
reactions occurring in the room are in a steady state and that the concentra-
tions of various gases are relatively uniform (except perhaps for some minor
concentration gradients near any plants and/or people located in the room),
with equal low into and out of the room for each type of gas. Notice, now, that
even this almost-equilibrium state requires artiicial maintenance (the rigidity of
walls, contact with an exterior reservoir supplying constant pressure, the contin-
uous work of the air conditioner, etc.). Stricter equilibrium states require much
more careful isolation and maintenance, and true equilibrium states (which only
exist in theory) require idealized boundaries (e.g., perfect thermal insulators,
frictionless pistons, perfectly rigid containers, etc.).
There is something of a tension, however, in the way that we think about
equilibrium states. On the one hand, equilibrium states are the product of
external conditions imposed on a system. On the other hand, once we consider
those external conditions as given, a system will naturally or spontaneously tend
toward the equilibrium state allowed by the constraints. But that spontaneous
or natural behavior cannot be conceived of without external constraints being
placed on the system in question. To even conceive of an equilibrium state,
we must ask about the conditions imposed on its boundaries. What kind of
walls enclose it? Permeable, semi-permeable, impermeable? Rigid or lexible?
Adiabatic or conducting? There is no such thing as an equilibrium state unless
the boundaries of the system are well-deined.1 And the conditions imposed
on those boundaries constitute external interventions on the system; they ef-
fectively set various thermodynamic variables to take on certain values. For
example, conducting walls that put a system in contact with a thermal reservoir
are efectively a way of intervening on temperature. Likewise, a semi-permeable
boundary is a way of selectively intervening on particle concentrations in the
system. (I will return to the question of how to conceive of boundary conditions
as interventions on thermodynamic variables below in section 3.)
Thus, thermodynamic equilibrium states are inherently manipulated states—
manipulated to be so either by human design or by some other mechanism that
efectively imposes equilibrium conditions by external intervention. And these
external manipulations or interventions, which impose values on certain thermo-
dynamic variables, are entirely consistent with the concept of an intervention
1In fact, a system with no deined boundaries or external constraints is effectively a universe,
and its fate is something like the “heat death” discussed by Thomson, Helmholtz, and Rankine.
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that has been developed by Woodward (2003) and others. According to the
interventionist account of causation, an intervention directly forces a variable
to take on (or remain ixed at) a certain value. Furthermore, Woodward’s def-
inition of an intervention makes no reference to human action, and thus any
entity or structure playing the role of setting certain variable values or hold-
ing them ixed can fulill the requirements for intervention. For example, a
cell membrane is a structure that efectively intervenes to maintain a certain
equilibrium internal to the cell, by keeping interior and exterior pressures equal
and by maintaining certain chemical concentrations by only allowing for select
passage into and out of the cell.
Now how do these manipulated equilibrium states igure into theorizing
about thermodynamic processes? We begin by representing our system of inter-
est by reference to a thermodynamic coniguration space. The thermodynamic
coniguration space is the set of all possible equilibrium states of a system, where
the coordinates of that space are a relatively small number of macroscopic ther-
modynamic variables and each point in the coniguration space represents a
distinct equilibrium state. For example, we might choose as coordinates the
following parameters: internal energy (U), volume (V ), and the particle num-
bers of the various species present (N1, N2, …, Ni). Then the entropy functionfor our system, S = S(U, V,N1, . . . , Ni), will deine a hyper-surface within theconiguration space (see igure 1).
With this thermodynamic coniguration space and the hyper-surface deined
by the entropy function in place, we can begin to theorize about any ordered
sequence of states (call these A,B,C, . . .) located on the hyper-surface. Notice
that a curve drawn through this sequence of states looks something like a pro-
cess (in fact, we call it a quasi-static process) in that it represents a series of
changes undergone by the system. However, such a curve can be nothing like a
real process, because real processes involve nonequilibrium states and the curve
represents a system that remains in equilibrium along its entire length. Further-
more, the curve could never represent the autonomous trajectory of a system,
since every state that makes up the path is an equilibrium state and no isolated
system would move from one equilibrium state to another spontaneously. So in
order to think about a quasi-static process as something like a process, we must
think of a system being “led”—by a series of external interventions—through
the succession of desired states via “hops”. We efectively imagine the system
being “corralled” through the sequence of equilibrium states. And by imagining
the sequence of hops between states to be very small and carried out by very
tiny interventions, we can approximate a smooth curve more and more closely
(in fact, arbitrarily closely).2
In summary, the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory is the set
of equilibrium states and the quasi-static “processes” that can be drawn like
lines through the space of such states. As I have argued here, the very idea
of an equilibrium state is not possible without reference to boundaries and the
constraints that set the value of certain thermodynamic variables within those
2My discussion here closely follows that of Callen (1985, Ch. 4).
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Figure 1: A representation of a quasi-static process in thermodynamic coniguration
space. From Callen (1985).
boundaries. Furthermore, we cannot think about quasi-static “processes”, which
are sequences of those equilibrium states, without thinking about a series of
ininitesimal external interventions that force a system from one equilibrium
state to the next. It is in this sense that interventionist reasoning is inseparable
from the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory.
In the next section, I will discuss thermodynamic theorizing in greater speci-
icity. As I will show, the interventionist view of causation maps naturally onto
the use of potential functions when theorizing about a system undergoing a
process.
3 Thermodynamic potentials and driving forces
The equilibrium state toward which a system will tend, given the conditions
imposed on its boundaries, is governed by the energy and entropy considerations
provided in the First and Second Laws of thermodynamics. The First Law tells
us that any change in the internal energy (U) of a system will be equal to
the total amount of energy it gains through energy exchange with the external
world, in the form of heat and/or in the form of work. The Second Law tells
us that any isolated system (i.e., any closed system with ixed internal energy)
5
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will tend toward its state of maximum entropy (S). The Second Law also has
the result that the internal energy of any closed system with ixed entropy
will be minimized. However, neither internal energy nor entropy are directly
measurable, nor do we have a speciic function that tells us their dependence
on other state variables. What we do have, however, are other equations of
state (e.g., the ideal gas law) in addition to equations for U and S in diferential
form, which tell us about the way in which small changes in other state variables
relate to small changes in energy and entropy:
dU = TdS − pdV +
∑
j
µjdNj (1)
dS =
(
1
T
)
dU +
( p
T
)
dV −
∑
j
(µj
T
)
dNj , (2)
where T is absolute temperature, p is pressure, V is volume, µj is the chemicalpotential for species j, and Nj is the number of particles for species j. The aboveequations (and other variant forms) are commonly referred to as thermodynamic
potential functions.
Notice that each term in both equations above involves a pair of conjugate
variables. The second term in equation 1, for example, involves pressure and
volume as a conjugate pair. For every pair of conjugate variables, one of the
variables is extensive (i.e., additive such that the property of a system is equal
to the sum of that property for all of its component subsystems), while the other
is intensive (i.e., independent of the size of the system). Looking again at the
second term in equation 1 as an example, pressure is the intensive variable and
volume is the extensive variable.
Depending on the factors controlled in a given experimental context, each
pair of conjugate variables tells us something about a tendency of the system
as it moves toward equilibrium in that context. Since conjugate variables will
be extremely important for our purposes here, let’s concentrate on one pair and
use an example to decipher its practical meaning.
Figure 2: Two thermodynamic systems A and B before, during, and after arriving at
thermal equilibrium. From Dill and Bromberg (2011, 100).
Consider the term ( 1
T
)
dU in equation 2 and the process pictured in igure
2. We begin with two systems A and B, each enclosed in a rigid container.
System A begins at temperature TA and system B at TB , where TA 6= TB .
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The two systems are then brought into thermal contact with one another,
but remain thermally insulated from the rest of the world. Now each sys-
tem has an unknown entropy that can be expressed as a function of its in-
ternal energy, volume, and particle numbers, and since entropy is an exten-
sive quantity, the total entropy of the combined system can be expressed as
STotal = SA(UA, VA,NA) + SB(UB , VB ,NB). Since entropy will be maximizedat equilibrium, we use equation 2 to write the diferential expression for STotaland set it to zero:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
)
dUA +
(
pA
TA
)
dVA −
∑
i
(
µAi
TA
)
dNAi+
(
1
TB
)
dUB +
(
pB
TB
)
dVB −
∑
j
(
µBj
TB
)
dNBj = 0
(3)
If we assume that there is no particle exchange between the two systems and
that no chemical change occurs within each system, we can eliminate the terms
that allow for changing particle numbers. And since the containers are rigid,
we can eliminate the terms that allow for changing volume. Furthermore, given
that the combined system is isolated from the external world, the total internal
energy of the combined system must remain constant, and any change in energy
of either system must be compensated by a change in energy of the other. Thus,
dUA = −dUB . So we have the following simpliied expression:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
−
1
TB
)
dUA, (4)
which will be equal to zero (i.e., attain equilibrium) when TA = TB .Thus we have derived the well-known result that two objects brought into
thermal contact will reach equilibrium when their temperatures are equal. But
more importantly for our purposes here, we can interpret the factors in equation
4 in light of this equilibration process. The diference in temperatures between
the two systems leads to a nonzero value of the factor 1
TA
− 1
TB
, which efectively
acts as a “force” driving a change dUA in the internal energy of system A. Moregenerally speaking, when a system is placed in thermal contact with a system
at a diferent temperature, the temperature diference between the two systems
acts as a force driving an exchange of heat energy between the systems. Phrased
in terms of a system and its surroundings, 1
T
describes the tendency of a system
to exchange heat with its environment; it is the incremental relaxation that a
system experiences in transferring a small bit of its energy dU .3
Physicists commonly use the language of “driving forces” in referring to the
intensive parameters in the thermodynamic potential functions. Looking back
again at equation 2, a diference between the pressure p of the system and its
environment will act as a driving force for an exchange of volume dV between
the system and its environment, and a diference between the concentration of a
3Alternatively, we could have begun with the thermodynamic potential function for internal
energy (equation 1) to derive the same result.
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particular species µj in the system and its environment will act as a driving forcefor exchanges of particles of the respective species with the environment (dNj).The force or tendency represented in each of the conjugate pairs (T, p,µ) can act,
separately or together (depending on the constraints imposed on the process),
to drive changes in its paired extensive variable (dU , dV , or dN, respectively),
and thus to drive the system and its environment toward the equilibrium state
of maximum entropy.4
This “driving force” language—and its basis in the way in which the en-
vironment exchanges energy and entropy with a system—matches the way in
which relationships among thermodynamic variables would be modeled by the
interventionist account of causation. According to the interventionist account, a
variable X is an interventionist cause of another variable Y if there is a possible
intervention on X that will change the value of Y (or the probability distribu-
tion over the values of Y ) when the values of all other variables in the system
remain ixed.5 In physical experiments, the condition that the values of all other
variables in the system remain ixed across changes in the intervention on X is
often enforced using what I will call “auxiliary interventions” on those variables.
To see how interventionist treatment matches the “driving force” language, let’s
consider the temperature equilibration case above, with system A as the causal
system under investigation.
Consider the set of thermodynamic variables characterizing system A when
we consider the temperature equilibration process in terms of maximization of
entropy: volume VA, the set of particle numbers for each species NA, tempera-ture TA, and internal energy UA. Each of these variables is represented belowin igure 3. The primary intervention in the temperature equilibration case was
the operation of placing system B in thermal contact with system A. This in-
tervention occurred speciically under conditions in which the volume VA andparticle numbers NA of system A were held constant; the enforcement of con-stant values of VA and NA, by enclosing the system within rigid impermeablewalls, constitutes the set of auxiliary interventions in this case. Under the con-
ditions set by these auxiliary interventions, the primary intervention produced a
change in TA, since the original temperatures of the two systems were not equal,and this change in temperature resulted in a change in the internal energy (UA)of the system. And since, under conditions where all other variables are held
constant, the intervention was an intervention on TA and resulted in a change
4Physicists use the language of “driving forces” in both the entropy and energy represen-
tations. When we flip between the energy picture of a system and the entropy picture of that
same system, the metric by which we measure progress toward equilibrium changes. Each
metric has its own way of characterizing the driving force because, in changing our metric of
progress, there is a transformation on the force term. Still, physically, it is one and the same
force driving the system toward equilibrium. This representational change in the physical
equations mirrors a widely-noted feature of the interventionist account of causation: when we
change the set of variables with which we characterize a causal system, our characterization
of the causal relationship itself can change.
5I have ignored some technical details for the sake of simplicity here. See Woodward (2003,
59) for the more precise interventionist criteria for X’s being a type-level direct cause of Y
and X’s being a type-level contributing cause of Y .
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in UA, we can say that TA is an interventionist cause of UA.

VA NA1 NA2 . . . NAi

I TA UA
Figure 3: An interventionist causal graph of the temperature equilibration process in
which system A, originally at temperature TA, is brought into contact with anothersystem B, originally at temperature TB . The variable I represents the intervention thatplaces the two systems in contact and thus changes the value of TA. The lock symbols() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold VA and NA ixed.
To further lesh out the causal claim being represented by the arrow from
TA to UA in igure 3, we can contrast varying interventions in which we putsystem A in contact with system B at varying temperatures TB1, TB2, . . . TBn,while still holding VA and NA constant at the same values. Under such varyinginterventions, we will ind that there are corresponding variations in the inal TAand UA. Therefore, the interventionist account conirms that the temperature
TA of system A is a cause of its internal energy UA. In general, interventionson temperature lead to changes in internal energy via exchange of heat when
volume and particle numbers are held constant. Such a causal claim seems
to be precisely what physicists mean to convey when they use “driving force”
language with respect to temperature.
The intervention in the above case, where we have an equilibration process
between two inite systems with difering initial temperatures, is an example
of a “soft” or “parametric” intervention in that it modiies the temperature of
our system rather than determining it completely.6 When we put system A
with its initial temperature TA in contact with system B with its initial tem-perature TB , the combined system inds an equilibrium temperature somewherebetween the initial values of TA and TB . But thermodynamics also providesconceptual tools for theorizing about “hard” or “structural” interventions that
entirely determine the value of an intensive parameter for a system. We call
these theoretical entities “reservoirs” or “baths”, and they have the property of
being able to exchange one or more extensive quantities while their correspond-
ing intensive properties remain constant. For example, an energy bath (i.e., a
temperature reservoir), by virtue of its size, is able to exchange energy with a
system with which it is put in contact with negligible efect on its temperature.
Likewise, a volume bath (i.e., a pressure reservoir) is able to exchange volume
while remaining at constant pressure, and a particle bath (i.e., concentration
reservoir) is able to exchange particles while maintaining constant particle con-
6For the distinction between soft and hard interventions, see Eberhardt and Scheines (2007).
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centrations. When we theorize about cases in which we put a system in contact
with a reservoir instead of a inite system, we consider a hard intervention that
determines the value of the relevant intensive variable in our system. Such the-
oretical experiments bring the interventionist causal structure into even clearer
relief: putting a system in contact with a reservoir is an intervention that sets
the value of an intensive variable in the system, which in turn results in a change
in the corresponding extensive variable.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Illustration of a pressure-driven process, depicting (a) the system in its initial
equilibrium state before the piston-locking pins are released; (b) the system once it has
reached its new equilibrium state after the pins are released. This image shows the result
of the case where p0 > pRes and the piston rises, but all of the same considerations wouldapply in the case that p0 < pRes and the piston falls.
Let’s look at an example. Consider a system that is in an initial equilibrium
state (p0, T,N). Suppose that we intervene on the system by bringing it intocontact with a reservoir that maintains the same temperature T as the system
but a diferent pressure pRes. We might do so by releasing an initially-lockedpiston, allowing it to move freely between the system and the reservoir (see igure
4). The process that ensues will be ruled by a maximization of the entropy of the
total combined system, so we are interested in the condition where dSTotal = 0:
dSTotal =
1
TRes
dUSys +
pSys
TRes
dVSys +
1
TRes
dURes +
pRes
TRes
dVRes = 0 (5)
Due to conservation of volume and conservation of energy, dUSys = −dURes and
dVSys = −dVRes, so the above condition reduces to the following:
dSTotal =
(
pSys − pRes
TRes
)
dVSys = 0 (6)
We can see here that it is the pressure diference between system and reservoir
that is driving the exchange of volume. And again, this physical interpretation
in terms of driving forces matches the interventionist causal account. By placing
the system in contact with the reservoir, we set the pressure of the system to
a new value, and the forced change in pressure results in a change in volume.
Were we to impose a diferent pressure on the system by placing it in contact
10
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with a reservoir at a diferent pressure, we would see the corresponding volume
change as well. Thus, pressure is an interventionist cause of volume (see igure
5).

T N1 N2 . . . Ni

I p V
Figure 5: Interventionist causal representation of the pressure equilibration process de-
picted in igure 4. The variable I represents the intervention that places the system in
contact with the pressure reservoir and thus changes the value of p. The lock symbols
() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold T and N ixed.
As shown in the examples above, the most important key to successful
thermodynamic theorizing is the careful deinition of the boundaries between
systems and accounting for the transactions that occur at those boundaries.
Interventionist reasoning its naturally into thermodynamic theorizing because
its distinction between the interventions external to a causal system and the
causal relations internal to that system is perfectly applicable where thermo-
dynamic boundaries are well-deined. Since interventions are always performed
on a causal system from outside, it is entirely natural to label exchanges be-
tween a system and its environment as interventions of the environment on those
systems.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that there is a natural it between thermodynamic
theorizing and the interventionist account of causation. I therefore argue that
the interventionist account is the most suitable account of causation for describ-
ing thermodynamic theorizing and our actual interactions with thermodynamic
systems.
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that we tend to assume that physi-
cal causation will have a dynamical form, and that my identiication of interven-
tionism as the most appropriate account of causation in thermodynamics would
run contrary to this assumption. It might be objected that this is a somewhat
dull result, however. Thermodynamics, so the objection might run, is not “fun-
damental” physics, and so it is unsurprising that we should ind interventionist
causation rather than dynamic causation in a realm of physics that is…well…not
dynamical. But such an objection would miss the point. Our common as-
sumption that “physical causation” must refer to the dynamical propagations
of systems is the result of our preoccupation with “fundamental” physics (which
11
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we also assume, almost by deinition, must have a dynamical form) and neglect
of those areas of physics which are considered to be “non-fundamental”.7
So what is it to be a cause in (at least some of) physics? Here is a simple
answer: an account of causation which appropriately characterizes the theoreti-
cal structure and phenomenal behavior of a domain of physics gives an account
of what it is to be a cause in that domain of physics. And I have shown that
the interventionist account does just that in thermodynamics.
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CENTRALISED FUNDING AND THE DIVISION OF
COGNITIVE LABOUR
Abstract. Project selection by funding bodies directly influences
the division of cognitive labour in scientific communities. I present
a novel adaptation of an existing agent-based model of scientific
research, in which a central funding body selects from proposed
projects located on an epistemic landscape. I simulate four differ-
ent selection strategies: selection based on a god’s-eye perspective
of project significance, selection based on past success, selection
based on past funding, and random selection. Results show the size
of the landscape matters: on small landscapes historical informa-
tion leads to slightly better results than random selection, but on
large landscapes random selection greatly outperforms historically-
informed selection.
Word count: 4359
Introduction
National funding bodies support much of contemporary science. The
selection criteria for funding have gained increasing attention within
philosophy of science (Gillies, 2008; O’Malley et al., 2009; Haufe, 2013;
Lee, 2015). Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in model-based
approaches to understanding the social epistemic activities of scientists
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009; Grim,
2009; Zollman, 2010). The current paper builds on previous modelling
tools to explore the effects of centralised selection mechanisms on the
division of cognitive labour and the ability of scientific communities to
efficiently discover significant truths.
Science aims at discovering significant truths, i.e. not just any truths,
but truths that will eventually contribute in a meaningful way to well-
being (Kitcher, 2001). This is the justification for the public support
of science, including basic science (Bush, 1945). Some funding termi-
nology: scientific projects have high impact (ex post) if they result
in significant truths; projects have high merit (ex ante) if they are
predicted to have high impact.
Polanyi (1962) analysed merit as being composed of three compo-
nents: scientific value, plausibility and originality. Polanyi notes an
essential tension between plausibility and originality: the more original
a project, the more difficult it is to evaluate its plausibility. Polanyi ad-
vocates selection by peer review as a conformist position, that sacrifices
the occasional meritorious original project while ensuring all supported
research projects are plausible, to “prevent the adulteration of science
1
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by cranks and dabblers” (p. 8). Gillies (2008, 2014) takes an oppos-
ing position, arguing that the cost of losing (infrequent) highly original
and meritorious research is much greater than the cost of occasion-
ally supporting implausible research that ends up being of low impact.
As an alternative to peer review, Gillies advocates random selection.
The tension between plausibility and originality is clearly relevant to
questions of effective division of cognitive labour, and has direct links
to science policy. This tension, and its complexity, is explored in this
paper.
I will argue that the results of the simulations presented are both sig-
nificant and surprising. The simulations show that, under reasonable
parameter values for at least some fields of science, choosing projects
at random performs significantly better, in terms of accumulated sig-
nificant truths, compared to other funding strategies, including project
selection by peer review. The results support, to an extent, Gillies’
proposal of funding by lottery.
1. Model description
The model explores the influence of different funding mechanisms on
the accumulation of significant truths. It builds on the epistemic land-
scape model developed by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), extending it
by adding representations of centralised funding selection and dynamic
changes in project merit. The latter is added to reflect a more realistic
picture of scientific merit. For example, Strevens (2003) discusses the
effect of a successful discovery on all further pursuits of the same ques-
tion: they no longer have any merit, as they lose all originality. Several
dynamic processes affecting merit are detailed later in the paper.
The model represents a population of scientists exploring a topic of
scientific interest. They are all funded by the same central funding
body to pursue projects of varying duration, measured in years. Each
project’s significance is allocated in advance by the modeller, from a
“god’s-eye” perspective. When grants end scientists successfully com-
plete their project. Their projects’ results contribute to the collection
of significant truths in the field’s corpus of knowledge. Funding mech-
anisms are compared by their ability to generate this accumulation of
significant truths.
For simplicity, scientists in the model (unrealistically) do not share
their findings nor explore similar projects during research. They only
work on the project for which they were funded and they only share
their results at the end of a grant. The social processes set aside here
have been explored in previous works (Grim, 2009; Zollman, 2010).
Future work may combine the different models towards a unified picture
of the division of cognitive labour.
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Funding is represented as a process of selection. In every time step,
the scientists whose grants have run out are placed in a pool of candi-
dates along with new entrants to the field, and the modelled funding
mechanism selects from this pool of candidates those who will receive
funding and carry out research projects. Modelled funding mechanisms
differ in the way they select individuals, as outlined below.
Actual potential: Actual potential, which can only be known from
a god’s-eye perspective, is the significance of a project’s re-
sults were it successfully completed today. In the absence of
time-dependant merit, actual potential is simply the signifi-
cance of the project’s results. However, in the presence of time-
dependence the significance could change between the initiation
of the project (at the point of funding) and its completion (at
the point of contributing the results to the relevant corpus).
This means that in the presence of time-dependence, actual
potential might diverge from the eventual contribution of the
project.
Estimated potential: Estimated potential is the scientific commu-
nity’s ex ante evaluation (assumed, for simplicity, to be single-
valued) of the merit of a proposed project. This prediction is
taken to rely on the known contributions of past projects which
bear some similarity to the proposed project, and so depends
on the history of research projects in the field. In representing
decisions based on the research community’s prediction, this
selection method is akin to peer-review.
Past funding: Under this mechanism, funding is allocated to those
scientists who already received funding in the past, and only
to them. The model (unrealistically) represents all scientists as
being of equal skill, and so this mechanism cannot be taken to
mean the selection of the most “intrinsically able” scientists.
Rather, this mechanism is included as a “most conservative”
option, not admitting any new researchers to the field beyond
the field’s original investigators.
Lottery: Under a lottery, all candidates have equal chances of being
funded. The lottery option serves both as a natural bench-
mark for other funding methods, and as a representation of the
mechanism proposed by Gillies (2014).
The essence of the model is the comparison of the performance of these
selection mechanisms in generating results of high significance over time
under various conditions.
To represent in the model the time-dependence of merit, the signif-
icance contributions of different project results are allowed to change
over time as a response to scientists’ actions. Three dynamic processes
are included in the model (details in §2.5). Two processes involve a re-
duction of significance following a successful project or breakthrough,
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which reflects the one-off nature of discovery. The third process involves
an increase in significance when a new avenue of research is opened by
a significant discovery. Simulations based on the model show that these
dynamic processes have a significant effect on the relative performance
of different funding strategies.
2. Simulation details
2.1. Simulating the epistemic landscape. To investigate the com-
plex nature of the domain being modelled, the model was turned into a
computer simulation.1 The basic structure of the landscape simulation
follows Weisberg and Muldoon’s, of a two-dimensional configuration
space, charted with two coordinates x and y, with an associated scalar
field represented in a third dimension as height along the z axis. Each
(x, y) coordinate pair specifies a different potential research project;
the closer two projects are on the landscape, the more similar they are.
The scalar value associated to the coordinate represents the significance
of the result obtained on a successful completion of the project, were
it completed today (allowing for time dependence). The limit to two
spatial dimensions of variation between projects is likely to be unreal-
istic (Wilkins, 2008), but a higher-dimensional alternative would make
the model much less tractable.
In each run of the simulation, the landscape is generated anew in the
following process:
(1) Initialise a flat surface of the required dimensions.
(2) Choose a random location on the surface.
(3) Pick random values for relative height, width along x, and width
along y.
(4) Add to the landscape a hill at the location chosen in step 2
by using a bivariate Gaussian distribution with the parameters
picked in step 3.
(5) Repeat steps 2-4 until the specified number of hills is reached.
(6) Scale up linearly the height of the landscape according to the
specified maximum height.
This process generates the “god’s-eye” perspective of the research po-
tential of the domain. Here and later, random variables are used to
fill-in parameters whose existence is essential for the simulation, but
where (1) the specific values they take can vary across a range of valid
model targets, and/or (2) there is no compelling empirical evidence to
choose a particular value. This requires, however, several runs of the
simulation for each configuration, to average out the effects of random
variation.
1Source code for the simulation is available from the author on request.
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2.2. Simulating agents. The agents in the model represent scientists
investigating the epistemic landscape. Each agent represents an inde-
pendent researcher or group, and is characterised by its location on the
landscape, representing the project they are currently pursuing, and
a countdown counter, representing the time remaining until their cur-
rent project is finished. Like Weisberg and Muldoon’s “hill climbers”,
agents are simulated as local maximisers. Agents follow the following
strategy every simulation step:
(1) Reduce countdown by 1.
(2) If countdown is not zero: remain in same location.
(3) If countdown is zero: contribute to the accumulated significance
the significance of the current location, and attempt to move to
the highest local neighbour.
In the simulation, the agents are identical, in the sense that any
agent, when successfully completing a project of a given significance,
will contribute exactly that amount to the accumulated significance
of the field. This simplification ignores natural ability and gained ex-
perience, and stems from a focus on a particular approach to science
funding, which funds projects, rather than funding people. The focus
is informed by the explicit policies of certain funding bodies, like the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), reflected, for example, in the in-
stitution of blind peer review. Thus, the results of the current work
would not extend to the minority of science funding bodies, such as
the Wellcome Trust, that make explicit their preference to fund people
rather than projects.
The local neighbourhood of an agent is defined as the 3 × 3 square
centred on their current position. The attempt to move to the highest
neighbour depends on the selection (funding) mechanism, as discussed
below. The accumulated significance, which is the sum of all individ-
ual contributions to significance, is stored as a global variable of the
simulation and used to compare strategies.
In the beginning of the simulation, a specified number of agents are
seeded in random locations on the landscape, with randomly generated
countdowns selected from a specified range of values. An example of
an initial seeding of agents can be seen in Fig. 1.
In the absence of selection and time-dependence, the course of the
simulation is easy to describe: agents begin in random locations on a
random landscape, and as the simulation progresses the agents finish
projects and climb local hills, until, after an amount of time which de-
pends on the size of the landscape, the number and size of peaks, and
the duration of grants, all agents trace a path to their local maxima
and stay there. Since agents increase their local significance during the
climb, the rate of significance accumulation increases initially, until
all agents reach their local maxima, at which point significance con-
tinues accumulating at a fixed rate indefinitely. This is the dynamic
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Figure 1. Landscape simulation with initial seeding of
agents. Each number on the landscape represents an
agent at its location, with the value of the number rep-
resenting the agent’s countdown. The colours indicate
the height (significance) of each position (project) in the
landscape.
seen in Weisberg and Muldoon’s simulation for a pure community of
“hill climbers”, and its unrealistic nature highlights the importance of
simulating the time-dependence of significance.
2.3. Simulating communal knowledge. In addition to their con-
tribution to significance, agents also contribute to the visibility of the
landscape (Muldoon and Weisberg, 2011). The visibility of a project
represents whether the scientific community, and especially funding
bodies, can estimate the significance contribution of that project. Ini-
tially, the entire landscape is invisible, representing full uncertainty.
Upon initial seeding of agents, each agent contributes vision of their lo-
cal neighbourhood, as defined above, to the total vision. As the agents
move, they add vision of their new local neighbourhood. Visibility is
used in the best visible funding mechanism described below.
The simulation represents visibility in a simplistic manner by assign-
ing binary values: either the community knows what the significance
of a project will be, or it does not. A more realistic representation will
allow partial visibility, with some distance decay effect, such that the
community would still be able to make predictions of significance for
less familiar projects, but these predictions will have a probability of
being wrong, with the probability of error increasing the more unfamil-
iar these projects are. This addition, however, will be computationally
heavy, as it requires maintaining multiple versions of the landscape,
both for the real values and for the estimated values.
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2.4. Simulating funding strategies. The aim of the model is to
explore the effects of funding mechanisms on the population and dis-
tribution of investigators. Since the aim is to simulate current fund-
ing practices (albeit in a highly idealised manner), and since current
funding practices operate in passive mode (choosing from proposals
originating from scientists rather than dictating which projects aught
be pursued), the guiding principle of the simulation is that a funding
mechanism is akin to a selection process: at each step of the simula-
tion, the actual population of agents is a subset of the candidate or
potential population, where inclusion in the actual population follows
a certain selection mechanism.
Funding mechanisms are simulated in the following manner:
Every step:
(1) Place all agents with zero countdown in a pool of “old candi-
dates”.
(2) Generate a set of new candidate agents, in a process identical
to the seeding of agents in the beginning of the simulation.
(3) Select from the joint pool of (old candidates + new candidates)
a subset according to the selection mechanism specified by the
funding method.
(4) Only selected agents are placed on the landscape and take part
in the remainder of the simulation, the rest are ignored.
The simulation can represent four different funding mechanisms:
best: selects the candidates which are located at the highest points,
regardless of the visibility of their locations. This simulates a
mechanism which selects the most promising projects from a
god’s eye perspective. This overly optimistic mechanism does
not represent a real funding strategy. Rather, it serves as an
ideal benchmark against which realistic funding mechanisms are
measured.
best visible: filters out candidates which are located at invisible loca-
tions, i.e. candidates who propose to work on projects which are
too different from present or past projects. It then selects the
candidates in the highest locations from the remainder. This
strategy is closer to a realistic representation of selection by peer
review. Note that even this version is epistemically optimistic,
as it assumes the selection panel has successfully gathered all
available information from all the different agents, both past
and present.
lotto: selects candidates at random from the candidate pool, disre-
garding the visibility and height of their locations.
oldboys: represents no selection: old candidates continue, no new can-
didates are generated.
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The key parameters for all funding mechanisms are the size of the
candidate pool and the size of the selection pool. The size of the can-
didate pool, which in turn depends on the size of the new candidate
pool (as the size of the old candidate pool emerges from the simula-
tion), has been chosen in the simulations such that the total candidate
pool is equal in size to the initial number of agents (except oldboys
where there are no new candidates). This means the success probabil-
ity changes between funding rounds, around a mean which is equal to
1/(average countdown). With an average grant duration of five years,
this yields a success rate of 20%, close to the real value in many contem-
porary funding schemes (NIH, 2014). The number of grants awarded
each year is set to equal the number of grants completed each year,
maintaining a fixed size for the population of investigators.
For simplicity, the simulated funding mechanisms do not take into
account the positions of existing agents on the landscape, except indi-
rectly when considering their vision. Future simulations may consider
a selection mechanism which explicitly favours either diversity or ag-
glomeration, though one expects difficulties in operationalisation and
measurement of epistemic diversity.
2.5. Simulating merit dynamics. To make the simulation more re-
alistic, the significance of projects is allowed to change over time in re-
sponse to research activities of the community of investigators. Three
such dynamic processes are included in the simulation:
Winner takes it all: As was made explicit by Strevens (2003), the
utility gain of discovery is a one-off event: the first (recognised)
discovery of X may greatly contribute to the collective utility,
but there is little or no contribution from further discoveries of
X. In the simulation, this is represented by setting the signifi-
cance of a location to zero whenever an agent at that location
has finished their project and made their contribution to ac-
cumulated significance. This effect is triggered whenever any
countdown reaches zero, which makes it quite common, but it
has a very localised effect, only affecting the significance of a
single project.
Reduced novelty: When a researcher makes a significant discovery,
simulated by finishing a project with associated significance
above a certain threshold, the novelty of nearby projects is
reduced, which in the model is simulated by a reduction of
significance in a local area around the discovery.
New avenues: When a researcher makes a significant discovery, it
opens up the possibility of new avenues of research, simulated
in the model by the appearance of a new randomly-shaped hill
at a random location on the landscape.
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3. Results and discussion
Here I present the results of simulations of different setups of interest,
exploring the relative success of different funding mechanisms under
different conditions.
All simulation results show a comparison between the four fund-
ing mechanisms, as a plot of total accumulated significance (arbitrary
units) at the end of the simulation run, averaged over five runs with dif-
ferent random seeds. In all simulations the range of countdowns was 2
to 7. The number of individuals was set to equal (size of landscape)3/4.
Simulations were ran for 50 steps. The trigger for significance-dependant
processes was 0.7 of the global maximum. Results are shown for a small
landscape (50× 50) in Fig. 2 and for a large landscape (500× 500) in
Fig. 3.
Figure 2. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, small landscape (50×
50).
To get a feeling for how the community is affected by the funding
mechanism, I present visualisations of the state of the landscape at the
end of the simulation run for the two funding mechanisms mentioned
in the introduction (best visible and lotto) in Fig. 4. Note that due to
the winner takes it all dynamic process it is possible to “see” the past
trajectory of exploration, as completed projects leave behind highly
localised points of zero (remaining) significance. This allows for a visual
representation of the division of cognitive labour that emerges under
different funding schemes.
As is clear from the simulations, the best funding mechanism is in-
deed best at accumulating significance over time, though with various
lead margins over the second best strategy. In the presence of dynamic
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Figure 3. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, large landscape (500×
500).
(a) best visible (b) lotto
Figure 4. Landscape visualisation at the end of the
simulation run under different funding mechanisms.
processes, best is in the best position to locate new avenues for re-
search, wherever they show up. However, as mentioned above, the best
funding strategy is not realisable, as it requires a god’s eye view of the
epistemic landscape.
On the small landscape the three strategies, best visible, oldboys,
and lotto perform roughly similarly, with lotto at a small disadvantage
as it cannot make use of valuable information from past successes. It
seems counter-intuitive that best visible performs worse than oldboys. A
possible explanation is the effect of reduced novelty: best visible tends
to cluster scientists around the most promising projects, and so when
one makes a breakthrough it reduces the significance of contributions
for all groups working on similar projects (the phenomenon known in
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contemporary science as “scooping”). This excessive clustering around
fashions is not present in oldboys or lotto.
On the large landscape lotto greatly outperforms best visible and
oldboys. This is because new avenues on a large landscape are likely to
spawn outside the visibility of the agents, where lotto can access them
but the other two strategies cannot. In the smaller landscape this
effect is not apparent, as the relative visibility is larger, and therefore
the chance of a new avenue appearing within the visible area is larger.
Conclusion
This paper presented a way to extend existing epistemic landscape
models so that they can represent selection by a central funding body
and time dependence of significance. This model was used in computer
simulations to compare the effectiveness of different idealised versions
of selection criteria, most notably selection based on past successes
(akin to peer review), random selection and no selection. The most
significant result from the simulation was that on a large landscape,
when a topic can be explored in many ways that could be very different
from each other, random selection performs much better than selection
based on past performance.
This result fits in with a general result from the body of works on
agent-based models of scientific communities, that shows diversity in
the community trumps individual pursuit of excellence as a way of
making communal epistemic progress. The tension of science funding,
between originality and plausibility, is thus a part of the broader tension
between diversity and excellence, between exploration and exploitation.
Previous social epistemology models have focused on the role of inter-
nal factors in shifting the balance between exploration and exploita-
tion. Kitcher (1990); Strevens (2003) look at reward structures (of
internal credit, not external monetary rewards) and individual motiva-
tion towards credit or truth. Grim (2009); Zollman (2010) look at in-
formation availability and information transfer between scientists, and
at individual beliefs. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) look at individual
researchers’ social strategy: follower or maverick.
The current work is the first within this modelling lineage to look at
the effects of an external, institutional factor: selection by a centralised
funding body. The current paper brings this line of research closer to
having a direct relevance to science policy. Hopefully future work in
this vain will continue this trend, to deliver on the challenge set out by
Kitcher (1990, p. 22):
How do we best design social institutions for the ad-
vancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored
the social structure of science. The point, however, is to
change it.
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We could start by advocating for funding mechanisms that allow for
more exploration.
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How	To	Make	Selective	Realism	More	Selective	(and	More	Realist	Too)	
Massimiliano	Badino	
Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	—	Universitat	Autonoma	de	Barcelona	
Abstract	
Selective	realism	is	the	thesis	that	some	wisely	chosen	theoretical	posits	are	essential	
to	science	and	can	therefore	be	considered	as	true	or	approximately	true.	How	to	
choose	them	wisely,	however,	is	a	matter	of	=ierce	contention.	Generally	speaking,	we	
should	favor	posits	that	are	effectively	deployed	in	successful	prediction.	In	this	paper	
I	propose	a	re=inement	of	the	notion	of	deployment	and	I	argue	that	selective	realism	
can	be	extended	to	include	the	analysis	of	how	theoretical	posits	are	actually	deployed	
in	symbolic	practices.	
1. Introduction	
Among	the	several	forms	of	realism,	the	so-called	selective	realism	(SelRealism)	is	
arguably	the	one	that	engages	history	of	science	more	seriously.	The	driving	idea	of	
SelRealism	is	that,	although	theories	as	wholes	are	false	and	doomed	to	be	
abandoned,	it	is	possible	to	select	a	certain	number	of	theoretical	posits	(TPs)	that	are	
likely	to	be	maintained	in	future	theories	and	are	therefore	true	or	approximately	
true.	How	to	determine	these	TPs	is	partly	an	empirical	question—and	this	explains	
the	historical	character	of	the	SelRealism	program—but	it	cannot	be	merely	an	
empirical	question	lest	one	end	up	in	post-hoc	rationalizations.	A	central	issue	of	
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SelRealism,	hence,	is	how	to	specify	criteria	to	properly	conceptualize	the	TPs	on	
which	one	should	place	one’s	realist	commitment.	
In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	contemporary	approaches	to	SelRealism	have	neglected	an	
important	element	related	to	the	way	in	which	theoretical	claims	are	deployed	in	
scienti=ic	theories	(Section	2).	In	Section	3,	I	propose	a	re=inement	of	SelRealism	
based	on	the	distinction	between	deploying	a	TP	fundamentally	and	deploying	it	in	a	
non-accidental	fashion.	I	use	the	concept	of	symbolic	practices	to	articulate	this	
distinction.	Finally,	in	Section	4,	I	clarify	my	points	by	discussing	the	early	
development	of	perturbation	theory.	
2. Selective	Realism:	Theory	and	Practice	
The	upholders	of	SelRealism	cherish	two	fundamental	ambitions.	First	and	foremost,	
they	aim	at	making	a	good	use	of	the	so-called	no-miracles	argument	(NMA)	
according	to	which	one	can	justi=iably	infer	the	truth	(or	the	approximate	truth)	of	a	
successful	theory,	because,	otherwise,	the	success	would	remained	inexplicable.	The	
NMA	is	considered	to	be	the	strongest	support	to	realisms	of	any	sort	(Musgrave	
1988;	Psillos	1999,	68-94).	A	challenging	objection	to	the	NMA	is	the	pessimistic	
meta-induction	(PMI)	originally	formulated	by	Larry	Laudan.	According	to	this	
argument,	the	success	of	a	theory	is	never	a	suf=icient	reason	to	infer	even	its	
approximate	truth	because	history	of	science	is	replete	with	examples	of	very	
successful	theories	that	wound	up	overthrown	at	some	later	stage.	As	it	is	likely	the	
case	that	our	most	successful	theories	will	suffer	the	same	fate	in	the	future,	one	has	
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to	conclude	that	the	realist	commitment	is	not	justi=ied	(Laudan	1981).	Among	the	
several	responses	to	the	PMI,	one	consists	in	noticing	that	the	failures	of	past	theories,	
in	fact,	did	not	depend	on	those	TPs	that	lead	them	to	success.	In	other	words,	granted	
Laudan’s	point	that	successful	past	theories	are	false	as	wholes,	it	can	still	be	argued	
that	the	constituents	of	those	theories	that	were	responsible	for	their	empirical	
success	have	been	retained	in	our	current	science.	Thus,	the	realist	needs	only	to	shift	
her	commitment	from	theories	as	wholes	to	those	enduring	TPs	that,	being	essential	
for	success,	can	be	justi=iably	believed	to	be	true	or	approximately	true.	
The	next	question	is,	of	course,	how	to	determine	those	TPs.	Thus,	the	second	
ambition	of	the	upholders	of	SelRealism	is	to	solve	the	problem	of	selectivity	in	some	
principled	way	and	so	beat	the	PMI.	In	one	of	the	=irst	instantiations	of	SelRealism,	
Philip	Kitcher	argued	that	one	must	“distinguish	between	those	parts	of	theory	that	
are	genuinely	used	in	the	success	and	those	that	are	idle	wheels”	(Kitcher	1993,	143).	
The	point	of	this	distinction	is	that	credit	for	the	success	of	a	theory	should	be	due	
only	to	those	TPs	that	effectively	contribute	to	it.	Elaborating	on	Kitcher’s	intuition,	
one	can	argue	that	the	program	of	SelRealism	is	based	on	two	major	conditions:	
(S)	Success	condition:	the	selection	of	the	important	TPs	must	hinge	on	their	
relation	with	some	signi=icant	success	of	the	theory.	
(D)	Deployment	condition:	one	must	select	those	TPs	that	were	effectively	used	in	
scoring	that	success.	
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Let	me	brie=ly	comment	on	these	two	conditions.	While	(S)	is	now	a	realist	trademark,	
the	deployment	condition	(D)	is	what	sets	apart	SelRealism	from	other	forms	of	
realism,	such	as	structural	realism,	also	engaged	in	picking	out	enduring	elements	of	
scienti=ic	theories	(Worrall	1989;	Chakravartty	2011).	It	is	also	important	to	notice	
that	(S)	and	(D)	are	independent	conditions.	Firstly,	(S)	refers	to	a	relation	between	
the	selected	TP	and	empirical	success,	while	(D)	refers	to	a	relation	between	the	TP	
and	the	rest	of	the	theory.	Secondly,	either	condition	can	be	satis=ied	separately.	(D)	
has	been	added	precisely	to	avoid	those	cases	in	which	idle	TPs	are	involved	in	
empirical	success	and,	obviously,	there	are	scores	of	examples	of	TPs	used	by	theories	
which	however	never	led	to	any	success.	It	follows	that,	while	(S)	is	supposed	to	meet	
the	=irst	ambition	of	SelRealism,	the	second	ambition,	to	block	the	PMI,	is	on	(D).	
So	much	for	SelRealism	in	theory.	Let	us	now	examine	how	this	program	has	been	
carried	out	in	practice.	One	of	the	=irst	philosophers	to	seriously	elaborate	on	
Kitcher’s	suggestion	was	Stathis	Psillos.	His	criterion	for	selecting	TPs	works	in	the	
following	way	(Psillos	1999,	110).	Let	us	assume	that	a	certain	successful	prediction	P	
can	be	obtained	by	combining	the	TPs	H,	H’	and	the	auxiliaries	A. 	According	to	1
	For	virtually	all	writers,	empirical	success	means	“successful	prediction”.	David	1
Harker	has	leveled	important	criticisms	against	this	tendency	to	interpret	success	in	
terms	of	individual	predictions	and	has	suggested	that	success	should	be	understood	
as	progress,	i.e.	in	terms	of	the	improvements	a	theory	makes	with	respect	to	its	
predecessors	(Harker	2008,	2013).
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Psillos,	the	TP	H	is	essential	to	success	P	and	should	be	considered	true	or	
approximately	true	if	and	only	if:	
(1) H’	and	A	alone	do	not	lead	to	P.	
(2) There	is	no	alternative	H*	to	H	such	that:	
(a) H*	is	consistent	with	H’	and	A;	
(b) H*,	H’,	and	A	lead	to	P;	
(c) H*	is	not	ad	hoc	or	otherwise	purposefully	concocted	to	lead	to	P.		
This	criterion	is	the	bedrock	of	Psillos’s	divide	et	impera	strategy.	The	driving	intuition	
behind	it	is	to	capture	the	indispensability	of	H:	we	should	place	our	realist	
commitment	upon	those	TPs	without	which	empirical	success	cannot	be	obtained.	
However,	Tim	Lyons	has	cogently	argued	that	Psillos's	criterion	fails	to	characterize	
indispensability	(Lyons	2006).	The	indispensability	of	H	should	be	ensured	by	
condition	(2),	which	states,	in	brief,	that	H	cannot	be	replaced	by	any	other	TP.	But,	
Lyons	notices,	“there	will	always	be	other	hypotheses,	albeit	some	that	we	=ind	very	
unappealing,	from	which	any	given	prediction	can	be	derived”	(Lyons	2006,	540).	
More	importantly,	Lyons	argues,	Psillos’s	criterion	is	not	even	an	effective	means	for	
credit	attribution,	because	it	does	not	tell	us	much	about	how	H	contributes	to	the	
empirical	success	P.	In	particular,	condition	(2)	has	no	relevance	whatsoever	for	H’s	
speci=ic	contribution,	because	it	only	concerns	conceivable	alternatives	to	H,	
alternatives	that,	if	H	is	at	hand,	nobody	would	even	bother	to	explore.	Lyons	
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perceptively	stresses	that	the	problem	with	Psillos’s	criterion	boils	down	to	the	fact	
that	it	obliterates	condition	(D):	“by	introducing	his	criterion,	[Psillos]	has	discarded	
the	central	idea	of	deployment	realism—introduced	by	Kitcher	and	seemingly	
advocated	by	Psillos	himself”	(Lyons	2006,	541).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	by	
dropping	condition	(D),	Psillos’s	position	becomes	vulnerable	to	another	form	of	PMI.	
One	could	think	of	getting	around	of	Lyons’s	=irst	objection	by	arguing	that,	even	
though	an	alternative	to	H	is	always	conceivable,	at	the	present	state	of	our	knowledge	
it	is	not,	therefore	the	objection	is	empty.	In	other	words,	one	could	inject	the	time	
factor	in	Psillos’s	criterion	and	make	it	a	statement	of	our	actual	best	knowledge.	But	
then	the	PMI	crops	up	again,	because	history	shows	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	
what	is	indispensable	today	will	be	so	tomorrow.	The	whole	point	of	the	PMI	is	that	
there	is	nothing	special	in	our	knowledge	as	far	as	it	is	considered	present,	because	
there	have	been	a	lot	of	present	knowledges	that	have	been	blissfully	abandoned.	This	
is	why	one	needs	condition	(D):	what	makes	our	present	knowledge	so	special	is	not	
its	happening	at	a	certain	time,	but	its	having	gone	through	a	certain	process,	i.e.,	a	
form	of	deployment.	The	fact	that	our	present	knowledge	has	been	deployed	at	
lengths	and	it	is	still	with	us	constitutes	a	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	true	or	
approximately	true.	
3. Deconstructing	Deployment	
Having	grasped	that	the	=law	in	Psillos’s	criterion	is	the	dropping	of	the	deployment	
condition,	Lyons	suggests	to	run	to	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	and	to	in=late	
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dramatically	the	notion	of	deployment.	His	“responsibility	model”	consists	in	
discarding	selectivity	altogether	and	in	considering	responsible	for	the	empirical	
success	of	a	theory	each	and	every	element	that	was	originally	deployed:	“credit	will	
have	to	be	attributed	to	all	responsible	constituents,	including	mere	heuristics	(such	
as	mystical	beliefs),	weak	analogies,	mistaken	calculations,	logically	invalid	reasoning	
etc.”	(Lyons	2006,	543).	Clearly,	Lyons’s	proposal	amounts	to	a	crack-up	of	the	entire	
SelRealism	program.	But,	more	importantly,	I	do	not	think	that	the	responsibility	
model	captures	the	correct	signi=icance	of	(D).	As	my	previous	considerations	about	
the	PMI	show,	the	deployment	condition	is	not	merely	supposed	to	tell	us	that	a	TP	
has	been	effectively	used	in	obtaining	empirical	success	(as	opposed	to	be	
dispensable),	but	also	that	it	has	been	robustly	so	(as	opposed	to	be	merely	
accidental).	What	makes	it	plausible	that	a	TP	will	still	play	a	role	in	future	theories	is	
the	fact	that	its	importance	for	empirical	success	has	been	tested	by	extensive	and	
repeated	deployment.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	there	are	two	ideas	nested	in	the	
deployment	condition.	One	is	the	idea,	captured	by	Psillos’s	criterion,	that	signi=icant	
TPs	must	play	a	fundamental	role	in	success	in	order	to	distinguish	them	from	idle	
hypotheses;	the	other	is	the	idea	that	the	deployment	of	a	TP	must	ensure	that	its	
success	is	not	accidental.	These	are	two	distinct	ideas.	It	might	happen,	for	example,	
that	a	TP	plays	an	essential	role	in	deriving	a	prediction	in	virtue	of	fortuitous	factors	
cancellation	or	other	favorable	circumstances.	So,	while	an	intensive	deployment	
ensure	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP,	an	extensive	deployment	founds	its	robustness.	Both	
fundamentality	and	robustness	are	ways	to	articulate	the	complex	relation	between	a	
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TP	and	the	rest	of	the	theory,	or	at	least	some	parts	of	the	theory	(more	on	this	in	a	
bit).	Further,	while	fundamentality	is	an	atemporal	articulation	of	this	relation, 	2
robustness	concerns	precisely	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	deployment	condition	
that	escaped	Lyons’s	analysis:	robustness,	as	we	shall	see	below,	is	achieved	over	time.	
In	order	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	fundamentality	and	robustness,	I	introduce	
the	notion	of	symbolic	practices.	By	symbolic	practices	I	mean	all	the	methods	
customarily	used	in	science	to	manipulate	symbols. 	These	include,	but	are	not	3
limited	to,	mathematical	methods,	formal	tools,	approximations	procedures,	models,	
heuristics,	solution	tricks,	and	any	sort	of	way	by	which	one	can	transform	a	symbolic	
expression	into	another	symbolic	expression.	Symbolic	practices	are	the	set	of	
methods	adopted	by	a	theory	to	“put	to	work”	a	certain	TP	or,	in	other	words,	to	
deploy	it	in	order	to	set	problems	and	to	interpret	solutions.	By	using	the	concept	of	
symbolic	practices,	one	can	reformulate	the	two	ideas	of	the	deployment	condition	in	
the	following	way:	
	Of	course	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP	can	change	over	time	because	it	can	become	2
more	or	less	fundamentally	used.	However,	the	relation	in	itself	does	not	concern	this	
change.
	My	discussion	is	especially	tailored	on	the	case	of	mathematical	physics.	I	do	not	3
exclude,	however,	that	it	can	be	suitably	extended	to	other	branches	of	science	by	
taking	an	appropriately	enlarged	notion	of	symbolic	practices.
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(F)	Fundamentality:	A	TP	must	be	embedded	in	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	that	lead	
to	empirical	success.	
(R)	Robustness:	The	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	deploy	the	TP	must	be	reliable.	
Let	us	begin	with	(F).	This	idea	hinges	on	the	“embeddedness”	of	a	TP	into	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices.	An	empirical	success,	a	successful	prediction	or	an	explanation,	is	
obtained	by	starting	with	one	TP—or,	better,	its	symbolic	codi=ication—and	by	
deriving	from	it	the	phenomena	to	be	treated	by	means	of	suitable	manipulations.	In	
their	analysis	of	the	path	from	TP	to	success,	philosophers	usually	disregard	the	
epistemic	role	played	by	symbolic	manipulations	of	TPs.	But	if	we	neglect	this	
important	factor	of	the	process	of	predicting/explaining,	we	are	left	with	no	other	
option	than	characterizing	fundamentality	as	a	relation	between	TPs,	i.e.,	a	‘Psillosian’	
criterion	and	then	a	‘Lyonsnesque’	argument	can	easily	prove	that	this	falls	short	of	
providing	a	satisfactory	notion	of	fundamentality.	In	my	proposal,	fundamentality	is	
rather	a	relation	between	TP	and	the	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	transform	and	
manipulate	it.	Although	intuitively	clear	enough,	the	concept	of	embededdness	
admittedly	needs	further	philosophical	analysis.	In	Section	4,	I	provide	a	historical	
example	to	clarify	what	it	means	for	a	TP	to	be	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	
practices.	
Before	discussing	the	example,	however,	I	need	to	analyze	brie=ly	the	idea	of	
robustness.	Condition	(R)	states	that	reliability,	and	hence	robustness,	is	a	property	of	
the	symbolic	practices	themselves.	In	other	words,	and	this	is	the	central	point,	a	TP	
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can	be	made	more	robust	by	means	of	historically	and	rationally	describable	strategies	
conceived	to	enhance	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	put	it	to	work.	
One	way	to	appreciate	this	point	is	to	notice	that	the	concept	of	reliability	has	three	
main	components.	First,	there	is	an	empirical	component,	that	is	its	connection	with	
success.	It	is	expected	that	reliable	symbolic	practices	have	led	and	will	lead	to	
empirical	success.	This	is	unsurprising,	because	it	is	still	part	of	the	relation	between	
(D)	and	the	NMA.	Second,	there	is	a	conceptual	component:	reliable	symbolic	practices	
allow	us	to	distinguish	between	real	facts	of	nature	and	artifacts.	This	is	the	
component	that	accounts	for	the	non-accidentality	of	success	and	it	depends	on	the	
adoption	of	strategies	to	enhance	reliability.	Applying	symbolic	practices	to	multiple	
cases,	relating	them	with	other,	better	understood,	sets	of	practices	(e.g.,	by	showing	
structure	similarities),	generalizing	solution	methods,	simplifying	computation	
procedures,	introducing	redundant	check	routines,	improving	the	symbolic	notation,	
multiplying	proof	procedures	are	just	a	few	examples	of	strategies	used	to	ensure	that	
the	result	of	symbolic	manipulation	is	a	real	information	and	not	an	artifact	generated	
by	the	practice	itself. 	Finally,	there	is	a	historical	component.	As	I	said	above,	4
deployment	is	a	process	extended	over	time.	When	are	we	justi=ied	to	consider	a	
result	as	reliable?	This	is	an	agent-	and	a	context-dependent	component	of	reliability.	
	This	component	of	the	concept	of	reliability	is	closely	connected	with	the	usual	4
notion	of	robustness	(see,	e.g.,	(Soler	et	al.	2012)	for	an	overview).	Indeed,	robustness	
has	to	do	with	the	multiplications	of	methods	of	check	and	control	as	a	way	to	
distinguish	what	is	real	and	what	is	fabricated	by	practices.
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I	submit	that	this	component	can	be	clari=ied	in	terms	of	control.	We	develop	theories	
because	we	need	to	manipulate	symbols	in	order	to	make	predictions	and	
explanations.	It	is	reasonable	to	state	that	an	agent	considers	reliable	a	theory	when	
she	has	control	on	it,	when	she	knows	how	to	do	things,	where	the	theory	can	be	
applied,	to	what	extent,	what	kind	of	information	she	can	obtain,	what	kind	of	
epistemic	risks	are	involved	in	it,	how	to	improve	progressively	the	performance	and	
a	lot	of	other	things	related	to	the	general	idea	of	knowing	what	is	going	on.	Thus,	
reliability	can	change	over	time	in	virtue	of	new	information	and	further	inquiry.	This	
component	accounts	for	the	fact	that	science	is	an	ongoing	human	endeavor.	
To	sum	up,	I	propose	to	extend	SelRealism	in	the	following	way:	
(SelRealism+)	We	are	entitled	to	consider	the	TP	H	as	true	or	approximately	true	at	
time	t	if	and	only	if:	
1. H	is	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	S	
2. S	is	reliable	
3. H	and	S	lead	to	signi=icant	success	
This	is	a	more	selective	version	of	SelRealism,	because	the	philosophical	and	
historiographical	program	stemming	from	it	extends	the	inquiry	to	the	strategies	
adopted	to	improve	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	and	the	contingent	conditions	
for	control.	As	stated	in	condition	3,	the	units	of	analysis	of	SelRealism+	are	TPs-cum-
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practices	rather	than	TPs	only.	In	the	following	section,	I	provide	an	example	of	what	I	
mean	by	intensive	and	extensive	deployment.	
4. The	Coming	of	Age	of	Perturbation	Theory	
The	Principia	Mathematica	are	a	supreme	example	of	how	to	embed	a	TP,	in	this	case	
the	gravitational	law,	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices. 	However,	Newton’s	mainly	5
geometrical	methods	were	fantastically	complicated	and	notoriously	dif=icult	to	
master.	A	signi=icant	breakthrough	in	what	came	to	be	called	celestial	mechanics	
happened	in	the	mid-1740s,	when	Leonhard	Euler	laid	down	the	foundations	of	
analytical	perturbation	theory.	Euler	made	a	number	of	decisive	steps	forward.	First,	
he	used	the	gravitational	law	to	formulate	general	equations	of	motion	for	celestial	
problems.	Second,	he	introduced	the	use	of	trigonometric	series	to	construct	
approximate	solutions.	The	use	of	these	series	also	depended	crucially	on	the	
gravitational	law,	because	it	satis=ied	the	assumption	that	planetary	orbits,	even	
under	perturbations,	can	be	represented	by	a	combination	of	periodic	functions.	
Finally	he	introduced	manipulation	practices	such	as	the	method	of	the	variation	of	
	In	what	follows,	I	consider	perturbation	theory	as	the	set	of	practices	conceived	to	5
put	to	work	the	gravitational	law.	It	must	be	noted	that	other	TPs	were	involved	(e.g.,	
Newton’s	laws	of	dynamics)	and	that	the	gravitational	law	can	be	decomposed	in	
further	assumptions	such	as	the	action-at-a-distance,	the	instantaneous	propagation	
and	so	forth.	These	considerations	affect	the	level	of	detail	of	my	example,	but	not	the	
structure	of	my	argument.
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constants	and	the	method	of	successive	approximations	to	solve	the	equations	of	
motion.	Perturbation	theory	is	therefore	a	clear	example	of	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	
conceived	to	cast	a	TP	into	a	manipulable	form	and	to	applied	it	to	speci=ic	problems.	
For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	I	distinguish	two	phases	in	the	early	history	of	
perturbation	theory.	The	=irst	phase	goes	roughly	from	the	mid-1740s	to	the	
mid-1760s	and	it	concerns	the	cause	of	numerous	astronomical	anomalies.	Newton	
had	left	behind	a	few	conundrums	that	even	his	genius	was	unable	to	unravel.	The	
most	conspicuous	of	these	problems	was	the	precession	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	
Newton's	Lunar	theory,	elaborated	in	Book	I	and	III	of	the	Principia	only	managed	to	
obtain	half	of	the	observed	value.	In	the	1740s,	there	were	two	approaches	to	the	
issue	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	The	analytical	approach	adopted	the	gravitational	law,	or	a	
slightly	modi=ied	form	of	it,	and	tried	to	calculate	the	observed	precession	by	
analytical	methods	only.	The	physical	approach	supposed	that	the	observed	
anomalies	could	be	due	to	material	causes	such	as	a	resisting	medium	or	
interplanetary	vortices.	It	is	important	to	realize	that	these	approaches	were	
compatible.	Euler	himself	supported	both	the	resisting	medium	hypothesis	and	the	
analytical	approach	and	occasionally	also	proposed	the	use	of	vortices	(letter	to	
Clairaut,	30	September	1747).	For	several	years,	the	best	mathematicians	of	Europe	
struggled	with	the	riddle	of	the	Lunar	apogee		(Bodenmann	2010)	until,	on	21	
January	1749,	Alexis	Clairaut	showed	that	if	one	pushes	the	approximation	to	the	
second	order	of	the	perturbation,	some	terms	that	are	negligible	at	the	=irst	order	
become	sizable	and	generate	the	missing	half	of	the	precession	(Clairaut	1752).	
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Clairaut’s	success	was	surely	an	impressive	breakthrough,	but	what	made	it	so	
impactful	was	not	the	brute	fact	that	gravitational	law	had	eventually	led	to	a	
successful	explanation.	Physical	hypotheses	such	as	vortices	and	resisting	medium	
also	provided	an	explanation	of	the	observed	precession.	The	crucial	difference	lies	in	
the	fact	that	the	gravitational	law	could	be	fully	integrated	with	the	analytical	
practices	and	then	manipulated	to	provide	suitable	symbolic	expressions	of	the	
precession	of	the	apogee.	That	did	not	happen	with	the	physical	hypotheses,	although	
not	for	lack	of	trying.	Euler,	for	instance,	tried	hard	to	integrate	the	hypothesis	of	the	
resisting	medium	in	perturbation	theory,	but	the	ensuing	equations	of	motion	were	
simply	unmanageable	(Euler	1747).	Clairaut’s	success	is	eminently	a	story	of	
intensive	use	of	the	gravitational	law:	he	managed	to	integrate	it	with	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices	and	to	accommodate	effectively	the	observations.	
Clairaut’s	feat	did	not	close	the	debate	on	the	gravitational	law,	tough.	His	calculations	
used	many	case-based	assumptions,	simpli=ications,	and	shortcuts	and	its	
straightforward	extension	to	more	complex	cases,	such	as	the	behavior	of	Jupiter	and	
Saturn,	was	doubtful	to	say	the	least.	But	there	was	also	a	deeper	problem.	At	some	
point	in	his	analysis,	Clairaut	obtained	an	“arc	of	circle”,	i.e.,	a	trigonometric	function	
multiplied	by	time.	Such	terms	are	obviously	unbounded	and	hence	make	the	whole	
trigonometric	series	diverge.	Clairaut	got	rid	of	it	by	ad-hoc	assumptions,	but	the	
status	of	these	unbounded	terms	remained	unclear:	they	could	represent	an	artifact	
of	the	theory,	a	limitation	of	its	predictive	power	or	even	a	dynamical	instability	of	the	
system.		
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Soon,	the	problem	of	the	arcs	of	circle	become	more	troublesome.	Euler	found	the	
same	terms	in	his	analysis	of	the	motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	and	in	1766	Lagrange	
proved	that	they	are	actually	a	necessary	consequence	of	the	method	of	successive	
approximations	applied	to	astronomical	problems	(Lagrange	1766).	Thus,	in	the	
mid-1760s,	perturbation	theory	appeared	to	be	a	fragile	set	of	practices	which	had	
scored	some	important	success,	but	was	still	marred	with	problems	of	unreliability	
under	certain	conditions.	From	the	late	1760s	onwards,	the	issue	of	improving	the	
robustness	of	perturbation	theory	became	a	central	preoccupation	of	the	leading	
mathematicians	interested	in	physical	astronomy.	
There	were	two	programs	inspired	by	this	issue.	On	the	one	hand,	Lagrange	tried	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	methods	as	a	mathematical	theory.	He	carried	
out	this	project	by	means	of	multiple	strategies:	(1)	enhancing	the	relation	between	
perturbation	theory	and	other	branches	of	mathematics	(e.g.,	potential	theory);	(2)	
elaborating	arguments	to	extract	information	from	the	equations	of	motion	without	
solving	them	(e.g.,	by	using	integrals	of	motion);	(3)	improving	methods	to	simplify	
the	solution	procedure	(e.g.,	Lagrange’s	coordinates);	(4)	introducing	new	symbolic	
codi=ications	to	manipulate	the	equations	of	motion	(e.g.,	the	perturbing	function);	(5)	
making	the	notation	less	cumbersome	(Lagrange’s	coef=icients).	Around	the	same	
years,	Laplace	was	also	working	to	improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	theory,	but	
his	program	adopted	a	different	approach.	He	concentrated	on	methods	to	make	
perturbation	theory	a	more	reliable	problem-solving	tool.		He	developed	his	own	
method	to	eliminate	the	arcs	of	circle—which	was	based	on	the	recalculation	of	the	
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integration	constants—he	imported	probability	theory	and	the	equations	of	condition	
to	deal	with	astronomical	observations	and	devised	several	strategies	to	identify	in	
concrete	cases	those	elements	of	the	equations	of	motion	that	were	likely	to	produce	
sizable	perturbation	terms	at	higher	order.	Both	Lagrange’s	and	Laplace’s	programs	
scored	their	own	successes.	In	the	early	1780s,	Lagrange	proved	a	very	general	result	
of	stability	according	to	which	the	three	more	important	orbital	elements	(mean	
motion,	eccentricity,	and	inclination)	are	invariable	or	bounded	(Lagrange	1781).	
Laplace,	on	his	part,	explained	the	decades-long	problems	of	the	anomaly	in	the	
motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	as	well	as	the	secular	acceleration	of	the	Moon	(Laplace	
1785,	1787;	Wilson	1985).		
5. Conclusions	
In	several	places,	Kyle	Stanford	has	argued	that	any	selection	of	enduring	TPs	is	
ultimately	ungrounded	and,	consequently,	the	entire	SelRealism	program	is	unviable	
(Stanford	2003,	2006).	In	his	view,	there	are	two	possible	ways	to	select	essential	TPs.	
The	=irst	way	is	to	trust	scientists	when	they	say	that	a	certain	posit	is	fundamental.	
However,	neither	commonsense,	nor,	more	importantly,	historical	records	support	the	
hypothesis	that	scientists’	take	on	this	matter	is	or	should	be	particularly	reliable.	The	
other	option	is	to	wait	and	see:	when	a	theory	is	superseded,	one	can	check	which	TPs	
have	survived.	The	reason	why	a	selective	realist	cannot	go	with	this	option,	however,	
has	been	summarized	effectively	by	Peter	Vickers:	
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If	we	cannot	identify	the	working	posits	of	a	theory	until	it	has	been	superseded	
by	some	other	theory,	then	realism	is	no	longer	about	identifying	what	we	ought	
to	believe	to	be	true:	one	is	always	waiting	for	the	next	theory	to	come	along	to	
tell	us	which	parts	of	our	current	theory	are	working	posits.	(Vickers	2013,	207)	
From	this,	Stanford	concludes	that	SelRealism	without	prospectively	applicable	
selectivity	criteria	is	empty	and	should	be	replaced	by	a	more	modest	form	of	realism.	
But	Stanford’s	wait-and-see	stance	is	neither	necessary	nor	suf=icient	to	do	the	job	it	
is	supposed	to	do,	i.e.,	to	pick	out	essential	TPs.	It	is	not	suf=icient	because	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	the	TPs	survived	one	theory	change	will	survive	the	next	ones.	It	is	not	
necessary	because	we	do	not	need	the	next	theory	to	form	reasonable	judgements	
about	essential	TPs.	As	I	have	shown	above,	science	provides	a	variety	of	strategies	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	the	TP-cum-practices	and	hence	good	reasons	to	believe,	
within	the	actual	theory,	that	a	certain	TP	intensively	and	extensively	deployed	is	in	
fact	essential.		
From	this	perspective,	Stanford’s	argument	simply	sets	the	epistemic	bar	too	high.	By	
stating	that	the	essentiality	of	a	TP	can	be	adjudicated	only	from	the	vantage	point	of	
the	superseding	theory,	he	implicitly	challenges	the	realist	to	provide	a	
“superselection	rule”	able	to	capture	the	whole	history	of	science,	a	task	that	the	
realist	is	neither	willing,	nor	actually	requested	to	accomplish.	By	contrast,	the	
historical	and	philosophical	program	of	SelRealism+	moves	from	the	conviction	that	
TPs	and	symbolic	practices	follow	a	dynamics	able	to	=ilter	out	inessential	
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components.	Consequently,	SelRealism+	is	committed	to	historically	identify	and	
philosophically	analyze	this	dynamics	and	to	trace	the	genealogy	of	our	theories	in	
terms	of	the	processes	of	codi=ication,	manipulation,	and	stabilization	of	TPs.	
Ultimately,	this	program	aims	at	producing	new	and	interesting	historical	narratives	
of	theory	change.	It	remains	true	that	the	strategies	making	up	the	theoretical	
dynamics	only	provide	good	reasons	to	allocate	the	realist	commitment.	It	might	
happen	that	the	judgement	on	the	reliability	of	the	TPs-cum-practices	change	over	
time	in	virtue	of	further	inquiry	or	new	information.	This	fact,	as	stated	above,	follows	
from	the	fallibility	of	science	as	a	human	endeavor	and,	as	such,	should	not	trouble	
the	realist.	
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Duhemian good sense and agent reliabilism 
 
Famously, according to Duhem a hypothesis can never be experimentally tested in 
isolation, but only along with the entire theoretical scaffolding it comes with. So in the face of 
disagreement between theory and experiment, it is impossible to point out which hypotheses in 
the theory are flawed. A big question for Duhem was, how does the physicist act in such a 
situation of underdetermination? Which hypotheses does s/he discard, and which one(s) does 
s/he retain? Duhem’s response was that the physicist possesses an intuitive “good sense” that 
directs this choice. Although good sense does not provide a rigorous, rule-based template for 
theory choice
1
, it allows scientists to weigh evidence and be “fair and impartial” (Duhem, 218) in 
theory choice. 
 
Recently, there has been much interest in drawing parallels between Duhem’s good sense 
and ideas in virtue epistemology (VE). VE emerged in the 1980s as an approach to epistemology 
based on virtue ethics. In the words of Greco (2004): “Just as virtue theories in ethics try to 
understand the normative properties of actions in terms of the normative properties of moral 
agents, virtue epistemology tries to understand the normative properties of beliefs in terms of the 
normative properties of cognitive agents.” A virtue epistemological reading of good sense as first 
advanced by David Stump (2007) is based on the idea that Duhem too emphasized the normative 
properties of the scientist qua cognitive agent and took them as a basis for legitimate scientific 
                                                
1
 While “theory choice” today is generally understood in the context of contrastive underdetermination, Duhem was 
primarily concerned with the holist variety of underdetermination and advanced good sense in the context of the 
latter. But for the purposes of this paper the distinction will not matter, and I shall use “theory choice” to refer to 
underdetermination in general, as do all the authors I reference. 
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knowledge in the face of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Stump finds striking 
similarities particularly between Duhemian good sense and Linda Zagzebski’s (1996) views of 
VE. Here, I discuss the views of Stump, Milena Ivanova (2010), and Abrol Fairweather (2012) in 
this regard and ultimately propose my own view in response which is an agent-reliabilist reading 
of Duhem’s good sense. 
 
Stump argues that Duhem conceived of good sense in a way that can today be understood 
as virtue theoretic. In particular, Stump finds similarities between good sense and ideas of VE 
put forward by Zagzebski (1996). As Stump tells us, Zagzebski argued that justified belief comes 
from a “cluster of intellectual virtues in the same way that the rightness of an act can be defined 
in terms of moral virtue in ethical theory”(Stump, 151). Stump argues that Duhem’s good sense 
nicely fits in with these ideas. Good sense depends on the scientist, the cognitive agent, being 
“virtuous”: s/he has to be, in the words of Duhem quoting Claude Bernard, a “faithful and 
impartial judge”. Stump further provides another illuminating quote from Duhem from his 
lectures on German science: 
 
“In the realm of every science, but more particularly in the realm of history, the pursuit of the truth not 
only requires intellectual abilities, but also calls for moral qualities: rectitude, probity, detachment 
from all interest and all passions. (Duhem, 1991b, p. 43)” (Stump, p. 152). 
 
Stump notes that some of the epistemic virtues put forward by Zagzebski include 
intellectual sobriety, impartiality and intellectual courage and the list fits very well with 
Duhem’s. Yet another striking similarity between Zagzebski and Duhem according to Stump is 
that they both appeal to non-rule-governed epistemology. Zagzebski, in making a case for an 
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epistemology based on ethics, says, “The idea is that there can be no complete set of rules 
sufficient for giving a determinate answer to the question of what an agent should do in every 
situation of moral choice.” (Stump, 152) Similarly, Duhem arrives at the idea of good sense 
when the rule-based epistemology of the physical method (i.e. strict agreement between theory 
and experiment) fails. As Stump says, 
 
“Holism threatens to make testing impossible, yet Duhem believes that scientific consensus will 
emerge. While the pure logic of the testing situation leaves theory choice open, good sense does not. 
Duhem claims that the history of science shows that while there is controversy in science, there is also 
closure of scientific debates.” (Stump, 155) 
 
Milena Ivanova (2010) has argued in response to Stump, that the latter is mistaken in 
drawing such close parallels between VE and Duhem’s good sense. She raises two main 
objections: first, while VE is concerned with getting to the truth via epistemic virtues, for 
Duhem, physical theory only asymptotically approaches truth – truth here being the truth of a 
natural order, of the “real affinities” among things. Ivanova makes this point keeping in mind 
Duhem’s view of a ‘perfect theory’ and the convergent nature of his realism: for Duhem, the aim 
of physical theory was to classify experimental laws, and a physical theory – one picked out by 
good sense in the face of underdetermination – constantly approached but never reached, a 
perfect theory which classified laws and their phenomena in exactly the way underlying 
metaphysical realities are really classified in nature. So her point is that while VE is concerned 
with getting to the truth, good sense doesn’t help us with that. But as Ivanova herself points out,  
 
“Still, in response to this objection one can adopt the weaker thesis that even though natural 
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classification may not reveal the truth about the unobservable, it will be true for the observable 
phenomena. Also, one may argue that it is legitimate to aim at a particular epistemic goal 
independently of whether this goal is achievable or not.” (62) 
  
I take her point here to be that both VE and good sense are after all in the business of truth-
seeking even though attaining the truth may be impossible for with the latter. 
 
Ivanova’s more forceful objection has to do with epistemic justification. According to her 
whereas VE takes epistemic virtues to be justifications for beliefs, Duhem did not invoke the 
concept of good sense to justify belief in one theory over another. (To reiterate, Duhem did not 
have a full-blown metaphysical notion of truth of a theory – but worked with the surrogate idea 
of truth, that a right theory approaches a transcendental, natural classification.) Rather, she 
argues, good sense for Duhem was more a post hoc explanation of the physicist’s choice: it 
explains the repeated success of theories at making novel predictions. According to Ivanova, 
what really justified belief in a theory for Duhem – i.e. the belief that it was approaching a 
natural classification – was the success of the theory in making correct novel predictions: She 
says that for Duhem, “[a scientist] is justified in believing that a theory is a natural classification 
only when some empirical evidence supports it or when the theory has become a ‘prophet for us’ 
(Duhem, 27), that is, when it has managed to make novel predictions.” (Ivanova, 62). Here’s 
Ivanova’s argument broken down: 
- Physical theory is a classification of laws.  
- In a situation where we have a theory that contradicts experimental data and are left 
without any means within physics to decide what to do - whether to tweak parts of the 
theory to accommodate the available experimental data – and if so, which parts to tweak 
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– or to abandon it for another theory. Somehow in the end, the scientist decides which 
way to go.  
- The “highest test” for physical theory is to ask it to make new and novel experimental 
predictions.  
- When the theory succeeds it is justified – in that it is taken to approach a natural 
classification. 
- Repeatedly, the scientist sees her/his choices made in the difficult situation of 
underdetermination emerging successful in such predictions.  
- How does this happen? There must be some innate ability or virtue in the scientist that 
enables him to do this: good sense. 
 
Thus according to Ivanova, good sense is an explanation of theory choice rather than a 
justification for it. Moreover, according to her, Duhem doesn’t say anything about good sense as 
a method of science: he doesn’t tell us how exactly it directs our choice. His account of how 
good sense comes about and works to direct theory choice is quite thin. For Ivanova, this further 
shows that Duhem did not introduce it as a justification but only as a post hoc explanation. 
 
 Abrol Fairweather (2012) has argued against Ivanova’s above objection and has 
attempted a position on Duhemian good sense that is a hybrid of Ivanova’s and Stump’s views. 
Fairweather claims to draw upon an agent reliabilist VE to do this. Reliabilism in Alvin 
Goldman’s words,  “… as a distinctive approach to knowledge is restricted to theories that 
involve truth-promoting factors above and beyond the truth of the target proposition.” (Goldman, 
2011) Fairweather’s argument is that good sense results in a reliable process. Since Duhem’s 
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claim is that good sense has a great “track record” and always picks out a successful theory – i.e. 
a theory which inevitably correctly makes a novel prediction – good sense produces knowledge 
(which here in the Duhemian context, consists in taking a predictively successful theory to be 
approaching a natural classification) by a reliable process. Good sense is a ‘truth-promoting 
factor’ regardless of whether the theory it picks out ultimately succeeds in novel prediction or 
not. It is “tracking evidentially important features of theories” (Fairweather, 10) Fairweather 
claims that “If a belief P is the product of a reliable capacity or process this fact constitutes 
evidence in favor of P.”  This implies, “If the products of good sense reliably turn out to be 
supported by compelling new evidence, then being the product of good sense will be evidence 
for any theory with such a distinguished etiology.” (Fairweather, 10) So, Fairweather says, it 
seems that “future evidence is not required to evidentially distinguish the theory chosen by good 
sense, because the reliability of good sense is itself evidence supporting that theory.” 
(Fairweather, 10) While I agree that agent reliabilism is the best way to understand good sense, 
Fairweather does not seem to give an accurate interpretation of this reading. Although he claims 
to provide an agent reliabilist reading of good sense, he grounds the reliability of good sense in 
its track record and not in its own nature or the mind where it is born. This is antithetical to agent 
reliabilist VE which situates reliability in the cognitive character of the agent. So it seems that 
Fairweather’s characterization is more along the lines of process reliabilism or simple reliabilism 
– according to which a belief is justified just in case it is formed via reliable processes – rather 
than agent reliabilism, and hence contrary to what he set out to do. His argument does not help 
situate good sense back into VE. Let us now turn to agent reliabilism in detail. 
 
Greco and Agent Reliabilism: A Short Detour 
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 As above, simple reliabilism is the view that a belief is justified just in case it is formed 
via reliable processes. Here the proportion of true beliefs the process results in, over time, 
measures reliability. Greco (1999) argues that simple reliabilism is insufficient for two reasons:  
1. An agent might form a belief via fleeting or strange processes: Greco starts by noting that 
“Reliabilism must somehow restrict the kind of reliable process that is able to ground 
knowledge, so as to rule out processes that are strange or fleeting.” (Greco, 286) As an 
example of such processes, Greco discusses Platinga’s “The case of the epistemically 
serendipitous lesion” where an agent has a rare kind of a brain lesion, one that makes her 
believe that she has a brain lesion. There is no evidence for the lesion: there no 
symptoms, no testimony etc.; in fact there might even be a lot of evidence against it. But 
the agent is unable to take account of this (lack of) evidence due to the lesion. The 
relevant cognitive process here must no doubt be deemed very reliable, but we would not 
want to take the resulting belief as justified.  
2. Process reliabilism doesn’t guarantee that the agent has a subjective justification of her 
belief. Greco says,  
“[there] is a powerful intuition that knowledge does require that the knower have some kind of 
sensitivity to the reliability of her evidence. Sometimes this intuition is expressed by insisting 
that knowledge requires subjective justification. It is not enough that one's belief is formed in a 
way that is objectively reliable; one's belief must be formed in a way that is subjectively 
appropriate as well.” (285)  
 
 Greco’s solution to the above problems is agent reliabilism. According to agent 
reliabilism, reliability is shifted from the belief-forming process to the qualities of the agent’s 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -662-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -41-
mind: 
“Relevant to present purposes is Sosa's suggestion for a restriction on reliable cognitive processes; it is 
those processes that have their bases in the stable and successful dispositions of the believer that are 
relevant for knowledge and justification. Just as the moral rightness of an action can be understood in 
terms of the stable dispositions or character of the moral agent, the epistemic rightness of a belief can 
be understood in terms of the intellectual character of the cognizer.” (Greco, 287) 
Following Sosa’s views, Greco proposes that “knowledge and justified belief are grounded in 
stable and reliable cognitive character.”(Greco, 287) Accordingly, “We may now explicitly revise 
simple reliabilism as follows: A belief p has positive epistemic status for a person S just in case 
S's believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S's cognitive character.” 
(Greco, 287) Hence we see that reliability now has little to do with the truth of the resultant 
belief(s) but rather with the cognitive character of the agent. 
 Greco proceeds to show how agent reliabilism also solves the problem of subjective 
justification: 
VJ: “A belief p is subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having knowledge) if 
and only if S's believing p is grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking 
conscientiously.” (289)  
By “thinking conscientiously”, Greco clarifies that he does not mean thinking with the purpose 
of finding truth, but rather the “usual state that people are in as a kind of a default mode – the 
state of trying to form beliefs accurately.” Greco contrasts this with epistemic “vices” such as 
trying to comfort oneself or trying to seek attention. Lastly, Greco points out that agent 
reliabilism reverses the “usual direction of analysis between virtuous character and justified 
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belief”. While non virtue theoretic epistemologies understand virtues in terms of justified belief, 
here justified belief is being cached out in terms of virtues of the cognizer. “Virtuous belief is 
associated with the dispositions a person manifests when she is sincerely trying to believe what 
is true”, and “The dispositions that a person manifests when she is thinking conscientiously are 
stable properties of her character, and are therefore in an important sense hers.” (Greco, 290) 
Therefore, a belief formed this way will be subjectively appropriate.  
Back to Duhem 
 Duhem’s views seem to exhibit all the features of agent reliabilism discussed above. In 
addition to the features of good sense and the physicist qua cognitive agent discussed so far I 
want to draw the reader’s attention to Duhem’s characterization of the different kinds of minds. 
For Duhem, the “strong and the narrow” mind is one capable of ordering and organizing laws 
and hypotheses into theories, and the “supple” mind or the “mind with finesse” – one capable of 
grasping a wide range of objects and at the same time able to group them logically – is the mind 
that produces good sense. This certainly seems to talk of  “stable dispositions” in Greco’s sense 
of the term, that reflect the “cognitive character” of the scientist. Duhem takes pains to carefully 
describe the mind of the physicist and discuss beliefs and attitudes in terms of cognitive character 
traits and not the other way round. i.e. Duhem talks of legitimacy of beliefs in terms of cognitive 
character traits; he does not talk of the traits or “epistemic virtues” so to speak, in terms of the 
validity of beliefs. For instance, he says about those not interested in seeing a unified system of 
classification erected, “Only those who affect a hatred of intellectual strength were mistaken to 
the extent of taking the scaffolding for a completed building.” (Duhem, 103) There are several 
such instances where Duhem turns traditional non virtue-theoretic epistemology on its head and 
makes cognitive character traits basic. Now it remains to be seen if we can defend a view of 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -664-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -43-
justification from good sense that goes with Greco’s account. If we are successful in this, 
Ivanova’s position will be untenable. Before going there though, let us return to Fairweather for 
a moment. 
In addition to the argument from reliabilism, Fairweather advances another argument 
against Ivanova’s “deflation of good sense”: the position that good sense does not lend any 
epistemic strength or any justification to the chosen theory. The argument is that if good sense 
were indeed merely explanatory and post hoc as Ivanova claims, and not justificatory, then we 
are free to imagine a case where good sense doesn’t intervene at all. After all, if good sense 
explains theory choice and there is no choice being made – i.e. no explanandum -  we don’t need 
an explanation. So let us suppose that we don’t make any choice and just wait for a future novel 
prediction to make a choice and justify it. This might not be the most efficient way to choose a 
theory, but let us assume we do this nevertheless – for according to Fairweather, Ivanova’s 
objection should imply the possibility of this solution. Fairweather rightly points out that in this 
situation we might again end up with an underdetermination: what if all competing theories pass 
the novel prediction test? Therefore, Fairweather argues, good sense must play an important 
epistemic role above mere explanation, in the face of such a “second level” underdetermiantion. 
But he goes further than that and says that without it, we would never end up with a determinate 
choice, even with new confirming evidence. What Fairweather is ignoring here is that future 
evidence could pick out a theory, however small the probability. It is possible that when all the 
options resulting from underdetermination are asked to make a novel prediction, only one 
succeeds, hence obviating the need for any further theory revision. But the important point is that 
good sense enters the scene even before such an attempt to single out a theory based on novel 
prediction. So the merit of good sense in my view does not lie in the inability of novel 
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predictions to single out a theory. It is more fundamental than that. But reasons for meriting good 
sense apart, let us again look at Fairweather’s take on what the merit of good sense is. 
 
According to Fairweather, good sense confers uniqueness to a theory (which, according 
to him, no future evidence can confer). But after good sense has uniquely picked out a theory, it 
is a successful novel prediction that counts as evidence in favor of the chosen theory. Fairweather 
makes the following interesting observation that follows from such a reading of good sense:  
 
“This shows an interesting fact that new evidence in favor of a theory gives it a different epistemic 
standing depending on whether we are considering it alongside or independent of meaningful rivals. In 
the former case, new confirming evidence does not make a theory the determinate choice with 
fundamental epistemic standing. In the latter case, that same evidence determines theory choice and 
confers fundamental epistemic standing.” (Fairweather, 13) 
 
So there are two “epistemic values and epistemic standings”: uniqueness, which comes from 
good sense, and clinching evidential support from a successful novel prediction. This way, good 
sense alone does not confer “fundamental epistemic standing”, and evidence alone cannot confer 
uniqueness. This account which recognizes an important epistemic role for both good sense and 
new evidence, Fairweather calls the “hybrid reading”. 
 
My own view is that while Fairweather is right in that good sense plays a key epistemic 
role unlike what Ivanova says, we can go back full circle to Stump and have a proper virtue 
epistemological – specifically agent reliabilist – reading of good sense. I contend that good sense 
confers not just uniqueness, but actually does determine theory choice, also providing (an agent-
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reliabilist) justification. Good sense doesn’t simply pick one and put the rest “out of the 
running”. It is not just something that prevents the proliferation of acceptable theories obtained 
by tweaking different parts of theories that don’t agree with future experiment. Good sense 
provides a basis for the uniqueness. Just as with the problem of coming up with a realist 
interpretation of Duhem, this problem of the epistemic role of good sense is not easy either given 
the sometimes confusing nature of Duhem’s claims. Nonetheless, I still think an agent-reliabilist 
VE reading of Duhem is possible and that Ivanova and Fairweather are mistaken. 
 
Ivanova claims that good sense is only offered as a post hoc explanation of theory choice 
during underdetermination and not as a justification. I argue to the contrary. Ivanova’s claim 
seems to be based on a purely externalist notion of justification. It seems to assume that there is 
one single concept of justification – specifically, externalist, evidential – and that good sense 
doesn’t fit with it. But justification can be of many kinds. Duhem says we can “very properly 
decide” (Duhem, 217) between multiple theory choices using good sense. Further, he says good 
sense strongly “comes out in favor of” one of the choices – again implying that we are compelled 
to accept its judgment even before future experiment can ratify the choice. He goes on to say, 
“Pure logic is not the only rule for our judgments; certain opinions which do not fall under the 
hammer of contradiction are in any case perfectly unreasonable." (Duhem, 217) How do we 
understand such language? If an epistemic choice is proper, forceful, and reasonable, I don’t see 
any reason we cannot properly construe it as being justified, in an internalist sense.  
 
Further, Duhem does not introduce good sense as a merely post hoc explanation. He says, 
we can “properly decide” between the various options of theories using good sense. “Properly 
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decide” very much implies an active role for good sense during underdetermination. Duhem 
presents elaborate and careful characterizations of different kinds of minds and puts forward 
quite clearly, normative merits of cultivating/ possessing one kind of mind over the other as far 
as physics goes (the supple or the strong and narrow over the ample, broad and weak).  Good 
sense is but a feature of the supple mind. It is not introduced all of a sudden as a new idea to just 
“save the (meta)phenomenon” of theory choice during underdetermination. It is a smooth and 
natural continuation of Duhem’s views on the mind of the theorist, which he articulates way 
before he comes to this problem of underdetermination, in one of the early chapters in Aim and 
Structure.  In fact, Duhem’s view that physicists don’t actually actively choose hypotheses at all, 
and that they “come to his mind” when his mind is ready to receive them, clearly reveals the 
agent reliabilist in Duhem. 
 
Finally, Greco’s account of agent reliabilist justification seems to lend itself to Duhem 
very well. Reliable cognitive character justifies beliefs it produces and further, it is subjectively 
justified: Duhem’s virtuous scientist certainly “thinks conscientiously”, following Duhem’s 
instructions of shunning passions and interests, and so a belief, here the belief in the theory 
chosen, grounded in the cognitive dispositions, here good sense, he manifests when thinking like 
this – is subjectively justified. So we seem to have comfortably accommodated Duhem in a full-
blown agent reliabilist reading. 
 
But what about the textual evidence cited by Ivanova, which seems to say Duhem did not 
think good sense justified theory choice? Why does Duhem insist that despite good sense, it is a 
successful novel prediction that has the final word? Why does he, in the context of resolving 
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underdetermination say in as many words that the method of the physicist “is justified only by 
experiment”? I contend that throughout Aim and Structure, Duhem seems to have two distinct, 
non-intersecting epistemologies: one of physics, and one outside of physics – which we may call 
philosophy. Duhem was a physicist-philosopher. He frequently claims that although there are 
absolutely no epistemic resources within physics for us to believe that physical theory latches on 
to a natural underlying order, we are forced to believe so by various factors outside of physics, 
logic and reason. It is worth noting that Duhem cites Pascal as saying that we sometimes believe 
for ‘reasons that reason does not know’, both in the context of theories converging on to a natural 
classification as well as in that of good sense during underdetermination. About the former, he 
says: “The opinion is a legitimate one because it results from an innate feeling of ours which we 
cannot justify by purely logical considerations, but which we cannot stifle completely either.” 
(Duhem, 102) Further:  
 
“No language is precise enough and flexible enough to define and formulate them; and yet, the truths 
which this common sense reveals are so clear and so certain that we cannot either mistake them or cast 
doubt on them; furthermore, all scientific clarity and certainty are a reflection of the clarity and an 
extension of the certainty of these common-sense truths.” (Duhem, 104) 
 
 Since Duhem attributes good sense to similar patterns of thinking, we can associate his 
above assertions about the legitimacy of beliefs not borne out of logic, with good sense as well. 
Given Duhem’s commitment to the moral goodness and the intellectual acuity of the supple, 
strong and narrow minds, it is very unlikely that he would think that epistemic ends justify the 
means (here, successful novel prediction justifying that which chose the theory, i.e. good sense). 
Reliabilism in fact expressly turns this around and say it is the means (by virtue of their 
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reliability) that justify the ends. So beliefs that arise from good sense are justified from an 
(internalist, deontological) agent reliabilist perspective. The justification Duhem talks about 
when he says that the methods of the physicist are justified by experiment should be when we are 
strictly within the context of physics: there it is Duhem qua physicist speaking. But from a 
broader, philosophical perspective, Duhem rather means, I think, that experiment validates the 
choice and confers certainty on it. But we can have justification without certainty, like in agent 
reliabilism. In simpler terms, the reasons for which the physicist chooses a theory are grounded 
in her good sense. However, the successful novel prediction will no doubt make the choice 
certain. 
 
Thus, Ivanova is mistaken in arguing that good sense does not provide justification. 
Fairweather’s hybrid reading is inadequate as well for it ignores the justification offered by a 
proper agent reliabilist reading of good sense. I argue that a proper agent reliabilism 
accommodates Duhem as a virtue epistemologist very well and shows us that good sense does 
offer justification for theory choice. Importantly, I have shown that it is certainly not a post hoc 
explanation but a part and parcel of Duhem’s overall views on the mind of the physicist. 
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There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation 
(Word count: 4998) 
 
Abstract: Callender and Cohen (2006) argue that there is no need for a special account of the 
constitution of scientific representation. I argue that scientific representation is communal 
and therefore deeply tied to the practice in which it is embedded. The communal nature is 
accounted for by licensing, the activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish a 
representation. A case study of the Lotka-Volterra model reveals how the licensure is a 
constitutive element of the representational relationship. Thus, any account of the 
constitution of scientific representation must account for licensing, meaning that there is a 
special problem of scientific representation.  
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1. Introduction 
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different 
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (2006), who argue that representation is the same across 
disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of scientific 
representation unexplained. To explain why scientific representation is dependent upon 
practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of representational 
vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists in accord with 
broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature of 
representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
2. Callender and Cohen’s View 
On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific representation has 
been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 67). Specifically, they think there is no reason for 
philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution question:” “What 
constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?” (2006, 68). In 
response to this question, they make a few observations. One is that it is “economical and 
natural to explain some types of representation in terms of other, more basic types of 
representation” (2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of 
how “entities other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent 
the very same targets that models represent” (2006, 71). For these reasons, they suggest that  
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“scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative representation” (2006, 
75). That is to say that the representational nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the 
same way that the representational nature of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In 
each case, and in every practice, the representational nature in question will be reduced to a 
more fundamental representational entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a 
painting, and a scientific model will each be explained in terms of the representational nature 
of mental states.  
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will 
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which delimit 
scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints are 
delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not a part 
of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the utility of 
these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that are 
representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se” (2006, 75). 
 If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive 
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there is 
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something special about representation in science.1 As one example among many, Mauricio 
Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His account 
takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation (what he 
calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be a scientific 
representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows competent and 
informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (2004, 773). If we accept 
Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many others like it do nothing 
more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies employed in delimiting 
representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).  
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation 
In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not been 
addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the 
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific 
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender and 
                                               
1
 For more accounts which answer the constitution question in a distinct way, see the work of 
Ronald Giere (1988, 2004), Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2008), RIG Hughes (1997), Steven 
French, James Ladyman, and Otávio Bueno (French and Ladyman 1999; Bueno and French 
2011), and Gabriele Contessa (2007). For an overview of these accounts of scientific 
representation among others, see Brandon Boesch (2015) and Mauricio Suárez (2015).  
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Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation, 
consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same 
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:2 
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A 
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and 
attributes some connection between X and Y.  
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of honeysuckle can 
be reminiscent of golfing, etc.  
 There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational nature 
of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental entities. 
For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of the mental 
state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it). Second, 
stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could draw a 
symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to buy bread from the store. 
The reminiscent relationship exists because of my stipulative act.  Finally, any limitations of 
reminiscent relationships will be made for pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for 
pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol on my hand look like a loaf of bread.  
                                               
2
 I should note that the account of reminiscence here is not meant as a detailed explanation of 
this concept, but only as an analogy to draw a point about representation.  
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 These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by 
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and Cohen’s 
perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the particular aims 
for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different aims alone are 
insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation and reminiscence: 
while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is necessarily communal. That 
reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that discussions of reminiscence can 
terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not 
someone is reminiscent of someone else. This is because reminiscence is agent-relative and 
so depends only upon some particular agent and her mental states.  
 Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued, “representation 
is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, and more 
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by 
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (2010, 99). 
Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is embedded. It is 
necessarily communal.3  The communal nature is demonstrated from the fact that 
representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and their mental 
                                               
3
 The view of representation argued for in this paper echoes many of the points made by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s in his ‘Private Language Argument’ where he argues that meaning is 
necessarily communal (1953/2009, 95e-111e).  
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states.4 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra model (which 
represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to genetic drift does not 
count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only because it does not 
(pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it ignores and discounts the 
autonomous elements of the model as understood by the broader scientific community.5 The 
autonomous elements are seen in the materiality or historicity of the representational vehicle; 
in its development, reception, and contemporary use. Understanding how and why the 
scientific object represents its target requires paying attention to these communal features. 
That is to say that the communal nature is partially constitutive of the representational 
relationship. Callender and Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently 
account for these constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below. 
4. Licensing 
Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention be given 
to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms of its 
                                               
4
 This point has already been made specifically with regard to models by Morrison and 
Morgan (1999). Here, I am extending a similar point to other representational vehicles,  
including things like diagrams and figures.  
5
 Of course, there may be disagreements and developments internal to the practice about how 
to use some representation, but these disagreements and developments are part of the 
practice.  
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development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific 
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of 
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a 
vehicle and its target. It is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship: it 
is a critical part in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing the 
sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the representational 
relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical development, reception, 
and use of actual instances of scientific representation.  
4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation 
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass on 
the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be helpful to draw an analogy to licensing in 
science.6 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an example. The 
mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of cyberbullying is 
clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how Guernica is 
representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s intentions within the 
environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was received by viewers in 
the years following its creation, and how it is understood today. With these features in mind, 
                                               
6
 It is somewhat contentious to draw conclusions about the nature of representation in science 
by appeal to art; see e.g. Bueno and French (2011). Nonetheless, it is a common technique in 
discussions of scientific representation; see e.g. Suárez (2004).  
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it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of the people of Guernica who had 
been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. 
The licensing here is a constitutive element of Guernica’s representational nature: without 
these features, it is not clear whether or how the painting would manage to represent anything 
at all. 
 Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic 
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not 
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the author 
Flannery O’Connor: 
[A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the significance of the 
Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant, but 
finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head.” (1988, 853) 
The Misfit is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to 
Find,” and, as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly 
representational. Her answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational 
target for the hat, there may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her 
authorial intent, but rather due to the views of the broader artistic community. 
 Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted 
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means of 
licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as if 
Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of Picasso, 
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audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding why it 
represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that there 
may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate one. A 
single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the target 
must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes as 
understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts are a 
critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat. 
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study 
The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is of a 
different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical role in 
establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of scientific 
representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a laborious art” 
(2014, 304).  Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the complexities of 
scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the complicated features 
seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any type of representational 
vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made by Bruno Latour (1999).  I 
will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its development exhibits interesting 
features, many of which have already been widely discussed by other philosophers (e.g. 
Knuuttila and Loettgers 2011, forthcoming).  
 As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent 
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different 
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scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of 
this model, it is important to pay attention to the licensing through its historical development. 
This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of the model by 
Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims. 
These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development reveal the partial 
autonomy of its representational nature. These features constitute the licensing which is itself 
partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model since understanding how and 
why the model represents its targets requires attending to these features. Let us now turn to 
examine these features in more detail. 
 Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by the 
goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in fishery 
statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 19). His aim to address a theoretical 
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the model 
historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider how 
Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description:  
Let us seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: 
afterwards let us translate these words into mathematical language. This leads 
to the formulation of differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be 
guided by the methods of analysis we are led much farther than the language 
and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry us and can formulate precise 
mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of observation. Rather 
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the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical results. 
(1928, 5)  
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of results (for 
both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to account for the 
population change of a single species. He then added additional species and modelled 
interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the same food and 
the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he demonstrated “three 
fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living together” (1928, 20). He then 
applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to the empirical case which had 
prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator populations during the decrease of fishing 
of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during World War I (1928, 21).  
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey 
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War I? 
It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and 
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims 
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature. 
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (forthcoming), the historical development of 
this model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two 
papers where he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target 
not by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive 
construction of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical 
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contexts and can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets 
because Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous 
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent? 
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra 
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra: 
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he developed 
a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling various kinds 
of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 13). He began by creating a very general 
equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among the 
several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 15). In two 
papers (1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and 
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question. For 
example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there would 
be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations (1920a, 414). 
Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but instead used his results 
to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which he then connected to 
theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First Principles (1920a, 414). 
 Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this 
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must 
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he 
applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is 
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constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of 
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey relationships. 
Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the general equation 
and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to specific targets. In so 
doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the model—he licenses it as a 
representation through activities in accord with the broader practice. 
 The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and complex. 
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the use 
of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey ratios 
rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time, was the 
use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death for the prey. 
These developments license new representational targets by expanding and altering the 
model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by removing 
idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions. Many other 
variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments. Additionally, 
the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory textbooks on ecology (see, 
e.g. Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational nature of the model in each of 
these cases is partially established by these features of the model which stand independent of 
any mental states of scientists and students alike. In short, the constitution of the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model relies deeply upon these historical 
features of licensing as understood by the broader scientific community.  
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Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these 
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose that 
they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that it 
represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It is 
not as if the star really is a scientific representation of predator-prey relations albeit a bad 
representation (because it does a poor job of meeting certain pragmatic constraints). Rather, 
the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Scientific representations are 
constructed to assist in answering certain questions, explaining certain phenomena, 
understanding certain target systems. It is through licensing that scientists build into the 
vehicle the features capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without licensing does not 
have this ability and so it is not just a bad representation. It is not a representation at all. 
Indeed, a discussion of the representational nature of vehicles which lack these features is 
either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the word ‘representation.’ A view of 
scientific representation which equally counts both the star and the Lotka-Volterra model as 
full scientific representations, even if it specifies one as good and one as bad, underestimates 
the role of these historical features of the model. They are not external to the representational 
nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an essential constitutive feature of this 
representational nature: without these features, the vehicle is not a scientific representation at 
all.  
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation  
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If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific representation 
which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s suggestion, we 
cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from questions of practice. 
A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is some stipulation and 
pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in which it was created, the 
application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness of and management of 
idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting for whether and how a 
scientific object represents its target will always require reference to these features which 
partially establish the representational nature.  Thus, there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender and 
Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are without 
any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument does 
indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is insufficient to 
account for scientific representation. Even if tomorrow we had a solid, universally accepted 
account of the representational nature of mental states, we would not yet have a complete 
account of scientific representation. We would still need an account of the deep reliance that 
it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus, while our discussion of the 
constitution of scientific representation might include reference to the representational nature 
of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have described here as the licensing 
by the practice.  
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A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I have 
identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a common 
feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested that it holds 
of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my argument, an account 
of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well, it does not indicate that 
it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the unique aims that mark off 
scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be correspondingly unique. 
That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the empirical world are special 
aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing. Scientific representation remains 
special because these features merit special attention.  
We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific representation 
as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that we understand the 
way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these representational 
devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different within different 
domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might be rather different 
from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad scale aims of the 
various domains, we can still say some general things about representation in science as a 
whole.  Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as it occurs in these 
more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop further insights 
about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific representational 
objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking hints and clues from 
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in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of science, e.g. those in Lynch 
and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al. (2014).  
6. Conclusion 
Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the constitution 
question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show why their 
account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by philosophers 
of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in which it is 
embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the way that 
science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities of 
licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing 
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any 
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve 
reference to licensing. Thus, there is a special problem of scientific representation.  
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Dissolving the missing heritability problem 
Abstract: Heritability estimates obtained in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are much 
lower than those of traditional quantitative methods. This has been called the “missing 
heritability problem”. By analyzing and comparing these two kinds of methods, we first show 
that the estimates obtained by traditional methods involve some terms that GWAS do not. 
Second, the estimates obtained by GWAS do not take into account epigenetic factors 
transmitted across generations, whilst they are included in the estimates of traditional 
quantitative methods. Once these two factors are taken into account, we show that the missing 
heritability problem can be largely dissolved. Finally, we briefly contextualize our analysis within 
a current discussion on how non-additive factors relate to the heritability estimates in GWAS.  
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1. Introduction.  
One pervasive problem encountered when estimating the heritability of quantitative traits is that 
the estimates obtained from Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are much smaller than 
that calculated by traditional quantitative methods. This problem has been called the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011). Take human height for example. Traditional 
quantitative methods deliver a heritability estimate of about 0.8, while the first estimates using 
GWAS were 0.05 (Maher 2008). More recent GWAS methods have revised this number and 
estimate the heritability of height to be at most 0.45 (Yang et al. 2010; Turkheimer 2011). Yet, 
half of the heritability is still missing. 
In quantitative genetics, heritability is defined as the portion of phenotypic variation in a 
population that is caused by genetic difference (Downes 2015). Traditionally, this portion is 
estimated by measuring the phenotypic resemblance of genetically related individuals without 
identifying at the molecular level (more particularly the DNA level) the genetic causes of 
phenotypic variation. GWAS have been developed in order to locate the DNA sequences that 
influence the target trait and estimate their effects, especially for common complex diseases 
such as obesity, diabetes and heart disease (Visscher et al. 2012; Frazer et al. 2009). As for height, 
almost 300 000 common DNA variants in human populations that associate with it have been 
identified by GWAS (Yang et al. 2010). Granted by many that the heritability estimates obtained 
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by traditional quantitative methods are quite reliable, the method(s) used in GWAS have been 
questioned (Eichler et al. 2010).  
A number of partial solutions to the missing heritability problem have been proposed, with 
most of them focusing on improving the methodological aspects of GWAS in order to provide 
a more accurate estimate (e.g., Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Some authors have also 
suggested that heritable epigenetic factors might account for part of the missing heritability. For 
instance, in Eichler et al. (2000, 488), Kong notes that “[e]pigenetic effects beyond imprinting 
that are sequence-independent and that might be environmentally induced but can be 
transmitted for one or more generations could contribute to missing heritability.” Furrow et al. 
(2011) also claim that “[e]pigenetic variation, inherited both directly and through shared 
environmental effects, may make a key contribution to the missing heritability.” Others have 
made the same point (e.g., McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008; Johannes et al. 2008). Yet, in the 
face of this idea one might notice what appears to be a contradiction: how can epigenetic factors 
account for the missing heritability, if the heritability is about genes?  
To answer this question as well as to analyze the missing heritability problem, we compare 
the assumptions underlying both heritability estimates in traditional quantitative methods and 
those in GWAS. We argue that a) the heritability estimates of traditional methods include some 
terms associated with broad-sense heritability (�²), as opposed to narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$); 
b) although GWAS are supposed to get ℎ$, ℎ$ relies on an evolutionary concept of the gene 
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that can include epigenetic factors while heritability estimates obtained from GWAS do not. 
With these two points being illustrated, we expect the missing heritability problem to be largely 
dissolved as well as setting the stage for further discussions. 
The reminder of the paper will be divided into three parts. First, we briefly introduce how 
heritability is estimated in two traditional methods, namely twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression. We show that the estimates obtained by each methods include some non-additive 
elements and consequently correspond neither to �² nor to ℎ$, but to a notion in between 
which we term “broader-sense heritability”. Second, we outline the basic rationale underlying 
GWAS and illustrate that they estimate heritability by considering solely DNA variants. By 
arguing that the notion of additive genetic variance does not necessarily refer to DNA sequences 
but can also refer to epigenetic factors in traditional quantitative methods, we show that the 
notion of heritability estimated in GWAS is more restrictive than that of traditional quantitative 
methods, and term this notion “DNA-based narrow-sense heritability”. Finally, in Section 4, 
based on the conclusions from Section 2 and Section 3, we claim that the gap between the 
heritability estimates of traditional quantitative methods and those of GWAS can be explained 
away in two major ways. One consists in recognizing that if non-additive variance was removed 
from the estimates obtained via traditional methods, they would be lower. The other consists in 
recognizing that if epigenetic factors were taken into account by GWAS, the heritability 
estimates obtained would be higher. We conclude Section 4 by showing how our analysis sheds 
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some light on a discussion about the role played by non-additive factors in the missing 
heritability problem. Because human height has been “the poster child” of the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011, 232), we will use this example to illustrate each of our 
points. 
 
2. Heritability in Traditional Quantitative Methods.  
According to quantitative genetics, the phenotypic variance (�& ) of a population can be 
explained by two components, its genotypic variance (�') and its environmental variance (�(). 
In the absence of gene-environment interaction and correlation, we thus have: 
�& = �' + �(  (1) 
From there broad-sense heritability (�$) is defined as: 
�$ =
+,
+-
   (2) 
�'  can further be portioned into the additive genetic variance (�.), the dominance genetic 
variance (�/) and the epistasis genetic variance (�0). We have: 
�& = �. + �/ + �0 + �(     (3) 
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where �. is the variance due to hypothetical genes making an equal and additive contribution 
to the trait studied (e.g., height). �/ is the variance due to interactions between alleles at one 
locus for diploid organisms, and �0 is the variance due to interactions between alleles from 
different loci. �/ and �0 together represent the variance due to particular combinations of 
genes of an organism. 
Since genotypes of sexual organisms recombine at each generation via reproduction, 
dominance and epistasis effects are not transmitted stably across generations, only additive 
genetic effects are. Therefore, �.  is the variance due to stably transmitted genetic effects. 
Narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) measures to what extent variation in phenotypes is determined 
by the variation in genes transmitted from parent(s) to offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 
123). It is defined as:  
ℎ$ =
+1
+-
                                                            (4) 
ℎ$ is important in breeding studies and is used by evolutionary theorists who are interested in 
making evolutionary projections of a trait within a population across generations. 
To know ℎ$, both �. and �& must be known. �&, for most quantitative traits (including 
height), can be directly estimated by measuring individuals. However, there is no direct way to 
estimate �. in traditional quantitative methods. The traditional way to estimate it requires two 
elements. First, one needs a population-level measure of a phenotypic resemblance of family 
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relative pairs1. This measure is obtained by calculating the covariance of the phenotypic values for 
those pairs. The choice of what sort of relatives to use depends on what data is available. The 
second element is the genetic relation between family pairs. It indicates the percentage of genetic 
materials the pairs are expected to share. With these two elements, one can estimate how much 
the genes shared contribute to the phenotypic resemblance. In a large population with different 
phenotypes, one can then estimate how much the additive genetic difference contributes to 
phenotypic difference in this population, which estimates ℎ$. 
For simplicity, traditional quantitative methods usually assume that there is neither gene-
environment interaction nor correlation (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 131). Thus the covariance 
between the phenotypic values (e.g., height) of pairs equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant and epistasis genetic covariance, plus the environmental covariance. A general 
equation for traditional quantitative methods can be written as follows: 
��� �6, �$ = ��� �6 + �6 + �6 + �6, �$ + �$ + �$ + �$ =
																														��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$  (5)          
where indexes “1” and “2” represent the two family members for each pair studied. 
��� �6, �$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one individual with the other. 
                                                
1
	 Or the mean values of  their class (e.g., offspring) depending on the particular method used.	
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� , � , �  and �  represent additive effects, dominant effects, epistasis effects and 
environmental effects respectively. 
The most commonly used traditional methods for estimating heritability are twin studies. 
In these studies one already knows that monozygotic twins share almost 100% of their genetic 
material while dizygotic twins about 50%. The environment is typically divided into the part of 
the environment that affects both twins in the same way (the shared environment, �) and the 
part of the environment that affects one twin but not the other (the unique environment, �) 
(Silventoinen et al. 2003). Hence, in the absence of interaction and correlation between � and 
�, we have:  
� = 	� + �     (6) 
Assuming epistasis effects to be negligible (a common assumption in twin studies), by inserting 
Equation (6) into Equation (5), we have: 
��� �>6, �>$ = ��� �>6 + �>6 + �>6 + �>6, �>$ + �>$ + �>$ + �>$ 	=
																						��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$   (7) 
where indexes “T1” and “T2” represent the two twins for each twin pair studied. 
��� �>6, �>$ 	is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other. 
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Because each twin’s unique environment by definition is independent of that of the other 
twin, ��� �>6, �>$  is zero for both monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Given that variance is 
a special case of covariance when the two variables are identical, and that for monozygotic twins 
�>6, �>6, and �>6equal to �>$, �>$, and �>$ respectively, we can formulate the equation 
from Equation (7) as follows: 
���?> �>6, �>$ = �. + �/ + �@      (8) 
where ���?> �>6, �>$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of monozygotic twin 
pairs studied. 
By contrast, dizygotic twins are expected to share half of their genes, which means that the 
covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other of dizygotic twin pairs 
studied (���/> �>6, �>$ ) is expected to be equal to half of the additive genetic variance, a 
quarter of dominant variance 2 , and all of the shared environmental variance (with 
��� �>6, �>$  also to be zero). We have: 
���/> �>6, �>$ =
6
$
�. +
6
B
�/ + �@      (9) 
It is classically assumed that �@  in Equation (8) and (9) is the same. That is to say, for both 
monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs, it is assumed that the shared environment would act in 
                                                
2  For each given gene with two alleles, the possibility that dizygotic twins have the same 
genotype is one quarter. 
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the same way if the pair has been reared together.3 �@  can be cancelled by subtracting Equation 
(9) from Equation (8). The heritability can then be estimated as follows:  
ℎCDE
$ =
$ @FGHD &DI,&DJ K@FGLD &DI,&DJ
+-
=
+1
+-
+
M
J
+L
+-
      (10) 
We call ℎCDE
$  broader-sense heritability (the index “b” is for “broader-sense”) from twin studies, 
because the resulting estimate (which is about 0.8 for height) provides an accurate estimate of 
neither �$ nor ℎ$, although it is closer to �$ than to ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 172). 
That is to say, it corresponds to a definition of heritability that includes some elements of broad-
sense heritability but not all of it. 
Another often used traditional quantitative method to estimate heritability involves a 
parent-offspring regression. This method also assumes neither gene-environment interaction 
nor correlation, the covariance between the height of parents (one or the mean of both) and the 
mean of their offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 164), equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant covariance (the epistasis covariance is assumed to be small and is not included), plus 
environmental covariance. Hence, Equation (5) can be formulated as follows:  
                                                
3 This assumption might be problematic because monozygotic twins are often treated more 
similarly by their parents than are dizygotic twins, and monozygotic twins are more likely to 
share a placenta than dizygotic twins. The difficulty can be mitigated by using adoption twin 
studies in which the environments for twins are random on average. But large adoption twins’ 
data are exceedingly difficult to get (Griffiths 2005). 
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��� �& , �N = ��� �& + �& + �& + �& , �N + �N + �N + �N =
																														��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N                  (11)                   
where indexes “P” and “O” represent the “parents” and the “offspring”.  
Two assumptions are then made. The first one is that there is no dominant effects 
transmitted from the parents to the offspring assuming the parents are unrelated (Doolittle 
2012, 178), which means ��� �& , �N  is nil. Another assumption is that there is no 
correlation between the parents’ environment and the offspring’s environment so that 
��� �& , �N  in Equation (11) is also nil. Given that on average, parents share in expectation 
50% of genes with their offspring (parents and offspring share half of their genes), it leaves 
Equation (11) with a result of half of additive genetic variance (
6
$
�.). Given �&, ℎ
$ can be 
estimated straightforwardly.  
But the above two assumptions are problematic. First, the assumption of unrelated parents 
might be violated because of assortative mating in humans resulting in parents to be more 
genetically similar than two randomly chosen individuals (Guo et al. 2014). Hence, 
��� �& , �N  is likely to be non-nil. Second, because the environments experienced by 
individuals are likely to be more similar within a family line, ��� �& , �N  might not be nil, 
either. If we take these two factors into consideration, the covariance of the parents and their 
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offspring is equal to half of additive genetic variance, plus a variance term representing effects 
due to dominance and similarities between environments. This can be written formally as:   
��� �& , �N = ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N =	
6
$
�. + �/&(@      (12) 
where �/&(@  represents the variance due to some dominance and environmental correlation 
effects between the parents and the offspring studied.                                        
The heritability can then be estimated by doubling the parent–offspring covariance in 
Equation (12) and dividing the total phenotypic variance of the population as follows: 
ℎC-PQ
$ =
$@FG &-,&P
+-
=
+1
+-
+
$+L&RS
+-
                                       (13) 
For similar reasons as with the heritability estimates from twin studies, we call ℎC-PQ
$  broader-
sense heritability (with the index “b” also being for “broader-sense”) from parent-offspring 
regression. Indeed, although it is often assumed that ℎC-PQ
$  represent ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 
1996, 147), the resulting estimate (also about 0.8 for height) is broader than ℎ$ as it can include 
a component led by dominance variance and environmental correlation between parent and 
offspring. 
To conclude this section, heritability estimates in both twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression include an extra term when compared to ℎ$, but they do not correspond to �². For 
this reason we regroup them under the term ℎC
$ for “broader-sense heritability”, such that: 
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ℎC
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$                                                     (14) 
where ℎFTUVW
$  is the part of heritability contributed by the extra component(s) representing 
non-additive variance. 
 
3. Heritability in GWAS.  
Although any two unrelated individuals share about 99.5% of their DNA sequences, their 
genomes differ at specific nucleotide locations (Aguiar and Istrail 2013). Given two DNA 
fragments at the same locus of two individuals, if these fragments differ at a single nucleotide, 
they represent two variants of a Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP). GWAS focus on SNPs 
across the whole genome that occur in the population with a probability larger than 1% which 
are called common SNPs. If one variant of a common SNP, compared to another one, is 
associated with a significant change on the trait studied, then this SNP is a marker for a DNA 
region (or a gene) that leads to phenotypic variation. For a polygenic trait like height, if we can 
detect all the SNPs that associate with it, then all the DNA difference makers that determine 
height difference can be located.  
The development of commercial SNP chips makes it possible to rapidly detect common 
SNPs of DNA samples from all the participants involved in a study. By using a series of 
statistical tests, it can be investigated at the population level whether each SNP associates with 
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that target trait. The choice of the statistical tests depends on the data available as well as the 
trait studied. For quantitative traits like height, the most common approach is to make an 
analysis of variance table and assess whether the mean height of a group with one variant at one 
nucleotide is significantly different from the group with another variant of the same SNP4 
(Bush and Moore 2012). With all the SNPs associated with height being detected, data from the 
HapMap project, which provides a list of SNPs that are markers for most of the common DNA 
variants in human populations (Consortium, International HapMap 3 2010), is used to map the 
associated SNPs with common DNA variants. These mapped DNA variants, to be 
distinguished from DNA variants that do not affect the target trait, have been called “causal 
variants” (Visscher et al. 2012).  
Based on the readings of SNP chips as well as further independent tests for SNPs, the 
effects of the associated SNPs (markers for causal DNA variants) on the trait can be calculated. 
By estimating the phenotypic variance contributed by these SNPs and the total phenotypic 
variance of the population, the heritability of causal DNA variants can be estimated as the ratio 
of the phenotypic variance caused by all the associated SNPs compared to the total phenotypic 
variance of the population (Weedon et al. 2008). Since it is common for biologists to assume 
                                                
4  For categorical (often binary disease/control) traits, the association test used involves 
measuring an odds ratio, namely the ratio of  the odds of  disease for individuals having a specific 
variant of  a SNP, and the odds of  disease for individuals who have another variant at the same 
locus. If  the odds ratio of  a common SNP is significantly different from 1, then that SNP is 
considered to be associated with the disease (Bush and Moore 2012). 
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that genes are only made up of pieces of DNA, it is thought that the variance obtained from all 
the causal DNA variants represent exactly the additive genetic variance, and the heritability 
estimated by GWAS should match narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) (Yang et al. 2010; Visscher et 
al. 2006). However, the assumption that additive genetic effects are solely based on DNA 
sequences is problematic when faced with the evidence of epigenetic inheritance. 
As was mentioned in Section 2, traditional quantitative methods for estimating heritability 
are based on measuring phenotypic values and genetic relations without reaching the molecular 
level. The genes are not defined physically, but functionally as heritable difference makers 
(Falconer and Mackay 1996, 123). In other words, they are theoretical units defined by their 
effects on the phenotype. With the discovery of DNA structure in 1953, it was thought that the 
originally theoretical genes were found in the physical DNA molecules. Since then, biologists 
commonly refer to genes as DNA molecules and this assumption is also made by researchers 
of GWAS. As [author] claim, this step was taken too hastily. If there is physical material, other 
than DNA pieces, that can affect the phenotype and be transmitted stably across generations, 
then it should also be thought to play the role that contributes to additive genetic effects. 
Many studies have provided evidence for epigenetic inheritance 5 , namely the stable 
transmission of epigenetic modifications across multiple generations and affect organism’s traits 
                                                
5 We use the notion of  “epigenetic inheritance” in the broad sense that refers to the inheritance 
of  phenotypic features via causal pathways other than the inheritance of  nuclear DNA 
(Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 112). 
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(e.g., Youngson and Whitelaw 2008; Dias and Ressler 2014). A classical example of this is the 
methylation pattern on the promoter of the agouti gene in mice (Morgan et al. 1999). It shows 
that mice with the same genotype but different methylation levels display a range of colors of 
their fur, and the patterns of DNA methylation can be inherited through generations causing 
heritable phenotypic variations. Epigenetic factors such as self-sustaining loops, chromatin 
modifications and three-dimensional structures in the cell can also be transmitted over multiple 
generations (Jablonka et al. 2014). Studies on various species suggest that epigenetic inheritance 
is likely to be ‘ubiquitous’ (Jablonka and Raz 2009).  
The increasing evidence of epigenetic inheritance seriously challenges the restriction of the 
concept of the gene in the evolutionary sense to be materialized only in DNA. Relying on 
traditional quantitative methods, it is impossible to distinguish whether additive genetic variance 
is DNA based or based on other material(s). Some transmissible epigenetic factors, which are 
not DNA based, might de facto be included into the additive genetic variance used to estimate 
ℎ². This extension of heritable units also echoes to the recent suggestion that genetic (assuming 
genes to be DNA based) and non-genetic heredity should be unified in an inclusive inheritance 
theory (Danchin 2013; Day and Bonduriansky 2010).  
To apply the idea that some epigenetic factors can lead to additive genetic effects, the 
additive variance of them (�.XYZ) should be added to the additive variance of DNA sequences 
(�.L[1) to obtain �.. Assuming there is no interaction between �.XYZ and �.L[1 , we have: 
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�. = �.L[1 + �.XYZ     (15) 
Inserting Equation (15) to Equation (4) leads to: 
ℎ$ =
+1L[1
+-
+
+1XYZ
+-
     (16) 
Here we term the first term on the right side of Equation (16) “DNA-based narrow-sense 
heritability” (ℎ/\.
$ ), and the second term “epigenetic-based narrow-sense heritability” (ℎV]^
$ ), 
we thus have: 
ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$        (17) 
 
4. Dissolving the Missing Heritability.  
As we mentioned it in Introduction, since the first successful GWAS was published in 2005 
(Klein et al. 2005), there have been a lot of proposals for methodological improvements in 
GWAS (Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Studies have been conducted according to 
those proposals that permit to obtain higher heritability estimates. Examples include increasing 
the sample sizes which has resulted in more accurate estimates (e.g., Wood et al. 2014), 
considering all common SNPs simultaneously instead of one by one which has increased the 
heritability estimates of height from 0.05 to 0.45 (see Yang et al. 2010), and conducting meta-
analyses which can lead to more accurate results when compared to single analysis (see Bush 
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and Moore 2012). Biologists have also suggested to search for SNPs with lower frequencies 
than 1% in order to account for a wider range of possible causal variants (Schork et al. 2009). 
Aside from these partial improvements, our analysis reveals two reasons explaining away 
the missing heritability problem: a) In traditional quantitative methods, the heritability estimates 
include extra terms which are not presented in GWAS; b) In GWAS, heritability is estimated 
solely from causal DNA variants, while in traditional quantitative methods the additive effects 
contributed by epigenetic difference (ℎV]^
$ ) are de facto included in the estimates. 
These two reasons can be shown formally. Using our terminology, missing heritability 
(��) equals to the estimates obtained by traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$ ) minus the 
estimates obtained by GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ), which are 0.8 and 0.45 respectively in the case of height. 
Thus we have: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$
      (18) 
Replacing ℎC
$ and ℎ/\.
$  by the right hand side of Equation (14) and (17), we obtain: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$ − ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$ = ℎFTUVW
$ + ℎV]^
$      (19) 
Which means that the missing heritability results from the part of heritability originating from 
epigenetic factors stably transmitted across generations, plus the part of heritability originating 
from non-additives factors. 
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Our point that part of the missing heritability can be dissolved by considering non-additive 
effects echoes to the claim that almost all GWAS to date have focused on additive effects might 
be a reason for the missing heritability (McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008). Although there is not 
enough data to confirm that non-additive effects do explain away some part of missing 
heritability, this claim appears again and again in discussions on the missing heritability problem 
(see for instance Maher 2008; Frazer et al. 2009; Gibson 2010; Kong 2010; Moore 2010). Yang 
et al. (2010, 565) disagree with this claim and respond that “[n]on-additive genetic effects do 
not contribute to the narrow-sense heritability, so explanations based on non-additive effects 
are not relevant to the problem of missing heritability.”  
We agree with Yang et al. (2010) that non-additive effects do not contribute to ℎ². That 
said, because the heritability estimates obtained from traditional quantitative methods do not 
strictly correspond to ℎ² but include some non-additive elements, non-additive effects cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant for the missing heritability problem, though probably they are relevant 
in a way that both Yang et al. (2010) as well as their opponents did not consider.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
We have provided two ways in which the missing heritability problem can be explained away. 
First, heritability estimates from traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$) are overestimated when 
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compared to ℎ$. The resulting estimates would be smaller if the non-additive elements were 
eliminated. Second, heritability estimates from GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ) are underestimated when 
compared to ℎ$ because they do not take into account the additive effects of epigenetic factors 
behaving like evolutionary genes. The resulting estimates would be larger if epigenetic factors 
were taken into account. We have voluntarily stayed away from the question of whether 
heritability should be defined strictly relative to DNA sequences or if it should encompass any 
factors behaving effectively like an evolutionary gene. Our inclination is that there is no 
principled reason to exclude non-DNA transmissible factors from heritability measures, but our 
analysis does not bear on this choice. 
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Abstract
Scientists are often asked to advise political institutions on pressing risk-
related questions, like climate change or the authorization of medical drugs.
Given that deliberation will often not eliminate all disagreements between sci-
entists, how should their risk assessments be aggregated? I argue that this
problem is distinct from two familiar and well-studied problems in the litera-
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ability thresholds. Majority voting is then defended by means of robustness
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1 Introduction
Scientists are often asked by political institutions to give expert advice on press-
ing questions. For instance, agencies that regulate medicines regularly resort to
expert panels, and national scientific academies give advice to the government or to
the assemblies. Even after discussing, scientific experts do not always agree on the
answer, and when they do, they may disagree on the justification for this answer.
How should decisions that involve risk assessments be taken and justified within sci-
entific expert panels? This is the central question studied in this paper. As a matter
of fact, many expert panels take decisions using the majority voting rule. This is
for instance the case in advisory committees in the European and in the American
agencies that grant medicines authorization, respectively the EMA and the FDA.1
But is it the best decision rule? Is majority voting on the final decision the best
way to aggregate different experts’ opinions, and to track their reasons? This paper
is restricted to cases in which the expert panel is asked to take a decision on only
one binary question, for instance to answer the question “Is the risk-benefit ratio
of some medicine worth it to be authorized for commercial use?”. This simple case
is already interesting as it corresponds to many real-life cases: some expert panels
are constituted on the sole purpose of answering one specific question, or are asked
to answer several but logically unrelated questions — e.g. decisions about different
medicines.
To study this problem, I introduce a novel decision-theoretic model. The true/false
decision is supposed to be taken by comparing a risk assessment a (typically, a prob-
ability) to a risk acceptability threshold t, e.g. “true” if and only if a < t. For sim-
plicity, a and t are supposed to be in [0, 1], but any quantity might go.2 It is assumed
that the n experts agree on the threshold value, but differ in their individual risk as-
sessments ak (k = 1, . . . , n) — or conversely, that they agree on the assessment, but
disagree on the threshold value. Typically, the question asked to the expert panel is
in the form “Is X’s risk below t?”. The problem studied in this paper is to determine
how the individual ak’s should be aggregated in comparison with t, so as to give the
group’s answer to this question (I shall speak equivalently of the group’s decision,
or of the group’s belief on whether the risk is below t). Compared to probability ag-
gregation theory which studies the aggregation of probabilistic opinions, the novelty
of this model lies (i) in the introduction of a threshold comparison which projects
probabilities into a binary space, and (ii) in the fact that the group has to take a
1Cf. Hauray and Urfalino (2007), Urfalino and Costa (2015).
2Real quantities can be mapped to the interval [0, 1], for instance with the function
x→ 1− 1/(1 + x)).
2
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stand on one binary question only, and not on a more complex agenda. Compared
to judgment aggregation theory which studies the aggregation of an interconnected
set of beliefs, the novelty is that individuals do not just have true/false beliefs but
probabilistic ones, even if the group is asked to express a true/false belief in the end.
The present problem can be considered as a first bridge between these two existing
frameworks. The best decision rule for our binary question is likely to depend on the
details of characteristics of the question, of the experts, of the available knowledge,
and on other details. My methodological approach is not to conduct a detailed study
of particular cases, but to look at features which most (interesting) cases share, so
as to find general properties of the best decision rule — what is meant by “best”
shall be discussed too.
The main claims of this paper are the following. I argue that the framework
of probability aggregation cannot help us solve the present problem (Section 2),
because the aggregation problems it considers are too general. For the aggregation
of scientific risk assessment on a specific question, a theory of its own is needed,
and I try to sketch one here. I then argue that robustness considerations clearly
legitimate majority voting on the final decision (Section 3). But when justifications
for the decisions are sought, majority voting can lead to inconsistencies and the
expert panel should aggregate on the reasons separately, before deriving logically its
decision (Section 4). Overall, the case for the majority rule is thus a mixed one.
2 Probability Aggregation and Beyond
A standard requirement for a scientific expert panel is that it provides justi-
fications for its decision. In the present model, the decision has to be consistent
with the comparison between the risk assessment and the threshold, so a minimal
justification is that the panel has a belief on the risk assessment (as all experts have
a belief on the risk assessment, it would be weird that the panel claims to refuse the
authorization while not being able to say that it believes that the risk assessment
is above the threshold). So, our problem includes as a first step the aggregation of
the individual risk assessments {ak}1≤k≤n into a single group assessment a — deeper
justifications for the group’s decision are contemplated in Section 4. The group’s
decision is supposed to be consistent with this assessment, so pragmatically the eas-
iest way to do so may be for the group to first aggregate the individual assessments,
and then compare the result to the threshold.
Majority voting on the decision itself is a standard way for expert groups to
take decisions, but it does not proceed in that way. Can it be objected that, within
our model, it lacks the requirement that the group should be attributed a belief
3
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on the risk assessment? No, for the following reason. The result of the majority
vote is “true” if and only if a majority of agents vote “true”, i.e. if and only if a
majority of agents have a numerical assessment below the threshold, i.e. if and only
if the median of the agents’ assessments is below the threshold. In other words, the
majority voting rule on the decision is equivalent to considering that the group’s
assessment is the median of the individual assessments. Hence, majority voting is in
the race. What are the other challengers? A standard way to aggregate probabilities
is to make averages. The linear average is defined as
∑
k ak, and it can be generalized
with weights ωk ≥ 0 and
∑
k ωk = 1, as
∑
k ωkak, to take into account unequal
degrees of expertise on the question.3 Other averages are the geometric average or
the harmonic average. Our problem is to determine which probability aggregation
rule, followed by the threshold, is the best one in our problem. It is easy to see that
these various probability aggregation rules can give different binary decisions for the
group.4
Pooling probability functions has been studied for several years in the theory
of probability aggregation (for surveys, cf. Dietrich and List forth., Martini and
Sprenger forth., section 3). Can its results be used to select the best aggregation
rule in our problem? I shall argue that unfortunately no. The framework of proba-
bility aggregation adopts an axiomatic method: it starts by stating several axioms
which appear as desirable properties for the pooling function and then studies which
function or aggregation rule, if any, satisfies them. The axioms considered in Dietrich
and List’s survey can be expressed in our case as:
• Independence: the group’s probability a only depends on the individual
probabilities ak.
• Unanimity preservation: if all agents’ probabilities ak are the same, then
the group’s probability a is this one too.
• Three Bayesian axioms: if some information is learned by all individuals,
then the group’s decision changes by conditionalization on that event.
3It is akin to the iterated Lehrer-Wagner model which, starting from respect weights agent have
to one another, provides a single probability for the group. However, the iterated Lehrer-Wagner
model, and even more its normative interpretation, have been subjected to many criticisms (for a
survey, cf. e.g. Martini and Sprenger forth. section 4). As a descriptive model, it is not useful for
the present discussion.
4Consider for instance the median and the linear average, with three experts with
a1 = a2 = 0.04, a3 = 0.10, and t = 0.05. A majority voting on the decision gives a “true” as
two experts on three assess the risk to be below the threshold. The linear average (with equal
weights) is 0.06, which is higher than t, so this gives a “false”.
4
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The Independence axiom is automatically satisfied here, because our problem con-
tains only one true/false answer, and there is no other probability on which a could
depend. The three Bayesian axioms make sense in cases where the expert panel
learns new information. In our problem, however, an extensive discussion has al-
ready taken place so no agent learns new information anymore, and the expert panel
is not making any new inquiry. So the Bayesian axioms are not relevant in our case,
and only the Unanimity preservation axiom expresses a desirable property for the
aggregation rule.
An essential point to note is that a very large number of aggregation rules sat-
isfy this axiom: the median, linear averaging, geometric averaging, and so on —
actually, any convex function of the ak. This illustrates the fact that a classical
uniqueness result from the probability aggregation literature does not hold any-
more: the well-known theorem by McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982, which states
that linear averaging functions are the only independent and unanimity-preserving
functions. The reason is that the theorem requires a set of at least three events,
whereas our problem only considers two — e.g. the product is risky, with probabil-
ity ak, and the product is not risk, with probability 1 − ak. Considering a simpler
agenda has widened the set of suitable aggregation rules, and no theoretical result
from the literature can be used to pick the best one. More generally, the uniqueness
and impossibility results from the theory of probability aggregation are useless for
our problem. So, how scientific expert panels should aggregate risk assessments is
not a simple problem that can be solved straightforwardly with the existing liter-
ature, which has focused on general problems with complex agendas, and has thus
neglected more specific yet important questions. In the next section, I discuss other
desiderata or axioms that we would like to impose on the aggregation rule.
3 Robustness Matters
Scientific risk assessment is supposed to meet some standards of reliability and
objectivity, and the aggregation of these assessments should follow alike standards.
In this spirit, I now introduce several new requirements for our aggregation rule.
The aggregation rule should be sensitive to the right features of our problem, and
not to the parasitic ones. It should favor objective features at the detriment of
idiosyncrasies or unwanted values (for an analysis of the concept of objectivity, cf.
Douglas 2004 — I refer to some of her distinctions below). In other words, the
aggregation rule should be robust to some changes that we regard as irrelevant.
In this section, I defend three dimensions of robustness that should be taken into
account: the risk metrics, the level of detail, and the presence of strategical agents.
5
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Several probability aggregation rules can be considered: linear averaging, geo-
metric averaging, harmonic averaging, among others. As the forthcoming robustness
discussion is similar for all the various averagings, I shall simplify it and consider
only linear averaging, which shall be contrasted with the median. Ra denotes the
aggregation rule that compares the threshold with the linear average (which thus
stands for other averages), and Rm the aggregation rule that compares the thresh-
old with the median of the individual assessments (which is equivalent to a majority
vote on the decision itself).
3.1 Metrics
The formal model I have introduced relies on a quantitative scale — a and t
are given numerical values in [0, 1]. How is this scale defined in real cases? My
talking about probabilities has been only a matter of simplicity given the reduction
of the problem to the [0, 1] interval, and typical cases do not bear on well-defined
probabilities or explicit scales. For instance, a standard question posed at an FDA
advisory committee is “Does the overall risk versus benefit profile for X support
marketing in the US ?”5. This question supposes that experts identify the risk versus
benefit profile, and determine the value of the threshold under which a marketing is
warranted. This can be done in a number of ways, and these are essentially value-
laden questions6 — what is acceptable or not has to do with extra-scientific values,
and may also reflect the fact that an expert is risk-averse or risk-seeking. Overall, it
makes sense to suppose that both the metrics scale and the threshold depend on the
experts. Conversely, as the aggregation procedure is supposed to take place when
the experts have extensively discussed, one can make the simplifying assumption
that the same facts are known to all, and thus that the risk assessment is the same
for all. In that way, our model actually applies in the setting in which a is common
to all experts, but each has her own threshold tk. The fact that the quantitative
risk scale is not uniquely defined can be approached from a mathematical viewpoint:
any scale can be reparametrized by applying any continuous bijection from [0, 1] to
[0, 1], such as x 7→ x2.
These points make a hard time for the rule Ra (and other non linear averagings).
First, from a practical viewpoint, the dependence of the risk scale metrics on the
expert prevents the use of rules which take as inputs the numerical values of the risk
assessments or of the threshold. For instance, is it even possible for a chairman to ask
her colleagues “Please tell me your overall risk versus benefit acceptability threshold”
5Cf. Urfalino and Costa (2015, p.183).
6On the role of values in science more generally, and a critic of the value-free ideal, cf. Douglas
2009.
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(or assessment), given that each expert may have her own scale? The rule Rm, as it
is equivalent to majority voting, needs not rely on input individual numerical values,
and is thus safe from this criticism. Second, even if these practical difficulties could
be overcome, some theoretical difficulties remain. Suppose a common scale has been
adopted so that all experts can express their tk. An aggregation rule that depends
on the metrics of that common scale can give different outcomes according to the
scale employed, as shown in Table 1. This dependence is a problem: which common
scale should be chosen? (This is another aggregation problem!) Note that a variant
of this problem exists even with a well-defined probability scale. For instance, let A
be the event that a certain risk (e.g. carcinogenic substances in food) is responsible
for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 1 year. The experts
estimate the probability of A, p(A). Consider now A′ the event that the risk is
responsible for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 10 years.
Call p(A′) its probability. If the cancer cases are independent along the years, then
p(A′) = 1− (1− p(A))10. Because the relation between p(A) and p(A′) is not linear,
taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A, and transforming it into
an assessment on A′, or taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A′,
does not give the same result. Which event A or A′ is the more “natural” is not
clear, and so much more for the right risk group assessment.
This gives good reasons to consider the following requirement: the aggregation
rule should be insensitive to the metrics used to describe the problem, i.e. the
assessment and the threshold. What should matter is just the relative position of
the a and tk, not their distance which can be due to some idiosyncratic value-laden
judgments. This is requiring that the aggregation rule is more objective, under the
sense of value-neutral objectivity as characterized by Douglas (2004, p. 460), which
does not mean “free from all value influence” (as judging whether a risk benefit
ratio is lower enough is bound to involve a value judgment), but takes a position
“that is balanced or neutral with respect to a spectrum of values” (here, the balance
is reached by taking into account only relative positions). The metrics robustness
excludes the rule Ra which employs a linear average — Table 1 has shown a counter-
t1 t2 t3 a Average t Ra Rm
x scale .01 .01 .1 .05 .04 False False
x2 scale 0.0001 0.0001 .01 0.0025 0.0034 True False
Table 1: Example in which the ruleRa gives different answers depending on the scale.
The three experts have different thresholds tk and a common risk assessment a.
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example — but not Rm which relies on the median.
7
3.2 Level of detail
Another argument for an aggregation rule that does not rely on a specific metrics
comes from considerations of the level of detail in which the problem is described. So
far, a continuous scale has been assumed, with numerical assessments in [0, 1]. Nu-
merical discrete scales could also be used or even qualitative assessments only — it
corresponds to decisions under uncertainty and not under risk. Consider for instance
the case of the well-known IPCC Assessment Reports, that formulate a synthesis of
existing scientific knowledge on climate change issues. The reports use a standard-
ized vocabulary to express uncertainties, with several scales: some are qualitative
(e.g. low/medium/high), others are quantitative (and use probabilities).8 The his-
torical trend has been to use more quantitative scales and less qualitative scales,
but the latter have the advantage of being easily understandable by non-technical
audiences, and thus should continue to be used in the future. Some qualitative
and quantitative scales are in an explicit correspondence, as illustrated on Table 2.
Writing an IPCC report involves synthesizing large amounts of scientific literature,
so co-authors of a chapter may have different beliefs on the uncertainties associated
with a finding. Whether they express their beliefs on a qualitative or on a quan-
titative scale, the way their beliefs are aggregated should be smooth and not vary
abruptly (some very precise yet qualitative scales are conceivable), all the more than
some explicit correspondence exist (Table 2). This is also a question of historically
7The comparability of scales is also discussed in Risse’s (2004) political philosophy work, who
also takes it as an argument for majority voting.
8Cf. e.g. the last report of the Working Group I, Stocker et al (2013, p. 138-142).
Term Likelihood of the Outcome
Virtually certain 99–100 % probability
Very likely 90–100% probability
Likely 66–100% probability
About as likely as not 33–66% probability
Unlikely 0–33% probability
Very unlikely 0–10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1% probability
Table 2: Likelihood terms associated with outcomes used in the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC (Stocker et al 2013, p. 142).
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consistency when switching from qualitative to quantitative scales.9 Thus, a sound
requirement is that the aggregation rule extends to formulations with discrete and
qualitative scales. As the average of non-numerical and qualitative values is not
defined, Ra does not satisfy this requirement. The median is defined on any kind of
scale, and Rm satisfies the requirement. So only Rm is robust for the level of detail.
3.3 Bias and strategical votes
Not all experts are moved by epistemic goals only, and conflicts of interests
can arise. For instance, numerous controversies have surrounded the FDA advisory
committees along the years (Urfalino and Costa 2015, p. 168-169.) If a better
selection of experts may be the solution, the decision rule used in the expert panel
can also reduce the impact of bias agents.10 With Ra, an expert can strategically
express a much lower risk of a medicine to influence the group’s average — with
a threshold at 10 %, she might express 0.1% instead of just 9%. The aggregation
rule should be insensitive to such a strategical vote manipulation, and this is all
the more important as the biased agent may have already influenced other agents
during the preceding discussion. Rm is clearly robust in this sense, as an agent has
the same influence whether her probability is just below the threshold or close to 0.
This is not so for Ra. This robustness requirement also makes the aggregation rule
more objective, in the sense of detached objectivity (Douglas 2004, p. 459): one’s
personal values (allegiance to a firm) should not prevail on evidence (e.g. that the
probability is 9%, as above).
Overall, the three robustness requirements considered here clearly favor Rm over
Ra. This provides a substantial justification for the traditional democratic rule in
expert panels confronted with a binary decision. This result is a real departure from
probability aggregation theory, in which linear averaging is justified on solid grounds.
Narrowing the agenda and introducing a threshold has changed the solution to the
aggregation problem.
9One may object that in the IPCC case the co-authors aggregate beliefs without a threshold
comparison for a binary decision. Actually, thresholds are implicit: a finding which confidence is
too low may not be mentioned. Anyway, the IPCC example can be seen as a mere illustration of
the level of detail problem.
10Biased and extremist agents have been much studied in the literature of opinion dynamics (cf.
for instance in Lorenz’s 2007 survey), but not so in the literature of opinion aggregation.
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4 Reasons
So far, a simplified model of scientific expert panels has been considered, one
in which the group is asked to give a binary decision. As argued, the first step in
justifying that decision consists for the panel to have a belief on the risk assessment,
which is given by the median of the individual assessments in the case of Rm. How-
ever, expert panels are often asked to provide a deeper justification. The question
then arises of how the panel should aggregate its members views on this justifica-
tion. In this section, I propose a novel but simple model for individual numerical
assessment justification, in line with my previous threshold model.
Perhaps the most typical interpretation of the risk assessment a is that of a
(subjective) probability. Suppose this probability is determined by m independent
factors (m ≥ 2). For instance, the risk associated with a medicine comes from m
unrelated secondary effects. Then a is the probability that at least one risk factor
triggers:
a = 1−
m∏
j=1
(1− aj). (1)
Each expert k is supposed to have her own assessment of each factor ak,j (j = 1, . . . ,m).
Our problem is then to aggregate the n×m matrix of probabilities ak,j, and to com-
pare that result with the threshold.
As the m factors are independent, a sound requirement is to aggregate the
individual assessments on them separately. How should that be done? Adapting the
arguments from the previous section, one is lead to the conclusion that the panel
should take the median of the individual assessments for each factor. However,
there is a fundamental limitation to this, due to the previously mentioned theorem
by McConway and Wagner’s (cf. Section 2). Here is why. Requiring as above
that the aggregation proceeds on each factor independently is just requiring the
classical independence axiom. Another legitimate requirement is the classical axiom
of unanimity preservation: if all experts agree on the risk assessment for one factor,
then the panel should take this value as its own. As m ≥ 2, all the conditions of
the theorem by McConway and Wagner are fulfilled11, so its conclusion apply: the
only probability aggregation rule on the set of factors and on the overall decision is
linear averaging. This reveals that, if groups use the median to determine both the
independence factors’ values and the overall risk (according to the above results),
then it does not give a probability function and inconsistencies can arise. Table 3
11Each of the m ≥ 2 factors can be triggered or not, so there are at least 4 events, which is
higher than the 3 required in the theorem.
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gives such an example. In other words, asking the expert panel to take stands on
the reasons for its majority decision can lead it to change its decision.
Does it mean that our robustness defense of the median should be discarded?
Not necessarily. The theorem by McConway and Wagner assumes that the experts
aggregate their views both on the independent factors and on the overall risk as-
sessment. But one can have the experts aggregate their views on the independent
factors only. The overall risk assessment is then computed according to Equation 1,
and the final decision is logically obtained from a comparison between this value
and the threshold. In that way, experts do not vote on the final decision directly.
This decision rule is a so-called premise-based rule.12 Then, the linearity result of
McConway and Wagner does not apply any more. The robustness considerations
from the previous section do apply at the level of independent factors, and they
recommend that the group takes the median of the individual assessments.
The present model of factors has assumed that there exists some common nu-
merical scale, so that taking the median of individual assessments makes sense.
However, the previous section has in part argued that such a scale may not always
exist. In these cases, the present model of independent factors cannot apply. The
theory of judgment aggregation offers a general framework for the aggregation of
non-numerical reasons or justifications, with true/false beliefs (for reviews, cf. List
2012, Martini and Sprenger forth.). Applying in detail this framework to our prob-
lem of scientific justification would require another paper. A general result from this
literature, however, is the discursive dilemma: majority voting on a set of true/false
beliefs related in a logical way (here: reasons for the decision) may generate incon-
sistent collective judgments. This echoes our own finding about the median, which
corresponds to majority voting in case of a threshold comparison. So whatever
12On this strategy more generally, see Cooke (1991), Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), Hartmann
and Sprenger (2012). Another solution to our problem could be the conclusion-based rule, i.e.
aggregate only the views on the conclusion, but this is just like the previous section that we are
trying to surpass.
Risk aspect a1 a2 a = 1− (1− a1) · (1− a2)
Agent #1 0.01 0.01 0.0199
Agent #2 0.02 0.01 0.0298
Agent #3 0.01 0.02 0.0298
Median 0.01 0.01 0.0199 or 0.0298 ?
Table 3: A case in which the rule of the median can lead to inconsistencies. With a
threshold at e.g. 0.025, the group’s decision could be either true or false.
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the scale, majority voting on all parts of the question is in great difficulty, and a
premise-based solution should be adopted.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the rationale for the majority rule that is often used
in scientific expert panels, when dissent persists after discussion, and has looked for
the best decision rule in this context. To this end, I have introduced a threshold
probability model for individual decisions. Three main points have been shown
in the paper: (1) the standard framework of probability aggregation is unable to
solve our problem of risk aggregation. (2) robustness considerations clearly favor
majority voting on the decision, i.e. comparing the threshold to the median of the
individual risk assessments. (The robustness axioms I have advocated, which have
been designed from considerations on scientific expert panel, could in return inspire
social choice theory). (3) when a justification of the panel’s decision is looked for,
the median rule (corresponding to majority voting) can lead to inconsistencies. The
promising route is to have the group aggregate on the reasons level, not on the final
decision one. This should encourage scientific expert panels to divide questions from
a logical viewpoints, and to take decisions on sub-problems instead of voting on the
final decision directly. Current practices in advisory committees of the FDA and of
the EMA could evolve in this respect. However, these claims have only been shown
in quite simple and idealized models of decision-making. Future work is needed
to investigate other models. These preliminary results have nonetheless cast some
serious doubts on the majority voting rule only applied on the final decision.
Note finally the generality of the proposed model, which goes well beyond sci-
entific expertise: the a and t variables can be interpreted as degrees of beliefs or as
utility measures, within an epistemology or an economy framework.
12
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Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often
built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries
that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing
receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the
likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often
has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also
help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence
of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of
interest signalling games.
1 Signalling games and evolution
Common interest signalling games were introduced by David Lewis (Lewis,
1969) as part of a game theoretic framework which identified communicative
conventions as the expected solutions to coordination problems. In recent years,
this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication,
incorporating signalling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to
modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms,
2010; Skyrms, 1996).
As the basis for game theoretic modelling of such phenomena, David Lewis
signalling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes.
They are coordination games of common interest between world-observing senders
and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where
interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the stan-
dard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signalling game (hereafter
the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaller) observes that the world is in one of
two possible states (state1 or state2) and broadcasts one of two possible signals
(signal1 or signal2) which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions (act1 or act2). If the acts match the state of
the world (i.e. act1 if state1 or act2 if state2) then the players receive a greater
payoff than otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signalling systems where
senders condition otherwise arbitrary signalling behaviour on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals to secure the mutual payoff. The two
1
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systems only differ on which signal gets to be associated with each state of the
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain
conditions a signalling systems is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution to be discussed further in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is the degree
to which we have confidence in the interpretation and application of such a
highly idealised model to the more complex target systems. The obvious worry
is that by introducing more realistic features into the model one might break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signalling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signalling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur. Some devia-
tions from the standard Lewis signalling game include: more and varied states
of the world, the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals,
partial deviation in interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case and Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Godfrey-Smith (2015) mix signalling games of common interest and conflict of
interest. One complication of the Lewis signalling game (particularly important
for our purposes) is that signalling systems are not guaranteed in the simple
2x2x2 case when the world is biased. In other words, when the probabilities
of the world being in state1 or state2 are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in
which no communication occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily
possible.
2 Symmetry breaking
The focus here will be with the idealisation that sender and receiver are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signallers do on observing the state of the world is send a
signal, and the receivers must act as though the world is in one or other of the
sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers
which is the more problematic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signalling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behaviour for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signalling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signallers than
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’, where the receiver
plays act1 or act2 unconditionally.
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for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate a
fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behaviour’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically rel-
evant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that of
observing a strategically relevant artificial signal. All this leads to two concerns.
Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations are likely to exist between senders
and receivers. Receivers are likely to have locally reasonable options available
to them other than those relevant to signaller-observed states of the world, and
their responsiveness to the strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily mod-
elled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures of standard signalling games.
Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost implications of sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to
differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not
expect their update-responsiveness in any given game to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modelled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (Sterelny, 2012) concerns about Skyrms (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of
the receiver might undermine the evolution of signalling even when these third
options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of
a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy –
taking an action which pays off modestly, regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behaviour of vervets, who
have specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet
takes to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead
to total disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle.
Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a
modest payoff. Translated to signalling games, such a gambit may, in many
cases, be more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signalling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a
3
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This compliments the structural responsiveness concern: receivers (espe-
cially) might have other options of value which will stand in competition to
those assumed in the standard signalling game. Something like these hedgehog
strategies are plausible departures from the idealisation and should be expected
on the part of the receiver given a realistic demandingness of the role. The
question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog strategies might
undermine the robustness of evolution toward signalling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signalling situations – such as predator-
prey signalling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signallers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signalling games (as with games of com-
mon interest in general) the Red Queen effect should have no role to play. How-
ever any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signalling game makes it plausible
to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not the norm.
First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures employed by
senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems will admit to
different degrees of plasticity and evolvability – and will have a different set of
cross-cutting tasks and utilities that will place their own demands upon them.
Quick and easy signalling responses will have different pathways of update and
adaptation than the (typically) more complex set of systems which appropriate
receiver responses require.
The consideration of multiple use or adaptive reuse also makes the Red
Queen hypothesis salient: it is wildly implausible that entirely separate cog-
nitive systems would evolve to deal with competitive signalling situations and
coordination-style situations. Cognitive structures which underpin sender or
receiver behaviour will likely be subject to evolutionary pressures from compet-
itive as well as cooperative situations, and the responsive nimbleness of sender
and receiver strategies is therefore not guaranteed to be the same. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
mediocre payoff. Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are
general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signalling games. Thanks to [name redacted
for review] for helping us better see this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
4
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not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signalling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as a basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signalling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaller with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR). If the receiver’s action
matches the state of the world, then both signaller and receiver get a fixed
positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero. Signallers and receivers
both have four pure strategies available to them (see table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaller and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signalling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t+ 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t)
Fi
FS
where Xi is the ith sender strategy, Fi is the fitness of that strategy and FS
is the average sender strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t+ 1) = Yj(t)
Fj
FR
where Yj is the jth sender strategy, Fj is the fitness of that strategy and FR is
the average receiver strategy fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle
5
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into an evolutionarily stable arrangement. The update process is deterministic
and no randomising or mutations are allowed.
5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the Skyrms/Lewis idealisation have on the evolutionary stability of signalling
equilibria.
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signalling game, one of the two signalling
equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics. In our
notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of the world
(i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine this, with
an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling equilib-
ria. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signalling strategies
in the sender population. In such situations, receivers do best to simply per-
form the act that is most appropriate for the more likely state of the world.
The incentive for senders to adopt a signalling system then disappears and the
community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we found a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH , becomes significant. The hedgehog strategy R5
is an additional unilateral response, and is able to draw some initial populations
away from the signalling equilibria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average
payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in Figure
14.
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artefacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of hedgehog payoff on proportion of signalling equilibria.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in com-
bination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of H. The
H = 0 curve has the expected n-shape, with perfect signalling being degraded
as world-bias increases away from the mid-point of even bias between L and R.
The inclusion of significant (i.e. H ¿ 0.5) hedgehog payoffs decreases signalling
at even bias. As nature becomes increasingly biased, however, the proportion
of simulations that head to a signalling system does not go down. In fact we
observe a ‘plateau’ followed by a gradual increase in the proportion signalling
as nature becomes increasingly biased. However, once the bias becomes too
extreme, the traditional pooling equilibrium becomes increasingly likely as the
payoff associated with simply performing the appropriate act for the more likely
state of the world approaches 1. This results in a steep decline in the proportion
of simulations that result in signalling systems.
6 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signalling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order control the rate at which sender and
receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and receiver
populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t+ 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t)
Fi
FS
+Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t+ 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t)
Fj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
7
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on proportion of sig-
nalling equilibria.
Note that when both ZR and ZS are zero there is no deviation from the stan-
dard replicator dynamics. Rates of changes are slowed as their values increase;
for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change for sender strategies. ZR
(alone) being set to 1 means taht the composition of the receiver population
would not change over time, and only the sender population would evolve.
The result of introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and
receivers is that signalling is more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where senders (ZS) and
receivers (ZR) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds (with the other
population unaltered) as the bias of nature is varied.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population whose conditional signalling is
low will begin to gravitate to the act that matches the more likely state of the
world (and the threshold for ‘low’ is higher at higher bias). This evolution-
ary trajectory only reverses if conditional signalling increases rapidly enough
to tip the fitness balance toward its matching conditional response, before that
response is overpowered. Thus signalling becomes quite a remote possibility
when bias is high and senders are slow, occurring in less than 10% of simula-
tions for some parameter values. Slowing the evolutionary responsiveness of the
receiver population evolves has the opposite effect – as senders will have time to
adopt the best separating strategy given the mix of receiver strategies, and the
receiver population slowly adjusts and a robust signalling system establishes.
By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a quickly evolving sender population
also mitigates against the effect of hedgehog strategies.
8
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on proportion of
signalling equilibria.
7 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized
and simple Lewis signalling game typically considered in the literature. As
shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often
significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For
one, providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a
decent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size
of the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is
a remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However the interaction between hedgehog payoffs and bias shows that signalling-
undermining effects are not strictly additive. Likewise, the situation is much
less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace than receivers. Interestingly,
many scholars in the animal communications literature have noted a similar re-
sponse asymmetry between sender and receiver in conflict of interest and partial
conflict of interest signalling games. For instance, Owren, Rendall, and Ryan
(2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signalling behaviour while re-
ceivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced by senders that
are more difficult to change. Thus some have taken to think of signalling as
primarily involving the manipulation of receivers by senders.
But this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a conflict of interest
between sender and receiver, then what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behaviour of the senders? In other words,
what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver? These are the exact circumstances we would expect the red queen
hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form the basis of
9
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a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. When the interests of sender
and receiver are perfectly aligned it is actually in the interest of both parties for
the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial signalling
system. When the interests of sender and receiver significantly diverge, however,
we would expect this not to be the case since both parties now have reason to
adapt at a faster pace than the other.
Yet individuals who routinely interact rarely find themselves playing either
common interest or conflict of interest signalling games exclusively. As is well
known by any parent, not all signalling interactions between relatives are free
of conflict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be par-
tially opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common
interest signalling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point is that a
variety of strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver, and there
is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve perfect alignment
or sizable conflict. If so, then a proportion of signalling interactions between
sender and receiver may involve no conflict, a partial conflict, or a full conflict
of interest. When the proportion of no or low conflict signalling games is sig-
nificant, the generational asymmetry result from the previous section may hold
to some degree. Both sender and receiver will then profit from the sender pop-
ulation evolving at a faster rate than the receiver population, and receivers do
best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence
of informative signalling systems when their interests do overlap. Thus, while
it may appear puzzling as to why a receiver is not more responsive when her
interests diverge from that of the sender, this confusion might be resolved when
the interaction is put into context.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signalling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signalling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signalling
in realistic environments.
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Abstract: Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that we ought to focus on retail arguments, 
which are arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical entities, as 
opposed to theoretical entities in general. However, scientists are the ones who put 
forward retail arguments, and it’s unclear how philosophers can engage with such 
arguments. We argue that philosophers can engage with retail arguments by providing 
criteria that they must satisfy in order to demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities. 
We put forward experimental individuation as such a criterion—when scientists 
experimentally individuate an entity, a realist conclusion about that entity is warranted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Magnus and Callender argue that we ought to abandon “wholesale arguments,” which are 
“arguments about all or most of the entities posited in our best scientific theories” (2004, 
321). Instead, we ought to embrace “retail arguments,” which are “arguments about 
specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance” (2004, 321). This shift in focus 
rules out standard scientific realism as well as various antirealist positions, and in Section 
2, we’ll argue that Magnus and Callender’s position is preferable to these other positions. 
However, we recognize that philosophers who choose to abandon wholesale 
arguments in favor of retail arguments face a potential problem. Dicken (2013) has 
argued that such philosophers will merely end up repeating the retail arguments that 
scientists offer. In that case, the turn to retail arguments may entail that no distinctively 
philosophical work remains to be done. In Section 3, we’ll argue that this is not the case. 
Not all retail arguments successfully demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities, and 
it can take some philosophical work to distinguish the ones that do from the ones that 
don’t. 
In Section 4, we’ll put forward a criterion for doing so, which we take from 
Chen’s (2016) work on experimental individuation. Chen suggests that “[i]f a scientist 
can realize the individuality of an object in a particular experiment, then she has provided 
the strongest evidence ... to warrant the reality of the object” (2016, 365). We’ll argue 
that retail arguments that demonstrate the experimental individuation of a theoretical 
entity succeed in showing that realism about that entity is warranted. 
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We’ll draw on three examples throughout the paper: Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of 
acidity, J. J. Thomson’s work on cathode rays, and Davy’s discovery of potassium. We’ll 
conclude, in Section 5, by applying our criterion to these three cases, with the result that 
the upshot of a retail argument can be either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding 
the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. 
 
2. The Turn to Retail Arguments 
 
We’ll now introduce Magnus and Callender’s position in a bit more detail, and indicate 
why we take it to be preferable to standard scientific realism (SSR) and antirealism. SSR 
is a position regarding theories in general—the success of our best theories warrants the 
claim that they are at least approximately true, as well as the claim that the theoretical 
entities that they posit exist. Antirealist positions come in a number of different forms, 
but they all typically endorse claims about theories in general, and deny that success 
warrants the two claims endorsed by proponents of SSR. 
According to Magnus and Callender, there is something that all of these positions 
have in common, namely, their proponents attempt to support these positions by engaging 
in wholesale arguments. They focus on two examples of such arguments. First of all, 
there is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of our best theories 
would be a miracle if those theories weren’t at least approximately true. Secondly, there 
is the pessimistic meta-induction, which uses past successful-but-false theories as an 
inductive basis for concluding that our current successful theories are false as well. The 
no-miracles argument is taken to support “[w]holesale realism,” which “seeks to explain 
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the success of science in general”; and the pessimistic meta-induction is taken to support 
“wholesale anti-realism,” which “seeks to explain the history of science in general” 
(2004, 321). However, Magnus and Callender argue that these arguments, and wholesale 
arguments in general, ought to be abandoned. This is because they embody the base rate 
fallacy, since they don’t take into account the base rate probability of any successful 
theory being true or false. For this reason, they maintain that wholesale realism and 
wholesale antirealism ought to be abandoned as well. 
Magnus and Callender propose that we ought to replace wholesale arguments 
with retail arguments. Unlike wholesale arguments, the scope of a retail argument is 
restricted to a particular theory and/or a particular kind of theoretical entity. By shifting 
the focus from theories in general to theories in particular, philosophers can dissolve the 
traditional realism debate, with the result that “realism and anti-realism are options to be 
exercised sometimes here and sometimes there” (2004, 337). This, in turn, opens up the 
possibility that “[t]here may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist 
about top quarks, and so on” (2004, 333). 
In order to show why this possibility represents an improvement over SSR and 
antirealism, we’ll now consider a case from the history of chemistry. This case concerns 
the composition of hydrochloric acid. Scheele was the first to decompose this acid, which 
he called “acid of salt,” and he identified its constituent substances as phlogiston and 
“dephlogisticated acid of salt” (1774/1931). However, it was a matter of some 
controversy whether he had succeeded in decomposing hydrochloric acid. According to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, all acids are composed of oxygen (the principle of 
acidity) and a radical, which can be either a simple substance or a compound (1789/1965, 
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65, 115). Neither Scheele nor any other chemist had been able to extract the oxygen from 
hydrochloric acid, which Lavoisier called “muriatic acid.”  And so Lavoisier held that it 
remained undecomposed, and, in accordance with his theory, he hypothesized that it must 
contain oxygen combined with what he called “the muriatic radical” (1789/1965, 71-72). 
As for Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt, Lavoisier held that it is a compound of 
muriatic acid and oxygen, which he called “oxygenated muriatic acid” (1789/1965, 73). 
Some years later, Davy argued that Scheele was correct, while Lavoisier was in error 
(1810, 236-37). On Davy’s view, muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and what he 
calls “oxymuriatic acid,” which is what Lavoisier called “oxygenated muriatic acid,” and 
what Scheele called “dephlogisticated acid of salt.”  Davy later went on to argue for the 
elementary nature of this latter substance, and proposed a new name for it: “Chlorine” 
(1811, 32). His approval of Scheele stems from the fact that Davy, like a number of 
latter-day phlogiston theorists, identified hydrogen with phlogiston.
1
  And the claim that 
hydrochloric acid is made up of hydrogen and dephlogisticated acid of salt, even if 
terminologically problematic, is essentially correct. Lavoisier, however, was in error 
since this acid contains no oxygen, thus falsifying his oxygen theory of acidity. 
Proponents of SSR, impressed by narratives of the Chemical Revolution 
according to which Lavoisier’s oxygen theory defeated the phlogiston theory, are often 
explicit that their realism applies to the oxygen theory but not to the phlogiston theory.
2
  
But in that case, SSR entails the implausible conclusion that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical 
exists, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt does not. It seems much better to 
																																																								
1
 See, e.g., Kirwan (1789, 4-5). 
2
 See, e.g., Hardin and Rosenberg (1982, 610) and Psillos (1999, 291). 
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conclude that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical doesn’t exist, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt does. 
Antirealism, at least of the Kuhnian variety, fares no better. Those influenced by 
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) views regarding incommensurability would claim that theoretical 
entities conceptualized by rival theories should be treated as different entities. However, 
chemists working in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shared a set of 
operations for producing the substance that was variously known as dephlogisticated acid 
of salt, oxymuriatic acid, and chlorine. It’s therefore implausible to maintain that, in light 
of the fact that these chemists held different theories, they were working with distinct 
theoretical entities. A trans-theoretical view of the substance that came to be known as 
chlorine is therefore preferable. 
By abandoning wholesale arguments in favor of retail arguments, we can sidestep 
these difficulties, and simply adopt realism about chlorine (whatever it was called and 
however it was conceptualized) and antirealism about Lavoisier’s muriatic radical. That 
said, by trading wholesale arguments for retail arguments, we face another difficulty, to 
which we’ll now turn. 
 
3. Can Philosophers Engage with Retail Arguments? 
 
Dicken (2013) has objected that those who abandon wholesale arguments in favor of 
retail arguments face a serious difficulty. In short, once one does so, it’s not clear that any 
“distinctively philosophical” issues remain to be addressed (2013, 564). Scientists are 
generally the ones who put forward retail arguments. And if the turn to retail arguments 
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amounts to merely repeating arguments scientists have offered first, then perhaps nothing 
distinctively philosophical remains to be done. Our goal in the remainder of the paper is 
to provide a way of engaging with retail arguments that is distinctively philosophical, and 
to thereby answer Dicken’s objection. 
We’ll start by considering how scientists demonstrate the existence of theoretical 
entities, and so we’ll now introduce another case from the history of science. This case 
concerns Thomson’s work on cathode rays and his determination of the mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the electron. According to the official website of the Nobel Prize, it was 
because of this work that Thomson “received the Nobel Prize in 1906 for the discovery of 
the electron, the first elementary particle.”
3
 Thomson (1897, 1906/1967) hypothesized 
that cathode rays are currents of “carriers of negative electricity” or “corpuscles”—what 
we now know as electrons.
4
 His hypothesis was not only about the nature of cathode rays, 
but also about the interaction among cathode rays and other theoretical entities such as 
electrostatic fields and electrons. In order to determine the mass-to-charge ratio, he 
measured the deflection of cathode rays passing through an electrostatic field, the 
strength of the electrostatic field, and other related magnitudes. He interpreted the value 
that he obtained for m/e in light of his hypothesis, and his experimental results confirmed 
that hypothesis. 
																																																								
3
 Retrieved January 27, 2016 from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/vacuum/experiment-1.html. See also 
Harré (2002) and Whittaker (1989). 
4
 For the identification of Thomson’s carriers with electrons, see the reprint of Thomson 
(1897) in Magie (1969), in which Magie makes the identification. 
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However, one might ask how it’s possible to infer from Thomson’s experimental 
confirmation of his hypothesis to the claim that he had thereby demonstrated the 
existence of the electron. Philosophers can engage with such a question. And regardless 
of the answers they provide, they must at least defend those answers by invoking some 
kind of criterion for concluding that the evidence that scientists have offered does or does 
not constitute a demonstration of the existence of a given entity. To take one example of 
such a criterion, Hacking (1983, 23) suggests manipulation: “if you can spray them then 
they are real.”  While Thomson manipulated cathode rays, he did not manipulate 
electrons, and so, according to Hacking’s criterion, Thomson did not offer evidence 
strong enough to demonstrate the existence of electrons. 
The important point, for our purposes, is that providing a criterion for granting the 
reality of a theoretical entity, and determining whether the evidence that scientists have 
offered satisfies that criterion, constitutes a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments. Scientists may be the ones who initially put forward retail arguments. But it is 
a distinctively philosophical task to determine a criterion that can distinguish those retail 
arguments that demonstrate the existence of a theoretical entity from those that do not. 
We thus have a way of answering Dicken’s objection, provided that, by invoking such a 
criterion, we are not thereby turning back to wholesale arguments. In the next section, 
we’ll introduce our criterion and argue that applying it does not amount to a wholesale 
argument. 
 
4. Ontological Commitment and Experimental Individuation 
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Our proposed criterion for granting the reality of theoretical entities is experimental 
individuation. A retail argument that demonstrates the experimental individuation of an 
entity is a good argument for realism about that entity. 
Individuation and ontological commitment are connected. When scientists are 
ontologically committed to the theoretical entities that they posit, this commitment 
involves not just a belief that the entities exist, but also a responsibility to demonstrate 
their existence. Demonstrating the existence of a posited entity requires scientists to find 
an individual instance or sample of that entity, and if a scientist posits a theoretical entity 
without individuating it, then her ontological commitment is empty. 
How do scientists individuate theoretical entities? Answering this question 
requires us to distinguish theoretical individuation from experimental individuation. 
Scientists theoretically individuate an entity if, in the course of theorizing, they describe a 
set of properties and behaviors of a posited entity by which they can identify it and 
distinguish it from other entities. However, these descriptions by which scientists 
theoretically individuate entities require evidence. Scientists can offer evidence for the 
existence of a theoretical entity if they produce an instance or sample of such an entity by 
performing an experiment. In doing so, they individuate an entity experimentally.
5
 
The relationship between theoretical individuation and experimental individuation 
is much the same as the relationship between theory and experiment more generally. 
																																																								
5
 Scientists may also individuate an entity observationally, by observing an instance or 
sample of such an entity. Since observation is itself a complex issue, and since 
participants in the realism debate rarely question the existence of entities that scientists 
have observed, we will not discuss observational individuation here. 
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Various worries about the theory-ladenness of experimentation are relevant here. If a 
theoretical hypothesis yields a prediction regarding some experimental result, the result 
may be interpreted in light of the hypothesis. Moreover, since a theoretical hypothesis 
may involve two or more theoretical entities and their interactions, it can be difficult to 
show that an experiment produces an instance or sample of the target entity, i.e., that it 
experimentally individuates that entity. And it can be difficult to judge whether an 
experiment produces a real individual, as opposed to a mere phenomenon that results 
from experimental apparatuses and their interactions with experimented objects. For 
these reasons, a criterion of experimental individuation that is sufficiently independent of 
theoretical interpretation is needed.  
Is there such a criterion for experimental individuation? One candidate is 
Hacking’s manipulation criterion, which we mentioned in Section 3. However, since 
experimenters can manipulate not just real individuals, but also mere phenomena, 
manipulation cannot singly serve as the criterion of experimental individuation. Chen 
(2016) takes Hacking’s criterion of manipulation, along with two other criteria, namely, 
separation and maintenance of structural unity, as jointly constituting a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the experimental individuation of a theoretical entity. In short, 
experiments that produce individuals are experiments that separate individuals from their 
surrounding environment, manipulate them, and maintain their structural unity 
throughout the process. Importantly, Chen’s further conditions ensure that the 
manipulated object is a real individual as opposed to a mere phenomenon. We take 
Chen’s criteria to offer a satisfactory account of experimental individuation. In Section 5, 
we’ll illustrate his criteria in terms of three retail arguments from the history of science, 
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and thereby provide some support for our claim that his criteria are satisfactory. 
For now, we wish to emphasize two points. First of all, experimental 
individuation is our proposed criterion for determining whether a retail argument 
successfully demonstrates the existence of some theoretical entity—it succeeds if it 
demonstrates the experimental individuation of that entity. Secondly, Chen’s three 
criteria provide an adequate account of what experimental individuation requires. 
Before moving on, we’ll discuss two potential problems with this proposal. First 
of all, some theoretical entities, like the chemical substances named by mass terms like 
‘water,’ ‘phlogiston,’ and ‘oxygen,’ are paradigm cases of non-individuals. It’s therefore 
not immediately obvious how we can appeal to the notion of experimental individuation 
when it comes to such entities. We propose to do so by considering the experimental 
individuation of samples of such substances, as we’ll illustrate in Section 5.1, in terms of 
Davy’s discovery of potassium. Since samples count as individuals, our criterion is 
applicable to cases involving non-individuals like chemical substances. 
Secondly, there’s the issue as to whether the application of our criterion amounts 
to a kind of wholesale argument. Whether a given retail argument demonstrates the 
experimental individuation of some theoretical entity is a local matter, grounded in the 
details of that argument. In contrast, wholesale arguments are not grounded in such local 
matters. Instead, they rely on claims regarding populations of theories in general, and it is 
for this reason that they embody the base rate fallacy. We’ve consciously avoided 
reasoning that may lead to the base rate fallacy. For example, we haven’t argued that the 
success of our best theories would be a miracle unless the entities they posit can be 
experimentally individuated. For these reasons, the application of our criterion to retail 
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arguments does not amount to a kind of wholesale argument. And in that case, we’ve 
provided a way of answering Dicken’s objection, since our criterion provides a way for 
philosophers to engage with retail arguments. 
 
5. Application of the Criterion to Three Retail Arguments 
 
Our goal at this point is to show how one can use the criterion we’ve proposed in order to 
engage with retail arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical 
entities. We’ll discuss three cases: Davy’s potassium, Lavoisier’s muriatic radical, and 
Thomson’s electron. 
 
5.1 A Realist Conclusion Regarding Davy’s Potassium 
 
To begin with, we’ll argue that Davy demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
potassium, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument for realism about 
that substance. 
 Davy first isolated potassium by decomposing potash, which he did by means of 
electrolysis (1808, 4-5). He was the first to decompose potash, though for some time, 
chemists suspected it to be a compound.
6
  Davy acted on a small piece of moistened 
potash with a Voltaic battery. As a result, at the negative surface of the battery Davy 
observed the appearance of “small globules having a high metallic lustre, and being 
precisely similar in visible characters to quicksilver” (1808, 5). In the lecture in which he 
																																																								
6
 See, e.g., Lavoisier (1965/1789, 156). 
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reports these results, Davy goes on to write: “These globules, numerous experiments soon 
shewed to be the substance I was in search of, and a peculiar inflammable principle the 
basis of potash” (1808, 5). And later in the lecture, he proposes the name “Potasium 
[sic]” for the basis of potash (1808, 32). 
 While this experiment, on its own, does not demonstrate the experimental 
individuation of a sample of potassium, subsequent experiments that Davy conducted do, 
and he shows that potassium satisfies all three of Chen’s criteria. First of all, there is 
Chen’s separation condition: scientists must separate the entities that they produce “from 
their environments” (2016, 348), and “from the experimental instruments that may have 
helped produce [them]” (2016, 365). In order to determine whether his results depended 
on the platinum instruments that he used, Davy performed a number of experiments using 
a variety of other materials, including copper, silver, and gold (1808, 5). And in order to 
determine whether his results depended on the fact that he conducted his experiments in 
the open atmosphere, he performed similar experiments in a vacuum (1808, 5). In all of 
these cases, he obtained the same results. These experiments collectively show that Davy 
had separated potassium from its surrounding environment (including the atmosphere and 
the other components of potash), and from the instruments that he used, thereby 
satisfying Chen’s separation condition. 
 Secondly, there is Chen’s condition regarding the maintenance of structural unity. 
Chen understands structural unity as the idea that “the components of an individual are 
structured into a whole in some specific manner” (2016, 358). Davy encountered a 
number of difficulties when it came to maintaining the structural unity of the globules of 
potassium that he had produced because “they acted more or less upon almost every body 
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to which they were exposed” (1808, 10). One of the first things Davy notes about the 
globules is that they did not last long—the ones that did not explode immediately after 
forming soon lost their metallic luster and became “covered by a white film” (1808, 5). 
Davy identifies this film as pure potash, and explains how it attracts moisture from the 
atmosphere, converting the globule into a saturated solution of potash (1808, 7). 
Eventually, Davy discovered one substance on which potassium did not have much of an 
effect, namely, recently distilled naphtha (1808, 10). He used that fluid to preserve 
globules of potassium, and he was able to examine the properties of potassium in the 
atmosphere by covering the globules with a thin film of naphtha. This method allowed 
Davy to maintain the structural unity of potassium, thus satisfying Chen’s condition. 
 Thirdly, there is Chen’s manipulation condition. Chen understands this condition in 
terms of the “instrumental use” of an object “to investigate other phenomena of nature” 
(2016, 358). Towards the end of the lecture in which he reports the electrolytic 
decomposition of potash, Davy conjectures that the globules of potassium he isolated 
“will undoubtedly prove powerful agents for analysis; and having an affinity for oxygene 
[sic] stronger than any other known substances, they may possibly supersede the 
application of electricity to some of the undecompounded bodies” (1808, 44). Making 
good on this conjecture would amount to showing that chemists can use potassium to 
decompose previously undecomposed substances, thereby satisfying Chen’s manipulation 
condition. And in the following year, Davy made good on this conjecture by using 
potassium to extract the oxygen from a previously undecomposed substance, namely, 
boracic acid, thereby decomposing it (1809, 76-77). 
 In sum, Davy shows that samples of potassium satisfy all three of Chen’s criteria. 
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And by demonstrating the experimental individuation of these samples, Davy presents us 
with a successful retail argument for realism about potassium. 
 
5.2 An Antirealist Conclusion Regarding Lavoisier’s Muriatic Radical 
 
We’ll now argue that Davy shows why the experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s 
muriatic radical is not possible, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument 
for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
As we discussed in Section 2, Lavoisier hypothesized that hydrochloric acid, 
which he called muriatic acid, is composed of oxygen and a hypothetical substance that 
he called the muriatic radical. He thereby theoretically individuated the muriatic radical 
as that substance which combines with oxygen to form muriatic acid, which, in turn, is 
converted into oxymuriatic acid (i.e., chlorine) by means of combining with even more 
oxygen. But as we emphasized in Section 4, theoretical individuation is a mere belief, 
and beliefs require evidence. 
Davy (1810, 235-36) provides a retail argument that demonstrates that the 
experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s radical is not possible. He emphasizes the 
results of various experiments that he and other chemists performed, which show that 
oxymuriatic acid combines with hydrogen to form muriatic acid. And he goes on to 
discuss those experiments that seem to show the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid into 
oxygen and muriatic acid. Davy observes that in these experiments, water is always 
present. And he concludes that the oxygen that such experiments produce results from the 
decomposition of the water, not from the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid, which has 
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not been demonstrated. If oxymuriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen, and muriatic acid 
contains oxymuriatic acid and hydrogen, then muriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen 
either. To adopt Davy’s later terminology, the only components of muriatic acid are 
hydrogen and chlorine. Experimentally individuating the muriatic radical would involve 
separating it from the oxygen with which it combines to form muriatic acid and 
oxymuriatic acid. And since Davy showed that this is not possible, he gives us a 
successful retail argument for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
 
5.3 A Skeptical Conclusion Regarding Thomson’s Electron 
 
Finally, we’ll argue that Thomson neither demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
the electron, nor shows that it is impossible. Hence, we have an example of an 
inconclusive retail argument. The proper response to such an argument is skepticism 
regarding the entity in question, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument 
regarding the existence of that entity. 
Thomson (1897) designed a new type of cathode ray tube (figure 1) to perform a 
deflection experiment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Thomson’s cathode ray tube in 1897. Reproduced from Thomson 1969, 586. 
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This tube contains a cathode C, a cylindrical anode A with a slit, a cylindrical metal ring 
B with a slit, and a pair of plates D and E that produce an electrostatic field. A cathode 
ray is produced when the cathode discharges, and the ray passes through the slits in A and 
B before passing through the electrostatic field produced by D and E. Thomson’s goal 
was to determine whether the ray would be deflected in the field, and to thereby 
determine the composition of cathode rays. The basic idea was that, if cathode rays were 
made of ethereal waves, the rays would not be deflected by an electrostatic field; if, 
however, the rays were made up of negatively electrified bodies, then the rays would be 
deflected by an electrostatic field. 
Thomson’s thought was that a cathode would produce both electric currents and 
cathode rays when discharging, and that, in order to determine the composition of 
cathode rays, it would be necessary to eliminate the electric currents and experiment with 
purified cathode rays. Purification is the function of the cylindrical metal ring B, which 
absorbs the electric currents leaked from A and thus ensures that the ray passing through 
B is pure. Thomson found that the purified cathode ray was deflected when it passed 
between the plates D and E, thus confirming that cathode rays are made up of negatively 
electrified bodies. 
While Thomson satisfies Chen’s criteria when it comes to cathode rays, he didn’t 
thereby experimentally individuate the electrons that make them up. Thomson succeeded 
in separating cathode rays from currents; purifying them with the metal ring B, and thus 
maintaining their structural unity; and manipulating them by deflecting them with an 
electrostatic field. According to Chen’s criteria, one can say that Thomson 
experimentally individuated cathode rays and demonstrated that they are currents of 
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negative electricity. But Thomson presupposed rather than demonstrated that the currents 
consist of electrons. He did not demonstrate the existence of electrons, because he did not 
experimentally individuate them. Hence, the proper response to the retail argument that 
Thomson gives us is neither realism nor antirealism, but rather skepticism regarding the 
existence of electrons, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our goal in this paper has been to provide a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments, and thereby show that, even if we dissolve the traditional realism debate, 
there is still philosophical work to be done. We’ve put forward the criterion of 
experimental individuation in order to determine whether a given retail argument 
demonstrates the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. And we’ve applied 
that criterion to three cases, with the result that the upshot of a retail argument can be 
either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding the existence of a particular kind of 
theoretical entity. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -757-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -136-
References 
 
Chen, Ruey-Lin (2016). “Experimental Realization of Individuality.” In Individuals 
Across the Sciences, ed. Thomas Pradeu and Alexandre Guay, 348-70. New York:  
Oxford University Press. 
 
Davy, Humphry (1808). “The Bakerian Lecture [for 1807], on Some New Phenomena of 
Chemical Changes Produced by Electricity, Particularly the Decomposition of the Fixed 
Alkalies, and the Exhibition of the New Substances Which Constitute Their Bases; And 
on the General Nature of Alkaline Bodies.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 98: 1-44. 
 
— (1809). “The Bakerian Lecture [for 1808]: An Account of Some New Analytical 
Researches on the Nature of Certain Bodies, Particularly the Alkalies, Phosphorus, 
Sulphur, Carbonaceous Matter, and the Acids Hitherto Undecompounded; With Some 
General Observations on Chemical Theory.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 99: 39-104. 
 
— (1810). Researches on the Oxymuriatic Acid, Its Nature and Combinations; And on 
the Elements of the Muriatic Acid. With Some Experiments on Sulphur and Phosphorus, 
Made in the Laboratory of the Royal Institution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 100: 231-57. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -758-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -137-
— (1811). The Bakerian Lecture [for 1810]: On Some of the Combinations of 
Oxymuriatic Gas and Oxygene, and on the Chemical Relations of These Principles, to 
Inflammable Bodies. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 101: 1-
35. 
 
Dicken, Paul (2013). “Normativity, the Base-Rate Fallacy, and Some Problems for Retail 
Realism.” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science 44(4): 563-70. 
 
Hacking, Ian (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hardin, Clyde L. and Alexander Rosenberg (1982). In Defense of Convergent Realism. 
Philosophy of Science 49(4): 604-15. 
 
Harré, Rom (2002). Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty Experiments that Changed our 
View of the World. New York: Dover. 
 
Kirwan, Richard (1789). An Essay on Phlogiston and the Constitution of Acids. 2nd ed. 
London: J. Johnson. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962/1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -759-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -138-
Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent (1789/1965). Elements of Chemistry. New York: Dover. 
 
Magie, William Francis, ed. (1969). A Source Book in Physics. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Magnus, P. D. and Craig Callender (2004). “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.” 
Philosophy of Science 71(3): 320-38. 
 
Psillos, Stathis (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Scheele, Carl Wilhelm (1774/1931). On Manganese or Magnesia; and Its Properties. In 
The Collected Papers of Charles Wilhelm Scheele, Translated from the Swedish and 
German Originals by Leonard Dobbin, 17-49. London: G. Bell and Sons. 
 
Thomson, Joseph John (1897). “Cathode Rays.” Philosophical Magazine, Fifth Series 44: 
293-316. 
 
— (1906/1967). “Carriers of Negative Electricity. Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1906.” 
In Nobel Lectures: Physics, 1901-1921, 145-53. Amsterdam: Elsevier Press. 
 
— (1969). “The Electron.” In Magie 1969, 583-97. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -760-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -139-
Whittaker, Edmund Taylor (1989). A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity. 
New York: Dover. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -761-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -140-
Chirimuuta (forthcoming)  Robustness in Neuroscience 
 
Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in 
Neuroscience: 
Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down?1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various 
mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology 
and neuroscience (e.g. redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions 
originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering 
aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness; (2) formulating 
hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness; and (3) quantifying robustness. 
Furthermore, I argue that the significant disanalogies between brains and 
engineered artefacts raise important questions about the applicability of the 
engineering framework. I argue that the use of such concepts should be 
understood as a kind of simplifying idealization.  
 
 
“The brain is a physical device that performs specific functions; therefore, its 
design must obey general principles of engineering.” 
Sterling and Laughlin (2015:xv) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I discuss a cluster of issues around the understanding of 
robustness in neuroscience. Systems biologist, Hiroaki Kitano defines 
                                                        
1 M. Chirimuuta. History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. 
mac289@pitt.edu. Accepted for presentation at the 2016 Philosophy of 
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robustness as, “a property that allows a system to maintain its functions 
against internal and external perturbations” (Kitano 2004, p.826). According 
to this definition, in order to determine whether or not a system is robust, one 
must specify its function, and also specify the kinds of perturbation it faces. 
Empirically determinable questions then follow about how exactly the system 
achieves its robustness. Various means for making systems robust have been 
discussed across biology and neuroscience: copy redundancy, fail-safes, 
degeneracy, modularity, passive reserve, active compensation, plasticity, 
decoupling, and feedback (see Figure 1). It is obvious, but still worth 
emphasising, that most of these notions originate from engineering.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The Engineering Framework for Robustness. A set of terms 
originating from engineering and control theory, which are applied to 
biological systems to explain how they achieve robust performance. 
 
In Section 2 of this paper I argue that the framework of concepts borrowed 
from engineering aids neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness by 
specifying functions of the system and determining possible sources of 
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perturbation; (2) formulating hypotheses about means for the system to 
achieve robustness; and (3) showing how robustness may be precisely 
quantified. This will be shown with examples of neuroscientific research 
which aims to measure robustness in a retinal circuit (Sterling and Freed 
2007), in the motor cortex (Svoboda 2015), and to develop models of 
homeostatic control (Davis 2006, O’Leary 2014).  
 
In Section 3 I argue that the use of the engineering framework in 
neuroscience gets stretched, perhaps to breaking point, when applied to 
systems where (1) there is no principled distinction between processes for 
robustness and processes which continually maintain the life of the cell; (2) 
where perturbations are a regular occurrence rather than anomalous events; 
and (3) where one should not conceive of the system as seeking to maintain a 
steady state. This point will be illustrated through examination of some 
recent work from Eve Marder’s laboratory, one of the key centres for research 
on robustness in neuroscience. 
 
I will argue that the limitations of the engineering notions are put into stark 
relief when one examines neural systems through the lens of the process 
approach to biology (Dupré 2012). The engineering perspective, to the extent 
that it treats biological systems as pre-specified objects with fixed functions, 
misses many of the features that make robust biological systems fascinating 
and which are highlighted by the process view. 
 
In Section 4 I will consider if it is necessary to re-engineer the concepts of 
robustness to be more in line with the dynamicism of biological systems; or 
alternatively, if we should accept the engineering perspective as it is, as one 
amongst many idealizing and simplifying heuristics for understanding 
complex systems like the brain. 
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2. PUTTING THE ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK TO USE 
 
The robustness of the brain is one of its many extraordinary attributes. By 
this I mean the fact that brains can undergo moderately severe external 
perturbations while still maintaining approximately normal function. 
Obviously, robustness has its limits and the brain’s characteristic patterns of 
resilience and fragility are an important target of research (Sporns 2010, 
chap. 10). In order to investigate robustness it is necessary first to specify 
what sorts of perturbations the system is robust to, and then to quantify how 
robust it actually is. Explanations of robustness can be developed by testing 
hypotheses concerning the exact mechanisms by which robust performance is 
achieved. The engineering framework can be put to effective use in each of 
these processes. 
 
For example, Sterling and Freed (2007) pose the question of how robust the 
retinal circuit is. They define robustness as the factor by which intrinsic 
capacity exceeds normal demand, which is the engineer’s notion of margin of 
safety (p.563). The idea can be illustrated through their comparison with 
bridge design. An engineer designing a road bridge will consider both the 
anticipated normal demand (e.g. commuter traffic) as well as the unusual 
demands that might occasionally be placed on the bridge (e.g. the passage of 
a 30 ton military vehicle). The unusual demand can be thought of as a 
“perturbation” in Kitano’s terms. A robust design will ensure that the system 
does not break when pushed beyond normal conditions. For a bridge this can 
be achieved with passive reserve (using thicker steel than is needed under 
normal conditions) and redundancy (including additional beams so that there 
are back-up structures if any parts are compromised). 
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Sterling and Freed take the bridge case to be analogous to the retinal circuit. 
Normal demand, for the retina, is the intensity of illumination that the eye 
will encounter under naturalistic stimulation conditions. The safety factor is 
calculated by experimental determination of the maximum illumination level 
under which neurons in the retina can maintain their ability to signal to 
downstream neurons. Sterling and Freed (2007, p.570) report that,  
“across successive stages in this neural circuit, safety factors are on the 
order of 2–10. Thus, they resemble those in other tissues and systems. 
Their similarity across stages also accords with the principle of 
symmorphosis—that efficient design matches capacities across stages that 
are functionally coupled….”  
 
Sterling and Freed’s explanation of robustness depends on the notion of 
passive reserve. For photoreceptor neurons, this is calculated as the number 
of vesicles of neurotransmitter available in their synapse for continuous 
signalling at high-rates without restocking of the vesicles (p.565-6). In 
arriving at their conclusion about retinal safety margins, they argue that 
there are at least twice as many vesicles as needed under normal stimulation 
conditions. In this case we have seen that a design approach borrowed from 
civil engineering plays a clear and striking role in these neuroscientist’s 
definition, operationalization and explanation of robustness in the retina.   
 
Another example comes from Davis’s (2006) review of work on homeostatic 
regulation2 in the nervous system. As he writes:  
                                                        
2 Note that Davis makes a conceptual distinction between robust properties 
and properties under homeostatic control: “In general, robustness describes a 
system with a reproducible output, whereas homeostasis refers to a system 
with a constant output” (2006, p.308). I will ignore this difference for the 
purposes of the paper since homeostatic systems conform to Kitano’s general 
definition robust systems.  
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“Homeostatic control systems are best understood in engineering theory, 
where they are routinely implemented in systems such as aircraft flight 
control. Recently, biological signaling systems have been analyzed with 
the tools of engineering theory….” (p.314)  
Accordingly, homeostatic control systems have a number of “required 
features”: 1) a set point which defines the target output of the system; 2) 
feedback; 3) precision in resetting the output back to the set point, following a 
perturbation; and (normally) 4) sensors which measure the difference 
between the actual output and the set point (p.309). 
 
Thus control theory offers neuroscientists clear and experimentally testable 
criteria for determining whether a system undergoes homeostatic regulation, 
by looking for these required features (e.g. the existence of a set point) in a 
system. The operating conditions of homeostatic regulation, and the 
biophysical mechanisms of feedback, sensors, etc., are also open to 
experimental investigation. Reported examples of properties under 
homeostatic control are muscle excitation at the neuromuscular junction 
(p.309) and bursting properties of invertebrate neurons (p.311). More 
recently, O’Leary et al. (2014, p.818) argue that ion channel expression in 
their simplified model of invertebrate neurons can be understood as an 
implementation of integral control, a standard control-theoretic architecture.  
 
Figure 2 (if space) schematic for integral control 
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3. CRASH TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
Before considering the question of whether the engineering framework 
becomes structurally unsound when applied to some kinds of neural systems, 
I would like to draw our attention to some of its features. The basic ideas are 
clearly illustrated in Sterling and Freed’s (2007) example of the bridge. When 
one considers the robustness of an engineered artefact like the bridge, it is 
presupposed that the system is built up from component parts in such a way 
as to achieve a specific function. The robustness of the bridge is conceptually 
distinct from its other designed features or functions, and it can trade off 
against some of them. For example, the more robust the bridge is to the 
passage of the occasional heavy vehicle, the more expensive it will be to build 
(because requiring more steel) (p.563). Moreover, the perturbations against 
which the system is robust are thought of as atypical events, also 
conceptually distinct from the normal operations of the system.  
 
There is also the tendency to think of robustness as allowing the system, 
following a perturbation, to return to its initial stable state. Some 
experiments specifically involve the operationalization of the robustness of a 
system as the reversion to a prior state. For example, reporting on an 
experiment in which mouse premotor cortex in one hemisphere was inhibited 
using optogenetics during the preparation period for the animal’s movement, 
Svoboda (2015)3 writes, that “[t]his preparatory activity is remarkably robust 
to large-scale unilateral optogenetic perturbations: detailed dynamics that 
drive specific future movements are quickly and selectively restored by the 
network.” This notion of robustness as the ability of the system to revert to a 
                                                        
3 To my knowledge, these results have not yet been published in a journal. I 
have contacted the author to find out if the study is under review or in press.  
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prior functional states is similar to the idea of homeostasis as the ability of a 
system to stabilize some quantity in spite of external changes.  
 
Figure 3 (if space) After Kitano (2004, Figure 1) 
 
Eve Marder’s laboratory has carried out a long term investigation into the 
ability of neurons to maintain stable electrophysiological properties despite 
continual turnover of the ion channels embedded in the cell membrane which 
are responsible for its electrical excitability. This research project is one of 
the central examples of the study of robustness in neural systems. Marder 
and her collaborators make ample use of the engineering framework when 
reviewing other results and reporting their findings. For example, O’Leary et 
al. (2013, p.E2645) write: 
“Both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that maintaining 
stable intrinsic excitability is accomplished via homeostatic, negative 
feedback processes that use intracellular Ca2+ concentrations as a sensor 
of activity and then alter[s] the synthesis, insertion, and degradation of 
membrane conductances to achieve a target activity level.”  
 
What is striking about the characterization of electrophysiological stability in 
the face of ion channel turnover as a kind of robustness in the face of a 
perturbation (e.g. p.E2651), is the fact that the turnover is just part of the 
normal physiology of the cell. There is no functional and stable state of the 
cell in which this turnover does not occur—a fact which these authors also 
highlight.4 This brings our attention to some strains in the application of the 
engineering framework to this biological system.  
                                                        
4 “neurons in the brains of long-lived animals must maintain reliable function 
over the animal’s lifetime while all of their ion channels and receptors are 
replaced in the membrane over hours, days, or weeks. Consequently, ongoing 
turnover of ion channels of various types must occur without compromising 
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In the basic engineering characterisation of robustness, sketched above, 
perturbations are different from the normal circumstances in which the 
system is expected to operate. “Perturbation” carries the everyday 
connotation of an event which throws the system off balance and is 
deleterious to its normal functioning. We cannot think of the events of ion 
channel turnover as perturbations in this sense; they are business as usual 
for the cell. 
 
Furthermore, it is not in the nature of the system to seek to return to a prior, 
stable arrangement of its parts. A crucial property of the nervous system is 
its plasticity: the tendency for its component parts and the connections 
linking them to be continually sculpted by experience. The homeostatic 
mechanisms which Marder and colleagues investigate need to be understood 
as maintaining specific properties (such as a cell’s Ca2+ concentration) at a 
certain point, but not (nor do these researchers claim it) some generalised 
operation for achieving system-wide internal stability (see §4.4). 
 
In the basic engineering conception of robustness, there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between the features of a system which allow it to carry out its 
intended function, and those which make the system robust (even if in reality 
one individual feature can serve both purposes). In the case of the neuron 
which has continual ion channel turnover and no definite stable state to 
return to following these “perturbations”, it is not clear that we can we make 
this distinction. A more natural way to think about this and other biological 
systems is as ones, unlike engineered artefacts, “designed” to keep changing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the essential excitability properties of the neuron” (O’Leary et al. 2013, 
p.E2645). 
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and “designed” to maintain functional stability in the midst of this constant 
change.5  
 
The tensions and strains associated with the application of the basic 
engineering framework to biological systems can be felt more sharply if we 
appeal to a process metaphysics of biological “things” (Dupré 2012). According 
to this view, organisms are not substances but processes—items whose 
existence depends on the taking place of certain changes. This highlights the 
fact that the life of organisms depends on a continual turnover of its 
component parts, and that the system as a whole, while living, persists longer 
than its parts. Yet features and functions of the organism remain relatively 
stable. For example, memories can endure for decades even though the 
neurons that form them have undergone material change. This stability must 
be achieved—somehow. And so processes for robustness are not cleanly 
distinct from the general maintenance processes which keep the organism 
alive. 
 
The processual nature of neurons is nicely described by Marder and Goaillard 
(2012, p.563): 
“each neuron is constantly rebuilding itself from its constituent proteins, 
using all of the molecular and biochemical machinery of the cell.”  
(and see F n 4) 
                                                        
5  This blurring of the lines between mechanisms for robustness and 
mechanisms for life is highlighted by Edelman & Gally (2001: 13763) in their 
discussion of the difference between redundancy and degeneracy in biological 
systems: “the term redundancy somewhat misleadingly suggests a property 
selected exclusively during evolution, either for excess capacity or for fail-safe 
security. We take the contrary position that degeneracy is not a property 
simply selected by evolution, but rather is a prerequisite for and an 
inescapable product of the process of natural selection itself.” They also 
discuss another disanalogy between engineered and biological systems—the 
applicability of “design” talk.  
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We can contrast this with the substance metaphysics that we usually assume 
when thinking about engineered artefacts. A bridge or an aeroplane is what 
it is because of the parts which comprise it. Its existence does not depend on 
the occurrence of any process. This is not to deny that an expert in the theory 
of matter might well argue that the steel of the bridge maintains its integrity 
because of some fundamental processes. The point is that when 
characterising the robustness of the bridge or the aeroplane we would not 
resort to such sophistication. Rather, we think of the bridge as a substance 
and not a process—a steel structure which, in order to maintain its function 
in the face of perturbation, must resist rather than effect the swapping 
around of its component parts.  
 
 
4. EXAMINING REASONS TO RE-ENGINEER 
 
Now that we have noted these disanalogies between biological organisms and 
engineered things, we ought to worry that the framework borrowed from 
engineering is misleading when thinking about robustness in the brain and 
other biological systems. Is it time to re-engineer our conceptual tools for 
thinking about robustness to make them more suitable for characterising 
living things? In this section I consider four possible answers to this question.  
 
4.1 No. The terms in the engineering framework are just words that are used 
to facilitate communication of the neuroscientific results.6   
 
One potential response to the concerns raised in the previous section is that 
they stem from a superficial fixation on the vocabulary neuroscientists use 
when writing about their research. Just because the authors discussed above 
                                                        
6 A response along these lines was suggested to me by Timothy O’Leary, in 
conversation.  
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have employed certain words first introduced by engineers, it does not follow 
that their understanding of neurophysiology is distorted by comparisons with 
engineering. For example, I mentioned that the word “perturbation” has a 
negative connotation which makes it seem inappropriate when describing 
non-pathological and frequent events like ion channel turnover. It could well 
be that in the context of this research the term takes on a different 
meaning—for example, as any event that the system cannot directly control,7 
such as changes in protein configuration due to thermal noise.  
 
I believe that this response is warranted by what we know of the 
methodology of some of the investigations discussed above, but not all of 
them. In the case of Sterling and Freed (2007) I was careful to show that the 
engineering conceptions directly shaped how these neuroscientists 
operationalized and quantified robustness, and how they identified 
mechanisms by which robustness is achieved. There is no indication that they 
used terms such as “safety factor” to mean something radically different in 
the context of neuroscience.   
 
A very explicit statement of the aim to apply engineering principles directly 
to the understanding of the premotor cortex comes from Svoboda (2015): 
“preparatory activity is distributed in a redundant manner across weakly 
coupled modules. These are the same principles used to build robustness 
into engineered control systems. Our studies therefore provide an example 
of consilience between neuroscience and engineering.”  
Thus the convergence between a neurophysiological and the engineering 
perspective on the mouse motor planning system is taken to be an important 
result of this study. This echoes Sterling and Laughlin’s (2015, pp. xiii-xv) 
proposal that enquiring to see how engineering principles are implemented in 
                                                        
7 I thank Timothy O’Leary for this suggestion.  
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neural systems, and the attempt thereby to reverse-engineer the brain, leads 
to insights not otherwise available through routine data collection.  
 
4.2 No. The inadequacies you point out with the engineering framework are 
based on a caricature of mechanical engineering, not the actual complex 
discipline.8 
 
My characterisation of the engineering framework assumes that mechanical 
engineering (the design of bridges, aeroplanes and such like) is paradigmatic 
of the engineering approach in general. But of course there are many 
different kinds of engineering, from mechanical to electronic to 
communications and chemical. It could well be that the mismatch between 
understanding the robustness of a highly dynamic entity like the brain, and 
the rather static conception of robust objects that falls out of the basic 
engineering framework is just an artefact of only focussing narrowly on the 
kind of engineering that is actually furthest away from neuroscience.   
 
It would take me beyond the scope of this short article (and well beyond my 
own knowledge of the subject) to sketch out the various possible frameworks 
associated with each field of engineering specifically, and to see which 
conception of robustness is most suitable for biology. However, what I will say 
is that there is evidence in the studies discussed above that neuroscientists 
themselves do sometimes draw from the mechanically based caricature. This 
is particularly true of Sterling and Freed (2007). In contrast, when Davis 
(2006) and O’Leary (2014) make direct appeal to engineering they refer 
specifically to models in control theory.9 This invites questions, still, about 
whether the paradigm examples of controlled systems (e.g. a car driven on 
                                                        
8 This concern was raised by Arnon Levy and Timothy O’Leary. 
9 See also Zhang and Chase (2015) on the physical control system perspective 
on brain computer interfaces for motor rehabilitation. 
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cruise control, a Watt governor, or an aeroplane flown on autopilot) are 
dynamical enough capture the processual nature of the nervous system.  
 
4.3 Yes. The brain is so different from an engineered artefact that the 
framework is misleading and inappropriate. 
 
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 I discussed two reasons for thinking that we should 
not be concerned about any radical disanalogy between robustness in 
biological and engineered systems. While I agree that these are important 
points to keep in mind, I do not think that they diffuse the fundamental 
concern that when neuroscientists borrow engineers’ terms in order to study 
robustness, they risk mischaracterising the brain as more like an engineered 
artefact than it actually is. Is the appropriate conclusion, then, that a neural 
circuit is so different from a bridge or an aeroplane that the engineering 
framework is simply misleading and should be discarded? 
 
The best way to make this strong negative case is to consider some historical 
examples in which reasoning by analogy with engineered systems seems to 
have lead neuroscientists and theorists astray. One example comes from von 
Békésy, a physicist and communications engineer who turned his attention to 
inhibition in the nervous system.  In his book Sensory Inhibition he notes 
that there are feedback loops everywhere in nervous system and he asks how 
it is that system manages to avoid ending up in a dysfunctional oscillatory 
state (1967, p.25). It seems that von Békésy is importing his understanding of 
systems containing feedback from engineering, and in that context 
oscillations are normally problematic and efforts must be made to dampen 
them. These days neuroscientists seek to understand how oscillations in the 
healthy brain  (i.e. its characteristic patterns of endogenous activity) are 
actually responsible for cognitive functions, and how these oscillations differ 
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from the ones associated with pathologies such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s 
disease.10  
 
Another example is the comparison of the effects of “noise” in brains and 
artificial signalling systems…… GET EXAMPLE 
 This is very different from how neuroscientists understand noise today, 
which begins with the idea that brains evolved under constraints imposed by 
noisy “components”, which has therefore shaped all aspects of neural 
computation (Faisal et al. 2008). It would be a mistake to think of the brain 
processing information in the same way as an electronic computer, but with 
added redundancy to offset the noisiness of individual processing streams. 
 
 
The cautionary tales just told give some concrete indications of how 
imposition of the engineering framework on to neural systems can lead to 
conclusions which in retrospect appear false and misguided. But it would be 
too hasty infer from these two examples that current work on robustness in 
neuroscience is of dubious standing whenever it appeals to the concepts of 
engineering. A more general argument is the following: the brain is not like a 
bridge (or a computer, or an aeroplane on autopilot….); therefore whenever 
neuroscientists appeal to terms borrowed from the analysis of such systems, 
they risk saying things that are simply false because they fail to notice 
relevant disanalogies. This lays all the sceptical cards on the table. In the last 
part of the paper I attempt to mitigate these worries.  
 
                                                        
10 For a scientific overview see Buzsáki (2006).  For discussion of 
philosophical implications, see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013). See also 
Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013, p.160) on a parallel difference across 
engineering and cell biology, where oscillations are found to have a functional 
role. 
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4.4 No. Use of the engineering framework should be thought of as a 
simplifying strategy. 
 
Neuroscientist Steven Rose (2012:61) writes that:  
“one of the most common but misleading terms in the biology student’s 
lexicon is homeostasis….[the] concept of the stability of the body’s internal 
environment. But such stability is achieved by dynamic responses; stasis 
is death, and homeodynamics needs to replace homeostasis as the relevant 
concept”11 
This seems to capture the problem that was first noted in Section 3, that we 
should not be mislead by the engineering framework into thinking of neural 
systems as seeking to maintain an initial stable state. But we also noted that 
the neuroscientists employing control-theoretic models of homeostatic 
mechanisms are not thinking of their systems as seeking stability in this very 
general way. Instead, they are modelling the stability of a specific variable—
in the case of O’Leary et al. (2014), the concentration of Ca2+—and 
investigating the mechanisms by which it is controlled. To this end, it is 
reasonable to interpret the system as an integral controller (p.818).12 Thus it 
is still useful to talk about homeostasis with respect to Ca2+ concentration, 
even while thinking of the system as a whole, and in reality, as a 
“homeodynamic” one. 
 
                                                        
11 Compare Sterling (2012) on the concept of allostasis – stability through 
change with an emphasis on predictive regulation. Day (2005) and O’Leary 
and Wyllie (2011), in contrast, argue that the concept of homeostasis easily 
accommodates these dynamic and predictive aspects, and that the term 
allostasis is therefore superfluous. It is an interesting question (but beyond 
the scope of this paper) whether the narrow or wide definition of homeostasis 
is currently more prevalent amongst biologists and neuroscientists.  
12 Note that O’Leary et al. (2014) study of homeostasis is via a model of a 
neuron. But the model is realistic enough that it is expected to shed light on 
actual biophysical mechanisms. 
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I think of neuroscientists whose investigation of robustness in the brain is 
scaffolded by the engineering framework as providing idealized mechanistic 
explanations. Their explanatory target is, for example, the process by which 
overall neuronal activity level is controlled via regulation of ion channel gene 
transcription through a Ca2+ sensitive feedback loop. This is standard fodder 
for mechanistic explanation. At the same time, the framework of 
engineering—in this case the schematic of the integral controller—serves to 
direct attention to specific parts and processes in the extremely complex 
cellular machinery and to interpret them in control theoretic terms (sensors, 
feedback loops, etc.), while bracketing other aspects not immediately relevant 
to the explanation of robustness.  
 
Bechtel (2015, p.92) has presented the case that: 
“mechanisms are [to be] viewed not as entities in the world, but as posits 
in mechanistic explanations that provide idealized accounts of what is in 
the world.” 
His example is the idealization (understood as “falsehood”) that scientists 
introduce by putting boundaries around putative mechanisms which in 
nature do not exist. In the cases explored in this paper, the idealization 
comes in through the analogical reasoning of treating a neuronal system as if 
it is an engineered artefact. This, like the positing of boundaries, is a useful 
way to simplify the explanandum. It enables neuroscientists to bracket some 
of the known facts about the brain’s messy, Heraclitean nature. But it means, 
perhaps, that there is a stark difference between the brain viewed sub specie 
aeternatis (what some neuroscientists call the “ground truth” of the brain) 
and viewed sub specie mechinae (in the guise of a machine).  
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Eight Myths about Scientific Realism 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Selective realist projects have made significant improvements over the last two decades. 
Judging by the literature, however, antirealist quarters seem little impressed with the results. Section I 
considers the selectivist case and its perceived shortcomings. One shortcoming  is that selectivist offerings 
are nuanced in ways that deprive them of features that—according to many—cannot be absent from any 
realism “worth  having”. Section II (the main part of the paper) considers eight features widely required of 
realist positions, none of them honored by selectivist projects. Modulo those requirements, even if 
selectivists managed to clear other shortcomings of their project selectivism would still not be a position 
worth considering. Next the historical background and present credentials of the requirements in question 
are examined. All are found to rest on myths and confusions about science and knowledge. If this is correct, 
realists and antirealists should reject the requirements. 
 
I. Background 
The antirealist waves of the 1980s stifled naïve realist projects, but they also gave rise to critical 
realist reactions, particularly a shift in the way theories are accepted at face value from whole 
constructs to selected “theory-parts” (existence claims, narratives and structures regarding 
features beyond the reach of unaided perception). Moves in this “selectivist” direction were 
variously developed in the 1980s and 1990s, most influentially by Leplin (1984), Worrall 
(1989b), Kitcher (1993), Leplin (1997), and Psillos (1999). Selectivists see in the history of 
science a past littered not just with failures but also clear successes, especially after the 
consolidation of methodologies focused on impressive novel prediction in the early 19th century. 
The successes selectivists point to involve law-like structures all over physics, functional (as 
opposed to formally “fundamental”) entities like the particles invoked by the kinetic theory of 
matter, numerous extinct species hypothesized by Darwin and his circle, structures and processes 
from microbiology, much in Mendelian genetics, myriads of  molecular structures, and most of 
the subatomic entities deemed well-established since the 1950s, along countless causal networks, 
histories and functional entities in virtually all theories with warrant in terms of impressive novel 
predictive success. Selectivists thus respond to skeptical readings of the history of science with 
optimistic readings, which they argue are better justified than Laudan (1981)’s skeptical appeals. 
History, Leplin (1984) noted early in the debate on selectivism, is not opposed to realism any 
more than our experience of ordinary objects is unambiguously veridical.  
In selectivist terms, successful scientific theories may provide imperfect representations 
of unobservable aspects of some of their intended domains, but they do get those aspects right to 
some significant extent—and that is what matters to a realist stance. Realism has to do with 
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having warranted augmentative inference at levels that reach into unobservables, i.e. beyond the 
level allowed by its contrast position—constructive empiricism. 
Developing selectivism into a mature project has not proved easy. The initial criteria 
proposed for identifying theory-parts worthy of realist commitment were either too vague or 
picked up through “retrospective” projection of current. As Kyle Stanford (2006) cautioned, 
mere retrospective projection of current science reflects limitations of human imagination as 
easily as it does truth-content and can be variously misleading; also, it can be self-serving, and 
worse still it severely weakens selectivism by giving up the traditional realist goal of identifying 
the truthful parts of a theory while the theory is still alive. Realists need to develop compelling 
criteria for prospective projection, applicable to theories in full flight, and over the last decade 
selectivists have moved imaginatively to respond to this challenge. One promising contribution 
is a stronger emphasis on impressive novel predictions as a marker of success and truth content. 
This trend is multiply developed in works that revisit in detail the cases most used by antirealists 
as springboard exemplars of gross epistemic failure, as well as studies of other seemingly 
germane cases from the last 200 years (e.g. Saatsi 2005, Saatsi & Vickers 2011, Votsis 2011, 
Vickers 2013, @@@). While the debate is far from over, upgraded proposals are on view in the 
selectivist analyses just cited. At the very least, the initial antirealist arguments from radical 
underdetermination and so-called “skeptical inductions” have been weakened by selectivist 
challenges to the antirealist arguments at work. Still, many critics join Stanford in thinking that 
selectivism lacks a convincing realist criterion for prospective identification of theory-parts. As 
said, promising selectivist developments seem on view in this regard, but there is something else. 
Something seems to be making the selectivist project intellectually unattractive in some 
quarters, independently of the issue about the criterion for theory-parts. There is, in particular, a 
perception (not least among many sympathizers of realism) that selectivism advances its case at 
the cost of diluting its realist import, resulting in a stance “not worth having.” By the lights of 
selective realism, an empirically successful theory T contributes significant truths about 
unobservables but  
(1) typically, what makes T approximately true is that abstract versions of some of its 
parts are truthful, making the realist stance applicable to selected fragments of T rather 
than the integral whole initially intended;  
(2) such truth as T contains need not have universal applicability;   
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(3) T need not offer literal truth at its most fundamental level;  
(4) the significance of T’s central terms is high in unificationist rather than epistemic 
terms;  
(5) T adds significantly to our knowledge of unobservables in the intended domain, but 
there is no reason to expect T to be “right for the most part” at any level (what matters is 
that it yields epistemic gain at theoretical levels). 
(6) T may not instantiate uniformly convergent progress towards any “final description;”  
(7) the intelligibility T confers to its intended domain is generally incomplete. 
 
Each of the above tenets clashes head on with widespread assumptions and expectations 
regarding a realist stance about theories. The latter, many believe, should (1) constitute integral 
wholes, (2) apply universally, (3) give correct theoretical description, (4) have central terms that 
refer, (5) be, at least, right for the most part. (6) display epistemic progress, and (7) offer 
substantial intelligibility of the intended domains, Behind these expectations about scientific 
theories and what theoretical claims amount to is a view on what a realist position worth having 
comprises: to be worth having, a realist position must encompass strong versions of most of the 
listed assumptions. Antirealists (and not a few realists) routinely take these assumptions for 
granted. This aspect of the debate needs discussion because, as noted, the assumptions in 
question are clearly at odds with the selectivist strategy, which—generalizing Worrall (2016) a 
bit—might be the only viable realist game in town.  
 
II. Taxing Assumptions  
There is a view, shared by numerous scientists, according to which scientific realism cannot be a 
position worth having unless it encompasses most of the traits listed at the end of the last section. 
One problem with those traits is that they provide antirealists with fodder for criticizing positions 
that embrace them and realists for dismissing positions that lack them. Let us consider the listed 
items in detail. 
 
(1) Theories as Integral Wholes. Selectivism rejects the view that theories and conceptual 
networks are intellectual constructs made of non-separable parts. The integral wholes vision 
commits realism to nothing less than complete theories. Motivations for it come from at least two 
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fronts. One includes linguistic holism and/or the statement view of theories, endorsed in the 
1960s and 1970s by thinkers as superficially different as Ernest Nagel and Thomas Kuhn. 
Another motivation, good for a weaker version of the vision, has been the presumption that some 
concepts are grounded in “metaphysical necessities,” a position widely held in natural science 
until the early 1900s. In the 19th century it was thought that breaking of a theory into 
independently assertible parts had drastic limits. A case in point was the need felt for positing an 
ether of light, as at the time waves were conceived of within a traditional metaphysics that 
regarded them as propagating disturbances and thus as ontologically dependent entities that 
required the existence of something being disturbed (@@@). Institutional deference towards 
similarly presumed conceptual necessities is massively lower now. One major inflection point 
was the acceptance of Einstein’s Special Relativity, which opened the road to changes in both the 
conception of light and the requirements of intelligibility in physics.  
Nobody thinks now that light is completely as Fresnel or Maxwell imagined, yet— 
having no conceptual links closed to the possibility of scientific revision— there is little question 
that Fresnel’s theory got many things right, e.g. what might be termed “Fresnel’s Core”: light is 
made of microscopic transversal undulations, and these undulations follow the Fresnel laws of 
reflection and refraction. Abstracted from reference to the wave substratum, this schematic part 
of the theory spells out a descriptive core that all subsequent theories of light have retained. Once 
conceptual networks are recognized as relations sustained by revisable inductive conjunctions, 
scientific “good sense” allows shifts in science towards theory-parts cut out from the rest. There 
is a historical supplement to this.  There has never been much serious allegiance to theory 
“unbreakability” in scientific practice. As scientists developed their ideas, virtually all took a 
realist stance towards just selected parts of a theory at hand while taking a non-realist stance 
towards other parts (e.g. Newton’s approach towards Kepler’s cosmology and Galileo’s 
mechanics; 19th century wave theorists towards particle theories of light, Einstein towards 
Fresnel’s Core, Einstein towards Newtonian mechanics, molecular geneticists towards 
Mendelian genetics, and so forth). Being selective about what to take at face value in a theory is 
exactly what selective realists do, also what we all do in ordinary life. The idea that proper 
theories are unbreakable integral wholes just rests on myth. 
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(2) Universality. Another widespread assumption is that, for realism, proper scientific theories 
must hold universally. We find this view expressed in e.g. van Fraassen (1980: 86): from a realist 
perspective, he claims, ‘‘a theory cannot be true unless it can be extended consistently, without 
correction, to all of nature’’  
This request rests on myth. There is no reason to think that interesting theories can be so 
extended even at the lowest phenomenal level. Generalizations limited to the observable level 
typically turn out to be true only over restricted ranges, just as with theoretical generalizations. 
The standards of acceptability should not be arbitrarily raised against scientific theories. So, past 
successful theories could not be extended consistently, without correction, to all of nature. 
However, as selectivists show, those theories made significant cognitive gains at significant 
levels, where various assortments of the theoretical descriptions they licensed remain both 
accurate and illuminating. The universality objection, it seems, burdens realism with a suicidal 
demand. 
 
(3) Truthful description. Realists are allegedly claim that what a theory T says about entities, 
properties, relations and processes should be construed literally; and to take a realist stance 
towards T is to believe that what it says is literally true. This view comprises three major lines: 
(3a) literalism, (3b) accuracy realism, and (3c) a methodological supplement.  
 
(3a) Like their biblical counterparts, theory-literalists think one mistake in a narrative is one 
mistake too many.  Phlogiston theory got some of its central claims wrong, as did also Fresnel’s 
theory, Mendel theory, Bohr’s 1913 theory of the hydrogen atom, and countless other theories, 
so those theories were all completely wrong.  
The antirealist uses of literalism are straightforward. If departures from literal accuracy, 
however small, make theories count as different, then the chances of a scientist  ever picking the 
right theory will be wretchedly small (argument of the bad lots). And the probability of 
conjecturing the one (and only one) truthful theory will be hopelessly small (problem of the base 
rate). And, so, at any given time, the chances that the one truthful theory is among the as yet 
“conceived alternatives” will be overwhelmingly low.  
Happily for realists, the expectations in (3a) belong in fairy-tales. Scientific theorizing is 
rarely strictly literalist. Scientists effectively abandoned literalism early in modern times, as they 
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began to articulate explanatory idealizations that carried an expectation that nothing in nature 
exactly realized them. For example, the aim of the kinetic theory of matter developed around 
1860 was to causally account for approximate empirical laws that had been gathered in the two 
previous centuries about the macroscopic behavior of gasses (e.g. PV = nRT ) and materials (e.g. 
thermal expansion).  Crucially, in the case of gases, the accounts invoked structureless point-
particles—the so-called “ideal gas”—that the theorists involved did not believe existed in nature. 
The ideal gas was explicitly an idealization, with a two-fold expectation at work: (i) actual gasses 
are made of non-ideal corpuscles moving at random  and  located at relatively large distances 
from one another “on average”; and (ii) the behavior of those actual corpuscles instantiated that 
of the ideal gas to a significant degree within a certain restricted domain. There was no question 
that ideal gasses literally construed had to be “real” in order to take the theory realistically. 
Scientific theories are likewise generally false in strictly literal fashion. As with maps, the point 
of realist interest is the extent to which a theory’s depictions match the intended domain. 
Theoretical representations of empirical domains resemble maps far more than they do assertions 
(e.g. Giere 2006). Selectivists proceed accordingly: taking a realist stance towards a theory T 
amounts to claiming only that some of the explanations and descriptions distinct to T are correct 
by acceptable standards.  
 
 (3b) In mathematized disciplines literalism easily ups its ante. According to a long lived 
assumption of quantitative exactitude, there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems 
have definite values, and in a correct theory the claims it makes correspond to the world with 
total accuracy. This ideal is found in early modern scientists, notably theorists with strong 
Platonist leanings such as Kepler.  
Dear though these expectations of divine accuracy and depth are, they rest on myth. Such 
correspondence as mathematized theories have to the world is not conditioned to radical 
accuracy. As Bertrand Russell noted on behalf of sound epistemology,  
 
“Although this may seem a paradox, all exact science is dominated by the idea of 
approximation. When a man tells you that he knows the exact truth about anything, you 
are safe in inferring that he is an inexact man. Every careful measurement in science is 
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always given with the probable error [...] every observer admits that he is likely wrong, 
and knows about how much wrong he is likely to be.” (1931: 42) 
 
More recently, in a more comprehensive vein, Paul Teller (2015) complains that “accuracy 
realism” assumes that the quantities invoked by a theory actually refer. But—he notes—this 
misunderstands the fabric of theoretical representation, because theories generally formulate 
idealizations that burden quantitative attributions with failure of specificity in picking concrete 
cases. In the narrowest literal sense, the claim “the meter-standard kept in Paris is 1 meter long” 
may be true only by definition—any attempt to check it with absolute precision against any 
external objective length would be frustrated by, to begin with,  ineliminable thermal and 
quantum mechanical fluctuations. The point is that one-to-one matching makes no sense as a 
goal in scientific language, given that so many descriptive words in science are intrinsically 
vague and/or refer to idealizations. Actual reference to lengths presumes just perspectivally 
acceptable (never absolute) accuracy. At the lowest empirical levels also, completely exact 
assertions are generally neither relevant nor true. This connects with a related point, namely, the 
irrelevancy of these literalist and accuracy assumptions to the actual realism/antirealism debate. 
Shaped by the discussions started in the 1980s, the dispute is now primarily about whether or not 
warranted augmentative scientific inferences reach into unobservable domains. Ordinary realism 
about chairs, cats and mountains fails the ideals of radical literalism and accuracy no less than 
scientific realism.  
 
(3c) The methodological supplement claims that science would be merely an instrumentalist 
affair unless theorists aim to produce a complete description of the way things are, with scientists 
as pursuers of God-like reportage (perfect “mirror reflection”): scientific theories advance 
towards the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth (see e.g. Sankey 2008’s discussion of 
this). Although this position lost much of its ancient appeal in the 18th century, to this day some 
top theoreticians continue to wax lyrical expressing it, especially in “editorials”. 
 
“The ‘theory of everything’ is one of the most cherished dreams of science. If it is ever 
discovered, it will describe the workings of the universe at the most fundamental level 
and thus encompass our entire understanding of nature. It would also answer such 
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enduring puzzles as what dark matter is, the reason time flows in only one direction and 
how gravity works. Small wonder that Stephen Hawking famously said that such a theory 
would be ‘the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then we should know the mind of 
God’ ”.  (New Scientists, 4 March 20101)   
 
This colorful supplement lacks warrant if, as selectivists claim, the realist stance can be 
consistently and fruitfully applied to selected theory-parts.  
 
The realist badge of honor is not awarded for telling the truth, all the truth, and nothing 
like the truth about anything—let alone reading the mind of God. It is a distinction for finite 
cognitive achievements forged with crooked tools. See also (6) below.  
 
(4). Realist Significance of the “Central Tenets” of a Theory. A related common assumption 
is this: Even if truthful description may have limits, taking a theory T realistically requires 
commitment to T’s central tenets (i.e. those about the entities, principles and laws that 
individuate T). In Laudan’s version, realism about T commits to the view that the T’s central 
terms successfully refer.  
There is little question that in numerous scientific theories the central terms fail to refer—
on this point we all have a debt of gratitude to Laudan. However, once theories are no longer 
approached as unbreakable wholes the emphasis on central terms wanes. If anything, the 
reference that matters is that of theory-parts. Then, on the explanatory side, the scientific focus is 
on the structures of possibilities of its intended domain D. As such, a theory is not exclusively 
about the entities and relations invoked at the level of its central terms. Primarily the theory is 
about D, whose relevant entities and structures include those that may be found at intermediate 
levels of description—like Fresnel’s Core. A theory may thus be individuated by its central 
tenets, but the latter do not exhaust the theory’s realist import. The appropriate realist focus is 
those theoretical claims derivable from the theory and for which there is strong evidence (and so 
a strong expectation of truthfulness), not whether the terms involved are “central”, 
“intermediate”, or “peripheral”.  
                                                 
1
  “Knowing the mind of God: Seven theories of everything”, New Scientists, 4 March 2010: 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18612-knowing-the-mind-of-god-seven-theories-of-everything/   
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(5). Being “right for the most part”. Another related assumption links the realist stance 
towards a theory with the claim that the theory is right “for the most part”. Michael Devitt, for 
example, voices this assumption when he defines scientific realism as the doctrine according to 
which “Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist 
mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science” (2005:  769). In 
his view, theories that are well-established theories by today’s methodological standards are right 
for the most part.   
This supposition sounds reasonable at first hearing but it too seems suicidal for realism. 
Virtually all the past theories realists want to be realist about seem to have turned out to be wrong 
“for the most part”—unless “being right” is granted with postmodern largesse.  Newtonian 
mechanics is “right” for a comparatively tiny regime of speeds and fields. Bohr’s theory of the atom 
gets impressive aspects right but otherwise is wrong for the most part of the entire quantum domain. 
Mendel’s theory invites a similar reaction. For all we know, our excellent present physics may be 
wrong for most of the total universe. So, scientifically successful theories seem “wrong for the most 
part”. But they have great realist import, nonetheless.  That import comes from the fact that they get 
right novel significant unobservable aspects of their intended domains. As David Bohm urged long 
ago, piecemeal caution needs to be exercised in one’s realist commitment to the entities, regularities 
and processes invoked by well-established current scientific theories (1957, Chapter V).  Two lines 
of reasoning in particular support this prudence (@@@): (1) Qualities, properties of matter, and 
categories of laws expressed in terms of some finite set of qualities and laws are generally applicable 
only within limited contexts (in terms of ranges of conditions and degrees of approximation). (2) 
There is no reason to suppose that new qualities and laws will always lead to mere correction 
refinements that converge in some simple and uniform way. This may occur in some contexts and 
within some definite range of conditions, but in different contexts and under changed conditions the 
qualities, properties and laws may be quite novel and lead to dramatic effects relative to what 
previous theorizing would have led to expect. For example, for bodies moving with speeds negligible 
compared to the speed of light, the laws of relativity lead to small corrections of the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics. But they also lead to such qualitatively new results as the “rest energy” of 
matter. Further laws yet to discover may be vastly more bizarre.  
 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -790-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -169-
(6) Progress: The realist expectation that successful science achieves cumulative truth content 
about unobservables is frequently nailed to the idea that “modern science is converging on a 
single picture of the world”.  Claims along these lines come in several flavors, in particular (a) 
linear epistemic progressivism and (b) “metaphysical” realism. 
 
(6a) Convergent progress. Léo Errera expressed the idea in his Botanique Générale of 1908: 
“Truth is on a curve whose asymptote our spirit follows eternally2.” This expectation has 
recurrent mystical roots in science. John Herschel, for example, is cited by Marcel de Serres as 
saying “All human discoveries seem to be made only for the purpose of confirming more 
strongly the truths come from on high, and contained in the sacred writings3.” 
Convergent progressivism runs against a recurrent realization in modern science. As 
selectivists recognize, successful theories give knowledge but they usually err at numerous levels of 
description. Successful theories don’t give us everything there is to know about any intended domain, 
let alone ‘The World.’ Finite sets of simple laws can provide correct descriptions and predictions 
when we constrain their context enough, notes Bohm (1957), but we should expect unrestricted 
theories to be false. Many defenders of scientific objectivity have followed suit, stressing the shift 
from traditional searches for a comprehensive world-view to explicitly perspectival searches for 
piece-meal knowledge about domains of current scientific interest, leading to assertions of 
corresponding partiality. 
 
(6b) In no better shape is the claim that realism is committed to the existence of one true and 
complete description of the world, whose truth bears one-to-one correspondence to ‘mind-
independent reality, so that the purpose of science is to discover that description. Critics 
persuasively dismiss this brand or realism. But no knowledgeable realist has held such a position 
in generations. It is a thesis recalled from the grave in the late 1970s and 1980s by Hilary Putnam 
under the label “metaphysical realism,” a view he presented as an example of a hopelessly 
jumbled project (e.g. Putnam, 1978: 49, and 1990: Preface). 
                                                 
2
  Recueil d'Œuvres de Léo Errera: Botanique Générale (1908), 193. As translated in John Arthur Thomson, 
Introduction to Science (1911): 57 
 
3
  Marcel de Serres, 1845. “On the Physical Facts in the Bible Compared with the Discoveries of the Modern 
Sciences”. The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal (Vol. 38): 260.  [239-271] 
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(7) Intelligibility: Another claim often associated with realism is that science aims to provide 
truthful explanations that make the phenomena at hand intelligible. This condition comes in (a) 
radical and (b) moderate strengths. The radical version calls for explanations that leave the 
intellect content and with no further whys. The weak condition calls for explanations that make 
the target phenomena more but not necessarily fully intelligible. 
 
(7a) Leibniz’s rationalist objection to Newton’s Theory of Gravitation exemplifies the radical 
version. He complained that if gravity were thought as a real force, then its effect would be a 
mysterious action at a distance. Leibniz blamed Newton for introducing “occult” forces into 
science, and until the end of his life Newton hoped to produce a properly “intelligible” account 
of gravity involving only action by contact interactions—he did not succeed. Modern scientific 
theories do not provide radical intelligibility. Once Galileo gave up his initial hope of presenting 
inertial motion as uniform circular motion, the theory of free fall he accepted left open at least as 
many whys as it closed. Why or how Galileo’s mysterious mathematical structures arise in 
nature? The same goes for subsequent theorizing. Why or how the regularity given as Newton’s 
law of gravitation arises? Why or how Fresnel’s Core arise? Why or how the speed of light is a 
universal invariant?  Contemporary fundamental theories fail radical intelligibility just as clearly.  
Realists need not worry about this. Calls for radical intelligibility rest on views of 
cognition now widely recognized as mythical. Barring mystical insight and such, all actual 
understanding comes with opaque spots. At every scientific stage scientific warrant (and 
intelligibility) stops somewhere, albeit usually not at the traditional empiricist boundaries. 
Realism is compatible with suspending judgment about whether a certain theoretical claim 
correctly describes a fundamental or derivative aspect of nature. This is exemplified in the stance 
realists take towards e.g. Fresnel’s Core, the invariance of light’s speed, and fundamental 
principles in general.  
A theory that saves all the known phenomena but whose reliable parts comprise only 
structures and explanations at phenomenal levels, provides the lowest level of understanding. 
This makes for a constructive empiricist take, which escapes skepticism by accepting realism 
about just the theory’s empirical substructures. The point here is that radical theoretical 
intelligibility is not necessary for taking a realist stance towards a theory. From a selectivist 
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perspective, the key factor for taking a theory-part realistically is not the “intelligibility” it 
confers but its indispensability for maintaining the theory’s predictive power in the context of 
current background knowledge. Ptolemaic orbits were denied realist interpretation not primarily 
because they failed the intelligibility requirement—Ptolemaic constructions went out of their 
way to honor, of all requirements, intelligibility (then guided by the Principle of Uniform 
Circular Motion for heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian arguments for the fixity of the Earth). 
Rather, Ptolemaic orbits were refused realist interpretation because the epicycles, deferents and 
equants they invoked were grossly underdetermined by extant knowledge (i.e. available data and 
cosmological principles). Positive evidence for the orbits specifically proposed was lacking.  
None of this is not to question the realist relevance of theories that seek to achieve deep 
understanding. What is denied is that scientific realism must embrace radical intelligibility. 
Radical intelligibility is a trait realism about observables and every day affairs neither honors nor 
is expected to honor.  
 
(7b) This brings us to cogent versions of the moderate intelligibility condition. Selectivists take a 
realist stance only towards theory-parts deemed to be both indispensable for the theory’s success 
and free of compelling specific doubts against them (@@@). That is, the realist stance goes only 
to tenets for which there is strong positive evidence by modern scientific standards.  In all the 
cases highlighted by realists, the selections supported by the strongest level of evidence available 
make the target domain intelligible well beyond the observable levels. When, by contrast, the 
positive evidence for a theory does not reach the unobservable explanatory posits that make the 
relevant phenomena intelligible, then the best stance to take about the theory is not realism but 
constructive empiricism. This clarifies what introductory characterizations of scientific realism 
get right about the intelligibility condition: A good theory must not have just significant 
predictive power but must also make the relevant phenomena intelligible (Richard DeWitt 2010: 
72). If the theory parts that do this lack evidential warrant, then the reasonable stance towards 
them is constructive empiricism. 
 
(8) Realism Worth having. Topping the above assumptions, there is a popular notion to the 
effect that a realist stance failing to adhere to most of the above requirements is “not a realism 
worth having”. Against this idea, I have argued that none of the listed assumptions is worth 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -793-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -172-
having. Every one of them lacks convincing warrant. Moreover, even if the assumptions did get 
proper warrant they face a deeper problem: the assumptions are irrelevant to the current 
realism/antirealism debate—they do not expose relevant contrasts between inferences limited to 
the phenomenal level and inferences that reach into theoretical levels.  
In modern science, virtually all interesting augmentative inferences violate the listed 
assumptions. So, the latter simply and arbitrarily raise the epistemological standards of 
acceptability against theoretical assertions. If the above considerations are correct, then, realists 
and antirealists should reject the assumptions examined in this paper—they all rest on 
counterproductive myths and confusions.   
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Abstract: This paper proposes a holistic approach to the model-world relationship, 
suggesting that the model-world relationship be viewed as an overall structural fit where 
one organized whole (the model) fits another organized whole (the target). This approach 
is largely motivated by the implausibility of Michael Weisberg’s weighted feature-
matching account of the model-world relationship, where a set-theoretic conception of the 
structures of models is assumed. To show the failure of Weisberg’s account and the 
plausibility of my approach, a concrete model, i.e. the San Francisco Bay model, is 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One philosophical interest in the philosophy of modelling focuses on the problem of the 
model-world relationship, also known as the representation problem. Among many 
approaches to this problem, the similarity account has attracted much attention recently. 
Ronald Giere (1988, 1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2010), Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Michael 
Weisberg (2012, 2013) have made the most substantial contributions. 
  The core of this account, first developed by Giere, is a view of the model-world 
relationship: 
The appropriate relationship, I suggest, is similarity. Hypotheses, then, claim a 
similarity between models and real systems. But since anything is similar to anything 
else in some respects and to some degree, claims of similarity are vacuous without at 
least an implicit specification of relevant respects and degrees. The general form of a 
theoretical hypothesis is thus: Such-and-such identifiable real system is similar to a 
designated model in indicated respects and degrees. (Giere 1988, 81; author’s 
emphasis) 
  However, critics point out that this account is only schematic since it falls short of 
specifying the relevant respects and degrees (Suárez 2003). Moreover, Giere argues that a 
philosophical account of scientific representation should also take into consideration 
factors such as the roles played by scientists, and the intentions those scientists have 
when modelling (Giere 2004, 2010). Given these considerations, Weisberg develops a 
more sophisticated similarity account, called the weighted feature-matching account 
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(2012, 2013). The basic idea of his account comes from psychologist Amos Tversky’s 
contrast account of similarity, which states that the similarity of objects a and b depends 
on the features they share and the features they do not. In light of this, Weisberg proposes 
his own account: 
S (m, t) = 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm) 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm)+ αf(MaTa)+ ȕf(MmTm)+ Ȗf(TaMa)+ δf(TmMm)            (1) 
f(x) refers to the weighting function, α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ denote weighting terms 
(parameters), subscripts a and m stand for attributes and mechanisms,1 and M denotes the 
model and T the target. (Ma∩Ta) stands for attributes shared by the model and the target, 
(MaTa) attributes that the model has while the target does not, and (TaMa) attributes that 
the target has while the model does not. The same story goes for mechanisms m. 
Attributes and mechanisms as a whole are called features of the model and the target. 
      An interpretation for this equation is needed. First, there must be a feature set Δ, and 
the set of features of the model and the set of features of the target are defined as sets of 
features in Δ. The elements of Δ are determined by a combination of context, 
conceptualization of the target, and the theoretical goals of the scientist. Besides, the 
                                                          
1
 Properties and patterns of systems are termed attributes, and the underlying mechanisms 
generating these properties and patterns are termed mechanisms (Weisberg 2013, 145). 
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contents of Δ may change through time as science develops, which in turn might result in 
a reevaluation of the established model-world relationship (Ibid., 149). 
      Second, consider the values of weighting parameters α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ. On Weisberg’s 
account, different kinds of modelling require different weighting parameters. For example, 
if what interests us is the minimal modelling which concerns merely the mechanism 
responsible for bringing about the phenomenon of interest, the goal of this modelling is 
written as:2 
Mm∩Tm 
       ——————————————      1 
                                          Mm∩Tm+MaTa+MmTm                                          (2) 
Finally, consider the weighting function f(x), telling us the relative importance of each 
feature in the set Δ. Weisberg says scientists in most cases have in their mind some subset 
of the features in Δ, which they regard as especially important. Hence some features are 
weighted more heavily, while others are equally weighted. Besides, the background theory 
determines which features in Δ should be weighted more heavily. If the background theory 
is not rich enough, deciding which should be weighted more heavily is partly an empirical 
problem. 
 Having presented an outline of Weisberg’s account, I will now argue that this account 
fails to capture the relationship between concrete models and their targets. To illustrate this 
                                                          
2
 Weisberg also describes three other kinds of modelling requiring different weighting 
parameters: hyperaccurate, how-possibly and mechanistic modelling (2013, 150-52). 
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shortcoming (Sec. 3), I will first describe the San Francisco Bay model (Sec. 2). Sec. 4 will 
propose a holistic alternative to Weisberg’s account, suggesting that the model-world 
relationship be viewed as an overall structural fit where one organized whole fits another 
organized whole. Sec. 5 will examine a case where the organization of the whole can be 
treated as simply another feature. 
 
2. The San Francisco Bay Model 
 
John Reber worried about the fragility of the water supply in the San Francisco Bay area in 
the 1950s. To solve this problem, he proposed an ambitious proposal, namely, to dam up 
the Bay. Carrying out this plan would not only supply San Francisco with unlimited 
drinking water but also entirely change the area’s transportation, industrial, military and 
recreation landscape (Weisberg 2013, 1). However, his critics worried that Reber’s plan 
would only achieve its aims at the cost of destroying commercial fisheries, rendering the 
South Bay a brackish cesspool, creating problems for the ports of Oakland, Stockton, and 
Sacramento, and so on (Jackson and Peterson 1977; Cf. Weisberg 2013, 1).  
      To settle this dispute, the Army Corps of Engineers was charged with investigating the 
overall influence of the Reber plan by building a massive hydraulic scale model of the Bay 
(Weisberg 2013, 1-2). Once the model was built, it was adjusted to accurately reproduce 
several measurements of the parameters such as tide, salinity, and velocities actually 
recorded in the Bay (for details see Army Corps of Engineers 1963). After the adjustment, 
it was time to verify the model: 
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Agreement between model and prototype for the verification survey of 21-22 
September 1956, and for other field surveys, was excellent. Tidal elevations, ranges 
and phases observed in the prototype were accurately reproduced in the model. Good 
reproduction of current velocities in the vertical, as well as in the cross section, was 
obtained at each of the 11 control stations in deep water and at 85 supplementary 
stations. The salinity verification tests for the verification survey demonstrated that 
for a fresh-water inflow into the Bay system […], fluctuation of salinity with tidal 
action at the control points in the model was in agreement with the prototype 
(Huggins and Schultz 1967, 11). 
After the verification, modellers were in a good position to assess the Reber plan through 
the model built. The investigation showed that it would considerably reduce water-surface 
areas, reduce the velocities of currents in most of South San Francisco Bay, reduce the 
tidal discharge through the Golden Gate during the tidal cycle, and so forth (Huggins and 
Schultz 1973, 19). Given these disastrous consequences, the Army Corps then denounced 
Reber’s plan (Weisberg β01γ, 9). 
 
3. How Could Weisberg’s Account Shed Light on the Bay Model? 
 
I have argued elsewhere that Weisberg’s account cannot shed light on mathematical 
models due to its atomistic conception of features and its assumption of the set-theoretic 
approach to model structures (citation anonymized). I find that the same charges can be 
raised in the case of concrete models. 
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        Consider the first charge: Weisberg’s account is committed to an atomic conception 
of features. The key of Weisberg’s account is the claim that the similarity of objects a and 
b depends on the features they share and the features they do not share. Let us take a closer 
look at the equation (1). The numerator invites us to weight features shared, and the 
denominator asks us to weight all features involved (including three feature subsets: 
features shared, features possessed by the model but not the target, and features possessed 
by the target but not the model). Each feature is weighted independently and only once, 
with it falling into one of the three feature subsets. The numerator is the weighted sum of 
features shared, the denominator is the weighted sum of features shared and unshared, and 
the similarity measure is the ratio of the numerator to the denominator. 
  However, features in the Bay model are not atomistic and independent of each other. 
As Huggins and Schultz put it explicitly, “Among the problems to be considered were the 
conservation of water […]; […] the tides, currents and salinity of the Bay as they affect 
other problems […]. None of these problems can be studied separately, for each affects the 
others” (1973, 12). The reason why none of these problems can be studied separately is 
because factors involved in these problems cannot be studied separately. 
  Consider, for instance, the relationship between two key features in the model: tide and 
salinity. Salinity levels vary along an estuary depending on the mixing of freshwater and 
saltwater at a site. An estuary “is the transition between a river and a sea. There are two 
main drivers: the river that discharges fresh water into the estuary and the sea that fills the 
estuary with salty water, on the rhythm of the tide” (Savenije 2005, Preface ix). 
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  To illustrate this “rhythm of the tide”, consider the effect of the spring-neap tidal cycle 
on the vertical salinity structure of the James, York and Rappahannock Rivers, Virginia, 
U.S.A.: 
 Analysis of salinity data from the lower York and Rappahannock Rivers (Virginia, 
U.S.A.) for 1974 revealed that both of these estuaries oscillated between conditions of 
considerable vertical salinity stratification and homogeneity on a cycle that was 
closely correlated with the spring-neap tidal cycle, i.e. homogeneity was most highly 
developed about 4 days after sufficiently high spring tides while stratification was 
most highly developed during the intervening period. (Haas 1977, 485) 
This short report shows not only that characteristics of salinity (such as stratification and 
homogeneity) are influenced by characteristics of the tide, but also that there is a phase 
connection (or synchronization) between tidal cycle and salinity oscillations. The former is 
a causal relationship while the latter is a temporal relationship. The phase connection 
among features was also emphasized by the Army Corps when verifying the Bay model, 
saying “These gages were installed in the prototype and placed in operation several months 
in advance of the date selected to collect the primary tidal current and salinity data required 
for model verification, since it was essential to obtain all data simultaneously for a given 
tide over at least one complete tidal cycle of 24.8 hours” (196γ, 50; my emphasis). 
Moreover, the same story goes for tide and tidal currents (for details see Army Corps 1963, 
20). 
  In short, features in a model bear not only causal relationships, but also temporal 
relationships to one another. This implies that, when verifying the model, features of the 
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model causally interact with each other in producing certain outputs (e.g. predictions, 
effects, phenomena, etc.), rather than that they individually or separately produce outputs. 
So although outputs of key features in the Bay model can be identified and measured 
separately, they are not produced separately. 
  It is important to note that the causal interaction among features may lead to a different 
kind of interaction, i.e. a “similarity interaction”,3 wherein features interact with one 
another in producing the similarity value. That is, one feature’s contribution to the 
similarity value depends on other feature(s)’ contribution to that value.4 The difference 
between causal and similarity interaction is that the latter is a statistical relationship among 
measured features, and can be viewed as a reflection of the former when coupled with an 
assumption that there might be such an underlying causal structure.5 For example, a 
similarity interaction is shown by the verification of salinity in the Bay model, where the 
measurement of salinity (as a measurement of one feature’s contribution to the similarity 
                                                          
3
 I thank X for suggesting this term for me. 
4
 This point can be best illustrated with the curve fitting example: when computing the fit 
of a straight line y=ax+b to a cloud of points, a and b will depend on each other to produce 
the best fit (I thank X for giving me this example). 
5
 This assumption is important because there are cases where the fact that there is 
similarity interaction cannot guarantee that there is also causal interaction, because some 
randomly generated data set may also show interaction among features. In other words, 
causal interaction can lead to similarity interaction and the reverse is not true (I thank Y for 
letting me know this). I will discuss this assumption, called “precondition” later, in Sec. 4. 
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value from Weisberg’s perspective) depended on other features in the way in which other 
features were kept constant: “salinity phenomena in the model were in agreement with 
those of the prototype for similar conditions of tide, ocean salinity, and fresh-water inflow” 
(Ibid., 54; my emphasis). 
  The way that similarity interaction reflects causal interaction, when coupled with the 
assumption mentioned above, can be expressed as follows: if what is under verification is a 
causal structure to which modellers do not have direct access (so the structure cannot be a 
feature in Weisberg’s formula), then the coherent behavior of features (i.e. their similarity 
interactions such as phase connections) is a way of verifying, or at least indicating, the 
causal interactions in the underlying causal structure.6 That is the reason why it was so 
essential to obtain all data simultaneously within a complete tidal cycle for the Bay model, 
and why all other features must be kept constant when verifying salinity (or other features). 
  Given features’ causal interactions in the model and their similarity interactions when 
measuring them, it seems that assessing the relationship between a model and its target 
cannot be simply achieved in the way suggested by Weisberg’s equation, for features’ 
contribution to the similarity relationship is not additive but interactive. That is, to assess 
the relationship between a model and its target, one cannot measure each feature’s 
contribution independently and then add them together. 
 
4. Set-Theoretic or Non-Set-Theoretic? A Holistic Alternative 
 
                                                          
6
 I thank X for bringing this point to my attention. 
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Now we arrive at the problem of why Weisberg’s account is deeply committed to an 
atomistic conception of features. As I have argued elsewhere, this problem ultimately 
comes down to Weisberg’s understanding of the structure of models (citation anonymized). 
Weisberg says models are interpreted structures (2013, 15), so concrete models are 
interpreted concrete structures. At first glance, I have no quarrel with this understanding. 
On closer inspection, however, it can be shown that Weisberg’s account on the model-
world relationship assumes a set-theoretic approach to the structure of models.7 This is 
because Weisberg’s similarity measure can be derived from the Jaccard similarity 
coefficient between two sets, a coefficient assuming a set-theoretic conception of objects 
(citation anonymized). 
  The key to the set-theoretic approach to structures is its assumption that elements of 
objects (i.e. models and targets) are independent of each other, just as elements of a set are 
independent of each other. In other words, it construes both the model and the target as a 
set of independent elements, the similarity between which consists in the ratio of the 
number of elements shared to the number of all elements (citation anonymized). However, 
as discussed in Sec. 3, features are not independent. More importantly, their causal 
interactions may result in a similarity interaction among features. 
  This similarity interaction undermines Weisberg’s account, for it cannot properly 
capture the dependence relationship of features’ contribution to the overall similarity 
                                                          
7
 Note that Weisberg explicitly objects to the set-theoretic approach to models (2013, 137-
42). However, I think it is compatible to claim that someone implicitly assumes what 
someone explicitly rejects. 
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measure between a model and a target. Nonetheless, there is still a way to save the very 
intuitive notion of similarity, by abandoning the set-theoretic conception of structures. That 
is, if the structure of a model is viewed as an organized whole in which each component of 
the whole is interconnected to other component(s) (directly or indirectly) in such a way 
that they interact with one another in producing certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). 
Under such an understanding, therefore, assessing the relationship between a model and its 
target cannot be simply achieved by assessing each individual feature’s relationship and 
then adding them together. Nor can this be done by assessing each connection among two 
or more features and then adding them together, even if connections (causal or non-causal) 
are also interpreted as features. On the other hand, however, the notion of similarity can be 
minimally preserved by claiming that assessing the similarity or fit (I will use fit hereafter) 
between a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit between the 
model and its target. 
  Generally speaking, structural fit means the structure of the model fits the structure of 
the target as an organized whole. That said, nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is 
no univocal meaning for the term “structural fit” that could encompass all circumstances, 
nor can a single equation or formula capture all situations. This is largely due to the 
heterogeneity of modelling practice and its multifarious goals. On the other hand, however, 
instructive points can still be asserted. In what follows I will elaborate some basics 
regarding the conception of “structural fit”. 
      Structural fit in mathematical modelling means different things than in concrete 
modelling. For example, in a very simple case of curve fitting where a straight line y=ax+b 
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is fitted to a cloud of points, features a and b will interact with each other to produce the 
best fit. That is, what fits the cloud of points is the overall structure, not the additive sum of 
each individual feature. As I have argued elsewhere, in more complicated mathematical 
modelling such as the maximum likelihood estimation, the fit is usually achieved through 
comparing the predicted data set derived from the model as a whole to the observed data 
set derived from the target system (citation anonymized). Individual features of the model 
simply disappear, and causally related features, as constituting a whole, that co-occur in the 
data set are what really matters. 
    In the case of concrete modelling, admittedly, the claim that assessing the fit between 
a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit seems to be less 
apparent. On closer examination, however, the same claim still holds. Let us go back to the 
verification of the Bay model. At first glance, it seems the verification of the model was 
achieved by independently verifying the output (i.e. data sets) of each individual feature, as 
the report showed (see Sec. 2 for the verification report). That is, it seems that by verifying 
that each feature in the model fits its counterpart in the target, scientists made the judgment 
that the model fits the target system. 
  Underlying this seemingly plausible reasoning, however, there remains the problem of 
why we are allowed to confirm the verification of the model by means of only verifying 
several outputs of individual features. Or, to put it slightly differently, in terms of what 
does the fit of features guarantee the judgment about the fit of the model to the target? I 
take it that it is more than the fit of individual features themselves that makes sense of the 
reasoning that the model fits the target. There must be a precondition for this reasoning 
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(remember the “assumption” made in the last section). After all, there are many cases in 
which the fit of features does not guarantee the fit of the model itself to the target. For 
instance, a drawing of Tom’s face may accurately capture all features of his face, e.g., nose, 
eyes, mouth, etc., but still falls short of fitting his face, because of the wrong organization 
of these features, e.g., putting the mouth in between the eyes and nose (Weisberg would 
argue that the organization could be a feature. I will discuss this point in Sec. 5.). 
  So if the fit of features is insufficient to vindicate the fit of a model to its target, what 
could provide this vindication? My claim is, contrary to Weisberg, that it is the overall 
structural fit of the model to the target system that warrants the fit judgment about the 
model and its target. In other words, the fit of individual features can only succeed in 
supporting the fit of the model to the target by the precondition that these features can be 
organized into the whole (i.e. the assumption that there is such an underlying causal 
structure), not the other way around. 
  To understand this “holistic reasoning”, let me articulate the specifics involved step by 
step. We first build a concrete model, i.e. a concrete structure, wherein features are 
interconnected with one other in such a way that they have the potential to interactively 
produce certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). Before verifying the model, we need 
to adjust key features to make sure the model works very well. Note that any adjustment 
will not simply be the adjustment of individual features but also of their interconnections, 
resulting in the adjustment of the overall structure of the model. Finally, we verify the 
model by comparing the outputs of the model to the outputs of the target. As with 
mathematical models, this verification is also usually made via comparing data sets, as 
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shown in the Bay model. Note that though these outputs can be identified, derived and 
measured independently, it is causally connected features that interact in producing them. 
In other words, although you verify each feature separately, the support provided by a 
single feature is not confined to that feature of the model, but confirms all aspects of the 
model that are involved in generating that output. 
  Thus understood, therefore, the gist of verifying a concrete model such as the Bay 
model can be captured as follows. The verification of each feature, as a component of a 
whole, is simply the verification of one aspect of the structure. So the verification of 
different features is the verification of the same structure from different perspectives. Thus, 
if the model is an organized whole, then the more features that are independently verified 
the more likely it is that the model resembles the reality. On the other hand, if what is 
under verification is not an organized whole but an aggregation of independent items, then 
the verification of each lends no credence to other parts of the aggregated whole—because 
these items are not causally linked, the verification of each item is only the verification of 
that item itself. 
  In sum, the relationship between a concrete model and its target is a holistic matter 
wherein an organized whole fits (to a certain degree) or fails to fit another organized whole. 
Though it seems at first blush that the verification of the whole results from the sum of the 
verification of each component, the real picture is just the reverse: the whole is always in 
place and the component can gather force in supporting the verification of the whole only 
when it can be organized into the whole. 
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5. Organization and Features 
 
As mentioned above, Weisberg would argue that the organization could be a feature, so a 
drawing of Tom’s face capturing accurately not only his nose, mouth, eyes but also their 
organization can be a good model of Tom’s face. A holistic account agrees that 
organization could be a feature, but disagrees with the way that organization is treated in 
Weisberg’s similarity measure. Intuitively, we may say that a drawing of one person’s face 
is a good model if it has the right features: such as a nose, a mouth, eyes, and the 
organization of all of these. So it seems that if you get each individual feature right, then 
you get the whole model right. That is, features additively contribute to the goodness of the 
model. 
      This intuitive way of understanding scientific modelling, however, obscures the fact 
that features may interact in producing the fit of a model, as shown in Sec. 4. To reiterate 
this point and to draw a connection to our current discussion, consider another ordinary 
example.8 Suppose Anne’s face is an ideal one which scientists want to model. Anne has 
an ideal nose, which is straight, in contrast to a non-ideal nose, which might be bumped or 
concave. She also has an ideal nostril, which is round, in contrast to a non-ideal one, which 
might be triangular or square. Scientist A draws a face for Anne that has a round nostril 
and a concave nose, while scientist B draws a face that has a triangular nostril and a 
bumped nose. Drawing A has an ideal feature (the round nostril), but neither feature of 
drawing B is ideal. Now we ask which drawing better fits Anne’s face. It is likely that we 
                                                          
8
 I thank X for giving me this nice example. 
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will say that B is better because our contemporaries’ taste tells us that there is no face so 
ugly as one with a round nostril and a concave nose, though a round nostril itself is ideal. 
Hence we see a case wherein the nostril and nose interact to produce the fit of a model to a 
target. 
      This discussion leads to a more general question: what are features? In Weisberg’s 
account, a model can more or less fit a target, but features are either shared or not. Yet as 
Wendy Parker points out, “relevant similarities often seem to occur at the level of 
individual features, not just at the level of the model” (β015, β7γ). This is because features 
themselves can be objects such that they more or less fit each other.9 Weisberg may argue 
that this problem can be fixed by the assumption that a feature can be redescribed as a set 
of sub-features, so the similarity between two features can be measured as the result of the 
similarity between their sub-features. However, I see this treatment as a non-starter, for the 
similarity between sub-features may also be a matter of degree such that it should be 
measured as the result of the similarity between their sub-sub-features, and between their 
sub-sub-sub-features, and so on. 
      On the other hand, a holistic account does not encounter this problem: if a feature is an 
object, then it can be viewed as an organized whole. So the relationship between a feature 
in a model and a feature in a target also consists in their structural fit. Take a minimal 
model for instance. Most minimal models primarily attempt to represent repeatable 
patterns of behavior largely insensitive to underlying microscopic details (Batterman 2002, 
27). Suppose we are interested in the buckling behavior of struts, and write a 
                                                          
9
 I thank X for bringing this to my attention. 
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phenomenological formula, called Euler’s formula, to characterize it (see Batterman β00β 
for details). It seems the pattern of behavior is the only feature involved in this case, i.e., a 
dependence relationship among several parameters. So assessing the fit between the model 
and the target comes down to assessing the fit between the feature in the model and the 
feature in the target. For this, a holistic account can easily come through: the relationship is 
an overall structural fit, wherein a dependence relationship as a feature fits another 
dependence relationship. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the assumption of a set-theoretic approach to structures makes 
Weisberg’s account fail to shed light on the San Francisco Bay model. Alternatively, a 
holistic approach to models, viewing the model-world relationship as an overall structural 
fit, fares better not only in capturing the Bay model, but more generally in making sense of 
modelling practice. 
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PROBABILISTIC ACTUAL CAUSATION
LUKE FENTON-GLYNN
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
GOWER STREET, LONDON, WC1E 6BT, U.K.
ABSTRACT. Actual (token) causes – e.g. Suzy’s being exposed to asbestos –
often bring about their effects – e.g. Suzy’s suffering mesothelioma – prob-
abilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to tackle one of the thornier
difficulties for traditional accounts of probabilistic actual causation: namely
probabilistic preemption.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Actual (token) causation is the relation that obtains when, for example, Suzy’s being exposed
to asbestos causes her to suffer mesothelioma. A number of theorists (e.g. Halpern and Pearl
2001, 2005; Hitchcock 2001, 2007; Weslake 2016) have deployed structural equations mod-
els (SEMs) in developing novel solutions to difficulties confronting traditional accounts of
this relation. These theorists have focused on deterministic actual causation (DAC).1 I draw
on probabilistic causal models (PCMs) – analogues of deterministic SEMs – to provide an
account of probabilistic actual causation (PAC). I don’t attempt to show that my account can
handle the full battery of test cases discussed in the literature. I simply demonstrate that it
yields an elegant treatment of one very central case – probabilistic preemption – with a view
to motivating further investigation of formal approaches to PAC.
2. PROBABILITY-RAISING
Probability-raising is central to the account developed here – as on traditional accounts of
PAC.2 To explain how I will understand that notion a bit of stage-setting is required.
I take the relata of the actual causal relation to be variable values. Adopting Goldszmidt
and Pearl’s (1992, 669–70) notation, P(W = w|do(V = v)) represents the probability forW =
w that would obtain if V were set to V = v by an ‘intervention’ (Woodward 2005, 98). This
is liable to diverge from the conditional probability P(W = w|V = v): witness the difference
between the probability of a storm conditional upon the barometer needle pointing toward the
1Cf. Halpern and Pearl (2005, 852); Hitchcock (2007, 498).
2Reichenbach (1971, 204); Suppes (1970); Lewis (1986, 175–84); Menzies (1989). The
deficiencies of these accounts have been demonstrated by e.g. Salmon (1984, 192–202);
Menzies (1996, 85–96); Hitchcock (2004).
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word ‘storm’ and the probability of a storm if I had intervened upon the barometer needle to
point it toward ‘storm’.
Variable X taking value X = x (rather than X = x ′) raises the probability of Y = y in the
relevant sense iff:3
(1) P(Y = y|do(X = x))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′))
Appealing to interventionist probabilities means avoiding probability-raising relations be-
tween independent effects of a common cause, such as the barometer reading and the storm
(cf. Lewis 1986, 178).
Probabilistic preemption cases illustrate that straightforward probability-raising is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for causation (Menzies 1989, 1996).
3. PROBABILISTIC PREEMPTION
The following example is inspired by Anscombe (1971).4
3Here and throughout, the probabilities (chances) should be taken to be those obtaining
immediately after the interventions bringing about the variable values specified in the scope
of the do(·) function have occurred (cf. Lewis 1986, 177).
4The probabilities involved (except the decision probabilities) are quantum and therefore
objective and able underwrite causal relations. (If you’re worried that the decision probabil-
ities are not objective, the example could be complicated so that the decisions are made on
the basis of outcomes of quantum measurements.) I find it plausible that the probabilities of
many high level sciences are also objective (cf. e.g. Loewer 2001; Ismael 2009).
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(ProbPre) Someone (neither you nor I) has connected a Geiger counter to a bomb so that the
bomb will explode if the Geiger registers above a threshold reading. I place a place a chunk
of U-232 (half-life = 68.9 years; decays by α-emission) near the Geiger. By chance, enough
U-232 atoms decay within a short enough interval for the Geiger to reach the threshold read-
ing so that the bomb explodes. Unbeknownst to me, you’ve been standing nearby observing.
You have a chunk of Th-228 (half-life = 1.9 years; decays by α-emission), which contains
many more atoms than my chunk of U-232. You’ve decided that you’ll place your Th-228
near the Geiger iff I fail to place my U-232 near the Geiger. There’s a negligible chance that
you won’t follow the course of action you’ve decided on. Seeing that I place my U-232 near
the Geiger, you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger.5
Let M, D, Y , T , and E be binary variables which, respectively, take value 1 if the following
things occur (and 0 otherwise): I place my U-232 near the Geiger; you decide to place your
Th-228 near the Geiger iff I don’t place my U-232 near the Geiger; you place your Th-228
near the Geiger; the threshold reading is reached; the bomb explodes.
My act (M= 1) was an actual cause of the explosion (E = 1). Yet plausibly the following
inequality holds:
(2) P(E = 1|do(M = 1))< P(E = 1|do(M = 0))
5The range of α-particles is 3-5 cm. Suppose that, for each of us, a decision to place our
chunk ‘near’ the Geiger counter is a decision to place it < 5cm away and a decision not to
place it nearby is a decision to place it nowhere near (≫ 5cm away).
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That is, my placing my U-232 near the Geiger lowers the probability of the bomb exploding
because it strongly lowers the probability of your placing your more potent Th-228 near the
Geiger. Probability-raising is therefore unnecessary for actual causation.
Your decision (D = 1) was not an actual cause of the explosion, since you don’t place
your Th-228 near the Geiger. Yet provided there’s some chance thatM = 0, the following
inequality holds:
(3) P(E = 1|do(D= 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
Inequality (3) holds because your decision raises the probability that the bomb will still ex-
plode in the scenario in whichM = 0.6 Probability-raising is therefore insufficient for actual
causation.
Actual causation therefore can’t be identified with probability-raising. In developing a
more nuanced analysis, it is helpful to appeal to PCMs.
4. PCMS
A PCM, M , is a 5-tuple 〈V ,C ,Ω,F ,do(·)〉. V is a set of variables. Suppose R de-
notes a function from elements of V to sets of values: for all V ∈ V , R(V ) is the range of
V . In Halpern and Pearl’s (2005, 851–2) terminology, a formula Vi = vi, for Vi ∈ V and
vi ∈ R(V ), is a primitive event. C is the set of all those possible conjunctions of primitive
6D= 0 is multiply realizable: there is more than one alternative to the decision that you in
fact make. E.g. you could decide that you will place your Th-228 near the Geiger no matter
what, or that you will not do so no matter what. We can stipulate that the latter alternative is
much more probable.
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events, V1 = v1& . . .&Vn = vn, such that Vi ∈ V and vi ∈ R(Vi) and such that, for no pair of
conjuncts Vi = vi, Vj = v j is Vi ≡ Vj, and where no two elements of C differ only in the per-
mutation of their conjuncts. Such a conjunction is denoted V = v (primitive events and the
null event are limiting cases of such conjunctions). Abusing notation, the fact that vi ∈ R(Vi)
for each primitive event Vi = vi in the conjunction V = v, is abbreviated v ∈ R(V) and the set
of variables that appear in V = v is denoted V.
Call a conjunction V = v maximal if it contains a conjunct of the form Vi = vi for each
Vi ∈ V . Ω is the set of all maximal conjunctions of primitive events. F is a sigma algebra
on Ω. Finally, do(·) is a function from elements of C to probability distributions on F (cf.
Pearl 2009, 70, 110): for each element V = v of C , P(·|do(V = v)) is the probability (chance)
distribution on F that would obtain if interventions were performed to bring about V = v.
A PCM can be represented graphically by taking the variables in V as nodes and draw-
ing a directed edge from Vi to Vj (Vi,Vj ∈ V ) iff, where S = V \Vi,Vj, there is some assign-
ment of values s ′ ∈ R(S), some pair of values vi,v
′
i ∈ R(Vi) (vi 6= v
′
i) and some value v j ∈
R(Vj) such that P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = vi&S = s
′)) 6= P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = v
′
i&S = s
′)).
In constructing a PCM, MPre, of (ProbPre) we might take the variable set to be VPre =
{D,M,Y,T,E}. The range of each variable in VPre is the pair {0,1}. CPre, ΩPre, and FPre
are generated by VPre and RPre in the way described above. For each element of CPre, the
function do(·) returns the chance distribution on FPre that would obtain if interventions were
performed to bring about that element of CPre. The graph for MPre is given as figure 1.
M E
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T
FIGURE 1
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A directed path in a graph is an ordered sequence of nodes, 〈V1,V2, . . . ,Vn〉, such that there is
a directed edge from V1 to V2, and a directed edge from V2 to . . .Vn. 〈M,Y,T,E〉 is an example
of a directed path in the graph of MPre.
5. APPROPRIATE MODELS
In Section 6, I provide a definition of what it is for X = x (rather than X = x′) to count as
an actual cause of Y = y relative to a PCM. I then define a non-model-relativized notion of
actual causation by saying that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause of Y = y
simpliciter provided that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause Y = y relative
to at least one appropriate PCM.7 A similar strategy is commonly adopted by those analyzing
DAC in terms of SEMs (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503; Weslake 2016). This requires an
account of ‘appropriate’ models.
Many of the criteria for an appropriate SEM for evaluating DAC carry over to PCMs,
including the following three:
(Partition) For all V ∈ V , the elements of R(V ) should form a partition (Halpern and Hitch-
cock 2010, 397–8; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
(Independence) For no two variables V,W ∈ V should there be elements v ∈ R(V ) and
w ∈ R(W ) such that the states of affairs represented by V = v andW = w
are logically or metaphysically related (Hitchcock 2001, 287; Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 397)
7As the parentheses indicate I define a contrastive relation of actual causation. Where
variables are binary – as in MPre – this is inconsequential and I will typically suppress such
parentheses. But it becomes important in cases of multi-valued variables (see Halpern and
Pearl 2005, 859).
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(Naturalness) For all V ∈ V , R(V ) should include only values that represent reasonably
natural and intrinsic states of affairs. (Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
The analysis of actual causation proposed below takes all and only values of distinct variables
to be potential causal relata. (Partition) insures that we don’t thereby miss actual causal rela-
tions because they obtain between the values of a single variable. (Independence) insures that
we don’t mistake stronger-than-causal relations for causal relations. (Naturalness) insures that
unnatural or non-intrinsic states of affairs do not get counted as causes and effects (see Lewis
1986, 190, 263; Paul 2000, 245).8
A further condition is that a model is appropriate for evaluating whether X = x is an ac-
tual cause of Y = y in world θ only if it satisfies (Veridicality):
(Veridicality) For any conjunction V = v ∈ C taken as an input, the probability distribu-
tion P(·|do(V = v)) yielded as an output by do(·) should be the objective
chance distribution over F that wouldθ result from interventions setting V = v.
(‘Wouldθ ’ indicates that what is required is that this counterfactual be true in
θ .)
(Veridicality) is an analogue – for PCMs – of the requirement that SEMs encode only true
counterfactuals (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503).
In the DAC/SEMs literature another condition on model appropriateness is typically
added:
(Serious Possibilities) V should not be such as to generate elements of Ω that represent pos-
sibilities “that we consider to be too remote” (Hitchcock 2001, 287;
8If absences are unnatural states of affairs (cf. Lewis 1986, 189–93), we might instead
require that each variable have at most one value representing such a state of affairs.
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cf. Woodward 2005, 86–91, Weslake 2016, Blanchard and Schaffer
2016).
We likely need this requirement too. A discussion of whether the vagueness and subjectivity
thereby introduced is problematic would take us too far afield.9 Still, it doesn’t put the present
account in any worse shape than its deterministic analogues. Moreover, traditional accounts
of actual causation – which don’t appeal to causal models – also stand in need of appeal to
‘serious possibilities’ (Woodward 2005, 86–8).
A final requirement – similar to one imposed in the DAC/SEM literature – for a model
M to be an appropriate one for evaluating whether X = x is an actual cause of Y = y in world
θ is:
(Stability) There is no model M ∗ (satisfying Partition, Independence, Naturalness, Veridi-
cality, and Serious Possibilities) with a variable set V ∗ such that V ∗ ⊃ V relative
to which X = x (rather than X = x′) is not an actual cause of Y = y. (Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 394–5; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016; Halpern 2014; Hitchcock
2007, 503).
The idea is that an appropriate model is a sufficiently rich representation of causal reality that
moving to a richer representation would not reveal an apparent actual causal relation to be
spurious.10
The converse requirement – that a negative verdict about actual causation should not be
overturned in a richer model – isn’t needed. This is because actual causation (simpliciter)
is defined in terms of actual causation relative to at least one appropriate model. A model
relative verdict that X = x is not an actual cause of Y = y thus automatically fails to translate
9See Woodward (2005, 86–91).
10(Stability) renders the notion of an appropriate model relative to the causal claim being
evaluated.
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into a verdict that X = x is not an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y if there is a richer (and
otherwise appropriate) model relative to which X = x is an actual cause of Y = y.
We can now state a definition of actual causation in terms of appropriate PCMs that han-
dles (ProbPre).
6. PAC
Actual causation simpliciter is defined in terms of actual causation relative to an appropriate
PCM. Model-relative actual causation is then defined.11
AC(S)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y ∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause
(simpliciter) of Y = y in world θ iff X = x (rather than X = x ′) is an actual cause of Y =
y relative to at least one model M (with X ,Y ∈ V ) that is appropriate for evaluating
whether X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y in θ .
11Those familiar with Halpern and Pearl’s (2001, 2005) analyses of DAC are invited to see
an analogy with AC(M-R). AC(M-R) was partly inspired by thinking about how a counter-
part of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis might be developed that is adequate to the probabilistic
case. Ultimately, I’m optimistic that an adequate account of DAC will fall out of an adequate
account of PAC as the special case where all probabilities are 1 or 0. This is why my defini-
tions take the definiendum to be ‘actual cause’ rather than ‘probabilistic actual cause’.
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AC(M-R)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause of Y = y
relative to a model M (with X ,Y ∈V ) in world θ iff there is a partition (Z,W) of V \X ,Y
and some setting W = w ′ of the variables in W such that the do(·) function associated
with M entails that, for all subsets Z′ of Z (where, for each such subset, Z′ = z∗ are the
values that the variables in Z′ have in θ ):
(IN) P(Y = y|do(X = x&W = w ′&Z′ = z∗))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′&W = w ′))
AC(M-R) countsM = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre (and the world
described in (ProbPre)). Consider the partition of VPre\M,E such that W = {D,Y} and Z =
{T}. And consider the assignment {D= 1,Y = 0} of values to the variables in W. AC(M-R)
is satisfied because (IN) holds for both subsets of Z ( /0 and {T}), as shown by (4) and (5):
(4) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
(5) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&T = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
Inequality (4) indicates that my action raises the probability of the explosion under the con-
tingency – i.e. holding fixed – that (you make your decision but) don’t place your Th-228 near
the Geiger. The existence of this contingent probability-raising reflects the fact that there is a
path – 〈M,T,E〉 – along which M = 1 promotes E = 1 (becauseM = 1 raises the probabil-
ity of E = 1 when we hold fixed the values of all variables off that path). It is the existence of
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such a path – representing the process via whichM= 1 produces E = 1 – that appears to drive
our intuitions about actual causation in this case (cf. Hitchcock 2001).
Inequality (5) indicates that, again holding fixed D = 1 and Y = 0, the probability of
E = 1 is higher if I place my U-232 near the Geiger and the threshold reading is reached than
if I’d simply never placed my U-232 near the Geiger in the first place. As will be seen, this
requirement ensures that, not only is there a potential process via whichM = 1 threatens to
bring about E = 1, but that process is complete.
Since AC(M-R) implies thatM = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre, AC(S)
yields the (correct) result thatM = 1 is an actual cause (simpliciter) of E = 1 provided that
MPre is appropriate. MPre is appropriate. Clearly it satisfies (Partition) and (Independence).
It satisfies (Naturalness) because all of the states that its variables represent are reasonably
natural. It was stipulated that the do(·) function associated with MPre is such that (Veridi-
cality) is satisfied. MPre does not represent the sort of ‘non-serious’ possibility that (Serious
Possibilities) is introduced to rule out (cf. Hitchcock 2001; Woodward 2005, 86–91).
Finally, (Stability) is satisfied because the causal process from my action to the explo-
sion is complete. Holding fixed Y = 0, the probability of the explosion ifM = 1 and part(s)
of this process occur(s) is higher than the probability of the explosion if simplyM = 0. Any
variable (whose values represent reasonably natural states, form a partition, and are logically
and metaphysically independent from the variables in VPre) that might be added to VPre either
represents part of this process or it doesn’t. If it does, its actual value represents the occur-
rence of part of the process. So, if it is added to VPre, including it in Z will not prevent (IN)
from holding for all subsets Z′ of Z. If it doesn’t, then adding it to VPre, including it in W,
and holding it fixed at its actual value as part of the assignment W = w ′ will not make a dif-
ference to the fact that (IN) holds for all subsets Z′ of Z, since holding fixed Y = 0 as part of
W = w ′ is already sufficient to ensure this.
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AC(M-R) gives the verdict that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
Consider the partition of VPre\D,E such that W = {M} and Z = {Y,T}. Observe that:
(6) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 0))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(7) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
Thus, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of E = 1 is higher if D= 1
than if D= 0. So D= 1 contingently raises the probability of E = 1.12 That’s because there’s
a path – 〈D,Y,E〉 – along which D= 1 promotes E = 1.
AC(M-R) nevertheless entails that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to
MPre. Consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:
(8) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(9) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 1))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
That is, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of the explosion is no
higher if you make your decision but don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger than if you’d
12The obtaining of just one of (6) or (7) would suffice to show this.
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never made that decision in the first place. Thus (IN) does not hold for every subset of Z for
this partition of variables no matter what values we assign to the variables in W. This re-
flects the fact that, because you didn’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, there is no com-
plete causal process by which your decision produces the explosion. Your non-placement of
your Th-228 ‘neutralizes’ the danger of your decision causing the explosion.
Is there an alternative partition (W, Z) of VPre and assignment W = w
′ such that (IN)
holds for all subsets Z′ of Z? (There need only be one for AC(M-R) to be satisfied.) There
isn’t. Assigning Y to W instead of Z won’t help, since the value of Y ‘screens off’ D from
E. So, where Y ∈ W, no assignment W = w′ will be such that, holding fixed W = w′, the
probability of E = 1 is higher when D = 1 (and the variables in /0 ⊆ Z are set to their actual
values) than when D= 0. So (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets Z ′ of Z for any such partition.
On the other hand, if we leave Y in Z and also assignM to Z, then there are no variables
in W to hold fixed. Now consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:13
(10) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
So, with M assigned to Z it remains the case that (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets of Z.
So there’s no partition of VPre\D,E such that (IN) is satisfied for all subsets of Z when
we consider D = 1 as a putative cause of E = 1. AC(M-R) therefore doesn’t count D = 1 as
an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
But for AC(S) to count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 simpliciter, there need only be
one appropriate model relative to which AC(M-R) counts D = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1.
Is there such a model? There isn’t. Suppose a candidate such model includes Y . Because D
is only relevant to E because of its relevance to Y , the value of Y ‘screens off’ the value of D
13Note: the fact that Y = 0 due to an intervention doesn’t makeM = 1 more likely.
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from that of E. This means that, if Y is included in W in the partition (W, Z) of the model’s
variable set and held fixed (either at 1 or 0) as part of the assignment W = w′, then (IN) won’t
be satisfied for the empty subset of Z. Alternatively, if Y is included in Z then, no matter what
other variables are included in the model and assigned to W, (IN) won’t be satisfied for the
subset {Y} of Z. Specifically, because D = 1 only threatens to bring about E = 1 because it
threatens to bring about Y = 1, no matter what we hold fixed by inclusion on both sides of
(IN), the probability of E = 1 is no higher if D= 1 and Y = 0 than if simply D= 0.
So AC(M-R) doesn’t count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to any appropriate
model with Y in its variable set. This means that any otherwise appropriate model relative to
which D = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 can be expanded to a model in which D = 1 isn’t an
actual cause of E = 1 simply by the addition of Y . Provided the expanded model is appropri-
ate, the original model violates (Stability) and is inappropriate. So AC(S) will correctly not
count D= 1 as an actual cause simpliciter of E = 1.
Since the values of Y form a partition and represent natural states of affairs, (Partition)
and (Naturalness) will be satisfied by the expanded model if they were satisfied by the orig-
inal model. With regard to (Veridicality), it should be noted that there are multiple ways of
expanding the original model via the addition of Y , each associated with a different do(·)
function from elements of C ∗ to probability distributions over F ∗ (where C ∗ and F ∗ are
generated by the expanded variable set in the way described in Section 4). In looking for an
apt expanded model, we just select the one with the do(·) function that returns the objec-
tive chances on F ∗ that would obtain as a result of interventions bringing about the various
elements of C ∗. With regard to (Serious Possibilities) note that, given your decision, your
placing and your not placing your Th-228 near the Geiger are both salient possibilities in
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(ProbPre). So it doesn’t seem that the expanded model could represent any non-serious pos-
sibilities if the original model doesn’t. (Independence) is a little trickier. Might not the origi-
nal model include a variable whose values are logically or metaphysically related to those of
Y? Given that the variables in the original model are assumed to satisfy (Partition) it seems
that any variable logically or metaphysically related to Y – e.g. Y ′, which takes value Y ′ = 0 if
you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, Y ′ = 1 if you place it 2.5-5cm from the Geiger,
and Y ′ = 2 if you place it 0-2.5cm from the Geiger – will also be such that its actual value
neutralizes the threat of D = 1 bringing about E = 1, so that AC(M-R) is not satisfied in the
original model. The exception to this would be if the original model included a variable that
represents a gerrymandered states of affairs – e.g. Y ′′, which takes value Y ′′ = 1 if you place
your Th-228 near the Geiger or Obama is US president, and Y ′′ = 0 otherwise – in which case
the original model will violate (Naturalness).
7. CONCLUSION
Drawing upon PCMs, an account of PAC has been given that gives a correct treatment of
probabilistic preemption on intuitive grounds. Traditional accounts of PAC misdiagnose this
central test case (Menzies, 1989, 1996; Hitchcock 2004). Examination of whether PCMs can
help tackle some of the other outstanding problems of PAC is warranted.
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When Journal Editors Play Favorites∗
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Abstract
Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
I consider two arguments in favor of this claim. The first says that
insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not
have had under triple-blind review, an injustice is committed against
certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit
this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are
affected by information they would not have had under triple-blind
review, it will negatively affect the quality of published papers. I
distinguish between two kinds of biases that an editor might have. I
show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the other
a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive
or negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general.
However, I do endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I
argue that the positive effect does not apply.
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1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By
making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and
which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given
attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be
informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to
publish a particular paper? Under a single- or double-blind reviewing proce-
dure, the editor has access to information about the author, whereas under a
triple-blind reviewing procedure she does not. So in other words the question
is: should journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-blind reviewing.
One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of
argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to
(partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information (such as the gender
of the author, or whether or not the editor is friends with the author). This
harms the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument focuses on the effect on the journal and its
readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity
information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that
as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to
accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that
a departure has been made from a putative “objectively correct” decision.
This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.
Here I provide a philosophical discussion of the reviewing procedure to
assess these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the editor’s
judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed to her. First,
the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does
not know. Second, the editor may treat authors differently based on their
membership of some group (e.g., gender bias). My discussion focuses on the
2
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following three claims.
My first claim is that the first kind of differential treatment the editor may
display (based on whether she knows a particular author) actually benefits
rather than harms the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a
reduction in editorial uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers when
she knows their authors. I construct a model to show in a formally precise
way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly, no assumption that the
scientists the editor knows are somehow “better scientists” is required—and
I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this
benefit only applies in certain fields. I argue that in other fields (in particular,
mathematics and the humanities) no significant reduction of uncertainty—
and hence no benefit to the readers—occurs (section 2).
My second claim is that either kind of differential treatment the editor
may display (based on whether she knows authors or based on bias against
certain groups) harms authors. I argue that any instance of such differential
treatment constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007)
against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just,
she should prevent such differential treatment, which can be done through
triple-blind reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds
I identified above: triple-blind reviewing is preferable because not doing so
harms authors (section 3).
My third claim is that whether differential treatment also harms the jour-
nal and its readers depends on a number of factors. Differential treatment
by the editor based on whether she knows a particular author may benefit
readers, whereas differential treatment based on bias against certain groups
may harm them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the
strength of the editor’s bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and
other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general
endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-blind reviewing is preferable
because readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse
3
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this argument for fields like mathematics and the humanities, where I claim
that the benefits of differential treatment (based on uncertainty reduction)
do not apply (section 4).
Note that, in considering the ethical and epistemic effects of triple-blind
reviewing, a distinction is made between the effects on the author and the
effects on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding
that in order to study the social epistemology of science, what is good for
an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider
scientific community (Kitcher 1993, Strevens 2003, Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the
number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he
does not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions and the uncertainty she
faces. Economists have studied models in which editor decisions play an im-
portant role (Ellison 2002, Faria 2005, Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have
not distinguished between papers written by scientists the editor knows and
papers by scientists unknown to her, and neither have they been concerned
with biases the editor may be subject to. And some other economists have
done empirical work investigating the differences between papers with and
without an author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003,
Smith and Dombrowski 1998, more on this later), but they do not provide a
model that can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the
literature.
2 A Model of Editor Uncertainty
As I said in the introduction, journal editors have a certain measure of power
in a scientific community because they decide which papers get published.1
An editor could use this discretionary power to the benefit of her friends or
1Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors
make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define “the editor” to
be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
4
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -837-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -216-
colleagues, or to promote certain subfields or methodologies over others. This
phenomenon has been called editorial favoritism. If anecdotal evidence is to
be believed, this phenomenon is widespread. Some systematic evidence of
favoritism exists as well. Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe
editorial favoritism to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage
claiming to have perceived it firsthand. Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross
(1992) find that, controlling for citation impact and various other factors,
papers whose author has a connection to the journal editor are allocated
more journal pages than papers by authors without such a connection.2
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to
accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not
know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989, Bailey
et al. 2008a,b). In both of the studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were
asked to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by
editors and reviewers, this disapproval was shown (using a factor analysis) to
be part of a general and strong disapproval of “selfish or cliquish acts” in the
peer review process. Thus it appears that the reason for the disapproval of
editors publishing papers by their friends and colleagues is that it shows the
editor acting on private interests, rather than displaying the disinterestedness
that is the norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, if connection bias was a serious worry for authors,
one would expect this to be a major consideration for them in choosing
where to submit their papers (i.e., submit to journals where they know the
editor), but Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case.3
2Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the
paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is
accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure
the influence of a relationship between the author and the editor on acceptance decisions
directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not
available in these kinds of studies.
3In particular, authors who know an editor and thus could expect to profit from con-
5
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Moreover, despite working scientists’ disapproval, there is some evidence that
connection bias improves the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and
Piette 1994, Medoff 2003, Smith and Dombrowski 1998). Does that mean
scientists are misguided in their disapproval?
As indicated in the introduction, I distinguish between the effects of ed-
itors’ biases on the authors of scientific papers on the one hand, and the
effects on the readers of scientific journals on the other hand. In this section,
I use a formal model to show that these two can come apart: connection
bias may negatively affect scientists as authors while positively affecting sci-
entists as readers. Note that in this section I focus only on connection bias.
Subsequent sections consider other biases.
Consider a simplified scientific community consisting of a set of scientists.
Each scientist produces a paper and submits it to the community’s only
journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that
this suitability for publication can be measured on a single numerical scale.
For convenience I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral
on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of
the epistemic value of the paper (which is perhaps an aggregate of multiple
relevant criteria), or as the number of times the paper would be cited in
future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each
member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it.4
nection bias would find knowing the editor and the composition of the editorial board more
generally to be important factors in deciding where to submit, contrary to Ziobrowski and
Gibler’s evidence (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in importance in a list
of sixteen factors that might influence the decision where to submit). Similarly, authors
who do not know an editor would find a lack of (perceived) connection bias and the com-
position of the editorial board to be important factors, but these rank only seventh and
twelfth in importance in Ziobrowski and Gibler’s study. In a similar survey by Mackie
(1998, chapter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her
preferences is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
4For more on potential difficulties with interpreting the notion of quality, see Bright
(2015).
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Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time
it is submitted. The aim of this section is to show how uncertainty about
quality can lead to connection bias. To make this point as starkly as possible,
I assume that the editor cares only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate
of the quality of a paper and publishes those and only those papers whose
quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. Since there
is uncertainty about the quality, qi is modeled as a random variable. Since
some scientists are more likely to produce high quality papers than others,
the mean µi of this random variable may be different for each scientist. I
assume that quality follows a normal distribution with fixed variance: qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to
keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the dis-
tribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution
of reviewers’ estimates of the quality of a paper. I see no reason to expect
the results I present below to be different when any of these assumptions are
changed.
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the av-
erage quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming
that the editor knows the value of µi. For scientists she does not know, the
editor is uncertain about the average quality of their work. All she knows is
the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community, which
I also assume to be normal: µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc).
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: the
scientific community is split in two groups (those known by the editor and
those not known by the editor) but average paper quality follows the same
distribution in both groups. If I assumed instead that scientists known by
the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively
similar to those I present below. If scientists known by the editor write worse
7
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papers on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal
editors are relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967), this would be
an implausible assumption except perhaps in isolated cases.
The editor’s prior beliefs about the quality of a paper submitted by some
scientist i reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist
she knows the value of µi, and so her prior is π(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu). If the
editor does not know scientist i she only knows the distribution of µi, rather
than its exact value. Integrating out the uncertainty over µi yields a prior
π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc) for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. In the
context of this model, the main purpose of the reviewer’s report is to provide
an estimate of the quality of the paper. But, I assume, even after reading the
paper its quality cannot be established with certainty. Thus the reviewer’s
estimate ri of the quality qi is again a random variable. I assume that the
reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality qi of the
paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect the uncertainty:
ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv).
5
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update her
beliefs about the quality of scientist i’s paper. I assume that she does this
by Bayes conditioning. Thus, her posterior beliefs about the quality of the
paper are π(qi | ri) if she does not know the author, and π(qi | ri, µi) if she
does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose
5The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged
opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which
case the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs
about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text can be used to cover
any of these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of
reviewers used. If the number of reviewers is frequently different for different papers (and
in particular when this difference correlates with the existence or absence of a connection
between editor and author) the assumption of a fixed variance in the reviewer’s report is
unrealistic because a report from multiple reviewers may be thought to give more accurate
information (reducing the variance) than a report from a single reviewer.
8
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -841-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -220-
mean is a weighted average of ri and the prior mean, as given in proposition 1
(for a proof, see DeGroot 2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers
Bayesian statistics).
Proposition 1.
π(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
π(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ,
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi.
When does the editor choose to publish a paper? Here I assume that she
publishes any paper whose posterior mean is above some threshold q∗. So
a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is published if µUi >
q∗ and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is published if
µKi > q
∗. This corresponds to being at least 50% confident that the paper’s
quality is above the threshold. Other standards could be used (risk-averse
standards might require more than 50% confidence that the paper is above
some threshold, while risk-loving standards might require less; in these cases
the threshold value needs to be adapted to keep the total number of accepted
papers constant) but for my purposes here it does not much matter.
Now compare the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist i
unknown to the editor is published to the probability that the paper of an
arbitrary scientist known by the editor is published. For this purpose it is
useful to determine the probability distribution of the posterior means (see
appendix A for proofs of this and subsequent results).
9
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -842-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -221-
Proposition 2. The posterior means are normally distributed, with µUi ∼
N (µ, σ2U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Here,
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
and σ2K =
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
.
Moreover, if σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0, then σ
2
U < σ
2
K.
The main result of this section, which establishes the existence of con-
nection bias in the model, is a consequence of proposition 2. It says that
the editor is more likely to publish a paper written by an arbitrary author
she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary author she does not know,
whenever q∗ > µ (for any positive value of σ2sc and σ
2
rv). Since q
∗ = µ would
mean that exactly half of all papers gets published, the condition amounts
to a requirement that the journal’s acceptance rate is less than 50%. This
is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a notable
exception). When acceptance rates are above 50% editorial favoritism is also
much less of a concern in the first place.
Theorem 3. If q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the acceptance probability
for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability for
authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 3 shows that in the model I presented, any journal with an
acceptance rate lower than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus
I have established the surprising result that an editor who cares only about
the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers
by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her
friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.
Why does this surprising result hold? The theorem follows immediately
from proposition 2, which says that the distribution of µUi is less “spread
out” than the distribution of µKi (σ
2
U < σ
2
K). This happens because µ
U
i is a
10
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weighted average of µ and ri, keeping it relatively close to the overall mean µ
compared to µKi , which is a weighted average of µi and ri (which tend to
differ from µ in the same direction).
Because the editor treats papers by authors she knows differently from
papers by authors she does not know, authors unknown to the editor are
arguably harmed. I pick up this point in section 3 and argue that this
constitutes an epistemic injustice against those authors.
What I have shown so far is that an editor who uses information about the
average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows in her acceptance
decisions will find that scientists she knows produce on average more papers
that meet her quality threshold. This is a subjective statement: the editor
believes that more papers by scientists she knows meet her threshold. Does
this translate into an objective effect? That is, does the extra information
the editor has available about scientists she knows allow her to publish better
papers from them than from scientists she does not know?
In order to answer this question I need to compare the average quality of
accepted papers. More formally, I want to compare the expected value of the
quality of a paper, conditional on meeting the publication threshold, given
that the author is either known to the editor or not.
Proposition 4. If σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the average quality of accepted
papers from authors known to the editor is higher than the average quality of
accepted papers from authors unknown to the editor, i.e., E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] >
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
Proposition 4 shows that the editor can use the extra information she
has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers
published in her journal. In other words, the surprising result is that the
editor’s connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of
the journal. It is thus fair to say that, in the model, the editor can use her
connections to “identify and capture high-quality papers”, as Laband and
11
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Piette (1994) suggest.6
To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality
is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors
using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the model
is seen to yield an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due
to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor
knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the
other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting
for publication papers written by authors she knows even though they do
not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by
authors the editor knows should (presumably) be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality of a paper,7 a
simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with
an author-editor connection have a higher or a lower average quality than
papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a
number of times, and the results univocally favor the hypothesis that editors
use their connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband
and Piette 1994, Smith and Dombrowski 1998, Medoff 2003).
Note that in the above results, nothing depends on the sizes of the vari-
ances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv. This is because these results are qualitative. The
variances do matter when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers
are compared quantitatively. For example, reducing σ2rv (making the re-
viewer’s report more accurate) makes the differences in the acceptance rate
and average quality of papers smaller.
6This result applies to connection bias only. Below I consider other biases the editor
might have, which yields more nuanced conclusions.
7Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be inter-
preted. If quality is simply defined as “the number of citations this paper would get if it
were published” the connection between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other
interpretations of quality, citations have frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure
(Cole and Cole 1967, 1968, Medoff 2003). This practice has been defended by Cole and
Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989) and Heesen
(forthcoming).
12
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Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ2sc and σ
2
rv are
positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ2rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the re-
viewer’s report describes the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In
this case the “extra information” the editor has about authors she knows is
not needed, and so there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality
based on whether the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to
expect reviewer’s reports to be this accurate.
If σ2sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers
produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not
tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work.
In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the
quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So
here also there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based
on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected
to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper?
This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of
the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can
increase or decrease the editor’s confidence that the experiments were per-
formed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible
to describe in such a paper. In a scientific paper, “[a]s long as the conclu-
sions depend at least in part on the results of some experiment, the reader
must rely on the author’s (and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author
really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out
as reported” (Easwaran 2009, p. 359).
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and some or all of the
humanities, there is no need to rely on the author’s reputation. This is
because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to
judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created. Easwaran
13
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(2009) discusses this in detail for mathematics, and briefly (in his section 4)
for philosophy. And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should
be judged: “Papers will rely only on premises that the competent reader
can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that the
competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration.”
(Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the advantage (see theorem 3 and proposition 4) conferred
by revealing identity information about the author to the editor applies only
in certain fields. The relevant fields are those where part of the information
in the paper is conferred on the authority of testimony, in particular those
where experimental results are reported. Even in those fields, of course, what
is being testified is supposed to be reproducible by the reader. But this is still
different from the case in mathematics and the humanities, where a careful
reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument. In these
latter fields there is no relevant information to be learned from the identity
of the author (i.e., σ2sc = 0), or, at least, the publishing norms in these fields
suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about
paper quality. The first main result, theorem 3, established the existence of
connection bias in this model: authors known by the editor are more likely
to see their paper accepted than authors unknown to the editor. The second
main result, proposition 4, showed that connection bias benefits the readers
of the journal by improving the average quality of accepted papers.
Despite the benefit to the readers, I claim that authors are harmed by
connection bias. In this section I argue that an instance of connection bias
constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007). Then I argue
that the editor is likely to display other biases as well, and that instances of
14
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these also constitute epistemic injustices.
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice.
Fricker (2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where
a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and
epistemically culpable, rather than being due to innocent error.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls “the central case of testimonial injustice” (Fricker
2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and
one or more attributes, where this association embodies a gen-
eralization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective
investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many
different social spheres.
Applying this to the phenomenon of connection bias, it is clear that this is
not an instance of the central case of testimonial injustice. This would entail
that there is some negative stereotype associated with scientists unknown to
the editor, as a group, which is not normally the case. So I set the central
case aside (I return to it below) and focus on the question whether connection
bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
Suppose scientist i and scientist i′ tend to produce papers of the same
quality, which is above average in the population (µi = µi′ > µ). Suppose
further that the actual papers they have produced on this occasion are of the
same quality (qi = qi′) and have received similar reviewer reports (ri = ri′).
If scientist i is not known to the editor, but scientist i′ is, then the paper
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written by scientist i′ is likely to be evaluated more highly by the editor.8
If the publication threshold q∗ is somewhere in between the two evaluations
then only scientist i′ will have her paper accepted.
In this example, the scientists produced papers of equal quality that were
evaluated differently. So scientist i suffers a credibility deficit. This deficit
is not due to innocent error, as it would be if, e.g., random variation led to
different reviewer reports (i.e., ri < ri′). The deficit is also not due to the
editor’s use of generally reliable information about the two scientists, as it
would be if there was a genuine difference in the average quality of the papers
they produce (i.e., µi < µi′).
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, as I stressed in section 2,
the editor is simply making maximal use of the information available to her.
It just so happens that she has more information about scientists she knows
than about others. But that is hardly the editor’s fault: she cannot be
expected to know everyone’s work. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know
the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove
all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by
using a triple-blind reviewing procedure, in which the editor does not know
the identity of the author, and hence is prevented from using information
about scientists she knows in her evaluation. Using such a procedure, at
least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a
given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted.
So a credibility deficit occurs which harms scientist i: her paper is re-
jected. Moreover, it harms her specifically as an epistemic agent: the rejec-
tion of the paper reflects a judgment of the quality of her scientific work. And
8The editor’s posterior mean for the quality of scientist i’s paper is µUi and her posterior
mean for scientist i′’s paper is µKi′ = µ
K
i , with µ
U
i < µ
K
i′ whenever σ
2
sc(ri − µi) < (σ
2
qu +
σ2rv)(µi − µ). The claim in the text is then justified by the fact that Pr(σ
2
sc(ri − µi) <
(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)(µi − µ) | µi > µ) > 1/2, assuming σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
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this harm could have been prevented by the editor by using a triple-blind
reviewing procedure.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for this
credibility deficit, and hence a testimonial injustice is committed against
scientist i. However, one may insist that it cannot be the case that the
editor is committing a wrong simply in virtue of using relevant information
that is available to her. An evidentialist in particular may say that it cannot
possibly be an epistemic wrong to take into account all relevant information.
I disagree, for the reasons just given, but I need not insist on this point.
Even if it is granted that the editor does not commit an injustice by using
the information that is available to her, the end result is still that scientist i
is harmed as an epistemic agent. She has produced a paper of equal quality
to scientist i′’s, and yet it is not published.
Moreover, the presence of scientist i′ is irrelevant. Any time a paper
from an author unknown to the editor is rejected which would have been
accepted had the editor known the author (all else being equal), that author
is harmed. So even if one insists that differential editorial treatment resulting
from connection bias is not culpable on the part of the editor, connection bias
still harms authors whenever it influences acceptance decisions.
In the model of section 2, and the above discussion, I assumed that con-
nection bias is the only bias journal editors display. The literature on im-
plicit bias suggests that this is not true. For example, “[i]f submissions are
not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women’s work
will probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of the same qual-
ity” (Saul 2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wennerås and
Wold (1997), Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Budden
et al. (2008), and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012).9 So women scientists are at
9These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various
ways. None of them focus specifically on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim
unless it is assumed that journal editors as a group are significantly less biased than other
academics.
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a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases exist
based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists’ identity, such as race or sex-
ual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013, for a critical survey of various biases in
the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: “The editorial
process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has ex-
cluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige
institutions”.
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. Any time a paper is
rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have been accepted
if the relevant part of the author’s identity had been different, all else being
equal), a testimonial injustice occurs for the same reasons outlined above.
Moreover, here the editor is culpable for having these biases.
Unlike instances resulting from connection bias, testimonial injustices
resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central case of tes-
timonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative
identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women’s
work, even when the person judging does not consciously believe in these
stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work
objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than
less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007, Stewart and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar
claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation. Bi-
ases based on academic affiliation are not usually due to negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes, as these do not generally affect other aspects of the
scientist’s life.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices
against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that authors are
harmed when journal editors do not use a triple-blind reviewing procedure.
This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-blind reviewing which
I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based on these consid-
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erations.
4 The Effect of Bias on Quality
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that
failing to use triple-blind reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because
it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2 I argued
that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average
quality. In this section I complicate the model to include identity bias.
Recall that the editor displays identity bias if she is more or less likely
to publish papers from a certain group of scientists based on some aspect of
their identity, e.g., their gender. I incorporate this in the model by assuming
the editor consistently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the
others). More precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced
by any scientist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it
really is by some constant quantity ε. Conversely, the average quality of
papers written by any scientist not belonging to this group is raised by δ.10
So the editor has a different prior for the two groups; I use πA to denote her
prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and
πF for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may be familiar with a given scientist’s work (i.e.,
she knows the average quality of that scientist’s papers) or not. So there
are now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the
stigmatized group the editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s
paper is πA(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi− ε, σ
2
qu). If scientist i is known to the editor but
is not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi | µi) ∼ N(µi + δ, σ
2
qu). If
10This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple
groups of different strengths, or biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases
which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016). However,
the assumption in the main text suffices to make the point I want to make. It should be
fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just
described.
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scientist i is not known to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior
is πA(qi) ∼ N(µ− ε, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc). And if scientist i is not known to the editor
and not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi) ∼ N(µ+ δ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc).
11
The next few steps in the development are analogous to that in section 2.
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the
quality of the paper, yielding the following posterior distributions.
Proposition 5.
πA(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKAi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKFi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πA(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUAi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUFi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µKAi = µ
K
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, µKFi = µ
K
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
µUAi = µ
U
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, µUFi = µ
U
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean (µKAi , µ
KF
i , µ
UA
i ,
or µUFi ) exceeds the threshold q
∗. The respective distributions of the posterior
11Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized
group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is
not triple-blind, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who sub-
mits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty
the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to expect the editor
to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely, because negative
identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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means determine how likely this is. These distributions are given in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6. The posterior means are normally distributed, with
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
This yields the within-group acceptance rates and the unsurprising result
that the editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased
against.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the acceptance probability for
authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance probability
for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not the
editor knows the author). That is,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors
that are subject to a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype are less likely to
see their paper accepted than authors who are not. As I argued in section 3,
whenever a paper is rejected due to identity bias this constitutes a testimonial
injustice against the author.
Now I turn my attention to the effect that identity bias has on the average
quality of accepted papers. In the current version of the model there is both
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connection bias and identity bias. Connection bias has been shown to have
a positive effect on average quality (see section 2). Whether the net effect of
connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative depends on various
parameters, as I illustrate below.
The benchmark for judging the average quality of accepted papers under
a procedure subject to connection bias and identity bias is a triple-blind
reviewing procedure under which the editor is not informed of the identity
of the scientist. As a result, she is both unable to use information about
the average quality of a given scientist’s papers and unable to display bias
against scientists based on their identity.
Under this triple-blind procedure, the editor’s prior distribution for the
quality of any submitted paper is π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu+σ
2
sc), i.e., the prior I used
in section 2 when the author was unknown to the editor. Hence, under this
procedure, the posterior is π(qi | ri), the posterior mean is µ
U
i ∼ N(µ, σ
2
U),
the probability of acceptance is Pr(µUi > q
∗) and the average quality of
accepted papers is E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
In contrast, I refer to the reviewing procedure that is subject to connection
bias and identity bias as the non-blind procedure. The overall probability that
a paper is accepted under the non-blind procedure depends on the relative
sizes of the four groups. I use pKA to denote the fraction of scientists known to
the editor that she is biased against, pKF for the fraction known to the editor
that she is biased in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists biased against, and
pUF for unknown scientists biased in favor of. These fractions are nonnegative
and sum to one.
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the non-
blind procedure. The overall probability of acceptance under this procedure
is
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Pr (Ai) = pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers can then be written as E[qi | Ai]. I
want to compare E[qi | Ai] to E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗], the average quality of accepted
papers under a triple-blind procedure.12
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such
that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal
to µ. In other words, her bias against the stigmatized group is canceled
out on average by her bias in favor of those not in the stigmatized group,
weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
(pKA + pUA) ε = (pKF + pUF ) δ.
I use the above equation to fix the value of δ, reducing the number of free
parameters by one. The equation amounts to a kind of commensurability
requirement for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor
perceives the average quality of submitted papers to be the same regardless
of whether or not a triple-blind procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the
parameter values that determine whether the non-blind procedure or the
triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers.
The question I will explore now, using some numerical examples, is how
biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to
outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the
12Expressions for Pr(Ai) and E[qi | Ai] using only the parameter values and standard
functions are given in lemma 11 in appendix A. These expressions are used to generate
the numerical results below.
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parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q∗ = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in
this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv, I
choose a “small” and a “large” value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that there is no correlation
between whether the editor knows an author and whether the editor has a
bias against that author (so, e.g., the percentage of women among scientists
the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the
editor does not know). I consider two cases for the editor’s identity bias:
either she is biased against half the set of authors (and so biased in favor
of the other half) or the group she is biased against is a 30% minority.13
Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of all scientists
submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30% of them.
As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (23 choices for
the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes). Whether the triple-blind
procedure or the non-blind procedure is epistemically preferable depends on
the value of ε (and the value of δ determined thereby).
It follows from proposition 4 that when ε = 0 the non-blind procedure
helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average
quality relative to the triple-blind procedure. If ε is positive but relatively
small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the non-blind procedure
harms the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers
under the non-blind procedure decreases continuously as ε increases (I do
not prove this, but it is easily checked for the 32 cases I consider).
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big
does the editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity
bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
13Bruner and O’Connor (forthcoming) note that certain dynamics in academic life can
lead to identity bias against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority.
Here I consider both the case where the stigmatized group is a minority (and is possibly
stigmatized as a result of being a minority, as Bruner and O’Connor suggest) and the case
where it is not (and so presumably the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype has some
other source).
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I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published
papers under the non-blind procedure and the triple-blind procedure is the
same for each of the 32 cases. But reporting these numbers directly does not
seem particularly useful, as ε is measured in “quality points” which do not
have a clear interpretation outside of the model.
To give a more meaningful interpretation of these values of ε as measur-
ing “size of bias”, I calculate the average rate of acceptance of papers from
authors the editor is biased against and the average rate of acceptance of
papers from authors the editor is biased in favor of.14 The difference be-
tween these numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it
measures (in percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the
editor accepts from authors she is biased in favor of, compared to those she
is biased against.
This difference is reported for the 32 cases in figure 1. To provide a sense
of scale for these numbers, I plot them against the acceptance rate that the
triple-blind procedure would have for those values of the parameters, i.e.,
Pr(µUi > q
∗).
Already with this small sample of 32 cases, a large variation of results
can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases in detail.
First, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 1 and σ
2
rv = 4. In this extreme case
the triple-blind procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72%. If the
groups are all of equal size (pKA = pKF = pUA = pUF = 1/4) then under the
non-blind procedure the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in
favor of needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for
authors the editor is biased against, in order for the average quality under
14These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not.
In particular, the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased against is
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
pKA + pUA
, and
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
pKF + pUF
is the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased in favor of.
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Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs
of the non-blind procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point
difference in acceptance rates), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the ac-
ceptance rate of the corresponding triple-blind procedure.
the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a
journal that only accepts less than 1% of papers. If the bias is any less than
that there is no harm to the readers in using the non-blind procedure.
Second, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 4 and σ
2
rv = 1. Then the triple-
blind procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66%. If, moreover, the editor
knows relatively few authors (pKA = pKF = 0.15, pUA = pUF = 0.35) then
the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be
only 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased
against, in order for the quality costs of the non-blind procedure to outweigh
its benefits. For a journal accepting about 23% of papers that means that
even if the identity bias of the editor is relatively mild the journal’s readers
are harmed if the non-blind procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are un-
likely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the non-blind procedure
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or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of pub-
lished papers for any particular journal.15 So in general it is not clear that
an argument that the non-blind procedure harms the journal’s readers can be
made. At the same time, a general argument that the non-blind procedure
helps the readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recom-
mend a triple-blind procedure for all journals because not doing so harms
the authors.
If there was reason to believe that the editor’s bias was very small, there
might be a case for the non-blind procedure using considerations of average
quality. Based on the empirical evidence I cited in section 3, it seems unlikely
that any editor could make such a case convincingly today. But if identity
bias were someday to be eliminated or severely mitigated, this question may
be worth revisiting.
So far I have argued in this section that in the presence of the positive
effect of connection bias on quality, the net effect of connection bias and
identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive
effect of connection bias may only exist in certain fields. In fields where
papers rely partially on the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the
identity of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and some
of the humanities testimony is not taken to play a role—the paper itself
constitutes the contribution to the field—and so arguably there is no value
in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but
there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for
the triple-blind procedure emerges, as the non-blind procedure harms both
authors and readers.
15Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this
question, as they do not directly compare the triple-blind and the non-blind procedure.
Their evidence supports a positive epistemic effect of connection bias, but not a verdict
on the overall epistemic effect of triple-blinding.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-blind re-
view: one based on the consequences for the author and one based on the
consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the non-blind procedure introduces differential treat-
ment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish
papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 3) and less likely
to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereo-
types to (identity bias, theorem 7). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result
of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is
committed against the author. This is an argument in favor of triple-blinding
based on consequences for the author.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed. Generally speak-
ing connection bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers
and identity bias a negative one. Thus whether the readers are better off
under the triple-blind procedure depends on how exactly these effects trade
off, which is highly context-dependent, or so I have argued. This yields a
more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994),
who focus only on connection bias, or by the argument for triple-blinding
based on the consequences for the readers, which focuses only on identity
bias.
However, in mathematics and some of the humanities there is arguably
no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s
other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative
effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’
perspective. In this situation, considerations concerning the consequences for
the author and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers
point in the same direction: in favor of triple-blind review.
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A The Acceptance Probability and the Aver-
age Quality of Papers
Proposition 2. µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Moreover, σ
2
U < σ
2
K
whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. First consider the distribution of ri. Since ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv), qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu), and µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc), it follows that ri | µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
and ri ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv).
The latter can be used straightforwardly to determine the distribution
of µUi . Since ri − µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv) it follows that
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) ∼ N
(
0,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
∼ N
(
0, σ2U
)
.
The result follows because µ is a constant and
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) + µ.
Determining the distribution of µKi is slightly trickier because there are
two random variables involved: ri and µi. As noted above, ri | µi ∼
N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv). Thus, writing Xi =
σ2
qu
σ2
qu
+σ2
rv
(ri − µi),
Xi | µi ∼ N
(
0,
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
Since
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi = Xi + µi
it remains to determine the convolution of Xi and µi. This can be done using
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the moment-generating function and the law of total expectation. Recall
that the moment-generating function of an N(m, s2) distribution is given by
M(t) = exp{mt+ 1
2
s2t2}. So the moment-generating function of µKi is
E[exp{tµKi }] = E[exp{t(Xi + µi)}]
= E[E[exp{tXi + tµi} | µi]]
= E[exp{tµi}E[exp{tXi} | µi]]
= exp
{
0t+
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
E[exp{tµi}]
= exp
{
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2 + µt+
1
2
σ2sct
2
}
= exp
{
µt+
1
2
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
,
which is exactly the moment-generating function of the desired normal dis-
tribution.
Finally, note that
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
,
σ2K =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv) + σ
2
scσ
4
rv
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
.
So σ2U < σ
2
K whenever σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0 (and σ
2
U = σ
2
K otherwise, assuming
the expressions are well-defined in that case).
Theorem 3. Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
if q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. It follows from proposition 2 that
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Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σK
)
and Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σU
)
,
where Φ is the distribution function (or cumulative density function) of a
standard normal distribution. Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument,
and σK > σU by proposition 2, the theorem follows immediately.
In order to prove proposition 4 a number of intermediate results are
needed.
Lemma 8.
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
Proof. Because µUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri, it follows
that
qi | µ
U
i ∼ qi | ri ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
.
The distribution of qi | µ
K
i is a little trickier to find, because µ
K
i is a linear
combination of two random variables, ri and µi, and it is not obvious that
learning µKi is as informative as learning both ri and µi. But using the known
distributions of qi | µi and µ
K
i | qi, µi and integrating out µi it can be shown
that
qi | µ
K
i ∼ qi | ri, µi ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
The important point here is that E[qi | µ
x
i ] = µ
x
i both for x = U and x = K.
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish that
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E[qi | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[E[qi | µ
x
i ] | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[µxi | µ
x
i > q
∗],
for x = U,K.
Let X ∼ N(µ, σ2) be a normally distributed random variable. Then
X | X > a follows a left-truncated normal distribution, with left-truncation
point a. As a result of lemma 8 I am interested in the mean of left-truncated
normal distributions. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994, chapter 13,
section 10.1), this mean can be expressed as
E[X | X > a] = µ+ σR
(
a− µ
σ
)
. (1)
Here
R(x) =
φ(x)
1− Φ(x)
for all x ∈ R, where φ is the probability density function of the standard
normal distribution, and Φ is its distribution function. R is the inverse of
what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
R′(x) = R(x)2 − xR(x). (2)
Proposition 9 (Gordon (1941)). For all x > 0, R(x) < x
2+1
x
.
Proposition 9 can be used to establish the next result.
Proposition 10. If X ∼ N(µ, σ2) and Y ∼ N(µ, s2) with s > σ > 0 then
E[Y | Y > a] > E[X | X > a].
Proof. It suffices to show that the derivative ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] is positive for
all σ > 0. Differentiating equation (1) (using equation (2)) yields
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∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] =
((
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1
)
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)2
.
Since R
(
a−µ
σ
)
> 0, ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] > 0 if and only if
(
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
> 0.
This is true whenever a−µ
σ
≤ 0 because then both terms in the sum are
positive. Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever a−µ
σ
> 0 as well.
Proposition 4. E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] > E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] whenever σ2sc > 0, and
σ2rv > 0.
Proof. By lemma 8,
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
By proposition 2, µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K), with σU < σK . Hence
the conditions of proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows.
Proposition 6.
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
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Proof. Since µKAi and µ
KF
i are simply µ
K
i shifted by a constant (see propo-
sition 5) they follow the same distribution as µKi except that its mean is
shifted by the same constant. Similarly µUAi and µ
UF
i are just µ
U
i shifted by
a constant. So the results follow from proposition 2.
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined
by
qKA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, qKF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
qUA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, qUF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Proof. For the first inequality, note that
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
< 1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
= Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
.
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established
in proposition 6. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly
increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
< 1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
= Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
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Lemma 11.
Pr (Ai) = pKA
(
1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
))
+ pKF
(
1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ pUA
(
1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
))
+ pUF
(
1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
E [qi | Ai] = µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
Proof. The expression for Pr(Ai) follows immediately from the distributions
of the posterior means established in proposition 6.
To get an expression for E[qi | Ai], consider first the average quality of
scientist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in
the group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against.
This average quality is
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
= E
[
qi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= E
[
µKi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
,
where the first equality simply rewrites the inequality µKAi > q
∗ in a more
convenient form, the second equality uses lemma 8, and the third equality
uses equation 1. Similarly,
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E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers E[qi | Ai] is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers
that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, au-
thors known to the editor that she is biased against form a pKA Pr(µ
KA
i >
q∗)/Pr(Ai) proportion of accepted papers. Hence
E [qi | Ai] =
1
Pr (Ai)
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
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Strategies of Explanatory Abstraction in Molecular Systems Biology
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Abstract 
I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems biology that are 
driven by mathematics as much as mechanistic detail. Analysis of differential 
equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of network motifs drives 
the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering drive the third. I 
also distinguish three abstraction types: aggregations, which simplify by 
condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by generalizing 
information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing information. 
Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust perfect 
adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli—I argue that each strategy invokes 
a different combination of abstraction types and that each targets its 
abstractions to different mechanistic details.  
 
 
1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The currently dominant paradigm for understanding explanation in biology puts 
mechanism at center stage (Nicholson 2012; Levy 2013). Leading accounts of 
mechanistic explanation, while differing in the particulars of their analysis of 
mechanism, agree that mechanistic explanations explain by alluding to mechanisms or 
models thereof (Machamer, Darden, Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005).  
 
There is a small publishing industry devoted to discerning the scope of mechanistic 
explanation in scientific practice. Some claim to identify biological explanations that do 
not allude to mechanisms (Wouters 2007; Huneman 2010; Rice 2015). Fans of 
mechanistic explanation tend to resist making scope concessions, preferring instead to 
accommodate the putative explanations as mechanistic despite initial appearances, to 
broaden the scope of mechanistic explanation or the analysis of mechanism, or else to 
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deny that the putative explanations are explanations at all (Craver 2006; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013). 
 
I set aside questions about what qualifies as an explanation as well as questions about 
whether only mechanisms—or models thereof—carry explanatory power. I focus, 
instead, on explanatory strategies, understood as patterns of reasoning directed toward 
providing explanations. I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems 
biology that are driven by mathematics as much as, if not more than, mechanistic detail. 
Analysis of differential equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of 
network motifs drives the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering 
drive the third.  
 
Systems biologists use these strategies to supplement the explanatory power of 
traditional molecular mechanisms (see Brigandt et al forthcoming). My aim is to identify 
how the strategies differ from each other, rather than how they differ from standard 
mechanistic explanations or what might unify them in those differences (for which see 
Green and Jones 2016). Doing so helps with understanding relations among the 
strategies, their tactics for integrating mechanistic detail, and explanatory affordances 
of their mathematical elements. 
 
They key to my analysis is a distinction among three abstraction types: aggregations, 
which simplify by condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by 
generalizing information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing 
information. Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust 
perfect adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli (Barkai and Leibler 1997; Ma et al 
2009; Yi et al 2000)—I argue that each strategy invokes a different combination of 
abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different mechanistic details. I 
begin with the typology of abstraction. 
 
 
2 Abstraction Typology 
 
I am interested in abstractions as representational rather than metaphysical. 
Abstractions, as I understand them, are ontologically innocent, so that characterizing 
features of representations as abstractions over some parts of reality carries no 
implication that features correspond to abstract objects (see also Cartwright 1989, 353-
354; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 243). So, for example, representing the relation between a 
person, a hotel, and a date range as a reservation does not entail that some abstract 
object, a reservation, eǆists; Ŷor does represeŶtiŶg the ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s 
ĐoŶstitueŶts as the ŵotioŶ of the oďjeĐt’s ĐeŶter of ŵass eŶtail that soŵe aďstraĐt 
object, a center of mass, exists. 
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Levy and Bechtel characterize a representation as abstract insofar as a more concrete 
representation is possible (2013, 242).  Brigandt and colleagues suggest that biologists 
use aďstraĐtioŶs to ͞eluĐidate sǇsteŵ-level patterns of organization that may not be 
ǀisiďle at the leǀel of ŵoleĐular details͟ ;forthcoming). I concur. I understand 
abstractions as representing only some of the many elements—objects, relations, 
parameters—associated with their targets, thereby making apparent patterns obscured 
by more detailed representations. I add to these insights that biologists produce (at 
least) three types of abstraction. 
 
Following Ordorica, I call the first aggregation (2015, 163-164). An aggregation 
represents some relationship among multiple elements of a representational target as a 
higher-level object, or multiple elements of the target as a single, composite object. (See 
Figure 1a.) Paradigm cases of aggregations include representations of person-hotel-date 
relations as reservations; of costs of services and costs of goods as costs; and of the 
ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s parts as the motion of a center of mass (from Ordorica 2015, 
164). Aggregations abstract from plurality to individual, ignoring differences among 
many in order to make salient some integrated unity among the elements of a 
representational target. They thereby simplify representations by condensing 
information about representational targets.  
 
Following Pincock, I call the second abstraction type generalization (2015, 864). A 
generalization represents some element of a representational target as a class of 
elements, where potential instances of the class might include elements not present in 
the target. (See Figure 1b.) For example, because the class of solution measures includes 
all soap-bubble-like surfaces, such as the cellular froth surrounding radiolarian protozoa, 
representing a soap-bubble surfaĐe as a ͞solution measure͟ is a geŶeralizatioŶ ;PiŶĐoĐk 
2015, 864). Generalizations abstract from an instance to a class thereof, ignoring 
differences between instances of the class in order to make salient some more general 
unity. They thereby simplify representations by generalizing from information about 
representational targets. 
 
I call the third abstraction type structuration. A structuration represents some element 
of a representational target as a position in a structure, such that potential occupants of 
the position might include elements not present in the target. (See Figure 1c.) I follow 
Haslanger in understaŶdiŶg struĐtures as ͞Đoŵpleǆ eŶtities ǁith parts ǁhose ďehaǀior is 
ĐoŶstraiŶed ďǇ their relatioŶ to other parts͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, ϭϭϴͿ. Paradigm cases of 
structurations include representating Barack Obama as President of the United States of 
America, or representing AIneias as son of Anchises and Aphrodite. Structurations 
abstract to a position in a structure, from an occupant of the position, ignoring intrinsic 
features of the occupant unrelated to its position in order to make salient the 
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oĐĐupaŶt’s role relatiǀe to occupants of other positions in the same structure. They 
thereby simplify by contextualizing information about representational targets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Visualizing Abstraction Types. (a) Aggregation A represents elements 
e1, e2, and e3 (and relations therein) as a single object. (b) Generalization C 
represents I1(c) as a class, instances of which also include I2(c) and I3(c). (c) 
Structuration p1 represents element o1 as a position in larger structure that also 
includes p2, p3, and p4. 
 
I understand aggregations as distinct from both generalizations and structurations, by 
virtue of being many-to-one, rather than one-to-one, simplifications. I also understand 
being a generalization as insufficient for being a structuration. For representations of 
positions carry information about functional relationships between their occupants and 
other positions in the same structure; but representations of classes do not. Finally, 
insofar as classes are sets, I understand being a structuration as insufficient for being a 
generalization. For, sometimes, representing target elements as classes carries some 
information about intrinsic features of those elements apart from their functional 
relations to elements occupying other positions in the same structure; but representing 
target elements as positions in structures never carries such information.  
 
 
3 Robust Perfect Adaptation of E.coli Chemotaxis 
 
My central claim is that different explanatory strategies from recent systems biology 
differ from each other, at least in part, by virtue of appealing to different abstraction 
types. I support this claim by considering a case in which multiple strategies target the 
same explanandum. Doing so minimizes confounds that confuse differences due to the 
nature of each explanatory strategy with differences due to the nature of each 
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explanatory target. I focus on a particular explanandum known as robust perfect 
adaptation of bacterial chemotaxis, following others who consider this a paradigmatic 
target for non-ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ ;Braillard ϮϬϭϬ; BrigaŶdt, GreeŶ, aŶd O’MalleǇ 
forthcoming; Matthiessen forthcoming). 
 
3.1 Explanadum Context 
Escherichia coli (E.coli) is popular model organism in biological research. It is very 
sensitive to small chemical changes over a very large range of background 
concentrations. It also has a simple and well-understood signal transduction network 
(Wadhams and Armitage 2004). 
 
E.coli manages two kinds of motion (Berg 2003). It runs by rotating its flagellar motor 
counterclockwise. This aligns all of its flagella into a synchronized bundle, resulting in 
movement in a straight line for about 1 second. E.coli also tumbles by rotating its 
flagellar motor clockwise. This breaks flagellar alignment, and the asynchronized flagella 
produce stationary changes of direction lasting for about 0.1 second. E.coli are randomly 
reoriented after each tumble. Moreover, while these tumbles occur with regular 
frequency, E.coli  with higher concentrations of CheR protein tumble more frequently 
(Spudich and Kochland 1975). 
 
E.coli’s ŵotioŶ iŶ a uŶiforŵ eǆterŶal eŶǀiroŶŵeŶt reseŵďles a raŶdoŵ ǁalk. E.coli has 
no ability to control or select its direction of motion, and its straight runs are subject to 
Brownian motion because of eddies. However, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant—amino acids such as serine or aspartic acid, or sugars such as maltose or 
glucose— E.coli taxis toward the attractant. This taxi behavior involves less frequent 
tumbles, leading to longer runs and so gradual motion toward the attractant. (There is 
an opposite behavior for repellants such as metal ions or leucine.) 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for E.coli chemotaxis is well-understood. When an 
environmental attractant attaches to a receptor, the receptor lowers the activity of the 
CheW-CheA protein complex. Less activity from this complex reduces the rate of CheY 
phosphorylation, which results in less phorphorylated CheY diffusing to the flagella. 
Because CheY induces clockwise rotation of the flagellar motor, the outcome is less 
frequent tumbling. 
 
3.2 Explanadum Question 
 
Alon and colleagues have experimental verification that, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant mixed uniformly into the environment at a constant concentration, E.coli 
chemotaxis perfectly adaptive (Alon et al 2009). After a brief period of decreased 
tumbling frequency, the frequency of E.coli tumbles increases toward and returns to the 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -881-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -260-
 6 
exact frequency prior to the introduction of the attractant. The effect of the attractant, 
accordingly, becomes entirely forgotten despite its continuing presence. 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for the adaptiveness of chemotaxis for E.coli is also well-
understood. Some time after a new attractant has been detected by receptors, the 
lower activity of the CheW-CheA complex induces less CheB activity. This reduces the 
rate for removing methyl groups from the CheW-CheA complex and, together with 
continual methylation of the CheR receptor, CheW-CheA methylation increases. More 
methylation means more CheW-CheA activity, which in turn induces more CheY 
phosphorylation. This eventually results in more phosphorylated CheY diffusing to the 
flagellar motor, which increases clockwise motor rotation and thereby raises tumbling 
frequency.   
 
Alon and colleagues have further experimental verification that this perfectly adaptive 
chemotaxis of E.coli is robust across ranges of CheR concentrations 0.5 to 50 times 
higher thaŶ ĐoŶĐeŶtratioŶ leǀels iŶ ͞ǁild tǇpe͟ E.coli (Alon et al 2009). (By contrast, 
E.coli’s adaptatioŶ tiŵe—the time to return to 50% of its pre-stimulus tumbling 
frequency—is not robust to different CheR concentrations, because more CheR entails 
longer adaptation times.) This is the explanandum of interest: why is the perfect 
adaptation of E.coli chemotaxis, in the presence of a well-distributed chemical 
attractant, robust to CheR protein concentrations?  
 
There are (at least) three strategies for answering this question in recent systems 
biology literature. (For a fourth, see Kollman et al 2005.) I consider each in turn, first 
sketching the general strategy and then making explicit the abstractions at work.  
 
 
4 Distinguishing Explanatory Strategies through Abstraction Types 
 
4.1 Dynamical Modeling 
I call the first strategy dynamical modeling. This strategy begins by constructing a 
chemotaxis network for E.coli. This network represents the mechanism for E.coli 
chemotaxis, including specific biochemical details about when and how relevant 
proteins affect each other. (See Figurer 2.) For example, Barkai and Leibler (1997) 
construct a model according to which, among many other specifics, CheB demethylates 
only the active form of the CheW-CheA complex and CheR works only at saturation.  
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 Figure 2. Mechanistic network for E.coli chemotaxis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
The dynamical modeling strategy proceeds by constructing a dynamical model—
typically a set of differential equations—from the network (see Jones and Wolkenhauer 
2012). One then demonstrates, via mathematical proof or simulation, that this model 
predicts perfect adaptation in the presence of a well-distributed chemical attractant for 
CheR concentration values varying over several orders of magnitude. (Raerinne 2013 
calls this sensitivity analysis.) The demonstration supports the inference that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation because of its biochemical specifics. 
 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) call the product of this strategy a dynamical 
mechanistic explanation. I set aside the issue of whether the dynamical modeling 
strategǇ produĐes eǆplaŶatioŶs. But I eŶdorse BeĐhtel aŶd AďrahaŵseŶ’s iŶsight that 
the dynamical modeling strategy produces accounts that are mechanistic, by virtue of 
depending upon mechanistic details, as well as dynamical, by virtue of analyzing 
ŵatheŵatiĐal ŵodels ďuilt upoŶ those details. For eǆaŵple, Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ 
mathematical analysis is relevant to E.coli chemotaxis only insofar as their network 
details are relevant; and analysis of the network apart from the model cannot produce 
an inference about the robustness of E.coli’s perfeĐtlǇ adaptiǀe Đheŵotaǆis. 
 
Let’s treat the dǇŶaŵiĐal model driving this explanatory strategy as an initial baseline for 
evaluating the number and severity of abstraction in various explanatory strategies. The 
model is abstract in various ways. But we shall treat it as a recipient of further 
abstractions, in the way a vehicle receives freight. Just as we can determine the weight 
of the freight indirectly by subtracting the gross weight of vehicle and freight from the 
͞tare ǁeight͟ ;the ǁeight of ǀehiĐle aloŶeͿ, ǁe shall determine abstraction variety and 
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severitǇ/eǆteŶt for ŵodels driǀiŶg other eǆplaŶatorǇ strategies ďǇ ͞suďtraĐtiŶg͟ their 
total aďstraĐtioŶ ǀarietǇ aŶd seǀeritǇ froŵ the ͞tare͟ aďstraĐtioŶ. 
 
4.2 Topological Analysis 
I call the second explanatory strategy topological analysis. This strategy begins by 
identifying all possible minimal adaptation networks capable of predicting robust 
perfect adaptation for E.coli chemotaxis. These networks, like the networks for 
dynamical modeling, represent mechanisms for E.coli chemotaxis. Yet, unlike the 
networks for dynamical modeling, these networks are minimal: they contain the fewest 
possible nodes and links that suffice for robustly perfectly adaptive chemotaxis. The 
procedure for identifying all possible minimal networks of this sort is brute 
computational search. It turns out that there are exactly three, each of which has 
exactly three nodes and no more than three links (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy proceeds by identifying a chemotaxis network known 
to predict robust perfect adaptation. This strategy thereby relies upon the dynamical 
modeling strategy, but only for mathematical results. The biochemical details of the 
chosen chemotaxis network turn out to be largely irrelevant, because the topological 
analysis strategy proceeds by demonstrating that a reduced form of the chosen network 
is topological equivalent to one of the minimal adaptation models. Reduced forms for 
mechanistic networks functional equivalents for node groups, group nodes or 
equivalents into modules, and ignore links within modules in favor of links between 
modules. 
 
Consider, for example, one of the three minimal adaptation networks Ma and 
colleagues (2009) discover for E.coli chemotaxis. (See Figure 3.) The network has an 
input activating node A, A inhibiting being activated by B, A also activating C, and C 
aĐtiǀatiŶg soŵe output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues shoǁ that Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ŵodel 
for E.coli chemotaxis reduces to this minimal network. Barkai and Leibler have an input 
and CheR activating, and CheB inhibiting, receptors; these receptors activating the 
CheW-CheA complex; the complex activating CheB and CheY; and CheY activating some 
output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues reĐoŶĐeptualize Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s Ŷetǁork iŶto oŶe ǁhere 
the input activates a receptor complex; this complex activates CheY, which activates the 
output; the complex also activates CheB, which inhibits a methylation level also 
activated by CheR.; and this methylation level activates the receptor complex. Then, in a 
second reconceptualization that produces one of their minimal adaptation networks, 
they group the receptor complex and CheB into module A, group CheR and the 
methylation level into module B, and rename CheY module C.  
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Figure 3: Network topology for E.coli chemotaxis (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy infers, from the topological equivalence between a 
minimal adaptation network and the reduced form of a network known to predict 
robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis, that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because of the topology of its chemotaxis network. Huneman (2010) calls the 
product of this strategy a topological explanation. Regardless of whether analyses such 
as Ma aŶd Đolleagues’s are eǆplaŶatorǇ, theǇ are topologiĐal ďǇ ǀirtue of demonstrating 
some consequence about the topological properties of a network. This means that, even 
if the mechanistic details of E.coli’s Đheŵotaǆis Ŷetǁork ǁere differeŶt, aŶd eǀeŶ if the 
biochemical specifics of the network chosen for reduction were different, the product of 
the topological analysis strategy would remain the same provided that the alternative 
networks preserve topological equivalence with the originals (see also Jones 2014).  
 
The topological model driving this second explanatory strategy is more abstract than the 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodel driǀiŶg our iŶitial ;͞tare͟Ϳ strategǇ. The topologiĐal ŵodel ĐoŶtaiŶs 
more aggregations. For example, it represeŶts CheY aŶd Che) as ͞the ŵotor rotation 
group;͟ it represents CheA and CheW as "the receptor complex;" and it represents the 
receptor complex aŶd CheB as ͞the phosphorǇlatioŶ group.͟ The topologiĐal ŵodel also 
contains more structurations. For example, it represents the phosphorylation group as 
͞A͟ aŶd the ŵotor rotatioŶ group as ͞C.͟ These representations abstract entirely from 
any intrinsic marks that might distinguish instanĐes of ͞A͟ froŵ iŶstaŶĐes of ͞C," relǇiŶg 
instead upon extrinsic relations to distinguish the nodes from each other. So, for 
example, "A" but not "C" inhibits "B," "A" activates "C," and so on.  
 
4.3 Organizational Design 
I call the third explanatory strategy organization design. This strategy begins with a 
proof to the effect that systems exhibit robust perfect adaptation if and only if they 
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satisfy the characteristic equation for Integral Feedback Control (IFC). The proof is 
purely mathematical, well-known from control engineering theory in contexts involving 
mechanical systems that exhibit IFC such as thermostats. I am not aware of a complete 
and published version of this proof, but Yi and colleagues (2000) provide a sketch with 
relevant details. The organizational design strategy proceeds by inferring that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation if and only if it satisfies the characteristic 
equation for IFC, and further inferring that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because it satisfies the characteristic equation for IFC. (For better 
explanatory details regarding this specific case, Braillard 2010; Green and Jones 2016.) 
 
The organizational design strategy invokes neither mechanistic specifics about the 
chemotaxis network for E.coli nor topological details about the structure of that 
network. The strategy takes the explanandum phenomenon as given, using a 
mathematical equivalence result to identify a principle both necessary and sufficient for 
the phenomenon. The strategy thereby has affinities with explanatory strategies that 
appeal to organizing principles (Green and Wolkenhauer 2013) and design principles 
(Green 2015).  
 
For siŵpliĐitǇ, let’s ͞reset͟ our aďstraĐtioŶ ͞tare͟ to the topologiĐal ŵodel, ďeĐause the 
model driving the organizational design strategy—call it the design model—is abstract in 
all the ways the topological model is abstract and more besides. The simplification 
thereby focuses attention on ways in which the design model differs from the 
topological model—and, by extension, from the initial dynamical model.  
 
Compared to the topological model, the design model contains more aggregations. For 
example, the design model represents CheY phosphorǇlatioŶ aŶd CheB aĐtiǀatioŶ as ͞k-
ďoǆ output.͟ This aggregation is, at the same time, a generalization and a structuration. 
For example, "k-box output" is a class, with instances biological as well as mechanical. 
The standard example of a mechanical instance is heater activation in a thermostat. The 
k-box representation is also a structuration, akin to the "A", "B," and "C" 
representations from the topological model. For the k-box represents whatever has 
such-and-such input and output (a position in a structure). (See Figure 4.) 
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Figure 4 Organizational design for bacterial Đheŵotaǆis…aŶd therŵostats (Yi et al 
2000). 
 
The topological model is more abstract than the dynamical model, by virtue of 
containing various abstractions over protein identities. The design model, in turn, is 
more abstract than the topological and dynamical models, by virtue of also containing 
various abstractions over protein interactions. We can, therefore, arrange the various 
explanatory strategies along a continuum of abstraction type and severity. The 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodeliŶg strategǇ, as our ďaseliŶe, oĐĐupies the ͞loǁ͟ eŶd of our ĐoŶtiŶuuŵ. 
Next is topological analysis, which involves aggregations of and structurations from 
protein identities (or aggregations thereof). Then there is organizational design, which 
also involves aggregation of protein interactions as well as generalization and 
structuration of protein identities (or aggregations thereof). 
 
 
5 Confirming the Analysis 
 
I consider the foregoing to establish that each explanatory strategy invokes a different 
combination of abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different 
mechanistic details. Whether this result generalizes beyond my chosen case study 
awaits future research. There is some reason to expect an affirmative result. For if 
dynamical, topological, and design explanatory strategies differ as I claim—specifically, 
along dimensions of number and severity of generalizations and structurations—then 
we should expect the more abstract strategies to have wider scope. For the more 
general models likely have more instances, and the more structural models likely have 
more position occupants.  
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We find confirmation of this prediction for the case of robust perfect adaptation of 
Bacillus subtilis (B.subtilis) chemotaxis. Details of the organization design strategy for 
explaining why E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation also apply for 
explaining why B.subtilis chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation. But details of 
the corresponding dynamical mechanistic strategy do not. The organization design 
strategy, as we know, involves more generalization and structuration than the 
dynamical mechanistic strategy. This confirms our prediction. 
 
Allow me to be brief with the details. Rao and Ordal (2007) develop a dynamic 
mechanistic explanation for the perfect robustness of chemotaxis for B.subtilis. Their 
eǆplaŶatorǇ strategǇ folloǁs the saŵe patterŶ as Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s iŶ the Đase of 
E.coli. But details differ. For example, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ŵodel, CheB iŶ 
E.coli demethylates only active receptor complexes; according to Rao and Ordal, CheB in 
B.subtilis deŵethǇlates iŶaĐtiǀe oŶes too. AgaiŶ, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s 
model, without CheY E.coli runs but does not tumble; according to Rao and Ordal, 
without CheY B.subtilis tumbles but does not run. One more: according to Barkai and 
Leiďler’s ŵodel, E.coli without CheB cannot run; according to Rao and Ordal, B.subtilis 
without CheB can run. See Figure 5. 
 
 
 Figure 5: Chemotaxis network for B.subtilis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
 
“o Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ does Ŷot applǇ for the Đase of 
B.subtilis. But Yi aŶd Đolleague’s orgaŶizatioŶal desigŶ strategǇ does. For B.subtilis, like 
E.coli, exhibits robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis if and only if it satisfies the 
characteristic equation for integral feedback control.  
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6 Toward Abstractive Mechanistic Explanation and its Affordances 
 
Systems biological strategies for explaining the robust perfect adaptation of bacterial 
chemotaxis (in E.coli, B.subtilis, etc) apply mathematical techniques to network models. 
Dynamical, topological, and design strategies apply different techniques to explain the 
same phenomenon. Each explanatory strategy, moreover, applies its mathematical 
techniques to network models that embody different kinds and severities of these 
abstractions such as aggregations, generalizations, structurations. These abstraction 
types, accordingly, help to explain how these systems biological explanatory strategies 
differ from each other.  
 
These abstraction types also provide a foundation for unifying various explanatory 
strategies from systems biology under the banner of mechanistic explanation. Let’s 
consider well known kinds of mechanistic explanation as standard. Let’s also folloǁ 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) by considering dynamical mechanistic explanation as a 
mathematized species of standard mechanistic explanation.  
 
Then let an abstract network be any network representation obtained by aggregating, 
generalizing, or structurating mechanistic details of the sort familiar in standard 
mechanistic explanation. Also let an abstractive mechanistic explanation be any 
explanation driven by applying mathematical techniques to an abstract network. See 
Figure 6. 
 
 
 Figure 6. Relating standard and abstractive mechanistic explanation. 
 
Then topological and organizational design explanatory strategies are mechanistic 
strategies—albeit abstractive ones. Topological explanations apply topological analysis 
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to aggregated and generalized mechanism networks. Organizational design explanations 
apply control systems engineering to aggregated, generalized, and structurated 
mechanism networks.  
 
Both kinds of explanation are mechanistic, by virtue of being grounded upon 
mechanistic details. But both also provide explanatory affordances unavailable through 
standard mechanistic explanations, by virtue of being abstract. For example, by virtue of 
using generalizations, topological explanations should have a greater scope than their 
standard mechanistic counterparts. By virtue of using generalizations and 
structurations, organizational design explanations should have still greater scope.  
 
That these abstractive mechanistic strategies use novel mathematical techniques is a 
side effect of their using novel abstractions (in comparison with standard mechanistic 
explanations and their dynamical cousins). These techniques, of course, support more 
general conclusions, with wider scope, than the kind of differential equation analysis 
available for dynamical mechanistic explanations. But the techniques do not explain why 
the strategies have broader scope. 
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How the Diachronic Theoretical Virtues Make an Epistemic Difference
Mike Keas • Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science • The Colege at Southwestern
Abstract. Among the virtues of good theories are those appropriately labeled diachronic: durability, fruit-
fulness, and applicability—the last of which is insufficiently recognized. Diachronic theoretical virtues
cannot be instantiated in the original construction of a theory; subsequent development is required. By
contrast,  one  can assess  the  degree  to  which  a  theory  exhibits  the  following  nine  non-diachronic
theoretical virtues in a theory’s  original  construction: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory
depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, and  unification.
The distinction between diachronic and non-diachronic virtues is important for understanding the role and
epistemic standing of each theoretical virtue.
Keywords. Theoretical virtues, durability, fruitfulness, prediction, and science-technology relations.
1. Introduction. Theoretical virtues are the traits of a theory that show it is probably true or worth accept-
ing. Although the identification, characterization, classification, and epistemic standing of theory virtues
are debated by philosophers and by participants in specific theoretical disputes, many scholars agree that
these virtues help us to infer which rival theory is the best explanation (Lipton 2004). The most widely ac-
cepted theories across the disciplines usually exhibit many of the same theoretical virtues listed below.
Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive
disclosure or expansion. In another forthcoming essay (Keas 2017) I argue for this new systematization of
the theoretical virtues. In the present essay I focus on the diachronic class of virtues in contrast with the
non-diachronic virtues.  One can assess the degree to which a theory exhibits the non-diachronic virtues
from the time a theory is initially framed. However, no theory, in its original construction, can instantiate
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the diachronic virtues: durability, fruitfulness, or applicability. These virtues are instantiable only as a the-
ory is later refined or applied.
Evidential virtues
1. Evidential accuracy: A theory (T) fits the empirical evidence well (regardless of causal claims).
2. Causal adequacy: T’s causal factors plausibly produce the effects (evidence) in need of explanation. 
3. Explanatory depth: T excels in causal history depth or in other depth measures such as the range of
counterfactual questions that its law-like generalizations answer regarding the item being explained.
Coherential virtues
4. Internal consistency: T’s components are related to each other logically. 
5. Internal  coherence:  T’s  components  are  coordinated  into  an  intuitively  plausible  whole;
T lacks ad hoc hypotheses—theoretical components merely tacked on to solve isolated problems.
6. Universal coherence: T sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs.
Aesthetic virtues
7. Beauty: T evokes aesthetic pleasure in properly functioning and sufficiently informed persons.
8. Simplicity: T explains the same facts as rivals, but with less theoretical content.
9. Unification: T explains more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theoretical content.
Diachronic virtues
10. Durability: T has survived testing by successful prediction or plausible accommodation of new data.
11. Fruitfulness:  T has  generated  additional  discovery by  means  such as  successful  novel  prediction,
unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration.
12. Applicability: T has guided strategic action or control, such as in science-based technology.
We will survey the first nine virtues only to the brief extent needed to recognize how one can assess the
degree to which a theory exhibits these theoretical virtues in its original construction. This will, by con-
trast, enable us to appreciate the unique temporal character of the diachronic theoretical virtues.
2.  Non-Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues. We begin  with  the  first  three  virtues.  Evidential  accuracy,
which is how well a theory fits the relevant data, can be assessed from the theory’s original construction.
Often a theory will also, from its inception, specify causally adequate mechanisms to produce the phe-
nomena in question. Such is not necessarily the case, as Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift illus-
trates. His theory enjoyed considerable evidential accuracy despite its lack of a plausible cause to move
the continents. Explanatory depth is also instantiated in a theory’s initial formulation if, for example, the
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theory answers a large range of counterfactual questions about a kind of phenomenon using the resources
of its law-like generalizations.
The  remaining  six  non-diachronic  theoretical  virtues  likewise  can  be  exhibited  in  the  initial
formation of a theory. A theory may be constructed in a logical manner so as to produce internal consis-
tency. Beyond that, the theoretical components might be well coordinated into an intuitively plausible
whole (avoiding ad hoc hypotheses), thus generating the theoretical virtue of  internal coherence. If the
theory sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs, then it possesses the virtue
of universal coherence. A new theory might even evoke aesthetic pleasure in the minds of experts, which
constitutes theoretical  beauty. The closely related virtues of simplicity and unification also might be in-
stantiated in the initial formation of a theory: explaining the same facts as rival theories but with less theo-
retical content (simplicity), and explaining more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theo-
retical content (unification).
Much more could be said about the first nine virtues outlined above (Keas 2017), but this is suffi-
cient to recognize them as a group of theoretical virtues that can, in principle, be instantiated in a theory’s
original formation. This common trait remains characteristic of these virtues even (largely) under the dis-
parate accounts found in the literature of how to characterize each virtue. Let us now explore the chief di-
achronic theoretical virtues in contrast to the non-diachronic virtues.
3.  Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues.  Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability, which I recognize as the
chief diachronic theoretical virtues, can only be instantiated as a theory is cultivated after its origin. This
necessarily extended temporal dimension of the diachronic virtues is, arguably, of considerable epistemic
importance. But even if one endorses the arguments that discount the epistemic significance of this tem-
poral component (Mayo 2014), one still should acknowledge a group of virtues that (unlike the other the-
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oretical virtues) can only be instantiated in a theory after its initial formulation. Time is of their essence in
a manner that goes beyond the trivial truth that all human endeavor is temporal. McMullin (2014) has lead
the way in articulating the epistemic significance of two of the three main diachronic virtues: durability
and fruitfulness (I recognize McMullin’s  third diachronic virtue of  “consilience”  as a mode of fruitful-
ness). Applicability, largely overlooked as a theory virtue, is another important member of this diachronic
category, as I shall demonstrate.
   3.1. Durability.  Durability, a virtue term McMullin (2014) recommended, refers to the favorable epis-
temic condition of a theory that has survived testing by successful prediction or by plausible accommoda-
tion of new unanticipated data (or both). Popular or long-lived theories are not necessarily durable in the
epistemic sense in view here. Equating durability with popularity or tradition is fallacious. While testabil-
ity is a pragmatically admirable trait of a theory, it is not an intrinsic epistemic characteristic of a theory;
many testable theories have failed too many tests to be acceptable. Steel (2010, 18) notes that the “more
precise and informative a theory’s empirical predictions are, the greater its testability.” The more testable
a theory is, the more durable it would prove itself to be if it passes the tests. A theory that scores low in
testability has little potential to exhibit durability.
Despite the leading role of  predictive success in many areas of science, it is less prominent in
some reputable scientific theories that are, nevertheless, well endowed with other virtues. Successful pre-
diction is very frequently part of explaining “how things work,” but less routine in explaining “how things
originated”—as in theories about the history of the cosmos, earth, and life (Cleland 2011, but Winther
2009 argues otherwise). Successful historical theories typically enjoy other forms of durability, most no-
tably a track record of plausible accommodation of new data that, although not predicted, came to light af-
ter the theory’s origin.  The durability of a theory suffers if one or more of its predictions are disconfirmed
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or when theorists respond to disconfirming evidence by modifying the theory with ad hoc hypotheses—
theoretical components merely “tacked on” to solve isolated problems. Although initially a theory may
exhibit a high degree of evidential accuracy (or any other of the first nine virtues in my systematization),
it is impossible for a newborn theory to instantiate the virtue of durability—this takes time in a sense not
required by the non-diachronic virtues. A similar necessary temporal dimension characterizes fruitfulness.
   3.2. Fruitfulness.  Fruitfulness, also known as fertility or fecundity, is another diachronic theoretical
virtue. A theory is fruitful if, over time, it generates additional discovery by means such as successful
novel prediction, unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration. While durability is about conserva-
tion (a theory passing tests to survive), fruitfulness is about innovation (a theory stimulating further dis-
covery). When a prediction formulated in the context of a theory’s construction is later verified, this suc-
cessful predictive outcome increases the virtue of durability in that theory. By contrast, a novel prediction
is one that was not conceived in conjunction with a theory’s construction, but that nevertheless follows
reasonably from it. When such a novel prediction is confirmed by observation, a theory exhibits more
fruitfulness.
The closely related diachronic character of durability and fruitfulness is well illustrated in the dis-
covery of the first two planets beyond Saturn. Soon after Friedrich William Herschel unexpectedly dis-
covered Uranus in 1781, astronomers noted that its observed motion strayed from what contemporary
Newtonian mechanics predicted of such a planet. However, given the overall theoretically virtuous status
of Newtonian physics up through that time (including its durability due to its success in testing), most as-
tronomers expected a forthcoming way to make Uranus compliant with established theory. Even rejecting
the anomalous data as “inaccurate” seemed reasonable early on. By the 1830s, however, the possibility of
a perturbing planet beyond Uranus became a more reasonable and popular speculation, despite the ab-
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sence of a precise novel prediction of where to find such a planet. By this time many astronomers were
modestly confident in the accumulated data of Uranus’ positions in the sky.
This brings us to the celebrated successful novel prediction of 1845-1846. Based principally on
Newtonian physics and the well-known irregularities in Uranus’ motion, two astronomers independently
predicted where another unknown perturbing planet (later called Neptune) was likely located. Le Verrier’s
estimate of the planet’s location was the most accurate (correct within one degree), as confirmed by a Ger-
man astronomer on September 23, 1846. The (fruitful) novel prediction of Neptune was born within the
context of a  durable Newtonian orbital  mechanics research tradition and the unexpected discovery of
Uranus with its anomalous motions. The sensational success of this novel prediction (the discovery of
Neptune)  also rendered Uranus a  Newtonian-compliant  planet—thus further vindicating  earlier  provi-
sional toleration of Uranus’ anomalies, a toleration that had been justified by yet earlier Newtonian dura-
bility and fruitfulness. 
Smith’s (2010; 2014) landmark study of gravity theory from Newton to the present further illumi-
nates the durability and fruitfulness of this research tradition, and it includes the case histories of Uranus
and Neptune. Smith was surprised that the principal kind of question being tested was not “Do the calcu-
lated motions [e.g., of Uranus] agree with the observed motions?”  Rather it was:  “Can robust physical
sources compatible with Newtonian theory be found for each clear, systematic discrepancy between the
calculated and the observed motions?” Neptune (as novelly predicted) turned out to be such a robust phys-
ical source. However scientists failed over a half century to find a robust (detectable) physical source for
the Newtonian-defying behavior of Mercury—a tiny anomaly in the precession of its perihelion. But this
failure, which Einstein solved by way of theory replacement, does not completely diminish the enduring
epistemic significance of two centuries of Newtonian durability and fruitfulness, as Hanson (1962) inac-
curately suggested. Smith notes: “All the other discrepancies ended up revealing some detail of our plane-
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tary system, the least subtle of which was Neptune, that theretofore had not been taken into account in the
calculations” (2010, 552).
Such  serial  Newtonian  problem  solving  became  (almost  always)  ever  more  empirically  con-
strained in a spiral of upward progress. For example, Uranus’ temporarily Newtonian-defying behavior
“would have been masked if the significantly larger gravitational effects of Saturn on Uranus had not been
included in the calculation first.” Smith explains further:
So, the discovery of Neptune provided evidence not only for Newton’s theory, but also for the
specific aspects of Saturn that entered into calculating its effects on Uranus, for these were no
less presupposed in the anomaly that emerged than Newton’s theory was. The point general-
izes. Each time a discrepancy emerges and a robust physical source for it is found, that source
is  incorporated  into the new calculations,  and the process  is  repeated,  typically  with still
smaller discrepancies emerging that were often theretofore masked in the calculations.  So,
what was being tested each time when a new discrepancy emerged and a physical source for it
was being sought was not only Newtonian theory, but also all the previously identified details
that make a difference and the differences they were said to make without which the further
systematic discrepancy would not have emerged. (2010, 552-53)
On display is an interlocking of durability (passing tests to survive) and fruitfulness (stimulating further
discovery) that is supportive of scientific realism. “This shows that increasingly strong evidence was ac-
cruing to Newtonian theory over the first two hundred years of orbital research based on it,” Smith con-
cludes. This point (with some qualification) extends even to Einstein’s theoretical innovation that was
partly justified by the unruly perihelion of Mercury. Einstein’s achievement was, to some degree, a con-
tinuation of this same progressive spiral, as Smith deftly explains: 
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As is well known, Einstein required Newtonian gravitation to hold in an asymptotic limit as
he developed his new theory of gravity—specifically in a static, weak-field limit. That he did
so was just as well because the 43 arc-seconds per century anomaly in the perihelion of Mer-
cury that was initially the sole evidence for his theory presupposes Newtonian gravity…. As a
matter of historical fact, all of the details singled out as making detectable differences during
the two centuries of prior research carried over intact into post-Einstein orbital mechanics.
Save for some qualifications concerning levels of precision, the same details are still making
the same differences as before…. So, Newtonian theory must still have some sort of claim to
being knowledge. (2010, 556-57)
Smith’s continuity-of-knowledge claim invites comment. While much of the metaphysics associated with
Newtonian theory has been repudiated, we nevertheless see an impressive degree of fruitful scientific con-
tinuity from Newtonian to modern physics (at least in the particular ways that Smith documents). In sum,
Newtonian orbital mechanics enjoyed increasingly impressive interlocking durability and fruitfulness over
multiple centuries, and its approximate legitimacy (not counting discarded Newtonian metaphysics) re-
mains similarly well-grounded today under the revisionary umbrella of modern physics.
Though some philosophers have argued to the contrary (Collins 1994; Harker 2008), many scien-
tists and philosophers think that predictive success—especially novel predictive success—is a stronger in-
dicator of likely approximate truth than a theory’s accommodation of data (Douglas and Magnus 2013).
According to my systematization (which illuminates but does not settle this thorny issue), data accommo-
dation refers to a theory’s initial instantiation of the evidential virtues (evidential accuracy, causal ade-
quacy,  and  explanatory  depth),  and  a  theory’s  subsequent  instantiation  of  certain  diachronic  virtues,
namely non-predictive durability (plausibly making sense of new unanticipated data) and non-predictive
fruitfulness (especially non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of new unanticipated data).
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -900-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -279-
   3.2.1 Unification as a Mode of Fruitfulness. Fruitful theory elaboration, whether by means of successful
novel prediction or non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of unanticipated evidence, often
also makes sense of new kinds of data, and thus is additionally recognized as increasing a theory’s unifica-
tion. Earlier we encountered unification as a non-diachronic (aesthetic) theoretical virtue. The diachronic
increase of unification differs somewhat from its non-diachronic cousin. The historian and philosopher of
science William Whewell (1794–1866) called diachronic unification “consilience.” When a theory ex-
plains a new domain of facts in a surprising way, then it is fruitful in a consilient manner. McMullin
writes in this regard:
A good theory will often display remarkable powers of unification, making different classes of
phenomena “leap together” over the course of time. Domains previously thought to be dis-
parate  now become one, the textbook example,  of course,  being Maxwell’s unification of
magnetism, electricity, and light. Examples abound in recent science, a particularly striking
one being the development of the plate-tectonic model in geology. Assuming that this unifying
power manifests itself over time, it testifies to the epistemic resources of the original theory
and hence to that theory’s having been more than mere accommodation. (2014, 505)
McMullin contrasts diachronic unification with its non-diachronic counterpart:  “If the unification was
achieved by the original theory, however, the virtue involved would no longer be diachronic.” Instead, it
would count (in my systematization) as an aesthetic theoretical virtue that I simply call “unification,” and
that Lipton calls  “variety”  (and yet others call  “broad scope”). Lipton favors the assumption that such
“heterogeneous evidence provides more support than the same amount of very similar evidence” (Lipton
2004, 168). Despite my own inclination to accept Lipton’s point, I recognize this as a somewhat debatable
assumption about the epistemic significance of an aesthetic property. However,
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over time, especially by means of surprising convergences, then unification is less likely the result of the
idiosyncratic aesthetic predispositions and clever accommodating skills of a theorist during theory forma-
tion. Thus fruitful diachronic unification has greater confirmatory power than a theory’s initial degree of
aesthetic unification.
   3.2.2 The Role of Prediction in the Diachronic Virtues. Drawing from Douglas’ work on the relationship
of prediction to inferring the best explanation, I argue that predictive success (in the first two diachronic
virtues explored above) extends the epistemic work of many non-diachronic theoretical virtues such as
causal adequacy, explanatory depth, beauty, simplicity, and unification. These latter theory traits, which
she collectively labels as “explanatory,”
appeal to us, not just because we are aesthetically driven creatures but because such virtues
help us to use the explanation to think and, in particular, to think our way through to new pre-
dictions, new tests, new rigors for our beautiful explanation. (2009, 460)
Douglas also notes:  
Predictions are valuable because they force us (when followed through) to test our theories,
because they have the potential to expand our knowledge into new realms and because they
hold out the possibility (if successful) of gaining some measure of control over natural pro-
cesses. (2009, 455)
Transposing Douglas’ insights into my taxonomic terms, predictions are valuable because they figure into
all three of the major diachronic virtues: durability (testing theories successfully), fruitfulness (expanding
“our knowledge into new realms”), and applicability (which includes “gaining some measure of control
over natural processes”). Moreover, the operation of prediction (“saying before” at least in a logical if not
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temporal sense) in these three theoretical virtues further supports my classification of them as diachronic.
Lets us now explore the last major diachronic virtue of applicability.
  3.3. Applicability.  Applicability refers to when a theory is used to guide successful action (e.g., prepare
for a natural disaster) or to enhance technological control (e.g., genetic engineering). High degrees of the
virtue of applicability obtain when a theory that is used to guide such action or control provides more ef-
fective outcomes than what is possible in the absence of the theory. Successful scientific theories consti-
tute knowledge of the world (knowing that), not control over the world (which is mainly knowing how)
for practical (non-theoretical) purposes. In this regard Strevens (2008, 3) notes: “If science provides any-
thing of intrinsic value, it is explanation. Prediction and control are useful … but when science is pursued
as an end rather than as a means, it is for the sake of understanding.” But even after the intrinsic good of a
theoretically virtuous explanation is in hand, one of several possible additional confirmatory diachronic
(predictive or controlling) virtues might be acquired by a theory, including applicability. In such cases a
good theory just gets better—even more confidence in its probable truth is justified.
Although scientific experiments use technological control, they do so to test scientific theories—
so the main function is still to understand nature, not to control it. However, especially in the case of theo-
ries supported by experimentally verified prediction, such foreknowledge and laboratory control might be
exploited to achieve practical aims such as device fabrication or medical intervention. But in any case,
one cannot apply scientific knowledge until after one first obtains it. This necessary time lapse makes ap-
plicability diachronic.
To obtain scientific knowledge we search for a theory that (initially) exhibits many of the non-di-
achronic theoretical virtues. Subsequent work aimed at theory testing and elaboration might produce the
additionally confirming presence of the diachronic virtues of durability and fruitfulness. At some point in
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -903-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -282-
this dance of virtue-driven theory assessment and refinement, sufficient confidence in a particular theory
might spur attempts to apply it as the basis for a new or improved technology. If the derived science-based
technology actually works, then the “applied theory” has acquired the additional theoretical virtue of ap-
plicability. Because this requires additional time after initial theory formation, the diachronic classifica-
tion of applicability is appropriate.
Although the application of scientific theories constitutes one aspect of technology, most of tech-
nology involves the empirical discovery of “know how” knowledge without crucially presupposing or im-
mediately applying any particular scientific theory. Indeed, the relation between science and technology is
not a simple one-way linear affair (Radder 2009; Douglas 2014). But this “emancipation” of technology
from subordination to science, accomplished by historians and philosophers of technology between 1960
and 1990 (Houkes 2009, 310), should not obscure the epistemic significance of instances of technological
innovation made possible, in part, by applied scientific theory.
This point is in harmony with the so-called demise of the “pure vs. applied science” dichotomy.
Understanding and controlling nature are closely related, as our study of the diachronic theoretical virtues,
including applicability, indicates. Douglas (2014, 62) surfaces some of the subtlety of this argument when,
on the one hand, she proclaims: “With the pure vs. applied distinction removed, scientific progress can be
defined in terms of the increased capacity to predict, control, manipulate, and intervene in various con-
texts.” But then, on the other hand, in a footnote she recoils partially: “To be clear, while I think this is a
useful rubric for scientific progress, it is not a remotely sufficient account for how one should assess sci-
entific theories.”  Other (non-diachronic) theoretical virtues that are complementary to, but less weighty
epistemically than, prediction and control also play important roles in theory assessment, she suggests.
Consideration of the nine major non-diachronic theoretical virtues systematized in Sections 1 and 2 drives
this point home.
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How exactly is applicability a diachronic theory trait that is epistemic (helping to indicate likely
truth) in view of the obvious  pragmatic orientation of  technological application?  Agazzi observes that
some technological projects “are designed or projected in advance, as the concrete application of knowl-
edge provided by a given science or set of sciences” (Agazzi 2014, 308). If a project of this kind actually
works as predicted, then this reinforces our confidence in the theory base that helped guide such action in
the world. Agazzi further notes:
The predictions  ‘contained’ in the project actually are the predictions made by the scientific
theories which have permitted the proposal of the complex noema that constitutes the project,
and contains not only prescriptions as to the way of realising the structure of the machine but
also as to its functioning. This functioning is something that happens; it is a state of affairs
that constitutes a confirmation of the theories used in projecting the machine. (309)
Although Agazzi’s scientific realism overstates the epistemic reach of applicability, it is helpful nonethe-
less as a corrective to other philosophical errors:
A mature science is a science that has given rise to a significant technology. This means, for
example,  that  we can  provisionally  admit  certain  theories  that  are  ‘empirically  adequate,’
without admitting their truth as van Fraassen says, until we have significant predictions con-
firming them. This fact (especially in conjunction with other ‘virtues’ discussed in the litera-
ture) already justifies attributing truth and ontological reference to them, but the existence of
technological applications is the last decisive step that assures that they have been able to ade-
quately treat those aspects of reality they intended to treat. These last words are very impor-
tant. They underline the fact that technological success does not eliminate the partial or lim-
ited scope of scientific theories. The fact that we can use classical mechanics in creating many
machines or for sending rockets into space certainly means that this mechanics is true of its
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objects and therefore ‘tells a true story’ about certain aspects of reality. This can also be ex-
pressed by saying that this theory is partially true of reality, but only if we mean that it does
not speak about the totality of the attributes of reality, and that, consequently, it can speak
properly only of such referents that possess these attributes. In other words, it is not correct to
say that this mechanics is true regarding the whole of reality because other aspects of reality
exist that must be accounted for by means of other theories which, in turn, can be used as a
basis for different technologies. (310-11)
To nuance Agazzi’s insightful but somewhat inflated epistemic role for applicability, we can observe that
this theoretical virtue is not commonly operative in certain scientific domains. For example, scientific the-
ories of “how things originated” (history of nature) lead to fewer technological applications than scientific
theories of “how things work.” Part of the reason for the infrequent applicability of origins theories is the
smaller role that experimentally controlled prediction plays in such theorization. For example, much of
the data that allows us to reconstruct the history of earth’s surface is collected by means of passive field
observations, rather than by laboratory experiments that make precise predictions and technological con-
trol more feasible.
4. Conclusion. The diachronic theoretical virtues possess a temporal dimension that is absent from the
other theoretical virtues. They can only be instantiated  after a theory’s initial formulation—when it has
had opportunity to be tested, elaborated, and applied. Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability build upon
the initial theory assessment process governed by the non-diachronic virtues (the evidential, coherential,
and aesthetic theoretical virtues). The cumulative result, when successful, is a mature theory with an even
greater probability of being true than an infant theory that has not yet had the opportunity to show whether
it will possess the diachronic theoretical virtues (anti-realists are invited to interject their own alternative
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to this realist understanding of the theoretical virtues). So, the distinction between diachronic and non-di-
achronic virtues is important for an adequate account of theory evaluation.
 The three major diachronic theoretical virtues are also better understood when they are recognized
as related to each other in the following progressive sequence. Durability is instantiated as a theory passes
more rigorous tests in a series of encounters with the world, especially by successful prediction and plau-
sible  accommodation  of  new  evidence.  Fruitfulness  discloses  a  theory’s  resourcefulness  yet  further
through innovation—stimulating additional discovery by successful novel prediction, unification, non ad
hoc theoretical elaboration, and other means. At last, applicability expands the epistemic accountability of
a theory into the final frontier: the vast domain of practical action. This virtue is instantiated when a the-
ory helps us to interact with the world successfully, most notably by technological control. Together, these
diachronic theoretical virtues provide an ongoing and epistemically intensified means of theory develop-
ment that complements the non-diachronic virtue assessment process that begins in a theory’s original
construction.
Applicability, as a theoretical virtue, has not received the attention it deserves. Surprisingly, it is
absent  from every theoretical  virtue  list I  have encountered.  My work sketches  a  way to understand
applicability in relation to the other  diachronic virtues, and the larger group of non-diachronic virtues.
This endeavor promises to illuminate, among other things, discussion of realism vs. anti-realism, science-
technology relations, and inference to the best explanation.
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Abstract
The debate between Fraser and Wallace (2011) over the foundations of
quantum field theory (QFT) has spawned increased focus on both the axiomatic
and conventional formalisms. The debate has set the tone for future foundational
analysis, and has forced philosophers to “pick a side”. The two are seen as
competing research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in
how each handles renormalization. In this paper I argue that the terms set by the
Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading. AQFT and CQFT should be viewed as
complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis. Further, the
focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly misleading.
Though their methods differ, both axiomatic and conventional QFT seek to use the
same physical principles to explain the same domain of phenomena.
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1 Introduction
Foundational invesitgation into quantum field theory (QFT) has emerged as a flourishing
enterprise in philosophy of science, thanks largely to work done in axiomatic QFT
(AQFT), particularly the C∗-algebraic approach enocoded by the Haag-Kastler axioms
(Haag and Kastler 1964). Despite the methodological disconnect with ‘conventional’
approaches to QFT (CQFT), AQFT has been defended by Fraser (2009) as supplying a
firmer foundation from which to conduct philosophical analyses. Though this is one of
few explicit defenses of AQFT, the widespread use of algebraic methods in philosophical
literature on QFT would lead one to believe that Fraser is merely making explicit the
assumptions in her field. Recently, Wallace (2006; 2011) has questioned the focus on
AQFT, arguing that CQFT is the better candidate for analysis. Since CQFT is the
theory that has been emprically successful—the Standard Model of particle physics is
built from CQFTs—and AQFT has yet to reproduce these results, Wallace argues that
we should focus analysis on CQFT rather than AQFT. Fraser’s (2011) reply has set up
what is now known as the Fraser-Wallace debate over the foundations of QFT. The
debate has set the tone for future foundational analysis, and seems to force philosophers
to “pick a side”—you either work in AQFT or CQFT. The two are seen as competing
research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in how each handles
renormalization. AQFT requires strict Poincare´ covariance at arbitrarily small length
scales, while the renormalization group (RG) methods in CQFT allow for a small-scale
cutoff, below which QFTs needn’t be well-defined.
In this paper I argue that the terms set by the Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading.
One needn’t view AQFT and CQFT as rival research programs; in fact, this view is
2
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detrimental to understanding the history and methodology of QFT. AQFT and CQFT
should be viewed as complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis.
Further, the focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly
misleading: AQFT can accommodate cutoffs and RG methods, and CQFT does not
explicitly require cutoffs. The focus on cutoffs as essential to CQFT could mistakenly be
taken to mean that CQFT depends on cutoffs actually being physical, in the same way
that cutoffs are physical in condensed matter physics (CMP). I will argue that this is not
the case: cutoffs needn’t be physical in any sense. Even if cutoffs are physically
significant, that does not entail that the cutoffs are themselves physical. Specifically, RG
methods provide no principled grounds for thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of
signifying a breakdown of field theories generally. Since Wallace (2011) set the terms of
the debate, the bulk of the arguments in this paper will be in reference to that paper. I
do not claim that Wallace holds all (or even most) of the views against which I argue;
rather, I use his paper to clarify potential misconceptions that could arise from the
debate. Renormalization is not central to the physical content of QFT, and the different
ways of handling renormalization do not mark AQFT and CQFT as different research
programs. We should instead view the formalisms as complementary: though their
methods differ, both seek to use the same physical principles to explain the same domain
of phenomena.
3
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2 Renormalization and the relationship between AQFT and
CQFT
Wallace (2011) emphasizes the ineliminable dependence on cutoffs in CQFT, along with
the success of RG methods for providing a physical motivation for cutoffs, as the wedge
which drives AQFT and CQFT apart. For Wallace, AQFT cannot deal with physical
cutoffs. Since RG methods have physically legitimized cutoffs, AQFT and CQFT have
differing physical content and must therefore be considered a different research program
(2011, Sec. 2). I disagree with this characterization on two fronts. First, AQFT has the
resources to incorporate RG methods when needed. Though typical axioms make no
metion of scaling behaviour, even the most rigid of axiomatic approaches—algebraic
QFT as codified in the Haag-Kastler axioms—can incorporate something like RG flows.1
Second, the calculational dependence on cutoffs in CQFT may not signal the physical
existence of cutoffs.
So, are cutoffs really that problematic for AQFT? Many axiomatic approaches to QFT
make no recourse to cutoffs, either explicitly or implicitly. An explicit forbidding of
cutoffs would mean that one of the axioms/postulates of the theory claimed that the
theory is empirically adequate at all spacetime length scales. Even if any axiomatization
contained such an axiom (none do), it would be hard to imagine what sort of work it
would do in derivations. Presumably, such a system could be modified to remove the
guilty axiom, without spoiling any physically useful theorems. One should therefore not
be concerned with an explicit ban on cutoffs in AQFT.
The more interesting case is when cutoffs are implicitly rejected by a particular theory.
1See Buchholz and Verch (1995) for an example of scaling algebras playing the role of RG flows.
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There are two common assumptions in AQFT that are problematic for handling cutoffs:
strongly continuous implementations of Lorentz invariance, and the association of
algebras with arbitrarily small open bounded regions of spacetime. Though the latter is
not common to all axiomatic QFTs (the Wightman axioms deal directly with quantum
fields, rather than algebras), the dominant axiomatization in terms of C∗ algebras—the
Haag-Kastler axioms—define QFTs in terms of algebras of observables corresponding to
open, bounded regions of spacetime.2 It is implicit that for any open bounded spacetime
region, no matter how small, one can define an algebra of observables satisfying the other
axioms defining QFT. If cutoffs are physical, one might conclude that there should be a
principled limit to the size of regions on which we can define algebras corresponding to
observables in QFT. If the cutoff scale is physically relevant, and only CQFT predicts its
existence, we might be tempted to conclude that the two are different, competing
theories. However, there are several possibilities for reconciling AQFT and cutoffs, which
I will outline below. These remedies are largely independent of one another, and
organized in terms of increasing foundational disagreement with Wallace’s view of
cutoffs. The “quick fixes” proposed first lead to further conceptual worries, and I
therefore endorse the option in Sec. 2.3, which is the biggest departure from taking
cutoffs as physical in CQFT. Nevertheless, all the options sketched below are
more-or-less viable. Section 2.4 outlines reasons for thinking that both AQFT and CQFT
suffer the same conceptual challenges if cutoffs really are physical.
2Since algebraic QFT is prima facie the most problematic, I will deal primarily with algebraic QFT in
this paper. The reader can take AQFT to stand for axiomatic QFT or algebraic QFT for the remainder
of this paper. The reader should also note that constructive QFT is another important strand of rigorous
QFT. Though it is conceptually distinct from AQFT, the two projects often overlap.
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2.1 Possibilities for cutoffs in AQFT
Just because we need to associate an algebra with any arbitrary open bounded region of
spacetime, we are not therefore compelled to make this algebra interesting. One way
that cutoffs could be introduced into AQFT is to specify that regions smaller than some
4-volume Λ are to be uniformly assigned trivial algebras, i.e., algebras containing only
multiples of the identity. Such assignments would be consistent with the demand that all
open bounded regions of spacetime be assigned an algebra, but it would make the cutoff
physically relevant, since no information about local parameters would be contained in
regions smaller than Λ.
Though this solution is available, it is admittedly somewhat ad hoc. Even worse, it
violates one of the crucial Haag-Kastler axioms: that of weak additivity. The axiom of
weak additivity states that, for every closed, bounded region O of Minkowski spacetime
M, the C∗ norm closure of the algebras A(O + α) for α ∈ R4 is just the quasilocal
algebra for the whole spacetime, A(M).3 There are two reasons why this is a problem
for introducing cutoffs in the way described above. First, we run into the problem that
the quasilocal algebra corresponding to the whole of M can be constructed from any
algebra corresponding to any closed, bounded region O. The norm closure of extensions
of a trivial algebra will not produce any interesting algebra as a result, so regions smaller
than the cutoff Λ will violate weak additivity. Second, extensions of an arbitrary region
O by some α < Λ should not be physical if Minkowski spacetime breaks down at scales
below Λ. In the spirit of the first ad hoc axiom modification, weak additivity could be
modified to exclude regions Osmall < Λ, and arbitrary extensions αsmall < Λ. However,
3See Ruetsche (2011), especially chapters 4 and 5 for an introduction to algebraic QFT. For a more
comprehensive review of algebraic QFT, see Halvorson and Mu¨ger (2007).
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there seems to be no principled reason for choosing a specific value of Λ, and one may
question the naturalness of such axioms. This makes the solution of simple axiom
modification less tempting, and forces us to admit that AQFT—at least in its current
guise—is in conflict with approaches to QFT that take cutoffs as physically meaningful,
since the basic axioms are currently in direct conflict with the introduction of cutoffs. If
we admit that there is currently no room in the formalism of AQFT for cutoffs, are we
doomed to take AQFT as (incorrectly) positing its own validity at all energy scales?
2.2 No cutoffs? No problem
If QFT methods are only applicable up to some cutoff energy, and we expect QFT to
incorporate this fact, we are saying that a good theory should signal its own demise. The
formal necessity of cutoffs in the formalism of CQFT has lead to the idea that our best
theories will continue to be an increasing hierarchy of effective field theories. Each field
theory requires cutoffs to be implemented at a certain energy scale, and this signals the
field theory’s domain of applicability. If supplanted by a successor field theory, one
expects that the new theory’s low energy regime reduces to the old theory, and further
that the new theory will itself have a higher energy cutoff. Following this approach, the
conventional formalism of field theories would allow us to climb higher and higher up the
ladder of energy scales, but we would never reach the top. We would require a theory of
a fundamentally different formal type in order to end the ladder of cutoffs. This is
presumably the view that Wallace holds, as he claims that if we replace one field theory
with another applicable at higher energies, “that field theory in turn will need some kind
of short-distance cutoff” (2011, p. 118).
As great as it may be to have a framework in which theories limit their own domain of
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applicability, this is certainly not a necessary condition that any good formalism need
satisfy. Even if AQFT does not contain cutoffs explicitly, this does not make it at odds
with CQFT. Many theories that have been useful in the past do not signal their ultimate
demise; on the contrary, most are mathematically well-defined well beyond their domain
of applicability. For example, classical theories of fluid dynamics treat fluids as classical
continua, and these continua are uniform to arbitrary precision. Classical continuum
fluid dynamics is a useful theory, and compatible with classical point mechanics, even
though classical point mechanics leads one to believe that the continuum is only an
approximation—at some point fluid dynamics must break down. There is nothing within
the formalism of fluid mechanics that signals its eventual breakdown; rather, the physical
systems we model using classical fluid dynamics, as well as the complementary formalism
of classical point particles, give us a physical motivation for the eventual breakdown of
the formalism. Deeper theories, such as quantum mechanics, also provide grounds for
believing in the limited applicability of both of the complementary classical formalisms.
Similarly, we can view AQFT as a complementary picture to the formalism of CQFT.
Both formalisms rely on the same general physical principles, though they are
implemented in different ways. Though the AQFT formalism does not demarcate its
domain of applicability in the form of explicit cutoffs, the necessity of some form of
cutoff in CQFT provides reason to believe that the AQFT formalism is only
approximately mapping the actual physics. Further, whatever extratheoretical grounds
we have for taking cutoffs to be physical—typically in the guise of speculative physics
beyond the Standard Model—can inform the scale at which we lose faith in the
predictions of both the AQFT and CQFT formalisms. When one does not view AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs, the two can work together to provide a deeper
8
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physical understanding of high energy physics, and the role of cutoffs is made clearer.
2.3 Physical significance versus being physical
Are cutoffs really that central? The arguments in the previous section assume that the
cutoffs required to generate predictions in CQFT are physical, in the sense that they
signal a breakdown of QFT. The fact that perturbative calculations within a particular
model diverge when the integrals are unbounded does not entail that field theoretic
methodology loses physical significance near these bounds. Undoubtedly we have
extratheoretical reasons for supposing that the QFTs making up the Standard Model are
not accurate to arbitrary energies—at some point gravity will surely play an important
role, to say nothing for possible unknown physics at higher energy scales—but this
needn’t signify a breakdown of QFTs in general beyond a cutoff. Nor is this notion built
in to the conceptual apparatus of RG methods, as Wallace claims.4 It remains entirely
possible that a QFT built with more terms in its Lagrangian could describe all relevant
physics and be well-defined at all energy scales. In fact, the renormalization group
procedure presupposes a theory given in terms of a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian with an
arbitrary number of terms. These terms are shown to go to zero in the low energy limit
(Wilson and Kogut 1974). We know—using the RG methods to determine the flow of
coupling constants—that for non-Abelian gauge theories, interactions become weaker at
higher energy scales. Total asymptotic freedom would be one way to eliminate cutoffs at
4“Wilsons explanation of the renormalisation procedure relies upon the failure of the QFT to which it
is applied at very short distances. It is then intriguing to ask how to put on a firm conceptual footing
a theory which relies for its mathematical consistency on its own eventual failure”. (Wallace 2006, 34,
emphasis added) Again, this passage can be read in a way that agrees with the arguments of this section.
I am attempting to argue against a naive reading, which takes the failure of one QFT (i.e., a single form
of interaction, encoded in a particular Lagrangian) to signal the failure of QFT methods in general.
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high energies. A successor QFT, such as a grand unified theory or supersymmetry, could
therefore unite the strong and electroweak coupling constants, while remaining
well-defined to arbitrarily high energies.5 All that RG methods rely on conceptually is
the ability to average out behaviour at high energy scales, and this is compatible with
many options for high-energy behaviour. First, our theories could be low-energy
approximations that break down at higher energy scales. This could be due to a
fundamental granularity or discreteness in the more fundamental theory, or due to the
absence of terms in the Lagrangian modelling high energy dynamics. Second, we could
have a well-defined high energy dynamics that is unimportant at the energy scales with
which we are concerned. In any case, RG methods provide no principled grounds for
thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of signifying a breakdown of field theories
generally. Unlike the breakdown of classical fluid mechanics—for which we have a more
fundamental successor theory (quantum mechanics) providing grounds to reject the
continuum as merely an approximation—there is as of yet no (empirically successful)
fundamental successor theory for which QFT can be considered a continuum
approximation.
One of the major reasons for thinking that cutoffs in QFT mark a regime beyond which
the methods of QFT can no longer be applied is the success of RG methods originating
from CMP (Wallace 2011, Sec. 1). RG methods were initially developed to investigate
long range correlations in materials approaching a phase transition. Long range
interactions are those most relevant to global transitions of a material, and so RG
5Whether a theory can be made well defined for arbitrarily high energies is a distinct issue from the
accuracy of that theory’s predictions at high energies. It may turn out that Standard Model QFTs can
be extended in a consistent way, but that the high energy predictions turn out to be false. This is the
case that is argued in Section 2.2 regarding AQFT.
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methods average out the unimportant short range behaviour near a critical point. The
apparatus of non-relativistic QFT (i.e., functional integrals using Galilean invariant
Lagrangians) is used in CMP as an approximation to the discrete atomic (or ionic)
physical makeup of bulk systems. Given the the CMP field theories are explicitly
constructed as approximations to a known underlying lattice model, we know that the
field theoretic methods must break down within CMP. RG flow equations are derived by
separating field variables ϕ into low- and high-momentum components ϕ = ϕlow + ϕhigh
(where the cutoff from low to high is chosen arbitrarily) and averaging over the high
momentum modes. The resulting Lagrangian L′(ϕlow) is then manipulated to fall into
the same form as the original Lagrangian L(ϕ). This process is repeated and generates
discrete recursive relations between the rescaled coupling parameters in the (n+ 1)th
Lagrangian in terms of the nth one. In the limit where the rescalings are continuous,
these become differential equations determining the flow of coupling constants under RG.
As the flows are taken to zero frequency—equivalent to the infinite spatial limit—only
those parameters relevant to phase transitions will remain in the renormalized
Lagrangian. One of the most qualitatively interesting features of successively averaging
out short distance (and therefore high energy) degrees of freedom is that, no matter how
complicated the initial field dynamics are (encoded as a Lagrangian), only the
renormalizable terms will contribute to the low energy dynamics of the theory. This
implies that a very broad class of higher energy Lagrangians can “reduce” to the relevant
dynamics at lower energy scales.
The success of RG methods in CMP lead to their quick application in QFTs (Wilson
1983)6, since the relevant formalism is shared between the two disciplines. If we choose
6Wilson even forms the QFT/statistical mechanics analogy explicitly, though the source analog in that
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to endow the RG methods with similar physical significance in QFT, then we can
interpret the high energy cutoffs required as marking the domain at which we expect
new physics to occur. The problem is that, because RG flows tell us that our low-energy
(effective) QFTs are largely insensitive to the dynamical details at higher energies, they
provide little insight our guidance into the high energy physics. Though the path to the
successor theory isnt apparent given our current QFTs, the up side is that our best
QFTs are protected from the details of our ignorance of high energy dynamics.
Where Wallace might be read to err is in the jump from believing that cutoffs have
physical relevance in QFTs to believing that cutoffs are physical :
“This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the
renormalization problem: it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of
quantum field theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence
of that failure is appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes
unproblematic, and indeed predictively powerful in its own right” (Wallace
2011, p. 119).7
The difference is subtle. Cutoffs can be physically relevant in that they signal the
breakdown of the particular theory or model beyond a certain energy scale, but whether
cutoffs themselves are physical depends on the precise nature of the breakdown. If the
case is a classical Ising model (Wilson and Kogut 1974). Fraser (2016) has provided an in-depth analysis
of the elements of the analogies between QFT and the Ising model, as well as the process of describing
RG flow.
7Or at least this is a jump he is sometimes guilty of. In other places he is more careful to elaborate
on this view, and it appears that he at least appreciates the fact that field theoretic methods may not
break down at all (Wallace 2006, pp. 43-4). As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is not a critique
of Wallace’s view explicitly, but of the misleading way of framing AQFT and CQFT as rivals based on
their differing treatments of the arbitrarily small; for this reason I aim to clarify the mistakes in a “naive”
reading of Wallace.
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breakdown can be remedied by adding new terms in the Lagrangian—effectively
changing the particular theory, but retaining the field theoretic framework—then the
cutoffs signal new physics, but are not themselves physical. If the breakdown is due to
the inapplicability of field theoretic methodology beyond that scale, then the cutoffs are
themselves physical.8 Even if one takes the cutoffs to have physical significance, cutoffs
needn’t be physical in this stronger sense.
One possible reason for thinking that cutoffs are physical is based off of reading too
much into the analogy with CMP. We know that field theoretic methods are
approximations in bulk matter systems—the atomic theory implies that macroscopic
matter is composed of discrete components. The analogy between QFT and CMP is
based on the use of the same field theoretic formalism in both disciplines, not on a
well-grounded physical similarity.9 Cutoffs are physical in CMP field theory because field
theoretic methods have been introduced as an approximation. Given that discrete
quantum mechanics of 1023 particles is intractable, we sacrifice (a surprisingly small
amount of) precision in order to apply the more soluble methods developed in QFT. But
the fact that cutoffs signal the breakdown of field approximations in CMP does not
imply that the same is true in QFT. The reasons we treat cutoffs as physical in CMP are
absent in QFT; there is no empirically successful theory that claims QFT breaks down
due to an underlying discreteness of physics near cutoff scales. Speculative physics may
posit some underlying structure for which quantum fields are merely an approximation,
8Presumably, the failure of field theoretic methodology in general would require some physical granu-
larity at high energies. This is what I mean by the cutoff being physical and is in direct analogy with the
case of non-relativistic QFT in CMP.
9Fraser (2016) and Fraser and Koberinski (2016) provide two concrete examples of fruitful formal
analogies between QFT and CMP. In the former case, it is the RG flow that is formally analogous,
while the latter deals with the formal similarities between spontaneous symmetry breaking within the two
theories.
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but until any of these theories make successful empirical predictions their significance for
interpreting QFTs must be limited.
2.4 Why physical cutoffs are also a problem for CQFT
Even though, as I have argued, there is currently no physically motivated reason for
supposing cutoffs to be physical, it may be the case that we find such a reason in the
future. Perhaps we will need radically different methods from those of field theory to
describe physics beyond the Standard Model. There is no shortage of candidates that
claim to radically alter our picture of the world—from 11-dimensional string theory to
discrete spacetime to the emergent spacetime of loop quantum gravity. Though
experimental support for any of these speculative theories would mean that the axioms
of any AQFT must be at best only approximations, this does not mean that CQFT
would escape unscathed. Any observed violation of Lorentz invariance would signal bad
news for both AQFT and CQFT, and the extent to which we choose to reject or salvage
the former, we should do the same for the latter.
Though its importance is not encoded in a set of axioms, Poincare´ invariance is of
central importance to the physical content of CQFT. In constructing QFTs, one starts
by writing down a classical Lagrangian to encode the physical content of the theory. The
two major constraints on the form of candidate Lagrangians are renormalizability (dealt
with above) and Poincare´ invariance. Since the Lagrangian is a scalar, it must remain
strictly invariant under the action of the Poincare´ group on its component fields. All of
the fundamental forces—as described by the Standard Model—are encoded in
Lagrangians obeying strict Poincare´ invariance. If anything qualifies as physically
relevant to CQFT, the Lagrangian certainly does; it is the starting point for building a
14
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -923-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -302-
QFT, and determines the types of fields, their masses, and the particulars of their
interactions. A violation of Poincare´ invariance at a more fundamental level—be it in a
particular physical process or in the structure of some new spacetime picture—undercuts
to the same extent the physical significance of any and all theories that depend on
Poincare´ invariance for their formulation. Thus, despite the lack of rigid and precise
axioms demanding Poincare´ invariance, the physical content of CQFT stands or falls
with AQFT.10
Once again, the major difference between AQFT and CQFT lies in the formalism.
Though the physical content of CQFT is built upon Poincare´ invariance11, the formalism
is indifferent to the constraints placed upon the Lagrangian. The success of field
theoretic methods in CMP is evidence of the flexibility of the formalism; in CMP the
Galilean group is taken as the appropriate symmetry group, given the low energies dealt
with. In contrast, the formalisms of various AQFTs are constructed around the axioms.
Any theorems that rely on exact Poincare´ invariance will only hold in the real world if
nature is Poincare´ invariant.12 The greater precision of the formalism in AQFT makes it
more rigid in this regard.
If violations of Poincare´ invariance are problematic for all variants of QFT, should
investigators into the foundations of QFT fret if such violations are experimentally
10CQFT methods could still be useful, but the theoretical framework of CQFT—as encoded in the
Standard Model—depends on Poincare´ invariance.
11Depending on how one views Poincare´ invariance, this may seem odd. The specific transformation
properties of scalars, vectors, and tensors under the Poincare´ group are undoubtedly formal properties
of the particular field representations. However, the physical symmetries represented in this way have a
physical basis (e.g., rotation invariance implies that the physical system can be modelled the same way
when rotated).
12Though it isn’t always possible, proofs of the form “If Minkowski spacetime then x” are strengthened
and made more robust by also showing “If approximately Minkowski spacetime then approximately x.
Given that our best current theories lead us to believe that spacetime is only locally Minkowski, these are
the results for which we can have a high degree of confidence in their robustness.
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confirmed? No; the experimental success of QFT implies that the world is at least
approximately Poincare´ invariant, and any evidence revealing the limits of that
approximation has no bearing on the theory itself. We have good reason to believe that
the QFTs in the Standard Model are not the final story: General Relativity implies that
strong gravitational effects distort spacetime, and that our spacetime is only ever
Minkowski in small patches where gravity is negligible. Though this approximation
seems to hold for experiments at the LHC, if we want a theory that gets spacetime
symmetries exactly correct, QFTs relying on Poincare´ invariance will not do the trick.
Rather than abandoning foundations of QFT for being approximate at best,
investigation should proceed given that QFTs are highly successful within the energy
domain currently testable. To this extent, we are justified in viewing the world as
approximately described by QFTs, and should content ourselves with investigating an
incomplete (though highly accurate) picture of nature. Whether we are dealing with a
formalism that encodes Poincare´ invariance into its axiomatic framework, or a formalism
in which Poincare´ invariance has been used indirectly to construct empirically successful
theories, we should not take violations of Poincare´ invariance as signalling the failure of
either approach. Any robust results obtained within either formalism will still hold
approximately, and should be equally subject to foundational analysis.
3 Conclusions
I have tried to show that cutoffs do not provide physical grounds for separating AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs. First, RG methods can be incorporated into
AQFT without major issue, and cutoffs can be introduced as well—though explicit
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cutoffs provide a more pressing conceptual revision to AQFT. Second, we needn’t take
AQFT to be an exact description of the world. In the same way that classical fluid
dynamics is compatible with classical point mechanics, AQFT defined to arbitrary
precision can be compatible with a CQFT that requires cutoffs. The apropriate lesson is
that we should take AQFT to be approximately true in sufficiently low energy domains.
Finally, even if cutoffs are of physical significance, they don’t require a breakdown of
continuum methods in general. This idea stems from pushing an analogy with CMP,
which appears to be unjustified.
Though the Fraser-Wallace debate has spawned increased investigations into the
foundations of QFT, it has set the boundaries of the debate in such a way as to create a
false dichotomy: one is forced to choose whether to immerse oneself in the AQFT or
CQFT formalisms. When we discard the false dichotomy and recognize AQFT as
complementary to CQFT, we open the door to the synthesis of axiomatic methods with
Lagrangian QFT. In this way the general features of QFTs can be investigated rigorously
in AQFT, and we can be confident that—insofar as the axioms of AQFT capture the
physical assumptions of CQFT—the results carry over to CQFT.
Though it is true that there do not yet exist AQFT models that incorporate interactions
in four-dimensional spacetime, the successes of AQFT have been compatible with
CQFT. Free field theories and φ4
2
interaction theories constructed in AQFT give
predictions in agreement with comparable CQFTs. Insofar as AQFT is a successful
formalism, its results should be thought of as complementary to those of CQFT: one
uses the same physical principles to construct differing formalisms.
In essence, I advocate for a position similar to Wallace’s earlier view (though note that
in this passage he refers only to specific results of AQFT, such as the spin-statistics
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theorem):
the foundational results which have emerged from AQFT have been of
considerable importance in understanding QFT and in general they apply
also to Lagrangian QFTs. This paper should be read as complementary to,
rather than in competition with, these results (2006, p. 35).
The particular choice of formalism will depend on the scope of the foundational
investigation. If the goal is to prove general results applicable to any relativistic QFT,
then AQFT is the appropriate formalism; if the goal is to determine the consequences of
specific physical interactions, then CQFT should be used.
18
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On	Epistemically	Detrimental	Dissent:		
Contingent	Enabling	Factors	v.	Stable	Difference-Makers.	
	
Soazig	Le	Bihan	and	Iheanyi	Amadi	
	
Abstract.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	(2015)	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	
context	of	science.		We	argue	that	the	presence	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	severe	
non-epistemic	consequences	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	conditions	for	EDD	
to	obtain.		We	clarify	their	role	by	arguing	that	they	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	
not	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	
difference-makers	are	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	
and	effective	public	dissemination.		
	
	
Introduction.		
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	context	of	
science	(2015).		We	follow	their	lead	in	taking	‘dissent’	to	be	a	particular	kind	of	
criticism,	i.e.	the	act	of	objecting	to	a	widely	held	conclusion.		When	done	properly,	
dissent	is	welcome	within	scientific	practice.		As	Helen	Longino	has	clearly	
established,	“scientific	knowledge	is	produced	collectively	through	the	clashing	and	
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meshing	of	a	variety	of	points	of	view	(1990,	69).		Criticism,	when	done	properly,	is	
integral	to	the	collective	advancement	of	science.1		Dissent,	when	an	instance	of	
proper	criticism,	is	thus	epistemically	valuable	in	the	context	of	science.			
Now	there	are	some	instances	of	dissent	that	come	out	as	epistemically	detrimental.		
That	is	to	say,	some	instances	of	dissent	seem	to	impede,	not	promote,	the	collective	
advancement	of	science.		Many	examples	come	to	mind,	that	have	been	well	
described	in	the	recent	literature	(Oreskes	and	Conway	2010,	Biddle	and	Leushner	
2015,	Harker	2015).		Roughly	speaking,	EDD	is	about	manufacturing	controversy	in	
a	particular	scientific	field.		The	typical	story	goes	something	like	the	following.		The	
research	involved	has	some	severe	non-epistemic	consequences	in	terms	of,	on	one	
side,	industry	profit,	and,	on	the	other	side,	public	welfare;	large	amounts	of	money	
are	invested	by	industry-related	groups	to	(1)	produce	some	skewed	research,	(2)	
largely	publicize	the	results	through	the	media,	(3)	produce	an	atmosphere	of	
confusion	and	doubt	within	the	public,	(4)	launch	some	campaign	against	the	lead	
scientists	of	the	field	in	the	media	and	political	world	(often	through	personal	
attacks	and	threats);	this	results	in	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	scientists	
subjectively	feel	a	lot	of	pressure	and	discomfort,	and	also	objectively	waste	
precious	time	and	limited	resources	to	address	the	well-publicized	skewed	research.		
At	this	point,	the	collective	advancement	of	science	is	clearly	impeded.		We	have	an	
instance	of	EDD.		
																																																								
1	Longino	(1990)	offers	an	account	of	some	of	the	various	kinds	of	epistemically	
beneficial	criticism	within	science.		
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The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	properly	distinguish,	in	that	story,	between	(1)	
contingent	enabling	factors,	and	(2)	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	
EDD.		Our	most	contentious	claim	is	that	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	
presence	of	severe	non-epistemic	risks	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	not	stable	
difference-makers	for	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	difference-makers	are	core	
to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	and	effective	public	
dissemination.		
In	Section	1,	we	offer	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	straightforward	argument	for	the	
claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	in	the	production	of	
EDD:	it	may	lead	to	EDD	only	if	it	leads	to	skewed	science.		In	Section	2	we	argue	
that	it	is	not	necessary	either.		Section	3	is	devoted	to	a	clarification	of	the	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	in	EDD	on	the	basis	of	a	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers.		Section	4	investigates	the	
consequences	of	our	analysis	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	proposed	by	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).	
	
Section	1.	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	sufficient	for	EDD	
That	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	to	the	production	of	EDD	
has	been	discussed	by	Wilholt	(2009),	and	Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).		Roughly,	
the	point	is	simply	that,	unless	intrusion	of	background	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
such	that	the	work	produced	fails	to	satisfy	some	of	the	conventional	standards	for	
proper	science,	there	is	no	problem.	We	offer	here	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	
straightforward	argument	for	this	point.			
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As	the	community	of	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	come	to	recognize,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	is	quite	common	(Douglas	
2009).		Now	obviously,	that	does	not	necessarily	result	in	skewed	science.		If	a	
scientist	defends	a	conclusion	C	on	the	basis	of	evidence	E,	the	fact	that	some	
background	non-epistemic	values	enters	in	her	reasoning	does	not	matter	if	(1)	she	
can	publicly	produce	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	C,	and	if	(2)	that	reasoning	can	be	
assessed	as	adequate	scientific	reasoning	by	her	peers,	including	peers	who	do	not	
share	the	same	background	non-epistemic	values.		If	these	two	conditions	are	met,	
then	the	conventional	standards	for	proper	science	are	met,	and	we	do	not	have	a	
case	of	skewed	science.		Now	if	proper	scientific	work	was	produced,	there	is	no	a	
priori	reason	to	think	that	her	work	cannot	partake	in	the	collective	advancement	of	
scientific	knowledge.		It	might	do	so	at	various	degrees,	but	that	will	depend	on	its	
heuristic	value,	which	is	a	priori	unrelated	to	whether	or	not	there	was	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	values.		
Let	us	push	this	line	of	argument	a	little	further.		It	is	important	here	to	underline	
the	fact	that	the	reasoning	rendered	public	by	the	scientist	might	not	be	the	actual	
reasoning	through	which	she	came	to	accept	either	E	or	its	relevance	with	regard	to	
C.		From	a	subjective	point	of	view,	for	example,	she	might	well	have	had	accepted	C	
well	before	she	produced	E	and	the	reasoning	defending	the	relevance	of	E	as	
supporting	C.		She	might	well	have	accepted	C	for	non-epistemic,	value-laden,	
reasons.		However,	such	considerations	over	the	subjective	state	of	scientists	do	not	
matter.		The	collective	assessment	of	scientific	research	is	not	in	the	business	of	
mind	reading.		No	matter	what	kind	of	reasoning	(or	non-reasoning)	actually	
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brought	a	scientist	to	believe	C,	the	relevant	question	is	whether	she	is	capable	of	
producing	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	E	and	its	relevance	with	regard	to	C	that	can	be	
publicly,	and	positively,	assessed	by	the	experts	in	her	field.		To	put	it	bluntly:	the	
most	biased	and	ill-intentioned	scientists	are	a	priori	capable	of	producing	good	
scientific	work.2			
This	line	of	argument	applies	to	the	production	of	dissenting	views.	Dissenting	
claims	proposed	by	scientists	motivated	by	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	lead	to	skewed	science	and	hence	to	of	EDD.		If	a	reasoning	can	be	
publicly	produced,	and	if	the	members	of	the	scientific	community,	including	
members	of	that	community	who	do	not	share	the	same	values	as	the	dissenting	
views’	proponents,	assess	that	reasoning	as	scientifically	adequate,	then	we	do	not	
have	an	instance	of	skewed	dissent.		As	an	instance	of	work	that	satisfies	the	agreed-
upon	standards	of	proper	scientific	practice,	the	dissenting	view	could	well	
participate	in	the	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge.		It	could	do	so	at	various	
degrees,	depending	on	how	important	the	dissenting	views	are,	but	that	would	not	
depend	on	whether	or	not	the	dissenting	views	are	the	product	of	scientists	with	
non-epistemic	agendas.		Considerations	about	the	subjective	intentions,	or	
background	beliefs,	of	the	scientists	are	irrelevant,	unless	one	can	show	that	skewed	
science	was	produced.		
																																																								
2	This	is	not	denying	the	actuality	of	implicit	bias.		By	definition,	implicit	bias	is	still	
bias.		As	such,	it	can	be	recognized	by	the	scientific	community	for	what	it	is.		What	
is	implicit	about	it	is	that	the	biased	author	(and	possibly	some	of	her	peers	as	well)	
is	not	even	realizing	her	own	bias.			
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Section	2	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	necessary	for	EDD	
At	this	point,	we	have	shown	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	result	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Note	that	EDD	does	not	require	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	either.		What	would	it	take	to	have	a	case	of	EDD	
without	any	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas?		We	know	that	EDD	is	about	
manufacturing	controversy	within	a	scientific	field.		First,	the	controversy	is	
“manufactured”,	not	genuine,	because	the	dissenting	view	is	not	based	on	proper	
science;	it	violates	some	of	the	commonly	accepted	standards	for	proper	scientific	
practice;	it	is	an	instance	of	skewed	science.		Now	skewed	science	can	come	to	be	in	
many	ways.		It	does	not	have	to	result	from	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		
One	can	imagine	the	case	of	a	scientist,	say	Jack,	who	is	genuinely	interested	in	
partaking	in	the	collective	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	is	also	a	poor	
scientist.		One	can	imagine	that	Jack	is	very	wealthy,	and	thus	has	both	the	time	and	
financial	resources	to	pursue	his	research,	and	produce	a	large	amount	of	work	
challenging	the	commonly	held	views	in	a	given	scientific	field.		Jack,	albeit	
misguided	in	many	ways,	could	conceivably	do	all	of	this	with	the	“purest”	goal	in	
mind.	
Now	one	immediately	sees	that	the	production	of	bad	science	is	not	enough	to	
produce	EDD.		Jack’s	research	is	likely	to	be	simply	ignored	by	the	scientific	
community.		So	what	would	it	take	to	“manufacture”	a	controversy	on	the	basis	of	
Jack’s	research?		The	answer	seems	rather	straightforward:	Jack’s	research	needs	to	
be	effectively	disseminated,	so	that	scientists	feel	pressured	to	respond	to	Jack’s	
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challenges.		The	standard	avenues	for	dissemination	of	scientific	research,	i.e.	peer-
reviewed	publication,	however,	are	not	likely	to	be	an	option	for	Jack,	since	his	work	
is	widely	recognized	by	the	community	as	being	of	poor	scientific	quality.		He	must	
then	bypass	these	avenues,	and	manage	to	effectively	disseminate	his	research	
among	the	public.		Mass	media	would	be	a	likely	option	for	this.		This	in	turn	forces	
scientists	in	the	field	to	waste	time	and	resources	to	address	Jack’s	research.		Hence	
a	case	of	EDD,	with	the	purest	epistemic	goal	at	its	source.		
The	case	above	might	seem	far-fetched.		One	objection	could	be	that,	unless	some	
non-epistemic	values	were	at	stake,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	media	and	the	public	
would	get	interested	in	Jack’s	research,	and	Jack	would	fail	to	be	able	to	
manufacture	the	controversy.		It	might	be	unlikely,	but	it	is	surely	conceivable.		If	
Jack’s	public	dissemination	machinery	is	effective	enough,	(mis-)	understandings	
over	the	state	of	research	in	the	field	of	concern	could	well	have	serious	
repercussions	on	public	funding.		Jack	could	well	have	a	very	strong	network	of	
communication	–	he	could	well	be	the	owner	of	a	very	large	cable	and	press	
network.		Repeated	reporting	on	public	funding	of	supposedly	controversial	science	
could	well	spur	outrage	in	the	public.		“Debates”	on	mass	media	would	ensue.		As	
soon	as	the	scientists	would	engage	in	that	conversation,	Jack’s	claims	would	gain	in	
credibility.3		At	the	end,	Jack’s	campaign	could	well	be	so	effective	that	scientists	
																																																								
3	This	is	a	point	that	Hannah	Arendt	made	clear	in	her	insightful	analysis	of	
controversy-	and	doubt-manufacturing	in	a	completely	different	context,	i.e.	the	
(non-)issue	of	the	reality	of	the	Holocaust	during	WWII	(1966/2010).	
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would	indeed	be	forced	to	repeatedly	address	his	research	to	defend	their	own.		So,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	necessary	to	the	production	of	EDD.		
	
Section	3.	Stable	Difference-Makers	v.	Contingent	Enabling	Factor	
From	the	discussion	above,	we	conclude	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD.		Such	a	conclusion	might	
strike	many	as	unsatisfactory,	however.		Isn’t	it	the	case	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	was	an	important	factor	in	the	production	of	the	common	cases	
of	EDD	that	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	50	years?		Some	may	even	want	to	
claim	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	in	all	of	the	cases	we	know	of	in	recent	history,	no	EDD	
would	have	occurred	if	it	were	not	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		This	
is	an	important	intuition,	and	arguably,	any	satisfactory	account	of	EDD	ought	to	
make	sense	of	it.		Fortunately,	we	believe	there	is	a	way	to	do	so,	that	is,	by	
appealing	to	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	
difference-makers	as	discussed	by	Thomson	(2003)	and	Woodward	(2010).		
Thomson	(2003)	makes	the	point	(contra	many	theories	of	causation)	that	just	
because	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’,	it	does	not	follow	that	‘C	has	caused	
E’.		She	argues	that	the	proposition	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’	only	
entails	that	‘C	was	physically	necessary	for	E’.		Consider	her	example.		John	built	a	
bridge	over	the	Rapid	River.		The	Rapid	River	is	notoriously	wild,	and	only	John,	a	
master-builder,	could	have	done	it.		From	the	bridge	being	built,	it	ensues	that	Smith	
crosses	the	river.		Now	John’s	building	the	bridge	was	physically	necessary	to	
Smith’s	crossing	the	Rapid	River,	but	most	would	agree	that	it	is	misguided	to	take	it	
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as	a	cause	for	it.		John’s	building	the	bridge,	even	if	“physically	necessary”	in	the	
whole	process,	remains	largely	irrelevant	to	Smith’s	crossing	the	river.		It	belongs	to	
the	background	conditions,	or	environmental	conditions,	that	make	Smith’s	crossing	
possible,	without	causing	it	in	any	genuine	sense	of	causation.		In	Thomson’s	
vocabulary,	it	is	only	an	enabling	factor.	
Woodward	(2010)	is	interested	in	analyzing	a	similar	distinction	between	the	core	
difference-makers	and	the	background	conditions.		His	analysis	is	useful	to	flesh	out	
some	of	the	characteristics	of	enabling	factors	à	la	Thomson.4		One	of	intuitions	
Woodward	is	trying	to	capture	is	that	some	causal	relationships	are	robust,	i.e.	
insensitive	to	environmental	change,	while	others	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	
a	specific	environment.		To	do	so,	he	articulates	the	notions	of	“stability”.5		A	causal	
relationship,	according	to	Woodward,	is	stable	if	and	only	if	it	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	background	conditions.		Some	examples	might	be	useful	at	this	point.		
																																																								
4	Note	that	we	do	not	claim	(and	neither	does	Woodward)	to	have	unveiled	the	set	
of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	factors	to	qualify	as	enabling	factors	by	
contrast	to	stable	difference-makers.		We	will	only	claim	that	being	enabling	factors	
are	typically	unstable,	and	hence,	that	lack	of	stability	serves	as	a	good	indicator	for	
a	factor	to	be	only	enabling,	not	causing.	
5	Two	other	notions	are	articulated	in	the	article.		The	notion	of	proportionality	
serves	to	address	the	issue	of	the	proper	levels	of	explanation.		The	notion	of	
specificity	serves	to	address	the	issue	of	coarse	v.	fine-grain	causal	influence.		
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A	paradigmatic	example	of	an	unstable	relation	would	be	the	following.6		“Star”	
professor	P	writes	a	letter	of	recommendation	for	Jane,	thanks	to	which	Jane	gets	a	
job	at	university	U.		She	would	not	have	gotten	the	job	without	it.		Jane	meets	Joe	at	
U,	they	get	married,	and	have	children.		Challenged	by	the	difficulties	of	coupling	an	
academic	career	with	quality	parenting,	Jane	goes	into	depression.		Now	consider	
the	following	claim:	‘P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	caused	Jane's	depression’.		Given	the	
story	that	is	given,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	enabled	
Jane's	suffering	from	depression,	but	there	is	also	a	strong	sense	in	which	it	is	
misguided	to	take	it	as	a	cause	for	it.		The	reason	is	that	the	relation	between	P’s	
writing	the	letter	and	Jane’s	suffering	from	the	disease	would	cease	to	hold	under	
many	small,	contingent,	changes	in	the	background	conditions	for	the	story	(Jane	
and	Joe	could	not	have	met,	they	could	have	decided	to	not	have	children,	U	could	
have	had	a	very	progressive	parental	leave	policy,	etc.).		The	causal	relationship	
between	the	letter	and	the	depression	is	thus	highly	unstable	because	it	holds	only	
in	a	very	specific	environment.	
Now	contrast	this	with	a	paradigmatic	example	of	a	stable	relation.		I	turn	on	the	
heat	under	my	closed	pressure	cooker	(with	some	water	in	it).		The	pressure	goes	
up	and	the	valve	shuts	down.		Clearly,	heating	up	the	pressure	cooker	is	a	stable	
cause	of	the	pressure	valve	to	shut	down.		Many	of	the	most	stable	causal	relations	
are	backed	up	by	what	the	kind	of	generalizations	that	we	take	to	be	the	laws	of	
physics,	or	chemistry.		These	generalizations	hold	over	a	wide	range	of	background	
conditions.	
																																																								
6	This	example	is	inspired	by	Woodward	(2010)	himself	inspired	by	Lewis	(1986).	
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There	are	obviously	various	degrees	of	stability	in	between	these	two	extreme	
cases.		Stability	is	not	an	all	or	nothing	affair.		It	might	also	be	difficult	to	figure	out	
which	causal	relationships	are	more	or	less	stable.		That	said,	it	could	also	be	worth	
the	effort	looking	into	it,	because,	how	stable	a	factor	is	could	be	a	measure	of	how	
well	we	can	target	change	by	targeting	that	factor	in	a	given	situation.		As	
Woodward	explains	(2010,	315):	“other	things	being	equal,	causal	relationships	that	
are	more	stable	are	likely	to	be	more	useful	for	many	purposes	associated	with	
manipulation	and	control	than	less	stable	relationships.”		Applied	to	our	case,	if	
ultimately	we	hope	to	be	able	to	alter	the	manufacturing	of	controversy	and	EDD,	it	
could	turn	out	to	be	very	useful	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	behind	EDD	by	
distinguishing	between	the	contingent	enabling	factors	and	the	more	stable	
difference-makers.			
Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	analyses	are	clearly	related.		Thomson’s	bridge	
example	is	a	clear	case	of	a	very	unstable	causal	relationship:	it	holds	only	under	
very	specific	background	conditions	(The	Rapid	River	could	have	been	gently,	Smith	
could	have	decided	not	to	cross	the	bridge,	etc.)	Some	unstable	causal	relationships	
as	discussed	by	Woodward	are	so	at	least	partially	because	they	are	relationships	of	
contingent	“physical	necessity”	à	la	Thomson.		So,	a	causal	factor	may	be	highly	
unstable,	despite	being	‘necessary’	to	the	causal	process,	if	its	influence	on	the	
process	is	highly	contingent	on	a	specific	environment.		No	matter	how	“necessary”	
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in	that	sense	a	factor	F	is,	F	being	unstable	points	F	being	a	enabling	factor,	not	a	
stable	difference-maker.7		
The	discussion	above	allows	us	to	bring	home	two	important	points.		First,	it	allows	
us	to	identify	two	stable	difference-makers	for	the	production	of	EDD:	the	
production	of	skewed	scientific	research	and	its	effective	public	dissemination.		That	
the	combination	of	these	two	factors	produces	an	instance	EDD	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	conditions.		What	changes	in	background	conditions	would	make	that	
causal	relation	to	fail?	First,	one	could	think	of	a	world	in	which	scientists	could	
ignore	even	well-advertised	skewed	science.		For	example,	that	could	possibly	be	
the	case	in	a	world	in	which	production	of	scientific	research	would	not	depend	on	
getting	public	founding,	or	in	a	world	in	which	the	public	is	generally	knowledgeable	
about	(the	philosophy	of)	science,	and	hence,	is	able	to	recognize	that	the	well-
																																																								
7	Two	points	of	clarification	are	in	order.	First,	Woodward	convincingly	argues	that	
the	extent	to	which	a	cause	is	stable	is	related,	but	not	equivalent	to,	its	
distal/proximate	character	vis	à	vis	the	effect.		Second,	Woodward	also	argues	that	
stability	is	not	dependent	on	the	level	of	explanation:	degrees	of	stability	are	not	
necessarily	to	how	“reductive”	the	explanation	is.		So,	our	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	is	not	trivial	in	the	sense	
that	the	most	stable	difference-makers	would	always	be	the	most	proximate	causes	
described	at	the	level	of	fundamental	particles.		
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advertised	science	is	skewed.		Arguably,	these	do	not	qualify	as	small	changes	in	the	
background	conditions	for	scientific	practice.8			
The	second	point	is	a	clarification	of	the	role	played	by	the	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
not	a	stable	difference-maker	for	the	production	of	EDD.		This	is	because	there	is	a	
large	range	of	conditions	under	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
result	in	EDD.		These	include	the	conditions	for	all	the	cases	in	which	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	agendas	do	no	result	in	skewed	science.		If	we	take	seriously	recent	
work	on	science	and	value,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	is	actually	the	rule,	not	
the	exception	within	the	practice	of	science	(Douglas	2009,	Intemann	2001,	2015,	
and	references	therein).		Note	that,	if	our	take	on	Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	
analyses	is	correct,	then	the	claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	a	
stable	difference-maker	but	only	a	contingent	enabling	factor	is	consistent	with	the	
fact	that	it	has	been	“physically	necessary”	in	many	of	the	well-known	instances	of	
EDD.		One	can	consistently	say	that,	while	not	a	stable	difference-maker,	it	has	been	
an	important	enabling	factor	for	the	production	of	well-publicized	skewed	science.		
Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	has	been	necessary	for	some	groups	to	develop	
an	interest	in	funding	the	production	and	public	dissemination	of	skewed	research.		
																																																								
8	There	is	also	a	possibility	that	some	cases	of	EDD	could	come	out	of	seemingly	
proper	science	“distracting”	the	public	from	the	most	widely	held	views	within	the	
scientific	community.		We	believe	that	even	in	these	cases,	dissenting	views	do	not	
entail	EDD	unless	there	is	violation	of	some	conventional	standards	for	proper	
science.		This	interesting	issue	belongs	to	another	paper.		
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -942-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -321-
	 14	
That	said	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	factors	that	are	characterized	by	
this	kind	of	‘necessity’	(the	bridge	or	letter	kind	of	necessity)	and	factors	that	are	
true	stable	difference-makers.		It	is	all	the	more	important	that,	if	one	of	our	goals	is	
to	alter	the	production	of	EDD,	then	our	analysis	suggests	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	is	not	the	proper	target.		Once	again,	non-epistemic	values	are	the	
common	rule	within	the	practice	of	science.		A	more	efficient	approach	in	the	
prevention	of	EDD	would	be	to	understand	the	various	ways	skewed	science	may	be	
produced.		This	includes	the	important	discussion	on	the	distinction	between	
legitimate	and	illegitimate	use	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	(Hicks	
2014,	Intemann	2015).		This	in	turn	includes	an	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	by	
which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	does	result	in	skewed	science.		Implicit	bias	
might	one	of	these	mechanisms.		Inductive	risk	bias,	as	we	shall	explain	in	the	next	
section,	is	another	one.		Before	we	turn	to	this	point,	let	us	take	stock.		
We	have	clarified	the	causal	landscape	for	the	production	of	EDD.		We	have	
identified	two	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science	and	its	
effective	public	dissemination;	and	we	have	characterized	the	important	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	within	science	as	contingent	enabling	factors	for	
the	production	and	dissemination	of	skewed	research,	hence	for	EDD.		
	
Section	4.	Consequences	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	have	articulated	what	they	call	the	“inductive	risk	account”	of	
EDD	(2015).		According	to	this	account,	the	following	set	of	conditions	are	jointly	
sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD	(2015,	273):		
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Dissent	from	a	hypothesis	H	is	epistemically	detrimental	if	each	of	the	following	
obtains:	
(1) The	non-epistemic	consequences	of	wrongly	rejecting	H	are	likely	to	be	severe	
(2) The	dissenting	research	that	constitutes	the	objection	violates	established	
conventional	standards.		
(3) The	dissenting	research	involves	intolerance	for	producer	risks	at	the	expense	
of	public	risks.		
(4) Producer	risks	and	public	risks	fall	largely	upon	different	parties.		
Biddle	and	Leushner	admit	that	these	conditions	are	not	necessarily	related	to	the	
production	of	EDD	(275):	
“We	are	not	arguing	that,	in	all	possible	worlds,	research	that	meets	the	conditions	
of	the	inductive	risk	account	inhibits	the	progress	of	science.	It	is	possible,	for	
example,	to	organize	science	and	to	regulate	industry	in	such	a	way	that	dissent	that	
meets	these	conditions	is	not	widely	disseminated,	does	not	acquire	political	
authority,	and	is	not	used	to	attack	mainstream	scientists.		But	this	is	not	the	way	in	
which	science	and	society	are	currently	organized.		Dissent	that	meets	the	
conditions	of	the	inductive	risk	account	is,	given	current	societal	arrangements,	
likely	to	inhibit	knowledge	production,	particularly	because	of	the	success	of	
political,	economic,	and	ideological	interests	in	structuring	the	dissemination	of	
research.”	
We	think	that	the	framework	used	in	Section	3	can	help	clarify	the	causal	landscape	
for	the	production	of	EDD	offered	in	the	Inductive	Risk	Account.		Our	contention	is	
that	Biddle	and	Leuschner,	by	focusing	on	inductive	risk,	have	identified	a	
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particular,	important,	but	still	contingent,	enabling	factor,	but	have	failed	to	clearly	
distinguish	the	proper	core	of	stable	difference-makers,	for	the	production	of	EDD.		
Let	us	make	that	point	in	more	details.		
The	four	conditions	above	can	be	seen	as	dividing	into	three	groups.		Condition	(2)	
identifies	one	of	the	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science.		
Conditions	(1)	and	(4)	together	specify	some	particular	enabling	conditions	for	the	
formation	of	non-epistemic	agendas	–	the	presence	of	severe	and	opposing	non-
epistemic	consequences	(SONEC).		Condition	(3)	identifies	a	mechanism	by	which	
intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	may	enable	the	production	of	
skewed	science.		In	other	words,	the	inductive	risk	account	of	EDD	identifies	an	
important	series	of	enabling	causes	leading	to	one	of	the	two	stable	difference-
makers	we	have	identified	in	Section	1-3,	i.e.	production	of	skewed	science.		That	
series	of	cause	is	something	like	this:	from	the	presence	of	SONEC	to	biased	
inductive	risk	reasoning,	and	to	skewed	science.		This	is	an	important	contribution	
to	the	understanding	of	EDD	precisely	because	it	not	only	identifies	some	particular	
enabling	factors	(the	presence	of	SONEC)	for	the	formation	of	epistemic	agendas,	
but	also	a	mechanism	by	which	intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	
may	enable	the	production	of	skewed	science	(via	inductive	risk	bias).		Now	it	is	also	
important	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	and	recognize	that	fulfillment	of	Condition	
(2)	is	the	stable	difference-maker	which	fulfillment	of	Conditions	(1),	(4),	and	then	
(3)	enable	as	a	matter	of	contingent	fact.		Biddle	and	Leuschner	seem	to	have	missed	
that	useful	distinction.		
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If	our	analysis	in	Section	3	is	correct,	they	also	have	failed	to	include	the	second	
stable	difference-maker	for	EDD,	i.e.	effective	public	dissemination.		As	they	admit	in	
the	paper	(see	quote	above),	the	presence	of	SONEC	obviously	does	not	imply	that	
effective	public	dissemination	will	ensue.		Conversely,	as	Jack’s	case	shows,	effective	
public	dissemination	could	well	be	obtained	without	the	presence	of	SONEC.		How	
(un-)likely	this	is	obviously	is	an	empirical	question.		No	matter	how	unlikely,	
however,	it	is	important	for	our	understanding	of	EDD	to	mention	effective	public	
dissemination	as	a	core	stable	difference-maker.		The	inductive	risk	account	fails	to	
do	so.		Let	us	underscore,	however,	that	Biddle	and	Leuschner	once	again	have	
identified	an	important	mechanism	by	which	presence	of	SONEC	enables	effective	
public	dissemination	and	the	manufacturing	of	controversy:	the	presence	of	SONEC	
not	only	enables	the	production	of	skewed	science,	but	also	the	establishment	of	
“sophisticated,	private-funded	network	for	disseminating	[dissenting]	results”	
(2015,	275).		
This	brings	us	to	our	conclusion	on	the	Inductive	Risk	Account:	Biddle	and	
Leuschner	have	successfully	identified	an	important	contingent	enabling	factor	for	
EDD,	i.e.	the	presence	and	influence	of	SONEC.		That	said,	they	have	failed	to	
distinguish	between	the	different	roles	that	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	play	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	hope	to	have	clarified	the	situation.		
	
Conclusion		
Well-known	cases	of	EDD	seem	to	have	in	common	various	forms	of	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic,	often	SONEC-related,	agendas	within	the	science.		We	have	argued	
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that	such	intrusion	is	not	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	neither	necessary	nor	
sufficient,	it	is	also	not	a	stable	difference-maker.		We	have	clarified	its	causal	role:	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	a	contingent	enabling	factor.		Reduced	to	its	
core,	EDD	is	just	well-advertised	bad	science.	Because	it	is	well	advertised,	it	has	an	
impact	on	the	collective	building	of	scientific	knowledge.		Because	it	is	bad	science,	it	
does	not	advance	that	endeavor,	but	any	case	negatively	impacts	it	instead.	
To	make	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	is	important	for	at	least	three	reasons.		First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	
causal	landscape	that	leads	to	the	production	of	EDD,	as	it	simply	increases	our	
understanding	of	EDD.		Second,	it	might	suggest	more	efficient	avenues	for	targeting	
change.		Finally,	it	is	crucial	to	make	room	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	
within	the	science	without	it	being	epistemologically	detrimental.		As	the	
community	of	philosophers	of	science	comes	to	recognize	that	such	intrusion	is	the	
rule	rather	than	the	exception,	one	must	leave	conceptual	room	for	a	distinction	
between	“legitimate”	and	“illegitimate”	role	for	non-epistemic	values	within	science	
(Hick	2014,	Intemann	2015).		
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Abstract
The problem of motion in general relativity is about how exactly
the gravitational field equations, the Einstein equations, are related
to the equations of motion of material bodies subject to gravitational
fields. This paper compares two approaches to derive the geodesic mo-
tion of (test) matter from the field equations: ‘the T approach’ and
‘the vacuum approach’. The latter approach has been dismissed by
philosophers of physics because it apparently represents material bod-
ies by singularities. I shall argue that a careful interpretation of the
approach shows that it does not depend on introducing singularities
at all, and that it holds at least as much promise as the T approach. I
conclude with some general lessons about careful vs. literal interpre-
tations of scientific theories.
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1 Introduction
It is a bit of an irony that one of the most widely embraced definitions of
what it means to be a scientific realist is due to the arch-anti-realist Bas van
Fraassen. His definition starts by stating that “Science aims to give us, in its
theories, a literally true story of what the world is like”.1 And indeed, scien-
tific realists often see themselves as committed to ‘taking scientific theories at
face value’: if the best theories of particle physics say that quarks exist, then
we should believe that they exist; if general relativity tells us that gravity
is really just an aspect of spacetime structure, then we should believe it; if
quantum mechanics tells us that the world is at its core non-deterministic,
then we should believe that too.
The problem is that scientific theories, or at least the theories of modern
physics, are not that straightforward with us. They may seem so at first,
but if you listen to the details of their respective stories, if you take your
time to look under the surface, what exactly we should take them to tell
us about the world is far from clear. Murray Gell-Mann, the inventor of
the concept of quarks, for a long time did not think that quarks should
be interpreted as literally existing; neither did Richard Feynman. Albert
Einstein passionately resisted the interpretation of general relativity that says
that the gravitational force field of Newtonian theory is ontologically reduced
to the geometry of spacetime in general relativity. And of course, there is
a long-standing battle in foundations of physics about whether quantum
mechanics really does tell us that the world is non-deterministic.2
In this paper I shall introduce a new case study that provides further
evidence for the position that, whether you are a realist or not, the literal
interpretation of a scientific theory, especially in physics, can be rather mis-
leading. I will argue that what we should aim for is a careful interpretation;
1Van Fraassen [1980], p.8.
2For a discussion of different interpretations of the quark concept see Pickering [1999],
for Einstein’s opposition to interpreting general relativity as a geometrization of gravity see
Lehmkuhl [2014], and for debate on whether quantum mechanics is really indeterministic
see e.g. Saunders et al. [2010].
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an interpretation of the theory or model or formalism that engages with its
details, both with the details of its mathematical structure and with how it
is applied to the natural world. Philosophy of science must be willing to look
under the hood.
The case study I want to look at is the so-called problem of motion in
the general theory of relativity (GR). It asks about the precise relationship
between the two sets of equations that are at the very heart of GR. On the
one hand there are the Einstein field equations, which give us the dynamics
of the gravitational potential (the metric tensor) gµν :
Rµν −
1
2
gµν = κETµν . (1)
On the other hand, we have the geodesic equation that determines which
paths through spacetime are geodesics of the connection Γνµσ compatible
with the metric gµν :
d2xτ
ds2
+ Γτµν
dxµ
ds
dxν
ds
= 0. (2)
In GR, material bodies subject only to gravitational fields are supposed to
move on the geodesics determined by equation (2).3 The problem of motion
in GR is the question of whether the equations of motion of matter subject to
gravitational fields (2) can be derived from the gravitational field equations
(1).
Einstein himself, in his first publication on the topic, a paper co-written
with Jakob Grommer and published in 1927, compares different classes of
attempts to give such a derivation. In particular, Einstein and Grommer
distinguish between two classes of attempts at deriving the geodesic motion
of matter from the gravitational field equations, which I will term the T
approach and the vacuum approach, respectively. The T approach starts from
the realization that the field equations (1) imply the conservation condition,
namely that the covariant divergence of the energy-momentum tensor Tµν
vanishes:
∇
µTµν = 0 . (3)
3It is a big question which systems are actually included under ‘material bodies’ here.
The minimal position is that only test particles are referred to: particles with negligible
extension, spin, and self-gravity. However, many actual bodies can be approximated well
by test particles in this sense; planets orbiting a star are an example, as we shall see below.
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From this, together with certain conditions on the energy-momentum
tensor Tµν , the T approach derives that material particles move on time-
like geodesics. It is this kind of approach to the problem of motion that
philosophers have engaged with almost exclusively up to now.4
Einstein and Grommer end up dismissing the T approach, and suggest an
alternative path to deriving geodesic motion instead. It is a particular version
of a vacuum approach to the problem of motion. Einstein and Grommer start
from the vacuum form of the Einstein field equations,
Rµν = 0 , (4)
and attempt to derive that the equations (4) imply that material particles
move on geodesics.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have quickly dismissed it because it seems to model material bodies
by singularities in spacetime; while singularities, by definition, are not even
part of spacetime. However, in this paper I shall argue that this dismissal
was far too fast, and that indeed the vacuum approach deserves at least as
much attention by philosophers as the T approach. The vacuum approach,
despite first appearances, engages more closely with some of the most major
predictions of GR: both the prediction of the perihelion of Mercury and
the prediction of light bending by the Sun utilise the vacuum approach to
the derivation of motion of material systems. Indeed, even the prediction
of gravitational waves resulting from a binary black hole merger that was
recently confirmed rests on the vacuum field equations, for black holes are
described by vacuum solutions.5
My argument in this paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will argue
that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion promises certain ad-
vantages that the T approach lacks. Second, I will argue that the problems
of the vacuum approach for which it has been dismissed are artefacts of a
too literal interpretation of the formalism and its application to the problem
at hand. Third, I will argue that a careful interpretation makes the prob-
lems disappear; I will argue that the approach does not need to interpret
singularities as representing material bodies.
4For a comprehensive review of the early history of this approach see Havas [1989]
and Kennefick [2005]; for two particularly beautiful exemplars from within this class of
proofs see Geroch and Jang [1975] and Ehlers and Geroch [2004], which are investigated
by Brown [2007], Malament [2012], and Weatherall [Forthcoming, 2011].
5See Abbott et al. [2016] and references therein.
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2 A critical comparison of the two research
programmes
I said above that the T approach to the problem of motion proceeds via
the fact that the Einstein field equations (1) imply the conservation con-
dition (3), which in turn implies the geodesic motion of matter. However,
as Malament [2012] pointed out, the conservation condition by itself is not
sufficient to prove that the geodesic equation is the equation of motion of ma-
terial particles. One of the most general proofs from within the T approach,
proposed by Geroch and Jang [1975] and further generalised by Ehlers and
Geroch [2004], rests not only on the conservation condition (3), but also on
the strengthened dominant energy condition, which states:
Given any timelike covector ξµ at any point in M , T
µνξµξν ≥ 0
and either T µν = 0 or T µνξµ is timelike.
The first clause is effectively the weak energy condition, which states that
the mass-energy-momentum density associated with the body in question is
always non-negative. The second clause states that every observer will judge
the mass-energy-momentum of the body to propagate along time-like curves
only.6
It would be rather attractive if we did not have to presume that mate-
rial particles move on time-like curves to then show that these curves are
actually time-like geodesics, and if we did not have to presume that matter
cannot have non-negative mass-energy. These are weak assumptions about
the nature of matter, but they are assumptions.
The vacuum approach to the problem of motion, on the other hand, aims
to make no assumptions about the nature of matter and its properties at all,
and to still derive that matter moves on geodesics. It starts from the question
of whether just knowing the exterior gravitational field of a material body,
and how this gravitational field interacts with the gravitational field of its
surroundings, is enough to derive that the body will move on a geodesic of the
metric surrounding it. Arguably, this programme is far more ambitious than
the T approach, for it starts with fewer assumptions.7 And yet, if successful,
it would really fit much better the virtues that philosophers have associated
6For more on the interpretation of the strengthened dominant energy condition
seeWeatherall [2011], Weatherall [Forthcoming] and especially Curiel [Forthcoming].
7One might be tempted to argue that despite first appearances the vacuum approach
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with the geodesic theorem(s) in the first place: deriving the inertial motion
of matter from knowledge of the dynamics of gravitational fields alone.8
Einstein was deeply skeptical of the role of the energy-momentum ten-
sor in GR. Throughout the decades, he emphasised that Tµν provides only
a ‘phenomenological representation of matter’.9 In Einstein and Grommer
[1927], Einstein elaborates that general relativity with an energy-momentum
tensor as a source term on the right-hand side of (1) is just not a com-
plete theory: it does not tell us what kind of matter is present, only that
it has a certain mass-energy distribution. This perspective on GR was fur-
ther strengthened by Tupper [1981, 1982, 1983], who showed that knowing
the energy-momentum tensor of a material system does not suffice to tell
us what kind of matter is present. For example, one and the same mass-
energy-momentum distribution Tµν featuring on the right-hand side of the
Einstein equations, and solving the Einstein equations for the same metric,
can correspond either to an electromagnetic field or a viscous fluid. Knowing
the energy-momentum tensor is just not sufficient to know which of these
two material systems it is that interacts with the metric field.
Einstein’s aim is then to instead start with the vacuum field equations
starts with more demanding assumptions than the T approach. For the vacuum Einstein
equations (4) logically imply that the strengthened dominant energy condition (SDEC)
holds for the Ricci tensor Rµν . The opposite is not true, so that demanding Ricci flatness is
clearly a stronger constraint on the Ricci tensor than demanding that it obeys the SDEC.
But concluding from this that the vacuum approach starts from stronger assumptions than
the T approach would be a mistake. For the T approach assumes i.) the full Einstein field
equations (1); and ii.) that the energy-momentum tensor (and thus the Einstein tensor)
adheres to the SDEC. The vacuum approach only assumes the vacuum Einstein equations
(4), and thus starts with weaker assumptions than the T approach. However, it might
well be that depsite starting with weaker assumptions than the T approach, a particular
manifestation of the vacuum approach might end up with stronger assumptions than
a particular manifestation of the T approach. For example, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer
vacuum approach, discussed below, involves, among other demands, a so-called equilibrium
condition which is supposed to relate solutions to the non-linear field equations to solutions
of the linearized field equations in a particular way; no such demand is included in, say,
the Geroch-Jang version of the T approach. Thus, further analysis might well show that
Einstein and Grommer use stronger assumptions than Geroch and Jang. Einstein himself
would likely have been content with that, as long as it allowed him to avoid the introduction
of Tµν , for reasons discussed below.
8Cf. Brown [2007], p. 141 and 163.
9See, for example, Einstein [1922], Einstein to Michele Besso, 11 August 1926 (EA-7-
361), and Einstein [1936].
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(4), treat material particles as singularities in the metric field,10 and derive
that they move on geodesics of a metric gµν that solves the vacuum field
equations (4) in the region through which the particle moves.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have already dismissed it at this point. The main criticism is that
the very idea of the approach is flawed: A singularity is not even part of
spacetime. How should it be possible to describe its motion in said spacetime?
Both Torretti and Earman essentially answer that this is not possible and
that the whole programme is ill-conceived. Earman [1995], p. 12, writes:11
[S]ingularities in the spacetime metric cannot be regarded as tak-
ing place at points of the spacetime manifold M. Thus, to speak
of singularities in gµν as geodesics of the spacetime is to speak in
oxymorons.
The most detailed discussion of the Einstein-Grommer paper in the philo-
sophical literature is due to Tamir [2012]. After quoting the above statement
by Earman, Tamir goes on to write (p.142):
The proponent of such a “vacuum-cum-singularity” technique is
faced with the rather paradoxical challenge of explaining in what
sense we can say that a singular curve (ostensibly constituted
by the missing points in the manifold) is actually a geodesic of
the spacetime from which it is absent. Not only is no metric
defined at the singularity, but also technically there are not even
spacetime points there: the geodesic does not exist.
Tamir then mentions a key ingredient of the Einstein-Grommer approach,
namely the distinction between an ‘inner metric’ and an ‘outer metric’.12
Einstein and Grommer aim to show that the particle characterized by a
10In recent years, the adequate definition of a singularity in GR has been a subject of
extensive debate, see e.g. Earman [1995] and Curiel [1999]. For Einstein’s thoughts on
singularities see Earman and Eisenstaedt [1999]; in the context of the Einstein-Grommer
paper Einstein clearly thinks of a singularity in the metric field gµν as a region where the
components of the metric tend to infinity.
11For similar statements see Torretti [1996], section 5.8.
12There is an interesting relationship between Einstein and Grommer’s distinction be-
tween inner and outer metric (discussed further in section 3) on the one hand and the later
distinction between interior and exterior black hole solutions on the other. I do believe
that bringing together results and concepts developed in the context of black hole solu-
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singular inner metric moves on geodesics of the non-singular outer metric.
Tamir states that the “suggested implication” is that we are to compare
a second spacetime whose metric is that of the regular outer metric with
the singular first spacetime, and identify the regular geodesic of the second
spacetime with the singular curve of the first one. He then argues that the
thought that the second singularity-free spacetime can teach us anything
about the singular original spacetime is “spurious”.
My point in the following will be this. Even if this argument were con-
vincing, its premise (the ‘suggested implication’ that Einstein and Grommer
intended to deduce something about a singular spacetime by comparing it
to a non-singular spacetime) is not. I shall argue that by looking at the de-
tails of the Einstein-Grommer approach we come to a different interpretation
of the approach, one that sheds a completely different light on the alleged
presence of singularities. We will see that a careful (rather than literal) in-
terpretation of the vacuum approach, and the Einstein-Grommer paper in
particular, does not actually depend on introducing singularities at all.
3 The vacuum approach to the problem of
motion
3.1 Two ways of looking at Einstein’s model of the
Sun-Mercury system
In a way, the story of the vacuum approach to the problem of motion starts
in 1915, with Einstein’s treatment of the orbit of Mercury around the Sun
in the context of GR. It is a two-body problem: a small body (Mercury)
with a comparatively small mass orbits a large body (the Sun). Einstein
seems to postulate (more on the ‘seems’ below) that the Sun be represented
by what would soon be recognized as an approximation to the Schwarzschild
metric. He definitely postulates (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic of said
metric.13 In a way, the problem of motion in GR is about the question of
tions (a special case of vacuum solutions) on the one hand and the vacuum approach to the
problem of motion on the other hand is very promising indeed. I will have to postpone a
detailed discussion to a later paper; it will include the problem of motion of a binary black
hole, the black hole equivalent of the Sun-Mercury two-body system discussed below.
13For a careful analysis of Einstein’s Mercury paper and how it rests on the Einstein-
Besso manuscript see Earman and Janssen [1993], and Janssen’s Editorial Note on the
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whether this second postulate is really necessary.
If we now look at Einstein’s Mercury paper and recall the kind of criticism
that was launched against the vacuum approach to the problem of motion,
we may find ourselves feeling puzzled. After all, the Schwarzschild metric is a
solution to the vacuum field equations, and it has a singularity at its center.14
If representing material bodies by singular metrics is so problematic, how
does it come about that Einstein [1915] successfully predicted the perihelion
motion of Mercury? Why is it not problematic to represent the Sun by the
singular Schwarzschild metric?
The answer lies in denying the premise of the question. Einstein’s treat-
ment of the Sun-Mercury system should not be interpreted as involving him
representing the Sun by (an approximation of) the Schwarzschild metric. We
know that the Sun is a material body with non-vanishing mass-energy, and
that it does not have a spacetime singularity at its center. What Einstein
really does is to convert the two-body problem Sun-Mercury into a one-body
problem, where one body (Mercury) is subject to an external gravitational
field. It is the exterior gravitational field of the Sun, not the Sun itself, that
is represented by the Schwarzschild metric. And that is enough to predict
the perihelion of Mercury: we don’t need to know what the Sun is made of
or what happens in its interior; all that matters is the exterior gravitational
field that Mercury is subject to.
Thus, worrying about the singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild
metric just misses the point: we do not have to interpret the interior part of
the Schwarzschild metric literally, at least not in this application.
In the following I shall argue that we should interpret the appearance of
singularities in the Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the problem of
motion in a similar vein.
3.2 The Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the
problem of motion
The general scheme of the Einstein-Grommer approach proceeds as follows.15
Einstein-Besso manuscript in Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (CPAE).
14For the history and interpretation of the Schwarzschild metric and its analytic exten-
sions see Eisenstaedt [1989] and Bonnor [1992].
15The genesis of the Einstein-Grommer approach has been a bit of a mystery up to now,
as pointed out by Kennefick [2005]. However, the work on the 15th volume of Einstein’s
collected papers has revealed the context and correspondence leading up to that paper,
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1. Reformulate the vacuum Einstein equations in terms of a surface in-
tegral over a three-dimensional hyper-surface such that we can ask
whether gravitational energy-momentum represented by the pseudo-
tensor tτα passes through the surface.
16
2. Pick a curve that is supposed to represent the path of a material par-
ticle.
3. Impose the linear approximation according to which gµν = ηµν + γµν ,
i.e. assume that, at least close to the curve, the metric deviates from
Minkowski spacetime only slightly.
4. Realise that not all solutions to the linearized field equations will corre-
spond to solutions of the non-linear field equations that the linearized
field equations approximate. Argue that in the case where an ‘equilib-
rium condition’ for the energy-pseudo-tensor of the gravitational field
holds, the γµν of the linearized field equations will solve the full non-
linear equations reformulated as a surface integral.17
5. Now split the γµν in the immediate neighborhood of the particle into
the ‘inner metric γ¯µν that the particle itself gives rise to and the ‘outer
metric γ¯µν that is due to other sources (or lack thereof). Observe that
the ‘outer metric’ is entirely regular, even if extended to the point at
which the material particle is supposed to be located.
6. Integrate the surface integral that is equivalent to the vacuum field
equations ‘around’ the curve that is supposed to represent the path
of a material particle. For the case where the integration surface is a
sphere, the equilibrium condition for tτα simplifies to
∂γ¯44
∂xσ
= 0.
and how it fits into Einstein’s overall research program. It is a fascinating story; alas, it
will have to wait for a separate paper.
16There has been a long debate on whether gravitational energy can be adequately
represented by a pseudo-tensor; I will not be able to do it justice here. For some details
see the introduction to Volume 8 CPAE for the debate between Einstein, Klein, Levi-Civita
and Lorentz, for conceptual analysis Hoefer [2000] and especially Trautmann [1962].
17This step is very intricate and it would take me a few pages to do it justice. This point
of the Einstein-Grommer paper has not been adressed by the literature at all (neither in
physics nor in philosophy); I will argue elsewhere that it sheds new light on Einstein’s
later doubts as to whether the gravitational wave solutions of the linearized equations
correspond to gravitational wave solutions in the full non-linear theory.
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7. Conclude that the curve that represents the path of a material particle
is a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν .
18
4 Interpreting the Einstein-Grommer approach
to the problem of motion
The reader might think that the argument presented in the last section cannot
be a faithful representation of the Einstein-Grommer approach; after all,
where is the claim that the material particle is represented by a singularity,
the reason the approach was dismissed by Earman and Tamir? Indeed, I
have omitted that after step 5 of the argument Einstein and Grommer do
say that one could assume that the inner metric γ¯µν is given by what is
effectively a three-dimensional counterpart of the Schwarzschild metric: it is
spherically symmetric and has a singularity at the center. And yet, Einstein
and Grommer never use this assumption in their argument. They call the
material particle ‘the singularity’ all the time, but their argument does not
depend on assuming any particular form for the inner metric, let alone one
that is necessarily singular. As a matter of fact, they do not even mention a
concrete candidate metric for the outer metric γ¯µν ; all they need is that γµν
is split into the inner metric γ¯µν and the outer metric γ¯µν in such a way that
γ¯µν is non-singular everywhere.
Note that this does not mean that we know that the inner metric γ¯µν
is non-singular. We don’t know anything about the inner metric, for the
argument is independent of γ¯µν having any particular form, just like the
derivation of Mercury’s perihelion was independent of whether there is a
singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild metric that represented the
exterior field of the Sun.
With regard to the Sun-Mercury system I argued that we should not
interpret the Schwarzschild metric as representing the Sun, but as represent-
ing its exterior gravitational field. The part of the Sun that is within the
event horizon, including the singularity at the center, should not be taken
18Einstein and Grommer then go on to generalise this result to the ‘non-stationary case’,
i.e. the case where it is not demanded that the external gravitational field, to which the
particle is subject to, does not change in time. They conclude that in this case, too, the
particle will move on a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν that is a solution to the field
equations. For the following this generalisation does not make a difference; I will thus
refer only to the stationary scenario described above.
11
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as a representation of the actual interior of the Sun, but as a placeholder
or a blind spot within the current description of the Sun-Mercury system: a
docking station for a theoretical model of the Sun not included in Einstein’s
Sun-Mercury model.19
Likewise, we should interpret the inner metric γ¯µν in the Einstein-Grommer
approach as a placeholder for a representation of matter not included in the
current theoretical approach. Sure, you can set γ¯µν to be a Schwarzschild-like
metric with a singularity at the center. But you don’t have to do that to
make the Einstein-Grommer argument work, and even if you do make that
assumption, you should still take this particular inner metric with a singu-
larity at its center as a placeholder for a representation or theory of matter
not yet provided.20
But now wait a minute. You might have disliked the occurence of sin-
gularities as representations of particles, but at least the singularity (in lieu
of a non-vanishing energy-momentum tensor) gave you an idea of where in
spacetime the particle was supposed to be. True, Earman and Tamir rightly
pointed out that the singularity is not actually part of spacetime, and so it
can hardly serve to localize the particle in spacetime. Still, you might think
that we’re throwing the baby out with the bath water by not choosing any
inner metric. After all, is it not the case then that the curve we have been
focusing on is just any curve, without any reason to think of this curve as
the curve of a material particle?21
Again, I think we can counter this criticism by comparing the Einstein-
Grommer approach to Einstein’s treatment of the Sun-Mercury system in
19Note that there are interior extensions of the Schwarzschild metric that model the
interior of the Sun by solutions of the non-vacuum field equations (1), for example by an
incompressible perfect fluid. See Bonnor [1992], section 5.
20If I had given more historical details, I could have, I believe, shown that Einstein
himself saw the occurence of a singularity in the inner metric in exactly this way. This
exegetical argument would have started with evidence that, from early on, he saw GR as a
theory of the pure gravitational field without any constraints on what kinds of matter give
rise to the gravitational field. Furthermore, I would have argued that even in the Einstein-
Grommer paper he clearly forbids singularities outside of material particles (where the
theory is supposed to give an adequate and deterministic representation of gravitational
fields) but has no problem with them appearing inside of material systems, where the
theory can provide at best phenomenological placeholders for a future ‘proper’ theory of
matter anyhow. Thus, for Einstein energy-momentum tensors as alleged representatives
of material systems were on a par with singularities: both were only placeholders for a
proper theory of matter.
21I thank Jim Weatherall for putting this question to me.
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Einstein [1915]. What Einstein did there was to assume that Mercury would
move on some geodesic of the exterior gravitational field produced by the
Sun. He calculated an approximation to the external gravitational field of a
static, spherically symmetric and asymptotically flat body; this gravitational
field he saw as represented by the connection components Γνµσ of a metric
gµν which deviated only slightly from the flat Minkowski metric. He then
inserted these gravitational field components Γνµσ into the geodesic equation
(2). He showed that this law contained Newton’s first law and Newton’s
second law with a gravitational potential giving rise to a force as a limiting
case, and showed how the resulting Keplerian laws for orbits differ in his
theory as compared to its Newtonian limit. In the end, he obtained that
according to the new theory the perihelion ǫ of any geodesic orbit around
the Sun is given by
ǫ = 24π3
a2
T 2c2(1− e2)
(5)
Here a denotes the length of the semimajor axis of the orbit in question, e
its eccentricity, c the speed of light, and T the orbital period of the planet in
question. Einstein then takes the astronomically known values for Mercury,
plugs them into equation (5), and thereby predicts that Mercury’s perihelion
changes by 43” per century.
Note that there is nothing in the theoretical description that singles out
any particular path as that of Mercury. There is no theoretical representation
of Mercury, no model. All that is there is the assumption that Mercury will
move on one of the geodesics of the affine connection determined by the
spherically symmetric field of the Sun. A general equation that all possible
geodesic orbits have to fulfil is derived. And then external knowledge is used
to single out one of these orbits as that of Mercury. Einstein trusts that
the astronomers have measured the orbital period, the semimajor axis and
the eccentricity of Mercury correctly. It is this external knowledge, plugged
into his theoretical model, which does not in itself contain a representation
of Mercury or its path, that produces the prediction.
In many ways, the whole vacuum approach to the problem of motion
is about the question as to whether in this kind of scenario we really have
to assume the geodesic equation as the equation of motion of matter over
and above the gravitational field equations. Indeed, let us look at the Sun-
Mercury system within the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach. The problem
of motion, then, is the question whether Einstein really had to introduce the
13
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gravitational field equations (to describe the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun) and the geodesic equation (to describe the path of Mercury subject
to this gravitational field) as separate assumptions.22 Could he have only
assumed the gravitational field equations and derived that Mercury moves
on a geodesic of the exterior field of the Sun? My point is that, just like
in Einstein’s 1915 treatment, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach does not
need to commit to a theoretical model that allows us to localise Mercury
internally. It is fine to ask whether the exterior gravitational field around
a given curve ‘forces’ that curve to be a geodesic. Just like in the 1915
treatment, Einstein and Grommer could then use external knowledge about
whether that particular curve is actually the curve of a material object, or
of Mercury in particular. No inner metric, no singularity to represent the
material body, is actually needed.
Let us take a step back though, for there is an important difference be-
tween the structure of Einstein’s 1915 treatment of Mercury on the one hand
and the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach on the other. In the Mercury case
Einstein had assumed (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic, i.e. a special
kind of curve, and model-external knowledge about the period, eccentricity
and semimajor axis of Mercury could then be used to determine which of
the many geodesics of the Schwarzschild metric corresponded to the path
of Mercury. But in the case of the Einstein-Grommer argument, what is in
question is whether we can prove that the path of Mercury, say, is a geodesic.
Thus, at first sight it looks as if while the 1915 argument only needed ex-
ternal knowledge to determine which geodesic is that of Mercury, appeal to
external knowledge in the Einstein-Grommer case would have to determine
a.) that this curve is a geodesic and b.) that it is the curve of a material
body.
Einstein and Grommer did not aim to derive both a.) and b.). Instead,
while Einstein in 1915 used external knowledge at the end of his argument,
Einstein and Grommer in 1927 use it at the beginning. They start out by
assuming that a given curve is the curve of a material particle, and then
ask whether having a regular outer metric (which solves the vacuum field
equations) around the curve means that the curve of this material particle,
22Interestingly, Einstein did not yet have the final gravitational field equations in the
Mercury paper; he found them a week later, in his fourth paper of November 1915. How-
ever, the approximation of the Schwarzschild metric that he uses in the Mercury paper is
an approximative solution of both the field equations from the Mercury paper, and of the
final Einstein field equations.
14
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given the further conditions summarized in section 3.2, must be a geodesic.
Rather than finishing the argument by appeal to external knowledge (as
in Einstein 1915), the Einstein-Grommer argument starts with an appeal to
external knowledge, which singles out a particular curve as that of a material
body.23
Either way, both in Einstein’s 1915 treatment and in the Einstein-Grommer
approach there is no reason to interpret the singularity (appearing in the
Schwarzschild metric or the inner metric, respectively) literally. In both
cases, the singularity should be interpreted to signify a placeholder or a blind
spot of the theoretical treatment, rather than something that should be inter-
preted literally, as referring and approximately true. Indeed, both Einstein’s
1915 treatment of the Sun-Mercury system and Einstein’s and Grommer’s
treatment of an arbitrary material particle subject to an external gravita-
tional field work just as well if, in the former case, no interior metric (to
describe the interior of the Sun) or, in the latter case, no inner metric (to
represent the location of the particle on the curve), is ever specified.
5 Conclusion
I started out by saying that whether we are realists or antirealists, we should
aim for a careful interpretation, rather than a literal interpretation, of the
scientific theory that we want to be realists or anti-realists about. As a case
study, I argued that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion in GR,
and the Einstein-Grommer approach in particular, is far more sensible and
promising if we interpret the singularities not as representing material bodies
but as placeholders for a representation of material bodies that is not included
in the model. Indeed, I argued that the approach does not even need the
23There is a further disanalogy between Einstein’s 1915 derivation of the perihelion of
Mercury and the Einstein-Grommer argument of 1927. In the former the choice of (an
approximation) the Schwarzschild metric to represent the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun does important work in the derivation of Mercury’s perihelion. In the Einstein-
Grommer approach, no choice of a concrete outer metric is necessary to derive that the
curve of the particle which is surrounded by the outer metric must be a geodesic. The
reason for this difference is that the Einstein-Grommer approach aims to be more general;
it only aims to derive that a material body moves on some geodesic of the outer metric.
However, note that it is not the case that any outer metric is allowed by the approach:
the class of outer metrics that the approach can work with is heavily constrained by steps
2 and 3 of the Einstein-Grommer argument (see section 3.2).
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introduction of singularities to represent material bodies; their introduction
does not do any work in answering the question at hand.24
Given that in their paper Einstein and Grommer seem to take the singu-
larities as representing material bodies, one might wonder whether this al-
legedly more careful interpretation does not fall prey to the criticism that the
careful interpreter presumes to understand the theory/formalism in question
better than its originators. This might seem at odds with the realist tenet
of taking scientists and science ‘seriously’. I do indeed think that putting
the Einstein-Grommer paper into its proper historical context by analysing
Einstein’s correspondence leading up to the paper and by relating it to his
overarching research project at the time would convincingly show that he
subscribed to something very much like the ‘placeholder interpretation’ I de-
fended above. Showing this in detail will have to wait for a much longer
paper, and I do not ask the reader to just take my word for it. So let us say,
for the sake of the argument, that Einstein and Grommer did indeed intend
the singularities as representatives of material objects in a rather straight-
forward way. I believe that we should not take their word for it either. And
neither did Einstein. Just a few years after the Einstein-Grommer paper, in
his famed 1933 Spencer lectures at the University of Oxford, Einstein told
us in his opening words: “If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist
anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following
advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements.”25
In philosophy of science, I believe there is no better way of examining a
scientist’s achievements than by looking for the best possible interpretation
24The argument that we should thus not see a realist as comitted to being a realist about
the singularities appearing in the Einstein-Grommer paper resonates well with selective
or posit realism as introduced by Vickers [2013]. The idea there is that we should only
be realists with respect to components of a prediction that ‘fuel the success’ of the pre-
diction, i.e. that are indispensable in the derivation of what is predicted. Using Vickers’
distinction the introduction of a singular inner metric in the Einstein-Grommer approach
is an idle rather than a working posit. However, note that the call for careful rather than
literal interpretations with which I started is independent of / complementary to aiming
for identification of the idle posits in a derivation. For even if we had found that the
introduction of the singular inner metric did do work in the derivation of geodesic mo-
tion could we have argued (with less force) that the singularity should be interpreted as
a placeholder for a future theory of matter, as a temporary measure within an effective
theory, and thus not as something that we should interpret as possesing as much ‘reality’
or ‘referring power’ as the regular outer metric governed by the field equations.
25See Einstein [1934], and van Dongen [2010] for a detailed analysis of the text.
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of his or her theories. To do that, we have to not just listen to the words
of the scientist who created or discovered it; we have to see what the theory
does in practice, how it is used ; which of its parts really do the work.
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abstract 
Modularity is a key concept in building and evaluating complex simulation models. My main 
claim is that in simulation modeling modularity degenerates for systematic methodological 
reasons. Consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to accessing how representational (inner 
mathematical) structure and dynamical properties of a model are related. The resulting problem 
for validating models is one of holism. 
The argument will proceed by analyzing the techniques of parameterization, tuning, and 
kludging. They are – to a certain extent – inevitable when building complex simulation models, 
but corrode modularity.  As a result, the common account of validating simulations faces a major 
problem and testing the dynamical behavior of simulation models becomes all the more 
important. Finally, I will ask in what circumstances this might be sufficient for model validation. 
 
1. Introduction 
For the moment, imagine a scene at a car racing track. The air smells after gasoline. The pilot of 
the F1 racing car has just steered into his box and is peeling himself out of the straight cockpit. 
He puts off his helmet, shakes his sweaty hair, and then his eyes make contact to the technical 
director with a mixture of anger, despair, and helplessness. The engine had not worked as it 
should, and for a known reason: the software. However, the team had not been successful in 
attributing the miserable performance to a particular parameter setting. The machine and the 
software interacted in unforeseen and intricate ways. This explains the exchange of glances 
between pilot and technical director. The software’s internal interactions and interfaces proved to 
be so complicated that the team had not been able to localize an error or a bug, rather remained 
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suspicious that some complex interaction of seemingly innocent assumptions or parameter 
settings was leading to the insufficient performance. 
The story happened in fact
1
 and it is remarkable since it displays how invasive computational 
modeling is into areas that smell most analogous. I reported this short piece for another reason, 
however, namely because the situation is typical for complex computational and simulation 
models. Validation procedures, while counting on modularity, run against a problem of holism. 
Both concepts, modularity and holism, are notions at the fringe of philosophical terminology. 
Modularity is used in many guises and is not a particularly philosophical notion. It features 
prominently in the context of complex design, planning, and building – from architecture to 
software. Modularity stands for first breaking down complicated tasks into small and well-
defined sub-tasks and then re-assembling the original global task with a well-defined series of 
steps. It can be argued that modularity is the key pillar on which various rational treatments of 
complexity rest – from architecture to software engineering. 
Holism is a philosophical term to a somewhat higher degree and is covered in recent compendia. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia, for instance, includes (sub-)entries on methodological, 
metaphysical, relational, or meaning holism. Holism generically states that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, meaning that the parts of a whole are in intimate interconnection, such 
that they cannot exist independently of the whole, or cannot be understood without reference to 
the whole. Especially W. V. O. Quine has made the concept popular, not only in philosophy of 
language, but also in philosophy of science, where one speaks of the so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis. This thesis is based on the insight that one cannot test a single hypothesis in isolation, but 
that any such test depends on “auxiliary” theories or hypotheses, for example how the 
measurement instruments work. Thus any test addresses a whole ensemble of theories and 
hypotheses. 
Lenhard and Winsberg (2010) have discussed the problem of confirmation holism in the context 
of validating complex climate models. They argued that “due to interactivity, modularity does 
not break down a complex system into separately manageable pieces.” (2010, 256) In a sense, I 
want to pick up on this work, but put the thesis into a much more general context, i.e. pointing 
                                                
1
 In spring 2014, the Red Bull team experienced a crisis due to recalcitrant problems with the 
Renault engine, due to a partial software update. 
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out a dilemma that is built on the tension between modularity and holism and that occurs quite 
generally in simulation modeling. The potential philosophical novelty is debated controversially 
in philosophy of science, for instance Humphreys (2009) vs. Frigg and Reiss (2009). The latter 
authors deny novelty, but concede issues of holism might be an exception. My paper confirms 
that holism is a key concept when reasoning about simulation. (I see more reasons for 
philosophical novelty, though.) 
My main claim is the following: According to the rational picture of design, modularity is a key 
concept in building and evaluating complex models. In simulation modeling, however, 
modularity erodes for systematic methodological reasons. Moreover, the very condition for 
success of simulation undermines the most basic pillar of rational design. Thus the resulting 
problem for validating models is one of (confirmation) holism. 
Section 2 discusses modularity and its central role for the so-called rational picture of design. 
Herbert Simon’s highly influential parable of the watchmakers will feature prominently. It 
paradigmatically captures complex systems as a sort of large clockwork mechanism. This 
perspective suggests the computer would enlarge the tractability of complex systems due to its 
vast capacity for handling (algorithmic) mechanisms. Complex simulations then would appear as 
the electronic incarnation of a gigantic assembly of cogwheels. This viewpoint is misleading, I 
will argue. Instead, I want to emphasize the dis-analogy to how simulation models work. The 
methodology of building complex simulation models thwarts modularity in systematic ways. 
Simulation is based on an iterative and exploratory mode of modeling that leads to a sort of 
holism that erodes modularity.  
I will present two arguments for the erosion claim, one from parameterization and tuning 
(section 3), the other from klu(d)ging (section 4). Both are, in practice, part-and-parcel of 
simulation modeling and both make modularity erode. The paper will conclude by drawing 
lessons about the limits of validation (section 5). Most accounts of validation require, if often not 
explicitly, modularity and are incompatible with holism. In contrast, the exploratory and iterative 
mode of modeling restricts validation, at least to a certain extent, to testing (global) predictive 
virtues. This observation shakes the rational (clockwork) picture of design and of the computer. 
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2. The rational picture 
The design of complex systems has a long tradition in architecture and engineering. At the same 
time, it has not been much covered in literature, because design was conceived as a matter for 
experienced craftsmanship rather than analytical investigation. The work of Pahl and Beitz 
(1984, plus revised editions 1996, 2007) gives a relatively recent account of design in 
engineering. A second, related source for reasoning about design is the design of complex 
computer systems. Here, one can find more explicit accounts, since the computer led to complex 
systems much faster than any tradition of craftsmanship could grow. A widely read example is 
Herbert Simon’s “Sciences of the Artificial” (1969). Still up to today, techniques of high-level 
languages, object-oriented programming, etc. make the practice of design change on a fast scale. 
One original contributor to this discussion is Frederic Brooks, software and computer expert (and 
former manager at IBM) and also hobby architect. In his 2010 monograph “The Design of 
Design”, he describes the rational model of design that is widely significant, though it is much 
more often adopted in practice than explicitly formulated in theoretical literature. The rational 
picture starts with assuming an overview of all options at hand. According to Simon, for 
instance, the theory of design is the general theory of search through large combinatorial spaces 
(Simon 1969, 54). The rational model then presupposes a utility function and a design tree, 
which are spanning the space of possible designs. Brooks rightly points out that these are 
normally not at hand. Nevertheless, design is conceived as a systematic step-by-step process. 
Pahl and Beitz aim at detailing these steps in their rational order. Also, Simon presupposes the 
rational model, arguably motivated by making design feasible for artificial intelligence (see 
Brooks 2010, 16). Wynston Royce, to give another example, introduced the “waterfall model” 
for software design (1970). Royce was writing about managing the development of large 
software systems and the waterfall model consisted in following a hierarchy (“downward”), 
admitting to iterate steps on one layer, but not with much earlier (“upward”) phases of the design 
process. Although Royce actually saw the waterfall model as a straw man, it was cited positively 
as paradigm of software development (cf. Brooks on this point). 
Some hierarchical order is a key element of the rational picture of design and presumes 
modularity. Let me illustrate this point. Consider first a simple brick wall. It consists of a 
multitude of modules, each with certain form and static properties. These are combined into 
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potentially very large structures. It is a strikingly simple example, because all modules (bricks) 
are similar. 
A more complicated, though closely related, example is the one depicted in figure 1 where an 
auxiliary building of Bielefeld University is put together from container modules.  
 
Figure 1: A part of Bielefeld University is built from container modules. 
 
These examples illustrate how deeply ingrained modularity is in our way of building (larger) 
objects. Figure 2 displays a standard picture for designing and developing complex (software) 
systems. 
 
Figure 2: Generic architecture of complex software, from the AIAA Guide for the Verification and 
Validation of Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations (1998). Modules of one layer might be used by 
different modules on a higher layer. 
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Some complex overall task is split up into modules that can be tackled independently and by 
different teams. The hierarchical structure shall ensure the modules can be integrated to make up 
the original complex system. Modularity not only plays a key role when designing and building 
complex systems, it also is of crucial importance when taking account of the system. Validation 
is usually conceived in the very same modular structure: independently validated modules are 
put together in a controlled way for making up a validated bigger system. The standard account 
of how computational models are verified and validated gives very rigorous guidelines that are 
all based on the systematic realization of modularity (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, see also Fillion 
2017). In short, modularity is key for designing as well as for validating complex systems.  
This observation is paradigmatically expressed in Simon’s parable of the two watchmakers. You 
find it in Simon’s 1962 paper “The Architecture of Complexity” that has become a chapter in his 
immensely influential “The Sciences of the Artificial” (Simon 1969). There, Simon investigates 
the structure of complex systems. The stable structures, so Simon argues, are the hierarchical 
ones. He expressed his idea by telling the parable of the two watchmakers named Hora and 
Tempus (1969, 90-92). P. Agre describes the setting with the following words: 
“According to this story, both watchmakers were equally skilled, but only one of them, Hora, 
prospered. The difference between them lay in the design of their watches. Each design involved 
1000 elementary components, but the similarity ended there. Tempus' watches were not 
hierarchical; they were assembled one component at a time. Hora's watches, by contrast, were 
organized into hierarchical subassemblies whose "span" was ten. He would combine ten 
elementary components into small subassemblies, and then he would combine ten subassemblies 
into larger subassemblies, and these in turn could be combined to make a complete watch.” 
(Agre 2003) 
Since Hora takes additional steps for building modules, Tempus’ watches need less time for 
assembly. However, it was Tempus’ business that did not thrive, because of an additional 
condition not yet mentioned, namely some kind of noise. From time to time the telephone rings 
and whenever one of the watchmakers answers the call, all cogwheels and little screws fall apart 
and he has to re-start the assembly. While Tempus had to start from scratch, Hora could keep all 
finished modules and work from there. In the presence of noise, so the lesson goes, the modular 
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strategy is by far superior. Agre summarizes that modularity, he speaks of the functional role of 
components, comes out as a necessary element when designing complex systems: 
“For working engineers, hierarchy is not mainly a guarantee that subassemblies will remain 
intact when the phone rings. Rather, hierarchy simplifies the process of design cognitively by 
allowing the functional role of subassemblies to be articulated in a meaningful way in terms of 
their contribution to the function of the whole. Hierarchy allows subassemblies to be modified 
somewhat independently of one another, and it enables them to be assembled into new and 
potentially unexpected configurations when the need arises. A system whose overall functioning 
cannot be predicted from the functionality of its components is not generally considered to be 
well-engineered.” (Agre 2003) 
Now, the story works with rather particular examples insofar as watches exemplify complicated 
mechanical devices. The universe as a giant clockwork has been a common metaphor since the 
seventeenth century. Presumably, Simon was aware the clockwork picture is limited and he even 
mentioned that complicated interactions could lead to a sort of pragmatic holism.
2
 Nonetheless, 
the hierarchical order is established by the interaction of self-contained modules. 
There is an obvious limit to the watchmaker picture, namely systems have to remain manageable 
by human beings (watchmakers). There are many systems of practical interest that are too 
complex – from the earth’s climate to the aerodynamics of an airfoil. Computer models open up 
a new path here, since simulation models might contain a wealth of algorithmic steps far beyond 
what can be conceived in a clockwork picture.
3
 From this point of view, the computer appears as 
a kind of amplifier that helps to revitalize the rational picture. Do we have to look at simulation 
models as a sort of gigantic clockworks? In the following, I will argue that this viewpoint is 
seriously misleading. Simulation models are different from watches in important ways and I 
                                                
2	This kind of holism hence can occur even when modules are “independently validated”, since 
these modules when connected together could interact with each other in unpredicted ways. This 
is a strictly weaker form of holism than the one I am going to discuss.	
3
 Charles Babbage had designed his famous „Analytical Engine“ as a mechanistic computer. 
Tellingly, it did encounter serious problems exactly because of the mechanical limitations of its 
construction. 
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want to focus on the dis-analogy.
4
 Finally, we will learn from the investigation of simulation 
models about our picture of rationality. 
 
3. Erosion of modularity 1: Parameterization and tuning 
In stark contrast to the cogwheel picture of the computer, the methodology of simulation 
modeling erodes modularity in systematic ways. I want to discuss two separate though related 
aspects, firstly, parameterization and tuning and, secondly, kluging (also called kludging). Both 
are, for different reasons, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling; and both make modularity of 
models erode. Let us investigate them in turn and develop two arguments for erosion. 
Parameterization and tuning are key elements of simulation modeling that stretch the realm of 
tractable subject matter much beyond what is covered by theory. Furthermore, simulation models 
can make predictions even in fields that are covered by well-accepted theory only with the help 
of parameterization and tuning. In this sense, the latter are success conditions for simulations. 
Before we start with discussing an example, let me add a few words about terminology. There 
are different expressions that specify what is done with parameters. The four most common ones 
are (in alphabetical order): adaptation, adjustment, calibration, and tuning. These notions 
describe very similar activities, but also valuate differently what parameters are good for. 
Calibration is commonly used in the context of preparing an instrument, like calibrating a scale 
one time for using it very often in a reliable way. Tuning has a more pejorative tone, like 
achieving a fit with artificial measures, or fitting to a particular case. Adaptation and adjustment 
have more neutral meanings. 
Atmospheric circulation is a typical example. It is modeled on the basis of accepted theory (fluid 
dynamics, thermodynamics, motion) on a grand scale. Climate scientists call this the “dynamical 
core” of their models and there is more or less consensus about this part. Although the employed 
theory is part of physics, climate scientists mean a different part of their models when they speak 
of “the physics”. It includes all the processes that are not completely specified from the 
dynamical core. These processes include convection schemes, cloud dynamics, and many more. 
                                                
4
 There are several dis-analogies. One I am not discussing is that clockworks lack multi-
functionality. 
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The “physics” is where different models differ and the physics is what modeling centers regard 
as their achievements and try to maintain even if their models change into the next generation. 
The physics acts like a specifying supplement to the grand scale dynamics. It is based on 
modeling assumptions, say which sub-processes are important in convection, what should be 
resolved in the model and what should be treated via a parameterization scheme. Often, such 
processes are not known in full detail, and some aspects (at least) depend on what happens on a 
sub-grid scale. The dynamics of clouds, for instance, depends on a staggering span of very small 
(molecular) scales and much larger scales of many kilometers. Hence even if the laws that guide 
these processes would be known, they could not be treated explicitly in the simulation model. 
Modeling the physics has to bring in parameterization schemes.
5
 
How does moisture transport, for example, work? Rather than trying to investigate into the 
molecular details of how water vapor is entrained into air, scientists use a parameter, or a scheme 
of parameters, that controls moisture uptake so that known observations are met. Often, such 
parameters do not have a direct physical interpretation, nor do they need one, like when a 
parameter stands for a mixture of processes not resolved in the model. The important property 
rather is that they make the parameterization scheme flexible, so that the parameters of such a 
scheme can be changed in a way that makes the properties of the scheme (in terms of climate 
dynamics) match some known data or reference points. 
From this rather straightforward observation follows an important fact. A parameterization, 
including assignments of parameter values, makes sense only in the context of the larger model. 
Observational data are not compared to the parameterization in isolation. The Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC acknowledges the point that “parameterizations have to be understood in the 
context of their host models” (Solomon et al. 2007, 8.2.1.3) 
The question of whether the parameter value that controls moisture uptake (in our oversimplified 
example) is adequate can be answered only by examining how the entire parameterization 
behaves and, moreover, how the parameter value in the parameterization in the larger simulation 
model behaves. Answering such questions would require, for instance, looking at more global 
properties like mean cloud cover in tropical regions, or the amount of rain in some area. Briefly 
                                                
5
 Parameterization schemes and their more or less autonomous status are discussed in the 
literature, cf. Parker 2013, Smith 2002, or Gramelsberger and Feichter 2011. 
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stated, parameterization is a key component of climate modeling and tuning is part-and-parcel of 
parameterization.
6
 
It is important to note that tuning one parameter takes the values of other parameters as given, be 
they parameters from the same scheme, or be they parts of other schemes that are part of the 
model. A particular parameter value (controlling moisture uptake) is judged according to the 
results it yields for the overall behavior (like cloud cover). In other words, tuning is a local 
activity that is oriented at global behavior. Researchers might try to optimize parameter values 
simultaneously, but for reasons of computational complexity, this is possible only with a rather 
small subset of all parameters. A related issue is statistical regression methods that might be 
caught up in a local optimum. In climate modeling, skill and experience remain to be important 
for tuning (or adjustment). 
Furthermore, tuning parameters is not only oriented at the global model performance, it tends to 
blur the local behavior. This is because every model will be importantly imperfect, since it 
contains technical errors, works with insufficient knowledge, etc. – which is just the normal case 
in scientific practice. Now, tuning a parameter according to the overall behavior of the model 
then means that the errors, gaps, and bugs get compensated against each other (if in an opaque 
way). Mauritsen et al. (2012) have pointed this out in their pioneering paper about tuning in 
climate modeling. 
In climate models, cloud parameterizations play an important role, because they influence key 
statistics of the climate and, at the same time, cover major (remaining) uncertainties about how 
an adequate model should look like. Typically, such a parameterization scheme includes more 
than two dozens of parameters; most of them do not carry a clear physical interpretation. The 
simulation then is based on the balance of these parameters in the context of the overall model 
(including other parameterizations). Over the process of adjusting the parameters, these schemes 
become inevitably convoluted. I leave aside that models of atmosphere and oceans get coupled, 
which arguably aggravates the problem. 
                                                
6
 The studies of so-called perturbed physics ensembles convincingly showed that crucial 
properties of the simulation models hinge on exactly how parameter values are assigned 
(Stainforth et al. 2007). 
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Tuning is inevitable, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling methodology. It poses great 
challenges, like finding a good parameterization scheme for cloud dynamics, which is a recent 
area of intense research in meteorology. But when is a parameterization scheme a good one? On 
the one side, a scheme is sound when it is theoretically well motivated, on the other side, the key 
property of a parameterization scheme is its adaptability. Both criteria do not point into the same 
direction. There is, therefore, no optimum; finding a balance is still considered an art. I suspect 
that the widespread reluctance against publishing about practices of adjusting parameters comes 
from reservations against aspects that call for experience and art rather than theory and rigorous 
methodology. 
I want to maintain that nothing in the above argumentation is particular to climate. Climate 
modeling is just one example out of many. The point holds for simulation modeling quite 
generally. Admittedly, climate might be a somewhat peculiar case, because it is placed in a 
political context where some discussions seem to require that only ingredients of proven physical 
justification and realistic interpretation are admitted. Arguably, this expectation might motivate 
using the pejorative term of tuning. This reservation, however, ignores the very methodology of 
simulation modeling. Adjusting parameters is by no means particular to climate modeling, nor is 
it confined to areas where knowledge is weak. 
Another example will document this. Adjusting parameters is also occurring thermodynamics, an 
area of physics with very high theoretical reputation. The ideal gas equation is even taught in 
schools, it is a so-called equation of state (EoS) that describes how pressure and temperature 
depend on each other. However, actually using thermodynamics requires to work with less 
idealized equations of state than the ideal gas equation. More complicated equations of state find 
wide applications also in chemical engineering. They are typically very specific for certain 
substances and require extensive adjustment of parameters as Hasse and Lenhard (2017) describe 
and analyze. Clearly, being able to process specific adjustment strategies that are based on 
parameterization schemes is a crucial success condition. Simulation methods have made 
applicable thermodynamics in many areas of practical relevance, exactly because equations of 
state are tailored to particular cases of interest via adjusting parameters. 
One further example is from quantum chemistry, namely the so-called density functional theory 
(DFT), a theory developed in the 1960s that won the Nobel prize in 1998. Density functionals 
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capture the information of the Schroedinger equation, but are much more computationally 
tractable. However, only many-parameter functionals brought success in chemistry. The more 
tractable functionals with few parameters worked only in simpler cases of crystallography, but 
were unable to yield predictions accurate enough to be of chemical interest. Arguably, being able 
to include and adjust more parameters has been the crucial condition that had to be satisfied 
before DFT could gain traction in computational quantum chemistry, which happened around 
1990. This traction, however, is truly impressive. DFT is by now the most widely used theory in 
scientific practice, see Lenhard (2014) for a more detailed account of DFT and the development 
of computational chemistry. 
Whereas the adjustment of parameters – to use the more neutral terminology – is pivotal for 
matching given data, i.e. for predictive success, this very success condition also entails a serious 
disadvantage.
7
 Complicated schemes of adjusted parameters might block theoretical progress. In 
our climate case, any new cloud parameterization that intends to work with a more thorough 
theoretical understanding has to be developed for many years and then has to compete with a 
well-tuned forerunner. Again, this kind of problem is more general. In quantum chemistry, 
many-parameter adaptations of density functionals have brought great predictive success but at 
the same time render the rational re-construction of why such success occurs hard, if not 
impossible (Perdew et al. 2005, discussed in Lenhard 2014). The situation in thermodynamics is 
similar, cf. Hasse and Lenhard (2017). 
Let us take stock regarding the first argument for the erosion of modularity. Tuning, or adjusting, 
parameters is not merely an ad hoc procedure to smoothen a model, rather it is a pivotal 
component for simulation modeling. Tuning convolutes heterogeneous parts that do not have a 
common theoretical basis. Tuning proceeds holistically, on basis of global model behavior. How 
particular parts function often remains opaque. By interweaving local and global considerations, 
and by convoluting the interdependence of various parameter choices, tuning destructs 
modularity. 
Looking back to Simon’s clockmaker story, we see that its basic setting does not match the 
situation in a fundamental way. The perfect cogwheel picture is misleading, because it 
presupposes a clear identification of mechanisms and their interactions. In our examples, we saw 
                                                
7
 There are other dangers, like over-fitting, that I leave aside. 
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that building a simulation model, different from building a clockwork, cannot proceed top-down. 
Moreover, different modules and their interfaces get convoluted during the processes of mutual 
adaptation. 
 
4. Erosion of modularity 2: kluging 
The second argument for the erosion of modularity approaches the matter from a different angle, 
namely from a certain practice in developing software known as kluging (also spelled kludging)
8
. 
“Kluge” is a term from colloquial language that became a term in computer slang. I remember 
when back in my childhood our family and another, befriended one drove towards holidays in 
two cars. In the middle of the night, while crossing the Alps, the exhaust pipe of our friends 
before us broke, creating a shower of sparks where the pipe met the asphalt. There was no 
chance of getting the exhaust pipe repaired, but the father did not hesitate long and used his 
necktie to fix it provisionally.  
The necktie worked as a kluge, which is in the words of Wikipedia “a workaround or quick-and-
dirty solution that is clumsy, inelegant, difficult to extend and hard to maintain, yet an effective 
and quick solution to a problem.” The notion has been incorporated and become popular in the 
language of software programming and is closely related to the notion of bricolage. 
Andy Clark, for instance, stresses the important role played by kluges in complex modular 
computer modeling. For him, a kluge is “an inelegant, ‘botched together’ piece of program; 
something functional but somehow messy and unsatisfying”, it is—Clark refers to Sloman—“a 
piece of program or machinery which works up to a point but is very complex, unprincipled in its 
design, ill-understood, hard to prove complete or sound and therefore having unknown 
limitations, and hard to maintain or extend”. (Clark 1987, 278) 
Kluges carried forward their way from programmers’ colloquial language into the body of 
philosophy guided by scholars like Clark and Wimsatt who are inspired both by computer 
                                                
8
 Both spellings „kluge“ and „kludge“ are used. There is not even agreement of how to 
pronounce the word. In a way, that fits to the very concept. I will use “kluge“, but will not 
change the habits of other authors cited with “kludge“. 
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modeling and evolutionary theory.
9
 The important point in our present context is that kluges may 
function for a whole system, i.e. for the performance of the entire simulation model, whereas it 
has no meaning in relation to the submodels and modules: “what is a kludge considered as an 
item designed to fulfill a certain role in a large system, may be no kludge at all when viewed as 
an item designed to fulfill a somewhat different role in a smaller system.“ (Clark 1987, 279) 
Since kluging stems from colloquial language and is not seen as a good practice anyway, 
examples cannot be found easily in published scientific literature. This observation 
notwithstanding, kluging is a widely occurring phenomenon. Let me give an example that I know 
from visiting an engineering laboratory. There, researchers (chemical process engineers) are 
working with simulation models of an absorption column, the large steel structures in which 
reactions take place under controlled conditions. The scientific details do not matter here, since 
the point is that the engineers build their model on the basis of a couple of already existing 
modules, including proprietary software that they integrate into their simulation without having 
access to the code. Moreover, it is common knowledge in the community that this (unknown) 
code is of poor quality. Because of programming errors and because of ill-maintained interfaces, 
using this software package requires modifications on the part of the remaining code outside the 
package. These modifications are there for no good theoretical reason, albeit for good practical 
reasons. They make the overall simulation run as expected (in known cases); and they allow 
working with existing software. The modifications thus are typical kluges. 
Again, kluging occurs in virtually every site where large software programs are built. Simulation 
models hence are a prime instance, especially when the modeling steps of one group build on the 
results (models, software packages) of other groups. One common phenomenon is the increasing 
importance of “exception handling”, i.e. of finding effective repairs when the software, or the 
model, performs in unanticipated and undesired ways. In this situation, the software might 
include a bug that is invisible (does not affect results) most of the time, but becomes effective 
under particular conditions. Often extensive testing is needed for finding out about unwanted 
behavior that occurs in rare and particular situations that are conceived of as “exceptions”, 
indicating that researchers do not aim at a major reconstruction, but at a local repair, 
                                                
9
 The cluster of notions like bricolage and kluging common in software programming and 
biological evolution would demand a separate investigation. See, as a teaser, Francois Jacob’s 
account of evolution as bricolage (1994). 
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counteracting this particular exception. Exception handling can be part of a sound design 
process, but increased use of exception handling is symptomatic of excessive kluging. 
Presumably all readers who ever contributed to a large software program know about 
experiences of this kind. It is commonly accepted that the more comprehensive a piece of 
software gets, the more energy for exception handling new releases will require. Operating 
systems of computers, for example, often receive weekly patches. Many scientists who work 
with simulations are in a similar situation, though not obviously so. 
If, for instance, meteorologists want to work on, say, hurricanes, they will likely take a meso-
scale (multi-purpose) atmospheric model from the shelf of some trusted modeling center and add 
specifications and parameterizations relevant for hurricanes. Typically, they will not know in 
exactly what respects the model had been tuned, and also lack much other knowledge about 
strengths and weaknesses of this particular model. Consequently, when preparing their hurricane 
modules, they will add measures into their new modules that somehow balance out undesired 
model behavior. These measures can also be conceived as kluges. 
Why should we see these examples as typical instances and not as exceptions? Because they 
arise from practical circumstances of developing software, which is a core part of simulation 
modeling. Software engineering is a field that was envisioned as the “professional” answer to the 
increasing complexity of software. And I frankly admit that there are well-articulated concepts 
that would in principle ensure software is clearly written, aptly modularized, well maintained, 
and superbly documented. However, the problem is that science in principle is different from 
science in practice. 
In practice, there are strong and constant forces that drive software development into resorting to 
kluges. Economic considerations are always a reason, be it on the personal scale of research 
time, be it on the grand scale of assigning teams of developers to certain tasks. Usually, software 
is developed “on the move”, i.e. those who write it have to keep up with changing requirements 
and a narrow timeline, in science as well as industry. Of course, in the ideal case the 
implementation is tightly modularized. A virtue of modularity is that it is much quicker 
incorporating “foreign” modules than developing them from scratch. 
If these modules have some deficiencies, however, the developers will usually not start a 
fundamental analysis of how unexpected deviations occurred, but rather spend their energy for 
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adapting the interfaces so that the joint model will work as anticipated in the given 
circumstances. In common language: repair, rather than replace. Examples reach from 
integrating a module of atmospheric chemistry into an existing general circulation model up to 
implementing the new version of the operating system of your computer. Working with complex 
computational and simulation models seems to require a certain division of labor and this 
division, in turn, thrives on software traveling easily. At the same time, this will provoke kluges 
on the side of those that try to connect software modules. 
Kluges thus arise from unprincipled reasons: throw-away code, made for the moment, is not 
replaced later, but becomes forgotten, buried in more code, and eventually fixed. This will lead 
to a cascade of kluges. Once there, they prompt more kluges, tending to become layered and 
entrenched.
10
  
Foote and Yoder, prominent leaders in the field of software development, give an ironic and 
funny account of how attempts to maintain a rationally designed software architecture constantly 
fail in practice. 
“While much attention has been focused on high-level software architectural patterns, what is, in 
effect, the de-facto standard software architecture is seldom discussed. This paper examines this 
most frequently deployed of software architectures: the BIG BALL OF MUD. A big ball of mud 
is a casually, even haphazardly, structured system. Its organization, if one can call it that, is 
dictated more by expediency than design. Yet, its enduring popularity cannot merely be 
indicative of a general disregard for architecture. (…) 2. Reason for degeneration: ongoing 
evolutionary pressure, piecemeal growth: Even systems with well-defined architectures are prone 
to structural erosion. The relentless onslaught of changing requirements that any successful 
system attracts can gradually undermine its structure. Systems that were once tidy become 
overgrown as piecemeal growth gradually allows elements of the system to sprawl in an 
uncontrolled fashion.” (Foote and Yoder 1999, ch. 29) 
I would like to repeat the statement from above that there is no necessity in the corruption of 
modularity and rational architecture. Again, this is a question of science in practice vs. science in 
principle. “A sustained commitment to refactoring can keep a system from subsiding into a big 
                                                
10
 Wimsatt (2007) writes about “generative entrenchment” when speaking about the analogy 
between software development and biological evolution, see also Lenhard and Winsberg (2010). 
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ball of mud,” Foote and Yoder concede. There are even directions in software engineering that 
try to counteract the degradation into Foote’s and Yoder’s big ball of mud. The movement of 
“clean code“, for instance, is directed against what Foote and Yoder describe. Robert Martin, the 
pioneer of this school, proposes to keep code clean in the sense of not letting the first kluge slip 
in. And surely there is no principled reason why one should not be able to avoid this. However, 
even Martin accepts the diagnosis of current practice. 
Similarly, Richard Gabriel (1996), another guru of software engineering, makes the analogy to 
housing architecture and Alexander’s concept of “habitability”, which intends to integrate 
modularity and piecemeal growth into one “organic order”. Anyway, when describing the 
starting point, he more or less duplicates what we heard above from Foote and Yoder. 
Finally, I want to point out that the matter of kluging is related to what is discussed in philosophy 
of science under the heading of opacity (like in Humphreys 2009). Highly kluged software 
becomes opaque. One can hardly disentangle the various reasons that led to particular pieces of 
code, because kluges are sensible only in the particular context at the time. In this important 
sense, simulation models are historical objects. They carry around – and depend on – their 
history of modifications. There are interesting analogies with biological evolution that have 
become a topic when complex systems had become a major issue in discussion computer use. 
Winograd and Flores, for instance, come to a conclusion that also holds in our context here: 
“each detail may be the result of an evolved compromise between many conflicting demands. At 
times, the only explanation for the system's current form may be the appeal to this history of 
modification.“ (1991, 94)
11
 
Thus, the brief look into the somewhat elusive field of software development has shown us that 
two conditions foster kluging. First, the exchange of software parts that is more or less motivated 
by flexibility and economic requirements. This thrives on networked infrastructure. Second, 
iterations and modifications are easy and cheap. Due to the unprincipled nature of kluges, their 
construction requires repeated testing whether they actually work in the factual circumstances. 
Kluges hence fit to the exploratory and iterative mode of modeling that characterizes 
                                                
11
 Interestingly, Jacob (1994) gives a very similar account of biological evolution when he writes 
that simpler objects are more dependent on (physical) constraints than on history, while history  
plays the greater part when complexity increases. 
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simulations. Furthermore, layered kluges solidify themselves. They make code hard or 
impossible to understand; modifying pieces that are individually hard to understand will 
normally lead to a new layer of kluges – and so on. Thus, kluging makes modularity erode and 
this is the second argument why simulation modeling systematically undermines modularity. 
 
5. The limits of validation 
What does the erosion of modularity mean for the validation of computer simulations? We have 
seen that the power and scope of simulation is built on the tendency toward holism. But holism 
and the erosion of modularity are two sides of the same coin. The key point regarding 
methodology is that holism is driven by the very procedure that makes simulation so widely 
applicable! It is through adjustable parameters that simulation models can be applied to systems 
beyond the control of theory (alone). It is through this very strategy that modularity erodes. 
One ramification of utmost importance is about the concept of validation. In the context of 
simulation models the community speaks of verification and validation, or “V&V”. Both are 
related, but the unanimous advice in the literature is to keep them separate. While verification 
checks the model internally, i.e. whether the software indeed captures what it is supposed to, 
validation checks whether the model adequately represents the target system. A standard 
definition states that “verification [is] the process of determining that a model implementation 
accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description of the model and the solution to the 
model.” While validation is defined as “the process of determining the degree to which a model 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the 
model.” (Oberkampf and Trucano 2000, 3) Though there is some leeway of defining V&V, you 
get the gist of it from the saying: verification checks whether the model is right
12
, while 
validation checks whether we have the right model. 
Due to the increasing usage and growing complexity of simulations, the issue of V&V is itself a 
growing field in simulation literature. One example is the voluminous monograph by Oberkampf 
and Roy (2010) that meticulously defines and discusses the various steps to be included in V&V 
procedures. A first move in this analysis is to separate model form from model parameters. Each 
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 This sloppy saying should not obscure that the process of verification comprises a package of 
demanding tasks. 
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parameter then belongs to a particular type of parameter that determines which specific steps in 
V&V are required. Oberkampf gives the following list of model parameter types: 
“  - measurable properties of the system or the surroundings, 
- physical modeling parameters, 
- ad hoc model parameters, 
- numerical algorithm parameters, 
- decision parameters, 
- uncertainty modeling parameters.” (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, section 13.5.1, p.623) 
My point is that the adjustable parameters we discussed are of a type that is evading the V&V 
fencing. These parameters cannot be kept separate from the model form, since the form alone 
does not capture representational (nor behavioral) adequacy. A cloud parameterization scheme 
makes sense only with parameter values already assigned and the same holds for a many-
parameter density functional. Before the process of adjustment, the mere form of the functional 
does not offer anything to be called adequate or inadequate. In simulation models, as we have 
seen, (predictive) success and adaptation are entangled. 
The separation of verification and validation thus cannot be fully maintained in practice. It is not 
possible to first verify that a simulation model is ‘right’ before tackling the ‘external’ question 
whether it is the right model. Performance tests hence become the main handle for confirmation. 
This is a version of confirmation holism that points toward the limits of analysis. This does not 
lead to a complete conceptual breakdown of verification and validation. Rather, holism comes in 
degrees
13
 and is a pernicious tendency that undermines the verification-validation divide.
14
  
Finally, we come back to the analogy, or rather dis-analogy between computer and clockwork. In 
an important sense, computers are not amplifiers, i.e. they are not analogous to gigantic 
clockworks. They do not (simply) amplify the force of mathematical modeling that has got stuck 
                                                
13
 I thank Rob Muir for pointing this out to me. 
14
 My conclusion about the inseparability of verification and validation is in good agreement 
with Winsberg’s more specialized claim in (2010) where he argues about model versions that 
evolve due to changing parameterizations, which has been criticized by Morrison (2015). As far 
as I can see, her arguments do not apply to the case made in this paper, which rests on a tendency 
toward holism, rather than a complete conceptual breakdown. 
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in too demanding operations. Rather, computer simulation is profoundly changing the setting of 
how mathematics is used.  
In the present paper I questioned the rational picture of design. Also Brooks did this when he 
observed that Pahl and Beitz had to include more and more steps to somehow capture an 
unwilling and complex practice of design, or when he refers to Donald Schön who criticized a 
one-sided “technical rationality” that underlies the Rational Model (Brooks 2010, chapter 2). 
However, my criticism works, if you want, from ‘within’. It is the very methodology of 
simulation modeling, and how it works in practice, that challenges the rational picture by making 
modularity erode. 
The challenge to the rational picture has quite fundamental ramification because this picture 
influenced so many ways we conceptualize our world. I will spare the philosophical discussion 
of how simulation modeling is challenging our concept of mathematization and with it our 
picture of scientific rationality for another paper. Just let me mention the philosophy of mind as 
one example. How we are inclined to think about mind today is deeply influenced by the 
computer and by our concept of mathematical modeling. Jerry Fodor has defended a most 
influential thesis that mind is composed of information-processing devices that operate largely 
separately (Fodor 1983). Consequently, re-thinking how computer models are related to 
modularity invites to re-thinking the computational theory of the mind. 
 
I would like to thank … 
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Abstract
Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism
appear to have a signicant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals.
They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to
decrease the inaccuracy of ones beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that
conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of mea-
sures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in
the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditional-
ization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from
which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based ap-
proach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.
A central concern of epistemology is uncovering the rational constraints
on an agents credences, both at a time and over time. At a time, it is typi-
cally maintained that an agents credences should conform to the probability
axioms, and over time, it is often maintained that an agents credences should
conform to conditionalization. How could such norms be justied? The tra-
ditional approach is to show that if your credences violate these norms, then
there is a set of bets, each of which you consider fair, but which collectively
are such that if you accept them all you will lose money whatever happens.
Since you do not want to be a money pump, you should adopt coherent cre-
dences. However, this Dutch book strategy rests on controversial assumptions
concerning prudential rationality and its connection to epistemic rationality.
The prudential elements may not be essential to the Dutch book approach
(Vineberg 2012). But even so, it would be better to be able to derive prob-
abilism and conditionalization from a clearly epistemic basic norm. A more
1
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recent approach seeks to do precisely that: to derive probabilism and condi-
tionalization from the intuitive epistemic norm that you should endeavor to
make your credences as accurateas close to the truthas possible. Drawing
on the work of Joyce (1998; 2009), Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Predd et
al. (2009), Pettigrew (2013) argues that the accuracy-based approach vindi-
cates both probabilism and conditionalization. We argue that this conclusion
is too strong: at present, the accuracy-based approach can vindicate either
conditionalization or probabilism, but not both.
Our argument turns on the features of various proposed measures of accu-
racy. The accuracy-based approach is predicated on the assumption that the
accuracy of your credences can be measured. Pettigrew (2013, 905) argues
that it is a strength of the accuracy-based approach that conditionalization
and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures, so that it doesnt
matter which measure is used to assess the accuracy of an agents credences.
Our counter-argument is that it does matter: of the known measures, some
vindicate conditionalization, and some vindicate probabilism, but there is
no known measure of inaccuracy from which both conditionalization and
probabilism can be derived.
1 Accuracy and conditionalization
First, let us briey run through the argument via which conditionalization
and probabilism are claimed to follow from considerations of accuracy, start-
ing with conditionalization. Suppose you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where the propositions form a parti-
tion, i.e. they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, so that exactly one of
them is true. The accuracy approach takes it that your primary epistemic
goal is having credences that are as accurate as possible, where complete ac-
curacy is a credence of 1 in the true proposition and a credence of 0 in each
of the false propositions. The closer your credences are to complete accuracy,
the better.
For this epistemic goal to make sense, we need a measure of closeness. In
what follows we will discuss several such measures, expressed as measures of
inaccuracy: the larger the measure, the further your credences are from the
truth. Hence your goal is to minimize the value of this inaccuracy measure.
By far the dominant measure in the literature is the quadratic rule or Brier
rule, which takes the square of the di¤erence between your credence in each
2
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proposition and its truth value, and sums the results. So for a partition, if
Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true, then the
Brier rule can be expressed as follows:1
Simple Brier rule: Ii(b) = (1  bi)
2 +
P
j 6=i b
2
j :
The Brier rule has been defended by epistemologists (Joyce 2009, 290; Leitgeb
and Pettigrew 2010, 219), and is frequently cited as the prime example of an
inaccuracy measure (Greaves and Wallace 2006, 627; Pettigrew 2013, 899).
Suppose you obtain evidence E that is consistent with some but not
all of the propositions X. How should you distribute your credence over
the remaining propositions? If your goal is to minimize your inaccuracy,
presumably the best you can do is to minimize your expected inaccuracy
given your prior credences b. So suppose that after you learn E, you shift
your credence in proposition Xi from bi to x. If Xi is true, the contribution
of this new credence to your overall inaccuracy is (1  x)2, and if Xi is false,
the contribution is x2. Given your prior credences b, you judge that the
chance that Xi is true is bi, and the chance that Xi is false is
P
E i bj, where
the notation E   i indicates that the sum is over all propositions consistent
with E except Xi. That is, the total contribution C of this new credence to
your expected inaccuracy is given by:
C = (1  x)2 bi + x
2
P
E i bj:
Your goal is to minimize C. So consider where dC=dx = 0:
dC
dx
=  2 (1  x) bi + 2x
P
E i bj
=  2bi + 2x
P
E bj;
where the sum in the last line is now over all propositions consistent with E.
This expression is zero when
x =
biP
E bj
:
1We call the version of the Brier rule applicable to a partition the simple Brier rule
only for ease of reference (and similarly for the simple log rule and simple spherical rule
to be introduced later).
3
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But note that this value for x is just your prior credence in Xi conditional
on E:
c(XijE) =
c(Xi ^ E)
c(E)
=
biP
E bj
:
That is, conditionalizing on E minimizes your expected inaccuracy.2 So if
your epistemic goal is to minimize inaccuracy, you should conditionalize on
new evidence.
Greaves and Wallace (2006) generalize this proof to cover measures of
inaccuracy other than the Brier rule. In particular, they show that condi-
tionalization minimizes expected inaccuracy for any measure of inaccuracy
Ii(b) satisfying strict propriety:
Strict propriety: For any distinct probabilistic credences b and b0,
P
i biIi(b) <P
i biIi(b
0).
Strict propriety says that the expected inaccuracy of your current credences
b is lower than the expected inaccuracy of any alternative credences b0 you
might adopt, where the expectation is calculated according to your current
credences. If it fails, then the injunction to minimize inaccuracy makes your
beliefs pathologically unstable: you can lower your expected inaccuracy by
shifting your credences, even in the absence of new evidence. Hence strict
propriety serves as a reasonable constraint on measures of inaccuracy. The
Brier rule is strictly proper, as are several other proposed inaccuracy mea-
sures to be discussed below.
Greaves and Wallace begin by introducing some terminology. They say
that a set of credences b recommends a set of credences b0 i¤ the expected
inaccuracy of b0 is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of b, where the
expectation is calculated using credences b:
Recommendation: b recommends b0 i¤
P
i biIi(b) 
P
i biIi(b
0)
Note that if the inaccuracy measure Ii(b) satises strict propriety, then b
only recommends itself.
They further dene quasi-conditionalization as a belief updating rule
that stipulates that your credences on learning E should be some set rec-
ommended by your prior credences conditional on E. They then prove
2This proof is a simplied version of the one in Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010).
4
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that quasi-conditionalization is always optimal: whatever measure of inac-
curacy you choose, strictly proper or not, the expected inaccuracy of quasi-
conditionalizing is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of any other
updating rule. Then if your measure of inaccuracy is strictly proper, con-
ditionalization itself is optimal, since for strictly proper measures, credences
only recommend themselves. In fact, since the inequality in strict propriety
is strict, conditionalization is strictly better than any other updating rule:
it uniquely minimizes expected inaccuracy. As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes,
this is a strong result: any inaccuracy measure satisfying strict propriety can
be used to vindicate conditionalization, and strict propriety is a constraint
we would expect any reasonable inaccuracy measure to obey anyway.
2 Accuracy and probabilism
Now let us turn to the arguments that your credences at a time should obey
the probability axioms. So far, we have been assuming that the propositions
we are interested in form a partition. But the probability axioms include
constraints on your credences in disjunctions, and to model such constraint
we need to allow that more than one of the propositions you are considering
can be true. To that end, suppose that you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where now the set of propositions
forms a Boolean algebra, i.e. it is closed under negation and disjunction. So
now we can no longer model a possible world simply as an index (picking
out the unique true proposition); instead, we need to label each proposition
separately as either true or false. That is, a possible world is specied by
! = (!1; !2; : : : !n), where !i = 1 when Xi is true and !i = 0 when Xi is
false. In this context, the Brier rule can be rewritten as follows:
Symmetric Brier rule: I(!;b) =
P
i (bi   !i)
2 :
As before, the inaccuracy of your beliefs according to the Brier rule is given
by the sum of the squares of the distance of each belief from the relevant
truth value. That is, the Brier rule is symmetric, in the sense that distance
from the truth for a true proposition plays the same role as distance from
falsity plays for a false proposition. This property will be important later.
The general strategy for defending probabilism based on accuracy goes as
follows. Suppose that your current credences are incoherentthat is, they
5
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Figure 1: De Finettis construction for a two-element partition (Joyce 1998,
582).
violate the probability axioms. Then one can appeal to a measure of inaccu-
racy to show that there are coherent credences that dominate your current
credencesthat are more accurate than your current credences whatever the
truth values of the propositions concerned. If your goal is to minimize in-
accuracy, this gives you a clear reason to avoid incoherent credences: there
are always coherent credences that are more accurate, whatever the world is
like.
De Finetti (1974, 87) constructs a dominance argument of this kind based
on the Brier rule.3 For illustration, consider the simple case of a proposi-
tion and its negation: that is, the propositions under consideration are just
(X;:X). In this case the space of possible credences forms a plane, as shown
in gure 1: your credence inX is the horizontal coordinate, and your credence
in :X is the vertical coordinate. The two possible worlds are represented by
the points (1; 0) and (0; 1), and your credences obey the probability axioms if
and only if they lie on the straight line that connects these two points, since
along this line your credences in X and :X sum to 1.
Suppose that your credences are incoherent: they are represented by a
point c = (c1; c2) that lies o¤ this diagonal. And suppose rst that the
3As Joyce (1998, 580) notes, de Finetti sets up this argument in terms of bets. However,
as Pettigrew (2013, 901) points out, it can be redescribed as an accuracy-based argument.
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actual world is represented by the bottom-right corner (1; 0)i.e. X is true
and :X is false. Then the inaccuracy of your credences according to the
Brier rule is I(!; c) = (1   c1)
2 + (c2)
2. Note that this is just the square of
the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (1; 0). That is, every point on the
circle segment C has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point between C
and (1; 0) has a lower inaccuracy. Now suppose instead that the actual world
is represented by the top-left corner (0; 1)i.e. X is false and :X is true.
Then the inaccuracy of your credences is I(!; c) = (c1)
2 + (1  c2)
2the
square of the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (0; 1). That is, every
point on the circle segment C 0 has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point
between C and (0; 1) has a lower inaccuracy.
Consider the area enclosed by the circle segments C and C 0. The cre-
dences represented by the points in this area have a lower inaccuracy than c
if X is true and :X false, and a lower inaccuracy than c if X is false and :X
true. That is, they have a lower inaccuracy whatever the world is like. And
this area includes part of the diagonal that represents coherent credences.
So for any incoherent set of credences, there is a coherent set that is less
inaccurate whatever the world is like. In this simple case, accuracy gives you
a motive to adopt coherent credences.
In the general case, the space of possible credences is n-dimensional, where
there are n propositions in the Boolean algebra. Each possible assignment
of truth values to the n propositions is represented by a point in this space,
and the set of coherent credences consists of these points plus the points
on the straight lines that connect them, the points on the straight lines
that connect those latter points, and so on. This set is called the convex
hull V + of the possible truth value assignments V . Via a generalization
of the construction of gure 1, de Finetti shows that if your credences are
represented by a point that lies outside V +, then there are points in V +
that are more accurate (according to the Brier rule) whichever point in the
space represents the actual truth values of the propositions. Hence if you
have incoherent credences, there are always coherent credences with a lower
inaccuracy as measured by the Brier rule.
Predd et al. (2009) generalize this proof strategy to cover a wider range
of inaccuracy measures. Their proof relies on two assumptions. The rst is
additivity:
Additivity: I(!;b) can be expressed as
P
i s(!i; bi), where s is a continuous
function of your credence in proposition Xi and its truth value.
7
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Additivity states that the inaccuracy of your beliefs in a set of propositions is
just the sum of your inaccuracies in the propositions taken individuallythat
is, s(!i; bi) is the inaccuracy of your belief in proposition Xi, and I(!;b) is
just the sum of these inaccuracies for all the propositions you are considering.
Note that it also contains the requirement that the inaccuracy measure should
be continuous. The Brier rule is obviously additive, since it is expressed as
a sum over propositions.
The second assumption is a version of strict propriety. For an additive
inaccuracy measure, strict propriety can be expressed in terms of your inac-
curacy function for a single proposition s(bi; !i) as follows:
Strict propriety (for an additive measure): bis(x; 1)+(1  bi)s(x; 0) is
uniquely minimized at x = bi.
Predd et al. (2009) prove that any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy
measure entails probabilism. De Finettis construction appeals to the natural
distance measure implicit in the Brier rulethe Euclidean distance between
two points in the space of your possible credences. But in the current case
we have no explicit measure of inaccuracy, so Predd et al. appeal to a
generalized distance measure4 called the Bregman divergence, dened for
a strictly convex function (x) as d(y;x) = (y) (x) r(x)  (y x).
They show that if the inaccuracy measure s(bi; !i) for a single proposition
Xi is strictly proper, then the function '(bi) =  bis(bi; 1)   (1   bi)s(bi; 0)
is strictly convex. In terms of this function, Predd et al. show that for
any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy measure, I(!;b) = d(!;b), where
(!) =
P
i '(!i) and (b) =
P
i '(bi).
The set of coherent credences forms a closed, convex subspace V + of
the space of all possible credences. It is a fact from the theory of Bregman
divergences that for any point c outside V +, there is a unique point c in
V + such that d(c
; c)  d(y; c) for all y in V
+. That is, c is the unique
closest point in V + to c, using the Bregman divergence as a distance measure.
It is a further fact that d(y; c
)  d(y; c)   d(c
; c) for all y in V + and
c outside V +. Note in particular that V + contains every possible world !,
since a consistent truth value assignment is also a coherent set of credences.
So setting y = !, we have d(!; c
)  d(!; c)   d(c
; c). Since d is a
positive-valued function, d(c
; c) > 0, so d(!; c
) < d(!; c), and hence
4The reason for the scare quotes is that the Bregman divergence is not symmetric, and
distance measures are typically symmetric.
8
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I(!; c) < I(!; c). That is, for any incoherent set of credences c, there is a
coherent set c that is less inaccurate than c in every possible world.
As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes, this is a strong result: any inaccuracy
measure satisfying strict propriety and additivity can be used to vindicate
probabilism, and while additivity is perhaps not forced on us in the way
that strict propriety is, it is certainly intuitive. As we shall see, there are
several available measures satisfying additivity and strict propriety, so it
initially looks like the accuracy-based program can justify both probabilism
and conditionalization based on minimal premises. Our purpose in this paper
is to argue that matters are not so straightforward.
3 Measures of inaccuracy
Let us return to the argument for conditionalization. This argument restricts
inaccuracy measures to those that are strictly proper. Note that strict pro-
priety is only a condition on expected inaccuracy. But expected inaccuracy is
calculated on the basis of the actual inaccuracy that the measure in question
ascribes to credences, and presumably there are a number of constraints any
such measure must obey if it is to genuinely measure epistemic inaccuracy
rather than something else. For example, if one of your credences shifts to-
wards the truth, while your other credences stay the same, then clearly your
actual inaccuracy should decrease. We wish to focus on one such constraint.
The constraint can be motivated by thinking about elimination cases.
Suppose you are considering a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
propositions, and suppose that your credences are coherent and that you
conditionalize on evidence. You acquire some evidence that eliminates one
false propositionyour credence in it becomes zerobut is uninformative
regarding the other hypothesesyour credences in them remain in the same
proportions. How does this a¤ect the accuracy of your credences?
It seems obvious that your beliefs have become more accurate. If you
believe that Tom, Dick or Harry might be the murderer (when in fact Tom
did it), and you eliminate Harry while learning nothing about Tom or Dick,
then you have made epistemic progress towards the truth, or at least away
from falsity. It is true that your credence in the false proposition Dick did
it goes up, but only by the same proportion that your credence in the true
proposition Tom did it goes up.
Unfortunately, the simple Brier rule does not always concur. Let X1 be
9
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Tom did it, X2 be Dick did it, and X3 be Harry did it, where unknown
to you X1 is true. Suppose that your initial credences in (X1; X2; X3) are
b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7). Then according to the simple Brier rule, your initial
inaccuracy is 54=49 = 1:10. Now suppose you acquire some evidence that
eliminates X3, but is uninformative regarding X1 and X2. That is, your
credence in X3 becomes 0 and your credences in X1 and X2 stay in the
same proportions, so that your nal credences are b = (1=4; 3=4; 0). Then
according to the simple Brier rule, your nal inaccuracy is 18=16 = 1:13.
That is, the Brier rule erroneously says that the inaccuracy of your beliefs
has gone up.
For a measure to genuinely measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs,
it should not be susceptible to counterexamples of this kind; it should count
elimination cases as epistemically positive. That is, measures of inaccuracy
should obey the following principle:
M: For coherent credences over a partition, if b assigns a zero credence
to some false proposition to which b0 assigns a non-zero credence, and
credences in the remaining propositions stay in in the same ratios, then
b is epistemically better than b0.
The simple Brier rule, as the example shows, violates M, and hence does not
plausibly measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs.5
Fortunately, though, there are alternative inaccuracy measures for parti-
tions we can appeal to. The two most frequently mentioned are the simple
log rule and the simple spherical rule:
Simple log rule: Ii(b) =   ln bi
Simple spherical rule: Ii(b) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j :
As before, Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true.
Both of these measures satisfy M, and hence are not susceptible to elimination
counterexamples.6 Hence each can plausibly be claimed to measure epistemic
inaccuracy. Furthermore, each is strictly proper, and so each can be used to
5One might reasonably think that acceptable measures of accuracy should obey a
stronger principle than M; see (reference removed).
6This is trivial for the log rule, and easily proven for the spherical rule. See (reference
removed).
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underwrite conditionalization via the above argument strategy. So there
are some inaccuracy measures that vindicate conditionalization, but not all
strictly proper measures do so. In particular, the simple Brier rule cannot
be used to vindicate conditionalization.
But what about probabilism? The simple log rule and simple spherical
rule are not applicable to a Boolean algebra, and so cannot be used to prove
probabilism as they stand. Perhaps the most straightforward way to general-
ize them is simply to sum the contribution given by the simple rule for each
true proposition in the Boolean algebra, while ignoring the false propositions
in the algebra:
Asymmetric log rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0 and
F (1; bi) =   ln bi.
Asymmetric spherical rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0
and F (1; bi) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j .
Both these rules are asymmetric, in the sense that inaccuracy is calculated
di¤erently for true and false propositions. These rules satisfy principle M:
for coherent credences, if your credence in a false proposition goes down and
your remaining credences stay in the same ratios, then your credence in each
true proposition goes up, and so your inaccuracy according to the relevant
asymmetric rules goes down. Hence the asymmetric log and spherical rules
are immune from elimination counterexamples.
But these rules do not satisfy the combination of additivity and strict
propriety required for the proof of probabilism. The asymmetric spherical
rule is not additive: F (1; bi) is not a function of bi alone. The asymmetric
log rule is additive, but it is not strictly proper in the required sense: F (1; bi)
is strictly proper, but F (0; bi) is not. Indeed, it is straightforward to show
directly that these rules cannot be used as the basis of a dominance argu-
ment for probabilism. Consider, for example, a two element partition, and
the incoherent credence assignment (1; 1). The asymmetric log rule counts
these incoherent credences as perfectly accurate (since the credence in the
false proposition is ignored), so no coherent credences can dominate them.
According to the asymmetric spherical rule, multiplying all credences by a
constant has no e¤ect on inaccuracy, so this assignment has the same inaccu-
racy as the coherent credence assignment (1=2; 1=2). If coherent assignments
cannot be dominated, then neither can the initial incoherent assignment.
11
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But if coherent assignments can be dominated then the dominance proof of
probabilism fails anyway.
So the asymmetric versions of the log rule and the spherical rule cannot
be used to prove probabilism. But for a Boolean algebra, the log rule and
the spherical rule are usually given a formulation that is symmetric between
truth and falsity:
Symmetric log rule: I(!;b) =
P
i  ln j(1  !i)  bij
Symmetric spherical rule: I(!;b) =
P
i 1 
j(1  !i)  bijp
b2i + (1  bi)
2
(see e.g. Joyce 2009, 275). These measures are additive, and each term in
the sum is individually strictly proper, so they can each be used to prove
probabilism via the proof of Predd et al.
But unfortunately, in their symmetric forms all three rulesBrier, log and
sphericalare subject to elimination counterexamples. For the Brier rule, the
counterexample is the same as before, since the symmetric Brier rule reduces
to the simple Brier rule when applied to a partition.7 That is, consider a
credence shift from b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7) to b = (1=4; 3=4; 0) when X1 is true.
According to the symmetric Brier rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1:10, and
your nal inaccuracy is 1:13, so your inaccuracy goes up. And this example
works equally well against the symmetric spherical rule: according to this
rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1.24 and your nal inaccuracy is 1.37, so your
inaccuracy goes up. This particular counterexample does not work against
the symmetric log rule, but a similar one does. Suppose your initial credences
are b = (1=13; 6=13; 6=13), and your nal credences are b = (1=7; 6=7; 0).
Then according to the symmetric log rule your initial inaccuracy is 3.80, and
your nal inaccuracy is 3.89: your inaccuracy goes up. Hence the symmetric
measures all violate principle M, and so none of them can be used to prove
conditionalization.
7Strictly, applying these rules to a Boolean algebra requires including credences in the
negations :X1, :X2 and :X3, plus the tautology X1 _ X2 _ X3 and the contradiction
:(X1 _ X2 _ X3). But for coherent credences the inaccuracies of the tautology and the
contradiction are zero, and for symmetric rules the inaccuracy of :Xi is the same as that
of Xi, so the inaccuracy calculated over the entire Boolean algebra is simply twice the
inaccuracy over the partition (X1; X2; X3).
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4 The extent of the problem
Let us sum up. The simple Brier rule cannot be used to prove conditionaliza-
tion, but the simple log and spherical rules can. The obvious generalizations
of the simple log and spherical rules to a Boolean algebrathe asymmetric
log and spherical rulescannot be used to prove probabilism. The symmet-
ric Brier, log and spherical rules can be used to prove probabilism, but none
of them underwrites conditionalization. So we have found no measure that
can be used to prove both conditionalization and probabilism.
Could there be such a measure? Perhaps, although it is worth noting
that one can prove that any inaccuracy measure that satises additivity,
strict propriety and a plausible symmetry principle is subject to elimina-
tion counterexamples. The symmetry principle is precisely the one discussed
abovethat the inaccuracy measure treats truth the same as falsity, in the
sense that it is a function of the distance between each credence and its
respective truth value. For an additive inaccuracy measure, the symmetry
principle can be expressed in terms of the inaccuracy function for a single
proposition s(!i; bi) as follows:
Symmetry: s(!i; bi) = s(j1  !ij ; j1  bij):
It is certainly highly plausible that this is part of what it means for s to
measure your distance from the truth, and as discussed above, the typical
Boolean algebra forms of the Brier rule, log rule and spherical rule all satisfy
it.
Let us see how this symmetry principle, together with additivity and strict
propriety, lead to elimination counterexamples. Consider a single proposition
Xi in which your credence is bi = 1=2. According to strict propriety, the
quantity (1=2)s(1; x) + (1=2)s(0; x) must be uniquely minimized at x = 1=2.
In particular, the value of this expression for x = 1=2 must be lower than its
value for x = 1:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1) + (1=2)s(0; 1);
and for x = 0:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 0) + (1=2)s(0; 0):
Adding these:
s(1; 1=2)+ s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1)+(1=2)s(0; 1)+(1=2)s(1; 0)+(1=2)s(0; 0):
13
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But by symmetry, s(1; 1=2) = s(0; 1=2), s(1; 1) = s(0; 0) and s(0; 1) = s(1; 0).
Substituting:
2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0):
Now consider your credences in three exhaustive and mutually exclusive
propositions X = (X1; X2; X3). Consider in particular the credence shift
from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to b = (0; 1; 0) for truth values ! = (1; 0; 0). By
separability, I(!;m) = s(1; 0) + 2s(0; 1=2), and I(!;b) = s(1; 0) + s(0; 1) +
s(0; 0). So since 2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0) it follows that I(!;m) <
I(!;b): your inaccuracy goes up. But the shift from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to
b = (0; 1; 0) is an elimination case: a false proposition is eliminated, and your
credences in the remaining hypotheses stay in the same proportions. And lest
one worry about the fact that your initial credence in the true proposition
is zero, we can modify the example. Consider the credence assignments
m0 = (=(2 + ); 1=(2 + ); 1=(2 + )) and b0 = (=(1 + ); 1=(1 + ); 0). For
small  these are close to m and b, and hence by the continuity clause of
additivity, the inaccuracy of m0 remains lower than that of b0. Again, the
transition fromm0 to b0 is an elimination case, and now your credence in the
true proposition is non-zero.
So elimination counterexamples a­ict any inaccuracy measure that satis-
es additivity, strict propriety and symmetry. That is, any symmetric mea-
sure that satises the assumptions of Predd et al.s proof of probabilism
violates principle M, and hence cannot be used to prove conditionalization.
Symmetry is not a premise in the Predd argument, so it is possible that an
asymmetric measure might allow the derivation of both probabilism and con-
ditionalization. But the only plausible asymmetric measure in the literature
is the log rule (Bernardo 1979), and we have seen that the asymmetric log
rule does not vindicate probabilism.
5 Conclusion
Pettigrew notes that conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide
range of measures of inaccuracy, and the implication is that it doesnt much
matter which measure you pick. But we think it does matter. There are mea-
sures that vindicate conditionalization, and there are measures that vindicate
probabilism, but nobody has yet identied a measure that vindicates both.
Hence the accuracy-based approach does not, as yet, give us the justication
we might want for the constraints on our credences.
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Can Typicality Arguments Dissolve
Cosmology’s Flatness Problem?
C.D. McCoy∗
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Abstract
The flatness problem in cosmology draws attention to a surprising fine-tuning of the spatial geometry of
our universe towards flatness. Several physicists, among them Hawking, Page, Coule, and Carroll, have
argued against the probabilistic intuitions underlying such fine-tuning arguments in cosmology and instead
propose that the canonical measure on the phase space of Friedman-Robertson-Walker spacetimes should
be used to evaluate fine-tuning. They claim that flat spacetimes in this set are actually typical on this
natural measure and that therefore the flatness problem is illusory. I argue that they misinterpret typicality
in this phase space and, moreover, that no conclusion can be drawn at all about the flatness problem by
using the canonical measure alone.
For several decades now cosmologists have maintained that the old standard model of cosmology, the highly
successful hot big bang (HBB) model, suffers from various fine-tuning problems (Dicke and Peebles, 1979;
Linde, 1984). They claim that the spacetimes on which the HBB model is based, the Friedman-Robertson-
Walker (FRW) spacetimes, require seemingly “special” initial conditions, such that when they are evolved
forward in time by the dynamical law of the general theory of relativity (GTR) they yield presently observed
cosmological conditions. For example, the flatness problem depends on the existence of special initial
conditions in the HBB model which are required to explain the observationally-inferred spatial flatness of
the universe. Due to their extreme precision or intuitive “unlikeliness,” these initial conditions are thought
to be unduly special, such that many cosmologists have felt that the initial conditions themselves are in need
of explanation and, moreover, present a significant conceptual problem for the HBB model.
Although physical fine-tuning could be interpreted in a variety of ways, cosmologists typically under-
stand it to mean that observationally-required initial conditions are in some sense unlikely (Smeenk, 2013;
McCoy, 2015). In order to substantiate this interpretation, one must show that initial conditions in the HBB
model which reproduce present conditions are in fact unlikely. This task presupposes that there is a justi-
fiable way of assessing the likelihoods of cosmological models (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page,
1988). Many arguments found in the cosmological literature, however, rely on ad hoc, unjustified likelihood
measures. Gibbons et al. (1987) propose a “natural” measure (hence the GHS measure) on the set of FRW
spacetimes (with matter contents represented by a scalar field) as a natural and justified way of evaluating
likelihoods. The GHS measure is simply the canonical Liouville measure associated with the phase space of
FRW spacetimes when GTR is put into a Hamiltonian formulation and in a precise sense “comes for free”
with the phase space.
While I would maintain that the GHSmeasure cannot be successfully used to make arguments about fine-
tuning in cosmology quite generally, I argue here only for its inapplicability to the flatness problem. Some
∗Eidyn Research Centre, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK. email: casey.mccoy@ed.ac.uk
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authors (Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010) have attempted to make probabilistic arguments,
in analogy to familiar probabilistic arguments in statistical mechanics, by making the GHS measure into a
probability measure. However, as the total measure of the FRW phase space is infinite, there is no canonical
choice of probability measure with which to make probabilistic arguments, a point that has been recognized
already by some (Hawking and Page, 1988; Schiffrin and Wald, 2012). Accordingly, any justification of a
particular probability measure is completely independent of the justification of the GHS measure—in short,
these probability measures are not in any substantive sense the GHS measure. On the other hand, one
might try to use the GHS measure by itself to make typicality arguments in analogy to typicality arguments
in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012). Carroll in particular advocates this approach and, interestingly,
claims that the GHS measure alone tells us that almost all spacetimes are spatially flat (Carroll and Tam,
2010; Remmen and Carroll, 2013; Carroll, forthcoming)—that there is in fact no flatness problem (Hawking
and Page (1988, 803-4) and Coule (1995, 468) suggest the same). Carroll’s claim, however, rests on a subtle
mistake in interpreting typicality. I claim, on the contrary, that the GHS measure cannot tell us anything
about likelihood without substantive additional assumptions such as those made in statistical mechanics,
e.g. a partition of phase space into “macroproperties” or similar. These necessary assumptions, however, are
doubtfully justifiable in the cosmological context. Thus I ultimately conclude that the GHS measure cannot
be used to clarify the nature of fine-tuning in cosmology.
1 The Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart Measure
An adequate view of what the GHS measure is and can do relies on understanding the details of how it is
introduced. For this reason I develop here the measure with considerably more care than other accounts
in the literature, which tend to jump straight to a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian formulation of GTR without
elucidating the geometrical origin of their variable choices and the relations between physical parameters.
My starting point is the initial value formulation of GTR, in which the “position” initial data of space-
time are represented by the spatial metric hab on a spacelike Cauchy surface Σ and the “momentum” initial
data by the extrinsic curvature πab (Wald, 1984; Malament, 2012). FRW spacetimes are spacetimes with
homogeneous and isotropic spacelike hypersurfaces, so one can foliate the spacetimes by a one-parameter
family of these spacelike hypersurfaces Σt that are orthogonal to a smooth, future-directed, twist-free, unit
timelike field ξa on M, where I define ξa = ∇at.For FRW spacetimes the extrinsic curvature of an initial data
surface Σt is Hhab, where H is the so-called Hubble parameter.Thus the initial data for an FRW spacetime are
completely represented by two objects: (1) the spatial metric hab and (2) the Hubble parameter H associated
with a spatial hypersurface Σ.
The space of initial data is therefore the product of the set of homogeneous and isotropic Riemannian
manifolds Σ (with metric hab) and the set of (real-valued) Hubble parameters H. Homogeneous and isotropic
Riemannian manifolds have constant curvature κ. Complete, connected Riemannian manifolds of constant
sectional curvature are called space forms. It is a theorem that every simply-connected three-dimensional
space form is isometric to the sphere S 3(
√
(1/κ)) if κ > 0, R3 if κ = 0, or the hyperbolic space H3(
√
(1/κ)) if
κ < 0 (Wolf, 2010). The standard metrics on each of these manifolds is understood to be the metric induced
on them by embedding them in R4. Every Σ is therefore isometric to one of these three classes of space
forms. Spaceforms of each of the three kinds are moreover homothetic, i.e. they are isometric up to the
square of a scale factor a (McCabe, 2004). Accordingly one has the means to represent curvature κ as a
function of the scale factor; in particular, for any Σ, a2κ is some constant k. Hence one can set any spatial
metric hab = a
2γab, where γab is the standard metric on the appropriate space form. This is useful in the
initial value formulation of FRW spacetimes because all time dependence of hab is thereby located solely in
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the scale factor rather than in the radius of curvature of the space form.
The Einstein equation reduces to two constraint equations and two evolution equations in the initial value
formulation (Geroch, 1972):
R − (π aa )2 + πabπab = −16πTabξaξb; (1)
Dcπ
c
a − Daπ cc = 8πTmrhmaξr; (2)
£ξ(πab) = 2π
c
a πcb − πccπab + Rab − 8πh ma hnb(Tmn −
1
2
Thmn); (3)
£ξ(hab) = 2πab, (4)
where R is the Ricci scalar of Σ, Rab is the Ricci tensor of Σ, and Da is the derivative operator on Σ. For
FRW spacetimes, these equations simplify to the following three (the second equation from above is trivial
since πab does not vary across Σ:
R − 6H2 = −16πρ; (5)
H˙hab =
(
− H2 − 4π
3
(ρ + 3p)
)
hab; (6)
h˙ab = 2Hhab, (7)
where ρ is the energy density and p the pressure of the matter. The first two equations are known as the
Friedman equations. Since hab = a
2γab, h˙ab = 2aa˙γab, and 2Hhab = 2Ha
2γab, it follows from the third
equation above that
H =
a˙
a
, (8)
which is the usual definition of the Hubble parameter H. To simplify matters somewhat and to make contact
with the literature, I shall henceforth take the matter contents of spacetime to be a scalar field φ in a potential
V which evolves according to the coupled Einstein-Klein Gordon equation.1 Then one has the following
equations of motion (Hawking and Page, 1988, 790):
R − 6H2 = −16π
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
(9)
H˙ = −H2 − 8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
(10)
φ¨ + 3Hφ˙ + V ′(φ) = 0, (11)
where V ′ is the derivative of the potential with respect to φ.2 (The third equation can be derived from the
previous two, and so is in fact redundant.)
For FRW spacetimes the spatial Ricci scalar is R = −6κ. As noted before, one can cast κ in terms of the
scale factor and a constant k: κ = k/a2. By using the scale factor a to replace κ, one has introduced a constant
k which has no physical significance beyond identifying whether the space form is flat, positively-curved, or
negatively-curved. One therefore usually takes equivalence classes of curves according to these three cases
and chooses k = +1, 0, and −1 as representatives. Then one may write R = −6k/a2, so that one finally has
Friedman’s equation in its usual form (for a scalar field in a potential):
(
a˙
a
)2
=
8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
− k
a2
. (12)
1The scalar field is meant to be the inflaton, the field that drives inflation in the early universe.
2If our interest were solely in assessing the HBB model’s fine-tuning, one could do the following analysis for perfect fluid matter
contents. The results would be qualitatively similar however, as shown by Carroll and Tam (2010, §4.2).
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The foregoing indicates that our FRW initial data hab and πab are equivalently representable in the space
{a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. This space is not the space of initial data, however, since the previous equation is a constraint
that must be satisfied by initial data. One must also keep in mind that k is an index for three separate copies
of the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙}. There is no continuous path between the three spaces.
Have identified the relevant spaces for representing FRW space forms, I next put the theory into a Hamil-
tonian formulation (Wald, 1984, Appendix E) in order to obtain a symplectic structure and, hence, the canon-
ical measure. I begin with the Lagrangian for our theory of FRW spacetimes with a scalar field as the matter
contents, where I have re-introduced the lapse function N as a Lagrange multiplier:
L = √−g
(
R
16π
+
1
2N2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
. (13)
In terms of the variables I have chosen, this is
L = − 1
8π
(
3
N
aa˙2 − 3Na3 k
a2
) +
1
2N
a3φ˙2 − Na3V(φ), (14)
in agreement with (Hawking and Page, 1988; Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010). The
momenta of a and φ are
pa ≡ ∂L
∂a˙
=
−3aa˙
4πN
; pφ ≡ ∂L
∂φ
=
a3φ˙
N
. (15)
The Hamiltonian on this phase space is
H = paa˙ + pφφ˙ − L = N
(
− 2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
)
, (16)
from which one recovers (after setting N = 1) our constraint (the Friedman equation) as the Hamiltonian
constraint C:
C ≡ −2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
= 0. (17)
The phase space γ of our system is thus the four-dimensional space {a, pa, φ, pφ} equipped with the canonical
symplectic form
ωpa,a,pφ,φ = dpa ∧ da + dpφ ∧ dφ. (18)
The dynamically accessible phase space points are constrained to be on the three-dimensional hypersur-
face C. Thus it would be inappropriate to use ω for constructing a canonical volume measure on phase space.
One can, however, pull the symplectic form back onto the constraint surface by first solving the constraint
for pφ:
3
pφ = a
3
(
4π
3
p2a
a4
+
3
4π
k
a2
− 2V(φ)
)1/2
. (19)
Following Carroll and Tam, I also switch coordinates from pa to H, so that
pφ = a
3
(
3
4π
(H2 + k/a2) − 2V(φ)
)1/2
(20)
3The scalar field can have positive or negative momentum, so strictly speaking there should be a ± in the following equation. The
reader is welcome to annotate the equations that follow.
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and
dpa = − 3
4π
(
2aHda + a2dH
)
. (21)
The differential of pφ is then
dpφ =
(3/4π)a3HdH − a3V ′dφ + 6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)da
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (22)
Substituting these into ω then gives the pullback of the symplectic form onto C. The result is the following
(pre-symplectic) differential form:
ωa,H,φ = ΘHa(dH ∧ da) + ΘHφ(dH ∧ dφ) + Θaφ(da ∧ dφ), (23)
where
ΘHa = − 3
4π
a2; (24)
ΘHφ =
(3/4π)a3H
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 ; (25)
Θaφ =
6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (26)
This form is not symplectic (it is degenerate), so one cannot construct a natural volume measure on C.
Ideally, the “real” phase space of our system would be given by “solving the dynamics,” and then taking
equivalence classes of phase points that are part of the same trajectory. In this way one would obtain the
space of motions, onto which one could then pull back the degenerate form to obtain a new symplectic form
(of degree two less than ω) and construct a canonical measure. This is quite complicated in general due to
the differential equation that must be solved. The usual approach to take instead is to set H to some value
H∗ in the differential form and define their measure accordingly, i.e. set
dΩ = ωa,H,φ|H=H∗ = Θaφ|H=H∗dadφ. (27)
One may do this because surfaces of constant Hubble parameter in phase space are transverse to temporal
evolution, and the measure is preserved under translation of these surfaces along the Hamiltonian flow.
Finally, one may naturally define the GHS measure µGHS on Lebesgue measurable sets U by
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
a2
(3H2∗ + 2k/a
2)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + k/a2) − 2V)1/2
dadφ. (28)
This expression of the GHS measure is equivalent to those derived in (Carroll and Tam, 2010; Schiffrin and
Wald, 2012).4
4There are some complications with the k = 1 case. See (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012, 8) for the details. I have however chosen not
to set 8πG = 1, but rather maintained consistency with the rest of this dissertation’s use of “geometrical units” by only setting G = 1.
Gibbons et al. (1987) use a simplifying, but less transparent coordinate choice. They also choose to investigate only the special case
where V = m2φ2/2. It can be shown with some work that their expression is equivalent to this one as well with this potential.
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2 The Flatness Problem
The GHS measure clearly diverges for large scale factors, a point originally recognized by Gibbons et al.
(1987, 745); it also converges to 0 for small scale factors. Due to the divergence, one may readily say that,
given any choice of Hubble parameter H∗, almost all spacetimes will have a “large” scale factor. More
precisely, pick any scale factor a∗; the set of spacetimes with a < a∗ is a negligible set: the total measure of
this set is finite whereas the total measure of its complement is infinite. What is the significance of this fact
about the GHS measure, specifically for the flatness problem?
Hawking and Page (1988, 803-4) suggest the following:
“Thus for arbitrarily large expansions (and long times), and for arbitrarily low values of the en-
ergy density, the canonical measure implies that almost all solutions of the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker scalar equations have negligible spatial curvature and hence behave as k = 0 models. In
this way a uniform probability distribution in the canonical measure would explain the flatness
problem of cosmology...”
By “arbitrarily large expansions” (and “arbitrarily low values of energy density”), they appear to mean
the following. Pick any arbitrary a∗ (and any arbitrary φ∗).5 According to the GHS measure almost all
spacetimes have a > a∗ (and φ > φ∗), or, equivalently, the spacetimes with a < a∗ (and φ < φ∗) compose a
negligible set. Furthermore, since this holds for any choice of a∗, one may infer that almost all spacetimes
are arbitrarily close to having κ = 0 (since κ = k/a2) in exactly the same sense. It is perhaps somewhat
misleading to say that curved FRW spacetimes with large scale factors “behave as k = 0 models;” the
curvature does not change in such models. It is, however, surely false to say that a “uniform probability
distribution” with respect to the GHS measure would explain the flatness problem of cosmology. There is in
fact no such uniform probability distribution, since the GHS measure is not finite. Moroever, there is also no
canonical probability distribution ρ at all which would make U 7→
∫
U
ρdΩGHS into a probability measure—
one has to make a choice in order to obtain a probability measure in the case of infinite total measure, a
choice which appears completely arbitrary in this context.
Carroll and Tam (2010, 14) invite us to consider the question in more “physically transparent” terms by
looking at the curvature κ, which I previously exchanged in favor of the scale factor a when deriving the
GHS measure. One can recast the scale factor a as the curvature κ using the relation from before, namely
κ = k/a2. (Note especially that this switch maps the entire set of scale factors for the k = 0 case to the single
point κ = 0.) One then defines the GHS measure (at least for curved FRW spacetimes) by the map
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
1
|κ|5/2
(3H2∗ + 2κ)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + κ) − 2V)1/2
dκdφ. (29)
It is clear that the measure diverges for small values of curvature, i.e. curvatures close to flat, due to the
curvature term in the denominator. This is pointed out by Carroll and Tam (2010, 15). They suggest the
following interpretation of this fact:
“Considering first the measure on purely Robertson-Walker cosmologies (without perturba-
tions) as a function of spatial curvature, there is a divergence at zero curvature. In other words,
curved [FRW] cosmologies are a set of measure zero—the flatness problem, as conventionally
understood, does not exist.”
5Gibbons and Turok (2008, 6) point out that φ is always bounded given H∗, so it is not really necessary to pick an arbitrary φ∗.
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As stated these claims are highly suspect.
Firstly, Carroll and Tam assert that all values of their curvature coordinate Ωk (essentially equivalent to
κ) can be integrated over. While this is perhaps true, portraying the phase space in terms of curvature is
misleading. For curved FRW spacetimes, it is true that the measure diverges for small values of curvature
κ, as I indicate above and as Hawking and Page suggest in the passage from their paper quoted above. The
recast measure, however, is infinite at zero curvature because the entire set of k = 0 scale factors is mapped
to κ = 0. The GHS measure diverges for large scale factors in the case of flat FRW spacetimes just as it
does for curved FRW spacetime. Thus it is misleading to describe a “divergence at zero curvature;” there is
nothing special going on in flat FRW spacetimes (at least in this respect).6
Secondly (and relatedly), curved FRW spacetimes are clearly not a set of measure zero—at least accord-
ing to the GHS measure. The initial data of FRW spacetimes is representable in the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. The
curvature constant k serves as an index for three different phase spaces, each of which has an infinite total
measure—even after taking into account constraints and choosing a hypersurface in the constraint surface
according to GHS’s procedure. The unboundedness of the total phase space measure for each kind of FRW
spacetime is due, again, to the unbounded range of the scale factor Schiffrin and Wald (2012, 11).7 This is
quite plain when one expresses the GHS measure in terms of the scale factor. Transforming to the curvature
coordinate κ should not change the fact that the total measure of each phase space is infinite. So, while it
is true that the GHS measure attributes infinite measure to flat FRW spacetimes (as Carroll and Tam appear
to recognize), it also does so both to positively curved FRW spacetimes and to negatively curved space-
times. Therefore it is false that the curved FRW cosmologies are a set of measure zero according to the GHS
measure; hence one cannot conclude on this basis that the flatness problem does not exist.
One might try to rescue Carroll and Tam’s claim about the flatness problem by interpreting flatness
more broadly, namely by including “nearly flat” curved spacetimes. This requires specifying what the set
of “nearly flat” curved spacetimes is to be, e.g. a specification of the set of spacetimes with curvature less
than some κ∗ (at some time corresponding to Hubble parameter H∗). Almost all spacetimes will have a
“small” curvature κ in comparison to this curvature κ∗. In other words, the set of spacetimes with κ > κ∗ is a
negligible set. Since our universe’s spatial curvature is thought to be “nearly flat,” i.e. it should be less than
κ∗ (whatever it is), it follows from this argument that our universe is actually typical, contra what is assumed
in the flatness problem. Unfortunately this argument does not follow from the GHS measure alone, since one
had to make an independent choice in choosing κ∗, a choice that is not natural in any clear sense whatever.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that there is any reasonable argument to justify a choice of κ∗—an explication of
“close to flat” in the context of FRW models; it appears to be a completely arbitrary choice.
Here is a slightly different tack into the same stiff headwind. Suppose κ∗ is the (non-zero) spatial curva-
ture of our universe at the present time. The GHS measure can be used to infer that almost all spacetimes
with the same Hubble parameter will have flatter spatial curvatures. In such circumstances, one might be in-
clined to wonder “Why is my universe’s spatial curvature so large? It seems like it ought to be much smaller
if my universe is typical!” On this line of thought, it seems like one actually has a curvature problem rather
than a flatness problem. Of course one would say this for any κ∗ whatsoever, regardless of its magnitude,
6Carroll and Tam appear to equivocate several times between there being a divergence at κ = 0 and the measure diverging as κ → 0:
“The integral diverges near [κ = 0], which is certainly a physically allowed region of parameter space” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17);
“The measure diverges on flat universes” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 28).
7Besides in (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012), this fact is correctly pointed out in (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page, 1988). While
Carroll and Tam (2010, 20-1) observe that “this divergence was noted in the original GHS paper, where it was attributed to ‘universes
with very large scale factors’ due to a different choice of variables,” they object to this as an interpretation: “This is not the most
physically transparent characterization, as any open universe will eventually have a large scale factor.” For this reason they exchange
the scale factor for curvature; it is not clear, however, how this characterization is more physically transparent since it amounts to the
same thing.
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so it is not clear how one would ever be in the position to be satisified with one’s curvature in an FRW
universe—at least insofar as one expects things in our universe to be typical (in accord with Copernican
principle-style reasoning). No matter. The measure suggests this question. What is the answer?
The answer is that the curvature depends on the actual dynamical history of the universe, and so it has no
explanation within the context of the HBB model (apart from one depending on an initial condition). That
answer may be unsatisfying, but the question is a bad one anyway, driven by misleading intuitions. There is
no such thing as a typical FRW spacetime, and the GHS measure is not going to explain why the universe’s
curvature is what it is. This kind of thinking is clearly motivated by supposing that the GHS measure can be
used as a likelihood measure, as Carroll and Tam clearly do:
“When we consider questions of fine-tuning, however, we are comparing the real world to what
we think a randomly-chosen history of the universe would be like” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 11).
Some popular, specious conceptions (in physics and beyond) of statistical mechanics encourage this line
of thought. Putatively successful typicality arguments in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012) depend,
however, not only on having a phase space measure, but also on both the dynamics of the system and on
a specification of macroproperties or macrostates (defined as regions of phase space) (Frigg, 2009; Frigg
and Werndl, 2012). Accordingly, any claim of fine-tuning in FRW spacetimes on the sole basis of the GHS
measure (which does at least incorporate the FRW dynamics) is bound to miss the mark without additional
assumptions (such as a well-motivated standard of flatness).
Gibbons and Turok (2008) take a different approach from Carroll and Tam. They correctly observe that
universes with large scale factors are universes with small spatial curvatures. They then claim that the scale
factor is neither “geometrically meaningful” nor “physically observable” and therefore propose to identify
all the “indistinguishable” nearly flat spacetimes on the surface identified by H∗.8 They do so by effectively
choosing a “cutoff” curvature κ∗ and throwing out all the spacetimes with curvatures smaller than it. The
advantage to doing this is that the total measure of FRW spacetimes with curvatures larger than κ∗ is finite,
so that one can then define a probability measure in a natural way.
The disadvantage is that this makes no sense. Carroll and Tam (2010, 20) comment, “to us, this seems to
be throwing away almost all the solutions, and keeping a set of measure zero. It is true that universes with
almost identical values of the curvature parameter will be physically indistinguishable, but that doesn’t affect
the fact that almost all universes have this property.” Indeed, doing what Gibbons and Turok do is throwing
away almost all the solutions (although the remaining set has finite measure, not measure zero as Carroll
and Tam claim). They are also right to point out that if nearly flat universes are physically indistinguishable,
so are “nearly-κ” universes for almost any κ. Gibbons and Turok do not throw out these universes however
(else they would not have been left with any universes at all). Their justification for an additional assumption
therefore fails.
Ironically, Carroll and Tam make essentially the same error as Gibbons and Turok, by identifying the
flat and nearly flat spacetimes. Instead of throwing out all the flat and nearly flat spacetimes like the latter
pair, however, the former pair throws out the complement of the flat and nearly flat spacetimes by assigning
them zero measure. They then triumphantly conclude that all FRW spacetimes are essentially flat! Carroll
and Tam propose to tame the remaining divergence in the GHS measure by regularizing the integral, in
effect making the measure finite. The problem with doing this is that, since the GHS measure is not finite,
8It is not clear what they mean by “geometrically meaningful.” The scale factor is clearly geometric in the relevant sense, since
it relates spaceforms of the same kind by scalings. It is moreover physically meaningful because space is expanding (or contracting)
in FRW spacetimes. The precise value of a does not matter, as it can be re-scaled, but that does not undermine its meaningfulness.
It is also unclear how the fact that a is physically unobservable should matter, since most features of spacetime are not observable,
e.g. the metric g, the spatial curvature κ, etc. The physically relevant content of these, including the scale factor, can be inferred from
observations and appropriate assumptions.
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regularizing the measure makes it no longer the GHS measure, in which case any justification the measure
had by its “naturalness” is lost since a choice was made.9 In short, one may as well have just assumed the
probability distribution they end up with from the very beginning.Their stated justification for this move is
pragmatic: “This non-normalizability is problematic if we would like to interpret the measure as determining
the relative fraction of universes with different physical properties” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17). However
this is obviously an inadequate justification for the propriety of their measure.
References
Albrecht, Andreas, and Paul Steinhardt. “Cosmology for Grand Unified Theories with Radiatively Induced
Symmetry Breaking.” Physical Review Letters 48: (1982) 1220–1223.
Belinsky, Vladimir, Leonid Grishchuk, Isaak Khalatnikov, and Yakov Zeldovich. “Inflationary Stages in
Cosmological Models with a Scalar Field.” Physics Letters B 155: (1985) 232–236.
Carroll, Sean. “In What Sense Is the Early Universe Fine-Tuned?” In Time’s Arrows and the Probability
Structure of the World, edited by Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake, and Eric Winsberg, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, forthcoming.
Carroll, Sean, and Heywood Tam. “Unitary Evolution and Cosmological Fine-Tuning.” ArXiv Eprint, 2010.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1007.1417.
Coule, David. “Canonical measure and the flatness of a FRW universe.” Classical and Quantum Gravity 12:
(1995) 455–469.
Dicke, Robert, and Jim Peebles. “The Big Bang Cosmology—Enigmas and Nostrums.” In General Rela-
tivity: An Einstein Centenary Survey, edited by Stephen Hawking, and Werner Israel, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979, chapter 9, 504–517.
Frigg, Roman. “Typicality and the Approach to Equilibrium in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics.” Phi-
losophy of Science 76: (2009) 997–1008.
Frigg, Roman, and CharlotteWerndl. “Demystifying Typicality.” Philosophy of Science 79: (2012) 917–929.
Geroch, Robert. “General Relativity.”, 1972. Unpublished lecture notes.
Gibbons, Gary, Stephen Hawking, and John Stewart. “A natural measure on the Set of all Universes.”
Nuclear Physics B 281: (1987) 736–751.
Gibbons, Gary, and Neil Turok. “Measure problem in cosmology.” Physical Review D 77: (2008) 1–12.
Goldstein, Sheldon. “Typicality and Notions of Probability in Physics.” In Probability in Physics, edited by
Yemima Ben-Menahem, and Meir Hemmo, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012, chapter 4, 59–71.
Guth, Alan. “Inflationary universe: A possible solution to the horizon and flatness problems.” Physical
Review D 23, 2: (1981) 347–356.
9Carroll more recently has conceded the artificiality of regularizing: “Earlier attempts to regularize the measure, for example by
considering an ǫ-neighborhood around the zero-curvature Hamiltonian constraint surface (Carroll and Tam, 2010) or by identifying
universes with similar curvatures (Gibbons and Turok, 2008) have not proven satisfactory” (Remmen and Carroll, 2013, 7). He remains
convinced, however, that almost all FRW spacetimes are “nearly flat:” “we should throw all of the others away and deal with flat
universes,” (Carroll, forthcoming, 19), developing a measure on just these spacetimes in a later paper (Remmen and Carroll, 2014).
9
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1015-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -394-
Hawking, Stephen, and Don Page. “How Probable is Inflation?” Nuclear Physics B 298: (1988) 789–809.
Linde, Andrei. “A New Inflationary Universe Scenario: A Possible Solution of the Horizon, Flatness,
Homogeneity, Isotropy, and Primordial Monopole Problems.” Physics Letters B 108: (1982) 389–393.
. “The inflationary universe.” Reports on Progress in Phyics 47: (1984) 925–986.
Malament, David. Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Gravity Theory. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012.
McCabe, Gordon. “The structure and interpretation of cosmology: Part I—general relativistic cosmology.”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35: (2004) 549–595.
McCoy, Casey. “Does inflation solve the hot big bang model’s fine-tuning problems?” Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics 51: (2015) 23–36.
Remmen, Grant, and Sean Carroll. “Attractor solutions in scalar-field cosmology.” Physical Review D 88:
(2013) 1–14.
. “How many e-folds should we expect from high-scale inflation?” Physical Review D 90: (2014)
1–14.
Schiffrin, Joshua, and Robert Wald. “Measure and probability in cosmology.” Physical Review D 86: (2012)
1–20.
Smeenk, Chris. “Philosophy of Cosmology.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, edited by
Robert Batterman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 17, 607–652.
Wald, Robert. General Relativity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Wolf, Joseph. Spaces of Constant Curvature. Providence, RI: AMS Chelsea Publishing, 2010, 6th edition.
10
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1016-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -395-
Invariance, Interpretation, and Motivation
Thomas Møller-Nielsen
July 2016
[Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science (2016 Proceedings).]
Abstract
In this paper I assess the ‘Invariance Principle’, which states that only quantities
that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue,
contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s sym-
metries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to
the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symme-
tries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to the quantity
in question. In the process of this discussion, I address the related but importantly
distinct issue of when symmetries can be said to prompt a mathematical reformulation
of the relevant theory.
1 Introduction
Take the Invariance Principle to be the principle that only quantities that are
invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real.1 It is a
doctrine with a distinguished pedigree: acclaimed theorists as diverse as the
physicist Paul Dirac, the mathematician Hermann Weyl, and the philosopher
Robert Nozick were all apparent signatories during their respective lifetimes.2
Prima facie, however, it is something of a mystery as to how and why the
principle is supposed to work. Nevertheless, there appear to be at least some
uncontroversial cases where it—or something very close to it—does work.
One such example can be found in Newtonian Gravitation Theory (NGT),
i.e., the theory comprising Newton’s three laws, plus his inverse square gravita-
tional law, governing the behaviour of point particles in Newtonian spacetime.
As is well known, this theory is Galilean invariant. This implies, among other
things, that if one takes any solution to NGT and “boosts” it—that is, uniformly
alters the absolute velocity of each point particle by the same amount through-
out its history—one will invariably get back a solution to NGT. Boosts, in other
words, are a symmetry of NGT: they are transformations that invariably map
solutions of the theory to solutions.
1I draw the term from Saunders (2007). Compare also Dasgupta’s (forthcoming)
“symmetry-to-reality inference”.
2See, e.g., Dirac (1930, vii), Weyl (1952, 132), and Nozick (2001, 82).
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Which quantity varies under this particular symmetry? The answer is obvi-
ous: absolute velocity. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we should
conclude that absolute velocity is not a genuine physical quantity. Conversely,
which quantities are invariant under this particular symmetry? Again, the an-
swer is obvious: relative (inter-particle) distance and velocity, temporal inter-
vals, and absolute acceleration. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we
should conclude that NGT’s boost symmetry does not threaten these quantities’
status as genuinely physical.
As it turns out, one can successfully purge Newtonian theory of the spacetime
structure required to make absolute velocity a physically meaningful quantity.
More specifically, one can move to Galilean spacetime. (Sometimes also called
“Neo-Newtonian spacetime”.)3 Here, the Newtonian posit of persisting points
of absolute space—persisting points which, crucially, allow for the notion of ab-
solute velocity to be physically meaningful—is done away with, but an affine
structure is nevertheless preserved, which defines the “straight” or force-free (in-
ertial) paths through spacetime. Absolute velocity is therefore not a physically
meaningful quantity in Galilean spacetime, as it is in Newtonian spacetime.
Nevertheless, all other Newtonian notions, including the notion of absolute ac-
celeration, remain well-defined in Galilean spacetime. To the extent that one
opts for Galilean over Newtonian spacetime, then, one has excised an ostensibly
odious piece of theoretical structure from NGT.
Three important caveats are worth noting, however. First, and most obvi-
ously, none of this is to say that Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime
is therefore the true and complete theory of the world. (It isn’t.) Second, nor
is this to say that by moving to Galilean spacetime one has thereby purged
Newtonian theory of all its “variant” structure. (One hasn’t. The symmetry
group of Newtonian theory is actually wider than the Galilean group: it has
additional symmetries.)4 Third, nor is this even to say that the invariant quan-
tities one ends up with following such an application of the Invariance Principle
will invariably be preserved in future theories. (For instance, there is no notion
of “relative spatial distance” simpliciter in special relativity.) Given all of these
caveats, however, one might well ask: What good is the Invariance Principle,
exactly? What purpose, in particular, does it serve?
As I see it—and, I take it, as many other contemporary theorists also see
it—the purpose of the Invariance Principle is essentially comparative. That is, it
is simply supposed to lead you to a better theory—or a better interpretation, or
characterisation, of the same theory—than the one you started with. To take the
case at hand: Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime is a better theory than
Newtonian theory set in Newtonian spacetime. It is a theory which possesses
all of the theoretical virtues of its rival, but lacks any apparent ontological
commitment to the unwanted variant quantity in question.
In summary, the Galilean invariance of NGT, in conjunction with the In-
variance Principle, is supposed to indicate that neither absolute velocity nor
3See, e.g., Earman (1989, §2.4).
4See, e.g., Knox (2014). I discuss this point further in Section 4 below.
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any corresponding persisting points of absolute space are genuinely real. Now
to lay my cards on the table: I actually think that something very close to
this general kind of inference—that is, from the variance of a quantity under
symmetries to that quantity’s nonreality—is legitimate. The devil, however, is
in the details. In particular, I don’t believe that the mere Galilean invariance
of NGT is enough to establish absolute velocity’s nonreality. And in general, I
don’t believe that the mere variance of a quantity under symmetries is enough to
establish that quantity’s nonreality. These beliefs, as far as I can determine, put
me in the minority camp in the contemporary philosophical literature on sym-
metries. Nevertheless, I think they are correct beliefs—and they are precisely
the ones that I will attempt to argue for in the remainder of this paper.
2 Interpretational vs Motivational
In arguing for the above claims, it will prove extremely useful first to distinguish
between two very different ways of thinking about symmetries.
Close cousins of the distinction that I have in mind have already been drawn
in the literature. Thus, Greaves and Wallace write:
There is a widespread consensus that two states of affairs related
by a symmetry transformation are really just the same state of affairs
differently described. That is, if two mathematical models of a physical
theory are related by a symmetry transformation, then those models
represent one and the same physical state of affairs. (Greaves and
Wallace 2014, 60)
They continue:
Although we agree with this consensus [...] even those who do not
agree that symmetry-related states of affairs are identical at least
agree that they are empirically indistinguishable from one another.
(Greaves and Wallace 2014, 60, fn 1)
To illustrate the difference between these two ways of thinking about symme-
tries, consider again the example of boosts in NGT. According to the “widespread
consensus” view alluded to, and endorsed by, Greaves and Wallace, boosted
models of NGT are to be taken to represent the same physical state of affairs
even when the theory is putatively set in Newtonian spacetime. In other words,
according to this view, one needn’t make the move to Galilean spacetime in or-
der not to be committed to absolute velocities; there is a way of understanding
boosted models’ physical equivalence, and their associated noncommitment to
the notion of absolute velocity, prior to making this move.5
Things are very different according to the second conception of symme-
tries described, and rejected, by Greaves and Wallace. According to this view,
boosted models of NGT are to be regarded as physically inequivalent: they are
not to be construed as representing the same physical state of affairs. Instead,
5See, e.g., Healey (2007, 114-7), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
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such models are taken to represent physically distinct scenarios, which differ in
what absolute velocity they ascribe to the world’s total material content. Never-
theless, such models still represent empirically indistinguishable states of affairs:
in a Newtonian universe, no experiment could ever help an observer determine
what her absolute velocity actually is. Such boosted models therefore represent
physically distinct ways for the world to be, albeit ones that are indiscernible
on the basis of measurement.6
As previously mentioned, this distinction between different ways of thinking
about symmetries is close, but not identical, to the one that I want to draw.
The key reason why it is not identical is because Greaves and Wallace say
nothing to the effect that the person who subscribes to the second conception
of symmetries—that is, who believes that symmetry-related models invariably
represent empirically indistinguishable, but not necessarily physically equiva-
lent, states of affairs—should still be motivated to seek an alternative theory, or
an alternative interpretation or characterisation of the same theory, according
to which such models do not merely represent empirically indistinguishable sce-
narios, but rather represent physically equivalent states of affairs.7 Moreover, I
claim, it is precisely this notion of motivation which plays a central role in cor-
rectly understanding the philosophical significance of symmetries in the general
case.8
Here, then, is what I take to be the appropriate distinction between these
two different ways of thinking about symmetries:
• Interpretational: Symmetries allow us to interpret theories as being com-
mitted solely to the existence of invariant quantities, even in the absence
of a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is
alleged to underlie symmetry-related models.
• Motivational: Symmetries only motivate us to find a metaphysically
perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
symmetry-related models, but they do not allow us to interpret that theory
as being solely committed to the existence of invariant quantities in the
absence of any such characterisation.
The central claim of this paper may now be neatly summarised: the (orthodox)
interpretational view is mistaken; the (unorthodox) motivational view is correct.
Drawing the distinction in the way that I have done, however, invites the
rather obvious question: What, precisely, is meant by a “metaphysically per-
spicuous characterisation” of reality? This is the question addressed in the next
section.
6See, e.g., Maudlin (1993, 192), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
7Compare (again) Maudlin’s (1993, 192) discussion in the Newtonian context.
8Note that I do not intend any of this as a criticism of Greaves and Wallace’s paper.
Indeed, as Greaves and Wallace (2014, 60, fn 1) are careful to remark, the distinction they
draw is orthogonal to the central topic of their paper, namely the issue of which symmetries
have “direct empirical significance” (i.e., have analogues to Galileo’s ship).
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3 More on Metaphysical Perspicuity
In intuitive terms, a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of reality is one
which corresponds to, or “limns”, reality’s structure in some suitably faithful
way. To use another common (Platonic) metaphor, a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of reality is one which “carves nature at its joints”. (In
comparative terms: a description of reality is more metaphysically perspicuous
than another precisely to the extent that it corresponds to, or limns, reality’s
structure more faithfully than its rival does.)
As many readers will be aware, such a notion is frequently alluded to, and
made use of, in contemporary analytic metaphysics.9 But metaphysical per-
spicuity is also, I think, a notion that is reasonably serviceable in physical (rather
than “merely metaphysical”) contexts. One particularly illustrative example—
albeit a slightly misleading one, for reasons that I will soon explain—drawn
from physics may plausibly be found in classical electromagnetism.10 As is well
known, this theory may be formulated in two different ways.11 According to
one such formulation, EM1, the theory is expressed in terms of the Faraday
tensor, Fab, satisfying the (Maxwell) equations ∇[aFbc] = 0 and ∇aF
ab = Ja,
where Ja is a vector field representing the charge current density. According to
the second formulation, EM2, however, the theory is expressed in terms of the
vector potential, Aa, satisfying the equation ∇a∇
aAb −∇b∇aA
a = Jb.
These two formulations of electromagnetism are related to one another.
In particular, any model 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 of EM2 corresponds to a unique model
〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, via the equation Fab = ∇[aAb]. The converse, however,
is not true. That is, a typical model of EM1 does not typically correspond to
a unique model of EM2. More specifically, if 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 is a model of EM2
corresponding to a model 〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, then so will any other model of
EM2 〈M,ηab, A
′
a〉, where A
′
a is related to Aa by a “gauge transformation” A
′
a
= Aa + ∇aχ, where χ is some smooth scalar field.
It is EM1 which, I take it, constitutes the metaphysically perspicuous charac-
terisation of this theory. That is, it is the tensor Fab which faithfully represents
the fundamental ontology of the theory, namely the electromagnetic field. Not so
EM2. This second formulation may, of course, be useful for various calculational
or heuristic purposes. But the key point is that the vector potential Aa does not
directly represent a genuinely real field: rather, it is merely a mathematically
convenient “shorthand” way of characterising and determining the values of the
Faraday tensor, which is taken to represent the genuine material ontology of
the theory.12 Moreover, it is precisely by construing the vector potential in this
9See, e.g., O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens (1995, 154-7).
10Here and below, I take this theory to be set in Minkowski spacetime. Thus, the spacetime
models of this theory are of the form 〈M,ηab〉, where M is a four-dimensional differentiable
manifold, and ηab is the Minkowski metric.
11For a recent, intriguing study of the relationship between these two different formulations
of electromagnetism, see Weatherall (forthcoming). I draw heavily on his discussion over the
next couple of paragraphs.
12Modulo, that is, certain concerns that arise as a result of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. See,
e.g., Healey (2007).
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way which plausibly allows us to explain and understand, in a fully transpar-
ent way, gauge-symmetry models’ physical equivalence in EM2—namely, for the
reason that they are merely notationally distinct ways of representing the same
fundamental physical ontology.
As mentioned above, I think this example of metaphysical perspicuity is apt
to be slightly misleading, at least when taken on its own. This is because this
example might make it seem as though having a metaphysically perspicuous
characterisation of the (putative) reality underlying symmetry-related models
crucially relies upon one having to mathematically reformulate the relevant the-
ory (or at least upon having such a mathematical reformulation already in hand),
and in particular upon having to reformulate the theory so as to remove any
relevant representational redundancy. However, I think this is incorrect. That
is, I believe that one can, in fact, be in possession of a metaphysically perspicu-
ous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even in
the absence of any mathematical (re-)formulation of the theory which removes
the relevant representational redundancy.
Let me illustrate this point with two simple examples. First, consider the
case of shift symmetry in NGT. This symmetry is subtly different from the case
of boost symmetry, discussed above. Here, instead of uniformly altering the
absolute velocity of each particle throughout its history, one enacts a global,
time-independent repositioning of all matter in space. Thus, for instance, in the
shifted world all of the world’s material content will (prima facie) be located
three metres to the left of where it is in the original world. The basic idea
behind the “Leibniz shift” argument—the famous argument associated with
this symmetry—is that the substantivalist’s admission of points of space as
primitive objects (allegedly) has the undesirable consequence of committing her
to regarding shifted worlds as physically distinct, yet nevertheless empirically
indistinguishable:13 in intuitive terms, everything would look, feel, taste, touch
and sound the same in the two (putatively distinct) shifted worlds, just as in
the case of boosted worlds.
It will prove helpful to express all of this in terms of the models of the theory.
Thus, take a generic model of NGT to be of the formM = 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉,
where M is a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, tab is the temporal metric,
hab is the spatial metric, σa is the timelike vector field whose integral curves rep-
resent the persisting points of absolute space, and ρ and φ represent the matter
density and the gravitational potential field respectively.14 A shift symmetry
can then be characterised as the application of the appropriate diffeomorphism
(corresponding to a spatial translation) d so as to yield a new model Mstatic =
〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, d∗ρ, d∗φ〉. It is then alleged thatM andMstatic differ precisely
13Though see Maudlin (1993), who notes that there is an interesting (epistemological) sense
in which shifted worlds in NGT are not indiscernible after all.
14Note that the canonical presentations of Newtonian spacetime (e.g., Earman 1989, §2.5)
take the affine connection as ideologically primitive. I find such presentations unsatisfactory for
historical rather than for philosophical reasons: in particular, it threatens to make the move
to Galilean spacetime seem almost trivial, and the associated timelike vector field trivially
superfluous. For more on this point, see Pooley (MS, §4.4-§4.5).
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insofar as they each represent the world’s matter content as being located at
distinct places in absolute space. More specifically, such Leibniz-shifted scenar-
ios are alleged to differ precisely with regard to which particular points of space
are underlying various parts of the matter fields.
For a second example, consider diffeomorphism symmetry in general relativ-
ity (GR). Here, similarly, the existence of this symmetry is alleged to commit
the substantivalist to a plurality of physically distinct possibilities that are nev-
ertheless empirically indistinguishable. In terms of the models of the theory:
taking a generic model of GR to be of the formM = 〈M, gab, Tab〉 and applying
an arbitrary diffeomorphism d to yield a new model Mdiff = 〈M,d
∗gab, d
∗Tab〉
(where M is again a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, gab is the metric
tensor, and Tab is the stress-energy tensor which, roughly speaking, represents
the model’s matter content), the two scenarios represented are alleged to differ
with regard to which particular points of the spacetime manifold are underlying
various parts of the metric and matter fields.15
It is my contention that neither the shift symmetry of NGT, nor the diffeo-
morphism symmetry of general relativity, by themselves motivate any mathe-
matical reconstrual of the respective theories. This is because I believe there
is a perfectly transparent, anti-haecceitist, “modestly structuralist”—but nev-
ertheless fully substantivalist—way of understanding such models’ representa-
tional equivalence even in the absence of any such mathematical reformulation.
On this view, spacetime points are construed as genuinely real, fundamental
entities. However, they are “contextually individuated”: they are not to be
understood as being anything more—or less—than “nodes” in the relational,
geometrical structures in which they are embedded. Shifted models in NGT
and diffeomorphically-related models in GR are thus to be understood as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs precisely because the exact same
pattern of relational, geometrical structures is represented as obtaining in each
case. Moreover, this view denies that there are any primitive, singular (“haec-
ceitistic”) facts about spacetime points which would even allow for a distinction
between shifted or diffeomorphically-related scenarios to be coherently drawn.16
Whence the difference, then, between the case of gauge symmetry in electro-
magnetism on the one hand, and shift and diffeomorphism symmetry in NGT
and GR on the other? I think the answer is straightforward. In the latter cases,
the models in question are isomorphic: they represent worlds which differ at
most with regard to which particular objects are playing which qualitative roles,
i.e., they represent at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. Hence,
adopting modest structuralism (which implies anti-haecceitism) about space-
time transparently collapses the number of possibilities represented by these
models to one. In the former such case, however, the relevant models are not
isomorphic—read “literally”, gauge-related models of EM2 assign qualitatively
distinct arrangements of the vector field over spacetime—hence adopting a mod-
estly structuralist ontology does not by itself collapse the number of represented
15For further details see, e.g., Earman (1989, §9).
16For further defence of this view—which is sometimes also called sophisticated substanti-
valism in the literature—see, e.g., Saunders (2003), Ladyman (2007), and Pooley (2013).
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possibilities to one. In order to transparently understand such models’ physical
equivalence, then, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
To summarise the claims made thus far: according to the motivational view
of symmetries, one is invariably only motivated to regard symmetry-related
models as physically equivalent; moreover, one is justified in regarding such
models as physically equivalent only insofar as one is in possession of a meta-
physically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
them. However, it is possible to be in possession of a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even
in the absence of a mathematical formulation of the theory which removes the
relevant representational redundancy. Such a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation is possible just in case the symmetry-related models in question are
isomorphic, or are naturally understood as representing at most haecceitistically
distinct possibilities. In brief: symmetry-related, isomorphic models invariably
do not motivate a mathematical reformulation of the relevant theory (modest
structuralism invariably suffices); but symmetry-related, non-isomorphic models
invariably do.17
4 In Defence of the Motivational View
Let us return once more to the case of NGT. As alluded to in Section 1, the
symmetry group of this theory is quite large. For not only does it include trans-
formations corresponding to global velocity boosts of solutions’ matter content,
but it also includes transformations corresponding to time-dependent transla-
tional accelerations of such content (so long as the gravitational potential field
is also appropriately transformed). Thus, read “literally”, the symmetries of
this theory include transformations that map solutions to solutions that repre-
sent physically distinct, but nevertheless empirically indistinguishable, states of
affairs in which a given material system is:
1. Force-free and stationary with respect to absolute space.
2. Force-free and moving at constant absolute velocity.
3. Absolutely accelerating under a gravitational force-field.
According to the interpretational conception of symmetries, we may legit-
imately take all of these symmetry-related solutions to in fact represent the
same physical state of affairs—despite the fact that they are naturally under-
stood as representing radically distinct physical situations. Things are very
different, however, according to the motivational conception of symmetries. On
this view, we are merely motivated to regard all such solutions as representing
the same physical state of affairs, the motivation arising from the general Oc-
camist principle that, other things being equal, our preferred scientific theories
should not allow for solutions that represent physically distinct but nevertheless
empirically indistinguishable possible worlds. According to the motivational
17See also Pooley (2013, 576-7) and Weatherall (forthcoming) for recent, related arguments
to this effect.
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view, then (and to repeat slightly), absent a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation of the reality underlying these symmetry-related models, we have
no choice but to regard them as representing physically distinct states of affairs.
For our purposes, the crucial thing to note about all of these models is
that none of them are isomorphic—naturally understood, they do not represent
at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. According to the criterion
laid down in the previous section, then, in order to be able to transparently
understand how it could be that such models may be said to represent physically
equivalent scenarios, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
As it turns out, such a mathematical reformulation of the theory is pos-
sible. In brief, in this reformulation one replaces the vector field σa with a
new kind of dynamical inertial connection ∇NC , with models of the formMNC
= 〈M, tab, h
ab,∇NC , ρ〉. Up to isomorphism, any two symmetry-related mod-
els of NGT correspond to a unique model of Newtonian gravity geometrised
in this way. Thus, it is said, by moving to this “Newton-Cartan” theory one
successfully removes the undesirable “gauge-redundancy” inherent in all non-
geometrised versions of Newtonian gravitation theory.18
What might the defender of the interpretational view of symmetries say in
defence of her view—in this context, that the move to Newton-Cartan theory
is not required in order to be able to legitimately regard all symmetry-related
solutions of NGT as physically equivalent?
I anticipate two likely lines of response. First, she might attempt to establish
the preferability of her view over the motivational view by noting that the
defender of the motivational view is committed, at least prior to the appropriate
theory’s reformulation (in the context of NGT), to the existence of in principle
undetectable (symmetry-variant) matters of fact. Moreover, the defender of
the interpretational view might argue, this is an unpalatable consequence, one
which we would do best to avoid—and one which, she might point out, the
interpretational view does in fact avoid.
I agree that the admission of such in principle undetectable facts is an un-
desirable consequence of the motivational view. However, I do not think that
this admission is sufficiently unpalatable so as to be capable of refuting the
motivational view, or even of establishing the preferability of the interpreta-
tional view over the motivational view. After all, prohibitively strong versions
of verificationism aside, there is nothing obviously absurd about admitting in
principle undetectable facts into one’s ontology; nor is there any obvious reason
why we should always be capable of discovering a theory, or a perspicuous char-
acterisation thereof (the case of isomorphic models excepted), which succeeds
in transparently explaining such solutions’ empirical equivalence by virtue of
18For further details, see, e.g., Knox (2014). Note also the important point that moving
to Newton-Cartan theory is not by itself sufficient for one to be able to transparently under-
stand as physically equivalent all symmetry-related models of Newtonian theory set in flat
spacetime. This is because—as mentioned above—such symmetry-related models will typi-
cally correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan theory only up to isomorphism. Thus,
in order to have a fully transparent understanding of how it is that symmetry-related models
of Newtonian theory set in flat spacetime can correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan
theory, a modestly structuralist conception of spacetime ontology is also required.
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their actual physical equivalence; nor indeed is there even any obvious way of
guaranteeing that there will always be such a theory or characterisation (again,
isomorphic models excepted) waiting in logical space to be discovered.
Furthermore, although it is to be admitted that the Newtonian who sub-
scribes to the merely motivational view of symmetries might indeed be com-
mitted to the possibility of there being facts beyond her epistemic grasp, it
nevertheless bears emphasising that for such a Newtonian there is a perfectly
good explanation as to why such facts are epistemically inaccessible: they are in-
accessible precisely because the world is in fact accurately described by the laws
of NGT, with associated models of the form 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉, and because
all any Newtonian observer ultimately has empirical access to are the relative
distances and velocities between material entities. For such a Newtonian, then,
the empirical phenomena underdetermine the genuine physical facts; but the
theory itself is able to provide a perfectly transparent explanation of the re-
ality behind the phenomena in terms of which the underdetermination can be
straightforwardly understood.
The Newtonian who adopts the interpretational construal of symmetries,
however, would appear to lose this explanatory transparency. In other words,
she might know that she may legitimately regard all symmetry-related solutions
as physically equivalent; but the reality in terms of which this physical equiv-
alence is to be understood will (absent a reformulation of the theory) remain
opaque to her; she is offered no immediate explanation as to how such physical
equivalence is to be construed, or how it could even be said to arise.
These considerations naturally suggest a second possible line of response for
the defender of the interpretational view. In particular, she might claim that
she does, in fact, have a transparent understanding of the reality underlying
NGT’s symmetry-related models, and that such a transparent understanding is
in fact attainable prior to the move to Newton-Cartan theory.19
Such a response evidently leads into deep philosophical waters very quickly.
(After all, what does it mean to be in possession of a “transparent under-
standing” of anything?) But let me make a brief remark as to why I find this
particular claim to be implausible. For note that in NGT the persisting points
of absolute space are not merely “idly turning wheels” that can simply be ex-
punged from the theory without explanatory loss: they are not “explanatorily
idle” posits. This is for two main reasons. First, such points play a crucial
role in the metaphysical explanation of what quantities like relative velocity and
absolute rotation and absolute acceleration truly are: for the Newtonian, facts
about particular inter-particle velocities and absolute rotations and absolute ac-
celerations are naturally understood as being grounded in particular facts about
(rates of change of) absolute velocities.20 Second, such points provide the cru-
cial transtemporal standard which is required in the realist’s causal explanation
of the observable effects of noninertial motion (e.g., Newton’s famous “bucket
experiment”): a standard without which Newton’s laws simply cannot be formu-
19Dewar (2015, esp. 322)—who is a recent, explicit defender of the interpretational view—is
plausibly read as making this claim.
20Cf. Pooley (MS, 118).
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lated (at least, absent any other way of construing the transtemporal structure
required to underwrite the distinction between inertial and noninertial motion).
In short—and to the extent that the interpretational view is not supposed to
reduce to a rather uninteresting form of scientific instrumentalism—it is simply
not clear what causal-explanatory, realistic picture of the world is being pro-
pounded by the defender of the interpretational view, at least in this particular
(Newtonian) context; it is simply opaque what, according to her, the world is
really like.
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The information loss paradox is often presented as an unavoidable consequence of
well-established physics. However, in order for a genuine paradox to ensue, not-trivial
assumptions about, e.g., quantum effects on spacetime, are necessary. In this work
we will be explicit about these additional, speculative assumptions required. We will
also sketch a map of the available routes to tackle the issue, highlighting the, often
overlooked, commitments demanded of each alternative. In particular, we will display
the strong link between black holes, the issue of information loss and the measurement
problem.
1 Introduction
The so-called information loss paradox is usually introduced as an unavoidable conse-
quence of standard, well-established physics. The paradox is supposed to arise from a
glaring conflict between Hawking’s black hole radiation and the fact that time evolution
in quantum mechanics preserves information. However, the truth is that, in order for a
genuine paradox to appear, a sizable number of additional, non-standard assumptions
is required. As we will see, these extra assumptions involve thesis regarding the fun-
damental nature of Hawking’s radiation, guesses regarding quantum aspects of gravity
and even considerations in the foundations of quantum theory.
In this work, we will be explicit about the additional assumptions required for
a genuine conflict to arise and delineate the available options in order to tackle the
issue. In particular, we will stress the connection between information loss and the
measurement problem, and display the often non-trivial commitments that each of the
available alternatives to solve the information loss issue demands.
1
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1029-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -408-
2 The classical setting: black holes hide informa-
tion
We start by reviewing some properties of classical black holes. Gravity, being always
attractive, tends to draw matter together to form clusters. In fact, if the mass of a
cluster is big enough, nothing will be able to stop the contraction until, eventually, a
black hole will form. That is, the gravitational field at the surface of the body will
be so strong that not even light will be able to escape and a region of spacetime from
which nothing is able to emerge will form. The boundary of such a region is called the
event horizon and, according to general relativity, its area never decreases.
In general, the collapse dynamics that leads to the formation of a black hole can, of
course, be very complicated. However, it can be shown that all such systems eventually
settle down into one of the few stationary black hole solutions, which are completely
characterized by the mass, charge and angular momentum of the the Kerr-Newman
spacetimes. In fact, the so-called black hole uniqueness theorems guarantee that, as
long as one only considers gravitational and electromagnetic fields, then these solutions
represent the complete class of stationary black holes. Moreover, the so-called no-hair
theorems ensure that the set of stationary solutions does not grow, even if one considers
other hypothetical fields.
The above mentioned results seem to suggest that when a cluster collapses to form a
black hole, a large amount of information is lost. That is, details such as the multipole
moments of the initial mass distribution, or the type of matter involved, seem to be
altogether lost when the black hole settles. Note however that such apparent loss of
information corresponds only to that available to observers outside of the black hole.
While at early times there are Cauchy hypersurfaces1 completely contained outside
of the black hole, at later times all Cauchy hypersurfaces have parts both inside and
outside it (see Figure 1). Therefore, using data located both outside and inside of the
black hole, the whole spacetime can always be recovered. We conclude that, in the
classical setting, information is not really lost. All that happens is that, when a black
hole forms, a new region of no escape emerges and some of the information from the
outside of the black hole moves into such new region. One could still argue that, since
there are points inside of the horizon which are not in the past of future null infinity,2
1A Cauchy hypersurface is a subset of spacetime which is intersected exactly once by every inex-
tensible, non-spacelike curve.
2Future null infinity is the set of points which are approached asymptotically by null rays which
2
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then it is impossible to reconstruct the whole spacetime by evolving backwards the
data on it. However, future null infinity is not a Cauchy hypersurface so one should
not expect to reconstruct the whole spacetime from such data.
I
−
I
+Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 1: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body. I+ and I− denote past and
future null infinity.
3 QFT on a fixed curved background: black holes
radiate
The most dramatic change in our understanding of black hole physics came as a result
of Hawking’s famous analysis. What this analysis showed was that the formation of
a black hole would modify the state of any quantum field in such a way that, at late
times, there would be an outgoing flux of particles carrying energy towards infinity.
Moreover, Hawking showed that the flux was characterized by the surface gravity κ of
the resulting asymptotic stationary state of the black hole. This discovery transformed
our perception of the formal analogy, originally pointed out in Bekenstein (1972),
between the laws of black hole dynamics, and the standard laws of thermodynamics
(see Wald (1994) for a discussion). In particular, it led to the view that the surface
gravity is in fact a measure of the black hole’s temperature T = κ
2pi
, and that the event
horizon’s area A is a measure of the black hole’s entropy S = A/4.
Hawking’s result is probably the most famous of the effects that arise from the
natural extension of special relativistic quantum field theory to the realm of curved
spacetimes. It imposes a dramatic modification on the classical view of black holes as
can escape to infinity.
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absolutely black and eternal regions of spacetime. It is important to stress, though,
that Hawking’s calculation, being a result pertaining to quantum field theory on a
fixed spacetime, does not encompass back-reaction effects. These are in fact notoriously
difficult to deal with and a general framework for doing so is lacking. At any rate, some
straightforward physical considerations, which have rather dramatic consequences, are
often brought to bear in this context.
4 Back-reaction and first quantum gravity input:
black holes evaporate
As can be expected, Hawking’s result also suggests a dramatic modification in our
expectation for the ultimate fate of a black hole. That is, while before Hawking’s
discovery, one would have expected that, once formed, a black hole would be eternal,
the fact that the radiation is caring energy away, assuming overall energy conservation,
leads one to expect that the mass of the black hole will start diminishing. The context
in which this problem is standardly set is that of asymptotically flat spacetimes, for
which we have a well defined notion of overall energy content given by the ADM mass3
of the spacetime, a quantity which is known to be conserved.
As we noted, Hawking’s calculation cannot deal with back-reaction. However, our
confidence on energy conservation in the appropriate situations is so robust that it is
difficult not to conclude that, as the radiation carries away energy, the black hole mass
will have to diminishing. If this takes place, the surface gravity of the black hole—which
is no longer really stationary, but can be expected to deviate from stationarity only to a
very small degree—would change as well. As it turns out, the surface gravity is inversely
proportional to the black hole’s mass, so the black hole temperature can be expected to
increase, leading to a ever more rapid rate of energy loss and a correspondingly faster
decrease in mass.
The run away picture for the evaporation process suggests a complete disappearance
of the black hole in a finite amount of time. Of course, we cannot really be sure about
this picture because, in order to perform a solid analysis, we would need to deploy
a, currently lacking, trustworthy theoretical formalism adept to the challenge. The
3The ADM mass is a quantity associated with the asymptotic behavior of the induced spatial
metric of a Cauchy hypersurface. In asymptotically flat spacetimes, it is known to be independent of
the hypersurface on which it is evaluated (see Arnowitt et al. (1962)).
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problem is that, by the removal of energy from the black hole, one can expect to
eventually reach a regime where quantum aspects of gravitation become essential to
the description of the process. At such point, one might contemplate the possibility
that, as a result of purely quantum gravitational aspects, the Hawking evaporation of
the black hole will stop, leaving a small stable remnant. This, in turn, might open
certain possibilities regarding the information issue. For the time being, though, we
will ignore such an option.
Then, in order to simplify the discussion at this point, we will ignore the possibility
of remnants and assume that there is nothing to stop the Hawking radiation. Then,
if the black hole’s mass decreases in accordance with energy conservation, one expects
that the black hole to simply disappear and the spacetime region where it was located
to turn flat (see Figure 2).
I
−
I
+
Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 2: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body, taking into account Hawk-
ing’s radiation.
At this point, we seem to come face to face with an information loss problem: the
original massive object that collapses, leading to the formation of a black hole, might
have required an incredibly large amount of detail for its description. However, the
final state that results from the evaporation is simply described in terms of the thermal
Hawking flux, followed by an empty region of spacetime. More to the point, even if
the initial matter that collapses to form a black hole was initially in a pure quantum
state, after the complete evaporation of the black hole there would be a mixed one,
corresponding to the thermal Hawking flux. These considerations seem to indicate
that, even at the fundamental level, we have a fundamental loss of information. The
final state, even if described in full detail, does not encode the information required
to retrodict the details of the initial one. At the level of quantum theory, we would
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be facing a non-unitary (and non-deterministic) relation between the initial and final
states of the system, a situation that seems at odds with the unitary evolution provided
by the Schrödinger equation.
There are, however, various caveats to the above conclusion. The first one is opened
up by the possibility of the evaporation eventually stopping, leading to a stable rem-
nant. The mass of said remnant can be estimated by considering the natural scales at
which the effects of quantum gravity are expected to become important. This leads to
an estimate of the order of Plank’s mass (≈ 10−5 gr). Then, if one wants the remnant
to encode all the information present in the initial state, one is led to the conclusion
that such a small object would have a number of possible internal states as large as
that of the original matter that collapsed to form the black hole, which can, of course,
have had a mass as large as one can imagine. It is hard, then, to envisage what kind of
object, with such rather unusual thermodynamical behavior, would this remnant have
to be. For this reason, this possibility is usually not considered viable (although we
acknowledge that these considerations might be overturned; for a discussion of these
issues see Banks (1994)). At any rate, we will not consider this possibility any further.
We should also mention another proposal which uses the idea that, while curing
singularities, quantum gravity might open paths to other universes, which could be
home to the missing information. Such information would be encoded either in a
new universe or in correlations between it and ours. Besides the dramatic ontological
burden, such proposal leaves open the possibility of these alternative universes emerging
even in ordinary processes (which could, e.g., involve virtual black holes), leading
to information loss in such standard scenarios. Alternatively, the information could
be preserved, but impossible to retrieve in principle. We will also not consider this
possibility any further.
A much more important caveat is the following: we have very solid results indicat-
ing that, associated with the formation of a black hole, there is always a singularity
of spacetime appearing withing it. The strongest results in this regard are a series of
theorems proved by Hawking (see Hawking and Ellis (1973)) showing that, under quite
general conditions, and assuming reasonable properties for the energy and momentum
of the collapsing matter, the formation of singularities is an inevitable result of Ein-
stein’s equations. The issue is that, at the classical level, these singularities represent
a breakdown of the theory and, in fact, a failure of the spacetime description. The
singularities are, therefore, to be thought of as representing boundaries of spacetime,
rather that points within it. Once a spacetime has additional boundaries, it is clear
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that the issue of information has to be confronted on a different light. Of course, if one
considers the description of the system at an initial Cauchy hypersurface and wants a
final hypersurface to encode the same information, one has to make sure that the final
one is also Cauchy.
The formation of singularities then implies that, if we want to have spacetime
regions where the system’s state could be thought of as encoding all the information,
then we must surround the singularities by suitable boundaries. In other words, if the
singularities force us to include further boundaries of spacetime, then the comparison of
initial and final information has to be done between the initial Cauchy hypersurface and
the late-time collection of surfaces that, together, act as a Cauchy hypersurface. That
collection could naturally include asymptotically null future, but also the hypersurfaces
surrounding the singularities. The same kind of calculation as the one done by Hawking
would then show that all the information present on the initial hypersurface would also
be encoded in the state associated with this late-time Cauchy hypersurface. That is,
if we include the boundary of spacetime that arises in association with the singularity,
then there is no issue regarding the fate of information. We conclude that, under these
circumstances, still there is no information loss.
5 Second quantum gravity input: black holes do
not involve singularities
As we noted above, singularities represent a breakdown of the spacetime description
as provided by general relativity and thus indicate the need to go beyond such theory.
The expectation among theorists is that quantum gravity is going to be the theory
that cures these failures of classical general relativity, replacing the singularities by
a description in the language appropriate to quantum gravity. This is, in fact, what
occurs with various other theories that are known to be just effective descriptions of
a physical system’s behavior in a limited context, but that have to be replaced with a
more fundamental description once the system leaves that regime. Think for instance
of the description of a fluid by, say, the Navier-Stokes equations. We know that this
description works very well in a large variety of circumstances, but that a breakdown of
such description occurs, for instance, when there are shock waves or when other types
of singularities are formed. However, under such circumstances, the underlying kinetic
theory, including the complex inter-molecular forces, is expected to remain valid. The
7
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point is that, just as in those cases, one expects the emergence of singularities in general
relativity to indicate the end of the regime where the classical description of spacetime
is valid and, therefore, where a quantum gravity description would have to take over
(see Figure 3 and Ashtekar and Bojowald (2005) for details).
I
−
I
+
Figure 3: “Quantum spacetime diagram” for a black hole.
Of course, if quantum gravity does in fact cure the singularities, and removes the
need to consider, in association with the corresponding regions, a boundary of space-
time, the issue of the fate of information in the Hawking evaporation of black holes
resurfaces with dramatic force. So, do we finally have a genuine paradox in our hands.
Not quite yet; a few elements are still missing. In order for a paradox to arise, we need
to couple a genuine loss of information with a fundamental theory which does not allow
for information to be lost.
6 A paradox?
When is it, then, that the Hawking radiation by a black hole leads to an actual paradox?
We are finally in a position to enumerate the various assumptions required in order to
construct a genuine conflict:
1. As a result of Hawking’s radiation carrying energy away from the black hole, the
mass of the black hole decreases and it either evaporates completely or leaves a
small remnant.
2. In the case where the black hole leaves a small remnant, the number of its internal
degrees of freedom is bounded by its mass in such a way that these cannot possibly
encode the information contained in an arbitrarily massive initial state.
8
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1036-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -415-
3. Information is not transfered to a parallel universe.
4. As a result of quantum gravity effects, the internal singularities within black
holes are cured and replaced by something that eliminates the need to consider
internal boundaries of spacetime.
5. The outgoing radiation does not encode the initial information.
6. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
We have already discussed the arguments in support of assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4
and saw that, although by no means conclusive, they are reasonable. But what about
5 and 6? Well, in order to avoid a paradox, and assuming the first four assumptions
to be true, at least one of them has to be negated. In order to explore the motivations
and consequences of doing so, we must think clearly about how to interpret Hawking’s
calculation in a context in which 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the case.
As we remarked above, Hawking’s calculation is performed in the setting of a quan-
tum field theory over a fixed curved background. What one finds there is that an initial
pure state of the field evolves into a final one which, when tracing over the inside re-
gion, reduces to a mixed thermal state. The key question at this point, then, is how
to interpret such a final mixed state in a setting in which i) the black hole is no longer
there, so there is no interior region to trace over, and ii) in which there is no singularity
(or parallel universe) for the information to “escape into.” As far as we can see, there
are two alternatives: either one assumes that the mixed state arises only as a result
of tracing over the interior region and maintains that the outgoing radiation somehow
encodes the initial information—which amounts to negating 5; or one takes Hawking’s
result seriously and maintains that, even in this scenario, information is lost—which
amounts to negating 6. Below we explore each option in detail.
6.1 The outgoing radiation encodes information
In the last couple of decades, the community’s position on the information loss subject
has been strongly influenced by developments in String theory. Such framework has
permitted exploration of questions, regarding black holes, using settings where event
horizons and singularities play no relevant roles. This is possible due to the AdS/CFT
correspondence (see e.g., Strominger (2001)), which allows the mapping of compli-
cated spacetime geometries in the “bulk” of asymptotically Anti-de Sitter spacetimes,
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including ones involving black holes, onto corresponding states of an ordinary quantum
field theory living on the Anti-de Sitter boundary (which is, in fact, a flat spacetime).
These considerations have led people to conclude that, as a breakdown of unitarity is
not expected to take place in the context of a quantum field theory in flat spacetimes,
there should be no room for a breakdown of unitarity in the corresponding situation
involving black holes either.4
The proposal, then, is that unitarity is never broken and that information is never
lost. As a result, Hawking’s calculation has to be somehow attuned to assure consis-
tency. In particular, the proposal is that the outgoing radiation must encoded all of
the initial information. There is, however, a high price to pay in order to achieve this.
As has been shown in Almheiri et al. (2013), in order for the outgoing radiation to
encode the necessary information, each emitted particle must get entangled with all
the radiation emitted before it. However, due to the so-called, “monogamy of entan-
glement,” doing so entails the release of an enormous amount of energy, turning the
event horizon into a firewall that burns anything falling through it. The upshot then,
is a divergence of the energy-momentum tensor of the field over the event horizon and
a radical breakdown of the equivalence principle over such a region.
6.2 Unitarity is broken
The discovery of the Hawking radiation was initially taken as a clear indicative of
information loss at the fundamental level. In fact, Hawking (1976) even introduced
a notation for this general type of evolution which was supposed to account for the
transformation from (possibly pure) initial states ρi into final mixed ones ρf . Hawking
denoted the general linear, non-unitary, operator characterizing such transformation
by the sign $, i.e., ρf = $ρi. Likewise, Penrose pointed out that, in order to have a
consistent picture of phase space for situations involving black holes in thermal equilib-
rium with an environment, one has to assume that ordinary quantum systems undergo
something akin to a self-measurement, by which he meant quantum state reduction
that was not the result of measurement by external observers or measuring devices
(see Penrose (1981)). Penrose (1999) further argued that quantum state reduction is
probably linked to aspects of quantum gravity.
The early assessments of these ideas in Banks et al. (1984) indicated that they
4Note however that the argument can be easily reversed to show exactly the opposite. Since
Hawking’s result shows that unitarity breaks when black holes are present, one must conclude that
quantum evolution cannot be unitary even in a quantum field theory on flat spacetimes.
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where likely to lead to a very serious conflict with energy and momentum conservation
or to generate unacceptable non-local features in ordinary physical situations. However,
further analysis in Unruh and Wald (1995) showed that these assessments where not
that solid and that there where various possibilities to evade the apparently damning
conclusions.
In (omitted references) we have explored the viability of breaking unitarity both
qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, we have successfully adapted objective
collapse models, developed in connection with foundational issues within quantum
theory, in order to explicitly describe the transition from the initial pure state into
a mixed one. Our view on the subject is based on the conviction that, contrary to
the prevailing opinion in the community working on the gravity/quantum interface,
there are good reasons to think that quantum theory requires modifications to deal
with its basic conceptual difficulties. Below we discuss these issues and explore their
consequences for the information loss paradox.
7 Information loss and the measurement problem
Most discussions of black holes and information loss do not implicate foundational
issues of quantum theory. Of course, ignoring such issues, particularly with pragmatic
interests in mind, is often acceptable. However, when deep conceptual questions are
involved, such as in the present case, the pragmatic attitude might not be the right
way to go.
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics involves a profoundly instru-
mentalist character, with notions such as observer or measurement playing a crucial
role. Such an instrumentalist trait becomes a problem as soon as one intends to re-
gard the theory as a fundamental one, useful not only to make predictions in suitable
experimental settings, but also to be applied to the measurement apparatuses, to the
observers involved, or to non-standard contexts such as black holes or the universe as a
whole. The resulting problem, often referred to as the measurement problem, has been
discussed at length in numerous places and many different concrete formulations of it
have been given. A particularly useful way to state it, given in Maudlin (1995), is as
a list of three statements that cannot be all true at the same time:
A. The physical description given by the quantum state is complete.
B. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
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C. Measurements always yield definite results.
Maudlin’s formulation of the measurement problem is noteworthy because of its
generality and its preciseness. Moreover, it is extremely useful in order to motivate
and classify strategies to solve the problem. For example, by negating A, one arrives
at so-called hidden variable theories, such as Bohmian mechanics; by removing B,
one gets so-called objective collapse theories, such as GRW; and by discarding C,
Everettian interpretations emerge. Of these three options, the last one is, by far, the
most contentious. Among its most urgent matters, we can mention the problem of
the preferred basis, the one of making sense of probabilities in the theory and the
general and basic issue of establishing a clear and precise link between the abstract
mathematical objects of the theory and concrete empirical predictions. Of course, brave
attempts to deal with these and other issues within Everettian frameworks abound.
However, be believe that, at least for the time being, they are far from being successful.
Returning to the measurement problem and its relation to the information loss
issue, we note that assumptions 6 and B are in fact identical. Therefore, the strategy
one decides to adopt in order to avoid complications regarding the information loss
issue (e.g., negating 5 or 6 above) has implications with respect to what one must
say regarding the measurement problem (e.g., negating A, B or C). In particular, if
regarding the information loss, one decides to maintain the validity of 6 (and thus
to hold that the outgoing radiation encodes all of the initial information), then one
necessarily has to either negate A or C (i.e., either to entertain a hidden variables theory
or an Everettian scenario). In other words, insisting on a purely unitary evolution,
not only demands a violation of the equivalence principle and a divergence of the
energy-momentum tensor, but also a commitment either with many worlds or with an
acknowledgment that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. On the other hand,
if regarding the information loss problem, one decides to abandon unitarity, the same
move automatically not only avoids a breakdown of the equivalence principle, but also
guarantees success with respect to the measurement problem. The upper hand of the
second option seems evident to us.
8 Conclusions
Since the publication of Hawking’s analysis, more than forty years ago, the issue of black
hole information loss has been a central topic in theoretical physics. The AdS/CFT
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correspondence, proposed almost twenty years latter, came to further propel an already
notorious debate. Yet, even after all these years, the discussion is often engulfed by
confusion and misunderstanding among participants. The objective of this work is to
develop a clear analysis of some of the key conceptual issues involved. Our hope is
that, by doing so, significant progress on this important topic could soon be achieved.
We have presented the basic theoretical setting of the black hole information issue,
paying special attention to elements, arising from not yet well-established physics, that
presently have to be regarded merely as reasonable assumptions. Moreover, we have
argued that the information loss issue is closely related to the measurement problem,
and claimed that it is precisely within the context of certain proposals put forward to
deal with the latter that the former finds one of its most conservative resolutions.
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Abstract
This presentation proposes a new account of homology, which de-
fines homology as a correspondence of developmental or behavioral
mechanisms due to common ancestry. The idea is formally presented
as isomorphism of causal graphs over lineages. The formal treatment
not only clears the metaphysical skepticism regarding the homology
thinking, but also provides a theoretical underpinning to the concepts
like constraints, evolvability, and novelty. The novel interpretation of
homology suggests a general perspective that accommodates evolu-
tionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary approaches to understand evo-
lution, facilitating further empirical and theoretical researches.
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1 Introduction
The homology thinking, the idea that the same anatomical structure repeat-
edly appears in different species or parts of the same organism, has a long
history in biology (Amundson, 2005). While the existence of such anatomi-
cal similarities among or within species is now explained by the descent from
a common ancestor, the conceptual issues surrounding the notion have in-
vited philosophical as well as methodological debates and skepticism. Owen
famously defined homology as “the same organ in different animals under ev-
ery variety of form and function,” but this definition is perplexing rather than
enlightening: what characterizes and warrants the sameness of “organs,” if
not their form or function? What, in other words, is the unit of homology?
There are three conceptual problems. The first and foremost problem is
its definition: what exactly is homology? Evolutionary theory tells us that
homology is identity due to a common origin, but an identity of what? Is
it morphological characters, activities, clusters of properties, or genetic net-
works that are regarded to be same? And what is the criterion to judge
whether or not two such things are actually the “same”? The second prob-
lem is metaphysical. As Ghiselin (1997) points out, the homology-as-identity
partitions the whole tree of life into equivalence classes. But doesn’t the sup-
position of such universal classes, reminiscent of Aristotelian essence, commit
us to an anti-evolutionary thinking? And thirdly, there is a pragmatic ques-
tion: why do we care about homology at all? Some neo-Darwinians such
2
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as G. C. Williams see homologs as mere “residues,” i.e. a relic of the past
common ancestry not yet washed out by natural selection (Amundson, 2005,
pp. 237-8). If that is the case homology by itself would have no explanatory
role in evolutionary theory, and the quest for its definition, however well-
defined and metaphysically sound, becomes a mere armchair exercise with
no scientific value.
There is at least one usage of the concept free from these issues: homology
of DNA sequences. Here the “sameness” is well-defined by matching bases
that can be one of the four chemical kinds, G, C, T, A. Moreover, the scien-
tific importance of orthologs and paralogs is undeniable in reconstructing the
evolutionary history and predicting gene function, to name a few. Things
become different for phenotype, in particular complex phenotypes like mor-
phological or behavioral traits. First of all, there is no clear-cut definition of
“phenotypic units” as that for nucleotides. Continuous traits such as height
or weight usually lack objects breakpoints by which we classify them into
discrete equivalence classes. In sum, there seem to be no non-arbitrary and
non-controversial units for phenotype of which we can talk about the same-
ness, and thus homology.
Our first task, therefore, is to identify the units on which the pheno-
typic homology relationship can be defined. This presentation proposes that
this purpose is best served by causal graphs which formally represent de-
velopmental or behavioral mechanisms. Homology is thus defined as graph
isomorphism over lineages, or conservation of the underlying causal structure
3
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over evolutionary history (Section 2). I will argue in Section 3 that the for-
mal treatment of homology (i) solves the philosophical as well as empirical
puzzles and criticisms regarding the homology concept; (ii) provides clear
meanings to some key but elusive concepts such as constraints, evolvabil-
ity, and novelty; (iii) and suggests a broad perspective that accommodates
evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary research projects. Section 4 compares
the present approach to other existing accounts of homology, and discusses
its relative strengths, challenge, and philosophical implication. As will be
stressed there, the primary objective of this presentation is to facilitate or
open up new empirical as well as theoretical questions. The last section con-
cludes with some of these research prospects that are prompted by the new
homology concept.
2 Defining homology with graphs
The idea of characterizing homology in terms of causal structures is not
new. Various biologists have suggested, albeit in different fashions, that the
developmental or behavioral mechanisms underlying phenotype can or should
serve as a unit of homology (e.g. Riedl, 1978; Wagner, 1989, 2014; Gilbert
and Bolker, 2001; Mu¨ller, 2003). These proposal, however, are mostly based
on independent examples or qualitative descriptions, and the lack of a unified
treatment has blurred their philosophical as well as theoretical implications.
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The aim of this section is to give a formal representation to the ideas of
developmental sameness by using causal graphs, in view of exploring the
conceptual nature of homology in the later sections.
A causal graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a set of phenotypic or
genetic variables of organisms and E is a set of edges representing causal
relationships among these traits. Development is understood as a causal web
connecting embryological, morphological, and behavioral traits, and the set
of edges E characterizes these causal links. Note that such connections may
remain invariant even under considerable modifications in phenotypic values
or the functional form that determines the quantitative nature of each edge.
The same set of E is consistent with a variety of phenotypic states and forms
of causal production; it only defines the qualitative feature of the causal
networks, i.e. which causes which.
Once modeled in this way, it becomes meaningful to compare causal struc-
tures of different organisms. A causal graph G1 = (V1,E1) is isomorphic
to another G2 = (V2,E2) if they have the same structure, or more for-
mally if there is a bijection f : V1 → V2 such that if (v, w) ∈ E1 then
(f(v), f(w)) ∈ E2. Likewise, isomorphism can be defined for subgraphs,
which are just parts of the causal graphs restricted to a subset V′ ⊂ V. We
write G1 ∼ G2 if two (sub)graphs are isomorphic. It is easy to see ‘∼’ is
symmetric, reflexive, and transitive, and thus defines a equivalence class.
Each individual is assigned one causal graph that models a particular
part of its developmental or behavioral mechanism. Let us denote the causal
5
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structure of an organism a by G(a). Collectively, G(A) is a set of causal
structures for a set of organisms A. We assume usual ancestor/descendant
relationships over a set of organism Ω (which may include more than one
species). If b is an ancestor of a, the lineage between b and a is a set of every
individual between them. Given this setup homology is defined as follows.
For two sets of organisms A,B ⊂ Ω, let G ′ be a subgraph of all
g ∈ G(A), and G ′′ be a subgraph of all g ∈ G(B). Then G ′ and
G ′′ are homologous iff
1. G ′ ∼ G ′′;
2. there is a set of common ancestors C ⊂ Ω of A and B1; and
3. for every d in all the lineages from C to A and C to B, G(d)
has a subgraph G ′′′ such that G ′′′ ∼ G ′ ∼ G ′′.
The definition explicates the idea that homology is the identity between
causal structures due to common ancestry. Two (sets of) organisms share
a homologous causal structure if, in addition to the graph isomorphism, ev-
ery individual on the lineage connecting them shares the same causal graph,
capturing the idea that the structure has been conserved through the evolu-
tionary history.
The same treatment applies to serial homology, i.e. the homology re-
lationship among parts of the same organism, such as teeth, limbs, or tree
1Note that C may be A or B themselves. Also note the condition 1 is redundant if a
lineage includes the both ends. But here it is retained for clarity.
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leaves. We can just set A = B, and compare different but isomorphic sub-
parts G ′,G ′′ of the same overall structure G(A). Then the homology hy-
pothesis is that there is an organism c in which the mechanism in question
was duplicated, and the lineages from c to A have conserved the duplicated
structures.
The above definition is illustrated with a case of special homology in figure
1, which depicts a particular region of the tree of life for (groups of) organisms
A to G. Two mutationsM1,M2 on the developmental mechanism occurred in
the lineage leading to F , in which one causal edge V1 → V3 was first removed
and then restored. In this example, the causal structure G(D) of population
D is homologous to G(E), for they are both inherited from the ancestral graph
G(B) and G(A). In contrast, it is not homologous to G(F ) even though they
are graph-isomorphic. This is because the lineages connecting D and F do
not conserve the causal structure in question: particularly it is not shared
by C.
The example, though too simplistic to capture any real biological phe-
nomena, makes explicit the idea that homology is a concordance of devel-
opmental mechanisms due to common ancestry. Note the criterion makes
no reference to the resulting phenotype represented by particular values or
distributions of variables. It does not require or forbid that, for example, two
populations E and D show similar morphological distributions. Nor does it
assume the graphs consist of the variables of the same nature. If the causal
graphs in figure 1 represent a genetic network, kinds of genes/variables that
7
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
∗
M1(V1 ̸→ V3)
∗
M2(V1 → V3)
Genealogy Causal graphs
V3
V2 V1
V3
V2 V1
Figure 1: Illustration of graph homology. On the left is a genealogy tree for
hypothetical populations A,B,C,D,E, F,G, while the graphs on the right
describe causal structures of these populations over three characters, V1, V2,
and V3. Two asterisks (∗) on the tree denote mutation events on the causal
structure. See text for explanation.
constitute the network may vary across populations, as long as they serve the
same causal roles within the overall structure. It is structural, rather than
material, identity that defines homology. Theoretical as well as philosophical
implications of this view will be explored in the following sections.
3 Conceptual advantages of the view
The above account is intended to provide a theoretical platform to formulate
and evaluate hypotheses or explanations regarding homology. This section
explicates the conceptual benefits of thinking homology in terms of causal
graphs. Discussions on the empirical adequacy are differed to the next sec-
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tion.
As discussed in the introduction, the major obstacle in defining homology
is the absence of definite phenotypic units. Homology is an identity rather
than similarity relationship (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997; Mu¨ller, 2003; Wagner, 2014),
whereas no two or more phenotypic characters are identical in a strict sense
— there are always subtle differences in, say, shape or size. The problem
could be solved if we could find a natural and non-arbitrary way to factorize
the phenotypic space into discrete regions so that two phenotypes within the
same region are regarded “identical” despite their apparent differences. This
is a difficult task, especially because we do not know the topological feature
of the phenotypic space (Wagner and Stadler, 2003). To solve this issue the
present analysis adopts a different strategy: instead of trying to impose a cer-
tain structure on the phenotypic space, it takes the generative mechanisms as
basic units. Once these mechanisms are represented by causal graphs, which
by nature are discrete mathematical entities, the desired identity relation-
ship is given by graph isomorphism regardless of differences in the resulting
morphology/phenotype. The graphical representation thus provides natural
units prerequisite to define homology.
It is granted that a graph representation is not determined uniquely, be-
cause the same developmental mechanism can be modeled in various levels of
abstraction, yielding causal graphs of different complexities. However, I take
this to be a strength rather than weakness of my view, because homology
too is often treated as description-dependent. Teleost fins and tetrapod limbs
9
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are said to be homologous as paired vertebrate appendages, but not as fins
or limbs. In contrast, our hands and pectoral fins of the whale are homol-
ogous not only as appendages but also as limbs. One tempting hypothesis
is that such degrees of homology relationship correspond to isomorphisms of
causal structures described at different granularities. In the above example,
it is hypothesized that teleost fins and tetrapod limbs are represented by the
same, but rather course-grained, causal graph, while tetrapod species share
the causal structure to much finer details.
Fixing the level of abstraction determines not only the equivalent classes
but also the degree of similarity between these classes. Two distinct causal
graphs may be closer or further depending on the number of changes required
to obtain one from the other. If G ′′ is obtained by removing one edge from G ′
which in turn lacks one of the edges of G, G ′′ is one step further than G ′ from
the original G. Each such deletion or addition of causal connection is called
novelty. Novelty in this framework is a modification of the causal graph, and
as such creates a new equivalence class of causal graphs, namely homology.
Evolutionary novelty also comes in different degrees. In general, a single
modification in abstract graphs will correspond to multiple edge additions
or deletions in detailed ones, and thus is weighted more. In this regard a
change in the causal graph shared both by teleosts and tetrapods will count
as a significant novelty and possibly a creation of a new “bauplan.”
This brings us to one of the central contentions in today’s evolutionary
biology, namely the alleged inadequacy of the Modern Synthesis framework,
10
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in particular population genetics, to incorporate macro-scale evolutionary
phenomena uncovered by evolutionary developmental biology (e.g. Pigliucci
and Mu¨ller, 2010). It has been claimed that homology (macro-scale conser-
vatism) and novelty (a large phenotypic change) not only resist explanations
by the Neo-Darwinian gradualism, but also constrain evolutionary trajec-
tories as modeled in population genetics (e.g Amundson, 2005; Brigandt,
2007). The theoretical relationship between Evo-Devo and population ge-
netics, however, remains elusive, which makes difficult to evaluate the call
for the “new synthesis.”
The present approach, by expressing homolgy and novelty in terms of
graph equivalence and modification, suggests a perspective on this connec-
tion and a way to turn these claims into empirical hypotheses. Because causal
models induce evolutionary changes as studied in population and quantita-
tive genetics (Otsuka, 2015, 2016), the graphical representation allows one to
analyze how developmental structures generate and constrain evolutionary
dynamics. In particular, topological features of the graph such as modularity
yield, via the so-called Markov condition, patterns of probabilistic indepen-
dence on the phenotypic distribution and determine possible evolutionary
trajectories or evolvability. The causal graph approach thus supports the
view that a homolog constitutes a unit of morphological evolvability (Brig-
andt, 2007).
The graph structures that yield population dynamics are usually not
study objects of population genetics. They rather serve as background frame-
11
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works in which evolutionary models are build to study changes in genetic or
phenotypic frequencies. These frameworks, however, must come from some-
where, and this evolutionary process is a primary interest of Evo-Devo. Stud-
ies on homology and novelty — graph stasis and change — amount to “higher
order” evolutionary analyses that deal with changes in the theoretical frame-
work used in population genetics to predict local population dynamics. The
graphical conception of homology thus suggests a broad perspective that ac-
commodates these different, and sometimes seen antagonistic, research fields
as complementary approaches to understand evolution.
Finally, let us turn to the metaphysical problem. As seen above, homol-
ogy is defined as an equivalence class over a set of causal graphs. But to
what do such classes correspond, if not some ideal types or essences? Ho-
mology thinking has been criticized as anti-evolutionary due to its alleged
commitment to essentialism. These critics thus re-interpret homology as a
lineage that connects individual parts, rather than as a universal class to be
instantiated by its members/homologs (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997). A detailed ex-
amination of this criticism must await another occasion, but here I just want
to propose a different way to look at the issue. A metaphysical implication
from the present study is that homology stands to concrete parts of organ-
isms not as a universal to individuals, nor as a whole to parts, but rather as a
model to phenomena to be modeled. A homology hypothesis is based on an
observation that two or more individuals or parts thereof can be modeled by
12
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the same causal graph.2 Hence the proper relationship is not instantiation or
mereology, but representation (Suppes, 2002). Once conceived in this way,
the metaphysical ghost of essentialism vanishes away. Just like the same
oscillator model characterizes various kinds of pendulum clocks, homology-
as-model is a mathematical entity (directed graph) that may represent more
than one actual individual, but that does not force us to commit to any form
of essentialism.
The individual-universal distinction has also cast a shadow on the prag-
matic issue regarding the epistemic role and significance of the concept of
homology. It has been argued that the study of homology cannot be any
more than a historiography since there is no such thing as a law for in-
dividuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A very different picture, however, emerges from
the present thesis. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis regarding
causal isomorphism— that two or more (sets of) organismal parts can be rep-
resented by the same causal model — and as such makes various predictions.
For example, it supports extrapolations from model organisms, predicting
that homologous organs will respond in the same or similar fashion to phys-
iological, chemical, or genetic interventions. In addition, since isomorphic
developmental structures will generate similar patterns of phenotypic vari-
ation (see above), their evolutionary changes are expected to follow similar
trajectories. Establishing homologous relationships therefore is not a mere
2This, in turn, implies these individuals would respond in a more or less same fashion
to hypothetical interventions (Woodward, 2003). Hence homology statements eventually
boil down to counterfactual claims.
13
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historical description, but has predictive implications both on physiological
and evolutionary studies.
4 Comparisons and possible objections
This section compares the present proposal with some of the existing ac-
counts of homology and also discusses possible objections. A number of
philosophers and biologists have recently proposed to define homology as a
homeostatic property cluster, a cluster of correlated properties maintained by
“homeostatic mechanisms” (e.g. Boyd, 1991; Rieppel, 2005; Brigandt, 2009;
Love, 2009). Since clustering and correlations are a matter of degree, homol-
ogy according to this view is not an identity but a similarity relationship. It
thus confronts with the boundary problem — to what extent properties must
be clustered to form a homolog? The underlying “homeostatic mechanism”
is supposed to clarify this boundary, but without a clear definition of what
it is such an attempt only leads to a circularity. In particular, if it is defined
as “those causal processes that determine the boundary and integrity of the
kind (Brigandt, 2009, p.82),” the charge of circularity cannot be avoided.
This kind of problem will not arise if the generative mechanisms are de-
fined explicitly in terms of causal graphs. While my approach proposes a
formal framework to represent these mechanisms, it does not make any as-
sumption or restriction on their structure: in particular it does not require
the mechanism to be homeostatic, circumventing the criticism that a home-
14
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1056-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -435-
ostatic mechanism by definition cannot evolve (Kluge, 2003). Moreover, the
reference to “clusters” or even properties becomes superfluous, because the
variational properties of phenotype are mere derivatives of the underlying
causal graph. Of course, covarying traits suggest some ontogenetic connec-
tions, and thus may serve as a useful heuristics for finding homologs. They
are, however, only “symptoms” — what define homology are not properties,
clustered or homeostatic, but rather generative mechanisms.
The present approach has a closer affinity to the so-called biological ho-
mology concept that attempts to explain the phenomena of homology on the
basis of a particular feature of the underlying causal structure, such as gene
regulatory networks (e.g. Wagner, 1989, 2014). Indeed, one motivation of
this presentation is to give a formal platform for these empirical hypotheses
to elucidate their theoretical as well as philosophical implications. An impor-
tant empirical challenge to the biological homology concept, and any other
attempts to identify a homolog with a certain developmental structure, is the
well-known fact that morphological similarity does not entail developmental
sameness (Wagner and Misof, 1993). It has been reported that apparently
homologous characters in related species may develop from different genes,
cell populations, or pathways — the phenomena called developmental system
drift (True and Haag, 2001). Although these phenomena present a challenge
to my account as well, not all of them count as counter evidence. If, for
example, “drift” concerns only genetic or cell materials, topological features
of the causal network may remain invariant. Descriptive levels also matter.
15
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Even if two causal structures differ at a fine-grained description, they may
coincide at a more abstract level. Finally, my view does not require the en-
tire developmental system to be conserved: if causal graphs share some part,
they may still be homologous in that aspect. Indeed, it would be surprising if
two apparent homologs turn out to share no developmental underpinnings at
all. Some degree of flexibility may be expected, but so is inflexibility. Rep-
resenting and comparing homologs in terms of the underlying causal graphs
will serve as a heuristics to identify which part of the overall developmental
system is responsible for generating similar morphological patterns.
From a philosophical perspective, a distinguishing feature of my account
is its explicit reference to models. Homology has traditionally considered to
be a relationship among concrete biological entities or properties thereof: it
is organs or phenotypic features that are said to be homologous. In contrast,
homology in my view is a relationship among abstract entities, i.e. causal
graphs. How and why does such an abstract relationship reveal anything
interesting about the concrete evolutionary history? That scientific theories
and concepts should directly describe actual phenomena is a predominant
view of science both in lay and scholarly circles. Under this conception
logical positivists made it their primary task to define theoretical terms by
the observable. In the same vein philosophers of biology have tried (not
successfully in my view) to justify the concepts like homology or species by
identifying necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of visible or directly
verifiable features of organisms.
16
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This apparently intuitive picture, however, has been criticized to be an
overly simplistic view on the relationship between a scientific theory and
reality (e.g. Suppes, 1967; Cartwright, 1983; Suppe, 1989). According to the
critics the primary referents of scientific theories, concepts, and laws are not
actual phenomena but idealized models. These models are not exact replicas
of reality, but extract only certain features that are supposed to play essential
roles in the scientific problem at hand. The present analysis is in line with this
tradition. Causal graphs are highly idealized and thus possibly incomplete
representations of complex causal interactions in living systems, but it is this
idealization that affords explanatory power and general applicability. That
is, on the condition that a model extracts the common causal structure of a
population can it be used to predict the population’s evolutionary trajectory
or consequences of hypothetical interventions.
Most of these models, however, are still idiosyncratic to particular popula-
tions — e.g. population geneticists usually build, customize, or parameterize
their model for each study object.3 Homology thinking aims at even higher
generality: its core idea is that some distinct species or organs allow for the
same treatment/model in the analyses of their evolutionary fate or physiolog-
ical performance. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis as to why
such a unified explanation is possible at all. That is, it justifies the use of the
same causal model based on evolutionary history, i.e. by the descent of the
3Models of adaptive evolution, however, may be extrapolated to the same or similar
environmental conditions. In this regard, the analogical thinking and homological thinking
represent two distinct ways to generalize evolutionary models.
17
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causal graph from common ancestry. Hence homology is far from “residual,”
but has a significant explanatory value in biology — it allows an extrapo-
lation of an evolutionary or physiological model to other contexts, and thus
provides a basis for the highest-level generality in biological sciences.
5 Conclusion
The concept of homology presupposes phenotypic units on which identity
relationships can be defined. The present analysis identified these units with
causal graphs representing developmental or behavioral mechanisms and de-
fined homology as graph isomorphism over lineages. The advantage of this
formal concept is that it acknowledges the distinctive role of the study of ho-
mology while suggesting its connection to the traditional population genetics
framework. That is, it not only provides definite meanings to such con-
cepts like constraints, evolvability, and novelty, but also presents homology
as a historical account or justification of the generalizability of evolutionary
or physiological models. This is paralleled with the shift in the ontological
nature of what can be said to be homologous: homology is a relationship
between theoretical models, rather than concrete biological entities such as
organs. Hence the proper relationship between homology to actual biological
phenomena is not instantiation, but representation. Once conceived in this
way the metaphysical problem of the alleged essentialism fades away.
The new account of homology prompts empirical, theoretical, and philo-
18
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sophical researches on various topics, including the study of novelty and
evolvability, the interplay between Evo-Devo and population genetics, im-
plications of developmental flexibility, and the generalizability of biological
models, to name a few. Another interesting philosophical question not men-
tioned above is the possibility of extending the current approach to another
vexing concept in evolutionary biology, namely species. If homology is a par-
tial matching of the causal structures between distinct species, it is tempting
to define species by the whole causal structure — so that two organisms
belong to the same species if their entire ontogeny and life history are rep-
resented by the same causal graph. This is a big question that requires an
independent analysis, but will be briefly discussed in the presentation if time
permitted.
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Abstract  
The unpredictability of the development and results of a research program is often invoked in 
favor of a free, desinterested science that would be led mainly by scientific curiosity, in 
contrast with a use-inspired science led by definite practical expectations. This paper will 
challenge a crucial but underexamined assumption in this line of defense of scientific 
freedom, namely that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
results. We will propose conditions favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course 
of a scientific investigation and then establish that use-inspired science actually scores better 
in this area.  
  
1. Introduction 
“I didn’t start my research thinking that I will increase the storage capacity of hard drives. 
The final landscape is never visible from the starting point.” This statement made by the 
physicist Albert Fert (2007), winner of the 2007 Noble Prize for his work on the giant 
magnetoresistance effect, expresses a very common belief, especially among scientists, about 
the unpredictable nature of the development and results of a research program. Such 
retrospective observations feed a type of “unpredictability argument” often invoked in favor 
of a pure, disinterested science led by scientific curiosity, in contrast with a use-inspired or 
applied science led by practical considerations. Polanyi gave a somewhat lyrical form of this 
kind of unpredictability argument in his classical essay “The Republic of Science” (1962). 
Science, says Polanyi (1962, 62), “can advance only by unpredictable steps, pursuing 
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problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances will be incidental and hence 
doubly unpredictable. … Any attempt at guiding research towards a purpose other than its 
own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of science… You can kill or mutilate the 
advance of science, but you cannot shape it.” In Polanyi’s view, claims about the 
unpredictable nature of scientific development go hand in hand with a plea for an internal 
definition of research priorities: a problem should be considered important in light of 
considerations internal to a field of scientific inquiry and not (at least not primarily) in light of 
external considerations, such as practical utility. The orientation of the inquiry by practical 
objectives is then deemed epistemically counter-productive and vain: one should not attempt 
to predict the unpredictable.  
 In response to this line of defense of free science, some authors emphasize the 
epistemic fecundity of use-inspired science (Stokes 1997, Wilholt 2006, Carrier 2004) 
showing that the presence of practical objectives does not run counter to the building of 
fundamental knowledge: more fundamental knowledge may be needed to achieve some 
particular practical ends. Industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s 
is a telling example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce applicable 
results but which nevertheless produced, along the way, new fundamental knowledge 
(Wilholt 2006). 
 Our aim in this paper is to develop another line of defense of the epistemic fecundity 
of applied science, by challenging a crucial but often implicit assumption in the traditional 
defense of scientific freedom based on scientific unpredictability (such as Polanyi’s or Fert’s), 
namely the assumption that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
facts. But what are actually the conditions favoring the emergence of novelty in the course of 
a scientific investigation? This important issue has not received much epistemological 
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attention.1 We will fill this gap by first distinguishing two kinds of unpredictability arguments 
often mixed when debating on scientific freedom, to wit, unpredictability as unforeseen 
practical applications and unpredictability as serendipity (cases, as we will explain in more 
details, where unexpected facts open up new lines of inquiry). Focusing on the latter, we will 
propose two conditions that favor the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course of a 
scientific investigation. In light of these two criteria we will then compare pure, disinterested 
science and applied science as regards their capacity to generate novelty.  
 
2.Two types of unpredictability arguments 
Appeals to the unpredictability of scientific results actually refer to various kinds of 
situations, which need to be clearly distinguished. First, the notion of unpredictability of 
scientific results can designate unforeseen practical applications of fundamental knowledge. 
Second, it can refer to a serendipitous dynamics of scientific progress: a line of research may 
sometimes lead to a totally unexpected, surprising result, which opens a new direction of 
inquiry. These two kinds of unpredictability give rise to distinct arguments in favor of 
scientific freedom, unfortunately often mixed in discussions about the relative merits of pure 
science and application oriented science.  
 
2.1 Unpredictability as unforeseen practical applications 
When unpredictability refers to unexpected applications, the argument is the following: 
freedom of research should be preserved since a free, disinterested science is needed to 
generate a reservoir of fundamental knowledge, which then can be used to develop 
																																																								
1 Wilholt and Glimell (2011, 353) do touch upon this issue when discussing the link made by 
proponents of the autonomy of science between freedom of research and diversity of 
approaches favoring the epistemic productivity of science. But they just note that it is a strong 
assumption and do no further discuss its validity. 
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applications. This argument was typically developed by Vannevar Bush who appealed to the 
now classically called linear model of innovation: 
 
“Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the 
fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New 
products and new processes do not appear full-grown" (1945, 20). 
 
The development of the H-bomb in the frame of the Manhattan project is a paradigmatic case, 
also invoked by Bush: “basic discoveries of European scientists" (1945, 20) about the 
structure of the matter is what made possible the military application. Another frequently 
cited example of unpredictable application is the invention of the laser, a widely-used 
technological device nowadays, made possible by pure theoretical developments in quantum 
physics during the first half of the XXth century.  
We will not in this paper discuss further this first version of the unpredictability 
argument. Let us just mention that its underlying linear model of innovation linking pure 
science and practical applications has already been challenged on several grounds by various  
authors (e.g. Brooks, 1994; Leydesdorff, 1997; Edgerton, 2004; Rosenberg, 1992). We rather 
want to focus on the second (and also widespread) type of unpredictability arguments, whose 
validity has been much less scrutinized.   
 
2.2 Unpredictability as serendipity 
This second type of argument appeals to unpredictability in the sense of serendipity: an 
unexpected observation or result opens up a new line of research leading to a fundamental 
discovery. A very well known historical episode illustrating such a serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the invention of the first antibiotic by Flemings, after he had accidentally 
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observed the effect of a fungi (Penicilium) on bacteria colonies (Flemings, 1929). Also often 
cited is the discovery of radioactivity by Henri Becquerel (1896): when working with a crystal 
containing uranium, Becquerel noted that the crystal had fogged a photographic plate that he 
had inadvertently left next to the mineral. This observation led to the hypothesis that uranium 
emitted its own radiations. Another, perhaps less cited instance of serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the discovery of the chemotherapeutic cisplatine molecule by scientists initially 
working on the effects of an electric field on bacteria growth (Rosenberg et al.,1967). They 
observed that cell division was inhibited because of the unexpected formation of a chemical 
compound with the Platinum atoms contained in the electrode. This chemical compound, 
which they named cisplatine, was then successfully tested as an anti-proliferative agent 
against tumoral cells.  
When unpredictability refers to such serendipitous discoveries, freedom of research is 
defended on the grounds that scientists should be able to freely change the direction of their 
research or open up new lines of inquiry, in order to be able to follow up on unexpected 
results, thereby generating new knowledge (which in turn will possibly lead to new 
applications). But to properly work as an argument favoring free, disinterested research over 
applied research, this “serendipity argument” actually presupposes that the occurrence of 
surprising facts is more likely to happen in the first system of science than in the second. For 
increasing the production of new knowledge (and possibly new applications) does not only 
depend on being able to freely follow up on unexpected facts, it also (obviously) depends on 
whether occurrences of unexpected facts are favored, to start with. Two types of 
considerations are thus mixed in the serendipity argument: considerations on the occurrence 
of unexpected facts and considerations on the (institutional, material) possibility to follow up 
on them.   
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We will not for the moment discuss the second type of considerations and focus on the 
first, which has been largely neglected in the literature on scientific freedom, namely the 
conditions that favor the occurrence of surprising facts. Our central issue is thus the 
following: is a use-inspired science less likely to generate unexpected results than a free 
science mainly fuelled by curiosity? After having clarified the notion of unexpected result, we 
will propose two criteria that, we will argue, favor the occurrence of such results and in light 
of which free science and applied science can be compared.   
 
3. Conditions of emergence of unexpected facts 
By “unexpected facts” occurring in the course of an inquiry, we simply mean here results 
(observations, outcomes of an experiment, etc.) that cannot be accounted for within the 
theoretical or, more largely, the epistemic framework in which the empirical inquiry has been 
conceived and conducted. This kind of “exteriority” is what leads scientists to move away 
from the initial explanatory framework and open up new lines of inquiry in search of an 
alternative one that could accommodate the unexpected results. 
 
3.1 Isolation and purification of phenomena 
It is now a well-known feature of contemporary experimental sciences that many of 
their objects under study are “created” in the laboratory rather than existing “as such” in the 
real world. When drawing our attention to this epistemologically important feature, Hacking 
(e.g. 1983, chap. 13) specified that we should not read this notion of “creation” of phenomena 
as if we were making the phenomenon, suggesting instead that a phenomenon is “created” in 
the laboratory to the extent that it does not exist outside of certain kinds of apparatus. This is 
typically the case for a phenomenon like the Hall effect: it did not exist “until, with great 
ingenuity, [Hall] had discovered how to isolate, purify it, create it in the laboratory” (Hacking 
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1983, 226, our italics). In other words, Hall created in 1879 the material arrangement  - a 
current passing through a conductor, at right angles to a magnetic field –, for the effect to 
occur and “if anywhere in nature there [were] this arrangement, with no intervening causes, 
then the Hall effect [would] occur” (1983, 226, our italics). Isolation, purification, control of 
intervening causes (i.e. control of physical parameters) are noticeable features of an 
experimental protocol that have a straightforward consequence directly relevant for our 
philosophical interrogation on serendipity: they tend to limit the number of causal pathways 
which can influence the response of the object or phenomenon under study experimentally. 
Unknown causal pathways existing in the real world are thus inoperant (or less operant) in 
laboratory conditions, thereby limiting the occurrence of unexpected results. Hence our first 
criterion to evaluate whether a certain system of science favors surprising results: the more 
the phenomena under study in that system are isolated, purified in highly regimented 
experimental conditions, the less likely the occurrence of unexpected results is.   
Moreover, isolation, purification of phenomena often go hand in hand with another 
noticeable feature of laboratory sciences, described by Hacking as follows: “as a laboratory 
science matures, it develops a body of types of theory and types of apparatus and types of 
analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other” (1992, 30). In particular, a given theoretical 
framework determines the type of questions that can be probed experimentally, guides the 
design of apparatus and defines the type of data produced. Consequently, “data 
uninterpretable by theories are not generated” (Hacking 1992, 55). This process of mutual 
constraints is well illustrated for instance by recent experimental inquiries in particle physics, 
such as the quest for the Higgs Boson. Its existence was postulated in the frame of the 
Standard Model of theoretical physics (Higgs, 1964) and complex experimental apparatus 
have been developed with the explicit goal of “discovering” it (LEP, 2003). The “discovery” 
occurred in 2012 (ATLAS, 2012) but the high degree of tailoring of the apparatus to the 
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theory postulating the particle can be considered as imposing some kind of a priori structure 
on the phenomenon, so that particles such as the Higgs boson are not so much “discovered” 
than “manufactured” (Falkenburg, 2007, 53). In any case, the “discovery” of the Higgs boson 
was hardly a surprise and illustrates Hacking’s more general contention about experimental 
inquiries typical of contemporary laboratory sciences as opposed to real-world experiments: 
“[their] results are more often expected than surprising” (1992, 37, our italics).  
 
3.2 Theoretical unifying ambition  
Another relevant characteristic of an experimental inquiry is the degree of generality of its 
theoretical framework. Scientists working within a theoretical framework with a large 
unifying scope will be reluctant to “leave” it and search for an alternative one when facing an 
unexpected result, and for good epistemological reasons: there is (obviously) a high epistemic 
cost of abandoning a theoretical framework that provides explanations for a large set of 
phenomena. The right move is rather to try to accommodate the surprising result by adopting, 
if necessary, ad hoc hypothesis or tinkering with some ingredients of the existing theoretical 
framework, so that the result looses its “exteriority” and ends up being integrated. And 
because of this well-known “plasticity” and integrative power of well-established theoretical 
frameworks with a large unifying scope2, when a (at first sight) surprising result occurs, it 
rarely leads to the opening up of a new line of inquiry in search of an alternative explanatory 
framework, but rather gets integrated within the existing one, thereby losing its 
unexpectedness. 
 There is another reason why a high degree of theoretical generality does not favor the 
occurrence of unexpected results, which is linked to our previous remarks on the process of 
																																																								
2 Classical references on these ideas of plasticity or integrative power are of course Kuhn’s 
description (1962) of scientists being busy working on resolving anomalies in normal science 
and Lakatos’ concept of “protective belt” of a research program (1978). 
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mutual adjustment between theoretical ingredients, apparatus and data. By constraining the 
type of experimental procedures developed and the type of data generated, a theoretical 
framework with a large unifying scope tends to homogenize the experimental works 
conducted to probe the various phenomena that it accounts for. And since a diversity of 
experimental approaches increases the possible sources of emergence of surprising facts, we 
can conclude that by reducing this diversity, theoretical generality makes the occurrence of 
unexpected facts less likely to happen.  
 The case of the etiology of cancer provides interesting illustrations of these two 
unexpectedness-diminishing effects of theoretical generality. The classical theory of cancer, 
the Somatic Mutations Theory (SMT), has been challenged for fifteen years or so by a new 
theoretical approach, the Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT) (Sonnenschein and Soto, 
2000). First developed in the 1970's, the SMT rapidly became the dominant research 
theoretical framework on carcinogenesis (Mukherjee, 2010). This hegemony led to a high 
degree of homogenization of the experimental inquiries:  the experimental procedures were all 
dedicated to the very standardized search for genetic mutations, in the context of molecular 
biology. Moreover, many, if not all surprising observations were made compatible with SMT 
by using ad hoc hypothesis (Soto, 2011). For instance, it was observed that various types of 
cancer were exhibiting large-scale disorganization of the genome. This observation was 
unexpected to the extent that it could not fit with SMT’s fundamental postulate of punctual 
mutations. To integrate it in the frame of SMT, the existence of an original genetic instability 
of the cancer cells was then postulated (Rajagopalan, 2003).  
 
4 Use-inspired science, pure science, and unexpected facts 
In light of the criteria that we proposed above, how does pure, disinterested science score 
compared to applied science when it comes to favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts? A 
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helpful starting point is provided by Martin Carrier’s insightful characterization of applied 
science: 
 
“Three methodological features can be observed whose combined or marked 
appearance tends to be characteristic of applied science: local models rather than 
unified theories, contextualized causal relations rather than causal mechanisms, real-
experiments rather than laboratory experiment conducted for answering theoretical 
questions" (2004, 4). 
 
4.1 Local models 
Let us start with the contrast between local models and unified theories. Whereas pure science 
often aims at providing comprehensive and unifying theoretical frameworks (think of the 
Standard Model in particle physics or the Big Bang model in cosmology), use-inspired 
research is characterized by the coexistence of numerous local models, each determining the 
development of specific experimental procedures. An extreme case of this locality are for 
instance the design-rules used in the industry, which are built as laws guiding action (Wilholt, 
2006). They are experimentally confirmed rules providing relations among different relevant 
parameters to manufacture industrial products. These rules are extremely specific: they apply 
to a very few number of situations and each of them determines a singular experimental 
practice. The use of local models is also widespread in the biomedical sciences, a typically 
use-inspired field of research. We will again draw on oncology to illustrate our point. 
Consider for instance the case of the development of radiotherapy protocols in the first half of 
the XXth century. The aim was to intervene on cancer to cure it, without any general model 
describing the mechanism of carcinogenesis. This program promoted the development of a 
variety of exploratory approaches using X-rays against cancer (Pinell, 1992). As there were 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1074-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -453-
	 11	
no standardized protocols, many experimental procedures were tested, changing the density of 
X-rays received, the distance of emission, the frequency of the radiotherapy sessions. In order 
to improve the efficiency of the therapeutic methods, scientists tried to build various local 
models describing the action of X-rays on cancer, corresponding to the variety of 
experimental procedures implemented. Grubbe (1949) formulated a model based on the 
inflammatory reaction to explain the effects of radiotherapy on cancer: the inflammation of 
the surrounding tissue beyond the effects of X-rays is responsible for the decrease of tumoral 
mass. This model is applicable to his specific use of X-rays: he applied very high doses, 
necessary to generate an inflammatory response. In parallel, Tribondeau and Bergonié, using 
more moderate doses, developed a model based on the proliferation of the cells in tumoral 
context, which led to the "Bergonié law": X-rays have a higher impact on proliferating cells 
(Tribondeau, 1959).  
 What lessons can be drawn from this first contrast between local models and unified 
theories? The answer is rather straightforward, given the link spelled out in the previous 
section between the level of generality of theoretical models and the occurrence of 
unexpected facts (our second criterion): by promoting the use of a diversity of local models 
and heterogeneous experimental protocols, applied science favors the occurrence of 
unexpected facts, whereas the penchant of pure science for comprehensive unifying 
theoretical frameworks, hence homogenized experimental protocols, does not.    
 
4.2 Causal incompletness 
Let us compare now pure science and applied science in light of our first criterion based on 
the degree of isolation and purification of the phenomena under study. A directly relevant 
feature of applied science is the use of what Carrier calls “contextualized causal relations” 
rather than full causal chains. Use-inspired science typically aims at directly intervening on a 
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process or phenomenon often disposing only of a partial knowledge of the causal chains 
involved and without being able to isolate it from various causal influences exerted by the rest 
of the physical world. A direct consequence of this feature of applied science is the low 
degree of control of its experimental protocols. By contrast, since pure science aims primarily 
at answering fundamental theoretical questions, it designs highly regimented experimental 
procedures that isolate and purify phenomena in order to be able to get empirical answers 
about the specific fundamental processes questioned in the theoretical investigation3. 
Moreover, building highly regimented experimental procedures requires knowledge of full 
causal chains in order to be able to better control the response of the system under study. The 
outcome of the application of our criterion is then again straightforward: compared with pure 
science, applied science favors the occurrence of unexpected facts to the extent that its 
experimental procedures are less controlled and based only on partial knowledge of the causal 
influences exerted on the phenomenon under study.  
 The etiology of cancer provides again interesting illustrations of our claim. Indeed, 
many current cancer therapies built in the frame of use-inspired research are based on 
contextualized causal relations. Typically, if a cellular agent is found to be massively 
expressed in cancer cells, drugs are designed to inhibit it, even if the whole causal chain 
determining its action is not known. For instance, a large amount of proteins promoting 
angiogenesis (the growth of blood vessels), notably VEGF (Vascular Endothelial Growth 
Factor), was found in tumoral cells, leading to the design of anti-VEGF molecules (Sitohy, 
																																																								
3 Carrier sums up this contrast as follows: “Empirical tests often proceed better by focusing on 
the pure cases, the idealized ones, because such cases typically yield a more direct access to 
the processes considered fundamental by the theory at hand. But applied science is denied the 
privilege of epistemic research to select its problems according to their tractability (...). 
Practical challenges typically involve a more intricate intertwinement of factors and are thus 
harder to put under control". (2004a, 4) In the life sciences, this focus on “pure cases” means 
using “model organisms” or a limited  number of well spread cell lines (e.g.  the HeLa cells or 
the Saccharomyces Cerevisiae yeast) to elucidate fundamental biological mechanisms. And 
the use of such standardized objects tends to homogenize the experimental protocols.  
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2012). These molecules are used without considering the complete causal chain in which the 
VEGF is embedded. Only their known action on angiogenesis is considered. The clinical tests 
have led to unexpected observations: the use of an anti-VEGF molecule (Avastin) can 
stimulate tumor growth (Lieu et al., 2013)4. This example shows that the use of 
contextualized causal relations promotes the appearance of surprising facts by allowing 
unknown mechanisms to intervene in the experimental procedure.  
 
 
5. Concluding discussion 
 
Our previous analysis has established that several features of pure, disinterested science make 
it less hospitable than use-inspired science to the occurrence of unexpected facts. For all that, 
it does not follow that proponents of freedom of science cannot appeal anymore to 
unpredictability in the sense of serendipity to make their case. For the issue of which 
conditions favor the occurrence of unexpected facts is only half of the story. The other half is 
the possibility to actually follow up on these occurrences and open new lines of inquiry. And 
this other half raises different issues. What are the institutional, social structures of science 
that make it easier for scientists to re-orient their research when needed? To what extent an 
initial orientation of a scientific investigation by “external” practical needs is less compatible 
with the opening of new lines of inquiry than an initial orientation by epistemic considerations 
internal to the dynamics of a scientific field? When appealing to the serendipity argument, 
																																																								
4 Interestingly, this observation led to new use-inspired research programs, aiming at 
identifing the molecular causal pathways giving rise to this tumoral resistance phenomenon. It  
has notably strongly oriented the research toward the precise understanding of the VEGF 
pathways (Moens, 2014). For instance, the study of the mechanisms of expression in cancer 
cells of various kinds of  VEGF agents is becoming an important program of research (Li, 
2014) and these works allow to build new fundamental knowledge about the action of the 
VEGF proteins.  
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proponents of free, disinterested science not only presuppose that it is the best system of 
science to generate unexpected facts to start with – a contention that we have challenged in 
this paper – but also that it actually gives more freedom to scientists to follow up on 
unexpected results. In other words, the issue of scientists’ given possibility to change the 
direction of their research when needed is somewhat mixed, confused with the normative 
issue of what the aims of science should be (in short, increase knowledge following 
considerations internal to science vs. answer external practical needs). But it seems to us that 
the two issues should be kept separate. After all, one can very well conceive a system of 
science whose aims are primarily to answer society needs but which nevertheless leaves 
scientists free to choose the lines of inquiry that seem to them the most promising ways of 
fulfilling these needs (which includes changing research directions if needed). Otherwise put, 
one can very well conceive a use-inspired science which is not a programmed science in 
which scientists are asked to plan every step of their inquiry in order to achieve a given aim. 
And note that a pure, disinterested science may be as much programmed as a use-inspired 
science: the fact that scientists are left free to choose the aims of their research does not 
protect them from having to plan every step to reach these aims. In any case, our purport in 
this paper was not to attack pure, disinterested science. There are, no doubt, many good 
reasons to defend it, but the widespread, traditional one grounded on the unpredictability of 
scientific inquiry is certainly not the most epistemologically cogent and solid one.  
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Abstract
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a 
significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process.  A question that 
naturally arises is: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose 
values should be used?  A common answer to this  question turns to political 
values — i.e. the values of the public or its representatives.  In this paper, I argue 
that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively 
requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with.  I 
conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.
1.  Values in Science and the Political View
By now, most philosophers of science probably agree that there is an important place for 
so-called contextual (i.e. personal, ethical, political) values in core parts of the scientific process, 
especially in areas where science is connected to policy-making.  Values may appropriately play 
a role in evaluating evidence (Douglas 2009), choosing scientific models (Elliott 2011), 
structuring quantitative measures (Reiss 2013, ch. 8; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010; Hausman 
 For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Alex Rajczi and the students in a seminar on science and values at 1
Claremont McKenna College.  For discussions on related topics, I thank Gil Hersch, Daniel Steel, and Branwen Williams. This 
work was supported in part by a research grant from the Claremont McKenna College Center for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship.
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2015), and/or in preparing information for presentation to non-experts (Elliott 2006; Hardwig 
1994; Resnik 2001; Schroeder 2016).  The natural follow-up question has received less sustained 
attention:  when scientists should make use of values, which (or whose) values should they use?   2
In some cases, philosophers of science criticize a value choice on substantive ethical 
grounds (e.g. Shrader-Frechette 2008; Hoffmann and Stempsey 2008).  This suggests that the 
values to be used are the objectively correct ones.  A second common view gives scientists 
latitude to choose whatever (reasonable) values they prefer or think best, usually supplemented 
by a requirement of transparency.  This is suggested by many existing codes of scientific ethics, 
which impose few constraints on scientists in making such choices.   Finally, a third view says 3
that scientists ought to use the appropriate political values — that is, the values held or endorsed 
by the public or its representatives — at least when those values are informed and substantively 
reasonable.   The most straightforward argument for this view grounds it in considerations of 4
democracy or political legitimacy.  If certain value choices are going to ultimately influence 
policy, then the public or its representatives have a right to make those choices (Douglas 2005; 
Intemann 2015; cf. Steele 2012; Kitcher 2001).
There are, of course further possibilities, and these views can be combined in more 
complex ways (e.g. requiring scientists to use political values in some domains, while permitting 
them to use their personal values in others).  But if, for simplicity, we stick to these three primary 
 In some cases, the justification for incorporating values into the scientific process dictates an answer.  Feminist critiques of 2
historically androcentric fields, for example, suggest that non-androcentric values are needed as a corrective.  I set aside such 
cases in this paper.
 Mara Walli, Matthew Wong, and I discuss this at length in a work-in-progress.3
 I set aside, then, cases where the values, say, of a policy-maker are unreasonable, in the sense that they lie outside the range of 4
values that ought to be tolerated in a liberal society.  In such cases, an advocate of the political view may permit or require 
scientists to reject those unreasonable values.  (See e.g. Resnik 2001.)  Also, in this paper I will set aside the important question 
of what the political view ought to say when the values of the public diverge from the values of policy-makers.  The answer to 
this question, I think, will depend on one’s theory of political representation.
!2
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options, I think the third, which I will call the political view, is the most attractive.  More 
precisely, I think that in most cases where values are called for in core parts of the scientific 
process, scientists should privilege political values.   The most obvious concern with this view, 5
and one that has received much attention from its advocates, is that it doesn’t seem practical.  It 
isn’t feasible to ask citizens or policy-makers to weigh in at every point in the scientific process 
where values are required, and even if we could, non-experts often will not have the scientific 
background to fully understand the options before them.  Substitutes for actual participation on 
the part of policy-makers or the public, such as asking scientists to predict what the public would 
choose or to determine what values policy-makers would hold upon reflection, seem to place 
unreasonable epistemic demands on scientists.
Douglas (2005), Intemann (2015), Guston (2004), and others have argued that these 
problems aren’t insurmountable, by suggesting specific ways that the concerns of policy-makers 
and the public can be brought into the scientific process.  And Kevin Elliott (2006; 2011) has 
suggested a more general way we might make progress.  The political view goes hand-in-hand 
with a view of the relationship between science and policy that is widely-held:  that the role of a 
scientist is to promote informed decision-making by policy-makers.   Bioethicists have 6
extensively discussed how health care professionals can promote informed decision-making on 
the part of patients and research subjects.  Theoretical and empirical research has led to a range 
of suggestions for how physicians can promote informed decision-making, even in cases where a 
patient’s values may be uncertain, different research subjects may hold different values, and so 
 This, of course, is proposed as a principle of professional ethics - not e.g. a legal requirement.5
 See also Resnik (2001), Martin and Schinzinger (2010), and Schroeder (2016) for theoretical defenses of this idea, which is 6
consonant with the mission statements of many scientific organizations and associations.
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forth.  Elliott’s hope is that many of these suggestions can be adapted to the scientific case, or at 
least a parallel research program could be carried out, informed by the work of bioethicists.7
It is, of course, far from established that these proposals will work, but the range of 
options on the table strikes me as cause for optimism.  And even if these solutions don’t work in 
all cases, there is still bite to the political view, since it could still tell scientists to use political 
values when they can determine those values.  Accordingly, in this paper I would like to describe 
a different and I think deeper concern with the political view, one which has been conspicuously 
absent from the literature thus far.  In requiring scientists to guide certain aspects of their work 
by political values, we will sometimes in effect ask that they support political causes they may 
personally oppose and bar them from fully advocating for their preferred policy measures.  We 
are, then, depriving scientists of important political rights possessed by the general public.  In the 
remainder of this paper, I will spell out this objection more fully and explain why I think it has 
significant moral force.  In the end, I will suggest that although there is reason to think that the 
objection doesn’t ultimately undermine the political view, it nevertheless constitutes a significant 
cost that accompanies that view, which its proponents need to acknowledge.
2.  Two Cases Where the Political View Seems Troublesome
The literature on values in science is vast and diverse, and so it will be useful to have 
some particular examples in mind.  First, consider Douglas’s (2000; 2009) argument that 
scientists should or must appeal to value judgments when resolving certain uncertainties that 
arise during the scientific process.  Scientists conducting research into the potential carcinogen 
dioxin, for example, were faced with liver samples which had tumors that could not clearly be 
 See also Schroeder (2016) for how this might go.7
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categorized as malignant or benign.  In resolving such borderline or ambiguous cases, Douglas 
argues that scientists should appeal to contextual values, when the constitutive norms of science 
don’t dictate any resolution.  In this case, health-protective values would lead scientists to 
classify borderline samples as malignant; while concerns about overregulation would lead 
scientists to classify those same samples as benign (Douglas 2000).  
Second, consider the many choices that scientists have to make when preparing their 
results for presentation.  How should uncertainty be characterized?  (Should 90% or 95% 
confidence intervals be used?)  Which study results should be highlighted?  (Which drug side 
effects should be discussed at length, and which included as part of a long list?)  How should 
statistics be summarized?  (As means or medians?  Should results be broken down by gender, or 
presented only in aggregate?)  In making choices like these, scientists frequently must appeal to 
values — to decide, for example, which pieces of information are important and which are not.8
It is, I presume, fairly uncontroversial that these value choices — how to resolve 
uncertainties in the research process and how to present results — can influence policy in 
foreseeable ways.  Douglas, for example, argues that this is the case in the dioxin studies.  
Classifying borderline samples as malignant will make dioxin appear to be a more potent 
carcinogen, likely leading policy-makers to regulate it more stringently (2000, 571).  Keohane, 
Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014) show how a presentation choice made by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change led to poor policy outcomes, which likely could have been avoided by 
presenting information differently.  More generally, we know from a wealth of studies in 
psychology and behavioral economics that the way information is presented to someone can 
strongly influence her subsequent choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), and there have been 
 For discussions, see Elliott (2006), Hardwig (1994), Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014), Resnik (2001), and Schroeder 8
(2016).
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several influential commentaries calling for scientists to more carefully “frame” their results 
(Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Lakoff 2010).  So it seems straightforward that the value choices 
made by scientists can predictably affect policy.
If these value choices can influence policy, then in directing scientists to make them in 
accordance with political values — as opposed to the scientists’ personal values — we are asking 
scientists to characterize policy-relevant material in a way that may promote an outcome they 
strongly disfavor.  For example, suppose the scientists in Douglas’s dioxin study value public 
health much more than they value keeping industry free from overregulation, but the public and 
its elected representatives have the opposite view.  Further, suppose both views are substantively 
reasonable, in that they are within the range of policies eligible for adoption through democratic 
processes.  In this case, the political view would tell the scientists to categorize borderline 
samples as benign, since that would better cohere with the public’s values.  This could make 
dioxin appear to have minimal carcinogenic effects, predictably leading to less regulation than 
would have occurred had the scientists classified borderline samples according to their own, 
health-protective values.  Similarly, suppose an environmental economist conducting an impact 
study of a proposed construction project is herself deeply committed to the preservation of 
natural spaces.  Nevertheless, if the public is strongly committed to economic development, the 
political view would require her to put front-and-center a detailed breakdown of the economic 
consequences of construction, while describing the ecological costs more briefly or in a less 
prominent place — likely frustrating her desire for preservation.
Notice that the concern here is not simply that scientists are being asked to provide 
information that will lead to an outcome they disfavor.  I take it that any reasonable approach to 
scientific ethics will require that scientists communicate honestly, even in cases where that 
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promises to yield policies they don’t like.  Similarly, I presume that scientists must also be 
forbidden from presenting information in ways that, though technically accurate, are nevertheless 
misleading.  The problem here is that Douglas’s scientists are being asked to characterize results 
in one way (as benign) that could, with equal scientific validity, have been characterized 
differently (as malignant).  And our environmental economist is being asked to present her 
results in one way (highlighting economic benefits), when an alternate presentation (one 
highlighting ecological costs) would be equally honest, accurate, objective, transparent, clear, 
and so forth.  In each case, then, we have a collection of underlying data which can be described 
or characterized in different ways, neither of which appears to be more scientifically valid than 
the other.  The political view insists that scientists choose the description grounded in values they 
don’t accept and which seems likely to promote policy outcomes they disfavor.  In this respect, 
the political view requires scientists to in effect advocate for, or at least tilt the playing field 
towards, political views they disagree with.9
3.  Elliott and The Principle of Helpfulness
This seems clearly to be a significant imposition on scientists and thus a cost of the 
political view.  It is therefore surprising that, so far as I can tell, philosophers who have argued 
for the political view have not commented on it.  This is most striking in Elliott’s work.  Elliott, 
recall, argues that scientists should aim to promote informed decision-making among policy-
makers, in something like the way physicians should aim to promote informed decision-making 
among patients.  Standard accounts in bioethics say that it is the patient’s values that carry the 
 Can’t we let the scientists advocate for their preferred positions in other ways?  We could let scientists present their preferred 9
interpretation separately.  But if the political view is to have bite, presumably these alternate results will have to be clearly 
designated so and offered in a less prominent place (e.g. in an appendix or online supplement).  And we should of course permit 
scientists to advocate for their views outside of their scientific papers/reports.  But it seems likely that these (private) statements 
will carry much less policy weight than their scientific ones.
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day: in normal cases, the physician’s job is to help a patient make decisions that cohere with her 
own values.  If the scientific cases is analogous, then the scientist’s job is to help policy-makers 
make decisions that cohere with their (or the public’s) values.  This, in turn, suggests that 
scientists should use political values when resolving uncertainties, presenting results, and so 
forth.  In other words, Elliott’s proposal seems to imply the political view.10
The main defense Elliott offers for this view, however, relies on Scanlon’s “Principle of 
Helpfulness”:
Suppose I learn, in the course of conversation with a person, that I have a piece of 
information that would be of great help to her because it would save her a great deal of 
time and effort in pursuing her life’s project.  It would surely be wrong of me to fail 
(simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is no compelling 
reason not to do so.11
Elliott sums up the idea this way:  “[I]n situations where one can significantly help another 
individual by engaging in an action that requires little sacrifice, it is morally unacceptable not to 
help” (2011, 139).  If the political view, however, requires characterizing data or presenting 
information in ways that promote policy choices a scientist strongly opposes, then this Principle 
doesn’t apply.  When the pro-health scientist is required to classify ambiguous samples as 
benign, that does involve a sacrifice.  A refusal to do so — which would hinder the pro-industry 
policy-maker’s ability to make an informed regulatory decision — would not be done “simply 
out of indifference”.  It would be done out of the scientist’s desire to protect public health.  
 In some work, Elliott appears to suggest that transparency about values may be enough (Elliott and Resnik 2014).  That is, he 10
doesn’t seem to place (many) constraints on scientists’ value choices, so long as they are open about those choices.  If that is 
Elliott’s view — and it is not clear to me that it is — it strikes me as in tension with his insistence that scientists promote 
informed decision-making.  Surely I can better help you make a decision that coheres with your values by working from your 
values, rather than by working from my own values (even if I am open about what I am doing).  Further, even if scientists are 
open about their value choices, policy-makers frequently won’t have the technical expertise to be able to reinterpret a scientific 
study, replacing one set of values (the scientist’s) with another (their own).  (If values could so easily be swapped out by non-
specialists, then much of the debate about values would be unimportant.  Transparency is all we would require.)
 Scanlon (1996, 224), quoted in Elliott (2011, 139).11
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(Similar things, obviously, can be said about the environmental economist asked to highlight the 
economic aspects of a proposed construction project.)
Scanlon’s Principle of Helpfulness is a quite weak one, applying only in cases where the 
agent in question can put forward no significant burden of compliance.  That Elliott uses it to 
justify his informed decision-making framework, and implicitly the political view, suggests that 
he thinks that such a view doesn’t impose significant burdens on scientists.  But if what I’ve said 
has been correct, that is wrong.  Even if the political view is justified — and, as I’ve said, I think 
it is — we need to recognize that it asks a lot of scientists in cases where their values diverge 
from those of the relevant political body.
4.  Physicians vs. Scientists
This, however, brings up an interesting question.  If Elliott is right that the scientific case 
is analogous to the biomedical case, then shouldn’t informed consent requirements in medicine 
be treated as similarly burdensome?  Few bioethicists, though, would have sympathy for a 
physician who claimed that seeking informed consent constituted a significant ethical burden.  
(They may have sympathy for the claim that seeking informed consent is burdensome in more 
mundane ways — e.g. too time-consuming — but those complaints seem very unlike the 
scientists’.)  I think that there is an important difference between the cases, which will help us to 
more clearly understand why the scientist is often burdened in a way that carries moral weight, 
while the physician normally is not.
We can see this by constructing a case which seems to put a physician in a position like 
the scientist’s.  Consider Jane, a doctor who strongly believes that the end of life for terminal 
patients is greatly enhanced by effective pain management, even if doing so shorten’s the 
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patient’s life or impairs his consciousness.  For this reason, Jane has chosen palliative care as her 
specialty, making it her life’s work to help dying patients avoid unnecessary pain.  One of her 
patients, John, has continually insisted that he wants to remain as lucid as possible, even if that 
means agony.  As he lies here, in agony, Jane suspects that if she framed the information properly 
— highlighting a medication’s ability to relieve pain, while downplaying its cognitive effects — 
she might be able to get John to accept it.  And accepting the medication, Jane strongly believes, 
would be much better for John.  Nevertheless, standard interpretations of informed consent 
forbid her from doing so.  Knowing that John is especially concerned about lucidity, she is 
ethically bound to highlight that information when informing him of his options.  Unsurprisingly, 
John declines the pain medication and experiences what Jane regards as an awful death — 
precisely the kind of thing she went into palliative care to prevent.
Like our pro-health scientist, Jane has been asked to present information in a way that 
ultimately frustrates her deeply-valued goals.  But imagine Jane complains to the ethics board at 
her hospital, arguing that it is burdensome to ask her to highlight to John the effects of pain 
medication on lucidity, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-held values.  This complaint 
doesn’t strike me as at all compelling.  Why?  Because Jane’s values shouldn’t hold any sway 
over John’s medical choices.  John has the right to reject pain medication, whatever Jane (or just 
about anyone else) thinks about it.  Put another way, John has no obligation to take Jane’s wishes 
into consideration, when he makes his decision.  His decision is ultimately his.
Now, imagine our pro-health scientist complains to her ethics committee, asserting that it 
is burdensome to ask her to present her data in a pro-industry light, when it could with equal 
scientific validity be presented in a pro-health light, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-
held concern for public health.  Or imagine the environmental economist complaining about 
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having to foreground the economic benefits of the proposed construction project, since doing so 
will make it more likely that the project is approved and another natural space will be bulldozed.  
If we assume that the scientists are citizens of the society in question, then their situation is 
different from Jane’s.  As citizens in a democracy, their views should hold some sway over their 
government’s policy choices.  A government does have an obligation to take its citizens’ views 
into consideration when making policy decisions.  And when the government ultimately acts, it 
does so on the scientists’ behalf.  The decision is, in part, the scientists’.
The scientists, then, are stakeholders and even part-decision-makers in the associated 
policy-decisions, in a way that Jane is not a stakeholder in John’s decision.  This is true even if 
Jane cares more about John’s decision than our scientists care about the policy decisions.  We can 
see, then, that the political view isn’t burdensome simply because it directs scientists to promote 
or advocate for outcomes they disfavor.  It is burdensome because it sometimes directs scientists 
to promote or advocate for disfavored views, on matters that they have a right to speak on, to a 
body that purports to act on their behalf.  This is what gives their burden its moral significance.12
5.  Justifying the Burdens of the Political View
Some scientists have recognized the burdens that even neutrality — let alone the political 
view — would impose on them.  
Conservation biology is inescapably normative. Advocacy for the preservation of 
biodiversity is part of the scientific practice of conservation biology.  If the editorial 
policy of or the publications in [the journal] Conservation Biology direct the discipline 
toward an “objective, value-free” approach, then they do not educate and transform 
society…  To pretend that the acquisition of “positive knowledge” alone with avert mass 
extinctions is misguided…  Without openly acknowledging such a perspective, 
 What about cases where the scientists are not citizens of the society in question?  In some cases, we can still make out a 12
stakeholder claim.  (When it comes to climate change, for example, we are all stakeholders in U.S. climate policy.)  But such 
cases raise complications which I unfortunately can’t discuss in a short paper like this one.
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conservation could become merely a subdiscipline of biology, intellectually and 
functionally sterile and incapable of averting an anthropogenic mass extinction.  (Barry 
and Oelschlaeger 1996)13
Most conservation biologists enter that field because of a strong commitment to the value of 
biodiversity and the preservation of nature (Marris 2006).  Similar things are surely true of other 
scientific disciplines.  (My experience has been that public health researchers and economists 
studying inequality disproportionately share certain political values.)  To the extent that these 
values diverge from the values of the public and its representatives, the political view would 
require these scientists to continually characterize their results in ways structured by a value 
system they find unacceptable.  (In this respect, things would be quite different for, say, climate 
scientists.  Although their work is controversial, it nevertheless is founded on values that are 
widely shared.  The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change are ones that 
virtually everyone cares about.  Climate change deniers typically object to the empirical claims 
made by climate scientists - not to the basic values they hold.)
Is it fair, then, to tell a conservation biologist, who perhaps entered the field because of 
her love for natural spaces and has spent the bulk of her life collecting information that she hopes 
can be used to preserve them, that she is nevertheless ethically bound to resolve uncertainties in 
her research in ways favorable to economic growth, or to present her results in ways that 
highlight the economic value (as opposed to, say, the private or aesthetic value) of undeveloped 
land?  I don’t have a full answer to this question — such an answer would require more 
empirical information, as well as a fuller discussion of political philosophy — but I think we can 
see how the argument would go.  There are a range of situations in which we impose significant 
 This article was followed by a collection of commentaries, most of which generally supported the authors’ views.  Similar 13
proposals seem to crop up frequently among conservation biologists, and are generally endorsed by those in the field (Marris 
2006).
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restrictions on speech and advocacy for people in important social positions.  The Code of 
Conduct for U.S. judges, for example, bars judges from publicly endorsing candidates for 
political office and from making speeches for political organizations.   Uniformed U.S. military 14
personnel are not permitted to participate in political fundraising, speak at political events, or 
display political signs, even on their private vehicles.   Other constraints on speech and 15
advocacy seem ethically appropriate for politicians, police officers, lawyers, and others.  
So, if there is an important public good served by constraining scientists’ advocacy, it 
doesn’t seem in principle problematic to do so.  Two arguments along these lines seem 
promising.  First, a distinctly political approach might argue that although imposing this burden 
on scientists does restrict important political rights of speech and advocacy, it is done in order to 
expand the political rights of others.  By requiring scientists to work from the values of the 
public, the ability of the public to make informed policy choices and to effectively advocate for 
their own positions is enhanced.  Thus, although the political view constitutes a loss of political 
freedom to scientists, that loss is more than balanced by the gain in political freedom to the 
public as a whole.  (A view like this seems generally consistent with an approach to democracy 
like Brettschneider’s (2007).)
Second, a straightforwardly consequentialist argument could point out the terrible 
consequences that threaten to follow if the public and/or policy-makers distrust scientific results.  
One of the primary arguments that has been put forward in favor of informed-consent approaches 
in bioethics has been that it promotes trust on the part of patients.  Similarly, Elliott’s informed 
decision-making approach — which implies the political view — seems like a promising way to 
 http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges14
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf15
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promote trust in science (Elliott 2011, 133-6; cf. Hardwig 1994; Resnik 2001).  If, then, the 
political view proves to be an effective way of promoting public trust in science, which in turn 
heads off the problems that ensue when policy-makers disregard science, that could justify 
imposing significant burdens on scientists.
Neither of these defenses, of course, is anywhere near complete.  But both do strike me as 
quite reasonable, and so I don’t think the concerns I’ve discussed in this paper should lead 
proponents of the political view to give up that position.  That said, it is important to note the 
form that these defenses take.  Neither attempts to show that the burden on scientists is not 
morally significant (as, perhaps, we might be inclined to say about the complaint of the palliative 
care physician).  Instead, they each point to compensating benefits — not necessarily enjoyed by 
the scientists in question — which morally outweigh the scientists’ burden.  This means that the 
political view, even if it is justified, comes at a real cost to scientists, which is something its 
proponents need to acknowledge.  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Two Roads Diverge in a Wood: Indifference to the Difference Between ‘Diversity’ and
‘Heterogeneity’ Should Be Resisted on Epistemic and Moral Grounds
Anat Kolumbus*, Ayelet Shavit* and Aaron M. Ellison
,,,
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference
from The Road Not Taken, by Robert Frost (1916)
Abstract: 
We argue that a conceptual tension exists between “diversity” and “heterogeneity” and that
glossing over their differences has practical, moral, and epistemic costs. We examine how 
these terms are used in ecology and the social sciences; articulate a deeper linguistic 
intuition; and test it with the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The 
results reveal that ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ have conflicting rather than 
interchangeable meanings: heterogeneity implies a collective entity that interactively 
integrates different entities, whereas diversity implies divergence, not integration. 
Consequently, striving for diversity alone may increase social injustice and reduce 
epistemic outcomes of academic institutions and governance structures. 
* Equal main contributors. 
Key words: collectivity, diversity, ecology, heterogeneity, injustice, institutional diversity.
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1. Introduction: Diversity in the Ecological and Social Sciences
The concepts of diversity and heterogeneity are two basic types of dissimilarity that are 
implicitly and commonly assumed to hold interchangeable meanings by scholars and 
laymen alike. However, when we examined their actual usage, a surprising conceptual 
discrepancy – in fact a tension – emerged. In this article we call attention to this tension 
between ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’1 and we argue that there are non-trivial epistemic, 
moral, and practical costs to science and society when this difference is glossed over. 
Our critical examination is part of a large body of literature on the benefits of 
diversity for science and society. There exist strong epistemic (Shrader-Frechette 2002; 
Longino 2002; Solomon 2006b) and moral (Haraway 1979; Fricker 2007; Douglas 2009, 
2015) arguments for diversity in institutions, governance structures, and ecological systems
1  In this article, we use the analytic tradition of concept notation. If quoting the 
concept’s usage, it will appear as “X” (e.g., Fisher’s “diversity” is defined as…), when 
explicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as X (e.g., the concept of diversity is…), 
and when implicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as ‘X’ (e.g., ’heterogeneity’ here 
describes…). 
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(“ecosystems”). For example, empirical evidence shows that diversity improves academic 
performance (Gurin et al. 2004; Freeman and Huang 2015; Page 2014), because diverse 
individuals hold different values (Longino 1990; Harding 1991), situated knowledge 
(Haraway 1989), socio-gender locations (Code 2006), research styles and specialities 
(Gerson 2013) and conflicting theoretical scaffolds (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007). There 
also are costs associated with diversity, including feelings of isolation and alienation 
leading to reduced academic achievements of minorities (Armor 1972; Holoien 2013) and 
unbridgeable disagreements among researchers that disintegrate research groups (Gerson 
2013; Shavit and Silver, accepted for publication).
There also are societal costs of divergence between scientists and non-scientists. 
Within the social realm, increased divergence from scientific worldviews may facilitate 
public manipulation by spreading ignorance – agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) 
– and untrue and/or unjust environmental outcomes (Shrader-Frechette 2002). Within the 
scientific realm, divergence exempts scientists from responsibility for not assessing 
carefully enough social risks of generalizing their recommendations outside the laboratory, 
field, or model (Douglas 2009). Given the increasing science-society divergence, it is often
non-experts who engage with the public – e.g., journalists teaching politicians about 
climate change or students teaching the underprivileged – which further widen the 
separation and may also silence local knowledge (Fricker 2007), e.g. by leading 
experienced mothers not to consider their comprehensive understanding and information as
‘knowledge’ compared to a young psychology student who never held a child, or depriving
those living all their life near a spring to “know” their local flow rate compared to an 
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ecology student or governmental regulator who read published results taken at random 
from nearby streams (Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication).
Given the fine line between the costs and benefits of constructive and destructive 
dissimilarities, interrogating the most basic concepts and measurements of dissimilarity 
seems important and timely. This paper aims for a step in that direction.
2. Definitions of Dissimilarity
Fundamental to both diversity and heterogeneity is the concept of “variance” (Fisher 1918, 
1925). Briefly, measurable properties (“variables”) of a group of individual entities (a 
“population” of cells, organisms etc.) are rarely identical. Rather, they will take on a range 
of values y = {y1, y2, y3, … yn}, where the value of the variable measured for the i
th 
individual is denoted yi. When graphed as a histogram (Tukey 1977), these values are 
distributed, with the most frequent values clustered around the most common one and rarer
values towards the edges.
The average value of the distribution of the measured variables (its expected value 
E(y) or its mean value y´ ), equals the sum of all the individual measurements divided by
the number of individuals, n: y´=∑
i=1
i=n y i
n
. The variance, or “spread” of the distribution is 
the sum of the squared differences between each individual measurement and the mean:
σ
2=∑
i=1
i=n
( y i− y´)
2
. The standard error of the mean ( √σ
2
n
)  provides intuitive estimates 
of how variable the set of measurements is. Under reasonable assumptions, ≈63% of the 
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measurements fall within ± 1 standard error of the mean, and ≈95% fall within ± 2 standard
errors of the mean.2
In statistics (and hence in nearly all the social and natural sciences), means and 
variances are characteristics of single populations (groups of measurements), but 
heterogeneity usually is a composite property of a group of measurements taken from more
than one population. For example, the classic analysis of variance (ANOVA) developed by 
Fisher (1918) is used to determine if two or more populations differ in their average 
measured traits (e.g., height). A basic assumption of ANOVA is that the variances of the 
populations being compared are equal; this is referred to as “homogeneity of variance” or 
“homoskedasticity”. In contrast, if variances are unequal (heterogeneous or 
heteroskedastic), mathematical transformations of the data must be done to ensure that 
variances are homogeneous prior to comparing populations using ANOVA.3 Note that 
‘heterogeneity’ here describes only the variance as a problem to overcome in order to allow
a common basis for comparison. Throughout the rest of this article, however, the concept 
of heterogeneity describes entities within a collective. “Diversity”, if it is used at all in 
statistics, refers simply to describe a collection of datasets that describe a wide range of 
different, often incommensurate, variables.
In contrast, diversity is used widely in ecology (e.g., McGill et al. 2015) and the 
social sciences (e.g., Page 2011). Unlike variance or heterogeneity, diversity is not a 
simple, one-dimensional predicate. McGill et al. identified at least 15 different kinds of 
2 Ellison and Dennis (2010) provide a full discussion of the assumptions behind these 
estimates and calculation of associated confidence intervals.
3 See Gotelli and Ellison (2012) for details and another example of a “cost” of 
heterogeneity.
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1101-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -480-
ecological diversity; differences among them reflect the number of variables or populations
that are measured (one or more), the spatial scale of measurement (local or regional), and 
whether it is measured within or between populations. Unlike ‘variance’ or ‘heterogeneity’ 
– both of which are interpretable on their own – ‘diversity’ has little meaning to an 
ecologist unless it is associated with an object. For example, the concept of alpha diversity 
refers to the number of different species in a locality, the concept of gamma diversity to the
number of different species in a region [a collection of localities], and beta diversity 
measures population change between localities.4  
In the social sciences, Page (2011) makes similar distinctions between three kinds of 
diversity: (1) variation, or diversity within a type, referring to quantitative differences in a 
specific variable; (2) diversity of types, referring to qualitative differences between types; 
and (3) diversity of composition, or the way types are arranged. Page’s variation is directly 
analogous to an ecologist’s alpha diversity, and his diversity of types and diversity of 
composition are analogous to different dimensions of an ecologist’s beta diversity. Most 
social scientists use “diversity” as a catchall phrase not attached to any particular measured
process (Page, personal communication), but we suggest that more attention should be paid
to the dimensions of beta diversity. 
Although ‘diversity’ appears to be used abstractly in common parlance and is 
implicitly assumed to mean something very similar to ‘heterogeneity’, when we examined 
deeply rooted linguistic intuitions of certain core examples, and tested these intuitions in 
large databases of linguistic usage, an interesting distinction between ‘diversity’ and 
4 Each of these can be unweighted (i.e., simple counts of different species) or weighted 
by their abundance or sizes (Chao et al. 2014).
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‘heterogeneity’ was revealed, with relevance for understanding and improving civil society
and its institutions. 
3. A Conceptual Tension Between Diversity and Heterogeneity
Whereas scientific language may seem indecisive or vague, artistic language can be precise
and revealing. For example, Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken beautifully highlights 
diverging dimensions of a difference (i.e., ‘diversity’), whereas the etymology of 
‘heterogeneous’ implies something quite the opposite: an integration of multiple other (Gr.:
hetero) kinds (Gr. genus) within a single whole. 
We argue that attributing heterogeneity to something (e.g., a cell, computer, etc.) 
implies attributing an integration of mutual interactions among different entities that all 
belong to the same collective, whereas attributing diversity to a collection of objects or 
entities entails neither interactions nor a common collective.
An examination of English idiomatic constructions reveals clear distinctions in usage
of diversity and heterogeneity. We would say that the parts of a cell or a clock are 
heterogeneous, but not that they are diverse. In contrast, we recognize a diverse collection 
of wall decorations or tools. There is an apparent semantic distinction here: cells and 
clocks are collectives whose functioning entails the integration of a number of interacting 
parts, whereas walls or garages function independently of the collection of items hanging 
on them.  In other aspects of common usage, however, many objects in daily speech, 
including communities, populations, or universities, are called diverse or heterogeneous 
interchangeably.
The Corpus of Contemporary American English (henceforth: COCA; Davies 2008) 
provides a resource with which to examine common usage of diversity and heterogeneity 
in more detail. COCA contains more than 520 million words of texts, including scholarly 
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writing, fiction and nonfiction, newspapers and spoken recordings, and has tools to 
conduct complex searches for occurrences of words, phrases, parts of speech, other 
linguistic forms, and any combination thereof. Compilations of lists of co-occurrences (i.e.,
all types of words [adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.] or specific words that appear near a target
word) that can be used to infer intended meanings of predicates such as diverse or 
heterogeneous. 
Sabar (2016) used COCA to infer motivations underlying regular co-occurrences of 
words. By identifying partial intersection of words that regularly co-occur more than 
expected by chance alone, Sabar identified communicative strategies: the choices of 
specific linguistic forms that best contribute to their intended message (e.g., “look” and 
“carefully” form the phrase “look carefully” that calls for visual attention). Thus, the 
generality of a communicative strategy that is evident in a particular example is established
via a quantitative prediction of a non-random co-occurrence (“look” and “carefully” occur 
together and in sequence more frequently than expected by chance alone, and Sabar (2016)
confirmed that “look” and “see” differ in meaning as a feature of attention by showing that 
“look” co-occurred more frequently with words such as “notice” than did “see”). 
 We searched COCA and the Wikipedia Corpus (Davies 2015) for frequencies of 
“diverse” and “heterogeneous” and tested our hypotheses regarding differences in meaning
between them using chi-square tests for non-random frequencies. “Diverse” occurred 12-
30 times more frequently than “heterogeneous” in the corpora. In line with our hypothesis, 
“homogeneous”, “collective”, “whole”, “integration” and “interaction” co-occurred 
significantly more frequently with “heterogeneous” than with “diverse” (improved 
prediction by, respectively, 58, 24, 8, 11, and 11%). Antonyms of these words (“single”, 
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“individuals”, “division”, “separation”) showed only random patterns of co-occurrence 
when they co-occurred at all (see tables 1-7 in the Appendix). A possible explanation for 
the latter findings is that while concepts of a collective whole seem to be more explicitly 
related to ‘heterogeneity’, words and meanings of singularity are relevant to both terms (in 
the case of heterogeneity they could relate both a single whole or to its parts). Nonetheless,
it is evident that there is empirical support for our semantic intuition regarding 
‘heterogeneity’ as interactions among diverse entities within a collective whole, and, 
perhaps more importantly, the empirical lack of a collectivist meaning for ‘diversity’.
The attribute of diversity does not correctly describe collective entities because its 
meaning and reference are much wider than the concept of heterogeneity. A heterogeneous 
entity may be composed physically of nothing more than diverse entities, but as a 
collective, it entails multiple direct and indirect interactions, and feedbacks, among these 
entities. All reproducing biological groups (genomes, cells, metapopulations, etc.) are 
heterogeneous in the collective sense. Hence, additional information that refers to internal 
interactive processes improves models of heterogeneous entities and systems (Wade 1978; 
Roughgarden, accepted for publication). Some human groups – e.g., families, football 
teams or kibbutzim – would best be described as heterogeneous, whereas others – e.g., 
people waiting to pay the cashier – would not (Shavit 2008). There may be grave costs 
associated with failing to identify the goals of certain human groups as diverse or 
heterogeneous, as the next section portrays. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1105-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -484-
4. Illustrating the Diversity-Heterogeneity Trade-Off
4.1 Moral costs  
Many – perhaps most – readers of this essay would say that promoting diversity is a social 
good because it is a stepping-stone to heterogeneity and thus to social justice. Although we 
may not yet have achieved a just and heterogeneous society, we should nonetheless 
promote diversity as much as possible and not dwell on the semantic particularities of 
distinguishing the concepts of diversity from heterogeneity. We think this line of thinking 
is misleading, and that the continuous focus on racial, ethnic, or gender ‘alpha diversity’ 
(i.e., headcounts) and use of the results of these measurements as a sufficient basis for 
discourse and policy, creates a vicious circle that may hinder social change in many of our 
institutions, in particular in our schools, colleges, and universities.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that segregation of African-American and Caucasian students in 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. One outcome of this 
decision was transporting students of different racial backgrounds into different school 
districts (“busing”) to achieve diverse, “integrated” schools. This was intended to provide 
equal opportunities, academic aspirations, and achievements for all students and to 
improve relations among different races (Armor 1972). Unfortunately, according to some 
of its strongest supporters, busing did not improve academic aspirations or achievements 
(St. John 1975), sometimes decreased them and often worsened interracial relations: 
“integration … enhances ideologies that promote racial segregation, and reduces 
opportunities for actual contact between the races.” (Armor 1972, 13). 
In higher education, diversification is primarily done through “affirmative action”. 
Many scholars support affirmative action (e.g., Bowen and Bok 2000; Rothstein and Yoon 
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2008), but others have argued that it leads to similar or worse outcomes than would have 
occurred in its absence (e.g., Sander 2004; Sander and Taylor Jr. 2012). For example, 
between 1988 and 2007, faculty of color made up only 17% of total full-time faculty, and 
that there had been little change in this number since the 1980’s (Turner, González, and 
Wood 2008). Similar findings have been reported for the number of earned PhDs (NSF 
2013). 
However one thinks about affirmative action, we suggest that in the interest of 
promoting social justice that institutions should not measure diversity alone – how many 
people of different backgrounds are found at a certain time and place – nor wait for it “to 
work its magic” and reduce injustice. Smith (2015) identifies three problems with current 
mechanisms for promoting diversity in higher education: (1) responding to calls to improve
diversity reactively rather than proactively, often by producing an internal quantified 
response to an external standardized requirement; (2) failure to include people from the 
many interacting parts of a university – faculty, staff, students, etc. – in discussions about 
diversity; and (3) making diversification into a specific program rather than an integral 
institutional function and goal. All of these common methods of “working towards 
diversity” are problematic precisely because they increase diversity but reduce 
heterogeneity. They track and magnify difference and divergence rather than encourage 
and enhance mutual interaction among all different co-occurring identity groups. 
A more positive approach was reported by Walton and Cohen (2011), who conducted
a very brief intervention in one’s sense of social belonging (SOB) to a selective, largely 
Caucasian, college. After three years, there was a significant increase in the GPA (grade 
point average) of African-American students relative to control groups. SOB is central to a 
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heterogeneous community as it is a psychological aspect of being a part of an integrated 
collective.   
We suggest that a trade-off exists between tracking diversity and building 
heterogeneity, which may result in a vicious circle leading to blaming those afflicted with 
social inequality for their under-representation. Since we are better at measuring discrete 
variables such as grades and gender than at measuring interactions such as SOB and 
research cooperation, we invest more effort in creating changes we can easily track rather 
than those that demand more complex, “beta type”, measurements (e.g., institutional SOB, 
type of contacts with colleagues or task composition in the lab). As a result of neither 
measuring these latter dynamics nor investing in their visible change, alienation and lower 
academic achievements may persist among minority students and scholars (Syed, Azmitia, 
and Cooper 2011) even while their “diversity” increases. If this processes continues, a 
dangerous positive feedback may emerge, where not only will one’s self-image and 
achievements be worsened, but also his/her social identity comes out worse than before 
affirmative action took place. 
4.2. Epistemic Benefits
Aiming for heterogeneity rather than diversity often has epistemic benefits. Human 
collectives – as well as individual agents – have a variety of epistemic perspectives 
(Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication). These perspectives differ in 
multiple inter-related ways, involve different backgrounds and experiences, and vary in 
ways of perceiving, explaining, and evaluating information about the world. Perspectives 
direct our attention to track a wide range of phenomena, promote diverse models to explain
them (Griesemer 2014) and encourage adaptive-reflection by employing “…a variety of 
social perspectives, often…by taking the perspective of others” (Bohman 2006, 180).
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Information is distributed asymmetrically between agents, so that some of it is 
known in general, some exclusive to certain groups, and some idiosyncratic to specific 
individuals (Sunstein 2003; Andesron 2006; Solomon 2006a; Gerson 2013); lack of 
interaction keeps pieces of information latent.5 Diversity alone will not ensure that 
information is shared and provides fewer opportunities for agents to reflect on information 
that they can access only through interactions with others (Longino 2002; Tollefsen 2006). 
Integrative working interaction across specialties – unlike the typical diverse-one-
way adoption of ideas from one disciplinary to another – “includes coordinated efforts to 
pose and solve new research problems that can redefine specialty boundaries” (Gerson 
2013, 516), and leads to developing new specialties. Tollefsen (2006) interweaves 
individual and collective knowledge in a way that demonstrates the benefits of epistemic 
heterogeneity. She suggested a framework of splitting a group that shares a common goal 
(e.g., works on a related set task or problems) into sub-groups; heterogeneity is manifested 
on an inter-sub-group level. Each sub-group is responsible for a different task, has its own 
sub-goals, and devises its own strategies and solutions. Mutual interactions result when the
sub-groups return to the original group setting to present their suggestions and give 
feedback to other sub-groups. They encounter dissenting perspectives of out-groups and 
are forced to consider them and examine their own perspective closely. This self-scrutiny 
and actual encounters with critiques by other groups reveals problems, such as 
inaccuracies, leaps and gaps, and uncertainties, allowing the sub-groups and the integrated 
collective opportunities for self-correction (Tollefsen 2006). 
5 There is an on-going discussion regarding the epistemic efficacy of deliberation, 
which is beyond the scope of this article.
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Since all sub-groups are part of a larger community that shares a common goal, they 
both depend on other sub-groups and are depended upon by them. This framework is 
heterogeneous rather than diverse as the common goal and the inter-sub-group interactions 
serve to integrate the group. It also maintains differences, thus reducing the danger of 
group cohesiveness leading to unanimity and conformism, without promoting divergence. 
Such a framework increases the chances of achieving accurate results and obtaining a more
just process of decision-making.    
5. Conclusion
Diversity is not heterogeneity, and a continued focus on the former is not increasing the 
latter; instead, there is often a trade-off and tension between them. We illustrated how 
heterogeneity can better advance academic institutions and governess structures by 
integrating different people, identities, perspectives, and sources of information; it 
facilitates interactions among them, which have constructive epistemic and moral 
implications. Conversely, diversity alone often leads to divergence, is insufficient to resist 
social injustice and it misses epistemic opportunities that result from integrative working 
interactions. Institutions are often unaware of the diversity-heterogeneity tension or remain
indifferent to it. They invest efforts in promoting diversity while neglecting heterogeneity, 
thus paying the costs of the trade-off and not reaping its benefits. Tracking alpha and 
disregarding beta diversity maintain this trade-off and obscures it. For moral and epistemic 
reasons we suggest noting this conceptual and practical difference and aiming for 
heterogeneity.
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Appendix
Table 1. Wikipedia Corpus total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
30967 1096
Table 2. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “interaction”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”-“interaction” > “diverse”-“interaction”. 
Interaction present Interaction absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 11 18 1085 7
Diverse 49 82 30918 93
Total 60 100 32003 100
P<.001
Table 3. COCA total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
16685 1305
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Table 4. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “collective”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “collective” > “diverse”- “collective”.
Collective present Collective absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 5 31 1300 7
Diverse 11 69 16674 93
Total 16 100 17974 100
P<.001
Table 5. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “whole”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “whole” > “diverse”- “whole”.
Whole present Whole absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 7 15 1298 7
Diverse 40 85 16645 93
Total 47 100 17943 100
P<.05
Table 6. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “integration”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”- “integration” > “diverse”- “integration”.
Integration present Integration absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 6 18 1299 7
Diverse 28 82 16657 93
Total 34 100 17956 100
P<.05
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 Table 7. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “single”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “single” < “diverse”- “single”.
Single present Single absent
N % N %
Diverse 77 97 16608 93
Heterogeneous 2 3 1303 7
Total 79 100 17911 100
P>.05
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Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation
Abstract
My starting points are the claims that explanations are answers to why-questions, and that
to answer the question why some event E occurred one must provide reasons why E oc-
curred. The idea that all explanations of events are causal then becomes the theory that
the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. My main thesis in this paper is that
many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should
distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why
those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a second-level
reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level reason is
not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be first-level reasons; nor (on my theory)
need they be causes. Along the way I use the distinction between levels to diagnose the
appeal of, and one main flaw in, the DN model of explanation.
1
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1 A New Causal Theory of Explanation
It is obvious that some explanations of some phenomena speak of the causes of those phe-
nomena. Simple examples come immediately to mind: the bridge collapsed because the wind
reached a certain intensity, electrons flew off the metal because light shone on it. Much more
controversial is the claim that every explanation of why some event happened must say some-
thing about the causes of that event. What’s more, not only is it controversial whether this
claim is true, it is also controversial how the claim should be understood. I have a new way
of understanding the idea that all explanations of events invoke causes, one that, I think, is the
most natural way to understand it. I also think that the idea, understood my way, is true (with
one qualification1), and can be defended against the repeated claim that there exist non-causal
explanations.
My theory starts with the idea, which has been held by many others, that explanations
are answers to why-questions.2 A theory of explanation, then, should say what it takes for
a proposition to be an answer to a why-question. Now one standard form answers to why-
questions take is “P because Q”: “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” answers
“Why is the tide high?” But there is another form answers to why-questions can take. The other
form is “A/The reason why P is that Q.”3 Now because-answers and reasons-why answers are,
in some sense, equivalent. “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” and “The reason
why the tide is high is that moon is overhead” in some sense convey the same information. But
I think that, for theoretical purposes, it is better to focus on reasons-answers. (I argue for this
claim in (Skow 2016).)
A theory built around reasons-why answers will fill in the schema
1See footnote 6.
2Among those who hold that explanations are answers to why-questions are Hempel
(1965)—with some qualifications, Bromberger (1992), and Van Fraassen (1980).
3I ignore here the forms used to give “teleological” explanations; I extend my theory to
cover teleological explanations in (Skow 2016).
2
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1121-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -500-
1. A reason why P is that Q iff . . .
What should the claim that “explanations of events are causal” look like, if put into the form
(1)? Let “P” hold the place for a sentence that describes the occurrence of an event. (I won’t try
to say anything useful about which sentences do this.) Here is my proposal:4
(T) A reason why P is that Q if and only if the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P.5
The same kinds of examples that lend credence to the idea that explanations of events are causal
lend credence to its translation (T) into the language of reasons. The lighting of the fuse caused
the bomb to go off; sure enough, it is also true that the reason why the bomb went off is that
the fuse was lit. The electron’s passing through a magnetic field caused it to accelerate; sure
enough, the reason why it accelerated is that it passed through a magnetic field.
On the other hand, the same examples philosophers have thought are counterexamples to
the idea that explanations of events are causal also threaten to be counterexamples to (T).
A bunch of these examples, I think, are based on the same mistake. There is a distinction
to be made between “levels” of reasons. The examples fail because they confuse the two levels.6
My aim in this paper is to introduction the distinction, and show how it can be used to defuse
some examples. I will look, in particular, at Elliott Sober’s claim that equilibrium explanations
are non-causal, and Marc Lange’s claim that “distinctively mathematical” explanations are non-
causal (Sober 1981, Lange 2013).
4There are other theories of explanation that try to capture the idea that all explanations of
events are causal—for example, (Salmon 1984) and (Lewis 1986). I do not have space here to
explore the differences between their theories and mine.
5For stylistic convenience I sometimes speak of causation as a relation between facts, and
sometimes as a relation between events. I remain neutral on which, if either, of these ways of
speaking gets us closer to causation’s “fundamental nature.”
6I should say that there is one kind of counterexample that I think succeeds against (T):
examples of “grounding” explanations. My true view is that every reason why a given event
occurred is either a cause or a ground of its occurrence. But I will ignore grounding explanation
in this paper.
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2 Levels of Reasons
The distinction I want to introduce is that between
• a fact R being a reason why some event E occurred—then R is a “first-level” reason; and
• a fact F being a reason why R is a reason why E occurred—then F is a “second-level”
reason, a reason why something else is a reason.
Reasons on the two different levels appear in answers to different why-questions. The first-level
reasons are the facts that belong in the complete answer to the question why E occurred. The
second-level reasons, on the other hand, belong in the answer to a different why-question: the
question, concerning some reason R why E occurred, of why R is a reason why E occurred.
It is easy to come up with examples of first-level reasons. If I strike a match and, by
striking it, cause it to light, then one reason why the match lit is that I struck it. What about an
example of a second-level reason? We can find one by looking for the answer to the question of
why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit. One answer (there are others)
is: one reason why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit is that there was
oxygen in the room at the time. In general, background conditions to a cause’s causing its effect
are, I hold, reasons why the cause is a reason why its effect happened. (Background conditions
are not, however, the only kind of second-level reason; more on this in a bit.)
3 Second-Level Reasons Need Not Be First-Level Reasons
Here is the thesis about levels of reasons that I will defend in this paper:
A fact can be a second-level reason without being a first-level reason. A fact F can
be a reason why R is a reason why E happened, without F itself being a reason why
E happened.
I say that F need not itself be a reason why E happened; I do not say that it cannot. The example
I gave earlier shows that sometimes F is also a reason why E happened. The presence of oxygen,
4
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besides being a reason why the striking of the match is a reason why the match lit, is also itself
a reason why the match lit. But it is not always like this.
Here is an example in which a second-level reason is not also a first-level reason. Jill
throws a rock at a window, Joan sticks out her mitt and catches the rock, and the window
remains intact. The fact that Joan stuck out her mitt is a reason why the window remained
intact. There is the first-level reason. Why is it a reason? The reason why it is a reason is that
Jill threw a rock at the window. (You can test this with a counterfactual: if Jill hadn’t thrown,
certainly Joan’s sticking out her mitt would not have been a reason why the window remained
intact. The window wouldn’t have “needed” Joan’s help.) But this second-level reason is not
also a first-level reason: that Jill threw a rock is not a reason why the window remained intact.7
In this case, the second-level reason that is not also a first-level reason is a fact that
“corresponds” to the occurrence of an event: Jill’s throwing of the rock. According to my theory
(T), first-level reasons why events occur all correspond to events, since they are all causes.
But not all second-level reasons are like the two examples we’ve seen so far (Jill’s throw, the
presence of oxygen); not all second-level reasons correspond to events.
In fact, I hold that laws of nature are second-level reasons that are not also first-level
reasons. If I drop a rock from one meter above the ground, and it hits the ground at a speed
of 4.4 m/s, the fact that I dropped it from one meter up is a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4
m/s. The law relating impact speed s to drop height d, namely s =
√
2dg (assuming drag is
negligible and d is small), is a second-level reason: it is a reason why my dropping the rock
from one meter up is a reason why the rock was going 4.4 m/s when it landed. But it is not, in
my view, also a first-level reason. It is not a reason why the rock is on the ground at 4.4 m/s.
Mentioning laws of nature probably brings to mind Carl Hempel’s DN model of expla-
nation, which says (I’m sure this is familiar) that an explanation of a fact F is a conjunction of
facts that (i) entail F, and (ii) essentially contains a law among its conjuncts (Hempel 1965).
7This is also the kind of example many take to show that causation is not transitive; see for
example (Hitchcock 2001).
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Hempel’s theory is not framed as a theory of the reasons why facts obtain, but it is natural to in-
terpret it as committed to the thesis that whenever there are any reasons why some fact obtains,
at least one of the reasons is a law of nature. I, along with many others, reject Hempel’s theory,
but I have a new diagnosis of where it goes wrong. Its mistake is to take certain second-level
reasons, laws of nature, to also be first-level reasons.
I asserted without argument that laws are second-level reasons; but this is a natural view
to have, on certain approaches to causation. One approach to causation takes laws to be central:
whenever you have a cause and effect C and E, there are some laws connecting C to E—and C
is a cause of E because of those connecting laws.8 But that is just to say that whenever C is a
cause of E, some law is a reason why C is a cause of E. Now I hold that when some fact F is a
reason why C is a cause of E, then F is also a reason why C is a reason why E happened. So it
follows from this theory of causation that laws are second-level reasons. If you start here, and
in addition think that second-level reasons are always also first-level reasons, you head toward
the characteristic thesis of the DN model, the thesis that among the reasons why some event
happens is always at least one law. But this line of thought is fallacious, because second-level
reasons need not be first-level reasons; and, on my view, laws that are second-level reasons are
never first-level reasons.
I admit that I have given no direct argument that laws are not first-level reasons. I’d like
to put the burden on the other side: why think the are? They are certainly second-level reasons:
they are certainly reasons why causes are reasons why their effects happen. But as the Joan
and Jill example shows, second-level reasons are not always first-level reasons. So why think
they are in the case of laws? Certainly we have a sense that laws are “explaining something”;
my view captures this sense, by assigning them the role of explaining why causes explain their
effects. Why isn’t that enough?
8Hempel endorses something like this idea about causation; see (Hempel 1965: 349). It has,
of course, had many other defenders.
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4 How The Levels Can Get Confused
I said that the flaw in the DNmodel is that it mis-classifies laws, which are second-level reasons,
as first-level reasons. I also sketched an argument (with a false premise) that leads to this mis-
classification: “laws are second-level reasons, and second-level reasons are always first-level
reasons, so laws are also first-level reasons.” But I’m not saying that Hempel or anyone else
ever entertained this argument explicitly. Is there anything else to be said about how and why
supporters of the DN model might have come to mis-classify laws as first-level reasons?
Yes, there is. Pragmatic effects, effects of the rules of conversation on information ex-
change, can produce “data” that misleadingly suggest that laws are first-level reasons.
The reasons why an event happened are the parts of the answer to the question of why it
happened. So if we come across a conversation in which one person asks “Why did E happen?,”
and another person answers this question by citing some fact F; and if that answer strikes us as
correct; then we have some good evidence that F really is a reason why E happened.
Some of the evidence that laws are (first-level) reasons why events happen appears to fit
this pattern (but I will argue it does not). Imagine someone walks into the room just as the rock
hits the ground at 4.4 m/s, and she sees that it hit at this speed (maybe the rock fell onto a device
that measures impact speeds). A curious person, she asks me why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s. I
respond,
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg (and of course
√
2 · 1 · 9.8 ≈ 4.4).
Haven’t I answered her question? And doesn’t the law that s =
√
2dg appear in my answer? If
so, then the law is a reason why the rock hit the ground at 4.4 m/s—isn’t it?
If the answers to these questions are “yes, yes, and yes,” then, at least in some cases, a
law is a reason why an event occurred. It’s not hard to get from this conclusion to the claim
(characteristic of the DN model) that this is so in all cases, and that when someone answers a
7
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why-question without mentioning a law, her answer is incomplete.9
But the answers to these questions are not “yes, yes, and yes.” To explain what I think is
going on I need to introduce another distinction: the distinction between a good response to a
question and an answer to a question. If someone asks a question, obviously one good way to
respond is to answer the question. But not every good response is an answer.
A simple example suffices to establish this. Sally asks whether Caleb is coming to the
party. I know he’s supposed to go to the party. I respond by saying “He’s sick.” This is a good
response. But it is not an answer. The only two possible answers are “yes (he’s coming)” and
“no (he’s not coming).” I didn’t say either of those things.
There is a theoretical reason why we should expect there to be good responses that are not
answers. The notion of an answer is a semantic one. The relation between a proposition and a
question, in virtue of which that proposition is an answer to that question, is a semantic relation.
But the notion of a good response is a pragmatic one. Whether a response to a question is good
is a matter of what a cooperative speaker should say. In some circumstances, a cooperative
speaker should respond to a question by doing something other than, or something more than,
answering the question. In the simple example, I know that if I just answer the question by
saying “no,” then Sally will immediately ask me why he’s not coming. Since I can foresee
that she’ll ask that, and since I know the answer to this question too, I respond to her explicit
question not by answering it, but by answering the expected follow-up question. It is okay in
this case not to explicitly answer the question she asked, because what I do say, my answer to
the expected follow-up, conversationally implies that the answer to her explicit question is no.
I did not, however, need to be so indirect. I could have responded by answering both
questions. I could have said, “no, he’s sick.” Here my response is good, but again it contains
information that is not part of the answer to the question she explicitly asked. What keeps
it from being a bad response is that the additional information is relevant to the topic of our
9This “incompleteness” defense is most fully developed by Railton (1981). For one thorough
argument against it, see (Woodward 2003: chapter 4).
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conversation; and it is relevant because, though it is not an answer to her question, it is an
answer to an expected follow-up question.
I think the same thing is going on in the dropped rock example. I responded to the question
by saying
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg.
My response is a good one, but (as we’ve seen) it does not follow that every part of my response
is part of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the first part of my response—“I dropped
it from one meter”—is an answer to the explicit question (“why did the rock hit the ground at
4.4 m/s?”), but the second part, the law, is not; it, instead, is an answer to an unasked follow-
up why-question, a follow-up question I can anticipate would be asked immediately if I only
answered the explicit question. The follow-up is, of course, why is the fact that I dropped it
from one meter up a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s?
In summary: it is often a good thing to include a second-level reason in a response to the
question why some event happened; but the fact that this is good thing to do is compatible with
that second-level reason not being a reason why that event happened.
5 Equilibrium Explanations
I now have two distinctions: that between first- and second-level reasons, and that between a
good response to a why-question an answer to a why-questions. The two together provide the
key to defusing many problem cases for (T), the thesis that the reasons why something happened
are its causes.
Elliott Sober argued that equilibrium explanations are not causal explanations. His main
example of an equilibrium explanation was R. A. Fisher’s answer to the question of why the ratio
of males to females in the current adult human population is very close to 1:1 (Fisher 1931).
“The main idea” of Fisher’s answer, Sober reports, “is that if a population ever departs from
9
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equal numbers of males and females, there will be a reproductive advantage favoring parental
pairs that overproduce the minority sex. A 1:1 ratio will be the resulting equilibrium point”
(201). Parents who overproduce the minority sex are likely to have more grandchildren. So if
males outnumber females in the population, the fitter trait is to be disposed to have more female
children than male; being the fitter trait, this disposition should increase in frequency, with the
result that the sex ratio is pushed from male-biased toward equality. The opposite happens if
females outnumber males. Now Sober claims that this is not a causal explanation, since
a causal explanation...would presumably describe some earlier state of the popu-
lation and the evolutionary forces that moved the population to its present con-
figuration...Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in
fact produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have occurred
regardless of which of a variety of causal scenarios actually transpired. (202)
In other words: Fisher’s explanation does not say, for example, that the sex ratio in the year 1000
was such-and-such, and that this caused the sex ratio in the year 1100 to be such-and-such, and
so on. Instead it consists of a bunch of conditional facts: for each year in the sufficiently distant
past, if the sex-ratio in that year had had any “non-extreme” value (non-extreme meaning not
all males or females), then the sex ratio today still would have been 1:1.
The first thing I want to say is that Sober makes a claim about what the causes of the
current sex ratio are that I reject. He thinks that the only relevant causes of the fact that the sex
ratio is currently 1:1 are facts of the form the sex ratio at time T is m:n. I’m with those who
reject this claim. The fact that the sex ratio in 1000 was m:n is “too specific” to be a cause
of the current sex ratio. There is a less specific fact, the fact that the percentage of males in
1000 was not 0 or 100%, that is as well placed to be the cause. The less specific fact is “better
proportioned” to the effect than the more specific one; so it gets to be the cause.10
10A “proportionality requirement” on causation is defended in Yablo (1992) and Strevens
(2008). The claim that examples of explanations that, like Fisher’s, abstract away from the nitty-
10
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My disagreement with Sober might not seem to help much. Isn’t Fisher’s explanation still
a counterexample to (T)? Even if the cause of the current sex ratio is that the sex ratio in the past
was never extreme, Fisher’s explanation doesn’t cite this cause either; his explanation instead
contains a bunch of other facts, namely the conditional facts described earlier. Doesn’t it follow
that these conditional facts, which are not causes, are reasons why the sex ratio is 1:1, and thus
that (T) is false?
I deny that those conditional facts that Fisher offers up are reasons why the sex ratio is
1:1. But I can’t just say this; for when Fisher offered those facts up in response to the question
of why the sex ratio of 1:1, everyone celebrated his response, they did not reject it. How can his
response be something to celebrate, if it didn’t answer the question?
The distinctions I introduced earlier show why. Fisher’s response was something to cel-
ebrate, because it was a good response to the question. But it can be a good response without
containing an answer; in fact that’s exactly what I think is going on.
I think that the reason why the sex ratio is now 1:1 is that the sex ratio in the past was
never extreme. But this is not something anyone would believe, or even be able to come to
know, without an accompanying answer to the question of why that is the reason. So a good
response to the question of why the sex ratio is now 1:1 must include an answer to the question
of why the fact that the sex ratio was never extreme in the past is a reason why it is 1:1 now.
And that’s the question that the conditionals in Fisher’s response constitute an answer to. Those
conditional facts are second-level reasons why some other fact is a reason why the sex ratio is
1:1.
gritty details of the causal process that produced the event being explained count as non-causal is
repeated by Batterman in, for example, (Batterman 2000: 28) and (2010: 2). Batterman assumes
that abstracting away from the details takes you away from the causes; but the proportionality
requirement shows that in some cases at least this is not so. Less specific facts may be better
proportioned to an effect than more specific ones.
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6 “Distinctively Mathematical” Explanations
Marc Lange has recently described a class of explanations that he calls distinctively mathemat-
ical explanations, and argued that they are not causal explanations (Lange 2013). My interest
is not in whether his examples qualify as non-causal by his criteria, but in whether they are
counterexamples to (T). Here is one of the examples:11
Why did a given person [say, Jones] on a given occasion not succeed in crossing all
of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once (while remaining always on land or on a
bridge rather than in a boat, for instance, and while crossing any bridge completely
once having begun to cross it)?...[Because] in the bridge arrangement, considered
as a network, it is not the case that either every vertex or every vertex but two is
touched by an even number of edges. Any successful bridge-crosser would have to
enter a given vertex exactly as many times as she leaves it unless that vertex is the
start or the end of her trip. So among the vertices, either none (if the trip starts and
ends at the same vertex) or two could touch an odd number of edges (488-89).
Here is what Lange says about why explanations like this one not causal explanations:
these explanations explain not by describing the world’s causal structure, but roughly
by revealing that the explanandum is more necessary than ordinary causal laws are
(491).
There is definitely something right, and deep, in what Lange says. But I do not think that his
examples are counterexamples to (T).
Let P be the property of bridge-arrangements that a bridge-arrangement has if and only if
either every land-mass or every land-mass but two is met by an event number of bridges. The
(supposed) answer to the question of why Jones failed that Lange presents boils down to this:
11This example is also discussed in detail by (Pincock 2007).
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(2) The bridges of Königsberg lacked P; and, necessarily, if a bridge arrangement lacks P,
then no one can cross all the bridges exactly once.12
Now if (2) really is the answer to the question, then my theory is false. So is (2) the answer?
There are two parts to (2). First is the fact that the bridges lacked P. Now it is no problem for
my theory to recognize that this fact is a reason why Jones failed. For this fact is certainly a
cause of his failure. The challenge to my theory comes if the second fact in (2) is a reason why
Jones failed. For the second fact, that necessarily, no one can cross all the bridges exactly once,
if the bridges lack P, cannot be a cause of Jones’ failure.
I want to say the same thing about this example that I’ve said about the others. (2), I
maintain, is not an answer to the question of why Jones failed. (2) contains an answer as a
part—the fact that the bridges lacked P. But it has another part, the necessary truth, that is not
part of the answer. How is this compatible with the evident fact that (2) is a really good thing
to say in response to the question of why Jones failed? Because the part of (2) that is not an
answer to this question is an answer to an obvious follow-up why-question, namely, why is it
that the bridges’ lacking P is the reason why Jones failed?
Lange’s diagnosis of this example, and the others he discusses, is quite sophisticated,
and I don’t have the space here to go in to all the things he says about them. Let me at least,
however, mention one further thing he says. At one point he writes, “Even if [these examples]
happen to appeal to causes, they do not appeal to them as causes...any connection they may
invoke between a cause and the explanandum holds not by virtue of an ordinary contingent law
of nature, but typically by mathematical necessity” (496). I am quite taken by this idea that an
answer to a why-question might appeal to causes but not appeal to them as causes. What might
this mean, in terms of reasons why? Here is a natural suggestion: maybe in some cases a cause
is a reason why its effect happened, but it is false that the reason why the cause is a reason why
its effect happened is that it is a cause. The suggestion continues: cases like that are examples
12I’m going to take Lange’s qualifications about always remaining on land etc. as given.
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of “non-causal explanations.”
I think the suggestion is plausible: if there truly are cases like that, they should be coun-
terexamples to my theory. They are not, however, counterexamples to my theory as stated. I
should amend my theory to make it more vulnerable:
(T2) A reason why P is that Q if and only if (i) the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P, and
(ii) the reason why the fact that Q is a reason why P is that the fact that Q is a cause of the
fact that P.
Now the question is whether the Königsberg example, or any other example, is a counterexam-
ple to (T2). I have a lot of thoughts about this, but can only be brief here. Lange’s idea is that
since the “connection” between the bridges’ lacking P, and Jones’ failure, is secured by a math-
ematical truth (a theorem of graph theory), the bridges’ lacking P, while a reason, is not a reason
because it is a cause. I reject this claim. Even if the connection is secured by a mathematical
truth, the cause is still a reason because it is a cause. This assertion requires defense, but I don’t
have the space to defend it here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a new causal theory of explanation that says that the reasons why
an event occurred are its causes. I also drew two distinctions: that between the reasons why E
happened, and the reasons why those reasons are reasons; and that between an answer to a why-
question, and a good response to a why-question. I used these distinctions to defend the theory
against the claim that equilibrium explanations and distinctively mathematical explanations are
non-causal; and I believe the distinctions can be used to defend it against a wide variety of other
examples.
14
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In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race 
Abstract. In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new 
metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative 
classificatory issues.”  Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-
substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics.  However, I show 
that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race.  
One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics. 
1. Introduction 
 In David Ludwig’s (2015, 44) recent article “Against the New Metaphysics of Race,” he 
argues for the provocative thesis that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.”  Furthermore, to continue to engage in such a 
“methodologically dubious metaphysics of race” is, in Ludwig’s (2015, 262) opinion, “a bad 
idea.”  Key to Ludwig’s critique is that he defines “metaphysicians of race” as “committed to the 
ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” much like other metaphysicians engaged in 
mainstream analytic metaphysics (Ludwig 2015, 245).  Furthermore, for Ludwig, “the new 
metaphysics of race” consists of disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race” (Ludwig 
2015, 245).  In his critique, Ludwig focuses on two debates in the new metaphysics of race.  
The first is the debate about whether races exist according to the one fundamental 
meaning of ‘race’ in current, ordinary English in the United States (Ludwig 2015, 257).  I’ll call 
this the US race debate*.1  According to Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 256, 260), some interlocutors 
                                                          
1
 The asterisk is intentional.  I’m calling this debate ‘the US race debate*’ because I think 
Ludwig has changed the focus of the relevant debate.  I borrow the convention of using an 
asterisk to flag when the meaning of a term has been changed from Joshua Glasgow (2009, 140). 
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in the US race debate* are Anthony Appiah, Joshua Glasgow, Michael Hardimon, Sally 
Haslanger, Quayshawn Spencer, and Naomi Zack.   
The second debate in the new metaphysics of race is about whether humans have races 
according to the one fundamental meaning of ‘race’ in the life sciences (Ludwig 2015, 254).  I 
will call this the biological race debate*.  Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 259) claims that, among 
others, the interlocutors of the biological race debate* are Robin Andreasen, Bernard Boxill, 
A.W.F. Edwards, Adam Hochman, Jonathan Kaplan, Koffi Maglo, Armand Leroi, Massimo 
Pigliucci, Neven Sesardic, and Alan Templeton. 
Ludwig defends his thesis using an argument premised on the claim that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics 
from contemporary metametaphysics: one from Eli Hirsch, one inspired from Theodore Sider, 
and one from Ludwig himself.  The relevant background here is that recent metametaphysics has 
been preoccupied with what constitutes a “substantive” metaphysical dispute, which, roughly, is 
a dispute that is really about metaphysics as opposed to some other topic, like how we use 
language (Hirsch 2005, 67). 
While I agree with Ludwig that to engage in a metaphysics of race that confuses 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues is a bad idea, and while I think that the new 
metaphysics of race (as Ludwig defines it) might be based on such a confusion, I will show that 
the work that actual metaphysicians of race are doing involves no such confusion.  In other 
words, the point of this paper is show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of the 
actual metaphysics of race. 
For clarity, by ‘actual metaphysicians of race’, I’m talking about the same group of 
scholars that Ludwig is talking about in his critique, and by ‘actual metaphysics of race’ I’m 
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talking about the same body of work that Ludwig is talking about in his critique.2  However, 
unlike Ludwig (2015, 245), I will not require actual metaphysicians of race or actual metaphysics 
of race to be “committed to the ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” even with respect to 
a particular linguistic context.   
I will begin by clarifying Ludwig’s argument and his defense of each premise.  Second, I 
will show that even if Ludwig’s argument is a good critique of the new metaphysics of race, it’s 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  Finally, I will provide closing remarks where, 
among other things, I will clarify how the actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in the philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.  As for 
objections, I will respond to them along the way. 
2. Ludwig’s Argument and Its Defense 
2.1 The Basic Argument 
 Though Ludwig does not state his argument explicitly, a charitable reconstruction of it is 
below:  
(1) If the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive, then it is based on a  
confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues. 
(2) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(3) So, the new metaphysics of race is based on a confusion of metaphysical  
and normative classificatory issues. 
                                                          
2
 For instance, like Ludwig (2015, 244), I consider Joshua Glasgow to be an actual 
metaphysician of race, and, like Ludwig (2015, 263), I consider Glasgow’s actual metaphysics of 
race to consist of work like his book A Theory of Race and his article “On the New Biology of 
Race.” 
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Ludwig states (3) as his thesis in the first paragraph of his opening remarks.3  Ludwig states (2) 
in his opening remarks as well and at several points throughout his paper.4  Ludwig also treats 
(2) as a reason for adopting (3).5  However, since there is a logical gap between (2) and (3), it’s 
charitable to add (1) as a suppressed premise.6   
2.2 Ludwig’s Defense of His Premises 
Though Ludwig takes the truth of (1) for granted, he offers three, in-depth defenses of (2) 
that utilize three different notions of non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s first defense of (2) 
is the following: 
(4) The new metaphysics of race is substantive only if there is exactly one  
allowable and fundamental ontology of race for each of its race debates. 
(5) If there is a plurality of legitimate biological subdivisions below the  
species level or a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ for 
each race debate in the new metaphysics of race, then there is a plurality 
of allowable ontologies of race for each race debate in the new 
metaphysics of race. 
(6) The antecedent of (5) is true. 
(7) So, it’s not the case that the new metaphysics of race is substantive. 
Ludwig claims (4) in section 3.1 and justifies his constraint on substantive metaphysics 
from how he defines ‘a metaphysics of x.’  For Ludwig (2015, 245, 251), a project on the 
                                                          
3
 See Ludwig (2015, 244). 
4
 See Ludwig (2015, 245, 260-262). 
5
 See, especially, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4 in Ludwig (2015). 
 
6
 [removed for blind review] 
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“metaphysics of x” assumes that metaphysicians of x are committed to “one fundamental 
ontology” of x that rules out “a plurality of equally allowable ontologies” of x, at least for the 
relevant linguistic context.7  Since a substantive metaphysics of x must at least be a metaphysics 
of x, it follows that a substantive metaphysics of x requires exactly one allowable and 
fundamental ontology of x.  Substituting ‘race’ for ‘x’ gives us (4).   
 As for (5), Ludwig states that the first disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s 
consequent in section 2.  Here Ludwig (2015, 247) follows Kaplan and Winther (2013) in 
arguing that if there is a plurality of equally legitimate but distinct ways of subdividing species 
into “legitimate biological kinds,” then “[e]mpirical evidence underdetermines the ontological 
status of race,” which in turn, permits a plurality of allowable ontologies of race (Ludwig 2015, 
246-247).  In particular, Ludwig (2015, 245, 247-249) argues that “both racial realism and 
antirealism” are allowable ontologies of race given different equally legitimate ways of 
subdividing a species, and even in the same race debate.  An example is how Zack (2002) uses 
the fact that humans have no subspecies to defend racial anti-realism in the US race debate*, 
while Spencer (2014) uses the fact that humans have a population subdivision that matches the 
current US census racial scheme to defend racial realism in the same race debate.   
 Ludwig states that the second disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s consequent in 
section 3.1.  In his words, “If there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’, 
there is also a plurality of equally allowable ontologies of race” (Ludwig 2015, 251).  
Interestingly, Ludwig never defends this assertion because he takes it to be obviously true.   
                                                          
7
 See Ludwig (2015, 251) for (4) and see Ludwig (2015, 245) for Ludwig’s view on the 
metaphysics of x. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1140-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -519-
 
6 
 
 Next, Ludwig defends (6) by defending the truth of each disjunct in the antecedent of (5).  
As for the first disjunct, Ludwig (2015, 246-247) argues that there is a plurality of legitimate 
biological divisions below the species level (e.g. population subdivisions, monophyletic levels, 
subspecies, etc.) because, first, legitimate biological kinds are interest dependent, and, second, 
there is a plurality of “explanatory interests” among biologists in different research contexts (e.g. 
population genetics, phylogenetic systematics, etc.).  As for the second disjunct, Ludwig reaches 
it by making an induction from what’s going on in the two most popular race debates in the new 
metaphysics of race: which are the US race debate* and the biological race debate*. 
Ludwig (2015, 254) argues that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of 
‘race’ in the biological race debate* since biologists in different research programs use ‘race’ in 
different ways that suit their needs.  For instance, Ludwig (2015, 254) points out that ‘race’ is 
often used as a synonym for ‘subspecies’ in systematic biology, but often used as a synonym for 
‘ecotype’ in ecology.  As for the US race debate*, Ludwig takes a more circuitous route to the 
conclusion that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ in that debate.  
First, Ludwig (2015, 255) appeals to Glasgow et al.’s (2009) empirical research on how 
Americans use ‘race’ to argue that ‘race’ is “polysemous” in the current US.  Next, Ludwig 
(2015, 257-258) argues that the context for the US race debate* has not been “sufficiently 
specified” to narrow the debate to “exactly one fundamental candidate meaning of ‘race’ in the 
United States.”  Hence, according to Ludwig, from induction, the second disjunct of (6) holds as 
well. 
Ludwig’s second defense of (2) utilizes Hirsch’s notion of non-substantive metaphysics.  
The second defense is below: 
(8) A dispute is merely verbal if each side can plausibly interpret the other  
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side as speaking a language in which the latter’s asserted sentences are 
true. 
(9) A dispute is non-substantive if it is merely verbal. 
(10) Each side can plausibly interpret the other side as speaking a language in  
which the latter’s asserted sentences are true in the new metaphysics of 
race. 
(11) Thus, the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(8) is a direct quote from Ludwig (2015, 259), which is itself a summary of Hirsch’s (2005; 
2008) view on non-substantive metaphysics.   
Hirsch defends his distinction between merely verbal disputes and ones that aren’t with 
several examples from the history of science and philosophy.  For instance, Hirsch (2005, 73) 
shows that the dispute among classical physicists about whether a projectile’s final velocity is 
equal to its initial velocity on Earth was not a merely verbal dispute because physicists on both 
sides could not charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true.  In other words, both sides 
were using the same meanings of ‘projectile’, ‘velocity’, ‘Earth’, etc., and what they disagreed 
about were the laws of motion.  In contrast, Hirsch (2008, 407-408) shows that the dispute 
between John Locke and Joseph Butler about whether a tree can survive a change in its parts was 
merely verbal since either side could charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true using 
the other’s meaning of ‘identity’.  In short, a merely verbal dispute for Hirsch is one where the 
disputants are either talking past one another or merely arguing about how we do (or should) use 
language. 
As for (9), we can infer that it’s a premise from how Ludwig (2015, 259-260) uses 
‘merely verbal’ and ‘nonsubstantive’ at this point in his paper.  Furthermore, Ludwig’s 
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vocabulary here is uncontroversial since it’s the same vocabulary that Hirsch (2005, 67) uses.  
As for (10), Ludwig endorses it when he says the following: 
Realists like Andreasen, Edwards, Leroi, Sesardic, and Spencer can interpret 
antirealists as speaking the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to 
subspecies, populations with visible traits that mark relevant biological 
differences, populations with cognitive differences, and so on.  Antirealists like 
Glasgow, Lewontin, Hochman, Maglo, and Zack can interpret realists as speaking 
the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to genetic clusters, patterns of 
mating, clades, and so on (Ludwig 2015, 259-260). 
Finally, Ludwig defends (2) in a third way using his interpretation of Sider’s notion of 
non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s third defense of (2) is below: 
(12) A dispute about an expression E is non-substantive if its disputants are 
endorsing multiple, equally joint-carving candidate meanings for E. 
(13) The new metaphysics of race is a dispute that is non-substantive according 
to (12). 
 (14) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(12) is directly from Ludwig (2015, 261), and is a rough summary of Sider’s (2011, 46-49) view 
of non-substantive metaphysics.  Sider defends the non-joint-carving condition in his definition 
of ‘non-substantivity’ from his stipulation of what metaphysics is about.   
For Sider (2011, vii) the “central task” of metaphysics is “to discern the ultimate or 
fundamental reality underlying the appearances.”  We are supposed to describe this reality using 
a privileged language, so-called Ontologese, which is privileged exactly because all of its 
expressions (e.g. terms, quantifiers, etc.) are “joint-carving,” which means that they carve out the 
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world’s fundamental structure (Sider 2011, vii).8  So, naturally, when we find that one or more of 
the expressions that we’ve used to formulate a question Q does not have exactly one, best joint-
carving meaning, it’s likely that a debate about Q is not about the fundamental structure of the 
world, and thus, is not a substantive metaphysical debate in Sider’s sense.   
With that said, it’s important to note that Ludwig’s summary of Sider is rough, and does 
not reflect Sider’s (2011, 49) “revised” definition of a non-substantive dispute.  What Ludwig 
presents is Sider’s unrefined view, which occurs at the beginning of section 4.2 in chapter 4 of 
Sider’s Writing the Book of the World.  However, later on in section 4.2, after Sider considers 
multiple problems with his unrefined view, he settles on what he calls his “revised” definition.9  
Nevertheless, since Ludwig uses Sider’s unrefined notion of non-substantivity in his critique, 
that’s what I’ll focus on as well.  However, for clarity, I’ll say that (12) expresses Sider-style 
non-substantivity as opposed to Siderian non-substantivity. 
In any case, Ludwig (2015, 261) asserts and defends (13) when he says that Spencer’s, 
Leroi’s, Pigliucci’s, and Hochman’s biological definitions of ‘race’ are all “equally joint-carving 
candidates” for ‘race’ because they are all “objective ways of distinguishing between populations 
below the species level.”  Furthermore, Ludwig (2015, 261-262) bolsters his support for (13) 
when he says that Hardimon’s, Glasgow’s, Feldman and Lewontin’s, and Appiah’s biological 
definitions of ‘race’ are also equally joint-carving candidates for ‘race’ because they are all “non-
joint-carving” meanings.  
3. Why Ludwig’s Argument is an Irrelevant Critique of Actual Metaphysics of Race 
                                                          
8
 For Sider’s clarification of “Ontologese,” see Sider (2011, 171-173). 
 
9
 For Sider’s “revised” definition, see Sider (2011, 49). 
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Even though Ludwig has provided a valid argument that may be sound as well, it turns 
out that Ludwig’s critique does nothing to undermine the actual metaphysics of race.  The latter 
is partially because Ludwig’s critique is not about the actual metaphysics of race, it’s about a 
hypothetical metaphysics that he calls ‘the new metaphysics of race’.   
Remember that the new metaphysics of race is, according to Ludwig (2015, 245), and by 
definition, constituted by disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race.”  Furthermore, 
remember that Ludwig claims that people like Glasgow, Haslanger, Appiah, and Spencer are 
engaged in one such dispute, the US race debate*, and people like Andreasen, Pigliucci, Kaplan, 
and Templeton are engaged in another such dispute, the biological race debate*.  However, these 
last two claims are simply false.   
For one, the term ‘fundamental ontology’ is not even a phrase used in actual metaphysics 
of race.  For instance, it does not appear once among the actual metaphysics of race that Ludwig 
(2015, 263-265) cites, and he cites 40 such publications.  Second, some actual metaphysicians of 
race embrace a pluralist ontology for the nature of race in the relevant context.  For example, at 
the beginning of Spencer’s (2014, 1026) article on the “national” meaning of ‘race’ in the US, he 
concedes that ordinary Americans are using multiple “geographic” and “ethnic” meanings of 
‘race’.  In fact, Spencer (2014, 1026) explicitly says, “Hence, I acknowledge upfront that there 
are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.”   
However, Ludwig could object here.  Specifically, Ludwig (2015, 257) interprets 
Spencer’s focus on the national meaning of ‘race’ in the US as an endorsement of it being “the 
only relevant candidate meaning for philosophical debates about the referent of “race” in the 
United States.”  While the latter is a possible interpretation of Spencer’s project, it’s not the most 
charitable one given how he presents his project at the beginning of his article.  Spencer (2014, 
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1025) begins by saying upfront that his project is merely “to debunk” the idea that “folk racial 
classification has no biological basis.”  Spencer attempts to accomplish that goal by showing that 
‘race’, in its national meaning in the current US, is a directly referring term for a biological 
entity—a set of particular human populations—that presently happens to be biologically real in 
virtue of being a level of human population structure.  Thus, given how Spencer (2014, 1026) 
presents his own project, his race theory is compatible with there being a pluralist nature of race 
in the current US context.  Furthermore, this interpretation best explains why Spencer (2014, 
1026) says that “there are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.” 
There are other actual metaphysicians of race who embrace pluralism about the nature of 
race as well.  For instance, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1162-1163) are happy to grant that both 
the ecotype and the subspecies are equally legitimate ways of dividing a species into biological 
races.  It’s just that they believe that humans have ecotypes, but not subspecies.  In fact, Pigliucci 
and Kaplan (2003, 1163) explicitly say, “Races, then, can be defined and picked out in a number 
of ways.” 
Finally, there are plenty of actual metaphysicians of race who do not embrace pluralism 
about the nature of race, but who do entertain pluralism as a metaphysical possibility, which is 
enough to show that they do not presuppose that there is a single fundamental ontology of race in 
the relevant context.  For instance, after obtaining messy results about how ordinary Americans 
use ‘race’ and race terms in a widely distributed survey, Glasgow (2009, 75) entertains the 
possibility that ordinary Americans are sometimes “talking past each other” when they use 
‘race’, much like we sometimes do when we use ‘jade’.  In fact, Glasgow (2009, 75) explicitly 
says, “So maybe ‘race’ is used in some contexts to refer to a social kind of thing and in other 
contexts to a biological kind of thing.”  That doesn’t sound like somebody who presupposes that 
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there is a single fundamental ontology of race in the US context.  Now, even though Ludwig’s 
argument is not about actual metaphysics of race, it could still be a relevant critique of actual 
metaphysics of race.  So to that I now turn. 
In order to know whether Ludwig’s argument succeeds in critiquing the actual 
metaphysics of race, we need to know more about the debates among actual metaphysicians of 
race.  Clearly, the US race debate* and the biological race debate* are not debates among actual 
metaphysicians of race.  However, the US race debate and the biological race debate are.  The US 
race debate is the debate about the nature and reality of race according to what ‘race’ means in 
the ordinary discourse of contemporary Americans, but only when ‘race’ is used to classify 
humans.  The latter debate actually exists because all of the individuals that Ludwig places in the 
US race debate* have expressed an interest in the focus I’ve just articulated.10  The biological 
race debate is the debate about whether humans have any races in a nontrivial biological sense of 
‘race’.  The latter debate actually exists as well.11  These are the two race debates that Ludwig 
was attempting to critique, and given these distinctions, we can see that Ludwig’s argument 
really isn’t relevant to these two debates. 
For one, neither the US race debate nor the biological race debate satisfies Hirsch’s 
criterion for a non-substantive dispute.  The US race debate is not a merely verbal dispute 
because racial realists in that debate, such as Haslanger and Spencer, cannot plausibly interpret 
racial anti-realists in that debate, such as Appiah and Glasgow, as speaking a language in which 
                                                          
10
 For evidence, see Appiah (1996, 42), Glasgow (2009, 15), Haslanger (2012, 133), and Spencer 
(2014, 1025). 
11
 For evidence, see Andreasen (1998, 200-201, 205), Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1161-1164), 
Maglo (2011, 362-363), and Templeton (2013, 262-263). 
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anti-realist race theories are true, and vice versa.  For instance, if Glasgow (2009, 33) is correct 
about (H1*) being part of the non-negotiable semantic content of ‘race’ in the ordinary discourse 
of Americans, then Spencer (2014, 1026) is incorrect about ‘race’ directly referring to a set of 
human populations in the national racial discourse of Americans, and vice versa.12  The 
biological race debate is not a merely verbal dispute either.  For instance, if Pigliucci and Kaplan 
(2003, 1165) are correct that humans subdivide into “biologically significant” ecotypes, then 
Hochman (2013, 347) is incorrect that humans do not subdivide into “meaningful biological 
units,” and vice versa. 
Next, even if the US race debate or the biological race debate is non-substantive in a 
Ludwigian or Sider-style sense, that fact does not imply a “confusion about metaphysical and 
normative classificatory issues” as (1) claims.  This is because actual metaphysicians of race are 
adopting a different view of substantive metaphysics—namely, one that does not require 
metaphysical disputes about race to presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race or 
anything about joint-carving.  Thus, while Ludwig’s argument is relevant to the hypothetical new 
metaphysics of race, it doesn’t make contact with actual metaphysics of race. 
Interestingly, when Ludwig defines ‘the new metaphysics of race’, he anticipates the 
worry that his focus on it may mischaracterize actual metaphysics of race.   In response, Ludwig 
(2015, 245) says, “However, I do not want to engage in a verbal dispute about the meaning of 
“metaphysics of race”… this article only challenges a certain type of metaphysics of race while 
proposing an alternative deflationist and normative metaphysics of race.”  However, this reply is 
                                                          
12
 (H1*) is the claim that a race is, at least, a group of human beings that is distinguished from 
other groups of human beings by visible physical features, of the relevant kind, that the group 
has to some significantly disproportionate extent (Glasgow 2009, 33). 
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perplexing because if the new metaphysics of race is a purely hypothetical metaphysics that does 
not describe the disputes in actual metaphysics of race (as I’ve shown), and, in addition, if the 
disputes in actual metaphysics of race already do away with monist and fundamentalist 
assumptions about race (as I’ve shown), it’s hard to imagine what the purpose is for lodging 
Ludwig’s critique in the first place.  In any case, we can rest assured that actual metaphysicians 
of race are immune to Ludwig’s critique because they’ve already been vaccinated against monist 
and fundamentalist assumptions about race. 
5. Closing Remarks 
In this paper, I’ve shown that Ludwig’s critique of the new metaphysics of race is 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  However, I’ve said little about the conditions of 
substantivity that actual metaphysicians of race adopt.  In addition to the bare minimum of “not 
talking past one another” (Glasgow 2009, 28), actual metaphysicians of race embrace disputes 
about how certain linguistic communities actually use ‘race’ (e.g. Pigliucci and Kaplan 2003, 
1162-1163; Glasgow 2009, 6), and embrace disputes about how certain linguistic communities 
should use ‘race’ (e.g. Haslanger 2012, 221-247; Hochman 2014, 80).  However, actual 
metaphysicians of race do not embrace disputes that have unimportant social and scientific 
consequences.  For instance, Haslanger (2012, 300) motivates the US race debate by pointing out 
that engaging in it will help us frame and evaluate social policies and appropriately address 
stubborn inequalities in health.  Also, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1170) point out that engaging 
in the biological race debate can help biologists debunk hereditarian hypotheses about race and 
intelligence, yield insights into human evolutionary history, and yield insights into human 
migration history. 
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Interestingly, the criteria for substantive metaphysics that actual metaphysicians of race 
adopt make the metaphysical disputes in the actual metaphysics of race more akin to 
metaphysical disputes in the philosophy of science (e.g. the species debate, the nature of natural 
kinds, the ontic structural realism debate, etc.) than those in mainstream analytic metaphysics 
(e.g. debates about the nature of fundamentality, grounding, modality, substantivity, etc.).  For 
instance, Matthew Slater’s (2015) stable property cluster theory of natural kinds has a real shot at 
explaining why some kinds support epistemically reliable inductions in a domain while others 
don’t, which could help systematic biologists achieve more agreement about how they should 
classify organisms into species and higher taxa.  So, much like disputes in the actual metaphysics 
of race, there are practical payoffs to science or society for engaging in metaphysical disputes in 
the philosophy of science.  However, mainstream analytic metaphysics does not guarantee a 
payoff for science or society.  For instance, what exactly is the payoff for science or society in 
debating about “the” nature of substantive metaphysics?  
Perhaps Sider (2011, 47) sums up my point best when he says, “… this concept is not 
intended to apply to everything that might justly be called “nonsubstantive”.  For example, it 
isn’t meant to apply to equivocations between distinct lexical meanings (as in a dispute over 
whether geese live by “the bank”, in which one disputant means river bank and the other means 
financial bank)… Nor is it meant to capture the shallowness of inquiry into whether the number 
of electrons in the entire universe is even or odd (an inquiry that is substantive in my sense, but 
pointless).” 
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Measurement of Statistical Evidence: Picking Up Where Hacking (et al.) Left Off 
 
Abstract Hacking’s (1965) Law of Likelihood says – paraphrasing– that data support 
hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 
1. But Hacking (1972) noted a seemingly fatal flaw in the LR itself: it cannot be interpreted 
as the degree of “evidential significance” across applications. I agree with Hacking about the 
problem, but I don’t believe the condition is incurable. I argue here that the LR can be 
properly calibrated with respect to the underlying evidence, and I sketch the rudiments of a 
methodology for so doing. 
 
Introduction  
The “likelihoodist,” or “evidentialist,” school of thought in statistics is well known among 
philosophers, more so perhaps than among scientists or even statisticians, in large part due to 
Hacking (1965). One way to distinguish evidentialism from the other major schools – 
frequentism and Bayesianism – is to note that evidentialism alone focuses on the assessment 
of statistical evidence as its principal task, rather than decision-making or the rank-ordering 
of beliefs.
1
  
																																																								
1	Hacking himself generally prefers the term “support” over “evidence,” as does Edwards 
(1992), but other representatives of this school (Good 1950; Barnard 1949; Royall 1997) 
refer to an equivalent concept as “evidence.”	I prefer “evidence,” since this is the familiar, 
albeit vague, word for what we are trying to illuminate; and I prefer “evidentialist” over 
“likelihoodist” as the name of the school, since the former highlights a key distinction 
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It might be thought, therefore, that evidentialism would be the predominant approach to 
statistical inference in science, where quantifying evidence is usually the main objective. (If 
you don’t agree, try getting scientists to stop using the p-value as a measure of the strength of 
the evidence!) But frequentism, and to a lesser extent Bayesianism, predominate in the 
scientific literature, while evidentialism is virtually unseen.  Why is this? I’m going to argue 
here that the fault lies with evidentialism’s failure thus far to address the problem of 
calibrating the units in which evidence is to be measured. Since meaningful calibration is the 
sine qua non of scientific measurement, this turns out to be the loose thread that causes the 
cloth to unravel when we pull on it.  
Before proceeding it may be worth noting some things I will and will not be talking about. 
First, I am concerned only with statistical evidence, and will not be considering the concept 
of evidence as it appears in other contexts, e.g., in legal proceedings. Second, I will treat 
statistical evidence as a relationship between data and hypotheses under a model that can be 
expressed in the form of a likelihood (as defined below). On this view, data do not possess 
inherent evidential meaning on their own, but only take on meaning in the context of their 
relationships to particular hypotheses, with the nature of those relationships governed by the 
form of the likelihood.  I will not be concerned here with measurement problems associated 
																																																																																																																																																																												
between this school and the others. By contrast, likelihood features prominently in all 
modern statistical frameworks.	
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with the data themselves.
2
  Third, I am interested here solely in addressing the question of 
whether this relationship between data and hypotheses can be rigorously quantified.  If the 
answer is yes, then presumably the degree of evidence could play a role in decision making 
(deciding how strong is strong enough when it comes to evidence) or in guiding belief, but I 
will not be addressing these topics here.  It is one hallmark of evidentialist reasoning that 
statistical evidence is treated independently of these matters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section (1) I articulate the central 
evidence calibration problem (ECP), and suggest reframing it in measurement terms. In 
section (2), I consider ways in which evidentialism’s preoccupation with so-called “simple” 
hypotheses (as defined below) has constricted the theory, masking the true nature of the 
underlying measurement problem, and also obscuring the solution. In section (3) I illustrate a 
methodology for beginning to address the ECP once the restriction to simple hypotheses is 
relaxed.  In section (4) I briefly consider what changes would be required to axiomatic 
foundations in order to accommodate this methodology while remaining true to the spirit of 
evidentialism’s original motivating arguments. 
 
(1) The Evidence Calibration Problem (ECP) 
At the heart of evidentialism is Hacking’s (1965) familiar Law of Likelihood, which says 
in essence that data support one statistical hypothesis H1 over another hypothesis H2 
																																																								
2	In common usage “evidence” is often used to refer to what I am calling data, but “evidence” 
also has this other sense of being a relationship between data and hypotheses. In order to 
maintain this distinction, I will call the data “data” and the relationship “evidence.”  
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whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 1. But Hacking (1972) pointed out 
a problem in assigning any particular interpretation to the magnitude of the LR. In his review 
of Edwards (1992, orig. 1972), he says: 
“Now suppose the actual log-likelihood ratio between the two hypotheses is r, and 
suppose this is also the ratio between two other hypotheses, in a quite different 
model, with some evidence altogether unrelated to [the original data]. I know of no 
compelling argument that the ratio r ‘means the same’ in these two contexts.”
3
 (p. 
136)  
Thus we can say that, for one experiment, data support hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 
with LR = 2, and, for another experiment, that a different set of data support  H3 over H4 with 
LR = 20; but we cannot saying anything definite about how much more the second set of data 
supports H3 over H4 relative to the amount by which the first set supports H1 over H2.  
Edwards was well aware of this problem, saying expressly that “we shall not be attempting to 
make an absolute comparison of different hypotheses on different data.” (p. 10).  But 
Hacking’s point cuts deep. If the numerical value of the LR cannot be meaningfully 
compared across applications, in what sense is it meaningful in any one application? 
																																																								
3	Here Hacking is using “evidence” in the sense of what I am calling data; however, he goes 
on to describe what he has in mind in terms of levels of “evidential significance.” He refers 
to the log LR as this is the form preferred by Edwards. Note that Hacking already appears to 
have been alluding to this problem in Hacking (1965), vide p. 61.	
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1156-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -535-
Veronica	J	Vieland	
Philosophy	of	Science	Assoc	Biennial	Meeting	2016	
Hacking’s criticism points to a fundamental problem for evidentialists, who appear to be 
able to say whether given data support H1 over H2, but not by how much they support H1.
4
 
This is on the face of it metaphysically perplexing, but also, it leaves a gap between support, 
as Hacking’s Law defines it, and a truly quantitative weight of evidence, which would be far 
more useful scientifically if only we could work out how to evaluate it.  
 Following the core arguments in Barnard (1949), Hacking (1965) and Edwards (1992), I 
will assume that the LR is the key quantity in any cogent theory of statistical evidence. But 
the Law of Likelihood is more specific than this assumption: it assigns a particular 
importance to one very narrowly conceived aspect of the LR, a fact that is obscured by 
evidentialism’s focus on simple hypotheses, to which I turn next.  
 Before doing so, I note that resolving Hacking’s problem requires unpacking his phrase 
‘means the same’.  I think that this must be understood as ‘means the same with respect to 
the underlying evidence,’ a locution that lands us solidly in measurement territory. We must 
be able to think in terms of the underlying evidence, as something we can – at least in the 
abstract – conceive of independently of how we measure it. The question then becomes: How 
do we establish meaningful measurement units for evidence, so that a given measurement 
value always ‘means the same’ with respect to the evidence? This is the ECP. 
And here, in a nutshell, is the evidentialist’s difficulty in addressing the ECP. The LR for 
a simple hypothesis comparison (see below) is a single number, thus, the evidentialist is lured 
																																																								
4	Royall (1997) is the only one as far as I know who argues that the magnitude of the LR 
does express strength of evidence in a comparable manner across applications. But I think his 
arguments on this point fail for reasons articulated in Forster & Sober (2004).	
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into the claim that “the LR is the evidence.” To see the danger here, consider a mercury 
thermometer reading 80°F. We might say, “the temperature is 80°,” but this is a 
circumlocution for “80 is the numerical value we assign, on the Fahrenheit scale, to the 
underlying temperature.” Now suppose that rather than degrees, only units of volume V are 
annotated on the sides of the glass. We might be tempted to say “V is the temperature,” but 
now this statement is not merely a circumlocution, it is also an error.  V alone does not tell us 
the temperature; we must, at the least, also take into account the pressure. To insist that 
temperature can be represented by volume alone, or by pressure alone, or by any other single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, is to mistake the nature of temperature. Just 
so, I am going to argue that the simple LR mistakes the nature of evidence, by obscuring the 
fact that the evidence itself is not a number, and moreover, that the evidence is not any single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, but instead, it is a function of (at least) two 
measurable things.  
 
(2) The Insidiousness of Simple Hypotheses 
To begin with, we need to define likelihood: 
“The likelihood, L(H|R), of the hypothesis H given data R, and a specific model, is 
proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality being arbitrary.” Edwards (1992) 
(p. 9) 
Two key points are familiar: (i) likelihood represents a feature of an hypothesis given data, 
not the other way around; and (ii) likelihood is related to but not the same as probability, 
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since it is defined only up to an arbitrary multiplicative factor and therefore does not follow 
the Kolmogorov axioms. I will not rehearse the advantages of likelihood in spelling out a 
theory of statistical evidence, but suffice it to say that likelihood enables inferences to 
proceed independently of what are, arguably, extraneous features of study design, including 
the sampling distribution of all those observations that might have occurred but didn’t.   
There is a third important feature of this definition as well, and this regards the nature of 
the hypotheses to which the definition is intended to apply. Edwards is, as always, explicit: 
“An essential feature of a statistical hypothesis is that its consequences may be described 
by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to each of which a definite 
probability is attached.”  (p. 4) 
This precludes consideration of likelihoods involving composite hypotheses. For instance, in 
the context of a coin-tossing experiment in which x independent tosses have landed heads 
and y have landed tails, and letting θ=P(heads), one can write the likelihood L(θ=0.1|x, y), or 
L(θ=0.2|x, y). These likelihoods involve “simple” hypotheses, in which θ is assigned a single 
numerical value, so that the corresponding probability P(x, y|θ) returns a single number on 
the probability scale for each possible outcome (x, y).  But one can not write L(θ=0.1 or 
θ=0.2|x, y), because the latter involves a “composite” hypothesis, which does not assign a 
definite probability to the observed outcome. To know the probability of observing (x, y) 
under the hypothesis “θ=0.1 or θ=0.2,” we would need not only to know the probability of (x, 
y) for each θ, but also, we would need to know the prior probabilities of θ=0.1 and θ=0.2.  As 
these prior probabilities lies outside the likelihood, they are not admissible on the 
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evidentialist view. 
But even the simplest examples of statistical reasoning generally involve hypotheses that 
appear on the face of things to be composite; e.g., we might be interested in whether the coin 
is biased toward tails or fair, which would appear to involve the improperly formed 
hypothesis θ<0.5. This situation is handled by treating composite hypotheses “solely on the 
merits of their component parts” (Edwards, p. 5). Thus in forming the LR corresponding to 
‘coin is biased toward tails’ vs. ‘coin is fair,’ we would need to consider separately the 
(infinitely many) simple LRs in the form L(θ=θi|x, y)/L(θ=0.5|x, y), for each possible i
th
 value 
of θ≤0.5. Now the LR is a function of θ, not a single number (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 LR as a function of θ for x = 2, y = 8. 
 
 
In practice it seems that what is important is not so much the proscription against 
composite hypotheses, but rather the prescription for how they may be interpreted.  We can 
graph the LR as a function of θ, as if we were admitting composite hypotheses, but we can 
only make statements like “θ=0.2 is supported over θ=0.5, on given data, by LR=6.9,” while 
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“θ=0.1 is supported over θ=0.5, on those same data, by LR=4.4.”
5
  But as a practical matter, 
the graph is not a sufficiently concise summary for general scientific applications. We still 
need some way to reduce the function LR(θ) to a single number summarizing the strength of 
the evidence.  
And this is where we get into trouble, because focus shifts naturally to the maximum LR 
(MLR), which occurs over the best supported value – the maximum likelihood estimate 
(m.l.e.) – of θ. Indeed, given that we are only allowed to make statements about one simple 
hypothesis comparison at a time, the MLR, itself a ratio of two simple likelihoods, appears as 
the best single constituent LR to use as a summary feature of the LR graph. (Below I 
consider how relaxing the requirement that hypotheses must be simple frees us up to consider 
other features.) We have now successfully summarized the function LR(θ) as a single number, 
the MLR, but this summary is tethered to the m.l.e.. We appear to have answered the 
question: How well supported is the m.l.e. compared to (one or more individual) alternative 
values of θ?  But that is not the question we asked initially, which was about the evidence.
6
 
The m.l.e. of θ arrives on the scene as a seemingly innocuous point of special interest, the 
value that corresponds to the maximum support, but it rapidly takes over, embroiling us in a 
downward spiral of increasingly perplexing difficulties. One immediate issue with relying on 
the MLR to summarize the evidence (continuing to focus for ease of discussion on the coin-
																																																								
5	Moreover we can only make such statements when both the data and the form of the 
likelihood are the same in the numerator and the denominator of the LR, for only in such 
cases will the constants of proportionality cancel. 
6
 Hacking (p. 28 ff.) makes clear the conceptual reasons for keeping estimation and evidence 
(or support) separate.  
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tossing example, in which maximization occurs only in the numerator of the LR), is that 
MLR≥1: the MLR can only show evidence in favor of the numerator but never in favor of the 
denominator. This is problematic, like using a thermometer in which the mercury is 
prevented from receding. 
Another problem with the MLR is that it begs the question of measurement scale in a 
particularly obvious way, because its evidential meaning would appear to require some kind 
of adjustment to compensate for the maximization itself. The more parameters we maximize 
over (again, for ease of discussion, assuming maximization occurs only in the numerator), the 
larger the MLR becomes. How are we to separate the portion of the MLR reflecting the 
evidence from the portion representing an artifact of the process of maximization?  It 
becomes particularly hard to retain the fiction that the numerical value of the maximum LR 
has some prima facie meaning with respect to the underlying evidence, regardless of the 
number of parameters over which the LR is maximized.  
There is a third, more subtle but at least as damaging, difficulty with summarizing 
evidence via MLRs. Simple LRs can be multiplied across two data sets, but MLRs can not be 
multiplied. Rather, to obtain the MLR based on two sets of data, we first combine the data to 
find the new m.l.e., which is a kind of weighted average of the two original m.l.e.s, and then 
we find the new MLR with respect to this average m.l.e. on the combined data. Now consider 
a situation in which data set D1 favors H2 by some substantial amount, and D2 also favors H2, 
but by a lesser amount. In such situations it is not uncommon for the combined support for 
H2 to be less than the original support on D1 alone.  But this is not how evidence behaves: 
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strong evidence for H2 followed by weaker evidence also supporting H2 ought to lead to 
stronger evidence for H2, not intermediate evidence. (A blood type match following a DNA 
match does not lessen the evidence that the defendant was at the crime scene.
7
) This means 
that we cannot in practice differentiate between situations in which new data are truly 
diminishing the evidence, and situations in which the evidence is in fact increasing but the 
MLR at the average m.l.e. goes down anyway. This tendency of the MLR to “average” 
across combined data is entirely due to its dependence on the m.l.e.; simple LRs do not share 
this defect.
8
 	
Of course none of this need surprise unreconstructed evidentialists, who, after all, 
disavowed composite hypotheses – and therefore any need for maximization – from the start.  
But then beyond the simplest of examples, we are left with an irreducible graph of the 
component simple LRs, not a single number.  This is true already in single-parameter cases;  
the problem is only exacerbated in higher dimensions.  
There is also the matter of masking the nature of the real problem: by focusing initially 
only on those situations in which the LR is a single number, we missed Hacking’s 
measurement question, how do we ensure that this number always ‘means the same’? It is 
only when we consider composite hypotheses that it becomes clear we were never warranted 
																																																								
7	This example was suggested by Hasok Chang. 
8	This issue plays a salient role in the current “crisis” of non-replication of statistical findings 
in the biomedical and social sciences, where the tendency of p-values and MLRs to “regress 
to the mean” upon attempts to replicate initial findings is widely interpreted as meaning that 
the evidence has gone down. In the absence of a properly behaved evidence measure, 
however, this conclusion is entirely unwarranted.	
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in the first place in assuming that the face value of the LR for a simple vs. simple hypothesis 
comparison is the evidence. Composite hypotheses force us to think in terms of the LR graph, 
which, precisely because it is not a single number, immediately raises the issue of which 
feature(s) of the graph might be relevant to the evidence. Composite hypotheses are crucial, 
not only because they are scientifically relevant, but also, because they beg a question all but 
hidden as long as we focus only on simple hypotheses.  
The urge to sidestep the problem of the evidential interpretation of the MLR is the reason 
evidentialists have been reluctant to admit composite hypotheses into their formalism in the 
first place.  But it is fair to say that they have failed to provide any viable alternative to the 
MLR as the summary measure of evidence strength in practice. The preoccupation with 
simple hypotheses has entailed inherent difficulties for the program, and it has also masked a 
basic underlying calibration issue.  The good news, I believe, is that it has also been masking 
the possibility of a solution.  
 
 (3) Towards a Solution to the Measurement Calibration Problem  
Consider again the coin-tossing experiment and LR(θ) as shown in Figure 1. Let us 
suppose, following the spirit if not the letter of the Law of Likelihood, that all of the 
evidential information is captured, somehow, in this graph. What feature(s) of the graph 
should we take as representing the degree of evidence?   
The MLR of course is one possibility, but I have already stated some objections to this 
option.  An alternative would be to use the area under the graph (ALR). (Note that this is 
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only possible if we allow ourselves to consider the truly composite hypothesis θ<0.5, because 
the ALR requires simultaneous consideration of all of the constituent simple hypotheses.
9
) 
But while we’re at it, why not also consider using sets of features of the graph?  For instance, 
the evidence might be a function of the both the MLR and the ALR, e.g., their product, or 
their ratio.  What we need is a methodology for figuring out which among the many 
possibilities is the correct one. 
The methodology I propose is quite simple, at least to begin with. Let’s consider the 
behavior of candidate evidence measures in situations where we have clear intuitions 
regarding the behavior of evidence, and see which of our candidate measures behaves like the 
object of measurement, the evidence. Here I will illustrate using coin-tossing “thought 
experiments” to discover patterns of behavior of the evidence with changes in data, 
considering the evidence that the coin is either biased toward tails or fair. I propose that, 
perhaps with a little persuasion, I could convince you that the following patterns capture 
what we mean when we talk about statistical evidence in this context. (Here I summarize the 
data in terms of n=the number of tosses, and x/n=the proportion of tosses that land heads.)  
(i) Evidence as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For any given value of x/n, the 
evidence increases as n increases. The evidence may favor bias (e.g., if x/n = 0.05) or no 
bias (e.g., if x/n = ½), but in either case it gets stronger with increasing n.  
																																																								
9	The ALR is proportional in this simple example to the Bayes factor under a uniform prior 
on θ, which is sometimes interpreted in Bayesian circles as a measure of evidence strength; it 
is also proportional to the relative belief (Evans 2015), another Bayesian proposal for 
measuring evidence. But the ALR itself does not involve a prior, so I see no prima facie 
reason for the evidentialist to balk at this suggestion, once composite hypotheses are allowed.	
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(ii) Evidence as a function of changes in x/n for fixed n  If we hold n constant but allow 
x/n to increase from 0 up to, say, 0.20, the evidence favoring ‘coin is biased’ diminishes: 
i.e., the evidence for bias is stronger the further x/n is from ½. But we have also already 
noted that when x/n is close to ½ the evidence favors ‘coin is fair.’ Therefore, as x/n 
continues to approach ½, at some point the evidence will shift to favoring ‘coin is fair,’ 
and from that point, the evidence for ‘coin is fair’ will increase the closer x/n is to ½.  
(iii) Rate of evidence change as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For given x/n, as n 
increases the evidence increases more slowly with fixed increments of data. E.g., consider 
evidence in favor of bias with one additional tail (T), following T, or TT, or TTT. When 
the number of tails in a row is small (i.e., when there is weak evidence favoring bias), each 
subsequent T makes us that much more suspicious that the coin is biased. But suppose we 
have already observed 100 Ts in a row: now one additional T changes our sense of the 
evidence hardly at all, as we are already quite positive that the coin is not fair.
10
  
 (iv) x/n as a function of changes in n (or vice versa) for fixed evidence It follows from (i) 
and (ii) that in order for the evidence to remain constant, n and x/n must adjust to one 
another in a compensatory manner. E.g., if x/n increases from 0 to 0.05, in order for the 
evidence to remain the same n must increase to compensate; otherwise, the evidence 
would go down, following (ii) above. By the same token, it is readily verified that if (i) 
																																																								
10	This underscores the point made above that evidence is not inherent in the data (say, a 
single toss T), but rather, evidence is a relationship between the data and the hypotheses that 
depends on context. 
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and (ii) hold, then as x/n continues to increase, at some point n must begin to decrease in 
order to hold the evidence constant as the evidence shifts to favoring ‘coin is fair.’  
Note that at this point we have not mentioned probability distributions, likelihoods,  or 
parameterization of the hypotheses. These patterns characterize evidence in only a very 
informal, vague manner. However, by the same token, they exhibit a kind of generality: they 
derive from our general sense of evidence, from what we mean by statistical evidence before 
we attempt a formal mathematical treatment of the concept.  
Can we find a precise mathematical expression that exhibits these patterns? As  
illustrated in Figure 2, the ratio RLR=MLR/ALR exhibits all of the expected behaviors. By 
contrast, neither MLR nor ALR shows all four of these patterns. For instance, MLR, as 
already noted, cannot show increasing evidence in favor of H2 because it can never favor H2 
in the first place; and both MLR and ALR increase exponentially in n for fixed x/n rather 
than showing the concave-down pattern in 2(a).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Patterns of behavior of RLR for coin-tossing thought experiments: (a) Patterns (i) 
and (iii); (b) Pattern (ii); (c) Pattern (iv).  
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Of course none of this proves that RLR is the correct, or optimal (or properly calibrated) 
measure of evidence. But this style of reasoning buys us an important methodological tool. 
Whichever features of the LR graph we consider and however we combine them, we must be 
able to show that the resulting evidence measure behaves like the evidence. When proposing 
candidate evidence measures anything goes, but only those candidates that behave 
appropriately remain on the ballot. And even in this very simple example, two obvious 
candidates – the MLR and the ALR – have already dropped out of contention.  
Of course, there is no reason to assume that what works in this simple case (RLR) will 
work in more complicated cases, nor have we yet resolved the ECP’s fundamental calibration 
issue. Establishing that a measure behaves like the object of measurement is only a first step, 
but it is a vital step not previously taken. It provides an “empirical” measurement scale, not 
an absolute scale, much as early thermoscopes provided good experimental tools while 
falling short of proper, absolute, calibration (Chang 2004).
11
  Projecting an empirical 
measure onto an absolute scale requires a broader theoretical foundation, but one needs the 
empirical measure first.  My point here is simply that confronting the ECP head on, and in 
the context of composite hypotheses, opens the door for the first time to the possibility of 
establishing a proper measurement scale for statistical evidence.   
Note too that the coin-tossing exercise suggests the existence of an equation of state 
involving the three quantities (n, x/n and the evidence), such that fixing any one quantity 
																																																								
11	Indeed, the ECP poses what Chang calls a “nomic” measurement problem, much like the 
nomic problem of temperature measurement. What I am describing here is a necessary but 
not sufficient stage in resolving a nomic problem. 
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while allowing a second one to change requires a specific compensatory change in the third. 
This in turn suggests a new, and potentially very powerful, way to think about the laws 
governing the behavior of LRs. I’m not aware of any evidentialist work that considers such 
equations, but I see no reason that an evidentialist-at-heart should be prohibited from 
pursuing their study. 
  
(4) Relaxing the Foundations To Include Composite Hypotheses 
In order to tackle the ECP in the terms of the preceding section, we need to amend the 
foundations of evidentialism, but only slightly. I propose the following changes. First, let’s 
retain Edwards definition of likelihood, as quoted above, but insert the word “simple” (which 
is tacit in Edwards’ original statement): “The likelihood, L(H|R), of a simple hypothesis H 
given data R, and a specific model, is proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality 
being arbitrary.” Second, we can again add the word “simple” to his characterization of a 
statistical hypothesis: “An essential feature of a simple statistical hypothesis is that its 
consequences may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to 
each of which a definite probability is attached.”  But we can now add a definition of 
likelihood for a composite hypothesis: “A composite hypothesis H given data R, and a 
specific model, is the set of all constituent simple hypotheses, defined up to a single constant 
of proportionality.” Thus the essential feature of a composite hypothesis is that each of its 
constituent simple hypotheses may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive 
outcomes, to each of which a definite probability is attached.  We can now use this definition 
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of a composite hypothesis to define the corresponding composite likelihood, as the set of all 
constituent simple likelihoods. 
Under my proposal, the spirit of the Law of Likelihood can be retained: We can say that 
all of the evidential information conveyed by given data regarding a comparison between two 
hypotheses on a particular model is contained in the LR, where, under the expanded 
definition of hypotheses, the LR is understood to be a function of all unknown parameters, or 
better still perhaps, a graph. This can equivalently be read as a definition of evidential 
information, as whatever changes the LR graph.
12
  But the idea that the (simple) LR itself 
expresses the degree or weight of the evidence must be abandoned. What I have attempted to 
argue here is that there is at least the possibility of replacing this notion with something more 
useful.   
 
Discussion   
Evidence is a general and vague term in science. Statistical evidence is a narrower concept, 
but it still inherits some of this vagueness.  One way to tackle a general and vague term is by 
seeking a precise definition that maintains full generality, but of course, this might not be 
possible. Weyl (1952) has suggested another approach: 
“To a certain degree this scheme is typical for all theoretic knowledge: We begin with 
some general but vague principle, then find an important case where we can give that 
																																																								
12	I borrow this idea from Frank (2014), who defines information as whatever changes a 
probability distribution. 
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notion a concrete precise meaning, and from that case we gradually rise again to 
generality… and if we are lucky we end up with an idea no less universal than the one 
from which we started. Gone may be much of its emotional appeal, but it has the same or 
even greater unifying power in the realm of thought and is exact instead of vague.” (p. 6) 
Can evidentialism be redeemed and made truly useful to science? Of course I have not 
proved that the answer is yes. But in section (3) I illustrated a case in which we appear to be 
able to give the vague concept of statistical evidence a concrete, precise meaning, via the 
quantity RLR=MLR/ALR. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to rise again to 
generality from this first step. But for those of us who agree with most of what Barnard, 
Hacking and Edwards have to say on the subject, it seems worthwhile to see how far we can 
take this line of reasoning. This also seems to be a singular opportunity for philosophers of 
science to step into the breach and at least try to solve a problem that has long stood between 
one of the needs of science – for well-behaved quantitative measures of evidence – and the 
capabilities of conventional statistical methodologies. 
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What Basic Emotions Really Are  
Encapsulated or Integrated?  
Abstract: While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions (BEs) and 
about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that 
BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the 
products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this 
assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that 
evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications 
of these claims for debates about the existence of basic emotions in humans. 
1. Introduction 
It is widely held among emotion theorists that there is some theoretically interesting 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. On this picture, basic emotions 
(BEs) are primarily structured by evolution whereas higher cognitive emotions are 
substantially structured by either culture or individual experience. While there is ongoing 
debate about the existence of BEs and about their status as natural kinds, these debates 
usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that 
encapsulation is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products 
of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumptions is entirely unwarranted, that 
there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to 
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expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the distinction between basic and higher cognitive 
emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications of these claims for the existence of basic 
emotions in humans.  
In the following section, I characterize the received view of BEs, which holds (among 
other things) that BEs are solutions to basic life problems in our evolutionary past. Then I 
consider and reject some of the reasons to think that BEs are cognitively encapsulated. In the 
second section, I provide an example of a BE in rodents that bears the marks of cognitive 
integration (as opposed to encapsulation). The basic life problem that likely shaped this 
emotion appears to demand substantial cognitive integration. In the third section, I draw out 
the implications for a current debate in emotion theory concerning the existence of BEs in 
humans.  
2. Basic Emotions 
BEs – including anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise (for an extended list, 
see Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) – are thought to be human-typical behavioral syndromes that 
include involuntary facial expressions of emotion, physiological changes (e.g. in heart rate, 
blood pressure, and hormone levels), and changes in bodily posture (including bodily social 
displays and orienting responses). According to BE theory, these syndromes have a similar 
kind of evolutionary explanation and similar neural and psychological mechanisms.  
Specifically, they each evolved to address basic life problems or adaptive problems (such as 
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resource competition, avoidance of predators and avoidance of poisons and parasites). Some 
of these basic life problems are ones that we share with non-human animals.  
Moreover, the elicitation and production of these syndromes (including the 
coordination of various response components) are supposed to be explained by automatic 
appraisal mechanisms and affect programs, respectively (Ekman, 1977, 1999). For instance, 
affect programs explain phenomena observed in experiments that ask people to distinguish 
photographs of facial expressions of emotions, connect these expressions with emotion 
terms, or rate their appropriateness in response to vignettes (for an overview, see Ekman, 
2003). They are also supposed to explain the results of experiments that connect facial 
expressions with changes in physiological response components (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). To generalize, affect programs are 
introduced to explain the observed coordination of various response components and the 
cross-cultural production of these various syndromes (which is thought to explain widespread 
recognition of facial expressions across cultures). 
3. Unwarranted Assumptions Concerning Cognitive Integration 
Many emotion theorists claim that BEs lack cognitive integration. In this section, I argue that 
these claims are based on unwarranted assumptions.  
Assumption 1: Cognitively Integrated only if Informationally Integrated 
In most cases, questions about the integration of emotions with cognition concern the 
possibility that emotions are modular in Fodor’s (1983) sense. This depends (among other 
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things) on whether they can store information that cognitive systems cannot access 
(informational encapsulation); or whether information from other cognitive systems can 
interfere with the operations of an emotion (cognitive penetrability); or whether people have 
conscious access to emotional processes or merely their outputs (opacity); or whether the 
information that an emotion provides is general as opposed to specific (which would imply 
shallow outputs). These are some of the more well-known marks of cognitive integration or 
its absence, encapsulation. 
Philosophers and psychologists alike usually proceed under the assumption that 
integration with cognition depends entirely on whether information is integrated in these 
ways. These assumptions translate to discussions about BEs, where evidence for lack of 
informational integration is sometimes used as evidence for lack of cognitive integration 
simpliciter: 
Three other types of evidence suggest that [basic] emotion processes can operate 
independently of cognition. Emotions have been induced by unanticipated pain…, 
manipulation of facial expressions…, and changing the temperature of cerebral blood… 
In all these conditions the immediate cause of the emotion was noncognitive. (Izard, 
1992, p. 563, see also his 2007) 
Here, Izard apparently assumes that the impenetrability of BEs constitutes evidence that BEs 
operate independently of cognition. The fact that they respond to low level inputs or 
processes to which other systems have limited access certainly suggests that emotional states 
can respond to information that is not integrated with cognition. In addition, there is evidence 
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that people cannot fully control facial expressions of BEs (Ekman, 1972; Friesen, 1973), 
suggesting that BEs are cognitively impenetrable. Overall, BEs appear to lack informational 
integration. 
Nevertheless, the realm of the cognitive picks out not only informational states, but 
also includes a broader range of internal states that function as causal intermediates between 
stimulus and response, perception and action (Rey, 1997). Cognitive states so understood 
include not only informational states (such as beliefs) but also motivational states (such as 
desires). Moreover, questions about cognitive integration may be asked about either 
informational or motivational states. If so, the possibility arises that the two forms of 
cognitive integration are independent of one another. If so, any inference from the one to the 
other is invalid.  
This becomes clear when we consider hunger. Hunger may very well be akin to 
desire (a paradigmatic case of a cognitively integrated state) in the sense that it can interact 
with other cognitive systems to produce flexible or novel behaviors, as when rodents take 
novel “short cuts” to get to a food box in a maze (Olton, 1979; Tolman, 1948). Short cut 
behaviors suggest that hunger is a motivational state that can incline rodents to the pursuit of 
an end (e.g. food consumption) by selecting from a range of different means, perhaps by 
interacting with informational states that relate means to ends (e.g. means-ends beliefs). Even 
so, hunger may be cognitively impenetrable in that it may be triggered by low level stimuli 
and processes (e.g. low-level detection of changes in blood sugar). Moreover, when one feels 
hungry, one cannot interfere with the feeling of hunger by thinking about it (e.g. by noticing 
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that the amount of energy one’s body has stored in fat deposits is more than enough to 
sustain oneself). One can even imagine that it is informationally encapsulated: it might store 
information (e.g. about which foods are more calorically dense) that other systems cannot 
directly access. 
These conceptual possibilities suggest that questions concerning the integration of 
informational states are conceptually independent of questions concerning the integration of 
motivational states. Hunger may be informationally encapsulated while retaining a degree of 
integration as a motivational state. Wholesale encapsulation, therefore, does not follow from 
informational encapsulation. If this is correct, then inferences like the one Izard draws above 
are invalid: having non-cognitive inputs is not a reason to think that emotions operate 
independently of cognition. They might very well operate in concert with cognition on the 
output side or as motivational states. Before I raise that possibility, consider another reason to 
rule it out at the outset: that BEs are not integrated with propositional attitudes, including 
beliefs and desires. 
Assumption 2: Integration with Beliefs and Desires is the Criterion for Cognitive 
Integration  
Contrary to the previous assumption, this one respects the distinction between motivational 
and informational integration. Nevertheless, I argue that it sets the bar for cognitive 
integration too high. 
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To see this, consider Griffiths’ (Griffiths, 1997, 2004) views on the distinction 
between basic and higher cognitive emotions. First, he draws on some of the same evidence 
as Izard to conclude that BEs are opaque and informationally encapsulated. Since they have 
these and other marks of modularity, Griffiths thinks BEs have “limited involvement” with 
higher cognitive processes, which are “…the processes in which people use the information 
of the sort they verbally assent to (traditional beliefs) and the goals they can be brought to 
recognize (traditional desires) to guide relatively long-term action and to solve theoretical 
problems.” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 92) Here, Griffiths may be making the same faulty assumption 
as Izard (that informational encapsulation implies cognitive encapsulation more broadly). 
However, let us grant that he may have additional reasons to think that emotions are not 
integrated on the output side or qua motivational states.  
From this, Griffiths draws a broader conclusion: that BEs are not “flexible [or] 
integrated with long-term, planned action” and are instead “restricted to short-term, 
stereotyped responses” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 241). The apparent assumption is that if BEs are 
not integrated with beliefs, desires and long-term planning, then the only alternative is that 
they are similar to fixed action patterns, being inflexible and stereotyped. Griffiths makes no 
explicit argument for this assumption, perhaps at the time it was widespread enough to make 
further argument otiose. 
Nevertheless, it has become a tendentious assumption for several reasons. First, the 
phenomena of intelligent action are much broader than deliberate, “long-term, planned 
action” mediated by beliefs and desires. For instance, Ginet (1990) argues that many clear 
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cases of actions (as distinct from mere behaviors, such as reflexes or fixed action patterns) 
are not plausibly mediated by conscious beliefs, desires or intentions: involuntarily crossing 
one’s legs, kicking a door in anger, impulsively pulling a loose thread from one’s clothes, 
and slamming on the brakes to avoid hitting a dog. These actions are not mere behaviors or 
reflexes. That is, they appear to be purposive and guided by the agent, but it is difficult to 
find belief-desire style explanations that render them intelligible.1 Why not think that BEs 
can influence actions more akin to this variety than to “long-term, planned actions”? Griffiths 
never raises this question, neither does he give reason to rule out the possibility that BEs 
cause actions intermediate between long-term planned action and stereotyped behavioral 
responses. 
Second, if we ask what might explain the other varieties of action that Ginet picks 
out, it may be that such actions are guided by other representational states, aside from 
conscious or verbally reportable beliefs, desires and intentions. For instance, in the last 
twenty years, cognitive scientists have begun to emphasize the role of unconscious or non-
conceptual representational states in generating flexible and intelligent behavior (Bermúdez, 
2003). Informational states aside from beliefs include perceptual representations, map-like 
spatial representations and representations of affordances. Motivational states aside from 
desires include drives, incentives and feedback mechanisms.  
                                                     
1 See also Hursthouse (1991). 
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The flexibility and intelligence of these representational states becomes clear when 
we consider animal behavior. Nonhuman animals display forms of intelligent or purposive or 
instrumental behavior (see e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998), even while lacking 
linguistically mediated propositional attitudes. This suggests that instrumental behaviors in 
non-human animals are underwritten by a different form of cognitive integration. Consider 
what Susan Hurley calls holistic flexibility: 
The holistic flexibility of intentional agency contributes a degree of generality to the 
agent’s skills: a given means can be transferred to a novel end, or a novel means adopted 
toward a given end. The end or goal functions as an intervening variable that organizes 
varying inputs and outputs and allows a degree of transfer across contexts. (Hurley, 2003, 
pp. 237–38) 
Where this sort of flexibility is found, it suggests that behavior is best explained with 
reference to informational states which represent the means available to an organism (e.g. 
affordances) and motivational states that represent its ends (e.g. drive states), which can 
interact interchangeably in order to bring about the same end by various means or to deploy a 
single means to bring about various ends.  
Nevertheless, these informational and motivational states may sometimes lack 
inferential integration with beliefs and desires. Even in humans, phenomena like “blind-
sight” suggest that perceptual representations can flexibly guide behavior without being 
integrated with verbally reportable states. That is, even though these perceptual states are not 
verbally reportable or consciously accessible, these informational states mediate goal-
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directed behaviors (e.g. putting a plate in a slot) rather than just reflexes and fixed action 
patterns (see e.g. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). All this suggests that Griffiths’ 
requirements on cognitive integration are too stringent. Verbal reportability and conscious 
accessibility of a representational state is not necessary for such a state to influence flexible 
behaviors. To my knowledge there is no evidence that BEs fail to meet less stringent 
requirements on cognitive integration such as holistic integration. 
Once the full range of representational states is expanded in this way (beyond beliefs 
and desires), it becomes possible that BEs have some degree of motivational integration with 
other representational states aside from conscious beliefs and desires to produce behaviors 
that are more flexible and purposive than stereotyped behaviors. Griffiths provides no reason 
to rule out this possibility.  
4. Evidence of Integration in a Basic Emotion 
In fact, there is some reason to rule it in. Consider the instinctive patterns of territorial 
behavior of rodents. These behaviors have been investigated in great detail using a resident-
intruder experimental paradigm (for an overview, see D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984, 
2003) add it Adams RRR) in which resident (who have occupied a cage or colony for a few 
weeks) will attack unfamiliar male intruders introduced into their cage. The attacks of the 
resident and the defensive maneuvers of the intruder comprise sets of stereotyped behaviors. 
Each attack behavior of the resident is paired with a matching defensive maneuver of the 
intruder. The resident adopts a set of stereotyped postures and attacks aimed at biting the 
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dorsal surfaces of the intruder. On the other hand, the intruder adopts a distinctive set of 
stereotyped behaviors aimed at avoiding or blocking the resident’s attempts to bite its back.  
While these behaviors are certainly stereotyped, they are not brittle or reflexive. For 
instance, attacks of residents vary depending on the defensive strategy adopted by the 
intruder, and they seem to be governed by a motive to approach and attack that persists the 
entire time that the intruder is present.  By contrast, the intruder rat’s whole suite of 
behaviors seems to be governed by a persistent motive to escape and avoid. 
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Figure 1 Confrontation and avoidance behaviors (e.g. facial expressions, postures and 
maneuvers) of resident and intruder mice (respectively). From Defensor and Corley (2012), 
p. 683 permission pending © Elsevier. Originally published in Physiology and Behavior. 
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What scientists have discovered about these behaviors (the flexibility of these 
behaviors and their coherent aims) indicates that they are produced by two underlying 
motivational systems, what I call the confrontation and avoidance systems (D. C. Blanchard 
& Blanchard, 1984, 2003; D. C. Blanchard, Litvin, Pentkowski, & Blanchard, 2009). The 
confrontation system is tuned to bring about a specific end state, repeated back-biting. 
Moreover, this motive does not depend on learning: rats which have been socially isolated 
from birth will still attempt to bite the back of an intruder (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1961). So far, the 
focus has been on cases in which a given rodent is purely motivated by confrontation or 
avoidance, but aggressive encounters in the wild usually involve a mix of offensive and 
defensive postures. This suggests that these motivational systems can be activated 
simultaneously or in close succession to produce mixed patterns of behavior. 
Regardless, these systems have many of the characteristics of affect programs in 
humans. They are posited to explain a coordinated suite of behaviors and physiological 
changes that may include facial expressions, cardiovascular changes, and endocrine 
responses (Defensor, Corley, Blanchard, & Blanchard, 2012; Fokkema, Koolhaas, & van der 
Gugten, 1995). Moreover, these systems are tailored to solve basic life problems. 
Specifically, the confrontation system solves the problem of defending territories from other 
males for breeding purposes (and without fatally injuring kin in the process), whereas the 
avoidance system solves the problem of avoiding occupied territories and failing that, 
defending against the attacks of residents. For these reasons, we have all the same reasons to 
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postulate BEs in rodent that we have in humans. Let us suppose then that the confrontation 
and avoidance systems are BEs in rodents.  
Interesting for my purposes, under certain conditions, the presence of the unfamiliar 
male can produce highly flexible and novel behaviors. In the bound-intruder task, an intruder 
is tied down on a Plexiglas plate with only its ventral surfaces (belly-side) exposed and 
placed in the cage of a resident, so that the resident cannot easily bite the back of the intruder. 
As a result, the resident will sometimes bite at the bands that tie down the intruder or dig 
under the intruder so that the resident can bite the intruder’s back (R. J. Blanchard, 
Blanchard, Takahashi, & Kelley, 1977). In contrast, none of these behaviors are adopted 
when the intruder is tied down with his back exposed.  
These instrumental behaviors are clearly not stereotyped forms of attack, rather they 
are forms of flexible behavior adjustment to achieve the aim of biting the intruder’s back: 
they exhibit holistic integration. In this case, the same end can be achieved by several, novel 
means. Attempts to bite the intruder’s bonds or to dig underneath the intruder are novel 
means toward the end of biting the back of the intruder. Moreover, some of a resident’s 
means can be deployed toward novel ends. Digging is an element of the rat’s behavioral 
repertoire that is ordinarily used for an entirely different purpose: constructing burrow 
systems for shelter and nesting (Boice, 1977). This suggests that there are informational 
states, representations of means (e.g. motor representations of digging, biting, lateral attack, 
etc.), that can interact interchangeably with motivational states, representations of various 
ends (e.g. nesting, back-biting, eating etc.), in order to produce flexible behaviors. 
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Importantly, the confrontation system seems to be involved in coordinating flexible 
back-biting behavior. Moreover, this is something we would predict if it is a solution to the 
basic life problem of defending a territory from intruders. Flexibility is required to 
successfully repel an intruder because it is not in the intruder’s best interest to be repelled 
easily or to act predictably. For instance, the intruder would be sure to fare poorly if it acted 
in a way that accommodates the attacks of the resident. So a single fixed action pattern or 
even a whole suite of fixed action patterns on the part of the resident would not tend to be 
successful against the most likely strategy of the intruder. It is more adaptive to have a 
flexible motivational state that leads to repeated back biting across a wide range of strategies 
or postures that the intruder might adopt. Rather than leading only to inflexible, stereotyped 
responses, it appears that solutions to basic life problems sometimes require some degree of 
motivational integration. 
 
5. Implications for Emotion Theory 
If we understand BEs in this way, this changes the shape of an ongoing debate in emotion 
theory concerning the existence of BEs in humans. In the past, this debate has carried on 
under the assumption that if an emotion is biologically basic, then one should predict that the 
various response components of the emotion will have a high degree of coherence; that for 
example “all instances of anger should have a characteristic facial display, cardiovascular 
pattern, and voluntary action that are coordinated in time and correlated in intensity.” 
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(Barrett, 2006, p. 29) This high degree of coherence is not observed across many emotions 
(Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). For 
instance, when anger is elicited in experimental settings, it is uncommon to observe facial 
expressions in conjunction with the other putative components of BE anger.  
One way of defending the basicality of an emotion against this criticism is to reassess 
what patterns of emotional response are predicted by BE theory. As we saw in the section 
above the motivational component of a basic emotion can select novel, instrumental 
behaviors. Moreover, the motivational component can be indispensable for solving a basic 
life problem. I think we can add to this the possibility that other response components are not 
as indispensable as the motivational state. To see this, suppose that anger in humans is a 
solution to basic life problems of deterring conspecifics from challenges and insults. If so, it 
may be that the only reliable requirement of successful deterrence (at least in our lineage) is a 
flexible motivation to retaliate against perceived wrongs (e.g. McCullough, Kurzban, & 
Tabak, 2012). For instance, a reliable disposition to garner a reputation for revenge (e.g. by 
avenging personal offenses) appears to be a highly reliable strategy for deterrence (e.g. Daly 
& Wilson, 1988; Frank, 1988), perhaps more so than any facial expression or physiological 
responses. If revenge can be served cold, then anger may not always require anything more 
than a motivation to avenge. If so, then we might expect that the only reliably occurring 
component of anger is the relevant motivational state. But if this is correct, then evidence of 
low coherence is not evidence against the existence of BE anger. While this is a just-so story 
that may or may not end up being true, it shows that the expected level of coherence in a BE 
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depends on which basic life problem shaped that emotion. In some cases, we might expect 
the motivational state to be the only component that does not significantly vary across the 
situations in which these problems arise. In that case, contextually variable responses will be 
the norm rather than the exception. 
 
6. Conclusion: What Basic Emotions Really Are 
So what are basic emotions? Like other theoretical terms, part of the theoretical function of 
basic emotions is to place selective stress on competing theories (e.g. Kroon, 1985). In this 
case, BEs and competing conceptions of emotion allow us to discriminate between 
evolutionary theories of emotion in competition with radical social constructivist theories 
(e.g. Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013).  
BEs help distinguish these theories by specifying an architecture for emotion 
production predicted by evolutionary considerations. The distinguishing factor is whether 
emotion production is categorical or dimensional (see figure 2). If each BE is a solution to a 
different basic life problem, then when a BE is elicited, we should see emotional responses 
that are relevant to that basic life problem and distinct from the responses manifested by 
other BEs. Emotion production is categorical in the sense that the behavioral responses are 
controlled by a single emotional state (as distinct from other emotional states that might 
control a distinct pattern of response). By contrast, if all emotions are socially constructed as 
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some theorists claim, we might expect to see emotional behaviors controlled directly by 
multiple dimensions of appraisal (as in the bottom half of figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Competing architectures for emotion production. Top diagram is a categorical 
architecture, whereas the bottom is dimensional. From Moors (2012), p. 266 permission 
pending © John Benjamins Publishing Company. Originally published in Zachar and Ellis 
(2012). 
 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1190-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -569-
Isaac Wiegman 
10/19/2016 
19 
 
Until the present, contextual variability of emotional responses has played a decisive 
role in distinguishing between these two architectures for emotion production. If flexible 
motivational states are not included among the components of BEs, then discrete emotion 
production predicts insensitivity to context subsequent to elicitation (though emotion 
regulation processes can perhaps inhibit or augment emotional responses according to 
context). However, once flexible motivational states are possible, categorical emotion 
production is compatible with a greater amount of contextual variability. 
Admittedly, this added complexity makes it more difficult to test whether humans 
have BEs. Nevertheless, it is not impossible. For instance, in the case of anger, researchers 
have developed a neurological measure of approach motivation (for a review, see Carver & 
Harmon-jones, 2009). If this motivational state is a component of anger, we can measure 
whether approach motivation itself is better predicted by contextual variables subsequent to 
anger elicitation or rather by contextual variables prior to or during elicitation. If contextual 
variables prior to elicitation do not independently predict approach motivation as BE theory 
might lead us to expect, then we would have evidence against the existence of BE anger. 
I have argued against prevailing assumptions that BEs lack cognitive integration. In 
the past, evidence against cognitive integration has been concerned with informational 
integration, and motivational integration has not been considered. Moreover, the assumed 
requirements for integration concern interaction with verbally reportable or consciously 
accessible states, and integration with other representational states is ignored. Moreover, BEs 
in rodents exhibit a form of motivational integration that plausibly hinges on interaction with 
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a wider variety of representational states. Properly understood, BEs are more likely to refer to 
emotional states in humans.  
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Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies
Abstract
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization 
and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) iluminating discussion
of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this 
renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an 
important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent 
grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization 
of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, 
intuitions notwithstanding, the terms in which their recommendation has been 
put make it impossible to folow, while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting 
their desideratum virtualy guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching 
of grains, what multiple realization realy requires is a principled method for 
adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. Shapiro’s (2000) work on multiple 
realization can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a method.
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1. Introduction
The multiple realization (“MR”) hypothesis asserts, at its baldest, that the same 
psychological state may be realized in neurologicaly distinct substrates (Polger 
2009). Hilary Putnam’s (1967) ingenious suggestion that pain is likely to be a 
multiply realized kind (“MR kind”) rather neatly captures the thought here—
while both mammals and moluscs presumably experience pain, they’re likely to 
instantiate it in neurological systems of a very diferent sort.
MR was played against a popular philosophical theory of mind in the 1960s 
which atempted to identify mental states with neural states. Since MR implies a 
many-to-one mapping from neural states to mental states, if it is in fact true that 
mental states are multiply realized, it folows that no clear identity relation can 
hold between them. As Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 176) frame the issue, “[o]ne 
corolary of this rejection of the identity thesis is the contention that information 
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about the brain is of litle or no relevance to understanding psychological 
processes.” When the MR hypothesis irst came to prominence, its critics by and 
large accepted it as empiricaly correct, and merely denied its touted 
antireductionist implications. In recent years the debate has struck a new note, 
with many philosophers caling the empirical hypothesis itself into question. 
Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) inluential paper, folowed quickly at the heels by 
Shapiro’s (2000) penetrating analysis of functions, perhaps did most to reignite the 
old controversy and drag MR back into the philosophical limelight. Bechtel and 
Mundale express what seems to be an important insight about multiple 
realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing 
kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization of psychological kinds are 
vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, intuitions notwithstanding, the 
terms in which their recommendation has been put make it impossible to folow, 
while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting their desideratum virtualy 
guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching of grains, what MR realy 
requires is a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. 
Shapiro’s (2000) work on MR can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a
method.
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2. Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement
Bechtel and Mundale appeal to “neurobiological and cognitive neuroscience 
practice” in the hope of showing how claims that psychological states are multiply 
realized are unjustied. Intuitively, theirs is an argument from success: cognitive 
neuroscience’s method assumes MR is false, and the success of that method is 
evidence that MR is false. They argue that it is “precisely on the basis of working 
assumptions about commonalities in brains across individuals and species that 
neurobiologists and cognitive neuroscientists have discovered clues to the 
information processing being performed” (1999, 177).
Bechtel and Mundale examine both the “neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological practice of carving up the brain.” What they believe this 
examination reveals is, irstly, that the principle of psychological function plays an 
essential role in both disciplines, and secondly, that “the cartographic project itself 
is frequently carried out comparatively—across species” (1999, 177), the opposite 
of what one would expect if MR were “a serious option.” It is the very similarity 
(or homology) of brain structure which permits generalization across species; and 
similarity in the functional characterization of homologous brain regions across 
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species only makes sense if the claims of MR are either false or greatly 
exaggerated. For instance, “[e]ven with the advent of neuroimaging, permiting 
localization of processing areas in humans, research on brain visual areas remains 
fundamentaly dependent on monkey research…” (1999, 195). “The clear 
assumption is that the neural organization in the macaque wil provide a 
defeasible guide to the human brain” (1999, 183). Brodmann’s famous brain maps 
were based upon comparisons of altogether 55 species and 11 orders of mammals. 
If MR were true, “one would not expect results based on comparative 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological studies to be particularly useful in 
developing functional accounts of human psychological processing” (1999, 178). 
They also argue that the ubiquity of brain mapping as a way of decomposing 
cognitive function points to the implausibility of the MR thesis. The understanding
of psychological function is increasingly “being fostered by appeal to the brain and
its organization” (1999, 191), again, the opposite of what one would expect “[i]f the
taxonomies of brain states and psychological states were as independent of each 
other as the [MR] argument suggests” (1999, 190-91).
In light of such considerations, Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 178-79, 201-04) 
resort to grains as a way of making sense of what they perceive to be the 
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entrenched, almost unquestioning consensus prevailing around MR. They think 
that it can be traced to the practice of philosophers appealing to diferent grain 
sizes in the taxonomies of psychological and brain states, “using a coarse grain in 
lumping together psychological states and a ine grain in spliting brain states.” 
When Putnam went about colecting his various specimens of pain, he ignored the 
many likely nuances between them. At the same time, he had few compuctions 
about declaring them diferent at a neurological level. His contention that pain is 
likely to be an MR kind can only command our respect if we can be sure that when
he was comparing his specimens from a neurological point of view he was careful 
to apply no less lenient a standard of diferentiation than he applied when 
comparing his specimens from a psychological point of view. Bechtel and Mundale
maintain that when “a common grain size is insisted on, as it is in scientic 
practice, the plausibility of multiple realizability evaporates.” As their examples of 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological practice atest, scientists in these ields 
typicaly match a coarse-grained conception of psychological states with an 
equaly coarse-grained conception of brain states. Despite the habit of 
philosophers individuating brain states in accordance with physical and chemical 
criteria, a habit no doubt originating with Putnam, this is not how neuroscientists 
characterize them. The notion of a brain state is “a philosopher’s iction” (1999, 
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177) given that the notion neuroscientists actualy employ is much less ine-
grained, namely “activity in the same brain part or conglomerate of parts.”
A not unrelated factor is that the MR hypothesis often gets presented in a 
“contextual vacuum.” The choice of grain is always determined by context, with 
“diferent contexts for constructing taxonomies” resulting in “diferent grain sizes 
for both psychology and neuroscience.” The development of evolutionary 
perspectives, for instance, in which the researcher necessarily adopts a coarse 
grain, contrasts with the much iner grain that wil be appropriate when assessing 
diferences among conspecics:
One can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain, but as long as one uses a 
comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the mapping between 
them wil be correspondingly systematic. For example, one can adopt a 
relatively coarse grain, equating psychological states over diferent 
individuals or across species. If one employs the same grain, though, one 
wil equate activity in brain areas across species, and one-to-one mapping is
preserved (though perhaps further taxonomic reinement and/or 
delineation may be required). Conversely, one can adopt a very ine grain, 
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and diferentiate psychological states between individuals, or even in the 
same individual over time. If one similarly adopts a ine grain in analyzing 
the brain, then one is likely to map the psychological diferences onto brain 
diferences, and brain diferences onto psychological diferences. (1999, 202)
At least among some philosophers Bechtel and Mundale’s message has 
evidently been wel received (Couch 2004; Polger 2009; Godfrey-Smith, personal 
communication; see also tacit approval in Aizawa and Gilet 2009, 573). Polger 
(2009) explains the motivation for the grain requirement in an iluminating way. 
Neuroplasticity has in recent times been thought to provide compeling evidence 
for the MR of mental states. He concludes that “contrary to philosophical 
consensus, the identity theory does not blatantly ly in the face of what is known 
about the correlations between psychological and neural processing” (2009, 470). 
The grains argument igures prominently in his reasoning. As he points out, it 
might be tempting to regard a phenomenon like cortical map plasticity—where 
diferent brain regions subserve the same function at diferent times in an 
individual’s history, say, after brain injury or trauma—as an existence proof of MR.
But not if the point about grains is taken to heart. It al comes down to what we 
mean by “diferent brain regions” subserving “the same function.” Consider that 
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recovered functions are frequently suboptimal. Genuine MR would indeed require
the same psychological state to be underwriten by diferent neurological states; 
but suboptimality is evidence of diference underlying diference, not diference 
underlying sameness, as MR requires:
It’s true that this kind of representational plasticity involves the “same” 
function being mediated by “diferent” cortical areas. But here one faces the
chalenge leveled by Bechtel and Mundale’s charge that defenses of [MR] 
employ a mismatch in the granularity of psychological and neuroscientic 
kinds. If we individuate psychological processes quite coarsely—by gross 
function, say—then we can say that functions or psychological states are of 
the same kind through plastic change over time. And if we individuate 
neuroscientic kinds quite inely—by precise cortical location, or particular 
neurons—then we can say that cortical map plasticity involves diferent 
neuronal kinds. But this is clearly a mug’s game. What we want to know is 
not whether there is some way or other of counting mental states and brain 
states that can be used to distinguish them—no doubt there are many. The 
question is whether the sciences of psychology and neuroscience give us 
any way of registering the two taxonomic systems. (2009, 467, my emphasis)
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3. Problems with the grain requirement: imprecise, impracticable, and 
misleading
But now the question is this: what, precisely, can it mean to use a “comparable” 
grain, or to keep a grain size “constant,” across both psychological and 
neurophysiological taxonomies? Polger’s motivation makes a lot of sense, to be 
sure, but talk of “registering” taxonomies (as of aligning classicatory regimes, or 
rendering distinct scientic descriptions commensurable, or however else one might 
care to put it) doesn’t shed any light on how the desideratum for consistent grains 
can actualy be met. Since it is intended to serve in part as a methodological 
prescription, it’s important to know what to make of this requirement—metaphors
won’t help us here. How, in concrete terms, is an investigator meant to satisfy such 
a condition as this on their research?
Perhaps it means this. Suppose you have two tokens of fruit. The science of 
botany (say) could deliver descriptions under which the two are classied the 
same (e.g. from the point of view of species), but also descriptions under which 
they come out as diferent (e.g. from the point of view of varieties). The irst 
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description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Now imagine 
economics coming into the picture. The science of economics can likewise deliver 
descriptions under which both tokens are classied the same (e.g. both are forms 
of tradable fresh produce) or diferent (e.g. one, being typicaly the crunchier and 
sweeter variety, has a lower elasticity of demand than the other). Once again, the 
irst description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Perhaps, 
then, we could take it that botany and economics deliver descriptions at the same 
grain of analysis when their judgments of sameness or diference cohere in a given
case. In the example, botanical descriptions via species classication would be 
furnished at the same grain as economic descriptions via commodity classication,
so that species descriptions in botany are “at the same grain” as commodity 
descriptions in economics. By the same logic, variety descriptions in botany would 
be comparable to elasticity descriptions in economics. Fine. But if that is al that 
“maintain a comparable grain” amounts to, it realy does beg the question, for this 
is simply type-type identity by iat. Of course such a recommendation wil ensure 
that the mapping between psychology and neuroscience wil be “systematic” (to 
use Bechtel and Mundale’s term), because on this account yielding concordant 
judgments of similarity or diference across taxonomies is what it means to apply 
the same grain. So we haven’t solved the problem: this version of the grain 
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requirement makes type-type identity a fait accompli, efectively obliterating al 
MR kinds from the natural order.
It’s just as wel that I don’t think this is what Bechtel and Mundale had in 
mind when they made their move to grains; supposing otherwise would serve 
only to trivialize an important aspect of their analysis. Stil the construal is by no 
means far-fetched: “[o]ne can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain,” they tel us, 
“but as long as one uses a comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the 
mapping between them wil be correspondingly systematic” (note that—it wil 
be!). This sounds like someone with the utmost conidence in the grain 
requirement, which is of course what one would have if one thought grains could 
be legitimately matched in just this way. My guess is that, while they do have 
something important to tel us about MR, a beguiling metaphor has led them to 
suppose that MR is easier to refute than it actualy is. (I’l support this contention 
with a few examples in a moment.)
Of course maters aren’t much helped by the reasonable suspicion that MR 
is the result of pairing inconsistent grains. For what is neuroscience if not a ine-
grained description of psychology, and psychology if not a coarse-grained 
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description of neuroscience? It is surely plausible that the neural and 
psychological sciences line up in something like this way, given that talk about the 
mind is realy talk about the brain from a somewhat more abstract point of view.
What Bechtel and Mundale are ultimately trying to convey through their 
discussion of grains is the thought that claims of MR cannot be advanced wily-
nily—that there is an objective and standard way to go about verifying the 
existence of MR kinds and arbitrating disputes involving them. For the reasons 
just canvassed, however, it strikes me that talk of grains doesn’t serve their 
purposes at al wel. In fact they would have been nearer the mark had they said 
that what MR requires is some sort of principled mismatching of grains.
So far I’ve tried to indicate in what respects Bechtel and Mundale’s grain 
requirement is imprecise and impracticable. Before I can show that the grains 
strategy is also misleading, and indeed often gets things wrong, I need to set it 
against an account which demonstrably gets things right.1 Shapiro (2000) expresses
with enviable lucidity what I think is the crucial insight towards which Bechtel 
1 It is an account which even its detractors concede gets at least the essential point of interest to us 
here right, e.g. Gilet (2003).
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and Mundale were uneasily groping. Interestingly, some philosophers—e.g. Polger
(2009)—write as if the grain requirement and Shapiro’s own formula for MR were 
efectively interchangeable. This is a mistake: the two approaches deliver diferent 
judgments in nontrivial cases (as I’l ilustrate in a moment).
As Shapiro reminds us:
Before it is possible to evaluate the force of [the MR thesis] in arguments 
against reductionism, we must be in a position to say with assurance what 
the satisfaction conditions for [the MR thesis] actualy are. (2000, 636)
For him, “[t]he general lesson is this. Showing that a kind is multiply realizable, or 
that two realizations of a kind are in fact distinct, requires some work” (2000, 645). 
Furthermore, “[t]o establish [the MR thesis], one must show that the diferences 
among purported realizations are causaly relevant diferences” (2000, 646). 
Shapiro’s concerns revolve around what motivates ascriptions of diference, and 
therefore sameness. The issue is important because the classic intuition pump that 
asks us to conceive a mind in which every neuron has been replaced by a silicon 
chip depends on our ascription of an interesting diference between neurons and 
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silicon chips, apparently even where silicon chips can be made that contribute to 
psychological capacity by one and the same process of electrical transmission. His 
answer too, like Bechtel and Mundale’s, depends ultimately on context—in 
particular, the context set by the very inquiry into MR itself.
Shapiro (2000, 643-44) argues that “the things for which [the MR thesis] has 
a chance of being true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or
contribution to some end.” This is the reason why carburetors, mousetraps, 
computers and minds are standard fare in the literature of MR. They are deined 
“in virtue of what they do,” unlike, say, water, which is typicaly deined by what 
it is, i.e. its constitution or molecular structure, and accordingly not an MR kind. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” Truly distinct (indeed multiple) realizations are those that “difer
in causaly relevant properties—in properties that make a diference to how [the 
realizations] contribute to the capacity under investigation.” Two corkscrews 
difering only in color are not distinct realizations of a corkscrew, because color 
“makes no diference to their performance as a corkscrew.” Similarly, the diference
between steel and aluminium is not enough to make two corkscrews that are alike 
in al other respects two diferent realizations of a corkscrew “because, relative to 
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the properties that make them suitable for removing corks, they are identical.” In 
this instance, diferences of composition can be “screened of.” Naturaly there 
may be cases where diferences of composition wil be causaly relevant (and it 
turns out that this wil be important to the broader point I make below about 
where the grains strategy goes wrong). Perhaps rigidity is the alegedly MR kind 
in question. In that event, compositional diferences wil necessarily speak to how 
aluminium and steel achieve this disposition. The crucial thing to note here is that 
MR is the context, and MR makes function the relevant consideration, i.e. the 
specic point of view from which we wil compare a set of tokens in the irst 
instance (not phenomenology, not behavioral ecology, or anything else for that 
mater). Explanatory considerations may of course ine-tune the sort of function 
that captures our atention (cork-removal, rigidity, vision, camera vision, etc.). But 
function here is our key preoccupation, and having setled on a specic function 
which a set of tokens can be said to perform, the al-important question on 
Shapiro’s analysis is how the two tokens bring that function about. Each case must 
be judged on its own merits. Thus unlike the two corkscrews identical in al 
respects save color, which do not count as distinct realizations, waiter’s corkscrews
and winged corkscrews are enabled to perform the same task in virtue of diferent 
causaly relevant properties, and therefore do count as genuinely distinct 
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realizations of a corkscrew, one based on the principle of simple leverage, the other
relying on a rack and pinions (Fig. 1).
(a) (b)
Figure 1. A waiter’s corkscrew (a) and a winged corkscrew (b). Each contributes to the capacity of 
cork-removal in diferent ways.
Notice that to the extent Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion envisages 
certain realizing properties being “screened of” from consideration in the course 
of inquiry, there is a sense in which the taxonomies of realized and realizing kinds 
may be said to be “commensurable” or “registrable” (no doubt explaining why 
some philosophers have simply confused commensurability with causal 
relevance). Thus when comparing the cork-removing properties of two waiter’s 
corkscrews, compositional diferences wil not feature in the realizing taxonomy (if
we accept Shapiro’s characterization of the problem). So we have cork-removal, 
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which features in what we may regard as a coarse-grained taxonomy, realized by 
two objects described by a “science” of cork-removal in which microstructural 
variations do not mater, hence which might also be regarded as a coarse-grained 
taxonomy. If on the other hand we were comparing the same corkscrews for 
rigidity, where one was made of steel and the other of aluminium, compositional 
diferences would feature in the realizing taxonomy. Here we would have rigidity, 
which features in what we could wel regard as a more ine-grained taxonomy 
than that encompassing cork-removal, realized by two objects described by a 
science in which microstructural variations realy do mater (namely metalurgy), 
and which might also be regarded as a ine-grained taxonomy, at least more ine-
grained than the ictitious science of cork-removal. But my point is this: 
commensurability nowhere appears as an independent criterion of validity in 
Shapiro’s account of MR, for it is an artifact of the causal relevance criterion, not a 
self-standing principle. Taxonomic commensurability is in fact an implicit 
requirement of the causal relevance criterion in the sense that it’s taken care of 
once the proper question is posed. As an explicit constraint it is a wil-o’-the-wisp.
Armed with this analysis, let’s examine how Bechtel and Mundale atempt 
to refute the status of hunger as an MR kind. Putnam (1967) had compared hunger
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across species as diverse as humans and octopuses to ilustrate the likelihood that 
some psychological predicates are multiply realizable. On the basis of their grains 
critique, however, Bechtel and Mundale suggest that hunger wil not do the work 
Putnam had cut out for it; for “at anything less than a very abstract level,” hunger 
is diferent in octopuses and humans (1999, 202). The thought is that a iner 
individuation of hunger refutes the existence of a single psychological kind, 
hunger, which can be said to cross-classify humans and octopuses. Thus they essay
to chalenge the cognitive uniformity which MR requires at the level of 
psychology.
Perhaps we might irst note that when identifying a single psychological 
state to establish the necessary conditions for MR, nothing Bechtel and Mundale 
say actualy precludes the choice to go abstract. If context is what ixes the choice of 
grain (as they are surely right to point out), who’s to say that context couldn’t ix 
the sort of grain that makes hunger relevant in an abstract sense? It may be 
tempting to think that a more detailed description of something is somehow more 
real. But there is of course nothing intrinsicaly more or less real about a chosen 
schema relative to others that might have been chosen. There is no reason to 
suspect, for instance, that a determinate has any more reality than a determinable.
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And yet there is a deeper problem with Bechtel and Mundale’s deployment 
of the grains strategy here. To repeat their complaint: “at anything less than a very 
abstract level,” hunger is diferent in octopuses and humans. But now why should 
this be relevant? Who would deny it? They themselves seem to be oblivious to the 
context which the very inquiry into MR makes paramount. They are not right to 
alege, as they do, that “the assertion that what we broadly cal ‘hunger’ is the 
same psychological state when instanced in humans and octopi has apparently 
been widely and easily accepted without specifying the context for judging 
sameness” (1999, 203). The reason why hunger, pain, vision and so on were al 
taken for granted—assumed to be uniform at the cognitive level—is because MR 
made function the point of view from which tokens were to be compared. As 
Shapiro reminds us, “the things for which [the MR thesis] has a chance of being 
true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or contribution to 
some end.” It was understood that, say in the case of pain, regardless of 
phenomenal, ecological or behavioral diferences between human and octopus 
pain (I doubt any of which were lost on Putnam), al instances of pain in these 
creatures had something like detection and avoidance in common. This might be to 
cast pain at “a very abstract level,” but this just happens to be the context which 
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the inquiry into MR itself sets. A similarly abstract feature is what unites al 
instances of hunger: let’s cal it nutrition-induction. It is not that decades of 
philosophers had simply forgoten to specify the point of view from which these 
psychological predicates were being considered: it is rather that they simply didn’t
need to, since al of them had read enough of Putnam and the early functionalists 
to know what they were about. Phenomenal and other diferences that one might 
care to enumerate between these predicates come a dime a dozen. But the whole 
point of functionalism was to abjure the inquiry into essences and focus instead on
the causal role of a mental state within the life of an organism. Yes, this is to 
compare tokens from an “abstract level,” but that’s what made functionalism 
intriguing to begin with. And if Shapiro’s analysis is any guide, it is realy the next 
step in the endeavor to verify the existence of an MR kind that is the crucial one. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” So the folow-up question concerns how the relevant organisms 
achieve their detection and avoidance function, or nutrition-induction function, or 
whatever the case may be. It is in fact only by asking this next question that we can
appreciate just how badly the grains strategy fares. The atempt to individuate 
hunger more inely does not refute the multiple realizability of hunger as between 
humans and octopuses. For, relative to the shared function of nutrition-induction, 
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it is extremely likely that humans and octopuses realize this capacity in diferent 
ways. The atempt to individuate pain more inely would likewise not refute the 
multiple realizability of pain as between humans and octopuses. For, relative to the
shared function of detection and avoidance, it is extremely likely that humans and 
octopuses realize this capacity in diferent ways. So we see that the grains strategy, 
to the extent that it involves ine-graining psychological states in order to 
undermine the cognitive uniformity required by MR, sets itself a very easy job 
indeed, and mischaracterizes the nature of MR by its neglect of function. Moreover
Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion—which honors the core concerns motivating 
Bechtel and Mundale’s resort to grains—does not demonstrate that hunger (or 
pain) is type-reducible.
A good ilustration of the grains strategy in action is provided by Couch’s 
(2004) atempt to refute the claim that the human eye and the octopus eye are 
distinct realizations of the kind eye. Conceding diferences at a neurobiological 
level, the strategy again involves chalenging the aleged uniformity at the 
cognitive level. As he explains, “[e]stablishing [MR] requires showing that…the 
physical state types in question are distinct [and] that the relevant functional 
properties are type identical. Claims about [MR] can be chalenged at either step” 
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(2004, 202). Reminding us that psychological states “are often only supericialy 
similar,” and that “at a detailed level the neural diferences make for functional 
diferences” (2004, 203), he states:
Psychologists sometimes talk about humans and species like octopi sharing 
the same psychological states. However, they also recognize that there are 
important diferences involved depending on how inely one identies the 
relevant features..Establishing multiple realization requires showing that 
the same psychological state has diverse realizations. But we can always 
disagree with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological 
diferences at another level of description. (2004, 203)
Thus he relates that while the two types of eyes have similar structure in certain 
respects, both consisting of a spherical shel, lens and retina, they use diferent 
kinds of visual pigments in their photoreceptors, as wel as having diferent 
numbers of them, the octopus having one in contrast to the human eye which has 
four. They also have diferent retinas. The human retina, with rods and cones, 
focuses light by bending the lens and so changing its shape. The octopus eye, with 
rhabdomeres instead of rods and cones, focuses light by moving the lens 
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backwards and forwards within the shel. Al these factors show up as diferences 
in output, not just structure. The octopus, having only a single pigment, is 
colorblind, while its receptor’s unique structure alows it to perceive the plane of 
polarized light. Retinal diferences likewise make for functional diferences, with 
very litle information processing occurring on the octopus’s retina, unlike the case
of the human retina. This produces diferences in stimuli and reaction times. So 
the two eyes might be similar, but when described with a suitably ine grain, he 
contends, they come out type distinct. In the result they are both physicaly and 
cognitively diverse, and so not genuine examples of MR.
Notice again that, contrary to what is claimed, it has not been demonstrated
that type-type identity prevails here after at al (on the understanding that the 
kind camera eyehuman reduces to its distinct neural type, and the kind camera 
eyemolusc in turn reduces to its distinct neural type). If anything what this foray into 
molusc visual physiology succeeds in showing is that, relative to the kind camera 
eye, human camera eyes and octopus camera eyes count as distinct realizations(!), 
for, assuming Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion applies, human camera eyes 
achieve the function of camera vision diferently to the way octopus camera eyes 
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achieve this function. Were we to atend to the original inquiry, which concerned 
whether human eyes and octopus eyes count as distinct realizations of the kind 
eye, Shapiro’s own response, for what it’s worth, is clear (2000, 645-46): here we do 
seem to confront a genuine case of type-type identity, as Putnam himself assumed,
because, relative to the function of vision (not camera vision), both humans and 
moluscs achieve the function the same way (namely, by camera vision!). 
Diferences that would be relevant at the neural level between humans and 
moluscs when asking how camera vision is achieved can be conveniently screened
of when the question is how vision, as distinct from camera vision, is achieved. 
Again if pain or hunger were the kind in question, it seems more likely than not 
that we would confront a case of MR (unlike with vision), as we conjectured earlier.
Explanatory context dictates the function of interest, and the function is one that 
we have to assume is common to the tokens in question in order to get the inquiry 
into MR of the ground. Indeed if Shapiro’s analysis is correct, with MR we’re 
always asking how some common function is achieved by diferent tokens that do 
that thing. Where there is no common function the question of MR cannot so much 
as arise. The fact that the question does arise in al the cases we’ve considered is a 
powerful indication that we’re dealing with functions which al the relevant tokens
actualy share. The grains strategy confuses maters by suggesting that in many 
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cases involving putative MR kinds, psychological states can be individuated using 
a iner grain of description. But if what I have been saying is right, this is not the 
proper way to refute a putative case of MR.
That mine is the correct assessment of the situation is not only atested to by
Shapiro’s analysis of MR, but also by the fact that it avoids the very mug’s game 
Polger sought to eschew by embracing the grains strategy in the irst place. If for 
any putative MR kind I am free to cavil with the choice of your size of grain (“oh, 
that’s far too coarse for psychology,” or “now that’s realy not coarse enough for 
neuroscience”), how is the resulting game any less of a mug’s game than the one 
we were trapped in at the start? I myself have played a few of these games with 
philosophers. No one wins. Couch’s remarks are teling: “we can always disagree 
with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological diferences at 
another level of description.” So the game goes on.
4. Conclusion
In sum, I think there’s a genuine problem with the grain requirement. The central 
diculty is that in the terms in which it’s been put it is largely unworkable, and at 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1223-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -602-
best no more than a loose metaphor. For a recommendation intended to serve at 
least in part as a methodological reform, this is clearly unsatisfactory. I don’t deny 
that Bechtel and Mundale were onto something. But whatever value their insight 
into MR might have has been obscured by their unfortunate formulation of the 
issue. Moreover, as I have tried to show, the formulation is unfortunate not just 
because it happens to be unworkable. More worryingly, the argument from grains 
distorts the truth about MR by encouraging the view that mind-brain identity 
comes for free once we invoke the “same grain” of description across both realized
and realizing kinds. But when the insight to which this locution seems to point is 
expressed in terms that are inteligible and empiricaly tractable (namely, Shapiro’s
causal relevance criterion), mind-brain identity seems anything but a fait accompli.
Grains talk makes it tempting to think MR is easier to refute than it in fact is. It is 
certainly true, as Bechtel and Mundale acknowledge, that context ixes the choice 
of grain (where by “grain” we mean the respect under which we seek to compare a
set of tokens); but we are not ipso facto obliged to employ a consistent grain across 
realized and realizing kinds (since this is just about meaningless as far as a 
researcher into these maters would be concerned and raises a host of diculties 
beside). Rather than matching grains, what MR realy behooves us to do is to 
apply a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens of a 
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functional kind. Shapiro’s work on MR shows us how to approach this important 
task.
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Abstract
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a
serious candidate for application in physics. This dismissal is related to
the problematic assumption that physical causation is entirely a matter
of dynamical evolution. In this paper, I offer a fresh look at the interven-
tionist account of causation and its applicability to thermodynamics. I
argue that the interventionist account of causation is the account of cau-
sation which most appropriately characterizes the theoretical structure
and phenomenal behavior of thermodynamics.
1 Introduction
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a serious
candidate for application in physics. For example, a dismissal of this sort is
evident in the words of theoretical physicist Peter Havas:
We are all familiar with the everyday usage of the words ǳcauseǴ and
ǳefectǴ; it frequently implies the interference by an outside agent
(whether human or not), the ǳcauseǴ, with a system, which then
experiences the ǳefectǴ of this interference. When we talk of the
principle of causality in physics, however, we usually do not think
of speciic cause-efect relations or of deliberate intervention in a
system, but in terms of theories which allow (at least in principle)
the calculation of the future state of the system under consideration
from data speciied at a time t0 (Havas 1974, 24).
And worries about the relevance of the interventionist account of causation in
physics come not only from physicists, but also from philosophers—even those
who favor interventionism:
There are important diferences between, on the one hand, the [in-
terventionist] way in which causal notions igure in common sense
and the special sciences and the empirical assumptions that underlie
their application and, on the other hand, the ways in which these
notions igure in physics (Woodward 2007, 67).
1
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The reasons for dismissals and worries like those above are related to a
common (but problematic) assumption that causation in physics has something
to do with the dynamical evolution of a closed system. The problem is that,
in our preoccupation with dynamical evolution and closed systems, we tend to
forget and/or neglect those areas of physics for which we do not have complete
equations of motion or for which it doesn’t make sense to consider entirely closed
systems. And it is in those areas that the dynamical view of physical causation
makes less sense and interventionism inds its home.
In this paper, I propose to take a fresh look at the interventionist account of
causation and its applicability to one of those neglected areas of physics: ther-
modynamics. I will argue that an interventionist analysis of thermodynamics
succeeds where the dynamical view of physical causation fails. As I will show, all
theorizing in thermodynamics requires careful deinition of the ǳsystemǴ under
consideration, which necessarily involves attending to the boundaries that en-
close the system and the conditions imposed on those boundaries. Once bound-
aries are adequately speciied, we end up with a strong distinction between the
internal properties and processes of the system and those external inluences
that constrain the internal dynamics. It is in the distinction between internal
properties and external inluences that the natural it between the structure of
thermodynamic theorizing and the interventionist account of causation becomes
apparent.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I show that interventionist
reasoning is inseparable from the structural foundation of thermodynamic the-
ory. In section 3, I show how ǳdriving forcesǴ and their conjugate luxes provide
a rich basis for meaningful interventionist causal claims in thermodynamics. In
section 4, I use the success of interventionist causal analysis in thermodynamics
to make some broader concluding remarks.
2 The centrality of manipulated equilibrium
Thermodynamic theorizing is structured around the characterization of equi-
librium states and the processes by which systems move from one equilibrium
state to another. But just what is a thermodynamic equilibrium state?
A thermodynamic equilibrium state is the state of a system that is not un-
dergoing a change (thermal, mechanical, or chemical). However, an equilibrium
state is not a spontaneous occurrence. Natural thermodynamic systems are in
constant lux. They engage in all sorts of interactions: they transfer heat, push
and pull on one another, change their volume, and chemically react. The very
idea of a thermodynamic ǳsystemǴ, which can only be deined by the location
and/or nature of its boundaries, is in itself a theoretical concept that we impose
on the world in order to do thermodynamic ǳbookkeepingǴ (Dill and Bromberg
2011, 93). In order for a thermodynamic system to achieve an equilibrium
state, the system must have been allowed to relax for a suicient amount of
time without the disturbing external inluences of uncontrolled contact with
other systems. And such a condition requires boundaries that isolate it—or
2
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otherwise control exchanges—from other systems. Often those boundaries are
put in place artiicially, by human intervention.
Consider, for example, the air in an ordinary room. If we deine our ther-
modynamic system in relation to the walls and doors of the room, we can say
that the system has a ixed volume. If no massive weather change is currently
occurring, we can assume that the air pressure in the room is approximately
constant (not by isolation, but by contact with an external system whose pres-
sure is approximately constant). If some kind of air conditioning system is in
place and has been running for some time, we can also say that the temperature
of the room is approximately constant. We can say that most of the chemical
reactions occurring in the room are in a steady state and that the concentra-
tions of various gases are relatively uniform (except perhaps for some minor
concentration gradients near any plants and/or people located in the room),
with equal low into and out of the room for each type of gas. Notice, now, that
even this almost-equilibrium state requires artiicial maintenance (the rigidity of
walls, contact with an exterior reservoir supplying constant pressure, the contin-
uous work of the air conditioner, etc.). Stricter equilibrium states require much
more careful isolation and maintenance, and true equilibrium states (which only
exist in theory) require idealized boundaries (e.g., perfect thermal insulators,
frictionless pistons, perfectly rigid containers, etc.).
There is something of a tension, however, in the way that we think about
equilibrium states. On the one hand, equilibrium states are the product of
external conditions imposed on a system. On the other hand, once we consider
those external conditions as given, a system will naturally or spontaneously tend
toward the equilibrium state allowed by the constraints. But that spontaneous
or natural behavior cannot be conceived of without external constraints being
placed on the system in question. To even conceive of an equilibrium state,
we must ask about the conditions imposed on its boundaries. What kind of
walls enclose it? Permeable, semi-permeable, impermeable? Rigid or lexible?
Adiabatic or conducting? There is no such thing as an equilibrium state unless
the boundaries of the system are well-deined.1 And the conditions imposed
on those boundaries constitute external interventions on the system; they ef-
fectively set various thermodynamic variables to take on certain values. For
example, conducting walls that put a system in contact with a thermal reservoir
are efectively a way of intervening on temperature. Likewise, a semi-permeable
boundary is a way of selectively intervening on particle concentrations in the
system. (I will return to the question of how to conceive of boundary conditions
as interventions on thermodynamic variables below in section 3.)
Thus, thermodynamic equilibrium states are inherently manipulated states—
manipulated to be so either by human design or by some other mechanism that
efectively imposes equilibrium conditions by external intervention. And these
external manipulations or interventions, which impose values on certain thermo-
dynamic variables, are entirely consistent with the concept of an intervention
1In fact, a system with no deined boundaries or external constraints is effectively a universe,
and its fate is something like the ǳheat deathǴ discussed by Thomson, Helmholtz, and Rankine.
3
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1229-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -608-
that has been developed by Woodward (2003) and others. According to the
interventionist account of causation, an intervention directly forces a variable
to take on (or remain ixed at) a certain value. Furthermore, Woodward’s def-
inition of an intervention makes no reference to human action, and thus any
entity or structure playing the role of setting certain variable values or hold-
ing them ixed can fulill the requirements for intervention. For example, a
cell membrane is a structure that efectively intervenes to maintain a certain
equilibrium internal to the cell, by keeping interior and exterior pressures equal
and by maintaining certain chemical concentrations by only allowing for select
passage into and out of the cell.
Now how do these manipulated equilibrium states igure into theorizing
about thermodynamic processes? We begin by representing our system of inter-
est by reference to a thermodynamic coniguration space. The thermodynamic
coniguration space is the set of all possible equilibrium states of a system, where
the coordinates of that space are a relatively small number of macroscopic ther-
modynamic variables and each point in the coniguration space represents a
distinct equilibrium state. For example, we might choose as coordinates the
following parameters: internal energy (U), volume (V ), and the particle num-
bers of the various species present (N1, N2, …, Ni). Then the entropy function
for our system, S = S(U, V,N1, . . . , Ni), will deine a hyper-surface within the
coniguration space (see igure 1).
With this thermodynamic coniguration space and the hyper-surface deined
by the entropy function in place, we can begin to theorize about any ordered
sequence of states (call these A,B,C, . . .) located on the hyper-surface. Notice
that a curve drawn through this sequence of states looks something like a pro-
cess (in fact, we call it a quasi-static process) in that it represents a series of
changes undergone by the system. However, such a curve can be nothing like a
real process, because real processes involve nonequilibrium states and the curve
represents a system that remains in equilibrium along its entire length. Further-
more, the curve could never represent the autonomous trajectory of a system,
since every state that makes up the path is an equilibrium state and no isolated
system would move from one equilibrium state to another spontaneously. So in
order to think about a quasi-static process as something like a process, we must
think of a system being ǳledǴ—by a series of external interventions—through
the succession of desired states via ǳhopsǴ. We efectively imagine the system
being ǳcorralledǴ through the sequence of equilibrium states. And by imagining
the sequence of hops between states to be very small and carried out by very
tiny interventions, we can approximate a smooth curve more and more closely
(in fact, arbitrarily closely).2
In summary, the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory is the set
of equilibrium states and the quasi-static ǳprocessesǴ that can be drawn like
lines through the space of such states. As I have argued here, the very idea
of an equilibrium state is not possible without reference to boundaries and the
constraints that set the value of certain thermodynamic variables within those
2My discussion here closely follows that of Callen (1985, Ch. 4).
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Figure 1: A representation of a quasi-static process in thermodynamic coniguration
space. From Callen (1985).
boundaries. Furthermore, we cannot think about quasi-static ǳprocessesǴ, which
are sequences of those equilibrium states, without thinking about a series of
ininitesimal external interventions that force a system from one equilibrium
state to the next. It is in this sense that interventionist reasoning is inseparable
from the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory.
In the next section, I will discuss thermodynamic theorizing in greater speci-
icity. As I will show, the interventionist view of causation maps naturally onto
the use of potential functions when theorizing about a system undergoing a
process.
3 Thermodynamic potentials and driving forces
The equilibrium state toward which a system will tend, given the conditions
imposed on its boundaries, is governed by the energy and entropy considerations
provided in the First and Second Laws of thermodynamics. The First Law tells
us that any change in the internal energy (U) of a system will be equal to
the total amount of energy it gains through energy exchange with the external
world, in the form of heat and/or in the form of work. The Second Law tells
us that any isolated system (i.e., any closed system with ixed internal energy)
5
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will tend toward its state of maximum entropy (S). The Second Law also has
the result that the internal energy of any closed system with ixed entropy
will be minimized. However, neither internal energy nor entropy are directly
measurable, nor do we have a speciic function that tells us their dependence
on other state variables. What we do have, however, are other equations of
state (e.g., the ideal gas law) in addition to equations for U and S in diferential
form, which tell us about the way in which small changes in other state variables
relate to small changes in energy and entropy:
dU = TdS − pdV +
∑
j
µjdNj (1)
dS =
(
1
T
)
dU +
( p
T
)
dV −
∑
j
(µj
T
)
dNj , (2)
where T is absolute temperature, p is pressure, V is volume, µj is the chemical
potential for species j, and Nj is the number of particles for species j. The above
equations (and other variant forms) are commonly referred to as thermodynamic
potential functions.
Notice that each term in both equations above involves a pair of conjugate
variables. The second term in equation 1, for example, involves pressure and
volume as a conjugate pair. For every pair of conjugate variables, one of the
variables is extensive (i.e., additive such that the property of a system is equal
to the sum of that property for all of its component subsystems), while the other
is intensive (i.e., independent of the size of the system). Looking again at the
second term in equation 1 as an example, pressure is the intensive variable and
volume is the extensive variable.
Depending on the factors controlled in a given experimental context, each
pair of conjugate variables tells us something about a tendency of the system
as it moves toward equilibrium in that context. Since conjugate variables will
be extremely important for our purposes here, let’s concentrate on one pair and
use an example to decipher its practical meaning.
Figure 2: Two thermodynamic systems A and B before, during, and after arriving at
thermal equilibrium. From Dill and Bromberg (2011, 100).
Consider the term
(
1
T
)
dU in equation 2 and the process pictured in igure
2. We begin with two systems A and B, each enclosed in a rigid container.
System A begins at temperature TA and system B at TB , where TA 6= TB .
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The two systems are then brought into thermal contact with one another,
but remain thermally insulated from the rest of the world. Now each sys-
tem has an unknown entropy that can be expressed as a function of its in-
ternal energy, volume, and particle numbers, and since entropy is an exten-
sive quantity, the total entropy of the combined system can be expressed as
STotal = SA(UA, VA,NA) + SB(UB , VB ,NB). Since entropy will be maximized
at equilibrium, we use equation 2 to write the diferential expression for STotal
and set it to zero:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
)
dUA +
(
pA
TA
)
dVA −
∑
i
(
µAi
TA
)
dNAi+
(
1
TB
)
dUB +
(
pB
TB
)
dVB −
∑
j
(
µBj
TB
)
dNBj = 0
(3)
If we assume that there is no particle exchange between the two systems and
that no chemical change occurs within each system, we can eliminate the terms
that allow for changing particle numbers. And since the containers are rigid,
we can eliminate the terms that allow for changing volume. Furthermore, given
that the combined system is isolated from the external world, the total internal
energy of the combined system must remain constant, and any change in energy
of either system must be compensated by a change in energy of the other. Thus,
dUA = −dUB . So we have the following simpliied expression:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
−
1
TB
)
dUA, (4)
which will be equal to zero (i.e., attain equilibrium) when TA = TB .
Thus we have derived the well-known result that two objects brought into
thermal contact will reach equilibrium when their temperatures are equal. But
more importantly for our purposes here, we can interpret the factors in equation
4 in light of this equilibration process. The diference in temperatures between
the two systems leads to a nonzero value of the factor 1
TA
− 1
TB
, which efectively
acts as a ǳforceǴ driving a change dUA in the internal energy of system A. More
generally speaking, when a system is placed in thermal contact with a system
at a diferent temperature, the temperature diference between the two systems
acts as a force driving an exchange of heat energy between the systems. Phrased
in terms of a system and its surroundings, 1
T
describes the tendency of a system
to exchange heat with its environment; it is the incremental relaxation that a
system experiences in transferring a small bit of its energy dU .3
Physicists commonly use the language of ǳdriving forcesǴ in referring to the
intensive parameters in the thermodynamic potential functions. Looking back
again at equation 2, a diference between the pressure p of the system and its
environment will act as a driving force for an exchange of volume dV between
the system and its environment, and a diference between the concentration of a
3Alternatively, we could have begun with the thermodynamic potential function for internal
energy (equation 1) to derive the same result.
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particular species µj in the system and its environment will act as a driving force
for exchanges of particles of the respective species with the environment (dNj).
The force or tendency represented in each of the conjugate pairs (T, p,µ) can act,
separately or together (depending on the constraints imposed on the process),
to drive changes in its paired extensive variable (dU , dV , or dN, respectively),
and thus to drive the system and its environment toward the equilibrium state
of maximum entropy.4
This ǳdriving forceǴ language—and its basis in the way in which the en-
vironment exchanges energy and entropy with a system—matches the way in
which relationships among thermodynamic variables would be modeled by the
interventionist account of causation. According to the interventionist account, a
variable X is an interventionist cause of another variable Y if there is a possible
intervention on X that will change the value of Y (or the probability distribu-
tion over the values of Y ) when the values of all other variables in the system
remain ixed.5 In physical experiments, the condition that the values of all other
variables in the system remain ixed across changes in the intervention on X is
often enforced using what I will call ǳauxiliary interventionsǴ on those variables.
To see how interventionist treatment matches the ǳdriving forceǴ language, let’s
consider the temperature equilibration case above, with system A as the causal
system under investigation.
Consider the set of thermodynamic variables characterizing system A when
we consider the temperature equilibration process in terms of maximization of
entropy: volume VA, the set of particle numbers for each species NA, tempera-
ture TA, and internal energy UA. Each of these variables is represented below
in igure 3. The primary intervention in the temperature equilibration case was
the operation of placing system B in thermal contact with system A. This in-
tervention occurred speciically under conditions in which the volume VA and
particle numbers NA of system A were held constant; the enforcement of con-
stant values of VA and NA, by enclosing the system within rigid impermeable
walls, constitutes the set of auxiliary interventions in this case. Under the con-
ditions set by these auxiliary interventions, the primary intervention produced a
change in TA, since the original temperatures of the two systems were not equal,
and this change in temperature resulted in a change in the internal energy (UA)
of the system. And since, under conditions where all other variables are held
constant, the intervention was an intervention on TA and resulted in a change
4Physicists use the language of ǳdriving forcesǴ in both the entropy and energy represen-
tations. When we flip between the energy picture of a system and the entropy picture of that
same system, the metric by which we measure progress toward equilibrium changes. Each
metric has its own way of characterizing the driving force because, in changing our metric of
progress, there is a transformation on the force term. Still, physically, it is one and the same
force driving the system toward equilibrium. This representational change in the physical
equations mirrors a widely-noted feature of the interventionist account of causation: when we
change the set of variables with which we characterize a causal system, our characterization
of the causal relationship itself can change.
5I have ignored some technical details for the sake of simplicity here. See Woodward (2003,
59) for the more precise interventionist criteria for X’s being a type-level direct cause of Y
and X’s being a type-level contributing cause of Y .
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in UA, we can say that TA is an interventionist cause of UA.

VA NA1 NA2 . . . NAi

I TA UA
Figure 3: An interventionist causal graph of the temperature equilibration process in
which system A, originally at temperature TA, is brought into contact with another
system B, originally at temperature TB . The variable I represents the intervention that
places the two systems in contact and thus changes the value of TA. The lock symbols
() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold VA and NA ixed.
To further lesh out the causal claim being represented by the arrow from
TA to UA in igure 3, we can contrast varying interventions in which we put
system A in contact with system B at varying temperatures TB1, TB2, . . . TBn,
while still holding VA and NA constant at the same values. Under such varying
interventions, we will ind that there are corresponding variations in the inal TA
and UA. Therefore, the interventionist account conirms that the temperature
TA of system A is a cause of its internal energy UA. In general, interventions
on temperature lead to changes in internal energy via exchange of heat when
volume and particle numbers are held constant. Such a causal claim seems
to be precisely what physicists mean to convey when they use ǳdriving forceǴ
language with respect to temperature.
The intervention in the above case, where we have an equilibration process
between two inite systems with difering initial temperatures, is an example
of a ǳsoftǴ or ǳparametricǴ intervention in that it modiies the temperature of
our system rather than determining it completely.6 When we put system A
with its initial temperature TA in contact with system B with its initial tem-
perature TB , the combined system inds an equilibrium temperature somewhere
between the initial values of TA and TB . But thermodynamics also provides
conceptual tools for theorizing about ǳhardǴ or ǳstructuralǴ interventions that
entirely determine the value of an intensive parameter for a system. We call
these theoretical entities ǳreservoirsǴ or ǳbathsǴ, and they have the property of
being able to exchange one or more extensive quantities while their correspond-
ing intensive properties remain constant. For example, an energy bath (i.e., a
temperature reservoir), by virtue of its size, is able to exchange energy with a
system with which it is put in contact with negligible efect on its temperature.
Likewise, a volume bath (i.e., a pressure reservoir) is able to exchange volume
while remaining at constant pressure, and a particle bath (i.e., concentration
reservoir) is able to exchange particles while maintaining constant particle con-
6For the distinction between soft and hard interventions, see Eberhardt and Scheines (2007).
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centrations. When we theorize about cases in which we put a system in contact
with a reservoir instead of a inite system, we consider a hard intervention that
determines the value of the relevant intensive variable in our system. Such the-
oretical experiments bring the interventionist causal structure into even clearer
relief: putting a system in contact with a reservoir is an intervention that sets
the value of an intensive variable in the system, which in turn results in a change
in the corresponding extensive variable.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Illustration of a pressure-driven process, depicting (a) the system in its initial
equilibrium state before the piston-locking pins are released; (b) the system once it has
reached its new equilibrium state after the pins are released. This image shows the result
of the case where p0 > pRes and the piston rises, but all of the same considerations would
apply in the case that p0 < pRes and the piston falls.
Let’s look at an example. Consider a system that is in an initial equilibrium
state (p0, T,N). Suppose that we intervene on the system by bringing it into
contact with a reservoir that maintains the same temperature T as the system
but a diferent pressure pRes. We might do so by releasing an initially-locked
piston, allowing it to move freely between the system and the reservoir (see igure
4). The process that ensues will be ruled by a maximization of the entropy of the
total combined system, so we are interested in the condition where dSTotal = 0:
dSTotal =
1
TRes
dUSys +
pSys
TRes
dVSys +
1
TRes
dURes +
pRes
TRes
dVRes = 0 (5)
Due to conservation of volume and conservation of energy, dUSys = −dURes and
dVSys = −dVRes, so the above condition reduces to the following:
dSTotal =
(
pSys − pRes
TRes
)
dVSys = 0 (6)
We can see here that it is the pressure diference between system and reservoir
that is driving the exchange of volume. And again, this physical interpretation
in terms of driving forces matches the interventionist causal account. By placing
the system in contact with the reservoir, we set the pressure of the system to
a new value, and the forced change in pressure results in a change in volume.
Were we to impose a diferent pressure on the system by placing it in contact
10
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with a reservoir at a diferent pressure, we would see the corresponding volume
change as well. Thus, pressure is an interventionist cause of volume (see igure
5).

T N1 N2 . . . Ni

I p V
Figure 5: Interventionist causal representation of the pressure equilibration process de-
picted in igure 4. The variable I represents the intervention that places the system in
contact with the pressure reservoir and thus changes the value of p. The lock symbols
() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold T and N ixed.
As shown in the examples above, the most important key to successful
thermodynamic theorizing is the careful deinition of the boundaries between
systems and accounting for the transactions that occur at those boundaries.
Interventionist reasoning its naturally into thermodynamic theorizing because
its distinction between the interventions external to a causal system and the
causal relations internal to that system is perfectly applicable where thermo-
dynamic boundaries are well-deined. Since interventions are always performed
on a causal system from outside, it is entirely natural to label exchanges be-
tween a system and its environment as interventions of the environment on those
systems.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that there is a natural it between thermodynamic
theorizing and the interventionist account of causation. I therefore argue that
the interventionist account is the most suitable account of causation for describ-
ing thermodynamic theorizing and our actual interactions with thermodynamic
systems.
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that we tend to assume that physi-
cal causation will have a dynamical form, and that my identiication of interven-
tionism as the most appropriate account of causation in thermodynamics would
run contrary to this assumption. It might be objected that this is a somewhat
dull result, however. Thermodynamics, so the objection might run, is not ǳfun-
damentalǴ physics, and so it is unsurprising that we should ind interventionist
causation rather than dynamic causation in a realm of physics that is…well…not
dynamical. But such an objection would miss the point. Our common as-
sumption that ǳphysical causationǴ must refer to the dynamical propagations
of systems is the result of our preoccupation with ǳfundamentalǴ physics (which
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we also assume, almost by deinition, must have a dynamical form) and neglect
of those areas of physics which are considered to be ǳnon-fundamentalǴ.7
So what is it to be a cause in (at least some of) physics? Here is a simple
answer: an account of causation which appropriately characterizes the theoreti-
cal structure and phenomenal behavior of a domain of physics gives an account
of what it is to be a cause in that domain of physics. And I have shown that
the interventionist account does just that in thermodynamics.
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Anthropomorphism as Cognitive Bias
Mike Dacey
Philosophers and psychologists have long worried that a human tendency to anthropomorphize
leads us to err in our understanding of nonhuman minds. This tendency, which I call intuitive
anthropomorphism, is a heuristic used by our unconscious folk psychology to understand the
behavior of nonhuman animals. I argue that the dominant understanding of intuitive
anthropomorphism underestimates its complexity. It does often lead us to err, but not always.
And the errors it produces are not only overestimations of nonhuman intelligence. If we want to
understand and control intuitive anthropomorphism, we must treat is as a cognitive bias, and look
to the empirical evidence. The literature on controlling implicit social biases is particularly
helpful. That literature suggests that the most common for intuitive anthropomorphism,
Morgan’s Canon, should be rejected, while others need supplementation. It also suggests new
approaches.
1. Introduction
Humans naturally anthropomorphize. As David Hume put it: “There is an universal tendency
among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves . . . We find faces in the moon, armies in
the clouds” (Hume 1957, pg. 29). Philosophers and psychologists attempting to understand the
minds of nonhuman animals have long worried that this tendency leads us to error. This worry is
shared across fields and across theoretical attitudes about anthropomorphism more generally.
Kennedy (1992) argues forcefully against any form of anthropomorphism, and sees this
tendency, which is “simply built into us” (pg. 28, emphasis his), as the reason it is so
problematic. Rivas & Burghardt (2002) believe that some forms of anthropomorphism are
valuable, but caution against its naïve forms: “Anthropomorphism is like Satan in the bible - it
comes in many guises and can catch you unawares!” (pg. 15). I call the human tendency to
anthropomorphise intuitive anthropomorphism, and it is the specific target of this paper. Existing
views get intuitive anthropomorphism wrong, and as a result, fail to control its effect on the
sciences of nonhuman minds.
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To start, the term ‘anthropomorphism’ (simpliciter) needs clarification. In its strictest sense,
anthropomorphism is sometimes defined as a kind of error: overestimating the intelligence of
animals by attributing to them human-like traits they do not have (perhaps consciousness or
belief-desire psychology). A broader sense of the term applies to the belief that a nonhuman
animal possesses any of these ‘characteristically human’ traits, while allowing that that belief
may be true or false. A still broader sense treats anthropomorphism as a way of thinking, or a
process of forming beliefs about non-human minds: coming to understand the minds of
nonhuman animals by analogy to our own, while leaving open whatever beliefs we might form. I
treat anthropomorphism as a process. Though anthropomorphism-as-an-error is probably most
often made explicit, usage of the term tends to slide between these, especially in debates over the
role of anthropomorphism in science (more in section 6). I view anthropomorphism as a process
because it allows more productive engagement with the crucial problem.1 I say this for three
reasons.
Firstly, this use allows me to remain agnostic about anthropomorphism generally. There is a
large and contentious debate about whether there are legitimately scientific anthropomorphic
strategies (e.g. Burghardt 1985, Rivas & Burghardt  2002, de Waal 1991, 1999, Mitchell 2005,
Wynne 2007). I side-step this debate to focus specifically on intuitive anthropomorphism, which
is just one kind of anthropomorphism.
Secondly, it does not prematurely restrict anthropomorphism to certain posits, better
capturing the nature of intuitive anthropomorphism. Intuitive anthropomorphism is a heuristic
1
 There are two other reasons I won’t argue for at length. First, treating anthropomorphism as a process is
anthropocentric in a much less pernicious way than the other definitions. They mark off a class of ‘characteristically
human’ traits, but why think we have special claim to them? But, we are human, so it is natural that we interpret
other species from our own perspective. Second, this view shows how one can be concerned about intuitive
anthropomorphism without thinking that animals are unintelligent, or that they don’t have minds. This is not what is
at issue here.
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employed by our unconscious folk psychology. Our unconscious interprets behavior of
nonhuman animals in the same way it interprets human behavior. It is an empirical question what
effects this may have. Like any cognitive heuristic, it likely leads to errors in many cases, but it
does not always do so, and we can’t know how or when it does until we’ve tested it. It is a
mistake to assume what effects it has at the outset. In fact, intuitive anthropomorphic error is not
merely a matter of overestimating intelligence by positing a set of specific mental states, so
controls that simply aim at correcting this mistake are ineffective. The effects of intuitive
anthropomorphism are complex, and the errors it produces share nothing besides their common
source. Focusing on any particular kind of posit or error before we understand intuitive
anthropomorphism dooms us from the start.
Thirdly, this way of looking at anthropomorphism opens up a new approach to debates about
it. Too often these debates proceed as follows: one theorist claims that common explanations of
some behavior (read: not their own preferred theory) are either overly anthropomorphic or overly
averse to anthropomorphism, while another claims the opposite. These are not really arguments
about anthropomorphism itself; they are arguments about those theories of animal cognition.
Very little in comparative psychology is settled, so it should not be surprising that these debates
make little headway. This approach makes sense if anthropomorphism is a kind of error: to
identify instances of anthropomorphism in the field, we must first identify errors in the field. If
anthropomorphism is a process, there is another approach available at the level of individual
psychology. So I do not argue that the field is overly anthropomorphic, I argue that any particular
judgement one makes about the psychology of nonhuman animals might be subject to the
influence of intuitive anthropomorphism. As such, any particular judgement is potentially subject
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to an intuitive anthropomorphic bias.2 To understand what this means, I look to the empirical
literature.
Intuitive anthropomorphic bias is one kind of cognitive bias that results from reasoning
heuristics applied in our unconscious (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1974). The literature on
cognitive biases and unconscious processing generally will help understand intuitive
anthropomorphism (section 2). The literature on implicit social biases will help understand how
to control it (section 3). This is the largest literature on controlling unconscious biases, and it
targets interventions of the right form for the current discussion. Collectively, this literature
suggests that existing strategies for controlling intuitive anthropomorphism are ineffective
(sections 4-6), and can help develop new controls (section 7).
Figure 1.
2
 This might appear to imply that the field is overly anthropomorphic. But I argue that the effects of intuitive
anthropomorphism are poorly understood, so it is unclear what it means to say that the field is overly
anthropomorphic in the first place.
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2. The Intuitive Anthropomorphic Bias
Figure 1 shows Ham the Chimpanzee in 1961, on his way to the capsule that will launch him
into space. He is about to become the first hominid to orbit the earth. The look on his face
appears to be one of excitement or pride (internet comments on the photo show how common
this interpretation is). Perhaps he perceives excitement in the behavior of those around him, or
perhaps he is just pleased by the attention. Unfortunately, this is unlikely. In chimpanzees, this
expression is known as the ‘fear grin.’ As much as we can rationalize the thought that Ham is
pleased, fear is a more likely reactions to being strapped into a seat and carried to a strange
enclosure.
This is a case where intuitive anthropomorphism leads us astray. We see an animal grinning
and it looks to us like happiness. That is a pretty good heuristic for dealing with other humans,
but we go wrong because our unconscious folk psychology applies it the same way in
nonhumans. Even knowing that we are wrong, the perceptual Gestalt remains: Ham still looks
happy. Note that we are not positing human-like capacities in Ham that he incapable of having.
There is no substantive difference in the intelligence required for fear and happiness.3 Intuitive
anthropomorphism does lead us to err, and those errors do not just overestimate intelligence
(though sometimes they do). We also should not think that intuitive anthropomorphism always
leads us to error (anthropomorphism is a way of thinking, not a kind of error), but there is good
reason to think it will do so often.
Daily experience with pets and animal cartoons demonstrates how easy it is: we talk to our
dogs, and do not blink when cartoon dogs talk to their owners. There are also evolutionary
3
 I am speaking loosely of ‘happiness’ and ‘fear,’ but I do not mean the human mental states; I mean whatever is the
chimpanzee analogue.
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1243-
Mike Dacey  Anthropomorphism as Cognit ive Bias
6
reasons to think we should anthropomorphize: Intuitive anthropomorphism is the kind of fast and
frugal heuristic that can work for evolutionary purposes, even if it is not up to the epistemic
standards of science. As some have argued (e.g. Caporeal & Heyes 1997, Gallup, Marion &
Eddy 1997), our intuitive folk psychology most likely evolved to inform social interactions with
other humans, and then was exapted to handle interactions with nonhuman animals. The
intractable problems of interpreting other minds are a prime target for ‘good enough’ predictive
strategies (Dennet 1989 argues in a similar spirit).
There is also considerable empirical evidence that humans make errors because of intuitive
anthropomorphism. In one of the classic studies of psychology, Heider & Simmel (1944) showed
that participants attributed intentional actions to a collection of two dimensional shapes
‘interacting’ in a short cartoon. This indicates a tendency to see (quite literally) intentional action
when certain cues are present. In this experiment, the cues are irregular movements that seeming
respond to one another. This, by itself, is insufficient evidence to really conclude that behavior is
intentional, but it seems to be enough for our unconscious folk psychology.
In general, our anthropomorphic unconscious folk psychology seems to trigger on simple or
irrelevant cues, suggesting it triggers too often. Other simple cues like hands, eyes, and faces
influence the attribution of conscious mental states (e.g. Arico et. al. 2011, Fiala, Arico, &
Nichols 2011).  Magnifying this, humans are wired to err in the direction of seeing faces that
aren’t there over missing faces that are (e.g. Liu et. al. 2014). Finally, humans are biased in
attributing conscious mental states to animals that move at about the same speed as us
(Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner 2007).
Children, of course, anthropomorphise wildly (e.g. Gebhard, Nevers, & Billmann-Mahecha
2003). And adults anthropomorphize when explaining and imagining behavior. Religious
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participants asked to describe God or tell stories involving God will anthropomorphize God,
even when doing so contradicts their theological beliefs (e.g. these are anthropomorphic errors
by the subjects’ own lights; Barret & Keil 1996). Participants presented with written descriptions
of situations and asked to assess the ‘reasonableness’ of various mental state attributions ascribe
mental states to dogs that are of the same kind as they do a human child (though quantitatively
simpler; Rasmussen and Rajecki 1995).
One might wonder whether these effects apply to scientists. While scientists may not make
the flagrant errors that children make, or that experimental subjects make in snap judgments, we
should expect that they do make some errors. In general, unconscious social biases influence
behavior even during careful deliberation by experts. This has been shown in hiring decisions
(Bertrand & Mullainathan 2003), including hiring by scientists (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012),
medical decision making (Green et. al. 2007), the judicial process (Banks, Eberhardt, & Ross
2006, Mitchell et. al. 2005, Rachlinski et. al. 2009). Expertise and deliberation are not
themselves sufficient to stop cognitive biases. In fact, the self-perception that one is objective
increases social bias (Uhleman & Cohen 2007).
So scientists and philosophers should not expect themselves to be immune. In addition,
scientific practice is complex, and intuitive anthropomorphism can arise at every stage of
research: model construction, experimental design, data gathering, and model choice. At each
stage, it can arise in different ways, and bias at one stage will be compounded in later stages:
attention and recall are biased towards stereotype confirming evidence (e.g. confirmation bias
supporting implicit bias; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Darley & Gross, 1983). This, along with
the subtlety of cognitive biases generally, mean that the effects of anthropomorphic bias can be
complex and, in at least some cases, counterintuitive (recall Ham).
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Putting this all together, there is good reason to believe that intuitive anthropomorphism is
problematic in a context like comparative psychology. It is triggered by simple stimuli like eyes
and hands, and its effects can be subtle and unpredictable. Awareness of the bias, even with
deliberation and expertise, is not sufficient to control it. We cannot be sure how and to what
degree any specific judgment about animal cognition is (or is not) influenced. So what can we
do?
3. Controlling Implicit Social Bias
The literature on controlling implicit biases provides the best current evidence about
controlling cognitive biases, and some of the interventions discussed there are especially
instructive to the current discussion. So I turn to that literature now. The upshot is that taking
steps to ensure that counter-stereotypical information is salient in reasoning is more effective
than simply directing participants to avoid or ‘correct’ for bias.
The Weapon Identification Task is a common test of bias. Participants identify an image as a
tool or a weapon, but are very briefly shown an image of a white or black face before. If, for
instance, subjects mistakenly say that a tool is a weapon after a black face more often than a
white face, that is taken as a characteristic indicator of bias.
Not all interventions that make intuitive sense work. Using this task, Payne, Lambert, &
Jacoby (2002) tested the effects of instructions on bias. Participants in the two experimental
conditions were first told that research had shown that people possess implicit racial biases that
can influence performance on the task, and then told either to “avoid race” or “use race” in
making their decision. Controls were not given any of these instructions. In fact, the two
experimental groups were more likely to make errors consistent with racial bias than the control
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group. Thus, the authors conclude, calling attention to race has the effect of increasing bias,
whether participants are told to use or avoid it. The instruction itself activates racial stereotypes
that lead to biased judgments. Similarly, Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht (2011) showed that
motivating participants to avoid racial bias increases bias if they perceive the motivation as
coming from an external source, but can reduce bias if it is seen as self generated.
Stewart & Payne (2008) found a more effective approach. They used implementation
intentions, which are if-then action plans that make it easier for participants to accomplish a goal
than general intentions to do so. For instance, the implementation intention “if I leave work, I
will stop and exercise at the gym” is more effective than the general intention “I will exercise
more.” Stewart & Payne asked participants to form one of three implementation intentions. The
first: “whenever I see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, accurate.” The second:
“whenever I see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, quick.” The third: “Whenever I
see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, safe.” Those participants were told: “By
thinking the word ‘safe,’ you are reminding yourself on each trial that you are just as safe
interacting with a Black individual as with a White individual” (pg. 1336). Only the ‘think safe’
condition reduced bias.
Another common intervention is to show participants images of admired or counter-
stereotypical members of the stereotyped group. Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001) found this effect
using the Implicit Association Test. In one manipulation, Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001) showed
participants images of admired black individuals and disliked white individuals before giving
them the IAT. They found that doing so reduced bias, whether the images were presented
immediately before or 24 hours before administering the IAT. Govan & Williams (2004)
achieved a similar result using counter-stereotypical examples in the experiment itself, even
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using non-social stereotypes about flowers and insects. Imagining a positive, productive
interaction with members of the stereotyped group before performing an IAT can also reduce
bias (Turner & Crisp 2010).
So the most consistently effective interventions are those that make counterstereotypical
information salient in reasoning, like the ‘think safe’ intention, or imagined interactions. What
doesn’t work is demanding accuracy.  I now apply the lessons of the discussion so far to existing
methods of controlling anthropomorphism.
4. Morgan’s Canon
Perhaps the most commonly advocated method of addressing anthropomorphism is an
updated version of Morgan’s Canon, a famous statement by the 19th century comparative
psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan (1894). The modern interpretation of Morgan’s Canon councils
that researchers should adopt the model that describes the simplest psychological process that
can predict behavior. This practice is widespread, and is still motivated largely by concerns about
anthropomorphism (Graham 1998, Manning & Dawkins 1998, Shettleworth 2010, Wilder 1996,
Wynne 2007). In order to control anthropomorphism generally, it must control intuitive
anthropomorphism specifically.
de Waal (1998), Sober (2005), and Fitzpatrick (2008) have argued that Morgan’s Canon
leads to errors of ‘anthropodenial,’ the underestimation of animal intelligence (more on their
reply in section 5). My arguments so far show why: Morgan’s Canon explicitly aims to correct a
bias that consistently overestimates intelligence, but, first, intuitive anthropomorphism does not
always lead to errors, and second (think of Ham) its errors need not have anything to do with
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intelligence. So Morgan’s Canon sometimes aims to correct errors that were not made, and
sometimes aims to correct the wrong error.
My arguments also suggest another problem: even in cases where intuitive
anthropomorphism has lead someone to overestimate the intelligence of an animal, Morgan’s
Canon may not be effective. Effective interventions to control implicit bias make counter-
stereotypical information salient. Morgan’s Canon does not. It is more similar to the ineffective
interventions: it is a demand to make the ‘unbiased’ judgment, like the Stewart & Payne (2008)
‘think accurate’ condition, or the Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby (2002) ‘avoid race’ instruction. The
effect Morgan’s Canon has depends on how it is represented by the person using it. If researchers
view it as an external demand to avoid anthropomorphism, it could actually increase bias
(Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht 2011). Similarly, if researchers view it as being about
anthropomorphism, it could activate anthropomorphic stereotypes, and increase bias, like the
“use race” and “avoid race” instructions from Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby (2002).
So how this plays out will vary on a case by case basis. But this leaves Morgan’s Canon in a
bad position. Firstly, intuitive anthropomorphism does not always lead to error, and when it does,
it does not always overestimate intelligence. In these cases, Morgan’s Canon produces errors in
the other direction. Secondly, even in the cases in which it should be most effective, the
empirical evidence suggests that it may be ineffective or even increase bias.4 Morgan’s Canon
should not be used to control intuitive anthropomorphism.
5. Evidentialism
4
 Also, as mentioned, intuitive anthropomorphism can influence any stage of research. A rule about model choice,
like Morgan’s Canon, doesn’t address anthropomorphism at other stages.
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The next control is proposed by Sober (2005) and Fitzpatrick (2008) as replacements for
Morgan’s Canon. Sober concludes his paper with the memorable line: “The only prophylactic we
need is empiricism” (2005 pg. 97). Fitzpatrick frames the claim as a principle he calls
‘evidentialism’ (2008, pg. 242). The shared idea is that one should wait until there is sufficient
evidence before adopting a hypothesis.
This, of course, is good advice. The problem is that inferences about what is sufficient
evidence are potentially subject to intuitive anthropomorphic bias. This is, arguably, exactly what
is at issue in this debate. We need guidelines that specifically address intuitive
anthropomorphism, so evidentialism alone is not enough.
6. Identifying Errors
Many authors discuss more specific instantiations of anthropomorphic error. This suggests a
third strategy. The more specific the errors we can identify, the better positioned we are to avoid
them. Simply warning against ‘anthropomorphism’ in general is too vague to be helpful.
De Waal (1999) argues against anthropocentric anthropomorphism, which is attempting to
explain behavior by simply imagining how you would approach the task. He emphasizes that
researchers need to consider the perspective of the animal itself. Thus, there is an identifiable
difference between instances of pernicious anthropocentric anthropomorphism and what he calls
animal-centric anthropomorphism. Rivas & Burghardt (2002) describe the related
anthropomorphism by omission, which assumes that the capacities of nonhuman animals are a
subset of our own. In reality, nonhuman animals have many capacities that we do not.
Lockwood (1986) distinguishes several kinds of anthropomorphism, the most interesting of
these is explanatory anthropomorphism. This is the fallacy of thinking we have explained a
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behavior simply by giving it a (folk psychological) name. Many raise related worries about the
use of folk psychological terminology, which might make it easy to unintentionally slip into
intuitive anthropomorphism. Authors worry about this to different degrees. Kennedy (1992)
argues for the complete replacement of folk psychological terminology, while de Waal (1999)
argues for the use of neutral descriptive terminology when observing and recording data, though
folk psychological can be used theoretical interpretation. Finally, Bekoff (2000) argues that
general care is all that is needed.
Povinelli lists several specific errors (2012, appendix 1), for instance, the end-point training
effect: one watching an animal perform some task can be struck by her success, and forget that
the behavior required hundreds or thousands of practice trials. Another, he calls The Erin
Moriarty effect (after a journalist who visited his lab): in tasks in which an animal has a 50/50
chance of ‘success,’ trials in which it succeeds feel more meaningful.
Whether or not these specific proposals stand up, there is a useful idea here. The problem is
that there is little reason to believe that we will be able to identify a list of discrete errors that
exhausts intuitive anthropomorphic bias. The effects of cognitive bias are subtle, complex, and
often unpredictable. And we need controls that will generalize to experiments not yet done. So,
like evidentialism, this approach is helpful, but more is needed.
7. Building New Strategies
I have argued that awareness of bias in deliberation is not an effective control itself, but it
might seem hasty to argue that it has no role. Either way, though, a proper understanding of bias
is essential. So given that the field has implicit anthropomorphism wrong, adopting the view that
I have argued for can only help. But we need more than this. Of existing controls, Morgan’s
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Canon should be eliminated, while evidentialism and identifying errors can be helpful, but are
not enough. So I suggest that we look to the literature on controlling social biases for new
strategies.
The literature on controlling implicit biases suggests an empirical hypothesis. Imagining
intelligent seeming actions performed by a being that is (relatively) unlikely to be
anthropomorphised, such as a computer, an insect, or an octopus (Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli
1993), might reduce subsequent intuitive anthropomorphism. This is analogous to imagining
positive interactions with members of stereotyped groups. As an empirical claim, this needs to be
tested, and testing it will not likely be easy.
In the meantime, there are proposals better supported by the evidence discussed above.
Implementation intentions reduce implicit bias because they help ensure that a specific goal is
implemented at the right time (Stewart & Payne 2008). For practicing comparative
psychologists, this would be much more difficult because the goals will have to be much more
complicated. So, in place of implementation intentions, I suggest checklists. Checklists have
been helpful in many settings, including airline takeoffs, engineering, and surgery (Borchard et
al. 2012), and have been suggested as a method to reduce implicit bias in judges (Seamone
2006). Checklists can ensure that a large number of complicated intentions are enacted at the
right time.
This checklist might include two sets of items. One set should specify alternative hypotheses
that might explain the behavior. This should include hypotheses beyond that which is favored in
the field and that which is the researchers own hypothesis: Heyes (2015) argues that many well-
known effects that could explain behaviors are often ignored in specific debates in comparative
psychology (One could also produce new hypotheses by imagining how something unlikely to be
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anthropomorphised could perform the task). Another set of items could come from a more
systematic program of identifying errors, modelled on the heuristics and biases literature (e.g.
Gillovich, Griffin, & Kahneman 2002). A more complete taxonomy of intuitive anthropomorphic
errors can help in many cases, even if it is not alone sufficient. If there is an alternative
hypothesis, or there is reason to believe an error has been made, one must step back and reassess
the evidence.
These suggestions of the last section need to be tested, and perhaps better measures can be
found, but for now, these are the options best supported by the empirical evidence we have.
8. Conclusion
One might reasonably wonder what this discussion means for the current state of
comparative psychology, as I have explicitly avoided this question. This discussion does not tell
us whether the field in general overestimates the intelligence of nonhuman animals. While
overestimating intelligence is one effect of intuitive anthropomorphism, it is only one of them. It
may not even be a dominant effect; it is easily identified, so its apparent prominence may simply
be an matter of availability.
One effect that the dynamic between intuitive anthropomorphism and Morgan’s Canon
might have is to produce a stark divide between sophisticated ‘cognitive’ capacities, often
couched in folk psychological terms, and overly simplistic associative explanations. This
concern has been raised elsewhere (Penn 2011, Heyes 2015), but considerations raised here can
(partially) explain it. Not only do folk-psychological models seem more intuitively plausible,
intuitive anthropomorphism can influence the building of models. So, either models are
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constructed using the few mathematical tools we have (like associative modeling) or under the
heavy influence of folk psychology. Beyond that, I suspect there is little that can be said in
general, and progress will have to be made on a case by case basis.
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Problems and Questions in Scientific Practice 
Author: Steve Elliott, Center for Biology and Society, Arizona State University  
Abstract 
 Philosophers increasingly study how scientists conduct actual scientific projects and the 
goals they pursue. But as of yet, there are few accounts of goals that can be used to identify 
different kinds, and specific instances, of goals pursued by scientists. I propose that there are at 
least four distinct kinds of goals pursued by scientists: ameliorating problems, addressing 
questions, satisfying values, and achieving epistemic aims. I focus on the first two kinds, and I 
provide tools to help conceptualize, distinguish, and identify the problems and questions pursued 
by scientists. This paper illustrates the use of those tools with two examples.
1
  
  
                                                
1
 Thanks to Tom Nickles, Rick Creath, and Manfred Laubichler for comments on earlier versions 
of this paper.  
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1- Introduction 
Philosophers increasingly study how contemporary scientists conduct ongoing scientific 
projects, often called scientific practice (Ankeny et al. 2011). Philosophers focus on the myriad 
theories, models, laws, hypotheses, and similar items (here grouped under the term ‘scientific 
products’) deployed in those projects (Green 2013; O’Malley et al. 2014). In doing so, they note 
that scientists construct, select, and deploy scientific products to achieve many different kinds of 
goals, from better describing phenomena, to explaining it, to addressing issues like deforestation 
or abnormal embryonic development (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Love 2013). But as of yet, 
no one has developed a systematic account of the different kinds of goals actually pursued by 
scientists. 
Such studies have yielded a wealth of new concepts with which to study the goal-directed 
aspect of much of science. Many accounts use similar terms for different concepts, such as for 
concepts of goals and aims (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Potochnik 2015), and for values 
(Douglas 2013; Brigandt 2015), to name just a few. Older but kindred accounts conflated terms 
or concepts of aims with those of values (Kuhn 1977; Laudan 1984), or of question-answering 
with those of problem-solving (Laudan 1977; Hintikka 1981).  
That florescence of concepts portends some issues. First, it may prompt philosophers to 
argue about, and entrench their positions against, concepts or accounts that are in fact compatible 
with their own. More importantly, it has made difficult at best our ability to compare results 
across different studies of scientific practice. Without such comparisons, such studies amount to 
little more than recounts of scientific research, yielding little understanding of the epistemologies 
of science. We need instead a framework of the myriad goals of scientific practice, combined 
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with a strategy with which to study and systematically compare cases of scientific practice. Here, 
I focus on the first issue.  
To ameliorate the above issue, I propose a framework of the goals of scientific research. 
The framework knits together many of the concepts proposed by others. I focus on two such 
goals: solving problems and answering questions. Many have nearly identified the two, but I 
argue that we more fruitfully study scientific practice if we distinguish them.  
In the next section, I sketch the overall framework of goals, while I discuss problems and 
questions in sections 3 and 4, respectively. In section five I provide some reasons for 
distinguishing problems from questions, and in section 6 I highlight two research projects that 
we better understand if we distinguish the questions they address from the problems they 
ameliorate. I close the paper by forestalling some worries about the overall sketch and about the 
distinction between problems and questions.  
 
2- Goals of Science 
Many accounts of the goals, aims, or ends of science privilege an ultimate goal, such as 
explanation (Popper 1957), problem solving (Laudan 1977), significant truth (Kitcher 2001), or 
understanding (Potochnik 2015). Some accounts propose multiple aims, especially focusing on 
addressing practical issues (Elliott and McKaughan 2014). Critics urge that there are no general 
aims of science, and that we should instead develop concepts of aims that are localized to 
researchers (Hardcastle 1999). I propose multiple goals of science focused around research 
teams. But my account knits together some of the insights of those who proposed ultimate aims.  
I propose that contemporary researchers pursue at least four kinds of aims: to solve 
problems, to answer questions, to achieve epistemic goals (such as describing, explaining, or 
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predicting phenomena), and to satisfy values. When I focus on scientific products instead of on 
researchers, I use the language of functions for artifacts (Knuuttila 2011; Love 2013; Woodward 
2014). Thus, scientific products function to solve problems, answer questions, etc.  
Furthermore, over the course of a project, the functions of problems, questions, etc. 
themselves change. At the beginning of a project, they motivate researchers to act. In the middle 
part of a project, they constrain the behaviors of researchers. At the end of a project, researchers 
evaluate the results of their projects and those of other according to those problems, questions, 
etc.   
The above sketch provides a bit of context for the sections to come. I can’t here detail all 
elements of the sketch, so I focus on two aspects of it: problems and questions. The next two 
sections provide the machinery with which to conceptualize problems and questions, while the 
ensuing section illustrates examples in which the machinery is useful.  
 
3- Problems 
 If we’re to take solving problems as a general goal of many scientific projects, we need 
an account of problems (Nickles 1981). To apply to actual scientific practice, such an account 
must provide a set of tools with which to identify the problems that scientists pursue, a known 
but little studied issue (Nickles 1988). The set of tools should include at least the following.  
 First, the account must specify the kinds of things to which ‘problem’ refers. Second, the 
account must provide a general semantical structure for propositions of the form “X is a 
problem”. Third, the account must provide conditions according to which researchers assert the 
proposition that ‘X is a problem’. With those tools, those who study scientific practice can better 
identify the problems that scientists identify as parts of their projects. I sketch four tools below.  
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1. Problems:  
Problems are, and the term ‘problem’ refers to, states of affairs or situations in 
which something valued is harmed or is obstructed from flourishing.  
 
Many who discuss problems in science adopt more restricted views of problems. They 
view problems merely as troubles faced by theories (Laudan 1977; Hattiangadi 1978; Nickles 
1981). That view prompts most to treat problems as questions, a positon I discuss in a later 
section. My account is more general, noting that scientists often motivate and evaluate their 
projects by more worldly issues, such as droughts, birth defects, and extinctions.  
 
2. Proposition that “X is a problem”:  
The proposition is an abstract object that includes: a set of propositions that 
describe a situation, an evaluative proposition that disvalues the situation, an 
imperative proposition to ameliorate the situation, and a set of propositions that 
describe constraints on the amelioration.  
 
 The above tool is due largely to Thomas Nickles (1981). My version is more general than 
his in several ways. First, I countenance more kinds of situations as problems than does Nickles. 
Second, for Nickles, all scientific problems include at least obstructed goals in relation to 
theories; while my account countenances harms or obstructions to explicit theoretical goals, but 
also to anything valued. Third, my account explicitly includes propositions to describe states of 
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affairs and an evaluative proposition, while Nickles’s account at best lumps those propositions as 
kinds of constraints on solutions.  
 
3. Problem Statement:  
A problem statement is a sentence that describes a problem. Put differently, a 
problem statement expresses the proposition “X is a problem” and specifies the X.  
 
A problem statement uses the concept of a problem when it implies all of the propositions 
that constitute that concept. For instance, the sentence “Deforestation is a problem in Montana” 
implies, among other things, that deforestation in Montana is dis valuable and that it should be 
reduced or halted.  
Nickles aimed to describe problems as things that could persist across projects and 
researchers, that could evolve over time, and that themselves could be studied. While he noted 
that agent-focused tools might complement his semantic account and be useful to study scientific 
practice, he provided none. The following is one such complementary tool. It provides a set of 
conditions in which agents can assert a problem statement.  
 
4. Agents (straightforwardly) assert that “X is a problem” only when: 
1. They’re conscious or aware of the state of affairs X 
2. They disvalue X 
3. They imply an imperative to ameliorate X 
4. They believe that effort is needed to further specify or to ameliorate X 
5. They believe that a possible strategy of action could ameliorate X 
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6. They believe that, when pursuing problems, it’s appropriate to use the 
language of ameliorable (ability), ameliorating (process), and ameliorated 
(result).  
 
The above tool is largely due to Gene Agre (1982). According to it, agents assert that 
some situation is a problem based on their background knowledge, values, and beliefs, all of 
which can differ across agents, and the latter two of which can be disputed. Furthermore, it 
provides a starting point around which those who study scientific practice can develop tools, 
such as surveys and content analyses, to collect data about the problems invoked and pursued by 
researchers. 
In a further respect, the above tools are more general than nearly all earlier accounts of 
problems. Earlier accounts describe researchers as solving problems. The above tools instead 
describe them as ameliorating problems. More than language of “solving”, language of 
“ameliorating” better fits the model of satisficing rationality explicitly invoked by most previous 
accounts of problems.  
 
4- Questions 
 If we’re to take answering questions as a general goal of many scientific projects, we 
need an account of questions. There has been substantially more research into questions than into 
problems, yielding a wide array of topics and accounts (Cross and Roelofsen 2016). Given that 
array, much less machinery needs to be developed to identify questions pursued in scientific 
practice. For semantics of questions, I review a standard account familiar to philosophers of 
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science (Belnap and Steel 1976), while for conditions under which agents poses questions, I 
specify a new account.   
 Questions are abstract objects, like propositions, posed by agents. For their most basic 
semantic structure, elementary questions include a set of possible alternatives and propositions 
that indicates how many of the distinct alternatives the agent seeks (Belnap and Steel 1976). An 
interrogative statement is a sentence that expresses a question, just as a problem statement 
expresses a problem proposition.  
For a question to possibly have an answer, it presupposes a proposition that describes a 
state of affairs in which the agent asking the question lacks information. Agents pose questions 
under at least the following conditions.  
 
5. Agents (straightforwardly) pose a question only when:  
1. They’re aware of their epistemic state of lacking information 
2. They disvalue that state 
3. They imply an imperative to ameliorate that state 
4. They believe that effort is needs to formulate the question or to provide the 
information to address it 
5. They believe that possible information could ameliorate their epistemic state, 
and that they could identify that information if presented it (Hintikka 1981).  
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6. They believe that, when pursuing questions, it’s appropriate to use the 
language of addressable (ability), addressing (process), and addressed 
(result).
2
  
 
There are many parallels between the above accounts of problems and questions, and I 
model the conditions for posing questions on Agre’s conditions for asserting problem 
propositions. Such similarities between the accounts partly explains why so many philosophers 
have given the appearance of equating the two. But for studying science, we most fruitfully treat 
problems states of affairs and questions as abstract objects.
3
  
 
5- Distinguishing Problems from Questions 
 Among those who study the role of problems in science, many seemingly identify 
problems with (sets of) unanswered questions and the practice of problem solving with that of 
questions answering (Laudan 1977, Hintikka 1981, Goldman 1986, Love 2008). The tools in the 
previous sections enable us to distinguish problems from questions, and to distinguish the 
practice of ameliorating problems from that of addressing questions.  
                                                
2
 Language of ‘addressing questions’ replaces that of ‘answering questions’ to better fit with the 
satisficing model of rationality.   
3
 Insofar as one ontologizes states of affairs as themselves abstract objects, then my argument is 
instead that problems have logical or abstract structure that is distinct from that of questions. 
Thus, the set of problems doesn’t overlap with the set of questions.  
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1266-
Elliott: 10 of 20 
	
There are several reasons why it is fruitful to distinguish questions from problems when 
we study research projects. First, the tools described above enable us to charitably interpret 
previous accounts of problems such their insights are still highly relevant to the study of 
scientific practice. Given those tools, questions presuppose a kind of problem proposition, and 
the practice of addressing questions is a subkind of the practice of ameliorating problems. Given 
a question, we might establish some translation rule to move between the question and a specific 
one of its presuppositions and back again.  
For instance, if I ask “Why do leafblowers make as much noise as they do?”, I 
presuppose that I lack that information, a situation I disvalue. If we treat lacking information as a 
situation in which something valued (here knowledge, information, or understanding) is 
obstructed, then we can class the situation as an (intellectualist) problem. Given appropriately 
developed translation procedures, we could infer “I lack information about what causes 
leafblowers to make as much as they do” from the above question. And given a proposition that 
describes an agent’s epistemic state of lacking information, we could infer a question from that 
proposition. Briefly put, a question presupposes an intellectualist problem proposition, and with 
the right translation procedures, we could move back and forth between the two.  
But we cannot develop such translation procedures for problems that aren’t epistemic 
states of lacking information. Such problems engender many questions. If an agent asserts that 
leafblowers are noisy, we can’t infer that the agent doesn’t know why they are noisy. She may 
know perfectly well, and she may be developing a noise damper. Rather, the problem engenders 
many questions: How noisy are they? For whom are they noisy? Where are they noisiest? When 
are they nosiest? What is their range of noise? How can we dampen the noise? Why do people 
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use leaf blowers?
 
Etc. For every answered question, people gain information with which they can 
ameliorate the problem.  
Older accounts of problems and questions captured an aspect of many problems pursued 
in scientific practice. In such cases, researchers disvalue their situations of lacking knowledge, 
situations that can be expressed either as problem propositions or as presuppositions to questions. 
The distinctions I offer enable us to maintain most of the usefulness of those accounts, such as 
rough distinctions between conceptual and empirical problems (Laudan 1977), the abstract 
structure of problem propositions (Nickles 1981), and an interrogative account of scientific 
discovery (Hintikka 1981).  
There’s a second general reason for why it’s fruitful to distinguish problems from 
questions as I do above. The distinction enables us to conceptualize, beyond the epistemic-state 
or intellectualist problems presupposed by questions, a larger variety of problems that 
researchers pursue and that give significance to their research projects. Such worldly problems 
are aspects of projects that comprise a vast expanse of scientific practice, including the study of 
fault lines near cities, extinctions, the physical decay of art, and disease, to name just a few. 
Often ignored by those who study science, such research has the potential to reveal not only how 
researchers design and conduct research, but also how they make trade-offs between competing 
values (Elliott and McKaughan 2014).  
Third, the distinction I propose enables the creation of tools to identify the problems and 
questions pursued by researchers. Insofar as we study science empirically, we need empirical 
tools to gather data about the aspects of research projects and how those aspects evolve over 
time. 
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 For instance, the two sets of conditions, one for asserting that something is a problem 
and the other for posing a question, provide foundations from which to create questionnaires or 
surveys of researchers about the problems and questions they pursue, foundations that are 
themselves revisable in light of disconfirming evidence. Similarly, the abstract structures of 
problem propositions and of questions provide foundations from which to create content analyses 
of documents such as research papers, grant applications, lab notebooks, etc.  
Fourth, the distinction between questions and problems enables the study of how those 
problems and questions function differently over the course of a given research project, and how 
they influence each other. Both can motivate scientists to design and conduct a project. But while 
questions focus research activity and function as criteria by which to select methods, problems 
often function as external justification for a course of action. Further, problems often engender or 
raise many questions, while the information used to address questions often ameliorates many 
distinct problems.  
A team might be motivated to conduct their project because of one problem, but may 
invoke a different problem when applying for funding. It may ignore both of those problems and 
invoke still a different problem when reporting its results and convincing others to use its 
scientific products. Problems are not, however, mere rhetorical devices, as much of science 
evolves by using the same results or products to ameliorate different problems, and many 
products are evaluated by how well they ameliorate problems, and by how many problems they 
ameliorate.   
Finally, the distinction between questions and answers enables more refined studies not 
only into how science is or should be evaluated and conducted, but also into how it is or should 
be designed. In that sense, the distinction is foundational in a general study of the conceptual 
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foundations of research design, a field scarcely touched by philosophers of science, and one ripe 
for further study.   
 
6- Examples 
 I describe two examples that highlight the above tools and the distinction between 
questions and problems. The first example straightforwardly fits my account, while the latter, 
while prima fascia challenging to my account and more amenable to older accounts, also fits it.    
 
Example 1 
 In Death Valley in California and Nevada, there are many species of pupfish isolated 
from each other in streams and water holes. One species lives only in Devils Hole, a seemingly 
bottomless, hot, and geothermal hole only a few meters in width and breadth that sustains little 
life. Devils Hole pupfish are distinct from pupfish in sister species in that they lack pectoral fins. 
The pupfish eat mostly the small amounts of algae that grow in Devils Hole, and when shade 
ceaselessly occludes the hole for two months every year, algae can’t grow and the pupfish 
population crashes. While the population rarely numbers more than a few hundred, during the 
shady season it has been recorded at barely a few dozen.  
The Devils Hole species is one of the most endangered on the planet. The US federal 
government has explicitly valued and protected not only the species, but also the hole and the 
water in which it lives (Cappaert v. United States 1976). The US Fish and Wildlife Service, 
among other federal organizations, pursues several efforts to conserve the species.  
In the framework of problems proposed in earlier sections, the population of Devils Hole 
pupfish is the thing valued, and its constant threat of extinction provides a problem at least to the 
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Fish and Wildlife Service tasked with conserving it. That problem has engendered many 
questions about the pupfish.  
A recent team to study the pupfish was led by Christopher Martin, a specialist in the 
speciation of small fishes at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Motivated by the 
conservation problem facing the Fish and Wildlife Service, the team primarily asked: How long 
had the Devils Hole species lived in Devils Hole? But it also noted a cluster of related questions 
(Martin et al. 2016, 3). Did pupfish colonize the hole just once? If so, how did their populations 
avoid inbreeding depression and extinction?  
To answer those questions, the team sampled DNA from preserved Devils Hole pupfish 
and compared it to DNA data from nearby sister species. They used that information to build 
several scientific products, including a metric of genetic diversity in and between species, a dated 
phylogenetic tree of the species, a DNA mutation rate, and a time-range in which the Devils Hole 
pupfish diverged from its sister species.  
Given those tools, the team answered it primary question by inferring that the current 
species of Devils Hole pupfish colonized Devils Hole within the last three hundred years, a 
surprisingly recent event. And given geological record of inundations in Death Valley, the team 
concluded that the current species of Devils Hole pupfish may be just the most recent species to 
colonize the hole. They also found evidence of gene flow between the Devils Hole population 
and sister species, though kilometers of desert often separated those populations. Such gene flow 
could stave off inbreeding depression, though mechanisms are needed to explain how genetic 
material somehow traversed kilometers.  
 With its scientific products and answers to their questions, the team recommended some 
strategies to conserve the Devils Hole pupfish, or to ameliorate the problem facing the Fish and 
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Wildlife Service. The team suggested that the current species may be only the most recent in a 
series of species that have colonized Devils Hole, evolved, and gone extinct. To conserve 
pupfish in Devils Hole, if not the current species, fish and wildlife managers should preserve the 
possibility for genetic information, and perhaps new organisms, to flow to and from Devils Hole. 
Whether or not anyone employs those suggestions to ameliorate the problem of potential 
extinction of the pupfish, or of life in Devils Hole, remains to be seen.  
 
Example 2 
 Not all research projects fit my account as nicely as the previous case. When many 
scientists describe their projects, they often don’t identify questions or worldly problems as 
motivation or justification for their projects. They often invoke intellectualist problems, such as a 
lack of understanding of a phenomenon, or trouble for a theory. Such cases are those 
traditionally studied by those who study problem solving in science. But as my account 
conserves and clarifies previous accounts, it can still handle such cases.  
 In the late 1960s, Eric Davidson partnered with Roy Britten to develop a project about 
gene regulation. They noted evidence that genes yielded products that regulated how other genes 
made products, and ultimately how cells differentiate. Davidson and Britten valued knowledge of 
how genes control cell differentiation. And the problem, as they came to state, was that 
researchers knew little about those mechanisms in which genes regulate each other, and they had 
little theory in which to describe such mechanisms or figure them out (Britten and Davidson 
1969).  
To address that problem, Britten and Davidson proposed a set of scientific products, 
which included theoretical concepts and a general model of a gene battery, according to which 
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gene products within a cell interacted with other genes in the cell to differentiate the cell into a 
given type. A few years later, they moved to Caltech to collaborate regularly. They pursued 
major grants together, and over time, their project and its motivating problems evolved. They 
helped to establish many instances in which genes regulated other genes in sea urchins. 
But by the late 1990s, the theory had evolved enough that Davidson and an army of 
colleagues could pose a new problem. No one had provided a relatively complete example of a 
gene regulatory network, as the batteries had been renamed, according to which researchers 
could manipulate gene regulation and precisely predict the effects on a major developmental 
process. Davidson was aware of that situation, disvalued it as a challenge to his and Britten’s 
theory, and exercised a considerable amount of effort to ameliorate it via a complex strategy 
(Davidson et al. 2002).  
To address that problem, Davidson’s team focused on the specification of endomesoderm 
cells in early sea urchin embryos, some of which develop into the distinctive juvenile skeletons 
found in many sea urchin larvae. The team systematically perturbed the expression of dozens of 
genes. Ultimately, they constructed a model of all the genes and their regulatory connections 
required to turn early sea urchin cells into endomesoderm cells, and ultimately juvenile 
skeletons. Given a model that ameliorated, but didn’t completely solve, the above problem, 
Davidson’s research evolved as he continued to refine motivating problems, from needing more 
detail on the endomesoderm network (Peter and Davidson 2010) to not knowing how it had 
evolved (Hinman et al. 2007).  
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7- Conclusion 
 In closing, I forestall some worries about the above sketch of problems and questions. 
First, while it characterizes problems and questions, is says little about solutions and answers, or 
about how researchers go about finding them. So the above sketches are incomplete. That point 
is right, and while a more thorough study of those topics is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
ripe for future research.  
 Second, my examples draw evidence only from the published reports of scientists, reports 
that are known not to capture how their authors actually reasoned during the life of their research 
projects. As such, the above examples may systematically mislead readers about the problems 
and questions actually pursued in the projects, which the authors rationally reconstruct in their 
reports. To an extent, that point is also right. But it misses at least two larger issues.   
 First, within any given research project, the functions of problems and questions change 
over the life of the project. In early stages, they motivate researchers to act, in later stages they 
constrain the behaviors that researchers perform, and in still later stages they justify the project, 
its results, and its products to other scientists. Here, I focus my examples only on the late stage in 
which researchers publish their results. Fuller case histories, however, would identify the 
problems and questions, and how they changed, throughout the life of the projects.  
 Second, while scientists reconstruct their projects in their research reports, that practice is 
a worthwhile object of study. Those who study them should be mindful that such reconstructions 
sacrifice historical accuracy and have rhetorical functions. But those reconstructions, and the 
practice of making them, provide a window through which those who study science can piece 
together the rationales for projects, results, and scientific products that scientists find convincing. 
Problems and questions are often distinct aspects of those rationales.  
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Abstract
According to entity realism, we are warranted in believing that some entities studied by 
science are real, but not that scientific theories are true. In discussions of scientific realism,
entity realism is usually quickly dismissed due to serious objections that appear to make it 
untenable. In this paper, I formulate a new robustness-based version of entity realism, and 
show that this version has resources to answer the classic objections raised against the 
original version. I also show that, in contrast to the currently popular (ontic) structural 
realism, robustness-based entity realism provides a plausible account of realism for the life 
sciences.
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1. Introduction
The core idea of standard scientific realism is that we ought to believe that the best 
scientific theories are (approximately) true. Antirealists deny this. Entity realists accept the 
antirealist tenet that we are not required to believe in the truth of scientific theories, but 
also defend limited realism, as they argue that we are warranted in believing that at least 
some entities that appear in scientific explanations are real. Thus, entity realism (ER) 
appears to lead to an appealing middle path between standard scientific realism and 
antirealism. 
However, in discussions of scientific realism, ER is usually quickly dismissed (see, e.g., 
Devitt 2005; Ladyman and Ross 2007; Psillos 1999). This is probably due to two main 
factors: the ambiguity and inconclusiveness of the arguments for ER, and several serious 
counterarguments that have been raised against it. In this paper, I will formulate a new 
robustness-based version of ER, and show that this version has resources to answer all the 
classic objections raised against original ER. I will also show that, in contrast to the 
currently popular (ontic) structural realism, robustness-based ER provides a plausible 
account of realism for the life sciences. 
In the next section, I will briefly go through ER and its main problems. In Section 3, I will 
present the robustness argument for ER, and in Section 4, I will argue that robustness-
based ER has resources to answer all the main counterarguments raised against original 
version. In Section 5, I briefly consider the relationship between robustness-based ER and 
(ontic) structural realism. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1279-
2. Entity Realism
The most important accounts of ER are in Nancy Cartwright’s (1983) How the Laws of 
Physics Lie and Ian Hacking’s (1983) Representing and Intervening. I will mainly focus on
Cartwright’s version of ER here, as it is more compact, and for the purposes of this paper, 
the differences between the accounts are inessential. 
Cartwright’s (1983) starting point is inference to the best explanation (IBE), which is one 
of the classic strategies to argue for scientific realism. The core of the IBE argument is that 
if theories or laws are extremely successful at explaining and predicting phenomena, we 
can infer that they are also (approximately) true. This strategy has been forcefully 
criticized by a broad range of authors, most prominently Bas van Fraassen (1980). 
Cartwright mostly agrees with the critics, but argues that there is one exception: causal 
explanation. In the context of causal explanation, IBE is justified: “To the extent that we 
find the causal explanation acceptable, we must believe in the causes described” 
(Cartwright 1983, 5). In other words, she states that “to accept the explanation is to admit 
the cause” (ibid., 99). To illustrate, she gives the following example (ibid., 91). The lemon 
tree in her garden is sick, and the leaves are falling off. She comes up with an explanation: 
Water has accumulated at the bottom of the pot, which has made the tree sick. According to
Cartwright, accepting this explanation as correct requires believing that the cause (water at 
the bottom of the pot) is real.  
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Importantly, Cartwright (1983, 75-76) also argues that accepting a causal explanation and 
the reality of the cause does not require accepting any theory or law as true. According to 
her, there is theoretical “redundancy” in science in the sense that the same causal process 
can be embedded into different theoretical frameworks, and consequently the reality of the 
causal process does not imply the truth of any theory. However, causal explanations 
themselves are “non-redundant”, as only one causal story for a given phenomenon can be 
accepted as satisfactory. 
Cartwright (1983) and Hacking (1983) also appeal to scientific practice and 
experimentation for support. Hacking famously argues that the best evidence for the reality
of electrons is that we can use them to create and study other phenomena – “if you can 
spray them, they are real” (Hacking 1983, 23). Cartwright claims that experimentation can 
give causal explanations a degree of objectivity that is impossible to reach for laws and 
theories, referring for example to a laser-making company that runs numerous test lasers to
death each year to make sure that the lasers produced have exactly the effects that they are 
supposed to have (Cartwright 1983, 3). 
Also transcendental or indispensability arguments for ER can be extracted from the 
accounts of Cartwright and Hacking (Morrison 1990; Miller forthcoming). The idea is that 
successfully manipulating and controlling nature with scientific means requires accepting 
the reality of the entities involved. As Hacking puts it, scientists cannot help being realists 
about (experimental) theoretical entities (Hacking 1983, 262). 
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Finally, an important consideration in favor of ER is that entities seem to be more stable 
and resistant to scientific revolutions than theories and laws. For example, the electron 
entered the ontology of physics in the late 19th century, and has remained there since, 
although theories in physics have gone through such dramatic changes as the discovery of 
quantum mechanics and the relativity theory (Hacking 1982). Thus, ER appears to be less 
susceptible to the pessimistic induction argument than standard scientific realism.  
ER is an attractive position, as it seems to amount to “defensible middle ground” between 
antirealism and standard scientific realism (Clarke 2001). However, ER has few 
proponents nowadays. This is probably due to two main reasons: the elusive nature of the 
arguments presented in favor of it, and serious counterarguments that can be raised against 
it. The elusiveness of the arguments for ER should be clear from the above summary. 
There is no compelling master argument, just several interconnected strands of reasoning 
presented in its support (see also Clarke 2001 and Miller forthcoming). I will now proceed 
to discuss the main counterarguments.  
First of all, the notion that accepting a causal explanation as correct implies accepting the 
reality of the cause can be questioned. An antirealist along the lines of van Fraassen (1980)
could argue that when a scientist accepts a causal explanation, she does not have to accept 
the reality of the cause, but merely that there is a causal story that is empirically adequate 
(Hitchcock 1992). Another strategy for an antirealist would be to argue that if Cartwright is
correct that statements of the kind “P causally explains Q” imply the reality of P, then we 
are not warranted in believing that such statements are true (ibid.). There seems to be no 
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compelling reason why accepting the scientific practices of causal explanation would 
require accepting the reality of the causes (see Clarke 2001 and Hitchcock 1992 for more). 
A second problem for ER can be formulated as a dilemma: Either ER is too minimal to be 
interesting, or it leads to a form of standard scientific realism (Morrision 1990; Psillos 
1999, 249). More specifically, if ER amounts to just being warranted in believing that 
some entity X exist, and nothing more than that, it is questionable whether it constitutes a 
substantial and interesting form of scientific realism. At least, a realist also has to accept 
the reality of some key properties of the entity, for example, that the electron has a negative
electric charge. However, the only scientifically acceptable way to attribute properties to 
entities is to do this on the basis of the most state-of-the-art scientific theories. This, in 
turn, seems to require believing that those theories are to some extent true (Chakravartty 
2007, 30; Psillos 1999, 248-249). But accepting that the best scientific theories are to some
extent true is not very far from accepting standard scientific realism. Thus, if entity realism
is extended to cover also the properties of entities, it may not be so different from standard 
scientific realism after all. 
A third and related problem is that, in spite of appearance, ER may not fare any better than 
the alternatives against the argument from pessimistic induction (Morrison 1990; 
Chakravartty 2007, 32). Although it may be true that, for example, the electron as such has 
withstood several scientific revolutions, views about its properties have considerably 
changed. Thomson and Rutherford believed very different things about electrons than 
scientists do today (ibid.). For example, they did not believe that the electron is a fermion 
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or that it exhibits wave-particle duality, which are nowadays seen as fundamental 
properties of electrons. If the views about the nature and properties of the electron have 
dramatically changed since it was discovered, the same presumably holds for entities as 
well, and the continuity that ER provides is only illusory.
In sum, the main problems of ER can be paraphrased as follows.  (1) The success of causal 
explanation does not warrant inferring the reality of the cause. (2) Realism about entities 
only (without their properties) is too weak to be interesting, but the properties of entities 
are attributed to them by the best scientific theories, so accepting their reality involves 
accepting that the best scientific theories are to some extent true, leading to a form of 
standard scientific realism. (3) The properties of entities cannot in general be expected to 
survive scientific revolutions, and thus any interesting form of ER fails to avoid the 
pessimistic induction argument. In the next section, I will formulate a new robustness-
based version of ER, and in Section 4 I will show that it successfully tackles these 
problems.  
3. Robustness
As we saw above, Cartwright and Hacking present several interconnected arguments in 
support of ER: causal considerations, arguments from experimentation, indispensability 
arguments, and so on (see Clarke 2001 and Miller forthcoming for more). These arguments
clearly have not convinced the philosophical community, as ER remains an unpopular 
position. However, there is a further argument for the reality of scientific entities, which 
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can be extracted from different debates in philosophy of science, and is far more promising
for defending entity realism. This is the argument from robustness: Roughly, if there are 
several independent way of measuring, detecting or deriving something, then we have 
good reasons to believe that that thing is real. 
Robustness in its different manifestations has been extensively discussed in recent years 
(Eronen 2015; Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni 2010; Kuorikoski & Marchionni 
forthcoming; Raerinne 2013; Schupbach forthcoming; Soler, Trizio, Nickles, and Wimsatt 
2012; Woodward 2006). It is also often briefly referred to in discussions of scientific 
realism, including those of Cartwright and Hacking (Cartwright 1983, 84; Hacking 1981; 
1983, 201; see also Chakravartty 2007, 65-66). However, it has not been developed to a 
full argument for scientific realism, with the exception of the work of William Wimsatt 
(1981, 1994, 2007), which I will take as the starting point here. 
Wimsatt (1994) explicitly argues that we should adopt robustness as a criterion for what is 
real, and that this leads to scientific realism that is less metaphysical and more local than 
the standard forms. The idea is that if there are many ways of measuring, detecting, 
producing or deriving something, and those ways are sufficiently independent, then it is 
very unlikely that all of them turn out to be mistaken or erroneous. Thus, things that are 
robust in this sense are very likely to be real. For example, electrons can be measured, 
detected and produced with many different techniques and setups relying on different 
theoretical assumptions, and they can be derived from various models and theories. 
Consequently, they are robust and extremely likely to be real. 
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Wimsatt’s rough idea is prima facie plausible, but is in several respects unsatisfactory or at 
least incomplete, and needs to be further refined (see also Eronen 2015). First of all, in 
order to avoid the implication that robustness itself makes things real (leading to some kind
of constructivism), we should not see it as criterion for what is real in any strong sense, but
rather as a source of justification or warrant for ontological commitments. This can be 
formulated as follows: Robustness confers justification for believing that X is real, and the 
degree of this justification corresponds to the degree that we have robust evidence for X. 
Furthermore, as robustness depends on currently available methods of measuring, detecting
or deriving something, it is clearly a feature that is relative to a certain scientific 
community at a certain time. This needs to be incorporated into any definition of 
robustness. For similar reasons, we should take into account that robustness is a matter of 
degree: for example, we have more robust evidence for electrons or DNA molecules than 
we have for the Higgs boson. With these considerations in mind, we can give the following
working definition of robustness (based on Eronen 2015):
(Robustness) The relevant scientific community at a certain time has robust 
evidence for X insofar as X is detectable, measurable, derivable, producible or 
explanatory in a variety of independent ways.
The notion “explanatory” has been included in the definition for the reason that it is very 
plausible that things that appear in many independent explanatory generalizations or 
models are more robust1 than things that do not (see also Eronen 2015). For example, 
1 Strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to always write “robust evidence for X” 
instead of “x is robust”, but for the sake of readability, I also use the latter kinds of 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1286-
electrons are very robust partly because they appear in a broad range of distinct models and
explanatory generalizations in physics, whereas D-branes only appear in certain string 
theory models, and are in this respect less robust. It is also important to note that none of 
the dimensions mentioned is by itself necessary for robustness: The moon, for example, is 
an extremely robust entity, although there is no clear sense in which we can produce it, and
properties or phenomena can be highly robust even though there are no accepted 
explanatory generalizations or models involving them (e.g., gamma-ray bursts).   
The notion of independence is crucial for robustness: If different ways of measuring 
something are not independent from each other, but are based on the same assumptions and
methods, then they all lose their value if those assumptions and methods turn out to be 
false or mistaken, and the robustness that they confer is only illusory. One problem for 
robustness-based realism is that spelling out the nature of this independence is far from 
trivial, and if it is unsuccessful, the plausibility of the whole account can be questioned 
(Hudson 2014; Stegenga 2009). However, in recent years much progress has been made in 
defining the right kind of evidential independence. What is certainly not required is 
statistical independence, as two distinct ways of measuring the same thing will be often 
correlated, and this should not prevent them from contributing to robustness (Schupbach 
forthcoming). The idea is rather that two ways are appropriately independent if their 
characteristic errors and biases are independent from each other (Kuorikoski and 
Marchionni forthcoming). For example, cloud chamber experiments to detect electrons are 
based on different causal processes and theoretical assumptions than cathode ray tube 
expressions here. 
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experiments, and thus they cannot involve the same biases or systematic errors. Ways of 
detection that are independent in this sense make it more likely that the entity or 
phenomenon is real, and thus contribute to robustness (see Kuorikoski & Marchionni 
(forthcoming) for more, and Schupbach (forthcoming) for an alternative proposal).  
For the purposes of this paper, let us assume that the account of robustness presented here 
is roughly correct, so that we can examine what consequences it has for the issue of entity 
realism. In fact, the consequences are rather straightforward. First, it is clear that many 
entities in science are detectable, measurable, derivable, producible, or explanatory in a 
variety of independent ways, and thus we have a high degree of robust evidence for them. 
From this it follows that we have a high degree of justification in believing that many 
entities in science are real, which amounts to a form of ER. Thus, if we understand the role 
of robustness as I have proposed here, it directly leads to ER.2 In the next section, I will 
clarify this robustness-based entity realism (from now on, RER) further, and show how the 
criticism raised against original ER fails to undermine it.
4. Neurons and Robustness-based Entity Realism 
2 Note that the account defended here does not imply that robustness is necessary for being
justified in believing something to be real: There may be also other sources of justification 
for ontological commitments. One important consequence of this is that cases where we 
are apparently warranted in believing in the reality of something that is not robust are not 
counterarguments to this account.
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The main example that I will use here to elaborate on RER is the neuron. This is a suitable 
case, as the neuron is a “theoretical” entity in the sense that it is not directly observable, 
and in the 19th century the existence of neurons was still just a hypothesis, but nowadays 
there is overwhelmingly robust evidence for their reality. Here it suffices to mention just 
some examples of the variety of independent evidence for neurons: they can be observed 
with a broad range of staining techniques; they can be seen with light microscopes and 
imaged with electron microscopes; their activity can be recorded with various single-cell 
and multi-unit recording setups; they can even be produced with the help of stem cells; 
they play an important role in explanatory models and generalizations concerning animal 
and human behavior, and so on. Even if broad categories of these sources of evidence 
would turn out to be mistaken, plenty of other independent sources would still remain, and 
we would still have highly robust evidence for the neuron. 
With this example in mind, let us go through the four objections to ER outlined in Section 
2. The first problem was that accepting a causal explanation does not require accepting the 
reality of the cause, contra Cartwright (1983). However, in contrast to the original ER, 
RER does not appeal to any special features of causal explanation. In the picture I have 
sketched above, the fact that an entity or a property appears in a causal generalization can 
contribute to its robustness (as “explanatory” is one of the dimensions in the definition of 
robustness), but just as one possible factor among many others. A robustness-realist can 
accept that causal explanations are as fallible as any other explanations in science. 
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However, even though RER evades this particular problem, an analogous anti-realist 
objection can be formulated for robustness. A constructive empiricist in the vein of van 
Fraassen could insist that there is no compelling reason why anyone would be required (as 
opposed to permitted) to believe in entities for which we have robust evidence (see also 
van Fraassen 1985, 297-300). This may be strictly speaking true, but in the case of entities 
like neurons, such suspension of belief comes close to outright skepticism. It could be 
argued that someone who has access to all the robust evidence for neurons is just as 
justified in believing in the reality of neurons as in the reality of the table in front of her 
(see also Hacking 1981). However, as I have pointed out above, RER does not require 
accepting any particular theories as true, or accepting IBE as valid, so many aspects of the 
constructive empiricism of van Fraassen (1980) are in fact compatible with RER.
The second problem for ER was the that realism about entities only is too weak to be 
interesting, but realism about the properties of entities seems to require accepting that the 
best scientific theories are to some extent true, leading to a form of standard scientific 
realism. First of all, RER can and should be extended to properties as well.3 The electrical 
conductivity of iron is detectable, measurable, derivable, producible and explanatory in a 
broad range of independent ways, and is thus an extremely robust property. Having a 
voltage gradient is an extremely robust property of the neuron, transmitting action 
3 Original ER was also never intended to apply only to the entities themselves. For 
example, Cartwright explicitly states that we are warranted in believing in the reality of 
many “theoretical entities and theoretical properties” (Cartwright 1983, 8, emphasis 
added).
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potentials is an extremely robust property of the axon, and so on.  However, extending 
RER to properties has only minimal implications for the truth of theories. Many ways of 
detecting or measuring the properties of entities such as neurons do not depend on any 
theory. For example, Golgi’s staining method for observing neurons was developed over 
100 years and is still in use, but there is no accepted theory that would explain how it 
actually works (Guillery 2005, 1290). Furthermore, the requirement of independence 
guarantees that highly robust evidence for an entity or property does not rely on just one 
theory, but on many distinct models or theories. Any one of these models or theories may 
turn out to be false, and the property would still remain robust. For example, even if the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model for the action potential would turn out to be fundamentally 
incorrect, plenty of other sources of independent evidence for the action potential would 
still remain. 
Thus, a high degree of robustness and the consequent justification in the reality of a 
property does not imply belief in the truth of any theory.  At best, the robustness realist 
may be required to believe that there are some true elements among the various theories 
and models involved, but she can still remain entirely agnostic about the truth of scientific 
theories in general, and deny the validity of the IBE argument (i.e., deny that we can infer 
the truth of scientific theories from their explanatory success).4  
4 One might object that robustness reasoning also involves a form of IBE: The best 
explanation for the robust evidence for X is that X is real, so we are justified in believing 
that X is real (cf. Hudson 2014). However, it is possible to accept a certain kind of IBE as 
valid, without accepting that IBE generally and universally works (Clarke 2001). A 
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The third problem was that although some entities such as the electron have withstood 
several scientific revolutions, many of their properties have been eliminated, and thus ER 
fails to evade the pessimistic induction argument. However, this issue can be reformulated 
and examined in new light once we understand that we can also have varying degrees of 
robust evidence for properties. Scientific properties often face elimination, but it is far 
from clear how often highly robust properties are eliminated. Many properties of neurons 
for which there was robust evidence in the early 20th century have been retained, such as 
having a negative transmembrane potential and communicating via synaptic junctions 
(Guillery 2005). Pessimistic induction reasoning works against RER only if it can be 
shown that highly robust properties have been repeatedly eliminated in the history of 
science, and it is far from clear whether this is the case. 
In sum, none of the objections raised against ER undermine the plausibility of RER. It is a 
viable and defensible form of scientific realism that deserves to be taken seriously and 
explored in more detail. 
5. Scientific Realism for the Life Sciences
An interesting feature of the debate on scientific realism is that the scientific examples and 
case studies have almost exclusively been drawn from physics. This is understandable, as it
robustness-realist can accept robustness-based IBE that concludes that we are highly 
justified in believing that X is real, but deny that the IBE from the success of theories to 
their truth is valid. 
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is widely assumed that the most mature and explanatorily successful theories and 
generalizations are found in physics. However, one consequence of this is that accounts of 
scientific realism often run into problems when applied to the life sciences. For example, 
Steven French’ (2011) discussion of scientific realism in biology merely gestures towards 
possible ways in which structural realism could be extended to biology in future work. 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) are more ambitious, and apply their ontic structural realism to 
the special sciences, but at the cost of reducing all special science entities to patterns that 
are defined in highly technical information-theoretic terms. This makes their realism 
completely detached from scientific practice, providing no tools for assessing our degree of
justification for the reality of special science entities and properties, and also forcing us to 
rethink all special science ontologies in terms of structures and patterns.
In contrast, RER directly supports realism in the life sciences, without imposing any kind 
of ontological revision, and in a way that is continuous with scientific practice. Above I 
have illustrated this with the example of the neuron, and this is not an isolated or cherry-
picked example; the life sciences are full of similar cases. Consider for example 
mitochondria, cell membranes, pollen or the Eschericia coli bacterium. There is extremely 
robust evidence for each of these entities and many of their properties, and they have been 
retained in the ontology of biology in spite of radical changes in biological theories. 
One related implication of RER is that we may sometimes be more warranted in believing 
in the reality of entities and properties in the life sciences than in the reality of fundamental
physical entities or properties (see also Eronen 2015). For example, when compared to the 
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neuron, there are relatively few independent ways of measuring, detecting or producing the
up quark. Same applies to the recently detected Higgs boson, and for various other 
elementary particles. In light of the biological examples above, it could turn out that the 
strongest case studies for scientific realism are not found in physics, as usually has been 
assumed, but rather in the life sciences. This of course would not mean that these entities 
and properties of the life sciences are more fundamental than physical entities or 
properties, but simply that we have more robust evidence for them, and consequently our 
degree of confidence in their reality is somewhat higher. 
As a final remark, it is also possible that ontic structural realism (in the vein of Ladyman 
and Ross 2007) and RER turn out to be compatible. Ontic structural realism could be seen 
as a framework for understanding realism in theoretical physics, and for spelling out the 
metaphysical relationship between special science properties and fundamental physics, 
while RER could be taken as an account of the science-based ontological commitments in 
the special sciences. This issue is a topic for future research; in this paper, I hope to have 
shown that RER is a plausible and defensible form of realism for the life sciences. 
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Abstract 
The more common scheme to explain the classical limit of quantum mechanics includes 
decoherence, which removes from the state the interference terms classically inadmissible 
since embodying non-Booleanity. In this work we consider the classical limit from a logical 
viewpoint, as a quantum-to-Boolean transition. The aim is to open the door to a new study 
based on dynamical logics, that is, logics that change over time. In particular, we appeal to the 
notion of hybrid logics to describe semiclassical systems. Moreover, we consider systems with 
many characteristic decoherence times, whose sublattices of properties become distributive at 
different times. 
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1. Introduction 
In the foundations of physics, the quest of explaining how the laws of classical mechanics 
arise from the laws of quantum mechanics is known as the classical limit problem (Cohen 
1989). Generally, this limit is studied for systems that, due to its interaction with the 
environment, develop a process known as quantum decoherence (Schlosshauer 2007). The 
mathematical description of this phenomenon is usually based on the Schrödinger picture, in 
which states evolve in time, while observables are taken as constants of motion. Then, 
projection operators representing physical properties do not evolve in time either. As a result, 
the structure of the lattice of quantum properties remains the same for all time: the quantum 
logic associated to the system does not change (Bub 1997). 
In this work, we will argue that the description of the lattice of properties in terms of the 
Schrödinger picture is inadequate for systems undergoing a decoherence process (and thus, it 
is not useful to describe the logical classical limit). We will show that, if the physics of the 
process represents a transition between quantum to classical mechanics, its logical counterpart 
should undergo an equivalent transition. Thus, we will propose to study the algebra of the 
lattice of properties from the perspective of the Heisenberg picture, in which operators 
representing observables, and their respective projection operators representing physical 
properties, evolve in time.  
From this perspective, we will introduce a novel feature of the classical limit. The study 
of the time evolution of the projection operators associated to quantum properties in 
decohering systems opens the way to considering the time evolution of the whole lattice of 
properties. On this basis, we will study the classical limit from a logical point of view, by 
describing the manner in which the logical structure of properties associated to observables 
acquires Boolean features. In other words: we will look for a limit between quantum logic and 
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Boolean logic and, in this conceptual framework, we will discuss some examples and future 
perspectives. 
 
2. Observables and Quantum Decoherence 
The classical limit problem is usually addressed in terms of the theory of environment induced 
decoherence (EID). This program was developed by the group led by Wojciech Zurek (1982, 
1991, 2003), currently at Los Alamos laboratory. According to the Schrödinger picture, a 
closed quantum system U, represented by a state ˆ ( )U t , evolves in time unitarily if no 
measurements are performed. The system U is partitioned into the system of interest S, 
represented by the state  ˆ ˆ( ) Tr ( )S E Ut t   , and the relevant rest of the world, which is 
interpreted as the environment E, represented by the state  ˆ ˆ( ) Tr ( )E S Ut t   . The EID 
approach to decoherence is based on the study of the effects due to the interaction between the 
quantum system S, considered as an open system, and its environment E. While U evolves in a 
unitary way, in some typical examples the subsystems may undergo a non-unitary evolution. 
This allows that, under certain conditions, the state ˆ ( )S t  becomes diagonal after a 
characteristic decoherence time Dt . In that case, some authors interpret this process as the 
essence of the classical limit of S.  
In the framework of the EID approach, quantum decoherence is conceptualized from the 
point of view of the Schrödinger picture: the phenomenon of decoherence is given in terms of 
the state evolution. In this representation, the observables associated to the system do not 
evolve in time. Thus, the commutator between two observables 1Oˆ  and 2Oˆ  stands unchanged 
during the process. However, decoherence can also be approached to from the viewpoint of 
the observables of the system. 
As it is well known, from the point of view of the properties of the system, the fact that 
the commutator between two observables vanishes ( 1 2ˆ ˆ, 0O O    ) indicates that those 
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observables are compatible: the corresponding properties can be measured simultaneously. If, 
on the contrary, the commutator is not zero, 1 2ˆ ˆ, 0O O    , the observables are compatible and 
the simultaneous measurement of the corresponding properties is not possible. The 
Schrödinger representation imposes that, if two observables are incompatible at the beginning 
of the process of decoherence ( 0t  ), then, they will remain incompatible during the entire 
process, up to its end ( Dt t ). This fact should call the attention of those who wish to interpret 
the diagonal state ˆ ( )S t  as a classical state, since in a classical system there are no 
incompatible observables. Thus, the diagonalization of the reduced state is not sufficient to 
describe the quantum-to-classical transition of the system. 
In the history of decoherence, alternative approaches have been proposed in order to 
deal with certain problems of EID, in particular, difficulties related to the study of closed 
systems (Diósi 1987; Milburn 1991; Casati and Chirikov 1995; Polarski and Starobinsky 
1996; Adler 2004; Kiefer and Polarski 2009). Among them, we are interested in the self-
induced decoherence approach, developed from the physical and philosophical point of view 
in several papers (Castagnino and Lombardi 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007; Castagnino 2004; 
Castagnino and Ordóñez 2004; Lombardi and Castagnino 2008; Castagnino and Fortin 2011a). 
According to the SID approach, a closed quantum system with continuous spectrum may 
undergo decoherence due to destructive interference, thus reaching a final state that can be 
interpreted as classical. The central point of this proposal consists in a shift in the perspective: 
instead of splitting the closed quantum system into “open system” and “environment”, the 
division is traced between relevant and irrelevant observables. This mechanism allows us to 
analyze the time evolution of the mean value of the observables: the vanishing of the 
interference terms is interpreted as the result of a process of decoherence, which leads to the 
classical limit. 
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At this point, it is important to remark that, by means of the commutator between two 
observables 1Oˆ  and 2Oˆ , it is possible to build a new operator 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ,C i O O     (Fortin and Vanni 
2014). We will interpret this observable as measuring the degree of compatibility between 1Oˆ  
and 2Oˆ : if ˆ 0C  , the observables are compatible; if ˆ 0C  , they are not. According to 
quantum mechanics, a closed system evolves unitarily following the Schrödinger equation; 
since the evolution is unitary, it is impossible that it leads to the following process:  
ˆ ˆ0 0C C    
In a recent article it has been proved that SID can produce a process of this type in the case of 
systems with continuous energy spectrum (Fortin and Vanni 2014). Given the incompatible 
observables 1Oˆ  with core 1( , )O    and 2Oˆ  with core 2 ( , )O   , both with continuous spectrum, 
we can compute the commutator Cˆ  as follows: 
   '1 2 2 1 , '
0 0 0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( , ) ( , ') ( , ) ( , ') 'i tC t i O O O O d e E d d
  

                 
where  , 'Eˆ   is the energy basis of the space of operators. If 1( , )O    and 2 ( , )O    are 
regular functions, then, by appealing to the Riemann-Lebesgue theorem, it is possible to prove 
that (see Castagnino and Fortin 2011b) 
ˆ ˆif ( 0) 0 lim ( ) 0
t
C t C t     
That is, the observable that measures the incompatibility between two observables goes to zero 
from the observational point of view. This shows that, since the SID approach describes 
decoherence from the point of view of the mean value of any observable, it turns out to be 
useful to study the quantum-to-classical transition of Cˆ  (see Fortin and Vanni 2014). As a 
concrete example, in a Mach-Zender interferometer, if 1Oˆ  is the observable that measures 
which is the path taken by the photon, and 2Oˆ  is the observable associated to the visibility of 
interference, then, Cˆ  can be conceived as the tool to measure how compatible those 
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observables are. In the lab, there are different observables associated with the degree of 
classicality; for example, the contrast of the interference fringes in the double slit experiment. 
When the experiment is performed and decoherence occurs, it is reasonable to expect that at 
the beginning ˆ 0C  , but then, after the decoherence time, the system reaches the classical 
limit with ˆ 0C  . And it is also expected that, in that limit, the interference fringes will 
accordingly vanish. Moreover, in an experiment with slow and controlled decoherence, it 
could be possible to measure the evolution of the observable Cˆ . 
EID and SID are not the only ways to account for non-unitary evolutions. A strategy to 
transform the unitary evolution of a closed system into a non-unitary evolution has been 
proposed in the cosmological context. Kiefer and Polarski (2009) adopted the Heisenberg 
picture for the study of the decoherence process of the universe. According to this perspective, 
the state ˆ  stands constant while the observables ˆ ( )O t  change in time. In this way, the 
observable associated to the commutator of two observables becomes a function of time, ˆ ( )C t . 
This approach allows us to study the commutator of two observables for cosmological 
problems. In particular, according to the inflation model, there was an accelerated phase of the 
early universe called inflation; the whole structure of the universe can be traced back to the 
primordial fluctuations in the inflaton field (Kolb and Turner 1990; Mukahnov 2005; Peacock 
1990). Because of the expansion of the universe, inflaton fluctuations must be described by a 
time-dependent Hamiltonian: 
   3 † † † †1 'ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 aH dk k a k a k a k a k i a k a k a k a ka             
where   is the conformal time, ˆ( )a k , †ˆ ( )a k  are the annihilation operator and the creator 
operator respectively, and a  is the scale factor of the universe. These three last elements are 
time dependent, and this is the reason why the Hamiltonian ˆ ( )H   is not constant in time. 
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Under these conditions, it is possible to compute the commutator between the operators of 
position ˆ( )y   and momentum ˆ ( )p   (see Kiefer and Polarski 2009): 
   ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(0), (0) 0 lim ( ), ( ) 0y p y p      
In other words, the evolution of the commutator between the operators of position and 
momentum shows that, under certain conditions, it vanishes for times longer than the 
decoherence time. 
Finally, it is important to mention that the approach to decoherence based in non-
Hermitian Hamiltonians was also applied to the study of the time evolution of the 
commutators (Fortin, Holik and Vanni 2016). 
 
3. The Logical Perspective 
As it is well known, any physical observable of a quantum system can be represented in a 
mathematical way as a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert space (Ballentine 1990). The spectral 
theorem states that any self-adjoint operator Aˆ  can be represented by its projective measure 
(...)AM  (Reed and Simon 1972; Rèdei 1998; Lacki 2000). A projective measure assigns a 
projection operator to each Borel set of the real line: given the interval ( , )I a b , ( )AM I  is a 
projection operator. This mathematical fact was interpreted by Birkhoff and von Neumann 
(1936) as follows. The projector ( )AM I  represents the empirical proposition: “the value of the 
observable represented by Aˆ  lies in the interval I ”. The truth value of this proposition can be 
obtained experimentally by means of a yes-no test: that truth value can be tested in any 
particular run of the experiment, and the quantum state assigns a probability to it.  
These formal aspects of quantum theory constitute the elemental bricks out of which the 
entire building of its rigorous formulation is erected; this task was achieved by von Neumann 
(1932) in his famous Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Importantly enough, 
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the same kind of analysis can be performed for classical probabilistic theories, and further 
research showed that this approach can be extended to quantum field theory and quantum 
statistical mechanics. The algebraic structure of the quantum mechanical propositions was 
called quantum logic after the famous paper by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936). As it is 
well known, those propositions can be endowed with an orthomodular lattice structure 
(Kalmbach 1983). Additionally, a solid axiomatic foundation for quantum mechanics can be 
used to explain in an operational way many important features of the Hilbert space formalism 
(Varadarajan 1968; Stubbe and Van Steirteghem 2007; see also Holik et al. 2013, 2014, 2015 
for more recent developments, and for the relationship between the quantum-logical approach 
and quantum probability theory). But the feature relevant to our discussion is that the logic 
associated to all varieties of quantum theories is not Boolean, due to the fact that it is not 
distributive. This implies a very deep structural difference between classical and quantum 
theories. 
Quantum states are, in its formal essence, measures that assign probabilities to all the 
different empirical propositions. For example, if we want to know the probability of observing 
the value of the observable Aˆ  in the interval I , given that the system is prepared in the state 
ˆ , the Born rule states that this quantity is given by  ( )ATr M I
.
. According to the traditional 
Schrödinger picture, unitary evolutions induce time transformations between states. But, 
according to the Heisenberg picture, observables are transformed, and this transformation 
induces an action on their respective spectral measures. This in turn implies that the actual 
properties (i.e., those involved in propositions whose truth is endowed with probability equal 
to one) also evolve in time. In other words, unitary time evolutions are represented by 
automorphisms on the quantum logic (they are just “rotations” in the projective geometry of 
the Hilbert space). More general evolutions (such as the non-unitary evolutions associated to 
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measurements or to decoherence processes) are represented by Kraus operators, and also 
induce concomitant maps on the quantum logic. 
But although all possible kinds of time evolutions can be described in the rigorous 
approach to quantum theory, decoherence poses a conceptual problem in the following sense. 
Let us suppose that we start with a system that is completely quantum, with its associated 
orthomodular lattice of projection operators. If the system undergoes a classical limit process, 
the lattice associated to the final stage should be classical (i.e., Boolean). Therefore, if we 
want to describe faithfully the classical limit, we should have at hand a time ordered family of 
logics, starting from a quantum one, and ending up with a classical one. This is the problem 
that we are going to address in the next section. Transitions between logics were studied (see, 
for example, Aerts et al. 1993), but not in relation to decoherence and the classical limit. In the 
present work, we are interested in the philosophical implications of assuming a non-unitary 
time evolution to induce a continuous family of logics to describe the process of the classical 
limit. As we will see, this perspective leads to a better understanding of this physical process, 
and is also useful to cope with hybrid systems. 
 
4. The Classical Limit from the Logical Point of View 
In order to be able to describe the classical limit from a logical point of view, let us consider a 
quantum system that evolves in a non-unitary way, and a set of relevant observables 
represented by self-adjoint operators,  1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,..., NO O O O O . Let us also consider the algebra 
(0)V
 generated by O  at time 0t  . We also assume that some of the observables of O are 
incompatible: for some i and j, we initially have ˆ ˆ, 0i jO O    . In a system with these features, 
the condition for the classical limit according to the Heisenberg picture is given by the 
following evolution: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
, , (0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ) 0i j i D j Di j O O O t O t           
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As time passes, the evolving operators generate a family of algebras ( )V t . The final algebra, 
( )DV t  is a Boolean algebra since, if the classical limit is reached successfully, the final set of 
generating operators will be a set of pairwise commutative operators. That is: initially 
incompatible observables become compatible after the decoherence time. The algebras ( )V t  
have associated orthomodular lattices ( )V tL : the classical limit is expressed by the fact that, 
while (0)VL  is a non-distributive lattice of projectors, ( )DV tL  is a Boolean one. In this way, we 
obtain an adequate description of the logical evolution of a quantum system. 
 
4.1 Semiclassical systems from the logical point of view. 
The condition that imposes that all observables of the system must be commutative is 
equivalent to that of the diagonalization of the state operator, and it is necessary in the case of 
quantum systems that become completely classical. Notwithstanding, if this condition is 
strictly applied to any case of classical limit, it leaves no room for the description of the 
majority of everyday systems, some of which of great importance, such as transistors or squids 
(Clarke and Braginski 2004). As an example, let us suppose that we go to an electronics store 
to buy a transistor. The salesman will first find its location in the shelves, and then will take it 
with his hand in order to put it in a bag and, finally, to give it to us. From this point of view 
and for all practical purposes, the transistor behaves classically: it is an object that can be 
located in space an time, and can be manipulated by classical means. However, when 
connected to a circuit, well-known quantum effects of our interest take place on it; for 
example, consider the tunnel effect of the electrons inside it. This means that a transistor is an 
object such that some of its observables behave classically, while some others behave in a 
quantum way: physicists refer to objects of this kind as semiclassical.  
Our approach of the classical limit allows us to account for these cases. In the 
semiclassical situation, instead of the above strong condition, the condition turns out to be: 
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
, , (0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ) 0i j i D j Di j O O O t O t           
In other words, there are some observables that begin as incompatible and become compatible 
through the evolution. But there may be also observables that are incompatible at the 
beginning, and remain incompatible after the decoherence time. From a logical viewpoint, this 
implies that the lattices of properties associated to this kind of systems are hybrid lattices.  
The focus on hybrid lattices is of particular importance, because it is reasonable to 
suppose that, if successfully developed, quantum computers will be semiclassical systems in 
their very nature, represented by hybrid lattices. This is manifested by the fact that some 
relevant quantum algorithms possess classical and quantum elements in the process of 
computation (see, for example, Shor 1997). Thus, a hybrid logic might be useful not only to 
describe the logical architecture of a quantum computer in a conceptual way, but also to cope 
with the problems related to decoherence. 
 
4.2 Transitions using many steps 
Up to this point we have considered quantum systems that become classical after a 
decoherence time Dt ; in this way, we explained the transition from a quantum logic to a 
Boolean logic. But we have not explored in detail the intermediate steps of this transition. One 
way to do this is to consider systems with several characteristic times.  
There are a number of examples of physical systems that reach the classical limit in 
several stages. From the point of view of the state operator, this means that its different non-
diagonal components vanish at different characteristic times (Fortin, Holik and Vanni 2016). 
A concrete example of such a system is that of a harmonic oscillator embedded in a bath of 
oscillators (Castagnino and Fortin 2012). In this case, the compatibility condition between 
different observables is fulfilled at different times as follows: 
 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1309-
 
       1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ) 0O O O t O t           
       1 3 1 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ) 0O O O t O t           
             … 
                           
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
, , (0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ) 0i j i D j Di j O O O t O t           
To put it into words: among all the observables that are incompatible at the beginning of the 
process, some become compatible at time t , others become compatible at time t , and so on. 
If the classical limit is reached, at the end of the process all the observables will commute with 
each other. In the logical language of lattices introduced above, this many-step process can be 
described by stating that the different parts of the evolving lattice will become distributive at 
different times. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Since the very beginnings of quantum mechanics, many attempts have been made to recover 
the laws of classical physics from quantum mechanics through a classical limiting process. 
This classical limit must do the job of turning a quantum system described by a quantum 
logic at 0t   into a classical system described by a Boolean logic at the end of the limiting 
process, at Dt  in the case of decoherence. The dynamical characteristics of the quantum-to-
classical transition were extensively studied in the physical literature. However, from a logical 
perspective, the quantum-to-Boolean transition was usually merely understood as a jump from 
a quantum logic at 0t 
 
to a Boolean one at Dt . Accordingly, researchers did not pay 
attention to the logical structures associated to the system in times belonging to the interval 
 0, Dt . As an example of this non-trivial logical structure, we presented physical systems with 
different characteristic times, which, as a consequence, reach the classical limit in many steps. 
This shows that the study of the logical features of intermediate times in a quantum-to-
classical limiting process may exhibit a rich and non-trivial dynamical structure. 
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In this work, we described the decoherence process by appealing to the Heisenberg’s 
picture. We argued that it is the proper framework for studying the quantum-to-Boolean 
transition. With this useful tool, we analyzed the transition in three different cases: (i) logical 
classical limit in systems with one characteristic time; (ii) systems that change from a quantum 
logic to a hybrid semiclassical logic; and (iii) systems with many characteristic decoherence 
times, whose sublattices become distributive at different times. The description of the classical 
limit presented in this short work does not claim to be exhaustive or complete. But it intends to 
be the kickoff for the study of a largely unexplored area of the logical structure of quantum 
systems. Studies of this kind might be of great help in the understanding of the new 
technologies associated to quantum computers (which involve hybrid logics) and to general 
quantum information processing tasks. 
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Abstract
Experiments demonstrating entanglement swapping have been alleged to
challenge realism about entanglement. Seevinck (2006) claims that entangle-
ment “cannot be considered ontologically robust” while Healey (2012) claims
that entanglement swapping “undermines the idea that ascribing an entangled
state to quantum systems is a way of representing some new, non-classical,
physical relation between them.” My aim in this paper is to show that realism
is not threatened by the possibility of entanglement swapping, but rather, it
should be informed by the phenomenon. I argue—expanding the argument
of Timpson and Brown (2010)—that ordinary entanglement swapping cases
present no new challenges for the realist. With respect to the delayed-choice
variant discussed by Healey, I claim that there are two options available to the
realist: (a) deny these are cases of genuine swapping (following Egg (2013))
or (b) allow for existence of entanglement between timelike separated regions.
This latter option, while radical, is not incoherent and has been suggested in
quite different contexts. While I stop short of claiming that the realist must
take this option, doing so allows one to avoid certain costs associated with
Egg’s “orthodox” account. I conclude by noting several important implication
of entanglement swapping for how one thinks of entanglement generally.
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Swapping Something Real
April 6, 2016
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of quantum entanglement has been taken to have broad
metaphysical implications.1 Such implications presuppose a broadly realist
view of entanglement, one that recognizes a genuine physical relation between
the subsystems that compose an entangled system. This entanglement relation,
in turn, is used to explain the sorts of non-local correlations found in the
measurement results of EPR-B2 and related experiments. These correlations
are “non-local” in that they hold between distant measurement events that
occur at the same time—i.e., at spacelike separation.
Recent experiments involving “entanglement swapping,” threaten to com-
plicate our typical understanding of entanglement. Some have even suggested
that these experiments threaten to undermine the realist position altogether.
Below I will argue that this isn’t the case. However, entanglement swapping
is not without important implications for the realist. Indeed, I claim that
delayed-choice entanglement swapping gives us reason to consider extending
1Ladyman and Ross claim that “entanglement as described by QM teaches us that Humean
supervenience is false, and that all the properties of fundamental physics seem to be extrinsic
to individual objects” (2007, 151). A similar claim is made by Esfeld (2004), who claims that
entanglement recommends a “metaphysics of relations.” Quantum entanglement also pays a critical
role in Schaffer’s (2010) defense of monism, the view that there is ultimately only one object: the
entire universe.
2I use “EPR-B” to refer to variations of the experimental arrangement due to Einstein et al.
(1935) and extended by Bohm (1951). The variations most relevant in what follows will be those
involving photon pairs with entangled polarizations.
2
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entanglement into the temporal dimension. By allowing for timelike entangle-
ment, the realist is able provide a unified account of a variety of experimental
results. Even if one rejects this radical suggestion, ordinary cases of entangle-
ment swapping alone require revising widely-held views about the nature of
entanglement.
2 Preliminaries
Quantum theory doesn’t wear its metaphysics on its sleeve. Different inter-
pretations of quantum theory radically diverge on what (if anything) it tells
us about the world. Accordingly, it is impossible to undertake our investi-
gation without making some interpretative assumptions. That said, many of
the issues here cross-cut interpretations and I hope to remain as neutral as
possible between the various realist interpretations. I begin with the orthodox
view of how entanglement arises in the formalism of (ordinary, non-relativistic)
quantum mechanics.
2.1 Nonseperable quantum states
Quantum mechanics allows for nonseparable quantum states. To keep matters
as simple as possible, consider two particles, 1 and 2, each of which can be as-
signed a pure quantum state. The standard approach represents the quantum
state of each particle with a vector (ray) |ψ〉 in a Hilbert space H. The quan-
tum states of two systems 1,2, then, correspond to vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉 in Hilbert
spaces H1,H2, respectively. The joint state of the system they compose is rep-
resented by the vector |Ψ〉 in the tensor product Hilbert space H12 = H1⊗H2.
If the state vector |Ψ〉 in H12 can be expressed as a product of vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉
in Hilbert spaces H1,H2, then |Ψ〉 is separable. But, in general, a vector in H12
cannot be expressed in the form |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉, with |ψ〉 ∈ H1 and |φ〉 ∈ H2.
Such states are called nonseparable quantum states.
On the standard view, entanglement occurs when distinct physical systems
are attributed nonseparable quantum states. Thus, if two photons 1,2 are
prepared in the nonseperable joint polarization state |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉−|V H〉),
3
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they (or their quantum states) are mutually entangled. While this standard
view of entanglement has been criticized (Ghirardi et al. 2002; Ladyman et al.
2013), all of the cases considered below will count as entangled on any suitable
definition. Accordingly, I will bracket worries about the precise formulation
of entanglement in the quantum formalism and simply assume the standard
account for ease of exposition.
2.2 Entanglement realism
In order to say more about entangled systems, we must go beyond the formal-
ism of quantum theory. What is the significance of ascribing entangled states
to a set of physical systems?
In what follows, I will be concerned with views that accord the quantum
state a descriptive role. Thus, when we attribute entangled states to compos-
ite systems, that tells us something about the relation between the physical
subsystems in question. I will aim to remain as neutral as possible about the
nature of this relation. The following are two possible views about the nature
of this relation:
Action at a Distance: On this view, distant entangled subsystems are ca-
pable of having an immediate and unmediated causal influence on each
other.
Ontological Holism: On this view, a compound entangled system is viewed
as a nonseparable whole, which is irreducible to the subsystems it com-
prises.
Other variations of these views are possible as well. Some maintain that
entangled systems are connected by a new non-supervenient relation while
others speak of non-local influence that fails to be genuinely causal. It is not my
aim here to adopt any particular approach to the metaphysics of entanglement.
Rather, what will be at issue is the following thesis:
Entanglement Realism: Entangled systems bear a genuine physical rela-
tion to one another—one that is constitutive of their mutual entangle-
ment.
4
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Entanglement realism cross-cuts interpretations of quantum theory. Broadly
“anti-realist” interpretations such as instrumentalism and other epistemic views
will deny the thesis, but so will some characteristically “realist” views as well.
First, consider an instrumentalist that views the quantum state epistemically.
On this view, the assignment of a non-separable quantum state is a way of
summarizing our information about the system. While ascribing such a quan-
tum state allows us to predict non-local correlations, this view stops short of
recognizing a physical entanglement relation between the particles themselves
(if there are such things). Second, consider a Bohmian who takes the motion
of particles to be fundamental and understands the wavefunction as a law-like
feature of how particles move. On such a view, an entangled quantum state
does not support the existence of a new physical relation between particles,
but only describes/guides the motion of the particles so as to generate non-
local correlations. There is not space to discuss all possible interpretations
of quantum theory and their relation to entanglement realism, nor is this the
appropriate place to debate the merits of the view. Instead, I’ll conclude this
section with two remarks intended to clarify the position.
First, whether an interpretation endorses entanglement realism depends
solely on whether there is a physical relation R that can be attributed to
a compound physical system in virtue of it being ascribed a nonseparable
quantum state; being a “realist” interpretation isn’t sufficient (though it may
be necessary). Second, as with other forms of realism, the primary motivation
for entanglement realism is explanatory. However the entanglement relation is
understood, it should enable robust explanations of non-local correlations in
measurement results. Relatedly, views the deny entanglement realism do so at
the potential cost of being unable to adequately explain non-local correlations.
Thus, there is at least some reason (ceteris paribus) to prefer interpretations
of quantum theory that countenance entanglement realism.
3 Entanglement swapping
The experiments that motivate entanglement across time make use of the
technique of entanglement swapping. Entanglement swapping is a relatively
5
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recent phenomena, and as a result has received relatively little consideration
by philosophers. A simple experimental arrangement is depicted below (fig-
ure 1). Consider two sources that each produce a pair of photons in the state
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉). One source produces the entangled pair (1,2) and
the other produces (3,4). Initially, the quantum state of the four-particle sys-
tem is simply the product of two pair states |Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉12⊗|ψ−〉34. This state
is separable into the states |ψ−〉12 and |ψ−〉34, each of which is an entangled
two-photon state. Accordingly, entanglement realist would initially recognize
two distinct entanglement relations—R12 and R34—but no such relations be-
tween the pairs or between photons from different pairs.
Figure 1: Entanglement Swapping Configuration
The outermost particles are sent off to polarization detectors at Alice and
Bob. The inner particles are sent to a common location, Victor, which contains
a switchable Bell-state analyzer. When switched on, a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) is performed, which has the effect of projecting the indent particles into
6
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one of the four entangled Bell-states.3 Otherwise, a separate state measure-
ment (SSM) is performed. If the analyzer is off and the particles are measured
separately, then, as expected, correlations are found between (1,2)and (3,4) as
in an ordinary EPR-B experiment.
If the analyzer is on, however, particles 2 and 3 are projected into one of
the entangled Bell-states and, as a result, the remaining particles 1 and 4 are
projected into an entangled Bell-state as well. This can be seen by writing the
initial four-particle state in the basis given by the Bell-states of (1,4):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉14|ψ+〉23 − |ψ−〉14|ψ−〉23 − |φ+〉14|φ+〉23 − |φ−〉14|φ−〉23]. (1)
Given this expression of |Ψ〉, we can see that if a BSM is performed at
Victor with the result |ψ+〉23, then the remaining particles are projected into
the state |ψ+〉14, and similarly for the other Bell states. Crucially, regardless
of the outcome of the BSM at Victor, photons 1 and 4 become entangled as a
result. This is the case despite the fact that they have never interacted.
At least some have taken this case to problematize entanglement realism:
that one cannot think of entanglement as a property [which] has
some ontological robustness can already be seen using the follow-
ing weaker requirement: anything which is ontologically robust can,
without interaction, not be mixed away, nor swapped to another
object, nor flowed irretrievably away into some environment. Pre-
cisely these features are possible in the case of entanglement and
thus even the weaker requirement for ontological robustness does
not hold. (Seevinck 2006, 1582)
The intuition underlying this challenge is that something real would re-
quire a genuine “interaction” to be altered, but entanglement swapping allows
us to move the entanglement around without such an interaction. But is it
3For polarization measured along the H/V axis these are:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|V 〉 ± |V 〉|H〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|H〉 ± |V 〉|V 〉].
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really the case that there is no interaction responsible for the swapping? After
all, particles 2 and 3 are directly affected by the BSM performed at Victor.
However, nothing is done directly to the remaining particles 1 and 4, and it is
these that become entangled, so perhaps there is something amiss. Indeed, it is
puzzling how exactly 1 and 4 become entangled remotely and instantaneously,
but this is simply the original problem of entanglement in another form.
According to the realist who posits non-local influence, the ordinary EPR
case is already one in which the measurement of a spacelike separated sys-
tem affects the properties of a system entangled with it. If, however, we have
some way of understanding such influence in terms of a physical entanglement
relation, then presumably that relation can do the necessary work needed to
account for entanglement swapping. In the case of a SSM at Victor, measure-
ments of 1 and 4 will display correlations with the results obtained at Victor.
In the case of a BSM, there are not simple correlations between the measure-
ment at Victor and those at Alice and Bob, but rather, a more complex pattern
of relations best accounted for by attributing an entangled Bell-state to the
joint (1,4) system.
Timpson and Brown (2010) agree that entanglement swapping fails to pro-
vide a convincing case against entanglement realism. They suggest an analogy
with gravity in Newtonian physics to illustrate:
We do not think that the relative distance between two planets in
Newtonian physics is not a genuine feature of reality because of the
action-at-a-distance of the gravitational interaction. (Timpson and
Brown 2010, 317)
I take the suggestion to be the following. Just as the Newtonian might seek
to explain a pattern in the motion of two planets by appeal to a pattern in
the motion of two other planets connected to them by an instantaneous grav-
itational influence, entanglement relations could provide a similar connection
between the pairs of particles between which entanglement is swapped. Note,
however, that adopting such a view requires a somewhat broader understand-
ing of action at a distance than is ordinary supposed. Standard formulations
focus on the intrinsic properties of systems. For instance, in his Stanford
8
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Encyclopedia article on the topic, Berkovitz defines action at a distance as:
a phenomenon in which a change in intrinsic properties of one sys-
tem induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a distant system
without there being a process that carries this influence contigu-
ously in space and time. (Berkovitz 2016).4
To account for entanglement swapping in the manner above, the proponent
of action at a distance must allow that the relational properties of particles
(i.e., their entanglement relations) can influence the relational properties of
the particles with which they are entangled.
How significant of a revision is this? One could claim, along holist lines,
that entanglement is an intrinsic property of the compound system, in which
case the ordinary version of action at a distance perhaps could be preserved. At
least on the “orthodox” understanding of quantum mechanics, however, there
is no clear basis for attributing an intrinsic property to a bipartite system on
the basis of entanglement between its constituents. The extension from intrin-
sic properties to relations is certainly in keeping with the spirit of action at a
distance, as the analogy with Newtonian gravity suggests, but it is a significant
change none the less. Entanglement must now be understood as capable of
spreading new entanglement relations, which is no doubt an interesting result.
Similar revisions are required for the holist to account for entanglement
swapping. When the photons are created there are two pairs of mutually
entangled particles. Hence, the holist would recognize (fundamentally) two
two-photon wholes, (1,2) and (3,4), that are spreading out spatially with time.
Victor’s measurement is performed on both wholes and immediately alters
both. If a SSM is performed, each two-photon system dissolves leaving photons
1 and 4 to be detected later. If a BSM is performed, again each two-photon
system is changed, but in a way that the new wholes (2,3) and (1,4) are
formed. Thus, the holist must allow that certain measurements are capable of
generating new wholes out the parts of the original ones. Again this is does
seem to mark an important revision in the view, but not one that creates any
4This is the broader of two definitions given by Berkovitz, both of which contain a reference to
intrinsic properties.
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obvious problems.
Before moving to the next section, it is worth noting that entanglement
swapping is not a mere philosophical curiosity, but is part of an active research
program in physics with numerous practical applications, including: construct-
ing a quantum telephone exchange, speeding up the distribution of entangle-
ment, correcting errors in Bell states, preparing entangled states of a higher
number of particles, and secret sharing of classical information (Bouwmeester
et al. 2000). This makes its dismissal or reinterpretation difficult to motivate
from a realist perspective. A key tenant in realist thinking recommends endors-
ing those parts of scientific theory that facilitate predictive and technological
successes such as these.
4 Delayed-choice entanglement swapping
The revision to our understanding of entanglement required by entanglement
swapping cases like that depicted in figure 1 is consistent with the central ideas
of action at a distance or ontological holism. Entanglement swapping with
delayed-choice, by contrast, threatens to undermine such notions completely.
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces
the lesson that quantum states are neither descriptions nor rep-
resentations of physical reality. In particular, it undermines the
idea that ascribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way
of representing some new, non-classical, physical relation between
them. (Healey 2012, 31)
The idea of delayed-choice entanglement swapping was first proposed by
Peres (2000). We begin with two entangled systems as in the ordinary case,
but rather than have Victor preform his measurement prior to Alice and Bob,
we delay particles 2 and 3 so that Victor can perform his measurement after
his colleagues. Because the explanation of the collapse of equation 1 into
entangled Bell-states of (2,3) and (1,4) didn’t specify any times, quantum
mechanics suggests that the same results would obtain. In particular, when
10
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Victor successfully performs a BSM, entanglement will be swapped to 1 and
4.
And, in fact, these results seem to have been confirmed by an experiment
conducted by Ma et al. (2012) depicted below (Figure 2). We begin as be-
fore: two pairs of entangled photons (1,2) and (3,4) are produced by two EPR
sources in the state |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34. At this point the photons 1 and 2 are
mutually entangled, as are 3 and 4, but the 4-particle state is separable, and
hence there is no entanglement across the two pairs. Alice and Bob each per-
form a polarization measurement of their photon (1 and 4, respectively) along
one of three freely-chosen axes (|H〉/|V 〉, |R〉/|L〉, |+〉/|−〉) and the data from
these measurements are saved for later analysis. Particles 2 and 3, meanwhile,
enter an optical delay, and only reach Victor at time MV , nearly 500ns after
MA and MB, the times at which Alice and Bob perform their measurements.
As before, Victor “chooses” between performing a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) or separate state measurement (SSM) on (2,3). In the actual exper-
iment, the switchable Bell-state analyzer was linked to a quantum random
number generator which determined the measurement (BSM or SSM) to be
performed. The photons 2 and 3 are projected into either an entangled state
(|φ+〉23 or |φ−〉23) if BSM is performed or a separable state in the case of SSM.
When Victor’s results are compared with those of Alice and Bob, they are
found to be consistent with ascribing an entangled state to photons 1 and 4
(|φ+〉14 or |φ−〉14) when BSM is performed and a separable state otherwise.
Thus, it seems that entanglement has been swapped to particles (1,4) after
they have already been detected (at MV )!
This is puzzling to the entanglement realist. It seems that Victor’s later
measurement has an effect on the earlier state of particles 1 and 4. This is
would seem to saddle the realist with a commitment to backward causation,
which many would find beyond the pale. Indeed, the authors themselves seem
to take the experiment to show the inadequacy of the realist approach.
If one views the quantum state as a real physical object, one could
get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future actions appear
as having an influence on past and already irrevocably recorded
11
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Figure 2: Delayed-choice entanglement swapping arrangement of Ma et al. (2012)
events. However, there is never a paradox if the quantum state is
viewed as to be no more than a “catalogue of our knowledge.” (Ma
et al. 2012, 483)
The committed realist must either deny that entanglement can be swapped
from (2,3) to (1,4) in this case, or else provide some account of how it can
occur. If one seeks to give the same explanation as in the case of entanglement
swapping without delayed-choice, then they must allow that entanglement can
obtain between (1,2) and (3,4) at the time of Victor’s measurement. Of course,
1 and 4 do not exist at the time of Victor’s measurement, so the entanglement
relation must obtain between events at different times. We will return to this
12
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idea below, but first, it’s worth considering a way the realist may avoid this
consequence.
4.1 Avoidance maneuvers
Matthias Egg (2013) offers a reply on behalf of the entanglement realist. He
urges that to describe the foregoing as a genuine case of entanglement swapping
is to beg the question against the realist. According to Egg’s realist, the parti-
cles (1,4) are either entangled or not at the time of their detection (MA,MB),
and later measurements cannot change this fact. In the case of entanglement
swapping without delayed-choice, entanglement has been “swapped” to (1,4)
as their quantum state has changed to become non-separable as a result of the
measurement taken at Victor. Yet, according to Egg, the quantum state of
(1,4) was separable when measured (MA,MB) in Ma’s experiment and hence
there was never a physical entanglement relation between (1,4) regardless of
which later measurement Victor performs on (2,3).
So what should we make of the experimental evidence in favor of entangle-
ment swapping to (1,4) after their detection?
The Bell measurement on the [2,3] pair allows us to sort the [1,4]
pairs into four subensembles corresponding to the four Bell states.
Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, because each
[1,4] pair really is in such a state after the [2,3] measurement. But
if the [1,4] measurements precede the [2,3] measurement, the [1,4]
pair never is in any of these states. This is entirely compatible with
the fact that evaluating the [1,4] measurements within a certain
subensemble shows Bell-type correlations. (Egg 2013, 1133)
Egg’s reply focuses on an aspect of Ma’s experiment that was omitted from
the initial presentation. Unlike a simple EPR-B experiment, the correlations in
the data recorded by Alice and Bob are only apparent once that data has been
sorted into subsets (“subsenembles”) according to the measurement performed
and results obtained by Victor. Once we sort the results obtained by Alice
and Bob in this way, we find that the subsets of data associated with Victor
performing a BSM exhibit correlations indicative of entanglement.
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Egg’s point is that these correlations only appear once we sort the results
in this manner, and such sorting needn’t have any physical significance. It’s
unsurprising that correlations of some kind can be found when we conditional-
ize on the results obtained by Victor; after all, the photons measured by Victor
were entangled with photons 1 and 4 until the latter were detected. Only when
Victor’s measurement actually causes a change in particles 1 and 4 are we jus-
tified in taking this process of sorting to have physical significance. Here we, as
realists, should not allow that Victor’s measurement has an effect on particles
1 and 4—doing so would require us to countenance backward causation—and
hence the correlations obtained after sorting should not be taken to provide
evidence for a genuine entanglement relation between particles 1 and 4.
4.1.1 Conflict with special relativity
Egg’s reply requires that the entanglement realist make an important distinc-
tion between cases in which Victor’s measurement occurs before Alice and
Bob’s measurements and those in which the time-order is reversed. Only the
former, says Egg, are cases in which (1,4) are genuinely entangled. Yet, spe-
cial relativity teaches that time-order is not an objective, frame-independent
notion. If, for example, Victor’s measurement (MV ) were spacelike separated
from Alice and Bob’s (MA,MB), then there would be no (frame-independent)
fact of the matter about the time-order of the events. This scenario is not a
mere hypothetical possibility either. In the much-publicized recent experiment
of Hensen et al. (2015), entangled photon pairs are created via entanglement
swapping from a location C that is spacelike separated from the measurement
locations A and B (see Hensen et al. 2015, fig. 1e and 2a). Given such cases
exist, adopting Egg’s response would commit the realist to the claim that there
is no (frame-independent) fact of the matter about whether the entanglement
relation obtains. This would saddle the realist with a problematic sort of
metaphysical indeterminacy.
In a footnote earlier in the paper, Egg offers the following rejoinder:
Some of the most widely discussed realistic versions of quantum
theory (e.g., Bohmian mechanics and the matter-density version of
14
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GRW) involve a commitment to a preferred foliation of spacetime. If
these proposals are reasonable, then so is the assumption that there
is a definite (although undetectable) temporal ordering between any
two events. (2013, 1130, n.7)
It is of course true that a preferred foliation of space-time would solve
the problem, and, indeed, this has been invoked in the service of some in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics, but no such foliation (or a determinate
time-ordering of spacelike separated events) is provided by our best theory of
spacetime.5 In order to take this option, the entanglement realist would be
forced to claim that special relativity must be amended or at least, supple-
mented. This is a significant cost.
4.1.2 Parity of reasoning
Even if we ignore the conflict with relativity, there is a further worry with
Egg’s proposal.
The realist who would deny the reality of entanglement between (1,4) in the
delayed-choice setup must claim that the standard argument for entanglement
realism fails in this case purely because doing so leads to the undesirable
result of backward causation. The argument for attributing entanglement in
the ordinary swapping case relies only on the four-photon state (1) and the
result obtained by Victor, without any mention of time. That same argument
applied to the delayed-choice case delivers the same result, namely, that 1 and
4 are entangled. This result is confirmed by analyzing the data obtained by
Victor, Alice, and Bob. Thus, there seems to be a tension in entanglement
realism (so construed): on the one hand, it recommends recognizing a physical
entanglement relation when it is instrumentally successful to do so, but, on the
other hand, we should not posit such a relation in this case despite meeting the
very same conditions that typically merit such an attribution. The failure to
5Of course, general relativity is our best theory of spacetime, and the situation there is more
complicated. There are several candidates for a preferred foliation in general relativity, such as
the “cosmological time” of relativistic cosmology. However, it is far from clear that any of these
candidates should be taken to provide the metaphysically privileged way of carving up spacetime.
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recognize entanglement in this case is an ad hoc measure to avoid the perceived
alternatives of antirealism or backwards causation.6
5 Entanglement across time
If we reject Egg’s attempt to reinterpret the outcome of these experiments,
we are forced to consider whether the entanglement realism is consistent with
genuine delayed-choice entanglement swapping. In particular, can the account
of ordinary entanglement swapping be extended to cover the delayed-choice
case? Because swapping is facilitated by entanglement relations, the answer
to this question will depend on one’s preferred metaphysics of entanglement.
Suppose we adopt the action at a distance view. This would seem to saddle
the realist with backward causal influence form Victor’s measurement of (2,3)
to particles 1 and 4 prior to their measurements by Alice and Bob.
But not so fast! First, we might question whether the influence is really
backward in time. It is tempting to assume that Victor’s measurement must
bring about the earlier entanglement of 1 and 4, but the dependence between
these events has a certain symmetry. Just as in the ordinary EPR-B case, it’s
hard to know which direction we should take the causal influence to go. Per-
haps we should regard the earlier entanglement of (1,4) to cause the later BSM
of (2,3). This might create worries about Victor’s free will (or the randomness
of the quantum random number generator), but these may not be decisive (see
Evans et al. 2012, §7.1). Second, we might wonder whether entanglement-
mediate influence should be understood as causal. It differs from paradigm
instances of causation in many respects, including: (a) it fails to diminish with
distance; (b) it cannot be shielded; (c) it doesn’t involve a transfer of energy
and; (d) it cannot be used to send signals. The last two conditions are of spe-
cial importance as most paradoxes associated with backward causation seem
to require them. In addition to these differences, action at distance must allow
6The sort of “instrumental success” I have in mind here is primarily the successful prediction
of correlations in measurement results. We may also recall that in cases of entanglement swapping
without delayed-choice, the attribution of an entangled state has important applications in quantum
information theory. It is not unreasonable to suppose that related applications might be found for
the attribution of an entangled state in the delayed-choice case as well.
16
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1331-
for instantaneous influence to account for standard EPR-B experiments and,
as a result, requires the rejection of the ordinary temporal asymmetry of cause
and effect.
So, the action at a distance view can be extended to the timelike case with-
out being committed to “backwards causation” by denying that either of the
terms apply. Alternatively, one may countenance limited backward causation,
but seek to downplay its significance for the reasons above (especially, the
inability to use it for signaling).
Adapting the holist approach to allow for timelike entanglement is less
straightforward. Part of the difficulty is due to the lack of clarity in the view
generally. Many philosophers have advocated understanding entanglement in
terms of a non-supervenient relation (e.g., Teller 1986; Howard 1985, 1989;
Esfeld 2004); the entangled state of the joint system merits the attribution of
a relation between its subsystems that fails to supervene on their individual
intrinsic properties. This is sometimes paired with a claim that the compound
system is more real or fundamental than the subsystems it comprises. One
version may regard the joint system as a single object spread, smeared, or
scattered across space. Another might take the distinct locations inhabited by
the object to be unified in a more fundamental space of higher dimensionality.
The former case, in which joint systems are thought of as wholes scat-
tered in space, seems to allow for extension to timelike separation without
major problems. Temporally-scattered objects are not hard to imagine—a
play with an intermission exists in two discontinuous timelike separated re-
gions of spacetime—but, it’s not obvious how such an approach is capable
(on its own) of accounting for Bell-type non-local correlations. Indeed, Hen-
son (2013) shows that the non-locality resulting from Bell’s theorem is not
avoided by denying separability. In some ways, this result is unsurprising.
Merely redescribing the two photons in an EPR-B scenario as parts of a non-
separable 2-photon whole does little to explain the correlations revealed by
their measurement. This is not to say such an approach is hopeless, but it’s
unclear how it avoids the necessity of non-local influence.7
7It’s possible that the advocate of this version of holism may wish to endorse action at a distance
as well. Perhaps the reason why non-local influence is possible is that entangled systems form a
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The other version of holism, in which joint systems are located at a single
location in some higher-dimensional reality, promises to offer a more satisfying
account of Bell-type correlations. The rough idea is to grant that the world
is non-local in four-dimensional spacetime, but regard this as a reflection of a
more fundamental space of higher-dimensionality which is entirely local (see
Ismael 2012).
Yet, even if the higher dimensionality approach offers a promising alter-
native to action at a distance, it’s not easy to see how the picture would be
adapted to the case of timelike entanglement. The best known higher dimen-
sionality view, wavefunction realism (Albert 1996; Lewis 2004; Ney 2013; Ney
and Albert 2013), posits a fundamental ontology that includes the quantum
wavefunction in a very high-dimensional configuration space. While such view
may have the desired effect of eliminating spatial non-locality, time is left un-
touched.8 The wavefunction evolves in configuration space with time. Thus,
non-local influence among timelike separated regions would remain.
Could it be possible that timelike separated systems are reduced to a single
object in a higher-dimensional space? Certainly. But, there are no known
candidates for such a view. While there is talk of the emergence of space-time
in some theories of quantum gravity, these ideas remain highly speculative.
Furthermore, there is no reason to think that such theories will have the right
features to provide a satisfactory account of entangled systems, much less those
that are timelike separated.
6 Lessons for the metaphysics of entangle-
ment
There are several lessons to be drawn. Most importantly, entanglement swap-
ping doesn’t undermine realism, but rather provides important insight into the
non-separable whole.
8It’s unclear that wavefunction realism is able to account for entanglement in the manner sug-
gested by Ismael. If everything is reduced to the wavefunction in high-dimensional configuration
space, it doesn’t seem able to account for what makes entangled systems special (c.f., Ismael and
Schaffer 2013, 15).
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nature of the entanglement relation. In particular, it compels the realist to
revise certain aspects of their understanding of entanglement:
• Contrary to many presentations of the topic, entanglement does not re-
quire common preparation or previous interaction between entangled sub-
systems.
• Entanglement can account for changes in not just intrinsic (monadic)
properties, but also the relations of entangled subsystems. Indeed, en-
tanglement relations can beget new entanglement relations.
• Delayed-choice entanglement swapping can be accounted for in at least
two ways:
1. Following Egg, the realist can deny that genuine swapping occurs in
delayed-choice setups.
2. The realist can endorse the possibility of timelike entanglement.
By taking the first option, the realist highlights their commitment to
a time-ordering of spacelike events. Taking the latter option requires
modifying the action at a distance or ontological holist views along the
lines explored in the previous section.
I conclude by noting two very different potential sources support for time-
like entanglement: (a) massless quantum fields in the Minkowski vacuum state
(Olson and Ralph 2011, 2012) and (b) temporal analogues of Bell’s theorem
(Brukner et al. 2004; Fritz 2010). The import of these issues for a realist
understanding of timelike entanglement remains to be seen.
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Abstract 
Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are 
objectively better than physical explanations of those phenomena. Prominent defenses 
of this claim appeal to the multiple realizability of special science properties. I argue that 
special science explanations can be shown to be better, in one respect, than physical 
explanations in a way that does not depend on multiple realizability. Namely, I discuss a 
way in which a special science explanation may be more abstract than a competing 
physical explanation, even if it is not multiply realizable, and I argue that this kind of 
abstraction can be used to support the idea that that special science explanation omits 
explanatorily irrelevant detail. 
 
 
1. In troduc t ion  
 
Almost twenty years ago, Ned Block wrote of a long-standing “anti-reductionist consensus” in 
the philosophy of mind (and the philosophy of the special sciences more generally), which holds “that 
reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences” (1997, 107). Although this 
consensus seems to have been weakened in recent years, anti-reductionism is still arguably the dominant 
view. Disagreement remains about exactly what it is for a special science to be autonomous, but I take it 
that autonomy involves at least the following claim: 
Explanatory autonomy: Some special science explanation of a given fact or event is objectively 
better than any fundamental physical explanation of that fact or event.1 
 
The classic papers that defended explanatory autonomy, and instituted the anti-reductionist consensus of 
which it is a part (e.g., Putnam (1967, 1975), Fodor (1974), and Kitcher (1984)), appealed to the alleged 
multiple realizability of special science properties. That is, these papers argued that any given special science 
																																																								
1 Explanatory autonomy pits the explanations offered by fundamental physical theory against all other scientific 
explanations. In practice, however, debates about reduction have often been waged between explanations offered by a 
pair of “nearby” sciences, such as classical genetics and molecular genetics (e.g., Kitcher 1984) or cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience (e.g., Bechtel and Mundale 1999). Two common assumptions support this practice: first, that sciences 
are organized into hierarchical levels and, second, that sciences at the “lower levels” of this hierarchy (such as molecular 
genetics and neuroscience) are reducible to fundamental physics. Anti-reductionists and reductionists, then, disagree 
about whether sciences at higher levels in the hierarchy are reducible to relatively lower level sciences, with anti-
reductionists claiming that reducibility fails to hold at some point in the hierarchy. Although there are reasons to doubt 
whether these assumptions are true, I shall adopt them in this paper for the sake of argument, along with the claim that 
neuroscience is reducible to fundamental physics. If these assumptions are false, then either anti-reductionism is in an 
even better position or the debate about reduction itself needs to be re-framed. 
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property could be realized by different (physically heterogeneous) physical properties and that this 
multiple realizability was crucial for defending explanatory autonomy.2 In this paper, I argue that there is at 
least one respect in which some special science explanations are better than physical explanations that 
need not be “based on an argument from multiple realizability.” Namely, some special science 
explanations isolate explanatorily relevant features even if they do not involve properties that are 
multiply realizable. As I discuss below, these explanations are more abstract than competing physical 
explanations in a way that does not entail that they are more general. If I am right, it is a mistake to think 
that explanatory autonomy hinges on multiple realizability. Avoiding this mistake sidesteps the morass of 
debates about the nature and extent of multiple realizability and opens up new conceptual space in an 
old debate. 
2. Re l evance ,  Genera l i t y ,  and Mult ip l e  Rea l izab i l i t y  
One plausible way in which an explanation is objectively good is if it provides the right amount 
of explanatory detail (see, e.g., Garfinkel 1981; Batterman 2002; Strevens 2008). For instance, suppose 
that an extremely loud utterance of the word “shatter” causes a crystal wine glass to break (cf. Dretske 
1988, 79). An explanation that cites the pitch and intensity of the sound waves is better than one that 
also cites the meaning of the utterance. This is because the meaning of the utterance was irrelevant to the 
glass’s breaking. The glass would have broken regardless of the utterance’s meaning (or lack thereof). 
Examples like this one support the following explanatory virtue:  
Relevance: Other things being equal, one explanation is better than another if it includes fewer 
features that are irrelevant to (the production of) the fact or event to be explained. 
 
One explanation will be better, with respect to relevance, than another to the extent that it is more abstract, 
in the sense that it eliminates or omits details. 
 There are other good-making features of explanations aside from relevance. For instance, good 
explanations will unify disparate phenomena. Other things being equal, one explanation is better than 
																																																								
2 As Block notes, it is part of the consensus that the autonomy of the special sciences is “based on an argument from 
multiple realizability” (1997, 107).  
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another if it is more general, if it is, in some sense, more widely applicable. One kind of generality that has 
often been used to defend explanatory autonomy traces back to Putnam’s (1967, 1975) work: one 
explanation of a given fact or event is more general, in this sense, than another if applies to wider range 
of (logically) possible situations. As with relevance, explanations will be more general to the extent that the 
properties that figure in them are more abstract.3 By eliminating or omitting physical details, some 
abstract special science properties will apply to more possible situations.  
Since both the greater relevance and greater generality of special science explanations depend on 
their being more abstract than physical explanations, it can seem as if these two explanatory virtues stand 
or fall together. If there were a single kind of abstraction that was required to support both of these 
virtues, then this would go a long way toward explaining why influential defenses of the greater relevance 
of special science explanations (and not just their greater generality) have relied on multiple realizability. 
Here I briefly sketch two such defenses. 
 First, consider Putnam’s famous discussion of why a 15/16” rigid cubical peg fits through a 1” 
square hole, but not a 1” circular hole, in a rigid board. Putnam claims that an explanation of these facts 
in terms of the shapes and relative sizes of the peg and holes and the rigidity of the peg and board 
“brings out” the “relevant structural features of the situation,” which any microphysical explanation “conceals” 
(1975, 296, 297, italics in original). And he suggests that this is because the “higher level” structural 
features are multiply realizable: the same explanation in terms of these features will be correct “whether 
the peg consists of molecules, or continuous rigid substance, or whatever” (ibid., 296). The idea is that 
changing the underlying microstructure makes no difference to whether the square peg goes through the 
round hole; all that is relevant is the abstract structural features that are common to those different physical 
realizers. 
Similarly, Kitcher (1984) claims that a derivation of the general principles of classical genetics 
from molecular genetics is not explanatory because “in charting the details of the molecular 
																																																								
3 In fact, in a paper that isolates and defends this kind of generality as a dimension of explanatory depth, Brad Weslake 
(2010) simply calls it abstraction.   
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rearrangements the derivation would only blur the outline of a simple cytological story, adding a welter of 
irrelevant detail” (ibid., 347, italics added). A little later, he claims that “adding [molecular] details would 
only disguise the relevant factor,” namely, that meiosis is a “pair-separation process” (ibid., 348). And, he 
claims that this fact about relevance hinges on multiple realizability—on the alleged fact that pair-
separation processes are “heterogeneous from the molecular point of view” (1984, 349) because they are 
“realized in a motley of molecular ways” (ibid., 350).4  
 Basing the greater relevance of special science explanations on multiple realizability may be ill 
advised, however. For, almost contemporaneously with the formation of the anti-reductionist consensus, 
some philosophers raised serious doubts about the multiple realizability argument,5 and, in the two 
decades since Block’s (1997) article appeared (in which he responded to one of these lines of doubt) a 
number of authors have raised additional critiques concerning the extent of multiple realizability and 
whether it can be used to establish the explanatory superiority of the special sciences.6 For all I say in this 
paper, the multiple realizability argument may be successfully defended against such critiques. However, 
if I am right, such a defense is unnecessary: the greater relevance of some special science explanations can 
be supported by a kind of abstraction that need not involve multiple realizability. 
3. A Dis t in c t ion  Among Kinds  o f  Abstrac t ion  
One entity is more abstract than another if it lacks detail that the other possesses. Different 
instances of abstraction will involve omission or elimination of different kinds of details, some of which 
I discuss below. There is an important distinction to be drawn among these varieties of abstraction: 
some kinds of abstraction require that more abstract entities are more general than less abstract ones (call 
this generality-entailing (GE) abstraction), while other kinds of abstraction do not impose this requirement 
																																																								
4 See also Garfinkel (1981), who claims that a “microexplanation” of why a rabbit was eaten (in terms of the “equations 
of interaction between individual foxes and individual rabbits (depending on such things as their physiology and reaction 
times)” (ibid., 55)) is inferior to a “macroexplanation” that simply cites the high population-density of foxes in the area 
(and implicitly, the Lotka-Volterra equation). Garfinkel claims that this is because the microexplanation “contains much 
that is irrelevant to why the rabbit got eaten and … [these irrelevant data] bury the explanation unrecognizably” (ibid., 56, 
italics added). And this is true, according to Garfinkel, because the macroexplanation is stable through variation in the 
way that the high population-density of foxes is realized (ibid., 57). 
5 See, e.g., Lewis (1969), Kim (1972, 188-92).  
6 See, e.g., Bechtel and Mundale (1999); Shapiro (2004) 
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(call this non-generality-entailing (NGE) abstraction). I first discuss two varieties of abstraction that fall on the 
former side of this divide; then, I outline two kinds of abstraction that fall on the latter side. 
First, consider the way in which determinables are more abstract than their determinates. Being 
red is more abstract than being crimson or being scarlet. What kind of detail does a determinable lack that its 
determinates possess? Assuming that colors are individuated by three “determination dimensions”: hue, 
saturation, and brightness, being crimson will be associated with particular values (or a small range of 
values) of hue, saturation, and brightness. It will occupy a relatively small portion of a three-dimensional 
color space. Being red, by contrast, will not be specified at this fine-grained level of detail. Rather, it will 
characterized by a broader range of hue, saturation, and brightness values. It will occupy a larger portion 
of three-dimensional color space, a portion that includes the space occupied by being crimson as a proper 
subspace. Following Haug (2011), I’ll call this kind of abstraction, homotopic abstraction, since it applies to 
properties that are characterized by the same property space. In general, we can say that a property P is 
more homotopically abstract than a property Q if and only if Q occupies a proper subspace of the 
portion of the property space occupied by P.7  
Second, consider the relation between a multiply realizable property and each of its individual 
realizers. There is disagreement about how to characterize multiple realizability, but on any plausible 
account, multiply realizable properties are more abstract than their individual realizers. If property P (of 
type X) is multiple realizable, then P omits (or “abstracts away”) from features that are unique to its 
individual realizers and isolates features that these realizers (or the objects that possess them) have in 
common. This will be true whether these features are causal powers (Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2001; 
Gillett 2002), or functional roles (Shapiro 2004; Polger 2007), or exact similarity of X-type features 
(Funkhouser 2007). 
																																																								
7 Note that this differs somewhat from the definition given by Haug (2011). Eric Funkhouser (2006, 2014) provides a 
helpful discussion of “determination dimensions” and how they (together with “non-determinable necessities”) specify 
the nature of kinds of properties. Note that homotopic abstraction is the inverse relation of what Funkhouser calls 
“specification.” 
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Homotopic abstraction and multiple realizability both clearly require more abstract properties to 
be more general than less abstract ones: they are instances of GE-abstraction. Clearly, the property being 
red must apply not just to scarlet objects but also to crimson ones. Similarly, a multiple realizable 
property, P, must apply not only to objects that possess one of P’s realizers, R, but also to objects that 
possess another of P’s realizers (and do not have R). 
Now consider a third example of abstraction. Given a physical system, one model or set of 
equations describing that system will be more abstract than another if it eliminates or omits at least one  
feature of that system (e.g., a quantity, degree of freedom, or boundary or initial condition) that the latter 
model or set of equations includes. For example, suppose we have a rotating sphere moving with a 
constant linear velocity along the x-axis. A set of equations (p) that includes only an equation of motion 
for the sphere’s linear motion is more abstract than one (pL) that includes equations of motion for both 
its linear motion and its rotation. Similarly, a thermodynamic model of a gas that takes the number of 
particles and volume to be infinite (while maintaining a constant ratio of number of particles to volume) 
is more abstract than a model that includes the boundary conditions imposed by the gas’s container. (For 
these examples, see Knox (2016, 44-45, 50).)  
Finally, consider the relation between having some hue or other (i.e., being hued) and having some color or 
other (i.e., being colored). Being hued is more abstract than being colored; it omits the other two dimensions of 
color: saturation and brightness. Following Haug (2011), we can call this kind of abstraction, heterotopic 
abstraction, since it applies to properties from different property spaces. If a property Q metaphysically 
necessitates a property P, then P is more heterotopically abstract than Q if and only if the characteristic 
property space of P has fewer dimensions than the characteristic property space of Q.8 
These two kinds of abstraction do not require that more abstract entities are more general than 
less abstract ones. A more abstract model or set of equations need not apply to more systems than a less 
abstract model or set of equations. For example, suppose that we take the set of equations pL above and 
																																																								
8
 Note that this also differs slightly from the account given by Haug (2011). 
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stipulate that the linear momentum is zero; call this set of equations (including the trivial equation of 
motion for rotation) pL-zero. Then, the set of equations p (that includes only an equation for linear 
motion) will apply (i.e. accurately describe) the kinematics of exactly the same set of possible physical 
systems as pL-zero, namely, those spheres moving along the x-axis that have zero angular momentum. 
However, p is still more abstract than pL-zero since it omits the equation of motion for rotation entirely.9 
Similarly, unlike the pair of being red and being scarlet, being hued is not more general than being 
colored. Necessarily, anything that has a hue is also colored (and, necessarily, anything that is colored is 
also hued). These properties are necessarily co-extensive, even though one is more abstract than another. 
Thus, in these cases, greater abstraction does not require greater generality: they are instances of NGE-
abstraction. 
4. NGE-abstrac t ion  and Explanatory  Re l evance  
 With the distinction between GE-abstraction and NGE-abstraction in hand, we can see that the 
former (and thus multiple realizability) is not required for defending the greater relevance of special science 
explanations; NGE-abstraction will work at least as well. 
 First, suppose that we have non-rotating sphere moving along the x-axis with a constant velocity. 
The systems of equations pL-zero and p, from above, apply to exactly the same systems; p is not more 
general than pL-zero; nevertheless, p clearly provides a better explanation of the sphere’s position; it 
isolates only the features that are relevant to this explanandum, omitting the irrelevant (and, incidentally, 
zero-valued) angular momentum. (For a more substantive example of NGE-abstraction with respect to 
certain features of a system, see Section 5.) 
Now, return to Putnam’s example from Section 2, and note that the “high level” structural 
properties in Putnam’s case are more heterotopically abstract than the microphysical properties that 
underlie them. Being a circle and being a square each have a single determination dimension (diameter length 
and side length, respectively). Further, rigidity (also known as stiffness) also has a single determination 
																																																								
9 This example is inspired by Knox’s (2016, 52) discussion of idealization as a “precursor to abstraction.” 
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dimension measured in units of [force/distance]. By contrast, the microphysical properties that are 
possible realizers of these structural features are characterized by more determination dimensions, 
including at least: (1) the nature of the components that make up the peg and board, (2) the nature of the 
bonds that hold between these components (e.g., ionic, covalent, metallic, or none (in the case of a 
(logically possible) continuous rigid substance)); (3) the angle(s) between these bonds; and (4) the 
entropy of the peg and board (which is especially important for understanding the stiffness of polymers 
such as rubber). (See Roylance (2000) for a discussion of the microscopic basis of stiffness.) 
A correct explanation of the fact that the square peg does not pass through the round hole 
depends only on the relations between the determination dimensions of being a circle, being a square, and 
rigidity. The determination dimensions of the underlying realizers are irrelevant to this explanation. 
Importantly, it is not the multiplicity of the values of these other determination dimensions that is crucial 
here but simply the fact that these other dimensions characterize the microphysical realizers at all. That 
is, it is not facts about homotopic abstraction or multiple realizability that are crucial for relevance but 
rather facts about heterotopic abstraction, a kind of non-generality-entailing abstraction.10   
 One might worry that multiple realizability (or homotopic abstraction) is required to justify the 
claim that these other dimensions are in fact explanatorily irrelevant to the explanandum—that without 
showing that the explanatory relationship is “stable” or “robust” through variation in the values of these 
underlying dimensions we would have no evidence that these other dimensions are themselves 
explanatorily irrelevant. However, this is not the case. Even without showing that the generalization that 
15/16” square pegs do not fit through 1” circular holes is independent of variation in the underlying 
physical realizers, it remains the case that this generalization is realization independent in the sense that 
one can discover and confirm it without knowing anything about the physical realizers that underlie it 
(much less confirming a generalization between them). That is, the very fact that structural predicates like 
																																																								
10 Haug (2011) claims that heterotopic abstraction can support the idea that some special science explanations omit 
explanatorily irrelevant details that are included in physical explanations. However, the discussion of this point is very 
brief, and Haug does not discuss how other forms of NGE-abstraction can also support this idea. (Cf. the discussion of 
the sphere example above and of thermodynamics in Section 5.) 
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“is a 15/16” square peg” are projectible is strong presumptive evidence that such predicates pick out 
objective features of the world that figure in real regularities. (On this point, see Antony (1999, 14ff.).) 
The underlying microstructure (whether it maps many-to-one or one-to-one to macrostructure) is irrelevant 
to confirming that such regularities obtain. 
 We can get clearer about how heterotopic abstraction can be used to defend the greater relevance 
of special science explanations without appealing to multiple realizability by seeing how such a defense 
effectively blocks reductionist appeals to “disjunctive properties” or “local reductions” (see, e.g., Kim 
1992; Lewis 1994). These appeals, in effect, claim that (perhaps disjunctive) physical properties can in 
fact be matched up one-to-one with (at least structure- or species-restricted) special science properties 
and that explanations in terms of these physical properties will be just as relevant and general as (any 
genuine) special science explanations. However, while these reductionist gambits may be successful with 
respect to generality, facts about heterotopic abstraction show that they are ineffective at undermining the 
greater relevance of special science explanations.  
Consider a disjunctive property, D, that has every metaphysically possible realizer of being a 
15/16” square peg as a disjunct. D is just as general as being a 15/16” square peg; they are necessarily co-
extensive. Thus, Putnam’s multiple realizability argument for the greater relevance of the macro-structural 
explanation is undermined.11 However, D’s instantiation consists merely in one of its disjuncts being 
instantiated, so its property space is arguably the sum (i.e. the span of the union) of the property spaces of 
each of its disjuncts. That is, D’s set of determination dimensions is the union of the sets of 
determination dimensions of its disjuncts. Thus, being a 15/16” square peg is still more heterotopically 
abstract than D; it still isolates features that are explanatorily relevant to the fact that the peg fails to pass 
through the round hole, while omitting features that are irrelevant to this behavior. 
																																																								
11 Implicit in the above discussion is Putnam’s claim that “the higher level explanation is far more general [than the 
microphysical one], which is why it is explanatory” (1975, 297, italics in original). But this claim is not true when the 
microphysical explanation is in terms of D. 
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Funkhouser also responds to the “disjunctive property” objection to the multiple realizability 
argument by pointing out that a realized property R has different determination dimensions than a 
disjunctive property whose disjuncts are each of R’s possible realizers (2014, 108-9). But Alexander Bird 
(2015) rightly asks how this point alone constitutes a reply to the objection. The key point that 
Funkhouser leaves out is that a difference in determination dimensions—in particular, greater 
heterotopic abstraction—supports greater explanatory relevance even if the absence of multiple 
realizability. Funkhouser emphasizes that realized properties and their realizers, by having different 
determination dimensions, are at different “levels of abstraction” (2014, 78, 89, 124). However, he does 
not seem to recognize fully that (as the disjunctive realizer case illustrates) this kind of abstraction does 
not depend on multiple realizability but rather on the realization relation (a particular kind of asymmetric 
necessitation) itself. 
5 .  Impl i ca t ions  fo r  How to  Frame Debates  about  Reduc t ion  and Autonomy 
In the last few years, several philosophers have defended explanatory autonomy or irreducibility 
without relying on multiple realizability (e.g., Wilson 2010; Knox 2016). I’ll conclude by briefly applying 
the notion of NGE-abstraction to one of these defenses (Knox 2016) and suggesting that this can help 
us better understand how to formulate debates about explanatory autonomy and reducibility, in 
general.12 
Knox (2016) argues that thermodynamics offers novel explanations of many phenomena, such 
as why diesel engines, unlike gasoline engines, do not need spark plugs. The novelty of this 
thermodynamical explanation consists in the fact it involves an abstraction (namely, omitting all details 
related to heat transfer) that “cuts across” the quantities that are recognized as natural by statistical 
mechanics (ibid., 46, 56). Further, Knox claims that this fact about explanatory novelty is compatible 
with the reducibility of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. According to Knox, the key to 
																																																								
12 Wilson’s (2010) argument that “eliminations of degrees of freedom” are sufficient for ontological irreducibility also 
relies on NGE-abstraction and not multiple realizability, but a discussion of this fact (and its implications) will have to 
await another occasion. 
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understanding this compatibility is that the bridge laws linking thermodynamical and statistical 
mechanical quantities will involve complex, “mathematically irreversible” operations (such as taking the 
limit as the number of gas particles goes to infinity) and thus will themselves involve abstraction (ibid., 
54, 57). As a result, further abstractions with respect to thermodynamical quantities will be “opaque” 
from the perspective of statistical mechanics (ibid., 42). 
First, note that these further abstractions will be instances of the first kind of NGE-abstraction 
discussed above—ignoring heat transfer simplifies the thermodynamical equations and isolates the 
explanatorily relevant features. Knox claims that this results in “novel explanations that are not merely 
abstractions of some more detailed [statistical mechanical] picture” (ibid., 41), and she seems to ground 
this novelty in the “mathematically irreversible” change in variables that occurs when one moves from 
statistical mechanical to thermodynamical quantities (ibid., 56). However, not every mathematically 
irreversible operation seems to induce this kind of “unnaturalness” from a lower level perspective: for 
example, taking a sum or a mean will lead to loss of information, but the result will be “merely an 
abstraction from some more detailed underlying picture.” I think that the second kind of NGE-
abstraction—heterotopic abstraction—can help here. It is not mere “mathematical irreversibility” that 
supports novelty but heterotopic abstraction. The mean of a quantity of a system is more homotopically 
abstract than a description that specifies the particular values of that quantity had by the components of 
that system: it omits detail within a single property space. But moving from a statistical mechanical 
quantity to a thermodynamical quantity involves moving to a new property space, one whose dimensions 
“cut across” the dimensions of the property space of the statistical mechanical quantity. 
Knox notes that her account of explanatory novelty fits poorly into standard taxonomies of 
emergence/reduction that characterize weak emergence as merely epistemic and strong emergence as 
metaphysical (2016, 58). Her account is weaker than standard epistemic accounts in that it is compatible 
with the theoretical reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, but it is stronger than 
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epistemic accounts in that it depends on objective features of the world and not merely on our cognitive 
limitations (ibid., 58, 44). 
But how can there be any objectively better “high level” explanations if all of the properties 
involved in those explanations can be mapped one-to-one via bridge laws to “low level” properties? What 
“objective features of the world” could these explanations be tracking other than those of fundamental 
physics? I think that NGE-abstraction suggests a framework within which to answer these questions. A 
property can be more NGE-abstract than another with which it is necessarily co-extensive. If NGE-
abstraction is itself an “objective feature of the world,” this suggests that we should adopt a 
hyperintensional criterion for property individuation.13 In short, there are “objective features of the world” 
that are more fine-grained than, and thus cannot be captured by, the resources used in standard 
formulations of the metaphysics of reduction and autonomy. Working out this hyperintensional account 
of property individuation will not be a trivial task, but if the discussion in this paper is on the right track, 
it is a task that is important not only for defending the autonomy of the special sciences but also for 
spelling out exactly what such autonomy amounts to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
13 This provides a further motivation for adopting a program of “hyperintensional metaphysics” (Nolan 2014), one that 
is more closely tied to actual scientific practice than recent work on the hyperintensional notion of “grounding” in 
analytic metaphysics. 
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Disambiguating Latent Variables
ABSTRACT
In contrast to Borsboom (2008) who distinguishes between manifest and latent variables on 
epistemic grounds in terms of “epistemic accessibility,” I advocate a demarcation on 
pragmatic grounds. The latter way of understanding this distinction does justice to the 
intuitions driving Borsboom’s account, but avoids unnecessary epistemic complications. I 
then turn to two cases, the Flynn Effect and the case of psycho-educational assessment, and 
show an equivocal understanding of one latent variable, Spearman’s g, has led some 
researchers to draw paradoxical conclusions regarding cognitive ability. 
Word count, including references and footnotes: 4790
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Disambiguating Latent Variables
1. Introduction: Variables Latent, Variables Manifest
Latent variables are ubiquitous in the social and behavioral sciences. Some claim they are an 
indispensable part of social and psychological research (Sobel 1994). We may distinguish 
between variables that are manifest and variables that are latent. Manifest variables are, at 
first pass, distinguished by being observed; at least this is one popular way of distinguishing 
them from latent variables. Suppose we set out to measure the lengths of various objects. 
With a meter stick in hand, we get to work: the length of the swimming pool is 100 meters, 
the ceiling is three meters from the floor, etc. In these cases, length is a manifest variable. It 
is also an observed property of the objects who length we measure. Some methodologists 
claim that what distinguishes manifest from latent variables is whether the quantity in 
question is observed or is inferred from some observed measure, respectively. While being 
observed and being manifest are seemingly concomitant properties, I will argue that this 
concomitance is not philosophically significant, and, furthermore, by avoiding a criterion that
demarcates latent and manifest variables in terms of whether a property instance is observed, 
certain quagmires can be sidestepped.
Contrast the case of manifest variables with the following: we want to find out 
someone’s or a demographic group’s socioeconomic status (SES). However, instead of 
setting out with an instrument that measures SES directly, we pass out questionnaires asking 
our subjects to report their gross annual income, level of education and occupations of both 
the subject and his parents. Based on the values for each of those variables, we locate our 
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subjects on the SES index. SES is not observed directly, it is a composite score based on 
values for manifest variables. Similarly for psychometric research on cognitive ability, a 
battery of tests is administered to an individual and the test-scores are manifest variables the 
correlations among which are explained by positing a latent variable, g (taken to denote 
general intelligence). Epistemic access to g is mediated by measuring its manifest indicators; 
no direct measure of general intelligence is available, though some indicators are taken to be 
better measures of it than others.
Variables considered to be manifest in one context would be considered latent in a 
different context if they figure in as a latent variable in a latent variable model. A latent 
variable model specifies the relationship between various observable indicators (manifest 
variables) and a latent variable or class of latent variables. Hence, height, though a manifest 
variable in the examples considered earlier, could be a latent variable depending on one’s 
measurement methods. For example, we may want to assess the heights of adolescents in a 
town where there are no meter sticks, rulers, or other devices for measuring height directly. 
Instead we may record their weights and shoe sizes (as indicated by the label in the shoe) and
use those values to infer values for height. On the basis of those measures we should be able 
to predict with good accuracy the length of the adolescents since the values for the manifest 
variables are known to correlate highly with height in adolescents; note that in this context 
there was no appeal to observation as a distinguishing characteristic. 
What makes height a latent variable in this example is that it and its values for a given
subject are inferred on the basis of known indicators of height in this measurement scenario. 
Hence, whether a variable is latent depends on the method used to ascertain its value in a 
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particular instance. The latent/manifest distinction does not track or commit one to the so-
called “observable/unobservable” or “observational/theoretical” distinctions. This is all the 
better for latent variable modelers that the legitimacy of their method not piggyback on 
controversial distinctions.
Latent variables form a heterogeneous bunch, united only by the fact that they are not 
manifest. I will restrict my investigation of latent variables to the social and behavioral 
sciences and the inferential problems introduced by positing latent variables, namely how we 
go from latent variables to quantities in nature. Specifically I will be concerned with latent 
variables in psychometrics, a branch of psychology devoted to the investigation of 
psychological traits and the structure of individual and group differences in psychological 
traits. I will devote considerable attention to the general factor of intelligence, i.e., the g-
factor and also consider latent variables in other disciplines such as socioeconomics. 
Unsurprisingly there are alternative views on how to understand the distinction 
between latent and manifest variables. Borsboom (2008) argues that the distinction is 
epistemic; it maps onto the differential evidential gap between data and their causes. 
Borsboom uses the term ‘observed’ to mean ‘manifest’. On this account, in the case of 
manifest variables, we assign probability equal to one to the measurement outcome; in the 
case of latent variables, we assign probabilities less than one to measurement outcomes. 
Furthermore, Borsboom’s criterion for demarcating variables is either too strong or 
arbitrary. His criterion of certainty is satisfied in very few measurement contexts, even those 
in which we would be inclined to deem the variable patently manifest. For example, the more
times I concatenate rulers, the less confident I am that I have not made some measurement 
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error, even if for each time I concatenate I believe that I have done so without error. Using a 
ruler to measure the length of a standard sheet of paper (or another ruler) is one thing, but 
measuring moderately large distances is another. On Borsboom’s account, length becomes 
latent once my confidence drops below one. But here charges of arbitrariness arise: why must
confidence amount to probability equal to one for the variable to be an “observed” variable? 
Without justifying that threshold, it seems arbitrary to set it at certainty and unnecessarily 
stringent. 
I suggest that we demarcate variables pragmatically: simply read off their status from 
the measurement or structural equation model. If in the model length is treated as a latent 
variable, then length is a latent variable in that model (e.g., in the structural equation 
modeling package LISREL, the variable is indicated by an ellipse instead of a rectangle, or 
such as a regression coefficient in a regression model). This approach is contextualist: a 
variable’s status depends upon the measurement context. It seems that in many circumstances
drawing the distinction in this way will make sense of Borsboom’s idea that we seem to have 
better epistemic access to manifest variables, or perhaps vice versa: Borsboom’s idea 
explains why we allow for some variables to be treated as latent in our models. The contexts 
in which one treats length as a latent variable are likely to be those in which there is an 
epistemic gap between what one is measuring “directly” and length. Likewise, if I can 
measure length itself I am unlikely to treat it as latent in my model. However, that a variable 
is latent is conceptually independent of my epistemic situation; it is contingent upon the 
formal aspects of the model. Drawing the line between latent and observed variables this way
avoids charges of arbitrariness or immoderate stringency.
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2. Interpretation and Latent Variables
Though latent variables may be invoked to refer to unobservable objects, such as electrons or
quarks, as they factor in psychometrics and the social sciences, latent variables are typically 
taken to refer to properties, e.g., personality characteristics such as “extraversion” and 
abilities such as “general intelligence.” I will assume that properties, or at least property 
instances, have causal powers. Thus, if a latent variable successfully refers to a property or 
property instance, then the variable’s referent has causal powers (i.e., it is causally 
efficacious). This commitment rules out the possibility of epiphenomenal latent variables, 
and this might seem suspect given that I am dealing with latent variables that purportedly 
refer to mental properties. Psychometrics seems to presuppose that epiphenomenalism is 
false, since psychological attributes, the referents, of latent variables are alleged to be 
causally efficacious if they exist at all.1 
1 However, some psychometricians believe that a psychological attribute, A, is causally 
efficacious only if there is actual variability in A. That is, a disposition to effect change is not 
strong enough. This variability in position on A is manifested in test behavior. See Borsboom 
(2005) and Holland (1986). One interesting consequence of this position is that general 
intelligence, the purported referent of the g-factor, is not causally efficacious since it exhibits 
no variability within individuals, i.e., there is no intraindividual variability. The severity of 
this consideration for theories of intelligence that take general intelligence to be a central 
theoretical posit and whether interindividual variation is sufficient to save general 
intelligence qua causally efficacious psychological attribute are questions that merit further 
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One may advance a wholesale rejection of psychometric constructs as meaningless or 
mere statistical artifacts. However, my starting point is psychometric practice, for it is this 
practice that I wish to clarify. Rejecting the entire discipline would be not only a disservice to
a scientific discipline which shows no sign of losing steam, but it would also be a disservice 
to the philosophy of science which potentially stands to gain from careful examinations into 
psychological measurement (see Trout 1999; Sesardic 2000).
2.1 Latent Variable Modeling as Data Reduction
Factor analysis is one statistical procedure for discovering latent variables (exploratory factor
analysis) and confirming latent variable models (confirmatory factor analysis). The utility of 
factor analysis is manifold. First, factor analysis is a data reduction technique. Suppose you 
have a p×p correlation matrix. The correlated items may be performance on psychometric 
tests or what have you. The larger p is, the greater the number of correlations in the matrix 
and also the more unwieldy the matrix becomes. Sometimes it might be useful to express the 
information contained in the correlation matrix with a smaller number of variables. For 
example, it may be more economical and cognitively tractable to deal with a 5×20 factor 
matrix expressing the relationship between the manifest variables and a compendious set of 
latent factors, rather than a 20×20 correlation matrix. To illustrate analysis, consider the 
following 8×8 correlation matrix from Jensen (1998, 80):
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8
V2 .5600
attention.
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V3 .4800 .4200
V4 .4032 .3528 .3024
V5 .3456 .3024 .2592 .4200
V6 .2880 .2520 .2160 .3500 .3000
V7 .3024 .2646 .2268 .2352 .2016 .1680
V8 .2520 .2205 .1890 .1960 .1680 .1400 .3000
V9 .2016 .1764 .1512 .1568 .1344 .1120 .2400 .2000
Table 1:  Hypothetical correlation matrix of intelligence test data
As the number of variables increases, so does the utility of being able to represent the 
information in terms of a few latent variables. Note that some of the indicators (the V’s) 
correlate more strongly with each other than with others. For example, V1, V2, and V3 are 
more strongly mutually correlated than they are with other variables. The correlations 
between variables can be expressed more economically in terms of a correlation with a latent 
variable. Factor analysis enables us to transform the correlation matrix above into a factor 
matrix expressing the correlation between each test and an “underlying” factor (table 2). 
1st order 2nd order
Variable F1 F2 F3 g
V1 .3487 0 0 .72
V2 .3051 0 0 .63
V3 .2615 0 0 .54
V4 0 .42 0 .56
V5 0 .36 0 .48
V6 0 .30 0 .40
V7 0 0 .4284 .42
V8 0 0 .3570 .35
V9 0 0 .2856 .28
Table 2. Factor matrix for hypothetical correlation matrix in table 1.
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The number of factors can be as many as the number of variables (though this would simply 
reproduce the original matrix). The correlation between an indicator and a latent variable is 
that indicator’s factor loading. Table 2 depicts three first-order factors (F1, F2, and F3) that 
account for correlations in the nine manifest variables, and the correlation between the three 
primary factors (i.e., latent variables) is accounted for by a second-order factor, g. 
3. Interpretations and Equivocations: ‘g’
Latent variables are sometimes interpreted as conveying some information about cognitive 
ability or personality. Matters are complicated by the fact that not all latent variables are 
similarly interpreted; some seem to lend themselves to a realist interpretation more readily 
than others. SES, for example, is typically not interpreted as real or causally efficacious. A 
specific value for SES is, depending on one’s measurement model, simply a sum-score of a 
variety of measures including level of education and occupational prestige. Psychological 
attributes, however, are generally construed to be causally efficacious. To illustrate this point,
consider the following two measurement models, which are common in sociological and 
psychometric research.
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Figure 1. Reflective and formative measurement models.
Appropriating the terminology of Edwards and Bagozzi (2000) and Borsboom (2005), I will 
refer to the model on the left side of figure 1 as a reflective model and to the model on the 
right as a formative model. Each Xi is a manifest (i.e., observed) variable or indicator such as 
an item response or test variable. ξ and η are latent variables, each λi is the factor loading of 
each indicator in the left-hand model, and each γi is a weight of the indicator with respect to 
the latent variable.2 Each δi is an error term for the relevant indicator. The reflective model is 
the typical unidimensional measurement model found in psychometrics. In the measurement 
of general intelligence, each Xi would be, for example, a subtest (or item) of a test of 
cognitive ability and performance on each subtest (or item) would be seen as a function of 
position on the latent variable g; it is differences in positions on g which, it is claimed, cause 
differences in performance on the indicators (hence the direction of the arrows). This is, of 
2 The factor loading of an indicator X with respect to a factor F is an estimated (Pearson) 
correlation between X and F
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1362-
course, a simplified model, but it should be sufficient for illustrative purposes. Formative 
models, on the other hand, are popular in sociological research. For example, socioeconomic 
status (SES) is often modeled formatively. In the formative model the direction of causal 
influence is reversed, running from the indicators to the latent variable. The latent variable is 
regressed on its indicators, not the other way around. One (or a population) occupies a 
position on SES because of the values of the indicators, such as gross yearly income, and 
SES is interpreted as summary of the observed measures; no ontological commitment 
regarding SES independent of its indicators is required. We may even use one’s SES score to 
predict one’s level on some unmeasured indicator, but even this does not entail that SES is 
being treated as existing independently of its indicators. 
Some latent variables are generated by variability between persons (interindividual 
variation) and others are generated by variability within persons (intraindividual variability). 
g represents the former kind of variability. Proponents of g-factor models of intelligence cite 
the robustness of g across different factor analytic techniques, biological correlates with g, 
and the apparent impossibility of constructing a test of cognitive ability that does not load on 
g as evidence that there is a single dominant mental ability underlying all cognitive tasks (or 
at least those sampled by intelligence tests). This is a bit rough since not all intelligence 
theorists who take g to be a requisite explanandum for an acceptable theory of intelligence 
interpret ‘g’ similarly. One source of the heterogeneity in interpretations of ‘g’ is confusion 
over what g is. Prominent intelligence researchers sometimes conflate distinct concepts under
the name ‘g’. This ambiguity in g is not a feature of g or factor analysis itself. Rather the 
ambiguity is a consequence of running distinct statistical concepts together. Offering a 
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cautionary tale I now turn to a discussion of how various prominent researchers have fallen 
prey to such confusions.
The four different notions that are sometimes run together under the term ‘g’ are 
1. g-factor: the most general and latent statistical factor that accounts for some 
portion of the correlation between variables,
2. g-score: the weighted sum of an individual’s scores on variables that comprise the
g-factor; i.e., one’s position on the latent variable, the g-factor,
3. general mental ability: the trait or attribute said to be measured by accepted tests 
of mental ability which load heavily on the g-factor; the purported latent cause of 
variability in between-subject scores on tests of mental ability,
4. g-loading: the correlation between a variable indicating performance (i.e., a 
variable in a matrix of correlations) and the g-factor.
As I will show, running these four related concepts together can lead to serious confusion and
odd results.  
3.1 Case 1: The Flynn Effect
The Flynn Effect is the well-documented, worldwide steady increase in average IQ (Flynn 
1984, 1987, 1999). IQ gains are, on average, 3 points per decade since 1932 (Neisser 1998, 
13). Opponents of the centrality of the g-factor object that if IQ tests measure mental ability 
(i.e., g in the third sense above) and IQ has been increasing, then so must mental ability. The 
force of the objection comes from the fact that performance on highly g-loaded IQ tests 
correlates strongly with academic and occupational achievement, but IQ gains have, in fact, 
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not been accompanied by corresponding gains in academic and occupational achievement 
(Deary 2001; Flynn 1999), which is a counter-intuitive result given that academic and 
occupational achievement are correlated with mental ability.
A popular response to this objection to g-factor theories of intelligence (Miele 2002; 
Rushton 1999) is to claim that the IQ gains are hollow in the sense that the gains reflect 
improved performance on just the non-g-loaded sections of the IQ tests. The rationale behind 
this suggestion is that if the gains in IQ can be accounted for by performance on those 
sections or items of the test that are not g-loaded, then performance is increasing on those 
sections or items of IQ tests that are not measuring mental ability. This response is an 
instance of a general strategy for countering the Flynn Effect—to acknowledge that there are 
IQ-gains, but to deny that there are corresponding gains in general mental ability. This 
response may seem ad hoc and difficult to reconcile with the fact that IQ-gains are most 
pronounced on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, the psychometric test said to be the “purest” 
measure of general mental ability, i.e., the Raven’s measures general mental ability and little 
else.
There is another response that follows the aforementioned general strategy, and 
though it may avoid charges of arbitrariness or ad hoc-ness, the response is marred by 
equivocation. The response typically goes as follows: if the individual differences, i.e., 
between-subject variability, in performance on psychometric tests (or the correlations 
between performance on the tests) has remained constant, then so will g. Therefore, IQ gains 
need not accompany gains in g, and since there are no gains in general mental ability, we 
should expect no gains in achievement. This response equivocates: ‘g’ in its first occurrence 
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only makes sense when interpreted as meaning the g-factor (a between-subject statistic), 
whereas in the second occurrence it is intended in the sense of general mental ability (a 
within-subject phenomenon).
3.2. Case 2: Psycho-educational Assessment
One dramatic instance of g-ambiguity comes from research in psycho-educational research, 
particularly research on learning disabilities in high-IQ children. The classic operational 
definition of learning disabilities is a discrepancy between IQ and achievement (Kavale and 
Forness 1995). In the field of educational psychology there has been a growing concern over 
misdiagnoses of learning abilities in gifted children. Under the classical operational 
definition of a learning disability, gifted children are at an increased risk for being diagnosed 
with learning disabilities—a surprising result. If mental abilities are more differentiated (i.e., 
less strongly correlated) in populations at the high end of the ability spectrum, then ability 
and achievement are also more likely to be more discrepant, leading to increased learning 
disability diagnosis rates. There are reasons to think that gifted children are not at an 
increased risk for learning disabilities, but that they are at an increased risk for misdiagnoses 
of learning disabilities (Lovett and Lewandowski 2006).  
That mental abilities show greater differentiation at higher levels is well-confirmed 
(Spearman 1927; Detterman and Daniel 1989; Deary and Pagliari 1991; Detterman 1991; 
Neisser 1999). For this and other reasons, researchers have questioned the legitimacy of 
learning disabilities operationalized as IQ/achievement discrepancy. Ability-differentiation in
high IQ children entails that IQ tests have lower g-loadings for that subpopulation. If g-
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loading is conflated with general mental ability, the paradoxical conclusion follows that 
gifted (high ability) children have a lower general mental ability than the rest of the 
population. Indeed, some psychologists have made this inference on the basis of such this 
confusion. For example, Ulric Neisser (1999, 131) writes:
Generally speaking, g accounts for less and less of the variance as one moves to 
individuals with higher and higher scores. This means that more intelligent people 
have more diverse sets of specific abilities; those in the lower range have not 
developed those abilities and must use what little they have for virtually every test. 
Less intelligent people have relatively more g!
The first occurrence of ‘g’ in the passage quoted above refers to the g-factor; however, the 
second occurrence of ‘g’ is intended to refer to general mental ability. Detterman (1991) 
gestures toward this inference (though he does not make it) when he points out that 
Spearman may have been committed to the paradoxical result:
[Spearman] thought that it was g that produced the correlations among tests, and that 
people differed in the g they had. Logically, then, groups with the highest correlations
among tests should have the largest amount of g. Because, in both data reported by 
Spearman and in my data, the low-IQ groups had the highest correlations among 
tests, they also must have the largest amount of g. In other words, g correlates 
negatively with intelligence, so g must be stupidity (1991, 254).
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In this passage, the first and second occurrences of ‘g’ refer to general mental ability, the 
fourth occurrence refers to the g-loading of the tests administered, and the third and fifth 
occurrence refers to general mental ability. Conflating these different concepts leads to the 
paradoxical result that general mental ability is “stupidity.” Notice also that the 
aforementioned paradoxical result entails that IQ tests, purported measures of mental ability, 
do not measure mental ability, at least not in any meaningful way.
4. Disambiguating g
The source of the confusion in the previous two examples is the conflation of levels of 
mental ability with the variance accounted for by g. A person’s level of general mental 
ability, i.e., what is represented by a person’s g-score, need not be commensurate with the 
amount of variance that the g-factor captures in a collection of scores on mental ability tests. 
The percentage of variance accounted for (g-loading) is not a meaningful statistic for an 
individual and, hence, cannot indicate an individual’s g-score or an individual’s level of 
ability. The assumption that the models constructed to represent the structure of variability in 
the population also fit the individuals within is known as local homogeneity (Borsboom 
2005). The quoted passages above seem presuppose local homogeneity, and some 
psychologists explicitly make the assumption as an idealizing principle. Consider the 
following passage from Anderson:
Since difference in test scores are the target of explanation, whether these represent 
differences between 2 adults or longitudinal changes within the same individual 
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seems irrelevant. It is taken to be a parsimonious assumption that these differences in 
scores are to be explained with reference to the same mechanism. Thus, for example, 
higher synaptic efficiency makes one individual more intelligent, and increasing 
synaptic efficiency with age makes us more intelligent as we develop (1992, 2). 
Nevertheless it makes little sense to appeal to local homogeneity in the context of 
intelligence research as it conflicts with another commitment typically held by proponents of 
g-factor theories of intelligence, namely the stability of an individual’s performance over 
time on tests of ability. If performance is stable, there is no variability to model; g is, by its 
nature, an interindividual statistic that arises when a diverse battery of mental ability tests are
administered to a large population. The claim that the g-factor is an indicator of general 
mental ability in individuals (to a greater or lesser extent) is logically independent from its 
statistical nature. If g has any empirical significance, it is as an indicator that individual 
differences in test scores can be modeled along a single dimension. Bartholomew (2004) 
likens g to longitude in this respect. Longitude is a dimension along which geographical 
points can differ. The Eiffel Tower and Lenin’s sarcophagus, for example, differ along this 
dimension. Each of these objects occupies a point on this dimension and their locations can 
be partially described by specifying their “score” on that dimension. However, the location of
the Eiffel Tower on its own is insufficient for constructing the dimension of longitude as the 
Eiffel Tower stays put. 
5. Conclusion
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I have drawn attention to several problems in the conceptual foundations of psychological 
measurement. First I argued for a pragmatic distinction between latent and manifest 
variables. This account avoids the controversy concerning the so-called 
“observable/theoretical” distinction associated with the realism debates. I then turned to 
equivocal notions of the g-factor. The diagnosis of the ambiguity is that it results from a tacit 
assumption of local homogeneity, which, in turn, leads to a conflation of several distinct 
statistical and psychological concepts. Once teased apart, no paradox arises; however, 
echoing others including Borsboom (2005), I noted that if g denotes general mental ability, it 
seems that no individual has it, for g is an interindividual statistic. As a dimension of 
variability, psychometricians can assign individuals scores on that dimension, though doing 
so involves substantive empirical assumptions and merely provides an ordinal standing of 
that individual relative to the relevant population. 
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Effects and Artifacts: Robustness Analysis and the Production Process
Abstract: Scientists often use multiple independent methods of identification to 
distinguish reliable results from those produced in error (artifacts). This process is referred to 
as ‘robustness analysis’. I argue that even though robustness analysis is useful for 
differentiating natural phenomena from artifacts, it fails to differentiate experimentally 
produced effects from artifacts. I argue that to bypass this problem, we can re-frame the role 
of robustness analysis to focus on cross-comparison between methods of production. 
Focusing on the production relation provides information about how changes in conditions 
alter given effects, without first having to make a distinction between effect and artifact. 
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1. Introduction.
Scientists often use multiple methods of identification to distinguish reliable results 
from those produced in error. When methods converge on an object or process, inferences are
made about reliability. For example, Perrin (1913) successfully used multiple independent 
methods of measurement and inference to converge on Avagadro’s number, thus supporting 
its objectivity. Unsuccessful convergence (or divergence) indicates error. Recently, 
disagreement has surfaced about the failure of reproducing results about an arsenic-
consuming living organism (Reaves et al. 2012). In 2010 a novel discovery seemed to 
redefine how biologists understand the chemistry of living organisms by questioning whether
phosphorous is necessary for cellular function. A bacterium in the arsenic-rich waters of 
Mono Lake was found. Under a set of specific experimental conditions the organism was 
found to replace phosphorous with arsenic in its DNA (Wolfe-Simon et al 2011). However, 
using more stringent, independent experimental conditions to eliminate phosphorous and to 
“purify” the DNA samples of any clinging arsenate, Reaves et al. (2012) did not find 
covalently bound arsenate in the DNA structure. The divergence in results indicates that there
was an experimental error produced and that the original arsenic-consumption effect was an 
artifact of the lack of purification in the preparatory procedure. 
This method of identification based on converging results is commonly referred to as 
‘robustness analysis’. It is a methodological process of generating conclusions or results that 
converge over a variety of independent identifications, models, measurements, or derivations 
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(Wimsatt 2007, 43). Philosophers of science have discussed robustness analysis in modeling1 
as well as in experimentation and evidence.2 I focus on the latter. According to Wimsatt, 
robustness analysis grounds realism, reliability, and objectivity and distinguishes the 
ontologically and epistemologically “trustworthy” from what is unreliable (2007, 56). 
Specifically, it differentiates real objects, events, and processes from “artifacts”, which are 
results produced in error (2007, 38).3 The characteristic of “artifactual” results is that they are
unstable in the context of multiple independent methods of identification (Wimsatt 2007, 56).
To understand how stability/convergence and instability/divergence works, a bit of detail 
about the process of robustness analysis is necessary. 
In robustness analysis, several independent methods converge on a common 
consequence despite independent conditions, abstractions, and idealizing assumptions 
(Levins 1966; Wimsatt 2007). This consequence, often referred to as a ‘robust consequence’, 
can be a prediction, property, or result.4 After the robust consequence is generated, a ‘robust 
1 See Levins (1966); Glymour (1980); Weisberg (2006); and Wimsatt (2007).
2 See Horwich (1982); Hacking (1983); Franklin (1997); Sober (1989); Cartwright (1991); 
Trout (1998); Culp (1994); Woodward (2006); Stegenga (2009).  
3 In this discussion I use ‘artifact’ in reference to experimental artifacts, which are results 
produced in error. Technological artifacts will not be addressed except for in the development
of a characterization of ‘experimental artifacts’ in Section 2. 
4 Levins and Wimsatt explicitly characterize common consequences and robust theorems in 
relation to the modeling process. Here, I extend ‘consequences’ to any method of 
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theorem’ is created, which states the robust consequence relatively independent of the 
different conditions, abstractions, and idealizing assumptions.5 Wimsatt (2007) frames 
robustness analysis as an effective “heuristic” that can be used to show how a robust 
consequence does not depend on the different details of each method (56). These details are 
unstable between methods and thus their divergence fades into the background, while the 
robust consequence is set into focus. Wimsatt (2007) uses the example of detecting properties
of planets with multiple independent imaging techniques. According to Wimsatt, if a given 
signal is weak and the noise of each imaging technique is strong, by combining techniques, 
the signal strength will increase while the different types of noise will not (2007, 57). The 
noise is independent, random, and differs between methods, while the signal is invariant and 
over each method. 
At first glance, philosophical examples of robustness analysis, signal detection 
(Wimsatt 2007; Campbell 1966), ecological populations and species polymorphism (Levins 
1966), predicting predator-prey relations using Lotka–Volterra equations (Weisberg 2006), 
climate change (Lloyd and Parker 2009; Lloyd 2010) do not seem to have anything particular
in common about the type of regularities studied. They show diverse application of 
robustness analysis to physical and biological regularities. But these are all examples of using
robustness analysis to distinguish natural phenomena from results produced in error. That is, 
indentification.
5 In discussions about the robust theorem, Weisberg (2006) places attention on underlying 
common structure. Levins (1966) and Wimsatt (2007) discuss the falsifying idealizations. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1376-
in these types of examples objects, events, and processes are discovered by carefully 
comparing multiple independent methods of identification. To use a signal detection analogy, 
methods are fine-tuned so that the signal of a given regularity is made clear. However, there 
is a different type of regularity that requires careful differentiation and attention: effects that 
are experimentally produced rather than discovered. 
Hacking distinguishes ‘phenomena’ and ‘effects’. He characterizes ‘phenomena’ as 
“observable regularities” (1983, 221). These are regularities that are not the result of 
experimental intervention—e.g., the planets and stars. According to Hacking, there are few 
phenomena in nature waiting to be observed but science is full of regularities that are 
produced through intervention as ‘effects’ (1983, 227).6 He distinguishes the two types of 
regularities:
Phenomena  and  effects  are  in  the  same  line  of  business:  noteworthy  discernible
regularities. The words ‘phenomena’ and ‘effect’ can often serve as synonyms, yet
they  point  in  different  directions.  Phenomena  remind  us,  in  that  semiconscious
repository of language, of events that can be recorded by the gifted observer who
does not intervene in the world by who watches the stars. Effects remind us of the
great experiments after whom, in general, we name the effects: the men and women,
the Compton and Curie, who intervened in the course of nature, to create a regularity
which, at least at first, can be seen as regular (or anomalous) only against the further
background of theory. (Hacking 1983, 224-225)
6 Often, Hacking uses ‘phenomena’ for ‘effects’. 
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Effects require carefully planned production conditions. According to Hacking, the aim of 
experiments is to “create,” “refine,” and repeat the effects produced in an experiment (1983, 
229-230). But because effects fall apart when conditions are modified, it is likely that effects 
are only produced under specific conditions in an experimental setting (1983, 225-226). 
Suppose that we apply robustness analysis to a given effect to figure out if it is reliable. We 
develop independent methods for the production of this effect, but because effects are 
sensitive to conditions, convergence is unsuccessful. What can we conclude about reliability?
Using diverging results will not help. It has been argued that divergence or “discordance” in 
results thwarts useful inferences about reliability and error (Stegenga 2009). An important 
methodological and epistemological question arises for robustness analysis: If effects require 
careful experimental production and are sensitive to changes, how do we know when an 
effect is genuine, rather when it is a result produced in error (an experimental artifact)? 
In this discussion I argue that robustness analysis does not reliably differentiate 
between effects and experimental artifacts, but that we can modify its function in such 
instances to give us useful information about the production relation. In Section 2, I argue 
that robustness analysis fails to differentiate genuine effects from artifacts because: 1) 
“Arrangements” cannot be differentiated into the “real” and the artificial; and 2) Introducing 
multiple methods will change the conditions, thus producing diverging results. In Section 3, I
argue that to bypass this problem about differentiating effects from artifacts, we can re-frame 
the role of robustness analysis. I propose that we can use cross-comparison to understand 
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how changes in conditions alter given effects. This allows us to understand the experimental 
production process.   
2. Differentiating Effects from Experimental Artifacts.
In this section I argue that both effects and experimental artifacts are condition-
sensitive, and for this reason difficult to distinguish. Hacking illustrates the condition 
sensitivity of effects by describing the original Hall effect experiment, where an electric 
current is passed through a gold leaf in the presence of a perpendicular magnetic field. These 
conditions produce a potential difference across the conductor (the leaf) and at right angles to
the magnetic field and conductor (1983, 224). Hacking says that even though the conditions 
were carefully planned and the apparatus was human-made, we have the intuition that the 
phenomenon was “discovered” in the laboratory rather than created (1983, 225). But 
according to Hacking, the “arrangement” of conditions behind the Hall effect only occurs in 
the laboratory. He says, “I suggest, in contrast, that the Hall effect does not exist outside of 
certain kinds of apparatus. Its modern equivalent has become technology, reliable and 
routinely produced. The effect, at least in a pure state, can only be embodied by such 
devices” (1983, 225). Hacking’s analogy between technological effects and experimental 
effects provides an important point. Both types of effects are sensitive to the manipulations of
the arrangement of conditions. Kroes (2003) provides a useful characterization that 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1379-
supplements Hacking’s analogy between experiment and technology, and he uses it specifies 
‘experimental artifacts’.7 
Kroes (2003) characterizes ‘artifacts’ in general as resulting from intentional human 
action and directed toward a specific function. However, he points out that artifacts “obey the
so-called laws of nature; that is, their behavior can be explained causally in a nonteleological 
way” (2003 19). We can summarize Kroes’ (2003) points into two important features of 
artifacts: 1) Human design/specified function; and 2) Regularities explainable by laws of 
nature. Kroes’ (2003) initial characterization focuses on technological artifacts, which require
a considerable element of human structural design and function. For example, the structured 
interactions of thin film transistors (TFT’s) can be manipulated for the purposes of LED 
technology (Machrone 2013).8 I add that such technological artifacts often result from 
experimentally produced effects.9 If technological artifacts are products of human design then
7 Kroes’s (2003) is noteworthy because it is an extension of Hacking’s argument for 
experimentation. Chakrabarty (2012) provides an important summary of definitions of 
artifacts.
8 This technology is based on the Hosono et al. (2005) research on crystal structure. 
9 Hosono et al. (2005) found that by manipulating the crystal structure of certain materials 
we can experimentally produce a compound that conducts electricity. The reason why this is 
an experimental effect is because even if a given compound’s conductivity is low (e.g., due to
the asymmetry in the crystal structure), adding titanium atoms to its structure produces 
symmetric cages, which allows free electron flow (Hosono et al. 2005). 
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experimental artifacts can be characterized as design products of the apparatus and the 
arrangement of measurement conditions. Kroes (2003) makes a fine-grained characterization 
of experimental artifacts by discussing “artificial environments” vs. the “object system” of 
study. Drawing on Franklin’s (1986) discussion he characterizes experimental artifacts as 
“results that are generated by the artificial environment or artificial means of observation of 
the natural phenomena under study” (2003, 71). In his discussion of distinguishing artifacts 
from genuine effects he suggests: 
The results of an experiment are always the outcome of the object system interacting
with an artificial environment, and therefore it is always necessary to filter out the
component in the results that tells us something about the object system. (2003, 71)
While this suggestion is useful in distinguishing phenomena from artifacts, it is not helpful 
for distinguishing effects from artifacts. The reason why is because it assumes that we can 
filter out the error in an experimental arrangement by separating the artificial environment 
from the object system. Sometimes, experimental arrangements do not lend themselves to 
filtering because they heavily rely on the manipulation of total conditions rather than on the 
distinction between artificial and natural conditions. Take Hasok Chang’s (2004) discussion 
the manufacturing process of fixed points in thermometry. 
Chang details how the boiling point of water varies with differences in atmospheric 
pressure and dissolved gas (Chang 2004, 15-19). Different arrangements of conditions will 
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produce a different boiling point. The effect of boiling point is so sensitive to the 
manipulation of conditions that water can boil at 101.9 degrees C merely in the presence of 
dissolved gas (Chang 2004, 19). In the history of fixed points like the boiling point of water, 
material conditions have to be fine-tuned to “manufacture” fixity (2004, 49). Here, Kroes’s 
(2003) suggestion to filter out the “artificial environment” and focus on the “object system” 
is not helpful. In the case of boiling point, all we have is “arrangements” that are 
manipulated. Sometimes nature manipulates the same effects that scientists create in the lab. 
For example, Hacking says, “If anywhere in nature there is such an arrangement, with no 
intervening causes, then the Hall effect occurs” (1983, 226). So we can’t claim that some 
arrangement themselves are artificial and some are natural. Additionally, in the lab, 
differentiating which arrangements are artificial and which ones are natural is just as 
difficult. Suppose that we manipulated atmospheric pressure but let dissolved gas run out 
naturally. While the former requires human intervention it is unclear if it is artificial. The 
latter requires no human intervention but is still changing given the conditions in the room. In
both instances there is a change in conditions relevant to the production of the effect, but the 
division between artificial and object system is unclear. Perhaps multiplying production 
methods will help. 
A common specification in robustness analysis is to use multiple independent 
methods.10 Suppose that we want to check to see if water boiling at 101.9 degrees C is an 
10 Philosophers such as, Nagel (1939); Horwich (1982); Franklin (1984); Sober (1989); 
Trout (1993); Culp (1994); Keeley (2002); Staley (2004); Douglas (2004); Novack (2007); 
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artifact. We repeat the exact same conditions and reproduce the effect of water boiling at 
101.9 degrees C. Here, we would not be using independent methods. For example, in our re-
production of the boiling point, the physical conditions are the same types of conditions. In 
fact, because of the sensitivity of boiling point they have to be the same types of conditions 
to reproduce the same boiling point. If we change the physical conditions, results will diverge
from those of our initial condition arrangement. The point is that using independent methods 
of measurement with sensitive effects will produce diverging results. The divergence does 
not differentiate effects from artifacts. 
The reason why robustness analysis fails to differentiate effects from artifacts is 
important. In the context of “discovered phenomena,” condition sensitivity is precisely the 
indicator in robustness analysis that tells us when something is produced in error. The 
mesosome is an example of a cellular structure that appeared in multiple types of microscopy
measurement methods. But it was later found to be a result produced in error by chemical 
fixation in a specific preparatory procedure.11 In the context of the mesosome, as soon as we 
switch preparatory procedures the mesosome disappears (Rasumussen 1993; 2001). This 
indicates that it was a result produced by the preparatory procedure. In the context of so-
Wimsatt (2007); and Stegenga (2012), have discussed conditions defining independence. I 
will not summarize the differences in views here. 
11 For debate on measurement methods and the mesosome see Culp (1994), Rasmussen 
(1993; 2001), and Hudson (1999). Stegenga uses this example to illustrate converging results
can support false conclusions (2009, 653).  
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called arsenic-ingesting bacteria, as soon as we carefully “wash” the DNA structure we see 
that there is no covalently bound arsenate in the DNA sample, and so the bacteria does not 
replace phosphorous with arsenate in its DNA structure (Reaves et al. 2012). This indicates 
that the pre-spectroscopy DNA “purification” procedure produced the result. In these 
contexts there is a phenomenon that is independent of the arrangement of conditions in the 
preparatory procedures. In the case of effects, the thing produced is arrangement-dependent. 
Given that artifacts are arrangement-dependent also, we need another condition that 
differentiates that two. But instead I propose that we look past the distinction to learn 
something unique about robustness analysis in the context of effects.12 We can use diverging 
results to understand how changes in conditions alter given effects. 
3. Production Analysis.
How can diverging results provide useful information in the context of effects? 
Robustness analysis focuses on converge. When using the analysis, we focus on 
consequences common to several independent methods. But there are two philosophical 
accounts of robustness analysis that say something useful about diverging results (Weisberg 
2006; Keyser 2016). I take elements from each in order to develop ‘production analysis’. 
Weisberg (2006) focuses on predictions rather than consequences and models rather 
than methods, but we can modify his steps to be useful for experimental production. 
12 In the remainder of the discussion I use ‘effects’ only in reference to things produced by 
the arrangement of experimental conditions. 
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Weisberg outlines robustness analysis using four steps. First, we find a robust property, which
consists of finding a property, experimental result, or prediction that is common to a set of 
models with different idealizing assumptions (2006, 736). In the context of effects, we do not
discover robust properties. Rather, we produce certain regularities. As was presented in 
Section 2, because of the sensitivity of effects and the requirement of independence, effects 
will fail to converge between production methods. Weisberg’s (2006) second step is to 
investigate the “common structure” by looking at the common features of the models that 
give rise to the robust property (2006, 737).” In the context of effects, we can look at this as 
the common features of production that create a given effect. However, if we have diverging 
results this step is not useful. The third step is an “empirical interpretation” of the 
mathematical structures from step two. That is, according to Weisberg in the third step of 
robustness analysis we are concerned with “interpreting the mathematical structures as 
descriptions of empirical phenomena (2006, 738).” This step is uninformative for produced 
effects because we are not using modeling methods to link a theory to a natural phenomenon,
but rather we are using experimental methods to manufacture the effect itself. In the context 
of effects, our concern is a production relation rather than a representation relation. However,
the final step of Weisberg’s (2006) analysis is important. Weisberg says, “Finally, the 
theorist can conduct stability analysis of the robust theorem to determine what 
conditions will defeat the connection between common structure and robust property” 
(2006, 738). 
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We can transform Weisberg’s stability analysis into what I call a ‘production 
analysis’. Instead of looking at what model conditions will defeat the robust property, we 
can look at how specific experimental conditions produce differences and similarities in 
effects. This requires structuring production analysis into features. First, multiple methods 
of production are involved. These can be referred to as ‘production processes’. The 
production processes will contain experimental conditions (i.e. “arrangements”) that are 
causally relevant to the effects they produce.13 These methods do not have to be 
independent. For example, we can compare multiple production processes of the boiling 
point of water, using the same condition parameter values. In fact, when it comes to effects,
it may help to have both dependent and independent methods. The reason why is because 
we can track what kinds of changes occur from similar processes as well as what kinds of 
changes occur from different processes. Second, conditions in production processes are 
compared to map out convergence and divergence. It may be that all production processes 
diverge (or converge), or that there is a mix of convergence and divergence. This feature of 
production analysis contains not only a comparison of convergence and divergence but also
a comparison of the conditions in each production process. Third, theory is applied to the 
two levels of comparison to explain why certain conditions produce (or fail to produce) 
specific changes in the effect. This final component of production analysis is informative 
about how conditions change effects. To detail how production analysis works, we can 
13 A particular theory of causation is not important for our purposes. 
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draw on elements from Keyser’s (2016) discussion about cross-comparison and theory in 
robustness analysis.14 
For his account of robust measurement, Keyser (2016) assumes an important 
mechanism discussed by Woodward (2003). Manipulating one variable to see changes in 
another is causally informative. Keyser (2016) argues that theory in the presence of diverging
measurement results can explain why divergence occurs. He uses the example of mixed 
convergence and divergence in multiple modes of temperature measurement. When multiple 
thermometers converge but others diverge, theory steps in to analyze the conditions behind 
the divergence (Keyser 2016, 10). Keyser proposes that theory homes in on specific physical 
differences in thermometers—e.g., the liquid used in a given thermometer—in order to 
explain how those features produce differences in results (2016, 10-11). This differential 
comparison and explanation process is useful for measurement in terms of specifying the 
“location” of error (Keyser 2016, 11). But in the context of production, what does it mean to 
have an explanation about why divergence occurs? 
To be more informative, I add that diverging results can provide information about 
which conditions produce a change (or fail to produce a change) in the effect. In other words, 
divergence locates specific changes in the production relation between condition and effect. 
Then theory can be used to explain why those production changes occur. Suppose that there 
are two experimental setups (or production processes) for the boiling point of water. In the 
first setup, there is no presence of dissolved gas. In the second setup, we add a certain 
14 Cited with permission from author. 
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amount of dissolved gas, which increases the temperature by a certain amount of degrees. 
Comparing the two setups in terms of divergence and also in terms of their conditions, we see
that there is divergence in results and that the difference in conditions is in the presence of 
dissolved gas. Each production process creates two different boiling points. Without the 
presence of theory these comparisons are uninformative. But with the presence of theory we 
understand that the difference between the two production processes can be explained by a 
specific theoretical reason (e.g., we are influencing “vapor pressure” in different ways in 
each process). 
To summarize, production analysis requires: 1) Two levels of comparison, which 
locate what conditions are relevant to the effects. Effects are compared to see the presence of 
divergence and convergence. Conditions are also compared to see what differences may be 
responsible for changes (or failures of change) in effects; 2) Theoretical explanation about 
why divergence is being produced and what conditions are responsible. In production 
analysis the focus is on how certain conditions produce effects. The aim is to understand 
production relations in the context of multiple production processes. The benefit of 
production analysis is it provides useful information about the production process without 
first having to differentiate effect from artifact. 
4. Concluding Remarks.
While robustness analysis is informative for the distinction between phenomena and 
results produced in error, it fails to distinguish experimentally produced effects from artifacts.
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The reason why is because in the context of production, both effects and artifacts are 
sensitive to changes in methods of production. This means that diverging results will not be 
informative for differentiating effects from artifacts. Condition sensitivity is precisely the 
indicator in robustness analysis that tells us when something is produced in error; and both 
effects and artifacts sound off this indicator. I argued that to bypass this problem about 
differentiating effects from artifacts, we can re-frame the role of robustness analysis to focus 
on: 1) Cross-comparison between results and also between conditions; and 2) Theoretical 
explanation of that cross-comparison. I refer to this process as ‘production analysis’. I 
proposed that we use diverging results to understand how changes in conditions alter given 
effects. This provides information about the production relation and a new role to robustness 
analysis in accounting for how conditions are relevant to effects. 
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 Indexically Structured Ecological Communities 
  
Abstract. Ecological communities are seldom, if ever, biological individuals. They lack 
causal boundaries as the populations that constitute communities are not congruent and rarely 
have persistent functional roles regulating the communities’ higher properties. Instead we 
should represent ecological communities indexically, by identifying ecological communities 
via the network of weak causal interactions between populations that unfurl from a starting 
set of populations. This precisification of ecological communities helps identify how 
community properties remain invariant, and why they have robust characteristics. This is a 
more general framework than individuality, respecting the diversity and aggregational nature 
of these complex systems while still vindicating them as units worthy of investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
Ecology studies the distribution and abundance of populations across landscapes and over 
time. Community ecology has long operated with the assumption of “local determinism”: i.e. 
that ecological patterns are primarily explained by the interaction of local populations within 
a community. The ‘local ecological community’ functions as the core unit of investigation; it 
is thought to have discrete boundaries, stable composition, predictable dynamics over time, 
and allows for inferences made from one community to apply to the next. But there have 
been many dissenting voices within the ecological research tradition who instead argue for 
ecological individualism, emphasizing that populations generally move around a landscape of 
their own accord driven by chance and by abiotic factors and are not heavily influenced by 
their local neighbours and as a result ecological communities are largely ephemeral 
compositions of populations. This debate drives considerations whether there are law-like 
regularities in community ecology.  
To arbitrate this debate philosophers and biologists have provided an analyses of the 
conditions for an assemblage- a collection of populations in a space- to be an ecological 
community. Namely, assemblages should be a biological individual just like an individual 
organism or a lineage. If an ecological community is a biological individual then it is the 
cohesive and distinct entity that local determinism presupposes. Jay Odenbaugh and Kim 
Sterelny independently specified the conditions under which an ecological assemblage can be 
thought of as an objective and important unit in nature, an ecological community. Both 
authors leave it empirically open as to whether and which assemblages satisfy the conditions 
they present (Odenbaugh, 2007; Sterelny; 2006).  
I argue that as ecological communities so rarely satisfy these conditions we need an 
alternative account of ecological communities. Instead ecological systems are largely 
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aggregations of individual populations unlinked by stable, strong causal interactions. As a 
result they are better described indexically, as causal networks which unfurl from a specific 
point of reference. This acts to fix the reference in these unsystematic systems and allows for 
the identification of the robust parts and robust properties of ecological systems. To infer 
from one community to the next we need a precise account of the identity of the units we are 
discussing. This elaboration on indexical communities provides that. This is not to say that 
ecological communities will never be biological individual, there will be limiting cases. But 
these lie so far from the norm that we need a framework that better represent the degree of 
variation in ecological assemblages.  
This proposal provides a substantively different framework to biological individuality, 
diversifying the ontological toolkit of philosophers of biology. To do this I will first introduce 
the theory behind ecological communities as biological individuals. I then elaborate on what 
it takes for a collection of parts to be an individual and why ecological systems are almost 
always not. Into this lacuna I then present the indexical account of ecological communities 
and the advantages it entails. 
2. Communities as Biological Individuals 
Multicellular biological individuals evolved from single cell biological individuals. While 
multicellular individuals often evolve from a single species population it is not uncommon 
for multispecies assemblages to form individual organisms such as lichens1. But there is also 
integration without unification; most large metazoans only function by inheriting bacteria that 
maintain them in a symbiotic relationship (perhaps also some biofilms). These biological 
                                                          
1
 Single species populations transitioning into an individual are referred to as fraternal 
transitions. Multispecies transitions are referred to as egalitarian transitions (Queller, 2000). 
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phenomena demonstrate that strong ecological interactions precede transitions in 
individuality and multispecies assemblages can be individuals. But where does this leave the 
assemblage’s community ecologists are familiar with? They are clearly less of an individual 
than populations in close symbiotic relationships. Any account of biological individuality for 
communities needs to be able to account for degrees of individuality. One way to indicate this 
is by providing a set of conditions which if fulfilled rightly counts an ecological community 
as an individual, then leave it open as to whether any actual ecological community satisfies 
these conditions. This is what both Sterelny and Odenbaugh do. The conditions they present 
follow: 
2.1. Boundaries 
Individuals, as spatio-temporal entities comprised of interacting sub-parts, have boundaries. 
For interacting parts to be a whole there must be strong causal interactions creating internal 
cohesion within the system which isolates it from external influences. The system parts in 
community ecology are the populations which causally interact, creating feedback loops 
maintaining local populations and excluding external populations from invading the local 
system. Sterelny particularly notes that local niche construction is one way populations can 
maintain an assemblage. Famously, Australian plants including Gums, Banksias, and 
Melaleucas are adapted to fire and facilitate the presence of each other by making their local 
environment more fire prone. Under this conception of boundaries ecological communities 
are bound by interaction strength between populations (Levins and Lewontin, 1985). While 
this does not necessarily mean that populations in the system will be congruent, strong causal 
interaction is associated with spatial overlap so congruence of community populations is 
expected. 
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2.2. Internally Structured 
The populations that belong to an ecological individual should act in ways that police the 
identity of that individual. Interspecific interactions- such as predation, competition, and, 
mutualism- are thought to form a lattice of positive and negative feedback loops, regulating 
the community and creating stability. When you couple these interactions with stable 
geographic ranges of the populations you gain a picture of stable economy of nature in which 
there is persistence of local population identity due to the specific roles that these populations 
play. Internal structure is the product of both feedback loops that act to maintain population 
identity in an area and the persistence of specific populations playing particular roles in this 
local community. 
2.3. System-level Properties 
If we wish to include local ecological communities in our general scientific ontology there 
has to be a reason to talk about communities rather than just talking about the populations 
that make up communities. There should be predicates and properties which are needed for 
describing phenomena at the community level. System-level properties are an explanadum to 
be explained by the assemblage and an explanans for ecological and evolutionary hypotheses. 
Properties generally discussed on the community level are associated with the maintenance of 
multi-species interaction networks (community network structures), the maintenance of 
composition identity or aggregative features (emergent community properties), or the various 
material outputs that the joint assemblage create (community outputs). Odenbaugh treats 
system-level properties as necessary for community existence: ‘species populations form an 
ecological community just in case… they possess a community level property’ (pg 636). He 
primarily mentions interspecific interactions and the feedback loops they create as 
community level properties. Sterelny describes emergent community properties, identifying 
several candidate emergent properties from the diversity-stability hypothesis such as 
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community population stability and community biomass production. The productivity and 
abiotic features ecological communities produce have become an area of keen interest for 
conservation science. Many ecologists have attempted to justify the preservation of 
ecological communities by appealing to the ‘ecosystem services’ - capacities commonly 
attributed to the community as a whole - which they provide. These system-level properties 
feature in ecological explanation and therefore need to be able to be represented by an 
account of ecological communities.  
3. Problems with Individuality 
Sterelny- Odenbaugh individuality features a tripartite criteria that ecological communities 
need to fulfill: they should be bound causally, they should have internal regulation, and they 
should have system-level properties. Sterelny represents these criteria hyper-dimensionally 
noting that each can be more or less instantiated (see fig 1). This is partially true, but these 
axes are not independent, as both authors independently note (Maclaurin and Sterelny, 2008; 
Odenbaugh, Forthcoming). Internal regulation demands boundaries contain regulatory 
patterns of interactions and system-level properties require the populations to be structured. 
This view implies that if communities do not have boundaries they will not have internal 
regulation and without internal regulation they will lack system-level properties. While I 
argue that communities do not have robust boundaries and their internal structure is not as 
stable as individuality requires, I maintain that ecological systems can have system-
properties. Loose aggregative ecological systems produce system-level properties by what I 
call machine robustness and ensemble robustness.  
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Figure 1. Sterelny’s Multidimensional Representation of an Ecological Individual. 
The best way to identify both the relation between robust outputs and the stability of the 
system that produces these outcomes can be found in Bill Wimsatts conceptual framework of 
multiple decomposition. For community boundaries to be ‘real’ they should be descriptively 
robust. An entity is descriptively robust when multiple interventions, multiple types of 
intervention, and different descriptions of relevant properties pick out organisation that is 
largely congruent (Wimsatt; 2007). The parts described by a ‘decomposition’ from one 
theoretical perspective largely align with those describe from another. By applying this 
procedure to local ecological communities, as I will now show, we find that communities as 
we often have understood them are not descriptively robust as a whole and therefore are not 
biological individuals.  
We multiply decompose a ‘local ecological community’ by identifying the causal system 
that the different co-located populations belong to. Each population will belong to an 
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ecological system consisting of just those populations to which they are counterfactually 
sensitive.  For example identifying the ecological system that an echidna populations belongs 
to will include its predators, Goannas, and prey, Termites. If we claim that a local assemblage 
of populations belong to the same individual then those populations should map into a single 
ecological system. If this system is bound and has its own properties then it is a biological 
individual and an ecological community. If populations have a causal interaction profile 
which picks out the same ecological community with congruent boundaries and the same 
sub-parts, then that individual is robust.  
The problem is that co-located populations often belong to radically different ecological 
systems. This is because causal relations in ecology are often asymmetrical and maps of 
organism distributions given by Global Information Systems (GIS) show that populations 
rarely spatially coincide2. Consider the factors relevant to a population of Spotted Quolls 
compared to their occasional prey, Greater Gliders. Individual Quolls roam over home ranges 
up to 3500 hectares moving between habitat fragments via wildlife corridors, while a Glider’s 
home range is only 2 hectares and is locked within a local habitat fragment. Unless there is a 
very strong counterfactual dependence between these two populations the network of 
populations relevant to the Quolls will be radically different to the Gliders, as Quolls interact 
with populations that intersect with their large home ranges. Further, due to the radically 
different ranges and population densities there is a strong asymmetry between these 
populations. Differential changes in a local Glider population are unlikely to affect the Quoll 
population. Its range would include several Glider populations and they are generalist 
predators. But differential changes that increase the Quoll population would impact the 
                                                          
2
 See for example the Atlas of Living Australia for spatial distributions of populations across 
the continent.  
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Glider population as increased predation can have large impacts on small local populations. 
This creates an asymmetry; intervention on Gliders has little impact on Quolls but 
intervention on Quolls significantly impacts Gliders.  
Population boundaries radically differ and the causal relations between populations are 
often asymmetrical. When these conditions are met, congruent boundaries are rare, and 
identifying the population network, and the space that network occupies, will be highly 
dependent on the initial choice of referent. Varying the starting population or property 
referred to in an assemblage will yield radically different descriptions of the ecological 
community. Figure 2 shows the variation that can be displayed in a simple four population 
system for the parts and system outputs. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Asymmetry and Congruence.  Each circle represents a population and its spatial 
range. These populations have the causal structure D  B  A,  CA. The relevant causal 
community of population A is all the local populations as it is causally influenced by all the 
other populations. If we want to find the relevant community for population B then it will 
include the shaded area as population B is only influenced by population D.   
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Ecology aims to explain how populations and their interactions result in system level 
properties like diversity, stability, or ecological services, e.g. water retention and biomass 
production. Local determinism supposes that stable relationships between persistent 
populations produce these properties; stable internal structure produces system level 
properties. Explanations of this type are machine robust; the system-level property is a result 
of a particular causal sequence of interactions between persistent parts. This is, however, a 
problematic assumption as populations are often highly transient. In one study of 100 biomes 
across earth, 75% of these systems had at least one in ten species disappear locally per decade 
(Dornelas, Gotelli et al. 2014). This is often coupled with little change in regional diversity as 
populations simply shift their distribution across the larger landscape (Thuiller, Slingsby et al. 
2007). These studies add further evidence to those who believe that local ecological 
communities are often the wrong scale to look for law-like generalities in ecology (Ricklef, 
1999; Lean and Sterelny, forthcoming). They claim that regional patterns better explain the 
local distribution and abundance of organisms than local patterns which are ephemeral and 
stochastic. These views explicitly reject the idea that local community identity is primarily 
maintained by internal composition. 
Machine robust systems are relatively rare in ecology but there are ubiquitous higher 
level properties begging for explanation. One way we get these stable higher level outputs is 
via another type of robustness commonly found in complex systems, ensemble robustness. 
Ensemble robustness is when the system-level property is a product of diverse and varied 
parts filling the same functional role. The parts in the system do not have to be identical over 
time and space for the high level properties to be robust. For critical feedback loops for 
overall system functioning we often find huge redundancy; for example gum forest 
pollination is done by a range of evolutionary distinct actors including marsupial, insects, and 
birds. The statistical aggregation of the actions of local populations can stabilize ecological 
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output as a result of statistical averaging effects, biological insurance, and sampling effects 
(Bryant, 2010). Ecological systems also have outputs which are not just the simple 
aggregation of component population’s actions. Diverse local species assemblages can have 
non-linear ecosystem outputs; for example, combinations of populations non-additively result 
in explosive combustion in forest fires (Van Altena et al, 2012). Due to all these factors 
higher level properties are ubiquitous in ecological systems even if there are no clear 
boundaries for these systems and the internal composition is unstable.        
Despite the highly aggregational quality of ecological systems, ecological community 
properties are not uniformly a product of ensemble robustness; specific populations are 
sometimes necessary for ecological output. Keystone species, which have disproportionate 
impacts on assemblage composition, function like mechanisms with particular populations 
playing a necessary and causally specific role in maintaining whole system features. The 
importance of keystone species is controversial, with some ecologists pressing that there are 
not such strong relationships between single populations and assemblage features (Mills et al, 
1993). But there is strong evidence that in some systems particular populations do play strong 
roles in regulating a cluster of populations in their assemblage (Ripple et al, 2001). Species 
can co-vary in tight relationships over geological periods that far outstretch local 
communities both spatially and temporally according to paleo-ecological evidence (Sterelny, 
2001). Symbiotic relationships show similar tight co-variation between populations. This 
indicates that nested within larger assemblages we can find sets of populations with strong 
and persisting causal relations that are much more stable than the community as a whole. 
To summarize, ecological communities are highly unsystematic systems, they lack clear 
boundaries and persistent internal identity, but they do have robust parts and robust system 
outputs via the variant aggregative interactions of their constituents. Any account of 
ecological community identity needs to be able to identify these explanatorily important 
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properties and fix the reference of the system that produces these properties. This is difficult 
as population networks will not in general be congruent over different choices of starting 
population as small changes in referent choice can result in a quite different network. But 
ecological communities are still causal systems. Indexical communities describe communities 
via the network of causal interactions between populations and provide a way to represent 
their causal structure.  
4. Indexical Communities 
On a first pass of the philosophy of ecology literature, accounts of ecological communities 
appear to split between treating populations as largely independent of each other, or 
describing them within an individuality framework. There are, however, other options which 
sit between these extremes with Sterelny proposing ‘indexical communities’ in contrast to 
ecological individuality (Sterelny, 2006). The following account of ecological communities 
supplements and develops indexical communities by providing the conceptual apparatus to 
identify robustness and utilizing the Woodwardian interventionist framework to fix the 
reference of the causal system involved (Woodward, 2005).  
Simple indexical communities are ecological units which aim to describe the conditions 
that affect the demographics of single populations. Indexically described communities are 
one of the most useful and utilized ecological technique in conservation science. To preserve 
the critically endangered Hairy Nosed Wombat we need to know how much native grasses 
and tubers they eat, what is an unusual parasite load, how to separate them from wild dog 
populations, and competing gazers. These populations are indexed to the Wombat population 
as they have a causal impact on them. This framework has become commonplace due in part 
to conservation funding being directed to individual species preservation. The science then 
aims to find the conditions that lead to the preservation of a focal population.  
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These simple indexical communities are not thought to be very informative for 
community level properties as they are constructed with limited epistemic aims, i.e. 
explaining the influences on a single population. Due to the limited scope of such causal units 
they remain silent on certain, hopefully generalizable, community level features such as the 
relationship between diversity and stability (Sterelny, 2006). Further it is thought that 
information about one indexical community is difficult to apply to other assemblages due to 
the apparent limited nature of their scope. But we can rectify these problems by building into 
indexical communities the means for identifying machine robustness and ensemble 
robustness. 
This is done by allowing for multiple decomposition of a local assemblage using 
Woodwardian Intervention. To be able to identify robustness in these ecological assemblage 
in their output or causal boundaries we need to have multiple starting points to investigate the 
unit. While indexical communities as they have previously been discussed are only around a 
focal population, this account of indexical communities expands the focal unit to a set of 
multiple populations. The stepwise procedure for identifying the relevant ecological 
community appears in Box 1, but here also is a description of the process. Take the starting 
set of populations and identify the indexical community of each individual population in the 
set. The indexical community for a population is identified by intervention: treat the focal 
indexical population as variable A. An alternative population variable, B, is said to be part of 
the same community, as well as a cause of A, if systematic intervention on B brings about 
change in A. Further, once we identify that a population variable has causal influence on the 
focal population we can ask whether intervention on populations that affect it also have 
‘downstream’ effects on A. If so, then that population is also part of the community. Each 
population node introduced between the focal population and a population of interest will 
necessarily reduce the counterfactual relationship between them. 
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This process yields a directed graphical map of the causal network indexed to 
population A. We repeat this procedure for all the populations in the starting set. The 
different causal maps are then compared. All the populations that causally contribute to the 
starting population are counted as part of the community. But the scope of the boundaries can 
be tweaked by varying the strength of the causal effect required for inclusion (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985). By setting this parameter moderately high we avoid ecological holism, 
where each indexical community has a numerous nodes and as result each indexical 
community will overlap each other. Population network structures that appear from multiple 
different indexed populations are more robust. For example if there are populations that act 
like keystone species they will be part of all the directed graphs as they play necessary role in 
maintaining the population network structure.  
What determines the starting set of populations? This is in part research interest defined 
but there are some obvious candidates. The first is including all the populations that cohabit 
Box.1. Indexical Communities can be built up from multiple indexical 
populations by the following procedure.  
i. Define the starting set of populations and/ or a community-level 
property (e.g. ecosystem output).  
a. If community-level property then identify the set of populations 
that contribute to the property.  
ii. Identify the populations that are causally salient for the set of 
populations via intervention. 
iii. Overlay the different networks of counterfactual dependencies from the 
specific populations.  
iv. If multiple interventions pick out the same connection these are the 
robust relationships in a community. 
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in a location. By identifying the network of populations that emanate out of co-habiting 
populations we can see to what extent this local ecological community is a causally cohesive 
unit. Alternatively we can look at community-level properties or outputs by starting with the 
set of populations that are thought to contribute to this community-level feature, for instance 
water filtration around a lake. The ecological structure that yields this output (filtration) is of 
economic interest and indexical communities identify the populations that need to be 
preserved to maintain this community output.  
What I find the most exciting aspect of this framework is it gives us the means to preserve 
two different important conservation units that have previously been criminally under-
described and referentially underdetermined. These are phenomenological communities and 
biodiverse communities. Phenomological communities are the communities that the folk who 
are interested in and spend time in the environment perceive. Environmentalists and the 
public often have an interest in preserving particular assemblages that are familiar from their 
experience of the wild. These assemblages include charismatic mammals, audible bird-life, 
visually stimulating angiosperms, and imposing trees. To fix the reference of such local 
assemblages we include in the starting set the phenomenologically prominent populations in a 
local area. For example if you want to find the community of a Blue Gum forest you include 
Blue Gums, lyrebirds, and Waratahs and identify the populations relevant to them.  
The second conservation-based community is a biodiverse community. The preservation 
of biodiversity has been the primary goal of conservation science for the last 30 years but 
‘biodiversity’ is ill-defined. Two major philosophical positions regarding biodiversity are 
conventionalism - biodiversity is the features of biological difference that community stake-
holders value - or realism - there are privileged carvings of biological difference which we 
should value (Sarkar, 2006; Maclaurin and Sterelny, 2008; Lean and Maclaurin, 2016). For 
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either position we can identify the populations which represent biodiversity in that particular 
local area and then use this procedure to find the relevant larger ecological community.  
 By allowing the starting set to be determined by the interested parties we are able to 
tailor the indexical community to fulfil both the epistemic and normative roles that 
community ecology and conservation science requires.  
5. Upshots of Indexical Communities 
Built into this methodology is the means of assessing an ecological community in several 
ways. The first is the invariance and production of community level properties. To explain 
how the starting assemblage produces a particular community-level property, be it stability of 
population network structure or an ecosystem output like fire likelihood, we need to identify 
the counterfactual interventions that affect that property. We do this so we can assess the 
invariance of the populations and their relationship to these properties. If particular 
populations appear in multiple networks in the same sequence, those parts of the system are 
robust, so we can gain a picture of the way these stable causal relations yield community 
properties. The indexical community identifies the descriptively robust features of the system 
under inquiry. Machine robust parts of the ecological network will always be descriptively 
robust. Weak aggregational interactions also bring about community-level phenomena. These 
are instantiated by many pathways, which have modest strength. To gain a sense of the 
relationship between the aggregative system and these properties we need to fix the identity 
of the system in question. Indexical communities provides a precise way to refer to such 
weak ‘systems’ and in by doing so provides a guide for further research into the relations 
between populations and community-level properties.  
For the ontological question of whether communities are real, indexical communities 
provides an answer. If the same causal structure appears from multiple starts and has robust 
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boundaries then we have a robust ecological community. It is, however, more likely that we 
will find that we have only partial overlap between the causal maps. This acts to identify the 
descriptive robust sub-systems within the community. As a result, this framework provides a 
more fine-grained and specific way of identifying whether a particular local ecological 
community is a system that acts like an individual, like an organism, or an aggregate, like gas 
particles in a beaker. If there is no causal connections between the starting populations then 
this is not a unitary community. So this methodology acts not just as a descriptive tool but 
also an existence test. Depending on referent choice, there can be multiple precisifications of 
a unitary community or none. 
By describing communities using a causal graph network description, we open them up to 
a range of formal methods of assessment. Modularity of the system and the sub-systems is 
one important feature. Modular clusters of causal interactors make a system more bounded 
and can account for particular system outputs. Formal methods like the Girvan-Newman 
algorithm can quantify such structures identifying modular grouping and boundaries in 
complex systems (Givarn and Newman, 2002). 
This is all to say we can assess an indexical ecological community in terms of the 
invariance of its system properties, its modularity, and its descriptive robustness. If an 
indexical community is completely modular, descriptively robust, and has highly invariant 
system properties then it will be a biological individual. But communities so rarely satisfy 
these conditions that we need an alternative framework. There is more to biology than just the 
study of individuals and this proposal gives an alternative framework to describe complex 
biological systems. 
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The deflationary view of information reloaded:  
communication and manipulability 
Abstract 
Timpson’s deflationary view of information is an innovative and well articulated view that had 
a great impact on the philosophy of physics community. However, recently some of the 
arguments supporting the deflationist view have been critically reviewed. The aim of this 
paper is to retain the general idea behind Timpson’s proposal, but replacing the conflictive 
elements used to support his thesis with new argumentative resources based on the notion of 
manipulability. 
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1. Introduction 
The central role played by the notion of information in contemporary science led to a 
significant growth of the literature on the subject. In the field of the philosophy of science, 
Christopher Timpson’s works stand out for their soundness and wide scope: the domain of 
application of Shannon’s theory (Timpson 2003), the relation between information 
transmission and quantum entanglement (Timpson 2005), the interpretation of teleportation 
(Timpson 2006), the relation of quantum information with the interpretations of quantum 
mechanics (Timpson 2008, 2013), among others. In this paper we will only focus on his 
deflationary view of technical information, according to which the term ‘information’ is an 
abstract noun and, as a consequence, information is not a concrete physical substance. 
This innovative and well-articulated view had a great impact on the philosophy of 
physics community, becoming a kind of orthodox view about the concept of information. 
However, recently some of the arguments supporting the deflationist view have been critically 
reviewed (Lombardi, Fortin and López 2016). The aim of this paper is to retain the general 
idea behind Timpson’s proposal, but replacing the conflictive elements used to support his 
thesis with new argumentative resources based on the notion of manipulability. 
 
2. Timpson’s Deflationary View and Its Difficulties 
Although Timpson’s deflationary proposal has many facets, its main goal is to eradicate the 
view of information as something material, a substance or stuff (Timpson 2004, 20; 2008, 28; 
2013, 34-36): “one should not understand the transmission of information on the model of 
transporting potatoes, or butter, say, or piping water.” (Timpson 2008, 31). Besides its 
plausibility, this perspective dissolves the problems related to with communication based on 
entanglement. In particular, Timpson (2006) cuts the Gordian knot of teleportation: if 
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‘information’ is an abstract noun, the question about how information “travels” from the 
source to the destination in teleportation is dissolved. 
Timpson’s argumentative strategy begins by introducing the difference between “bits” 
and “pieces” of information (2008. ‘Quantity’ replaces ‘bits’ in 2013, 16), in order to show 
that in both cases information is an abstract item. The notion of bits of information refers to 
the amount of information that a source of information produces. A piece of information is 
“what the output of a source (quantum or classical) is” (2008, 27; emphasis in the original). 
On this basis, the argument for the abstractness of information runs as follows. On the one 
hand, information qua-quantity is abstract because quantities are abstract. On the other hand, 
the abstractness of information qua-piece relies on the philosophical distinction between types 
and tokens: “one should distinguish between the concrete systems that the source outputs and 
the type that this output instantiates.” (Timpson 2004, 22). The piece of information is not the 
token produced at the source, but the corresponding type; and since types are abstract, then 
information qua-piece is abstract. 
The argumentative strategy sounds very appealing, and perhaps this fact explains the 
high impact of Timpson’s deflationary view. However, when subjected to further scrutiny, 
certain difficulties come to light. 
According to Timpson, when the source of information produces a message, what we 
want to transmit is not the sequence of the states themselves: “one should distinguish between 
the concrete systems that the source outputs and the type that this output instantiates.” 
(Timpson 2004, 22). The goal of communication is to reproduce at the destination another 
token of the same type: “What will be required at the end of the communication protocol is 
either that another token of this type actually be produced at a distant point (as a consequence 
of the production of the initial token); or at least that it be possible to produce it there (as a 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1416-
 
consequence of the initial production) by a standard procedure.” (Timpson 2013, 23, emphasis 
in the original; see also Timpson 2008, 25). 
The problem here is that the goal of communication is not to reproduce at the destination 
a token of the same type as that produced at the source. As Shannon stresses, “[t]he significant 
aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages.” (1948, 379, 
emphasis in the original). This means that the goal of communication consists in identifying at 
the destination the state produced at the source. Therefore, the success criterion is given by a 
one-to-one or a one-to-many mapping from the set of letters of the source to the set of letters 
of the destination. As Duwell (2008, 200) correctly points out, this mapping is arbitrary; then, 
the states of the source and the states of the destination may be of a completely different 
nature: the source may be a dice and the destination a dash of lights; or the source may be a 
device that produces words in English and the destination a device that operates a machine. It 
is difficult to understand in what sense a face of a dice and a light in a dash are tokens of a 
same type (see full argument in Lombardi, Fortin and López 2016). 
Perhaps with the purpose of stressing the arbitrariness of the success-defining mapping, 
in his 2013 book Timpson generalizes the type-token distinction in terms of sameness of 
pattern or structure: “the distinction may be generalized. The basic idea is of a pattern or 
structure: something which can be repeatedly realized in different instances” (2013, 18). 
However, this new move is not free of difficulties. First, sameness of structure is a purely 
formal relation, which cannot be simply identified with the philosophical relation between 
tokens of the same type: a type needs to have some content to be able to identify its tokens. In 
other words, the distinction between types and tokens is not merely formal or syntactic: being 
tokens or a same type is not an arbitrary relation. Admitting arbitrary functions as defining the 
relation of being tokens of the same type leads to admit that any two things arbitrarily chosen 
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can always be conceived as tokens of the same type and, thus, trivializes the distinction type-
token (see Wetzel 2014). 
However, the main difficulty is technical (Lombardi, Fortin and López 2016). The 
characterization of the goal of communication in terms of sameness of structure disregards the 
possibility of noisy situations. In the presence of noise, the states of the source and the states 
of the destination are linked by a one-to-many mapping; nevertheless, this does not prevent a 
successful communication, since the states of the source can still be identified by means of the 
states of the destination. These noisy cases are precisely the situations of real interest in the 
practice of communication engineering. 
These objections do not aim at undermining Timpson’s proposal. On the contrary, the 
challenge is to try to preserve his deflationist view of information, but avoiding those 
criticisms. This will be the task of the following sections. 
 
3. Information and Communication 
If the deflationary strategy is developed in the line followed by Timpson, the goal of rejecting 
the stuff-view of information is reached but at the price of turning information into a purely 
formal concept. This is the trend of some recent textbooks, which introduce information 
theory in an exclusively formal way, with no mention of sources, destinations or signals: the 
basic concepts are defined in terms of random variables and probability distributions over their 
possible values. It is only when the formalism has been presented that the theory is applied to 
the traditional case of communication (see the extensively used book of Cover and Thomas 
1991). From this perspective, information theory is a new chapter of the theory of probability: 
the word ‘information’ does not belong to the language of empirical sciences, it has no 
extralinguistic reference in itself. Its “meaning” has only a syntactic dimension. As a 
consequence, the generality of the concept of Shannon information derives from its 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1418-
 
exclusively formal nature; this generality is what makes it a powerful formal tool for empirical 
science, applicable to a variety of fields. (Lombardi, Fortin and Vanni 2015). 
Although this purely formal conception of information has its advantages, this is not the 
conceptual framework of Timpson’s argumentation. On the contrary, his discussion is framed 
within a particular context, in which information is much more than mere correlation. In fact, 
it is important to recall that, even in the domain of statistical information (as different from 
semantic information, see Floridi 2015), different contexts can be distinguished, each one with 
its particular formal resources to deal with specific goals.  
In the computational context, information is something that has to be computed and 
stored in an efficient way. The algorithmic or Kolmogorov complexity measures the minimum 
resources needed to effectively reconstruct an individual message (Solomonoff 1964; 
Kolmogorov 1965; Chaitin 1966): it supplies a measure of information for individual objects 
taken in themselves, independently of the source that produces them. In this context, the basic 
question is the ultimate compression of individual messages; the main idea is that the 
description of some messages can be compressed considerably if they exhibit enough 
regularity. The Kolmogorov complexity of a message is, then, defined as the length of the 
shortest possible program that produces it in a Turing machine. In the communicational 
context, whose classical formalism is Shannon theory (Shannon 1948, Shannon and Weaver 
1949), information is primarily something that has to be transmitted between to points for 
communication purposes. The formalism was designed to solve certain specific technological 
problems in communication engineering, in particular, to optimize the transmission of 
information by means of physical signals whose energy and bandwidth is constrained by 
technological and economic limitations. Although the computational and the communicational 
contexts are the traditional ones, they are not the only ones. For instance, in an inferential 
context the interest is to find a universally good prediction procedure on the basis of the 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1419-
 
possessed data, where “good” involves a version of Occam’s Razor: ‘The simplest explanation 
is best.’ The thermodynamic context is devoted to relate information to entropy and to explain 
the entropy increase in terms of informational concepts and arguments. In a gambling context 
the problem is to use informational resources to formalize a gambling game, by representing 
the wealth at the end of the game as a random variable and the gambler as a subject that tries 
to maximize that variable.  
Timpson is clearly thinking in communication which, although independent from any 
informational content −“The semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem.” (Shannon 1948, 379)−, is not a merely syntactic notion. Many different 
definitions of the concept of communication can be found in the literature, most of them 
involving semantic notions such as meaning, epistemic notions such as understanding, and 
even notions referring feelings and emotions. Here we are not interested in giving a definition 
of communication, but only in isolating some of its essential notes, in order to identify in 
which situations it can be said that there is communication and, consequently, transmission of 
information. 
Regardless of how the quantity of information is defined, there are certain minimum 
elements that can be abstracted to characterize a communicational context. From a very 
general perspective, communication requires a source S with its different states, which 
produces the information to be transmitted, a destination D with its own states, which receives 
the information, and a channel through which information is transmitted from the source to the 
destination. In the context of this abstract framework, communication requires that a certain 
action performed at the source modifies the destination so as to establish a correlation between 
the state of the source and the state of the destination. Let us notice that this characterization 
does not involve knowledge, not even in the weak sense of a subject that identifies what state 
occurred at the source from knowing the state occurred at the destination: the state of the 
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destination can be manipulated from the source for exclusively control purposes. Moreover, 
perfect correlation is not required: non-perfect correlation, manifested as equivocity and/or 
noise, can be corrected my means of redundancy and/or filters that preserve communication. 
This characterization, although very abstract, includes two essential notes, which are not 
independent but linked to each other:  
• Asymmetry. Communication is an asymmetric process: the source sends information and the 
destination receives it. Although in a following stage the roles can be interchanged, in each 
run of the communication process source and destination are clearly different and cannot be 
confused. 
• Production. What happens at the source modifies what happens at the destination, produces 
a specific change of the state of the destination. In other words, the asymmetry is not a 
merely formal relationship, but a physical connection that links events occurred in different 
space-time locations. 
These two features are not manifest in Shannon’s formalism taken at face value, without 
adding explanations related to producing, sending and receiving information (see Cover and 
Thomas 1991). They can neither be obtained from Timpson’s deflationist view of information: 
asymmetry and production find no place in the context of a view that conceives the link 
between source and destination merely as sameness of form. Therefore, an additional 
ingredient is necessary to identify situations of transmission of information in a 
communicational context. 
If, independently of the nature of source, channel and destination, communication 
requires that what happens at the source in a certain way produces what happens at the 
destination, perhaps the notion suitable in this case is that of causation. Moreover, the causal 
connection between source and destination would recover the asymmetry of the 
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communication process. Although this seems a promising strategy, the main challenge that it 
has to face is the elucidation of the very concept of causation. 
 
4. Communication and Manipulability 
Although the appeal to causation may offer a clue to elucidate the concept of information in 
the communicational context, the risk is to try to elucidate an obscure concept by means of 
another even more obscure: the notion of causation is one of the most controversial topics in 
the history of philosophy. 
The traditional approaches to causation are usually classified into two categories: the 
counterfactual approaches and the physical approaches. The first ones carry the burden of 
finding a proper semantics for counterfactuals. The physical approaches seem to be more 
adequate in a physical context of communication. From the physical perspective, causation has 
been conceived in terms of energy flow (Fair 1979), of physical processes (Dowe 1992), and 
of property transference (Kistler 1998): all these views involve physical signals or space-time 
connections between cause and effect. For this reason, the physical approaches to causation 
might have been particularly useful to elucidate the concept of information in the traditional 
cases of communication, as those that constituted the original field of application of Shannon 
theory. Those cases, the most common in engineering, are constrained by the well-known 
dictum ‘no information without representation’: the transmission of information between two 
points of the physical space necessarily requires an information-bearing signal, that is, a 
physical process propagating from one point to the other. As expressed by Landauer (1996, 
188), “[i]nformation is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical 
representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a 
punched card, a mark on a paper, or some other equivalent.”  
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However, at present the landscape has drastically changed with the advent of quantum 
information theory. In fact, teleportation challenges the traditional assumption about the 
inescapable need of a physical signal carrying the information through space. Broadly 
speaking, an unknown quantum state χ  is transferred from Alice to Bob with the assistance 
of a shared pair of particles prepared in an entangled state and of two classical bits sent from 
Alice to Bob. The perplexity of the case lies in that −among other facts− the information is 
transferred from Alice to Bob without any physical signal other than the classical channel 
through which the classical bits are transmitted. As a consequence, a conception of causation 
based on physical interaction through space and time cannot account for the transmission of 
information in the case of the paradigmatic example of entanglement-assisted communication. 
On the other hand, independently of any philosophical discussion, both in the everyday 
life as in science people act as if there were real causal links, without considering whether or 
not there is a space-time connection between the cause and its effect. Regarding causes, 
anyone distinguishes the case of pain due to burn injury from the appearance of the paperboy 
when the sun rises. Similarly, a chemist clearly distinguishes the causal action of a catalyst in 
increasing the rate of a reaction from the mere correlation between the melting point and the 
color of an element.  
The manipulability accounts of causation intend to capture this intuitive distinction. 
Their basic idea is that it is possible to draw the distinction between cause-effect relationships 
and mere correlations by means of the notions of manipulation and control. As Cartwright 
(1979) stresses, causal relationships ground the distinction between effective and ineffective 
strategies: an effective strategy proceeds by intervening at a cause in order to obtain a desired 
outcome. In other words, only causal relationships, but not mere correlations, are exploitable 
by us in order to bring about a certain outcome (Frisch 2014). 
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There are different manipulability accounts of causation. According to the early versions, 
causal terms need to be reduced to non-causal terms, such as free agency (von Wright 1971; 
Price 1991; Menzies and Price 1993). These first manipulability versions received several 
criticisms. On the one hand, they were charged of circularity: since “doing” and “producing” 
are already causal notions, they cannot be legitimately used to define the notion of causation. 
On the other hand, manipulability is an anthropocentric notion; then, the resulting concept of 
causation is not sufficiently general; for instance, it is not be able to identify the relationship 
between the gravitational attraction of the moon and the motion of the tides on the earth as a 
causal relation. 
The interventionist version of the manipulability account of causation (Woodward 2003, 
2007; Hausman and Woodward 1999; Pearl 2000) comes to solve those criticisms. Given the 
variables X and Y, “the intuitive idea is that an intervention on X with respect to Y changes the 
value of X in such a way that if any change occurs in Y, it occurs only as a result of change in 
the value of X and not from some other source” (Woodward 2003, 14). In this case, it can be 
said that the relationship between X and Y is a genuine case of causation. According to 
Woodward, the circularity criticism does not apply because the interventionist approach does 
not intend to define causation in terms of non-causal notions, but to delimitate the domain of 
causation by means of the possibility of control or manipulation: the response to interventions 
is used as a probe to know whether or not a certain relation is causal (Woodward 2003, 21). As 
Frisch (2014, 78) puts it, “the results of interventions into a system are a guide to the causal 
structure exhibited by the system.” On the other hand, the interventionist faces the charge of 
anthropocentrism by arguing that the concept of intervention must be understood without 
reference to human action. According to Woodward, the consideration of possible 
interventions admits a counterfactual formulation, which makes sense of causal claims in 
situations where interventions do not occur and even in cases in which they are impossible in 
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practice. Nevertheless, the interventionist approach is not a counterfactual view of causation 
because counterfactuals are not applied to the very relationship whose causal nature is to be 
determined. 
Besides the traditional charges of circularity and anthropocentrism, other criticisms have 
been directed toward the interventionist approach to causation (see Woodward 2013). One of 
them is related to the use of counterfactuals: since the truth conditions for counterfactuals can 
be explained in terms of laws, the appeal to interventions is not necessary (Hiddleston 2005). 
In turn, Cartwright characterizes the interventionist approach as “operationalist”: it admits a 
single criterion to test causation, and leads to “withhold the concept [of cause] from situations 
that seem the same in all other aspects relevant to its application just because our test cannot 
be applied in those situations” (Cartwright 2002, 422). 
Independently of how appropriate these criticisms are, they are directed toward a 
position that intends to supply the elucidation of the very concept of causation. Here we will 
not enter into the debate about whether the interventionist approach reaches its goal or not, 
because our concerns about causation are more modest. We are not interested in supplying a 
characterization of causation applicable in every circumstance in which the causal talk makes 
sense. Our only aim here is to explore the possibility of appealing to interventionist causation 
to characterize the informational relation between source and destination in a 
communicational context.  
In this context, the charge of anthropocentrism is innocuous: here we are not interested 
in the moon causing tides or in the motion of tectonic plates causing earthquakes. Our interest 
is confined to cases of communication, in which there is always a deliberate intervention on 
the source of information with the purpose to change the state of the destination. Moreover, 
Cartwright’s worries are beyond our limited scope: the fact that the interventionist concept of 
cause cannot be applied in certain relevant causal situations is not a problem if those situations 
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do not involve communication. In our case, causation is used only as a probe tool to know 
whether there is transmission of information or not in the communicational context 
independently of signals and interactions between source and destination. 
Regarding the objection to the use of counterfactuals, it does not apply in our context of 
interest. In fact, counterfactuals are introduced in the interventionist approach to deal with 
cases where the intervention on the cause is physically or practically impossible. But in 
situations of transmission of information the interventions on the source are always physically 
and practically possible. Even more, since the messages to be transmitted are embodied in 
sequences of the states of the source, the possibility of controlling the state of the source is an 
essential requirement for communication: the nature of communication itself includes that 
possibility; it makes no sense to conceive a source of information whose states cannot be 
modified. 
Despite we found this strategy to elucidate the notion of information in communication 
completely reasonable, those who outright reject the interventionist account of causation might 
transitively reject the strategy. Therefore, perhaps it is convenient to slightly modify the 
strategy in the following sense. Up to now we searched for the ingredient that would account 
for the feature of production that distinguishes communication from mere correlation, and 
found it in causation, in particular, in its interventionist version. But we can reach the same 
goal without appealing to the concept of causation, and by using the interventionist view of 
causation as a mere inspiration for designing a manipulability approach to information in the 
communicational context. From this perspective, causation does not matter: the interventionist 
arguments serve the function of delimitating the domain of communication by means of the 
possibility of control or manipulation. To put it in another way, the response to interventions is 
used as a probe to know whether there is transfer of information or not. 
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This manipulability approach to information applies successfully to entanglement-
assisted communication, where there is no information-carrier signal other than that carries the 
classical bits. Although teleportation is based on EPR correlations, it is not a mere EPR-
experiment. In fact, Alice not only counts with a particle of the entangled pair, but she also has 
access to the state χ  to be teleported, and to the two two-state classical systems needed to 
send the two bits of information through the classical channel. Since communication requires 
those three elements, the intervention does not need to act on the entangled pair, but it can 
operate on the other two elements. For instance, the intervention on Alice’s end may change 
the state to be teleported, from χ  to ϕ : as a consequence, something changes in Bob’s end, 
since he will recover ϕ  and not χ . Or the intervention might block one of the classical 
systems that Alice sends to Bob: in this case, Bob would be unable to recover the teleported 
state. It is worth stressing that we can be sure about the consequences of these interventions 
independently of whether the entangled pair is interpreted as consisting of two systems or as a 
single holistic whole. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Traditional engineers could feel comfortable conceiving information as something that is 
transferred from source to destination through space: in fact, before the advent of quantum 
information theory, the need of a signal acting as a carrier of information was a basic and 
indisputable assumption in the training of communication engineers. But entanglement-
assisted communication changed the panorama and raised new challenges for the concept of 
information. In this context, Timpson proposed a deflationist view of information that 
overcame the obstacles posed by the new forms of communication. However, his strategy to 
support deflation, inspired in resources coming from the philosophy of language, show some 
weak spots when considered from a broader perspective. 
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In this paper we intended to follow the deflationist trend opened by Timpson, but 
avoiding the difficulties derived from his particular line of argumentation. With this purpose, 
we seek for a foundation of the central features of communication −asymmetry and 
production− independent from travelling carrier signals. The inspiration came from the 
manipulability accounts of causation. In particular, we used the strategy of the interventionist 
view adapted to the case of communication to identify the cases in which there is information 
transference. Of course, this is only a first step of a research that deserves to be further 
developed. Nevertheless, this deflationist perspective not only can be successfully applied to 
account for teleportation; it also seems to be a perspective more natural for those scientists and 
technologists interested in the practical exploitation of quantum entanglement for 
communication. 
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Abstract: 
A key question for evidence-based medicine (EBM) is how best to model the way in which 
EBM should “[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” 
(Sackett et al. 1996). We argue that the formulations and models available in the literature 
today are modest variations on a common theme and face very similar problems. For 
example, both the early and updated models of evidence-based clinical decisions presented 
in Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt (2002) assume (with Sackett, et. al., 1996) that EBM 
consists of, among other things, evidence from clinical research and clinical expertise. On 
this A-view, EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable medical decision. There 
is, however, an alternative interpretation of EBM, the B-view, in which EBM describes just 
one component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from 
clinical research) and in which, together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a 
justifiable clincial decision but does not describe the decision itself. This B-view is 
inspired by a 100-years older version of EBM, a Swedish standard requiring medical 
decision-making and practice to be in accordance with ‘science and proven experience’. In 
the paper we outline how the Swedish concept leads to an improved understanding of the 
way in which scientific evidence and clinical experience can and cannot be integrated in 
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light of EBM. In addition the paper sketches the as yet unexplored historical background to 
EBM. 
1. Introduction 
 
EBM is actually only a reformulation of the motto ‘science and proven experience’ 
(Werkö et al. 2002, 3478, our translation) 
 
Globally, evidence-based medicine (EBM) is favoured in the public sector. In Sweden a 
bipartite, partly overlapping standard that is more than 100 years older than EBM applies 
in the public sector and parts of the private sector as well. This Swedish standard requires 
decision-making and practice to be based on both science and proven experience, or 
vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet (VBE), and indeed leading Swedish physicians often 
think of EBM as a reformulation of the Swedish standard. Lars Werkö, “the icon beyond 
all comparison in Swedish health care” (Hont 2009) is a clear example (e.g. see Werkö et 
al. 2002 above). Since its first legal application in Swedish health care in the late 1800s, 
the VBE standard has been pressed into service in law and public policy in areas as diverse 
as medicine and health care, education, environmental risk assessment, veterinary care and 
social work. We shall focus on the application of VBE in medicine (VBE-M).  
 
The Swedish concept of VBE-M helps us to understand the ways in which scientific 
evidence and clinical experience both can and cannot be integrated within EBM. The 
similarities and dissimilarities between VBE-M and EBM shed light on the capacity of 
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EBM to “[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” (Sackett 
et al. 1996). This most influential and elusive ambition of EBM (Sackett et al. 1996) is the 
primary focus of the current paper. In addition, however, VBE-M helps to bring out the 
historical background to EBM.  
2. EBM and VBE-M: Similarities and dissimilarities 
Prima facie it makes sense to compare EBM and VBE-M. (1) Both introduce evidentiary 
standards for decision-making (not a standard for science as such). (2) Each promotes the 
goal of making more use of science and sound evidence in practical decision-making. But 
(3) the two approaches diverge, on the surface at least, when it comes to the types of 
evidence that should be allowed to influence practical decision-making. 
 
(1) EBM highlights the decision-making context. It is primarily about the professions and 
the connection between the academic disciplines and the professions; only by implication 
is it about the disciplines themselves. Several of the leading articles on EBM were 
published in the British Medical Journal, which has the slogan: helping doctors make 
better decisions. Rosenberg’s and Donald’s well-known 1995 BMJ paper is entitled 
“Evidence based medicine: an approach to clinical problem-solving”. 
 
Similarly, in Swedish law VBE is the gold standard for decision-making and practice, 
especially in health care (VBE-M). For example, VBE-M states that medical practice must 
be based on science and proven experience. Health care workers who do not provide care 
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in accordance with VBE-M can be criticized by the Health and Social Care Inspectorate 
and even be held responsible according to penal law.
 
VBE also helps to define patients’ 
rights to reimbursement for expenses associated with treatments in other European 
countries. The legislative use of science and proven experience illustrates that the notion is 
intended for policy-making and practical decision-making.  
  
(2) To a large extent EBM focuses on the need to make more, and better, use of research 
findings in clinical decision-making: 
  
Evidence based medicine is the process of systematically finding, appraising, and 
using contemporaneous research findings as the basis for clinical decisions. For 
decades people have been aware of the gaps between research evidence and clinical 
practice, and the consequences in terms of expensive, ineffective, or even harmful 
decision making. Inexpensive electronic databases and widespread computer 
literacy now give doctors access to enormous amounts of data. Evidence based 
medicine is about asking questions, finding and appraising the relevant data, and 
harnessing that information for everyday clinical practice. (Rosenberg and Donald 
1995) 
  
The focus, claims (Eddy 2005, 14) , “is on educating physicians to help them bring more 
research and evidence into their individual decisions about individual patients.” The same 
goes for VBE-M. However, before we proceed it should be noted that, in health care at 
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least, the Swedish notion is not explicitly defined in any official documents. One will 
search in vain for suitable stipulations to guide applications of the laws in which the 
expression occurs. Hence its characteristics have to be inferred from its many applications, 
i.e. its use and history. We will therefore present a sketch of the history of VBE-M (and to 
a lesser extent EBM).  
  
It was probably no accident that the Swedish concept emerged in health care regulations in 
the late 1800s (the concept itself is, at least, somewhat older; almost exactly the same 
formulation occurs in the oath that were taken by those who were awarded the licentiate 
degree in medicine in Uppsala, Lund, and Stockholm from 1829 and onwards). It is 
sometimes argued that the mid-1800s were dominated by lack of confidence in the 
therapeutic methods available in Sweden and elsewhere. Scholarly work referring to this 
period uses terms such as “doubt disease” (Fåhræus 1950, 98), “therapeutic nihilism” 
(Danek 1969, 65), “the bankruptcy of therapy”, and “crisis in medical self-confidence” 
(Stolt 1994, Chapters 4 and 5). Mid-1800s advances in basic medical science did not reach 
practitioners and were generally of little therapeutic consequence (Porter 1995), and this 
was especially so, perhaps, for the typical Swedish countryside doctor: 
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Practitioners in the countryside used trial and error, and as late as 1850 they had 
little use of medical science in their everyday practice. (Stolt 1994, 159, our 
translation)
1
 
 
Trust in medicine as taught by the universities decreased. Quackery had been an alternative 
for long in Sweden, and it is reported that in the 19
th
 century it was equally natural to seek 
help from a “wise woman” as it is to visit the doctor today (Ling 2004, 21). The period is 
referred to by Swedish scholars ironically as ‘the golden era of public distrust and humbug 
medicine’ (Fåhræus 1950, 102). 
  
Whatever the connection might have been medical science advanced rapidly during the 
second half of the 1800s: from Louis Pasteur’s 1859 suggestion that microorganisms may 
cause many human and animal diseases, Joseph Lister’s 1867 publication “On the 
Antiseptic Principle in the Practice of Surgery”, showing that disinfection reduces post-
operative infections, to Robert Koch’s 1882-1883 isolations of the microorganism 
responsible for tuberculosis and cholera. In short, in Sweden the decades before the 
regulation was put in place involved several breakthroughs in medical science; it was a 
time when medical science, finally, advanced to a position from which it could actually 
prove useful to medical practice. It is indeed interesting that those who explain the 
                                                
1
 Approximate translation of the Swedish original: “[Landsortspraktikerna] prövade sig 
fram, och ännu runt 1850 hade de förvånansvärt liten nytta av de medicinska teorierna i sin 
vardag.” 
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emergence of EBM also refer to medical breakthroughs in the late 1800s: “The 100-year 
period between 1885 and 1985 brought amazing medical breakthroughs” (Howick 2011, 
11). 
 
It makes sense to ponder what happened in Finland during this period. For centuries – until 
1809 – Finland and Sweden were joined. Considerable overlap with regard to the 
requirement of science and proven experience between the two countries would come as no 
surprise. The Medical Society of Finland
2
 (Finska läkaresällskapet) was founded in 1835 
with the dual purpose of developing medical science and health care. It was followed by 
The Finnish Medical Society (Duodecim) in 1881, which aimed to develop medical science 
and practice in Finland.
3
 Nowadays the overwhelming majority of Finnish physicians who 
are members of The Finnish Medical Association (Lääkäriliitto), founded in 1910, are 
committed to treating patients in accordance with science and proven experience through 
the code of medical ethics approved by the association’s delegate committee (Lääkäriliitto 
                                                
2
 We are unsure whether there is an official English translation, but “The Medical Society 
of Finland” is sometimes used when Finska läkaresällskapet is referred to in English 
contexts. 
3
 The Medical Society of Finland was set up specifically for the Swedish speaking 
community of practice, whereas the explicit aim of Duodecim was to promote medical 
practice and uptake of medical science in Finnish. A third society, Suomen Lääkäriliitto 
(The Finnish Medical Association), was established in 1910. Many thanks to Matti 
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2014). Moreover, it is a legal requirement in Finland since 1994 that all health care 
personnel should only apply methods that there is proven experience of (since 2000 the 
same requirement holds for those in veterinary care).
4
 Much of the development leading to 
the current role of VBE in Finland has happened after 1809. Thus the overlap is not a mere 
historical artefact. So what we refer to as the Swedish concept has a perfect match in 
Finland, although it is much more widespread in its Swedish applications. The motivation 
                                                
4
 Lag om yrkesutbildade personer inom hälso- och sjukvården (1994/559) §15: ”En 
yrkesutbildad person inom hälso- och sjukvården skall i sin yrkesutövning tillämpa allmänt 
godtagna och beprövade metoder enligt sin utbildning, som han hela tiden skall försöka 
komplettera. I samband med yrkesutövningen skall en yrkesutbildad person inom hälso- 
och sjukvården opartiskt beakta den nytta och de eventuella olägenheter den medför för 
patienten.” See also Lag om utövning av veterinäryrket (2000/29) §13. Läkarens etiska 
regler, accepted by Suomen Lääkäriliitto (The Finnish Medical Association) in 1988 states 
in §V that: ”Läkaren skall upprätthålla och förkovra sina kunskaper och sitt kunnande och 
han skall endast rekommendera undersökningar och behandlingar som i enlighet med 
medicinsk vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet anses effektiva och ändamålsenliga” (Saarni 
2006, 11). A closely similar formulation occurs in the latest version of the codex, approved 
2014 (see Lääkäriliitto 2014). The English translation of the relevant passage reads: ”A 
physician shall maintain and improve his knowledge and skills.  He shall use and 
recommend only such examinations and therapies which medical knowledge and 
experience have shown to be effective and purposeful” 
https://www.laakariliitto.fi/en/ethics/. 
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behind the requirement in Finland is arguably the same as in Sweden since the two 
countries had so much in common during the concept’s pre-history.
5
 
 
In fact, moving outside of the strict domain of VBE-M one could claim that VBE is a 
Nordic concept. For instance, since 1998 psychologists in the Nordic countries are 
committed to VBE through Yrkesetiska principer för psykologer i Norden. These principles 
state: ”Psykologen arbetar i enlighet med vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet och 
eftersträvar en kontinuerlig professionell utveckling genom att inhämta mer och ny 
kunskap om den vetenskapliga och yrkesmässiga utvecklingen.” 
(Sveriges_Psykologförbund 1998, 6)
6
  
 
Certainly, it was not only in the Nordic countries that it was acknowledged, around 1890, 
that medical science ought to guide medical decision-making. Failure to consider medical 
science in the medical profession was criticized in The Boston Medical and Surgical 
Journal too: 
  
… medical art without science is not only unprogressive, but almost inevitably 
becomes quackery. As soon as we treat our patients by rule of thumb, by tradition, 
                                                
5 It hasn’t been possible to track the pre-history with sufficient certainty and 
accuracy within this project – at least not so far – but there appears to be similar 
ideas in 1800 century writings by, for instance, the father of pediatrics in Sweden, 
Nils Rosén; moreover, a predecessor from 1733 resembles in some respects the 
1829 oath we have referred to above (Eklöf 2000). 
6  
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by dogmas, or by metaphysical axioms, we do injury to ourselves as well as to 
them. (Pye-Smith 1900, 173) 
  
Still, if we (simplistically) compare occurrences of the expression “science” (“vetenskap”) 
with occurrences of the expression “experience” (“erfarenhet”) in sources such as The 
Transactions of The Medical Society of Finland
7
 (Finska läkaresällskapets handlingar) in 
the latter half of the 1800s we immediately find that, whereas quite a few reports contain 
the word “experience”, there is less mention of “science”. Hence it is understandable that 
further measures, such as the requirement of VBE-M, were put in place to ensure that 
doctors made more use of science in practice. 
 
There is arguably a similar story to be told about the emergence of EBM exactly 100 years 
later. Here both Guyatt and Sackett report on the need to be sceptical vis-à-vis received 
medical wisdom (Howick 2011, chapter 2). 
  
(3) However, it seems that experience of a specific kind – proven experience – was also 
identified as important as a result of the arrival of VBE-M. Somewhat paradoxically it 
seems that the development of relevant scientific evidence was accompanied by a 
corresponding development (or upgrading, or rating-up) in the role of evidence of a certain 
kind from experience as well. This is the third relevant comparison point between EBM 
                                                
7
 There is, as far as we know, no official translation of Finska läkaresällskapets handlingar 
into English. 
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and VBE-M. Looking at the recent introduction of science and proven experience in the 
Swedish Educational Act (2010:800), we can see that Swedish schools and education 
authorities have developed a growing interest in proven experience. In particular, these 
discussions highlight the evidential relevance of experience within the professional 
collective. A third comparison between EBM and VBE-M can therefore be based on the 
way they deal with the relationship between two different types of evidence: evidence that 
is ‘scientific’ and evidence that is ‘experienced based’.  
 
Whether the prominence of proven experience is to be counted as a similarity between 
EBM and VBE-M depends on whether EBM and VBE-M have the same effect of rating up 
experience of the proven kind. We are ready to argue that they do, but this assessment 
depends on an assumption few advocates of EBM endorse. The assumption is that there is 
no strong link between EBM and science – or rather that the link, such as it is, is no 
stronger than that connecting EBM and proven experience.
8
 In other words, the scientific 
classification here is not straightforwardly guaranteed by the use of certain methods or 
methodologies recommended by EBM such as, for example, randomised controlled trials. 
Much of what is regarded as being at the core of EBM could then equally well be classified 
as proven experience. To the extent that this assumption is accepted there is reason to think 
that EBM would simply prioritize experience of a certain kind. Advocates of EBM might 
                                                
8
 For a related observation, see (Stoyanov, Machamer, and Shaffner 2012, 150): “In fact, 
they do nothing else but retell us the fragmented individual narrative, but presented in an 
ostensibly scientifically structured manner.” 
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be dissatisfied with that implication because they wish to preserve the link between basic 
science and clinical research: 
      
Evidence-based medicine focuses on these systematic studies simply because they 
represent the most advanced stages of testing to ascertain whether the innovations 
of basic science work, how well they work, and for whom they work when applied 
in the clinical setting. Thus, evidence-based medicine is not in competition with 
basic science; rather it depends on it and builds on it. (Haynes et al. 1996, 196-97) 
 
A clear dissimilarity – no matter how EBM is construed with respect to science and proven 
experience – would be that EBM downgrades certain kinds of science, such as science that 
is not based on RCTs (e.g. cohort studies), but this is not the case with VBE-M, at least not 
explicitly. In the next section we will look more closely at the way EBM and VBE-M 
handle the notion of evidence. 
 
A further dissimilarity between EBM and VBE-M can be detected. The meaning of VBE-
M varies with context among medical practitioners. (Persson and Wahlberg 2015) reports 
that the BE (or proven experience) component is sometimes taken to report a property of 
doctors and sometimes used to refer to a fact about how seriously a therapy has been tested 
in practice. By contrast, EBM seems fixed. Indeed if it were not fixed it would be difficult 
to understand the need for instruments such as the Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) framework. GRADE is a framework 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1443-
13 
for synthesizing and rating the quality of evidence, and for providing clinical practice 
guidelines addressing alternative management options. It is used by many important actors 
in health care all over the world, including WHO and the Cochrane Collaboration. 
 
To the extent that EBM introduces a new paradigm – see, for instance, Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group (1992) – it ought to follow that something of fundamental 
importance remains fixed through various applications of EBM. Our hypothesis is that the 
primary candidate for this static role is the EBM position on evidence (see next section, 
and (Howick 2011, 4)). 
  
3. EBM and VBE-M: The question of evidence 
There is a clear sense in which medicine must always be based on some kind of evidence. 
If evidence is merely a ground for belief, there will not be anything new about EBM. The 
“evidence” in EBM, and in the “science/vetenskap” (V) and “proven experience/beprövad 
erfarenhet” (BE) of VBE-M, is all about what medical practitioners, or policy makers, can 
justifiably base their decisions on. 
 
EBM is a procedure, or approach, that ensures, or perhaps maximises, justifiable decisions. 
VBE-M, as it stands, is a criterion for evaluating whether a decision is warrantable. This 
does not entail that VBE is only put to use post hoc. VBE can be used prospectively, too, 
as can be seen from the discussions in the Journal of the Swedish Medical Association 
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cited in (Persson and Wahlberg 2015) and in the oath taken by Finnish physicians – which 
requires that one to tries to advance proven experience in one’s field.  
  
So, what is this evidence that makes EBM different from medicine practised before 1990? 
There are two suggestions, both present in the prehistory of EBM. Archie Cochrane wrote 
in 1972: 
 
It is surely a great criticism of our profession that we have not organised a critical 
summary, by specialty or subspecialty, adapted periodically, of all relevant 
randomised controlled trials. (quoted from Sønbø Kristiansen and Mooney 2004, 2)  
 
The first is that EBM builds on the principle that all relevant evidence should be taken into 
account. 
 
The second is that EBM builds on an idea of levels of evidence which not only identifies 
but also ranks the relevant kinds of evidence. For Cochrane in 1972 it was randomised 
controlled trials that constituted the relevant level. In the case of EBM, the Oxford Centre 
for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) presents a comprehensive list of levels of evidence 
for different clinical questions. For therapy/prevention these are, from the top down: 
systematic review of RCTs, individual RCTs (all or none), systematic reviews of cohort 
studies, individual cohort studies, “outcomes” research, ecological studies, individual case-
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control studies, case series, and last, expert opinions either without explicit critical 
appraisal or based on physiology, bench research or “first principles” (CEBM 2009).  
 
It is obvious that evidence from basic medical science (physiological processes) and 
institutional or individual experience are not held in high regard.
9
 The evidence on which 
decisions should be based is that deriving from clinical research. This evidence has high 
predictive value. An early presentation of EBM from the Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group (1992), states that: 
 
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. 
(EBMWG 1992, 2420) 
 
Given this understanding of evidence, which is clearly based on clinical research, the 
question becomes what to do about clinical experience. Needless to say, clinical experience 
is often decisive for predictive purposes (see, for instance, Cartwright and Hardie 2012).  
 
                                                
9
 Holly Andersen provides an interesting argument explaining why this is the case 
(Andersen 2012). In general the fact that our bodies are complex evolved systems makes it 
likely that relevant variables will be masked. 
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It is certainly plausible to say that EBM cannot be based solely on evidence from clinical 
research. Results from clinical research are not always there to be had, and where they are 
unavailable unsystematized clinical experience can be used as evidence:  
 
... systematic attempts to record observations in a reproducible and unbiased 
fashion markedly increase the confidence one can have in knowledge about patient 
prognosis, the value of diagnostic tests, and the efficacy of treatment. In the 
absence of systematic observation one must be cautious in the interpretation of 
information derived from clinical experience and intuition, for it may at times be 
misleading. (EBMWG 1992, 2421) 
 
 
This is not the situation with regard to VBE-M. Good therapeutic decision-making rests, 
according to VBE-M, on two evidential sources – science and proven experience. In EBM, 
by contrast, acknowledgement of the importance of clinical experience as evidence seems 
to be limited to cases where there are no relevant research findings. 
 
This way of conceiving of EBM might not be shared by Swedish doctors. Trained as they 
are in thinking about VBE-M, it is natural for Swedish practitioners to assume that EBM 
has a place for BE as evidence, too (EBM replaces, as it were, the older idea of science 
(V), in VBE): 
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It is a misunderstanding to assume that EBM no longer involves what we have 
called ‘proven experience’ … The right way to use personal experience is to 
contrast experience against the literature when a current problem is analysed. 
(Werkö et al. 2002, 3478-79, our translation)
10
  
 
(Indeed, Professor Lars Werkö was one of the leading Swedish physicians. He became 
president of the Swedish Medical Society and ended his career as director of SBU (Hont 
2009)) 
However, as we shall argue in the next section, the combination of EBM and BE is 
sometimes problematic. EBM’s take on evidence, in what appears to be the most common 
version of EBM internationally (the A-views subsection, see below), is too restrictive to 
allow for full incorporation of BE. 
4. EBM and VBE-M: Integrating science and experience 
In an influential statement of EBM by Sackett et al. (1996) it is clear from the subtitle of 
the paper that individual clinical expertise is also important in EBM: 
  
Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t 
It’s about integrating individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence 
                                                
10
 Det är ett missförstånd att tro att EBM inte längre skulle röra det vi kallat ‘beprövad 
erfarenhet’. … Den rätta användningen av den egna erfarenheten borde vara att i samband 
med analys av ett aktuellt problem ställa erfarenheten mot vad litteraturen visar. 
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However, in connection with EBM it is sometimes unclear whether this integration means 
(A) that EBM consists of several parts, with evidence from clinical research being one part 
and clinical expertise being another, or (B) that EBM is one part of the total decision 
situation, with such things as clinical experience and patient preferences being other 
components. (Eddy 2005) introduces a somewhat similar distinction between evidence-
based medicine and evidence-based guidelines, arguing that the former concept is built 
around individuals (decision-makers as well as patients) but could usefully be widened so 
as to include the latter phenomenon (often including multi-disciplinary teams). Our point, 
however, is that the A-view is “internally” problematic. 
4.1 A-views 
(A) is clearly the more common version of EBM. A number of introductions to EBM 
present flow charts like that in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: The A-view, adapted from 
http://guides.mclibrary.duke.edu/c.php?g=158201&p=1036021 (downloaded 1-Feb 2016) 
 
An influential position paper remarks that: 
 
Initially, evidence-based medicine focused mainly on determining the best research 
evidence relevant to a clinical problem or decision and applying that evidence to 
resolve the issue. This early formulation de-emphasised traditional determinants of 
clinical decisions, including physiological rationale and individual clinical 
experience. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
These remarks concern the very first EBM-formulations. Sackett et al. (1996) is conceived 
as the original attempt to integrate evidence and clinical experience in a better way. Sackett 
et al. (1996) seemingly advocate a version of the A-view. The position paper continues: 
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Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice 
of evidence based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the 
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research. (Haynes, 
Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
 
According to this statement, EBM includes both evidence and clinical experience. EBM 
does not complement clinical experience; it includes it. However, it should be noted that 
Sackett et al. (1996) discuss evidence only in connection with external clinical experience, 
which is to say research. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) picture the position in 
Sackett et al. (1996) in a way that makes it very similar to the A-view shown in Figure 1 
above. 
 
It is said that the “concepts of evidence-based medicine are evolving as limitations of 
earlier models are addressed” (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002). However, in our 
view this has not led to the abandonment of the A-view. That view is perhaps even more 
clearly relied on in later formulations of EBM – e.g. in what is often presented as the 
“contemporary definition”: 
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… the integration of the best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient 
values. (Sackett et al. 2000, 71)  
 
Now, as we have already touched upon, the A-view makes it difficult to talk about 
evidence as something other than research evidence. As (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 
2002) puts it: 
 
Evidence-based medicine recognises that such evidence is not “created equal” and 
provides detailed guides for finding the most rigorous and pertinent evidence for a 
specific clinical decision. 
 
As a consequence the use of clinical experience as evidence has been downplayed in later 
developments of EBM, and clinical experience is nowadays almost exclusively mentioned 
as that which is needed to implement scientific evidence in a specific decision context. An 
example of this is the entry on “Making a decision” on the CEBM website, www.cebm.net. 
Here, a decision is made by: 
 
Incorporating the findings of valid, important and applicable research with your 
patient values and preferences and your clinical expertise to arrive at the right 
decision about their individual health care. (CEBM 2016)  
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Duke University Medical Center, from whose work we adapted the flow chart in Figure 1, 
presents the issues in a similar way: 
 
The evidence, by itself, does not make the decision, but it can help support the 
patient care process. The full integration of these three components into clinical 
decisions enhances the opportunity for optimal clinical outcomes and quality of 
life. (http://guides.mclibrary.duke.edu/c.php?g=158201&p=1036021 (downloaded 
1-Feb 2016)) 
 
In other words, the original idea behind EBM highlights the need to integrate research 
findings with individual clinical expertise, but on the A-view it is clear that this integration 
cannot be one in which two types of evidence are integrated, since that would violate 
EBM’s paradigmatic view of evidence. Remaining within the paradigm might work in 
some cases, for certain types of clinical experience (proven experience of a certain kind), 
but normally the difference between evidence from the two sources would be too 
pronounced for anything but research evidence to count, according to EBM. This creates 
considerable tension within A-views, since they also wish to acknowledge the role of other 
kinds of “information”: 
 
We title this component of clinical decisions ‘research evidence’ to distinguish it 
from other forms of information that have always been part of clinical decisions, 
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such as the patient’s history, physical findings, diagnostic tests, circumstances, and 
stated preferences. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
4.2 B-views 
The B-view, where EBM is one part of the total decision situation, also has advocates. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Swedish perspectives sometimes express B-views, since these 
are much easier to interpret in terms of VBE. For example, in a much quoted passage in a 
letter to a physician, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare explains: 
 
In the exercise of her profession, the medical doctor must take account of both 
science and proven experience. [...] When a new method is introduced, proven 
experience of it is trivially lacking, and the scientific evidence can suffice for 
acceptance […]. At other times, long clinical experience might be the dominating 
evidence in favour of accepting the medical treatment whereas theoretical and/or 
experimental evidence for its effectiveness might be lacking.  
 
(Asplund 2001) presents a picture captured in the following flow chart: 
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Figure 2: The B-view, modified from Asplund (2001) 
 
The B-view is not a uniquely Swedish phenomenon. For instance, Haynes et al. 1996, p. 
196, defines evidence-based medicine thus: 
 
Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious and judicious use of current best 
evidence from clinical care research in the management of individual patients. 
 
At first blush this definition seems very similar to those we have referred to as A-views, 
and that is probably how it was intended to be presented. Here too, however, it might be 
argued that EBM is but one part of a larger decision context, the management of individual 
patients. But this is not normally how proponents of EBM picture it. They distinguish 
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between early and updated models (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002), and this would 
be one of the earliest – a model that “de-emphasised traditional determinants of clinical 
decisions, including physiological rationale and individual clinical experience.” The 
alternative B-view reading would be that the early models present EBM as one component 
of the decision. 
 
On a B-view it is much easier to understand EBM and its evidential levels. “The doctor as 
clinician” (see Figure 2) can bring evidence into the decision as well, but it is not the type 
of evidence EBM speaks of, which concerns research findings only. On the A-view the 
clinician’s expertise is only a means of applying research evidence to a particular case. 
That expertise does not provide any additional evidence. On the B-view, by contrast, the 
individual and collective clinical experience that the clinician adds to the decision basis 
qualifies as relevant evidence too. Consequently, according to the B-view EBM does not 
really set a standard for decision-making (see above). Its capacity to help doctors make 
better decisions is clearly weakened. EBM becomes much more of a partial tool for 
decision-making than advocates of EBM normally assume. 
  
4. Concluding remarks 
Advocates of EBM struggle to model the way evidence-based medicine should “[integrate] 
individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” (Sackett et al. 1996). We have 
argued that the formulations and models available in the literature today are variations on a 
common theme. On these A-views EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable 
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medical decision. A-views inevitably create tensions in the concept of evidence they 
require. 
  
For that reason alone B-views are of interest. On a B-view EBM describes just one 
component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from clinical 
research). Together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a justifiable clincial 
decision, but it does not describe the decision itself. The B-view is inspired by a 100-years 
older version of EBM, a Swedish standard that requires medical decision-making and 
practice to be consistent with ‘science and proven experience’.  
 
In sum, the Swedish concept of ‘science and proven experience’ clearly resonates with 
several characteristics of evidence-based medicine. Like EBM it focuses on evidence 
(rather than opinion), on science, and on the need for integration. 
 
However, the Swedish concept also differs from the concept of evidence-based medicine in 
that it clearly identifies two sources of evidence as special: science (vetenskap) and proven 
experience (beprövad erfarenhet). Comparing EBM and VBE, one is struck by the relative 
clarity of the Swedish notion. 
[Acknowledgements to be inserted after review] 
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No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of  
Meta-Induction 
          Word count: 4986 
Gerhard Schurz   
 
Abstract: The no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996) is a radicalized version of Hume's 
induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all 
possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms  whether 'clever' inductive or 'stu-
pid' guessing methods (etc.)  have the same expected predictive success. This theorem 
seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction (Schurz 2008). According to the-
se results, certain meta-inductive prediction strategies may dominate other (non-meta-
inductive) methods in their predictive success (in the long run). In this paper this conflict is 
analyzed and dissolved, by means of probabilistic analysis and computer simulation. 
 
1. The Optimality of Meta-Induction: A Solution to the Problem of Induction? 
 
In Schurz (2008) a new account to the problem of induction has been developed that is 
based on the optimality of meta-induction. The account agrees with Hume's skeptical in-
sight that it is impossible to demonstrate a priori that induction is reliable in the sense that 
it is predictively more successful than random guessing. Such a demonstration is impossi-
ble without assuming that the actual world possesses a certain amount of regularity. Reich-
enbach (1949, §91) argued that it is at least possible to demonstrate a priori that induction 
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is optimal, i.e., is the best what we can do for the purpose of predictive success. Results in 
formal learning show, however, that it is not possible to demonstrate optimality at the level 
of object-induction, that is, of induction applied to the task of predicting events in arbitrary 
possible worlds (cf. Skyrms 1975, ch. III.4). In contrast, what the account of meta-
induction attempts to show is that induction is optimal if it is applied at the meta-level of 
competing prediction methods. The meta-inductive strategy tracks the success rate of all 
prediction methods whose predictions are accessible and predicts an optimal weighted av-
erage of the predictions of those methods that were most successful so far. Based on results 
in mathematical learning theory (Cesa-Bianchi 2006), Schurz (2008) proved that there ex-
ists a particular weighting method, called attractivity-weighting, which grants the meta-
inductivist a predictive success rate that is in the long run at least as high as that of every 
other prediction method that is accessible to the meta-inductivist, even if their success rates 
are permanently changing in an irregular way. Since the restriction to accessible methods is 
crucial for the optimality theorem, Schurz and Thorn (2016) call this kind of optimality 
access-optimality. Remarkably, the access-optimality of meta-induction holds in all possi-
ble worlds, even in 'chaotic' ones in which event frequencies do not converge against limits 
or in 'paranormal' worlds which host clairvoyants.  
 Technically the account of meta-induction is based on the notion of a prediction game: 
 
Definition 1. A prediction game is a pair ((e),) consisting of: 
 (1.) An infinite sequence (e) := (e1,e2,) of events encoded by real numbers between 0 
and 1, possibly rounded according to a finite accuracy. For example, (e) may be a sequence 
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of daily weather conditions, football game results, or stock values. In what follows Val  
[0,1] denotes the value space of possible events enVal. Each time n corresponds to one 
round of the game.    
 (2.) A finite set of prediction methods or 'players'  = {P1,,Pm,MI} (in what follows 
we identify 'methods' with 'players'). In each round it is the task of each player to predict 
the next event of the event sequence. "MI" signifies the meta-inductivist and the other 
players are the 'non-MI-players' or 'candidate methods'. They may be real-life experts, vir-
tual players implemented by computational algorithms, or even 'clairvoyants' who can see 
the future in 'para-normal' possible worlds. It is assumed that the predictions of the non-MI 
players are accessible to the meta-inductivist. Moreover, they are elements of Val  [0,1]. 
 
 The predictive success rate of a method P is defined by means of the following chain of 
definitions: 
 predn(P) is the prediction of player P for time n delivered at time n1, 
 the deviation of the prediction predn from the event en is measured by a normalized loss 
function, loss(predn,en)  [0,1], 
 score(predn,en)  =def 1loss(predn,en) is the score obtained by prediction predn of event en, 
 absn(P) =def 1in score(predi(P),ei) is the absolute success achieved by player P until 
time n, and 
 sucn(P) =def an(P)/n is the success rate of player P at time n.  
 
The natural loss-function is defined as |prednen|. The optimality theorem holds below for 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1462-
  4 
all convex loss functions, which means that the loss of a weighted average of two predic-
tions is not greater than the weighted average of the losses of two predictions. In what fol-
lows we assume convex loss functions; they comprise a large variety of loss functions in-
cluding all linear, polynomial, or exponential functions of the natural loss function.  
 'Possible worlds' are identified with prediction games. A special case are binary games 
whose events and predictions are elements of {0,1}. For binary games the natural loss 
function coincides with the zero-one loss: loss1-0(pred,e) = 0 if pred = e, and otherwise = 1.  
 The simplest meta-inductive strategy is called "Imitate-the-best" and predicts what the 
presently best non-MI player predicts. It is easy to see that this meta-inductive method 
cannot be universally access optimal: Its success rate breaks down when it plays against 
non-MI methods that are deceivers, which means that they lower their success rate as soon 
as their predictions are imitated by the meta-inductivist (cf. Schurz 2008, sec. 4). A realis-
tic example is the prediction of stock values in a 'bubble economy': Here the prediction that 
a given stock will yield a high rate of return leads many investors to put their money on 
this stock and by doing so they cause it to crash. Nevertheless there exists a meta-inductive 
strategy that is provably universally optimal. This strategy is called attractivity-weighted 
meta-induction, abbreviated as wMI, and is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 2. The predictions of wMI (attractivity-weighted meta-induction) are defined as 
predn+1(wMI) =def  


 
mi1
mi1
)(Pat 
)(Ppred)(Pat 
in
i1nin
 , where 
 atn(Pi) is the attractivity of a player Pi for wMI at a given time n, defined as  
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atn(Pi) =def  sucn(Pi)–sucn(wMI), if this expression is positive; else atn(Pi)=0, and 
 if n=1 or the denominator is zero, wMI's prediction is a random guess. 
 
Let "maxsucn" denote the non-MI-players' maximal success rate at time n. Then the opti-
mality theorem for wMI (proved in Schurz 2008, sec. 7, theorem 4) asserts: 
 
Theorem 1. (Universal access-optimality for wMI): 
For every prediction game ((e), {P1,,Pm,wMI}) the following holds:  
(1.1) (Short run:)(n1:) sucn(wMI)  maxsucn  n/m . 
(1.2) (Long-run:) sucn(wMI) (strictly) converges to the non-MI-players' maximal success 
for n. 
 
According to theorem (1.2) attractivity-weighted meta-induction is long-run optimal for all 
possible event sequences and sets of accessible prediction methods. The only proviso is 
that the set of accessible methods is finite, which is a realistic assumption for cognitively 
finite beings. In the short run, weighted meta-induction may suffer from a possible loss, 
compared to the leading player. This loss (which is also called wMI's 'regret') is caused by 
the fact that wMI must base her prediction of the next event on the past success rates of the 
candidate methods, and the hitherto most attractive methods may perform badly in the pre-
diction of the next event. Fortunately theorem (1.1)  states a worst-case upper bound for 
this loss, which is small if the number of competing methods, m, is small compared to the 
number of rounds, n, and which converges quickly to zero when n grows large.  
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 Theorem 1 applies to prediction games with real-valued as well as binary (or discrete) 
events. Even if the events are binary wMI's predictions are real-valued (because proper 
weighted averages of 0s and 1s are real-valued).  How can the optimality result of theorem 
1 be transferred to binary games whose predictions must be binary? There are two methods 
by which this can be done:  
 (1.) Randomization, rwMI (cf. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006, sec. 4.1): Here one as-
sumes that rwMI predicts en=1 with a probability (P) that equals the optimal real-valued 
prediction of wMI, i.e., P(predn(rwMI) =1) = predn(wMI). This method is not entirely gen-
eral since it presupposes that the events are probabilistically independent from rwMI's 
choice of prediction. 
 (2.) Collective meta-induction, cwMI (Schurz 2008, sec. 8): Here a collective of meta-
inductivists approximates real-valued predictions by the mean value of their binary predic-
tions. Their mean predictive success rate approximates provably the success rate of the 
optimal method wMI. Assuming that the cwMIs are cooperators and share their success, 
every individual member of the collective is predictively optimal.   
 Theorem 1 establishes the following a priori justification of attractivity-weighted meta-
induction: In all environments it is reasonable  in addition to searching for good object-
level methods  to apply the strategy wMI, as this can only improve but not worsen one's 
success in the long run. Note that by itself this justification does not entail anything about 
the rationality of object-level induction: it may well be that we live in a world in which a 
method different from object-induction is predictively superior. However, it seems that the 
a priori justification of meta-induction give us the following a posteriori justification of 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1465-
  7 
object-induction: to the extent that (a particular version of) object-induction was so far the 
most successful prediction strategy, it is meta-inductively reasonable to continue favoring 
(this particular version of) object-induction.   
 Theorem 1 asserts the  optimality but not the dominance (in the long run) of attractivi-
ty-based meta-induction. Thus there may exists other methods, different from wMI, that 
are likewise long-run optimal. In fact one can prove that there are certain variants of wMI 
that are long-run optimal  and have short-run advantages in certain and disadvantages in 
other environments. So wMI is cannot be universally long-run dominant. Nevertheless, the 
following restricted dominance result for wMI follows from theorem 1: 
 
 
Theorem 2. (Dominance for wMI): 
(2.1) wMI dominates every prediction method that is not universally long-run optimal. In 
other words, for every such method M there is a prediction game containing wMI and M in 
which wMI's long-run success rate exceeds that of M.  
(2.2) Not universally long-run optimal are, for example, all independent non-clairvoyant 
methods, that is, methods that can learn only from observations of past events, but not from 
the predictions of other methods.  
 
Proof of theorem 2: Theorem (2.1) is an immediate consequence of theorem 1 and the def-
inition of "optimality". The proof of theorem (2.2) goes as follows: Let M be an independ-
ent method based on a function f that maps each n-tuple of past events (e1,,en)  Valn 
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into a prediction predn+1Val. We define an M-adversarial event sequence (e') as follows: 
e'1 = 0.5, and e'n+1 = 1 if f(e'1,,e'n)  0.5; else e'n+1 = 0. Moreover we identify the predic-
tions of the perfect (e')-forecaster M' with the so-defined sequence, i.e., predn(M') = e'n 
(note that if f is computable, M' is so, too). In the prediction game ((e'),{M,M',wMI}) the 
success rate of M can never exceed 1/2, that of M' is always 1 and that of wMI converges 
to 1 (by theorem 1). This proves theorem 2. Q.E.D. 
 
 Theorem 2 is crucial for the next sections in which we confront the optimality of meta-
induction with the no free lunch theorem. 
  
 
2. Radical Inductive Skepticism: The No Free Lunch Theorem 
 
 Wolpert's (in)famous no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996) is a radicalized version of 
Hume's inductive skepticism for theoretical computer science. The theorem applies to pre-
diction methods that can be represented as computable functions from past observations to 
predictions, so called learning algorithms (thus, clairvoyance is excluded). The theorem is 
often expressed by the assertion that for each pair of prediction methods, the number  or 
in the infinite case the probability  of possible worlds (event sequences) in which the first 
method outperforms the second is precisely equal to the number (or probability) of worlds 
in which the second method outperforms the first. We call this assertion the strong version 
of Wolpert's theorem, because it presupposes a 'homogeneous' loss function:  
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Theorem 3. Strong no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996, 1354f, theorems 1, 3):  
For every possible loss value c, the probability of worlds in a which prediction method 
leads to a loss of c is the same for all possible prediction methods, provided one assumes  
 (a) a state-uniform prior probability distribution, that is, a uniform distribution over all 
possible event sequences (or states of the world), and  
 (b) a homogeneous loss function, in the sense that for all possible loss values c, the num-
ber of possible events e Val for which a prediction predVal leads to a loss of c is the 
same for all possible predictions predVal. 
  
The requirement of a homogeneous loss function very strong: It is only satisfied if events 
and predictions are binary, or more generally, if they are discrete with a zero-one loss 
function. Under this assumption homogeneity is obvious: If the value space has k elements, 
then for every predVal the number of possible events eVal that lead to a loss of 1 is 
obviously k1, and the number of events that lead to a loss of 0 is one. In contrast, in pre-
diction games with real-valued predictions the homogeneity requirement fails. In the bina-
ry case, for example, the number of events which lead to a loss of 1 is one for the two pre-
dictions pred =1  and pred = 0, but zero for the prediction pred = 0.5.  
 Homogeneous loss functions are a clear restriction of the strong no free lunch theorem, 
since, as we have seen, real-valued predictions can be implemented even in binary games, 
either by randomized binary predictions or by a cooperative collective of binary forecast-
ers. There is, however, a weak version of the no free lunch theorem (mentioned by Wolpert 
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1996 on p. 1354 ) which applies to real-valued predictions over binary or discrete events 
and assumes what we call a "weakly homogeneous" loss function:  
  
Theorem 4. Weak no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996, 1354):  
The probabilistically expected success of every possible prediction method is equal to the 
expected success of random guessing or of every other prediction method, provided one 
assumes 
 (a) a state-uniform prior probability distribution, and   
 (b) a weakly homogeneous loss function, in the sense that for every possible prediction 
pred  Val the sum of pred's losses over all possible events eVal is the same 
(predVal: eValloss(pred,e) = a constant c*). 
 
 For binary events with real-valued predictions and a natural loss function weak homo-
geneity is satisfied, since for every prediction pred[0,1], loss(pred,1) + loss(pred,0) = 
1pred + pred = 1.    
 For prediction games with real-valued events, most loss functions (including all convex 
ones) are not even weakly homogeneous. Here "free lunches" are possible in the sense that 
not all prediction methods have the same expected success, relative to a state-uniform 
probability distribution.  
 In this paper we focus on prediction games with discrete events and real-valued predic-
tions, to which the weak no free lunch theorem applies. The framework in which Wolpert 
proves his theorems are not prediction games, but learning algorithms that map training 
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sets into predictions of test items. But since a prediction game can be considered as an iter-
ated procedure of selecting a training set of n events and predicting the event at test item 
n+1, Wolpert's result applies straightforwardly to prediction games.  
 Theorem 4 asserts that every possible prediction method  be it an intelligent inductive 
one, a crazy anti-inductive one, or a stupid one that always predicts the same value  has 
the same expected predictive success relative to a state-uniform prior distribution. For all 
induction-friendly philosophical programs, including the program of meta-induction, this 
result seems to be devastating. How is it possible? In what follows we give a brief explana-
tion of Wolpert's theorem in terms that are philosophically more familiar than his own "ex-
tended Bayesian framework". 
 Wolpert's theorem is a far-reaching generalization of a straightforward result about the 
prediction of binary sequences. For this application the strong no free lunch theorem 
amounts to the following: However a prediction function f, with predn+1 = f((e1,,en)) 
{0,1}, is defined, there are as many sequences of a given length k>n extending (e1,,en) 
that verify f's prediction predn+1 as there are sequences that falsify it. Thus by attaching an 
equal probability to every possible sequence the expected score of each prediction function 
will be 1/2. More generally speaking, this result is an immediate consequence of an 
(in)famous result in probability theory which can be found (among other authors) in Car-
nap (1950, 564-566) or Howson and Urbach (1996, 64-66). The result can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Theorem 5. (Carnap 1950, 564-566):   
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Let P be a state-uniform prior probability (density) distribution over (the Borel algebra 
over)1 the set of all infinite binary sequences, {0,1}Then P has the following two 'radi-
cally non-inductive' properties:  
 (a) P assigns the same conditional probability to each event en  {0,1} independently of 
the preceding events (e1,,en1) of the sequence. Thus, P is an IID (independent identical 
distribution) with P(1) = P(0) = 1/2.  
 (b) P assigns a probability of one to the class of sequences with a limiting frequency of 
1/2 and a probability of zero to all other possible limiting frequencies; this follows from (a) 
by the strong law of large numbers.
 
3. No Free Lunch and Meta-induction  a Conflict?    
  
 We now turn to the relation between the weak no free lunch theorem and theorem 2 
about meta-induction. The no free lunch theorem applies not only to object-level prediction 
methods, but also to all meta-strategies, given that they are applied to a fixed set of inde-
pendent prediction methods  for the reason that every combination of a finite number of 
prediction algorithms is itself a prediction algorithm. So the puzzling question arises: If the 
                                                 
1
  P yields Carnap's confirmation function c†. Technically, {0,1} is represented by the 
interval [0,1] of real numbers in binary representation (see fig. 1 below). P over the 
Borel algebra Bo([0,1]) is defined by the integrals of an assumed density function DP 
over [0,1]. 
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no free lunch theorem is true, how can it be that attractivity-weighted meta-induction, 
when applied to a fixed set of independent prediction algorithms, is dominant in compari-
son to certain other methods, as stated in theorem 2? Is this a contradiction? 
 Our answer to this question in regard to the long run perspective can be summarized as 
follows: No, the contradiction is only apparent. It is indeed true that there exist many wMI-
accessible methods whose predictive success rate is (in the long run) strictly smaller than 
that of wMI in some worlds (event sequences)2 and never greater than that of wMI in any 
world  let us call these methods Minf (for "inferior"). Nevertheless the state-uniform ex-
pectation values of the success rates of wMI and Minf are equal, because the state-uniform 
distribution that Wolpert assumes assigns a probability of zero to all worlds in which wMI 
dominates Minf; so these worlds do not affect the probabilistic expectation value.  
 Let us elaborate on this connection. The major difference between the account of meta-
induction and Wolpert's extended Bayesian account is this: While the former account is 
independent from any assumed prior  distribution over possible event sequences, Wolpert's 
result depends on a particular prior distribution, the state-uniform distribution. Wolpert 
seems to assume that this distribution is epistemically privileged. Reasonable doubts can 
be raised here, because the state-uniform distribution is induction-hostile. A proponent of 
this distribution believes with probability 1 a priori that the binary event sequence she is 
                                                 
2
  Generally speaking possible worlds are identified prediction games. But in the given 
context we assume a fixed set of prediction methods, whence possible worlds can be 
identified with event sequences. 
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going to predict (a) has a limiting frequency of 1/2 and (b) is non-computable. Fact (a) 
follows from theorem 5, and (b) from the fact that there are uncountably many sequences, 
but only countably many computable ones. However, the event sequences for which an 
intelligent prediction method can be better than random guessing or any other stupid meth-
od are precisely those event sequences that do not fall into the intersection of classes (a) or 
(b). To make this point explicit: For random sequences with a limiting frequency of 1/2, all 
combinations of independent methods must have the same success rate as random guess-
ing, i.e. 1/2. The only possibility for these sequences to be predictable is that they are com-
putable by an internal regularity, but this possibility has probability zero, too.  
 In conclusion, proponents of a state-uniform prior distribution are strongly biased: they 
are a priori certain that the world is irregular so that induction cannot have any chance. We 
suppose that adherents of a more induction-friendly view, for example Bayesians in the 
ordinary (not Wolpertian) sense, will regard a state-uniform prior distribution as highly 
"unnatural". Instead of a state-uniform distribution they typically prefer a uniform distribu-
tion over all possible limiting frequencies; we call such a distribution a frequency-uniform 
distribution. It is well known that frequency-uniform distributions are highly induction-
friendly: from them on can derive Laplace's rule of induction,  P(en+1 = 1 | fn(1) = nk )  =  
2n
1k


 , where "fn(1)" denotes the frequency of 1's among the first n events (cf. Carnap 
1950, 568). In computer science, Laplace's rule has been generalized by Solomonoff (1964, 
sec. 4.1), who proved that if the prior probability of a sequence is inversely proportional to 
its algorithmic complexity, then Laplace's rule of induction is valid.  
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 The precise relation between prior distributions over the space of possible infinite se-
quences and corresponding distributions over the space of possible limiting frequencies (or 
classes of sequences with the same frequency) is displayed in figures 1 and 2 below. As 
usual, infinite 0-1-sequences are represented as real numbers between 0 and 1 in binary 
representation (e.g., 0.0110) and ordered according to their numerical size. In this way, 
the state-uniform distribution over possible sequences is represented as a uniform density 
over the interval [0,1]. Fig. 1 presents the transformation of this distribution into the corre-
sponding distribution over possible limiting frequencies, with the result that a uniform dis-
tribution over [0,1] viewed as space of sequences is transformed into a maximally dogmat-
ic distribution (an infinite density peak) over [0,1] viewed as space of frequency limits.  
 
Uniform density over possible   Corresponding 'maximally dogmatic' 
sequences (binary coding)    density over possible frequency limits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Transformation of a state-uniform into a frequency-uniform distribution.   
 
 
Fig. 2 (below) illustrates the inverse transformation. The upper part of fig. 2 shows what 
happens to a  frequency-uniform distribution over [0,1], if it is transformed into a distribu-
tion over [0,1] viewed as space of possible sequences. The resulting distribution becomes 
  
 
1  
 
  0      1     0  1/2    1 
1
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non-continuous and entirely disrupted: in every finite interval I  [0,1] it increases infinite-
ly often to a positive value and falls back to zero.
3
 It follows that a state-uniform prior dis-
tribution makes Bayesian converge results impossible, because all these results presuppose 
a (not necessarily uniform but) continuous prior distribution over the possible frequencies 
(cf. Earman 1992, 141ff). Thus "outwashing of priors" is impossible for state-uniform prior 
distributions. The lower part of fig. 2 displays Solomonoff's result (1964) which states that 
the frequency-uniform probability of a (finite or infinite) sequence decreases exponentially 
with its algorithmic complexity c(s): P(s) ~ 2c(s).  Thus sequences with lower complexity 
have a higher frequency-uniform probability than those with high complexity. In conclu-
sion, a frequency-uniform distribution is strongly biased in regard to less complex (more 
regular) sequences.    
 So which prior distributions are more natural, state-uniform ones or frequency-uniform 
ones? In our eyes, this question has no reasonable answer because all prior distributions are 
subjective and biased in some respect. We regard it as a great advantage of the optimality 
of meta-induction that it holds regardless of any assumed prior probability distribution. For 
a frequency-uniform prior distribution the probability of worlds in which meta-induction  
dominates random guessing is close to one. For a state-uniform prior the probability of  
                                                 
3
 To see this, let r1 and r2 (r2 > r1) be two infinite sequences represented as binary real 
numbers r1 = "0.00...(n times zero)11...(one forever)" and r2 = "0.00...(n1 times ze-
ro)11...(one forever)". Their complexity is minimal. The class of sequences lying be-
tween r1 and r2 contains sequences with all complexities between the minimal one and 
the maximal one, which is possessed by sequences with frequency limit 1/2. So the 
density climbs up and down between minimal and maximal complexity in the interval 
[r1,r2]. Since this holds for every arbitrary small interval, the claim follows.  
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         0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Transformation of a frequency-uniform into  
  upper part:  a state-uniform density distribution.  
  lower part:  a distribution over the algorithmic complexity. 
 
worlds in which meta-induction dominates random guessing is zero. Nevertheless many  
such worlds exist and it is precisely in these worlds that intelligent prediction methods can 
have chance at all. We should certainly not exclude these induction-friendly worlds from 
the start by assigning a probability of zero to them. This concludes my discussion of the 
relation between meta-induction and the no free lunch theorem within the perspective of 
the long run.   
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
1
          
       
        
0        
 
          
c(s)
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
0 
Corresponding 'disrupted' density over 
possible sequences in binary representation  
Uniform density over 
possible frequencies 
Corresponding 'inductive' density over 
algorithmic complexity of sequences  
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4. No Free Lunch and Meta-induction in the Short Run Perspective  
 
 The discussion of Wolpert's theorem within the perspective of the short run is more 
intricate. Recall that for finite sequences the advantage of meta-induction comes at a cer-
tain cost, that vanishes in the long run but is non-negligible for short sequences. Table 1 
presents the result of a computer simulation of all possible prediction games with a length 
of 20 rounds, with binary events, three independent prediction methods and wMI.
4
 The 
considered independent methods were  
   majority induction, M-I, which always predicts the event that so far has been in the 
majority, and 0.5 in the case of ties (i.e.,predn+1 = 1/0.5/0 iff fn(1) >/=/< 0.5, respectively),  
  majority anti-induction, M-AI, which predicts the opposite of M-I (i.e., predn+1 = 
0/0.5/1 iff fn(1) >/=/< 0.5, respectively),  
   averaging, Av, which always predicts 0.5.  
 Table 1 displays the frequencies of sequences for which the absolute success of a pre-
diction method lies in a certain interval that is specified at the left margin, with [0,1) being 
the lowest and [19,20] the highest possible success interval. In accordance with the weak 
no free lunch theorem one sees in the bottom line that the average success is the same for 
all four methods. Nevertheless the frequency distributions over classes of sequences in 
which these methods reach certain success levels is remarkably different. The averaging 
method predicts always 0.5 and earns a sum-of-scores of 10 in all possible sequences. The 
object-inductive method M-I reaches a high success level in more worlds than the anti-
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inductive method M-AI (symmetrically, Av-AI attains a low success level in more worlds 
than Av-I). In compensation, the number of worlds in which the anti-inductive method 
does just a little better than averaging is significantly higher than the corresponding num-
ber of worlds for the inductive method. 
    M-I M-AI Av wMI 
Su
m
-o
f-s
co
re
s i
nt
er
va
ls 
[0,1) 0 0.000 0 0 
[1,2) 0 0.003 0 0 
[2,3) 0 0.029 0 0 
[3,4) 0 0.159 0 0 
[4,5) 0 0.618 0 0 
[5,6) 0.537 1.824 0 0 
[6,7) 3.540 4.254 0 0 
[7,8) 9.579 8.035 0 0 
[8,9) 15.622 12.476 0 36.491
[9,10) 18.346 16.065 0 23.472
[10,11) 17.915 18.157 100.000 14.835
[11,12) 15.046 17.510 0 11.880
[12,13) 10.266 12.854 0 7.469 
[13,14) 5.635 6.305 0 3.595 
[14,15) 2.448 1.611 0 1.513 
[15,16) 0.821 0.098 0 0.560 
[16,17) 0.204 0 0 0.153 
[17,18) 0.035 0 0 0.029 
[18,19) 0.004 0 0 0.003 
[19,20) 0 0 0 0 
State-uniform 
average 10 10 10 10 
 
Table 1. Computer simulation of M-I, M-AI, Av and wMI in all (220) binary sequences 
with 20 rounds. Cells show percentage of sequences in which certain levels of absolute 
success (left margin) have been reached.   
 
 Based on these results we obtain a justification of object-induction and of meta-
                                                                                                                                                    
4
  Computer simulations were performed by Paul Thorn. 
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induction even within the induction-hostile perspective of a state-uniform prior distribution 
for short-run sequences. One can reasonably argue that what counts is to reach high suc-
cess in those environments which allow for high success. This is what independent induc-
tive methods do. At the same time one should protect oneself against  low successes  this 
is what cautious methods of the type "averaging" do. The advantage of wMI meta-
induction is that it combines both   reaching high successes where it is possible (inspect 
the intervals [12,13)[19,20]) and at the same time avoiding low successes (inspect the 
intervals [8,9) and [9,10)). Thus wMI achieves "the best of both worlds". This, however, 
goes on the cost of a certain short-run loss (inspect the intervals [10,11) and [11,12)). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we confronted the optimality of meta-induction with the no free lunch 
theorem. We demonstrated that the apparent conflict between these two results disappears 
when one considers that the no free lunch theorem assumes a state-uniform prior distribu-
tion over the set of all (binary) event sequences. This distribution assigns a probability of 
zero to all infinite sequences that exhibit some sort of regularity which an intelligent pre-
diction method could exploit. Short sequences were investigated by means of a computer 
simulation of all possible sequences of length 20. The result shows that in spite of having 
an equal expected predictive success, different prediction methods differ significantly in 
the frequency with which they reach certain success levels. Meta-induction turns out to 
offer the best combination of two abilities: exploiting regular sequences and avoiding loss-
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1479-
  21 
es in irregular sequences.  
 We emphasize that this characterization of the advantage of meta-induction holds for 
the induction-hostile state-uniform prior distribution. If one switches to a frequency-
uniform prior distribution, the computer simulation produces rather different results: Now 
M-I and wMI have highest predictive success in all classes of sequences whose frequencies 
are in the intervals [0,0.1), , [0.3,0.4) and  [0.6,0.7), , [0.9,1]. wMI suffers from a 
small loss compared to M-I in these frequency intervals. In the frequency intervals 
[0.4,0.5) and [0.5,0.6) the picture is reversed: Here M-AI and Av are more successful than 
M-I; wMI suffers from a small loss compared to M-AI and Av, but is more successful than 
M-I. Because of space limitations we abstain from presenting the details.   
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Constructing Diagrams to Understand Phenomena and Mechanisms 
Benjamin Sheredos     Department of Philosophy 
   William Bechtel & Center for Circadian Biology
               UC San Diego
Biologists often hypothesize mechanisms to explain phenomena. Our interest is how their
understanding of the phenomena and mechanisms develops as they construct diagrams
to communicate their claims. We present two case studies in which scientists integrate
various  data  to  create  a  single  diagram to  communicate  their  major  conclusions  in  a
research publication. In both cases, the history of revisions suggests that scientists' initial
drafts encode biases and oversights that are only gradually overcome through prolonged,
reflective re-design. To account for this, we suggest that scientists only develop a unitary
understanding of their results through their attempts to communicate them. 
1. Introduction
In biology, explanation often involves characterizing a phenomenon and generating an 
account of the mechanism thought to be responsible for it. The notion of mechanism has 
played this role in the life sciences since at least the 18th century, when it was adopted to 
characterize explanations that result from analyzing or decomposing biological systems 
into component parts, detailing their operations, and determining how these parts are 
organized and the operations orchestrated to produce the phenomena of interest (Bechtel 
& Richardson, 1993/2010). Scientists frequently find it productive to represent both 
phenomena and  mechanisms in diagrams, in which different glyphs (Tversky, 2011) are 
laid out spatially. Shapes represent entities (the mechanism or its parts) and arrows 
represent operations. Space-on-the-page sometimes represents physical space (e.g., the 
nucleus versus the cytoplasm of the cell) but often is used simply to separate glyphs, 
distinguishing the represented parts and operations (Sheredos, Burnston, Abrahamsen, & 
Bechtel, 2013). Often, viewers can mentally animate a diagram to get an intuitive 
understanding of the mechanism's operations (Hegarty, 1992). Diagrams also aid in 
producing abstract mathematical cognition in the construction of computational models 
(Jones & Wolkenhauer, 2012). 
Our focus here is on how scientists generate such diagrams. Generally these figures 
do not arise in a final format all at once, but result from a history of producing and revising 
interim drafts. Hand-drawn sketches might be preserved in laboratory notebooks 
(Nersessian, 2008). In the electronic era, a lineage of drafts is often preserved digitally in 
the files researchers save on the way to a final diagram. We take advantage of these to 
study the development of diagrams that appeared in two published papers. The first 
authors of each paper have provided their drafts of both text and the figures, allowing us to 
analyze their development. The last figure in one paper depicts a mechanism proposed to 
explain a phenomenon, whereas in the other the last figure presents a new phenomenon to 
be explained. We examine the drafts leading to these. 
The researchers made major revisions to these diagrams as work on the 
manuscripts proceeded, reflecting the cognitive labor required in their development. We 
advance a hypothesis regarding why such labor is required, and why it takes the form it 
does: prior to the attempt to develop a coherent diagram, scientists themselves lack full 
understanding of the domain of inquiry. They have a “cognitive collage” (Tversky, 1993) 
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consisting of somewhat isolated and only partly-integrated understandings, often gleaned 
from diverse sources of data. It is through the attempt to develop a communicative diagram
that these disparate, partial understandings are integrated into a detailed, cohesive whole.
Our case studies both concern research on circadian rhythms: endogenously-
generated oscillations of approximately 24 hours that regulate the timing of other 
physiological and behavioral activities. The laboratory from which these publications arose
studies circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria (specifically Synechococcus elongatus), the only 
bacterial lineage in which circadian rhythms have been demonstrated. 
The basic mechanism responsible for circadian timekeeping in cyanobacteria is 
represented in Figure 1. (This figure comes from our first case study, examined further in 
the next section. For further details on the core mechanism see Kim, Dong, Carruthers, 
Golden, & LiWang, 2008.) The mechanism involves three proteins (KaiA, KaiB, and KaiC) 
plus their states and interactions at four major time-points (organized here in a circle, with 
different time-points at top, right, bottom, and left). KaiC is the large macromolecule shown
at each time-point. It undergoes phosphorylation and dephosphorylation at two locations; 
the added phosphate groups are symbolized by the letter P in a black circle. KaiC itself 
initiates both phosphorylation and dephosphorylation, but the other two Kai proteins 
determine which dominates. When KaiA, represented using a purple, “bunny-eared” icon 
(top, right, and bottom), binds to KaiC (see top) phosphorylation is sped up and KaiC 
quickly becomes phosphorylated at both locations (see the two “P”s at right). When KaiB, 
represented using four stacked red ovals (at right and bottom) binds, it sequesters KaiA 
(see bottom), allowing dephosphorylation to proceed until neither location is 
phosphorylated (see left). 
Since there is a specific and regular order of phosphorylation, and one cycle takes 
about 24 hours, KaiC's phosphorylation state predicts the current time of day, and serves 
as the cyanobacterium's “clock.” Although open questions remain, this basic mechanism is 
well-established (see Mackey, Golden, & Ditty, 2011, for review) and provides the backdrop
for the research pursued in our two case studies.
Figure 1. The first figure in Paddock et al. (2013) showing KaiC's phosphorylation cycle, as 
regulated by KaiA&B. Arrows leading to the word Output? encode uncertainty regarding  
which phosphorylation state communicates predicted time-of-day to the rest of the cell. 
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2. Advancing a New Hypothesis About the Output Mechanism
In our first case, Paddock, Boyd, Adin, and Golden (2013) advanced an important revision 
of what had become the standard account of the output mechanism through which the 
cyanobacterial circadian clock regulates the expression of virtually all genes. Two relatively
well-defined classes of genes exhibit peak expression around (predicted) dawn and 
(predicted) dusk. If expression peaks near dawn, the gene is said to be regulated by a Class 
1 promoter; if near dusk, by a Class 2 promoter. The proximal cause at work in each case is 
a transcription factor, which activates the promoter and initiates gene expression. 
Somehow, the clock must regulate promoter activation. Yet the Kai proteins are not 
transcription factors: none can directly influence any gene's expression. So additional 
components, forming an “output pathway,” must mediate clock control of gene expression.
Two proteins, SasA and RpaA, had long been implicated since knocking out these 
proteins severely reduces rhythmic gene expression, even though the clock (KaiC's 
phosphorylation rhythm) is left intact. Since RpaA, but not SasA, is a transcription factor, 
the output pathway was hypothesized to run from KaiC to SasA to RpaA (Takai, Nakajima, 
Oyama, Kito, Sugita, Sugita, Kondo, & Iwasaki, 2006). We return to discuss this SasA-RpaA 
pathway below. What this research had not been able to determine, however, was which 
phosphorylation state(s) of KaiC triggers output. 
This question is posed in Figure 1 (which is Paddock et al.'s published Figure 1). In 
addition to the glyphs we discussed above, the graphic includes four dotted arrows, 
originating at each phosphorylation state of KaiC and terminating in “Output?” Use of 
question marks to indicate uncertainties is common in mechanism diagrams. These arrows 
were added in a late draft (March 13, 2013), but the uncertainties they represent were 
formulated well in advance, as the specific target of research: Paddock et al. tested which 
phosphorylation state(s) drives output from the clock, and controls gene expression. The 
decisive experiments involved two steps.
First, Paddock et al. took cells and knocked out KaiC, destroying the clock. In this 
condition, there is no circadian regulation of gene expression: transcription factors activate
promoters at their leisure. It was observed that with circadian regulation eradicated, Class 
1 promoters “default” to a constantly high level of activation compared to wild-type (rather
than selectively increasing activation at dawn) and Class 2 promoters “default” to 
constantly low activation (rather than selectively increasing activation at dusk).
Next, Paddock et al. reasoned that any phosphorylation state of KaiC that induced a 
deflection away from these “default” values could play some role in controlling output. To 
examine this, they created four molecules, each of which mimicked one phosphorylation 
state. (These phosphomimetics are named in italics in Figure 1). They then replaced KaiC 
with one of the phosphomimetics. Each modified cell essentially has a clock that is 
artificially “stopped” at one time-of-day. Paddock et al. then measured the effect on gene 
expression (using a luciferase reporter to detect promoter activation).
Only one phosphomimetic (KaiC-ET) induced activation different from the KaiC 
knockout's “default” activation. It both repressed the default-high activation of Class 1 
promoters and enhanced the default-low activation of Class 2 promoters. This established 
that a single phosphorylation state of KaiC serves as the clock's output signal. This 
phosphorylation state (labeled “KaiC-pST” on the bottom of Fig. 1) corresponds, roughly, to
predicted middle-of-the-night. 
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Between October 2012, when the authors began writing the manuscript, and June 
2013, when they submitted it for publication, Paddock et al. drafted a series of diagrams to 
resolve the uncertainties presented in Figure 1. Two early versions are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2A continues to show all four phosphorylation states of KaiC, and adds an inhibitory 
arrow showing repression of PkaiBC (a Class 1 promoter which serves to represent all Class 1
promoters) and an excitatory arrow showing activation of Ppurf (representative of Class 2 
promoters). Figure 2B partially simplifies the diagram by leaving out phosphorylation 
states that were ineffective in regulating gene expression, retaining a circle to indicate the 
phosphorylation cycle of KaiC. It also adds some linguistic labels and an indication that the 
clock is affected by inputs. 
Figure 2. Panel A: an early version in the lineage of sketches that culminated in 
Figure 7, dated December 4, 2012. Panel B: a pared-down version, dated January 11,
2013. 
These early drafts foregrounded the importance of KaiC-pST in regulating clock 
output, but did not include roles for SasA and RpaA, which were known to influence output.
Paddock et al.’s data showed that when their phosphomimetic induced output from the 
clock, it did not affect the SasA-RpaA pathway. This left a puzzle: RpaA had been supposed 
to mediate the output, and yet it was not affected by the newly-identified output signal. To 
resolve this puzzle, the researchers drew upon additional data involving RpaA knockouts. 
As noted above, with KaiC knocked out (but with RpaA present), Class 1 promoters 
“default” to high activation, and Class 2 promoters “default” to low activation. In a RpaA 
knockout with KaiC still present these values are reversed: Class 1 promoters show 
constant low activation, and Class 2 promoters show constant high activation. When both 
RpaA and KaiC were knocked out, the results match those observed in the KaiC knockout 
alone. Taken together, the data indicate (a) that KaiC-pST affects output independently of 
RpaA, and (b) that the influence of RpaA is antagonistic to, or inhibitory of, the effects of 
KaiC-pST. Paddock et al.  concluded that there were two output pathways: the previously-
known SasA-RpaA pathway, and the one demonstrated to originate from KaiC-pST.
They drafted new diagrams (starting March 2013) to try to show how the two 
pathways interact in regulating gene expression. Presumably because they wanted to show
the origin of the SasA-RpaA pathway in a different phosphorylation state, they restored the 
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other phosphorylation states that had been dropped from Figure 2B (see Figure 3A below).
Because the origin of the SasA-RpaA pathway was unknown, the sketch shown in Figure 3A
does not link it to any one phosphorylation state. It is shown as inhibiting output from the 
KaiC-ST phosphoform. Here effects on gene expression are shown all at once, in terms of a 
general measure, Oscillator Output Activity, which we do not discuss further (an analysis 
has been provided by Burnston, Sheredos, Abrahamsen, and Bechtel, 2014).
Altogether Paddock et al. generated seven variants of Figure 3A. These became quite
complex as they tried to illustrate the interactions between pathways. Then in the draft of 
April 11 they abruptly changed to the simpler format shown in Figure 3B. Multiple 
representations of KaiC's phosphorylation states are removed, and a single circle 
represents KaiC's phosphorylation rhythm. Another circle represents a cycle of RpaA 
phosphorylation.  Instead of trying to show the effects on Class 1 and Class 2 promoters at 
once, they show each separately, duplicating the whole arrangement. The schematic graphs
on the right indicate effects on expression (using recorded bioluminescence as well as the 
measure of Oscillator Output Activity, now renamed Kai Oscillator Activity (KOA)). 
Figure 3B shows what appeared, with minor changes, as part of Paddock et al.'s 
Figure 7. The history of drafting described here reflects a variety of attempts to portray the 
mechanisms of circadian output. What we highlight is the progression through several 
repetitive phases of abstraction, or the elimination of detail. In moving from Figure 2A to 
2B, a number of details regarding phosphorylation states of KaiC are deemed irrelevant 
and dropped out. Yet when it comes time to add a depiction of the RpaA pathway, these 
same details re-appear in Figure 3A. Along with a number of other changes, there is a 
repetition of the same abstraction to obtain 3B, and the same details are again dropped out.
This months-long drafting process only gradually produced the published figure, and one 
sees the researchers struggling repeatedly to move away from their initial, detail-rich 
sketch.
Figure 3. Panel A: one of several intermediate versions that appeared in versions of 
the manuscript from early March until mid-April 2013. Panel B: a pared down 
version that appeared on April 11, 2013. 
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3. Characterizing the Changing Location of the Clock within the Cell
Our second case comes from the same laboratory. Instead of advancing a new set of 
operations in a mechanism, Cohen, Erb, Selimkhanov, Dong, Hasty, Pogliano, and Golden 
(2014) reveal a new phenomenal aspect of the circadian clock, its changing location within 
the cell over the course of a day. Although the clock's migration is potentially important in 
explaining the operation of the clock, the goal of the paper is simply to demonstrate this 
movement.
Since they lack internal membranes, bacteria were long regarded as internally 
disorganized bags of genes, enzymes, and other molecules. Recent research has identified 
extensive internal organization and determined its importance for various physiological 
activities of bacteria (Rudner & Losick, 2010). Cohen et al. set out to investigate where the 
Kai proteins are located in the cell. Using luciferase and fluorescence reporters, they 
determined that although KaiA and KaiC are distributed throughout the cell during the day, 
at night they localize to one pole. Notably, when KaiA and KaiC are localized at the cell pole,
they are co-localized with KaiB and with CikA (a part of the input pathway to the clock, 
affecting its “entrainment” or synchronization to local day/night cycles). Cohen et al. 
suggest that this localization may be functionally significant for timekeeping, and may 
“facilitate interactions among the clock components” (p. 1840).
The data graphics for the paper, presenting evidence for the changing localization of
KaiA and KaiC, were largely settled by the time drafting of the manuscript began in March 
2014. Over the following four months of drafting, much effort was spent developing a 
diagram linking the localization of the proteins to previously-known operations involved in
the clock. All versions were prepared by the first author, with others offering advice and 
aiding decisions between alternatives. We examine a few steps between the initial draft 
and the final figure, which eventually appeared as the final figure in the published article. 
The initial draft, dated March 7, 2014 comprised five panels. Three panels 
reproduced extant images (from the web or from another publication) to present some 
examples of how other diagrams had shown relevant information. One panel consisted of 
questions and design considerations for the figure, and read:
“Model: entrainment/proteolysis.
1. SDH/respiration goes to poles in low light.
2. ATPase interactions at night? ATPases are in the curved part of the 
chloroplasts
3. Curvature”
Although these phrases are cryptic, they reference specific information that the researchers
considered including in their diagram. The word entrainment refers to CikA's role in the 
input pathway. The co-localization of CikA and KaiC at the cell pole may be related to 
entrainment, and it was considered whether to emphasize this in a future draft. The word 
proteolysis invokes a well-documented migration of proteins to the membrane when 
targeted for destruction. The newly-documented movement of the Kai proteins was found 
not to be related to proteolysis, and it was considered that future sketches might 
underscore this. The first bullet point points out that succinate dehydrogenase (SDH) and 
other enzymes involved in respiration also migrate to the poles. Implicitly, the question of 
the relation of the clock's migration to basic cell metabolism is being raised. The next bullet
point raises it more explicitly, asking whether the clock's migration is related to energetic 
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processes at the pole. The last bullet point raises the question of whether the curvature of 
the membrane at the pole figures in directing the migration. 
Although these were raised as design considerations, none were addressed in the 
initial draft that appeared in the remaining panel (Figure 4 below). A single 
cyanobacterium is shown with a green line representing its membrane. To illustrate the 
different state of the clock over time, the figure is divided diagonally into two segments 
(day phase is yellow, including an icon of the sun, and night is grey, including a moon). In 
each half of the figure, the phosphorylation cycle is shown, using glyphs similar to Paddock 
et al.'s for the Kai proteins, but showing only two of the four phosphoforms (white circles 
indicate phosphates). During the day phase KaiA is shown bound to phosphorylated KaiC, 
and detached from unphosphorylated KaiC; all these glyphs are situated towards the center
and away from the pole. In the night phase CikA and KaiB are included, and the glyphs are 
placed near the pole.  Two bullet points reference other studies documenting events 
occurring during the night phase.
Figure 4. First draft of the mechanism diagram in Cohen et al. Dated March 7, 2014.
This first draft did not address any of the additional design issues discussed above 
(entrainment, proteolysis, metabolism, etc.). Based on feedback the first author received, 
she prepared two revised versions  (Figure 5 below). Neither addressed those additional 
design issues but instead focused on the phenomenon of localization alone. Two features 
shared by these new drafts are the use of a vertical rather than diagonal division of the 
figure into sections for day and night, and the incorporation of a diamond representation in
the center for the full, four-stage cycle of KaiC phosphorylation.
Figure 5. Two drafts of Cohen et al. Figure 6 from April 6, 2014.
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The version in Figure 5's left panel retains the portrayal of one bacterial cell, with 
the Kai complex localized to the pole at night (now on the right) and free in the cytoplasm 
during the day. Overlaid is a bell-curve representation of the abundance of KaiC, which 
increases in concentration during the day and declines through the night. The implied x-
axis for this graph imposes a linear representation of time, from dawn on the left to the 
next day's dawn on the right. This is in tension with the cyclical representation of time in 
the center of the figure. This kind of infelicity is not surprising in a draft diagram, as 
theauthor is actively trying out ideas in the attempt to construct a coherent representation. 
Despite this infelicity, the first author  prefers this version, and continues to use it in her 
talks.
Other members of the research team, however, preferred the version in Figure 5's 
right panel, which introduces a fundamental change: multiple representations of the cell, 
aligned with the four phosphorylation states of KaiC, shown in the cyclical representations 
in the center. It is interesting that the whole figure takes the form of an oval although there 
is no longer any attempt to show all processes within a single bacterial cell: this is a 
“remnant” from the first sketch. Finally, this figure introduces a legend to link different 
glyphs to the molecules they represent.
After feedback from the other authors, the first author created two more versions by
April 25, 2014. One of these (Figure 6 below) was eventually published without any further
alteration. The sun and moon glyphs are re-introduced, and the spacing of some protein 
glyphs is slightly altered. Perhaps the most significant innovation is that additional KaiC 
icons in light blue are added in all stages of the cycle. This is intended to indicate that there 
are many copies of KaiC in the cell, and they are often in different states of phosphorylation.
 
Figure 6. Final version of Figure 6 in Cohen et al.
From the initial sketch, the diagram underwent substantial modification until the 
authors settled on the published version. We highlight that the final version includes much 
more detail than was present in the initial sketch, and that the history of revision is one of 
gradually adding details. The first step was to consider a variety of details that had been 
omitted (e.g., regarding entrainment, proteolysis, metabolism). These were not addressed; 
instead the authors added a clockwise portrayal of the progression of phosphorylation 
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states, and exploited this to organize the newly-discovered information regarding Kai 
localization at different times of day. The fundamental constraint was to deploy limited 
space-on-the-page to simultaneously represent intracellular space, functional states of the 
components, and time-of-day. This proved to be difficult: several rounds of revision were 
required before a format was attained which overcame the limitations of the initial sketch. 
Even still, many graphical elements changed little through the revisions.
4. An Hypothesis: Scientists Develop Understanding by Drafting Diagrams
We examined the evolution of two diagrams developed to communicate hypotheses about 
phenomena and mechanisms. Through analysis of the lineage of drafts the authors made, 
we identified an iterative process in which different representational strategies were 
gradually developed and enacted. In one case, the initial sketch was much more detailed 
than the final graphic; the excess details stubbornly re-appeared mid-way through 
revisions, only to be dropped again, revealing an iterative attempt to pare down irrelevant 
detail. In the other case, the initial sketch required supplementation to reach the desired 
degree of detail, and basic limitations of the initial sketch had to be gradually overcome in 
order for details to be coherently included. We described an iterative attempt to add in 
relevant detail.
One might regard the development of these diagrams as essentially epiphenomenal 
to scientific cognition: at the outset, the researchers possessed a cohesive understanding of 
the domain, and diagram construction was an additional layer of practice, aimed at 
developing a representation to aid in communicating that pre-established understanding. 
We question this “epiphenomenalist” view. The histories of revision suggest that at the 
outset it was neither obvious to scientists what details should be included in an adequate 
diagram, nor obvious how relevant details might be adequately represented. Rather, an 
initial attempt was made, and its excesses and omissions were then identified and 
corrected. The epiphenomenalist might account for this by proposing some general 
cognitive inability to communicate the cohesive understanding of the domain which 
researchers allegedly had in advance. But construction of these diagrams was preceded by 
months of reflective and careful experimental work, resulting in a hard-won understanding
of the domain that motivated the researchers to write a manuscript in the first place. We 
can agree with the epiphenomenalist that translating the pre-established understanding 
into a specifically graphical format is an important challenge. But this is not the whole 
story. First, the data, which support the understanding of the domain, are typically already 
encoded in a graphical format – in the data graphics which, in our cases, were essentially 
finalized before authors begin the months-long process of developing their diagrams. 
(Moreover, both our cases show researchers integrating data-graphics directly into 
mechanism diagrams, suggesting there is little if any cognitive “gap” between them.) 
Second, while it takes multiple revisions to generate a diagram which is deemed “just 
right,” there is little reason to posit any inability to develop graphical representations as 
such: witness the number and variety of graphics the researchers developed, of which we 
have given only a small sample.
An adequate account must grant that researchers began with some understanding of
the hypotheses they aim to communicate, but must account for the great expenditure of 
cognitive labor documented in the history of revisions. We propose that as a result of 
experimental work, scientists understand the domain through a variegated “cognitive 
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collage” (Tversky 1993) involving a diversity of representational formats. Some might be 
abstract (e.g., mathematical), others more clearly materially grounded (e.g., embodied 
familiarity with experimental protocols), and most are probably a mix. These 
representations are sufficiently integrated to enable the researcher to articulate their 
major hypothesis, but they are not yet integrated in a single representation that 
simultaneously provides an adequate understanding of the evidence for, and relations 
between, various elements of the hypothesis. There is at this point no “map-like” 
representation that integrates all this information. The initial sketches, we propose, are the 
first attempt to integrate this information into a cohesive representation. This integrative 
process is prone to what scientists regard as errors, of which we have identified two kinds: 
the inclusion of irrelevant and the omission of relevant detail. Moreover, the process is 
prone to a kind of anchoring effect—the initial sketch may include infelicitous elements 
that persist as an obstacle for later revisions (e.g., the re-appearance of irrelevant detail in 
Paddock et al.'s revisions; the difficulty of representing time in Cohen et al.'s graphics). 
A variety of authors have argued for the practical necessity and epistemic merits of 
“multiple models idealization” (see Weisberg 2007 for references to the many proponents 
of this view). Viewed in the context of that work, our hypothesis provides an account of 
how and when such integration can be achieved: an iterative process of diagram redesign 
can generate the final, cohesive understanding of the phenomena or mechanism.
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Abstract
Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that they know
to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because the Bayesian proba-
bility of a hypothesis is supposed to represent the probability that the hypoth-
esis is true. I investigate whether Bayesianism can accommodate the idea that
false hypotheses are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses
or models can be closer to the truth than others. I argue that the idea that
some hypotheses are approximately true in an absolute sense is hard to square
with Bayesianism, but that the notion that some hypotheses are comparatively
closer to the truth than others can be made compatible with Bayesianism, and
that this provides an adequate and potentially useful solution to the inter-
pretive problem. Finally, I compare my “verisimilitude” solution to the in-
terpretive problem with a “counterfactual” solution recently proposed by Jan
Sprenger.
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1 Introduction
According to the standard Bayesian interpretation of probability, the probability of
a hypothesis is the probability that the hypothesis is true. However, scientists, in-
cluding scientists who make use of Bayesian statistical methods, often investigate
models and hypotheses that they know to be false. In particular, statistical models
tend to be constructed on the basis of auxiliary assumptions (e.g. normality and
independence of measurement errors) that are often known to be false. Moreover,
statistical analysis is often restricted to hypothesis sets, such as the set of linear or
exponential functional relationships, that are known to at best be (false) approxima-
tions of the actual functional relationships. Presumably, if something is known to be
false, then it has a probability of 0 of being true, so all of the preceding practices are
hard to reconcile with the standard Bayesian interpretation of probability. Indeed,
Bayesian statistical practice apparently is faced with an interpretive problem: on
2
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the one hand, Bayesian probabilities are standardly interpreted as probabilities of
truth; on the other hand, Bayesian scientists routinely assign non-zero probabilities
to hypotheses they know to be false.
How serious is the interpretive problem and how may it be solved? I argue that
there are many cases where the interpretative problem does not arise, even when
the statistical model is false. But there are also many cases where the interpretive
problem does arise. Many scientific realists have suggested that successful scientific
models and hypotheses, though usually false, are nonetheless often approximately
true, or – at the very least – that successful hypotheses in general are “closer to the
truth” (or have higher “verisimilitude”) than hypotheses that are less successful. I
argue that, provided we jettison the standard Bayesian interpretation of the proba-
bility axioms, Bayesianism can accommodate the insight that some false hypotheses
are closer to the truth than others, and that this reinterpretation of the probability
axioms is potentially useful. I contrast this solution to the interpretive problem with
another recent proposal due to Jan Sprenger (2016), according to which probabilities
of false hypotheses are interpreted as “counterfactual degrees of belief,” and I argue
that the two approaches – when spelled out in detail – are formally inter-translatable
and help illuminate each other.
2 The Basics of Standard Bayesian Inference
Bayesianism is a prominent approach in both confirmation theory and in statistical
inference. Bayesian confirmation theory and Bayesian statistics clearly have many
things in common, but they are also different enough that it pays to discuss them
separately. In this paper, I will focus my attention on Bayesian statistical inference,
though much of what I will say also has relevance to Bayesian confirmation theory.
In statistical inference, a set of competing hypotheses is usually indexed by a
parameter, which in general will be a real-valued variable or a vector of real-valued
variables. Given a space of candidate hypotheses parameterized by Θ, and given
some particular context in which the possible observations or outcomes are x1, x2,
etc. – or X, for short – a statistical model consists of a set of conditional probability
3
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(density) distributions, p(x|✓), that jointly specify the probability of each possible
x ∈ X given each possible ✓ ∈ Θ.1
Almost invariably, the statistical model is premised on various auxiliary assump-
tions, A, that jointly guarantee that each value of ✓ entails a probability for each
x. Sometimes A itself has free parameters – so-called “nuisance parameters,” N –
that must also be estimated from the data, in which case the conditional probability
distributions will be of the form p(x|✓&n). Thus, a statistical model may in general
be regarded as being composed of two distinct ingredients: the hypotheses of inter-
est, parameterized by Θ; and the auxiliary assumptions, A, consisting of nuisance
parameters, N , and background assumptions, B. It follows that a statistical model
is “true” if and only if the following conjunction is true: (1) some element of Θ is
true and (2) A is true: that is, B is true and some element of N is true.
For example, suppose you are interested in estimating the mass of some object by
measuring it a single time using a scale. The hypotheses of interest are the various
possible masses of the object, which you may index using a real-valued parameter,
m. The possible outcomes, x, are the various possible outcomes of the measurement.
In order to probabilistically link m to x, you may, for example, add the auxiliary
assumption, A, that the measurement outcome is normally distributed around the
true mass with a variance of d. Here d is a nuisance parameter. Then the assumptions
of the statistical model generate the following conditional probabilities:
p(x|m&d) = 1
d
√
2⇡
e−
(x−m)2
2d2 (2.1)
In this case, the statistical model is true if and only if (1) there is some value m0
of m that corresponds to the actual mass of the object, and (2) the measurement
outcome is actually normally distributed around m0 with some variance d0.
What distinguishes Bayesian inference from other sorts of statistical inference is
that Bayesians use probability distributions to assess the plausibility of parameter
values. In addition to requiring a statistical model, a Bayesian analysis therefore
1Note: p is a probability function over the set X if and only if the following three axioms are
satisfied: (1) p(X) = 1. (2) p(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ X. (3) p(
W
xi) =
P
p(xi), whenever the xi in the
disjunction are mutually exclusive.
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requires that the parameters of interest Θ and the nuisance parameters N all be
assigned so-called prior probabilities; these are probabilities that are assigned before
the observation of data. Moreover, if there are multiple candidate statistical models,
then all of the models must be assigned prior probabilities as well. In the above
example, prior probabilities must therefore be assigned to each possible value of
m and to each possible value of d. Once these probabilities have been assigned,
the joint distribution of the possible observations and the parameters is defined as
the product of the likelihood and the prior: p(x,m, d) = p(x|m, d) ∗ p(m, d). The
posterior probability distribution of m is given by Bayes’s theorem, p(m|x, d) =
p(x|m, d) ∗ p(m, d)/p(x, d)
There is disagreement among Bayesians concerning how prior and posterior prob-
abilities should be interpreted. Some see these probabilities as the subjective or ra-
tional degrees of belief of some agent, whereas others interpret them as evidential
degrees of support or as representing an objective state of information. However,
regardless of whichever more specific interpretation they endorse, Bayesians of all
kinds agree that p(✓) represents the probability that ✓ is true.2 This interpretation
of probability – the standard Bayesian interpretation – leads to problems, however,
because the models and hypotheses that scientists investigate are often believed or
even known not to be true. This problem has not gone completely unnoticed in
the philosophical literature,3 but in general the seriousness of the problem seems
not to have been appreciated. The problem seems to be more acknowledged in the
statistical literature, but no satisfactory resolution has been offered.
3 The Interpretive Problem in Bayesian Statisti-
cal Inference
Statistical models, much like other models in science, contain idealizations and ap-
proximations that render the models strictly speaking false. Typical examples in-
2Or more precisely, the probability that the hypothesis indexed by θ is true.
3E.g. Forster and Sober (1994), Shaffer (2001), and more recently Sprenger (2016).
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clude, e.g., the assumption that measurement error is bell-shaped, or that measure-
ments are independent and identically distributed. To be sure, these assumptions
are often justified because they hold approximately, but they rarely hold exactly. In
other words, the auxiliary assumptions of statistical models are generally false.
For these reasons, the statistician George Box famously said that “all models
are false, but some models are useful.”4 More recently, Andrew Gelman and Cosma
Shalizi write, “To reiterate, it is hard to claim that the prior distributions used in
applied work represent statisticians’ states of knowledge and belief before examining
their data, if only because most statisticians do not believe their models are true, so
their prior degree of belief in all of Θ is not 1 but 0.” (Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, p.
19).
A fully Bayesian analysis requires that we assign probabilities to our models
and to the parameters inside the models. But according to the standard Bayesian
interpretation of probability, the probabilities we assign are supposed to represent
the probabilities that the models and parameters are true. If we know that they are
all false, it would seem they should therefore be assigned a probability of 0.
Of course, Bayesian statisticians typically do not assign probabilities of 0 to
parameters or to models; they assign non-zero probabilities. This practice is what
leads to the interpretive problem, which may be phrased in the form of a question:
what does it mean to assign a model or hypothesis that is known to be false a
non-zero probability? To more precisely diagnose the problem, it helps to state the
probability axioms with the standard Bayesian interpretation made explicit:
Suppose H is a set of hypotheses {H1, H2, . . . , Hn}. Then
1S. p(H) = 1. Interpretation: one of the hypotheses in H is true.
2S. p(Hi) ≥ 0 for all Hi ∈H. Interpretation: no hypothesis has a negative
probability of being true.
3S. p(
W
Hi) =
P
p(Hi), whenever it is impossible for more than one Hi
in the disjunction
W
Hi to be true.
4This quote is famous enough that it has a Wikipedia page. Box repeated the quote, or variations
of it, in several places. e.g. Box (1980)
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Here we can see that the interpretive problem is really a problem with the stan-
dard interpretation of the first probability axiom. That is, for many of the hypothesis
sets that scientists study, it will not be the case that one of the hypotheses is true.
Hence, strictly speaking, many hypothesis sets will not satisfy axiom 1S. Axioms 2S
and 3S, on the other hand, will generally be satisfied by the kinds of hypothesis sets
that Bayesian statisticians study.
One possible remedy to the interpretive problem that might initially seem attrac-
tice is to try to change the algebra over which the probability function p ranges.5
Later, we shall consider a couple of specific proposals along these lines. However,
there is a fundamental reason why any such proposal will not work. Briefly, the
reason is that if you want to do Bayesian inference on a statistical model that is
parameterized by ✓, then you need to assign probabilities to ✓; you cannot instead
assign probabilities to, e.g., propositions of the sort <✓ = 2 is the best parameter
value> or <✓ = 2 is the parameter value that is most predictively accurate>, be-
cause these propositions are not part of the statistical model. Nor can you amend
the statistical model so that it is instead parameterized by these other propositions.
Gelman and Shalizi’s (2013) solution to the interpretive problem (to the extent
that they see it as a problem) seems to be to refuse to interpret Bayesian probabilities
in any standard way. Bayesian probabilities of parameters inside models, they say,
are “regularization devices” and models themselves should not really be assigned
probabilities at all. This does not seem like a solution so much as an admission of
defeat. Morey et al. (2013) pursue a different strategy. They reply to Gelman and
Shalizi with the assertion that “...scientific models, including statistical models, are
neither true nor false” (p. 71) and that “Box’s (1979) famous dictum... ...could
be shortened to ‘some models are useful’ without any loss” (p. 71). They then
recommend assigning odds rather than probabilities to models because a “Bayesian
who employs odds is silent on whether or not she is in possession of the true model,
and, in fact, need not acknowledge the existence of a true model at all” (p. 71). It
is, however, unclear how using odds rather than probabilities is supposed to solve
5For example, some might be tempted to consider the algebra generated by the associated
propositions, <Hi is the best hypothesis>, for each Hi, or something similar.
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the interpretive problem. And it is not clear how refusing to assign truth values to
models solves the problem either. What does it mean to say that your odds are 5
to 1 in a model that is neither true nor false as against another model that is also
neither true nor false? The interpretive problem seems to be just as severe here as
before.
Moreover, the claim that statistical models do not have truth values seems wrong.
As we saw, a statistical model can be regarded as a conjunction of a claim about
the hypotheses of interest (namely that one of them is true) and a claim about the
auxiliary assumptions (namely that they are all true). It follows that a statistical
model is false either if none of the hypotheses of interest is true or if one of the
auxiliary assumptions is false. The second situation arguably is less serious than the
first.
4 False Auxiliary Assumptions vs False Hypothe-
ses of Interest
If a statistical model is false because one of its auxiliary assumptions is false – which
is almost always the case – then the interpretive problem arises on the level of model
inference. That is, if there are multiple statistical models that all contain known false
auxiliary assumptions, then all of the models will have a probability of 0 of being
true, and hence a standard Bayesian who wants to use Bayesian inference to find the
best model will run into the problem of how to sensibly assign non-zero probabilities
to the models.
How to make sense of model inference and model selection is therefore a serious
problem for Bayesians. However, if the statistical model is not itself the hypothesis
of interest, then the fact that the statistical model is false does not necessarily mean
we are faced with the interpretive problem.
Consider, for example, the previous example involving the estimation of the mass
m of some object. A good way of getting an estimate of m is by embedding m in
a statistical model. Now, even if the statistical model is false because it is based
8
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on known false (auxiliary) assumptions, probabilistic statements about m will still
be completely sensible; thus, in cases like this one, the interpretive problem does
not arise for inferences about the parameter m. For example, a statement like “the
probability that it’s true that m is 2kg is 0.5” is perfectly sensible as long as it is
remembered that the probability is premised on the auxiliary assumptions of the
model. If those assumptions are seriously wrong, the probability may well be inac-
curate or misleading; however, the probability can still sensibly be interpreted as a
probability of truth.
Because Bayesian parameter inference often makes sense even if the statistical
model is false, George Box famously recommended a reconciliation between Bayesian
and frequentism. According to Box, frequentist methods should be used to identify
a “useful” (albeit false) statistical model; Bayesian inference can then be used to
infer plausible parameter values inside the assumed statistical model. This two-step
procedure makes sense in cases where the hypotheses of interest are parameters that
represent real quantities out in the world, such as for example the mass of an object.
However, it happens not infrequently in science that the hypotheses of interest are
themselves known to be false, strictly speaking; but this has not stopped scientists
from employing Bayesian methods in their research. For example, phylogeneticists
in both biology and linguistics use trees to represent family relationships between
species or between languages. In both cases, the trees investigated omit known re-
lationships and introduce false idealizations. For example, a tree phylogeny for a
language family is premised on the (false) idea that languages bifurcate instanta-
neously and are forever separated thereafter. Yet, even though all phylogenetic trees
are clearly false, Bayesian phylogeneticists are often interested in discovering which
tree has the highest posterior probability. These probabilities cannot comfortably
be interpreted as probabilities that the trees are literally true, and thus we are faced
with the interpretive problem.
The interpretive problem also arises whenever the hypotheses under consideration
posit simple functional relationships that are almost certainly false idealizations.
This is usually the case whenever Bayesian linear regression is used, for example,
because most functional relationships in the world are not actually linear.
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As an example, suppose you are interested in the functional relationship between
just two variables, X and Y . For concreteness, suppose X represents some mea-
surement of a complex system, e.g. the barometric pressure of a weather system,
and Y represents some quantity of interest, e.g. how much it will rain in the next
hour. The true functional dependence of Y on X is in all likelihood very complex.6
Nonetheless, it is very common in such cases to restrict attention to classes of simple
functional relationships, such as the set of linear hypotheses with 0 intercept, which
models the relationship between Y and X as follows:
Y = ↵X + ✏ (4.1)
Here, ✏ represents the (hypothesized) random fluctuation around the linear func-
tion Y = ↵X; ✏ is generally taken to be a normal distribution with a mean of 0
and standard deviation d. ↵ is the parameter of interest while d is a nuisance pa-
rameter (auxiliary assumption); both need to be estimated from data. Note that ↵
does not represent some “real” quantity out there in the world; indeed, if we were
to interpret ↵ as representing a real quantity, then presumably that quantity would
be a rate. Thus, ↵ would refer to the constant rate at which Y changes (on average)
given changes in X. However, if the true functional relationship between X and Y
is not actually linear, then there is no constant rate at which Y changes in response
to changes in X. Thus, in sharp contrast to the previous example concerning the
estimation of the mass of an object, ↵ = 2 cannot be true or false in the same way
that statements such as m = 2 or m = 3 are true or false.
But if ↵ does not represent a quantity in the world, then what does it mean for a
given value of ↵ to be “true” or “false”? Well, ↵ indexes a set of hypotheses, namely
Y = ↵X + ✏, so to say that ↵0 is “true” in this case is the same as saying that there
exists some value of ✏ such that the hypothesis Y = ↵oX + ✏ is the true functional
relationship between X and Y . To paraphrase Sober (2015), ↵ “lives inside” its
6By “the true functional dependence,” I mean the functional dependence that would result if
we were to keep fixed all other predictively relevant variables and see how Y varies given changes
in X. Since X may – indeed probably does – interact with other variables, this definition is too
simplistic, but going into the details here is not worth the pay-off.
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model; it has a meaning only in the context of the statistical model of which it is a
part. Not all parameters are created equal.
Note that in this example, it is pretty much a foregone conclusion that no hy-
pothesis of the form Y = ↵X+✏ describes the true functional relationship between Y
(i.e. how much it will rain) and X (the barometric pressure). Hence it’s not merely
the auxiliary assumptions of the model that are false in this case; the very hypotheses
that we are interested in are all known in advance to be false. Hence, the interpretive
problem hits us again with full force: how are we supposed to understand non-zero
probability assignments to values of ↵?
5 Approximate Truth
This is where the notion of approximate truth may be helpful. More generally,
scientific realists would doubt whether any scientific or statistical model could be
“useful” (to use Box’s term) were it not approximately true in some sense; thus, we
should assign a model (or a parameter inside a model) a probability proportional
to the extent to which we find it approximately true (in the relevant sense). The
question we need to ask is whether and how the idea that hypotheses and models
are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses are closer to the truth
than others can be accommodated within the Bayesian framework. Because model
inference and parameter inference are different in some important ways, I will from
now on focus only on parameter inference. That is, I will assume that the hypotheses
of interest are indexed by a parameter Θ inside some fixed statistical model, and
that each ✓ ∈ Θ picks out some hypothesis that does not itself contain adjustable
parameters.
Before we can address properly the question whether some hypotheses can be ap-
proximately true or closer to the truth than others, we must make a few assumptions
about what approximate truth is and how it can be measured.
The study of approximate truth was initiated by Popper (1963) and has by now
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accumulated a large literature.7 The most influential contemporary approach in the
study of approximate truth – known in the literature as the “similarity approach” –
takes seriously the idea that approximate truth is a particular kind of approximation.
To say that something is a good approximation of something else is to say that the
two things are similar in some relevant respect. Thus, to say that a hypothesis or
is approximately true is to say that the hypothesis is sufficiently similar to the true
hypothesis.
This idea can be formalized if we suppose that there is a (context-appropriate8)
verisimilitude measure, v, that takes as its input a hypothesis ✓ and has as its output
some real number that represents how similar ✓ is to the truth. If we presume
that such functions are available, we can say that ✓ is approximately true just in
case v(✓) < ✏, for some suitably chosen ✏. There are certain requirements that the
verisimilitude measure arguably ought to obey. For example, it arguably ought to be
non-negative, and it is also natural to demand that it be continuous whenever the
hypothesis space is indexed by a real-valued parameter.
As a concrete example, one non-negative and continuous divergence measure
that has been suggested as a verisimilitude measure in a statistical context is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence (Forster and Sober, 1994). Supposing that q is the “true”
probability distribution that governs the distribution of the data, then the verisimil-
itude (according to the K-L divergence) of some hypothesis ✓ (that does not contain
adjustable parameters) is KL(✓) = − R q(x) log q(x)
p(x|θ)
dx.
Unfortunately, the various ways one might try to accommodate approximate truth
within the Bayesian framework face a severe difficulty having to do with the third
probability axiom. Briefly, the problem is that, given a set of hypotheses indexed
by a parameter, there will generally be multiple parameter values that meet any
verisimilitude threshold we set for “approximate truth.” Hence, the different param-
eter values will not be mutually incompatible in the sense that it will be possible for
several of them to be approximately true simultaneously. However, Bayesian infer-
7See Niiniluoto (1998) for a survey.
8In general I agree with Northcott (2013) that there is little reason to assume a priori that there
will be a single distance measure that appropriately measures approximate truth in all contexts.
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ence requires that the different parameter values be mutually incompatible. Thus,
Bayesian inference will in general be impossible if we change the goal of inference
from truth to approximate truth. For a more thorough discussion of these issues, and
how exactly a conflict with the third probability axiom is to blame, see the appendix.
The underlying problem is that approximate truth is too coarse-grained a concept
since it fails to distinguish between several hypotheses, all of which are approximately
true. This problem should motivate us to look for an alternative solution to the
interpretive problem.
6 The Verisimilitude Interpretation of Probability
Presumably some hypotheses that are approximately true are closer to the truth than
other ones, and – at least in many cases – one of the hypotheses under consideration
will be closer to the truth than all the others. This suggests a different interpretation
of probability. In particular, it is tempting to interpret p(✓) as the probability that ✓
is closest to the truth out of the hypotheses in Θ; note that in contrast to both truth
and approximate truth, closeness to the truth is fundamentally a comparative notion.
I will call this interpretation the “verisimilitude interpretation” of probability, and
I will use pc with a c subscript whenever this is the intended interpretation. It is
helpful to write out all of the probability axioms with the new interpretation made
explicit:
1C. pc(Θ) = 1. Interpretation: one of the hypotheses in Θ is closest to
the truth.
2C. pc(✓) ≥ 0 for all ✓. Interpretation: no hypothesis has a negative
probability of being closest to the truth.
3C. pc(
W
✓i) =
P
pc(✓i), whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i
to be closest to the truth.
There are several things to note here. First, and most importantly, just about
any set of hypotheses will satisfy the verisimilitude interpretation of the probability
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axioms. More precisely, given any set of hypotheses that can be compared using
some verisimilitude measure, at least one of the hypotheses must be maximally close
to the truth according to the verisimilitude measure, so the set of hypotheses will
satisfy 1C. Hence, the verisimilitude interpretation avoids the interpretive problem of
the standard interpretation, which we saw was really a problem with the first axiom.
The verisimilitude interpretation also avoids the problems with the third prob-
ability axiom that we identified with the approximate truth approach. In order for
Bayesian inference to be possible on the set of hypotheses, the hypotheses must be
mutually incompatible in the sense of 3C; that is, it must be impossible for more
than one of the hypotheses to be closest to the truth. This axiom will not always
be satisfied. For example, if the hypotheses are models and some of the models are
contained in others, it may be possible for several of the models to be equally close to
the truth, depending on the verisimilitude measure. However, most of the hypothesis
sets that Bayesian statisticians study will satisfy 3C.
Another important thing to note is that, under the verisimilitude interpretation,
the probability of a hypothesis is always relative to the set of competing hypotheses
under consideration. For example, in the set {H1, H2}, pc(H1) is the probability that
H1 is closer to the truth than H2. On the other hand, in the set {H1, H3}, pc(H1)
is the probability that H1 is closer to the truth than H3. The probability of H1 is,
of course, also relative to the verisimilitude measure. The verisimilitude probability
of a hypothesis is therefore not an absolute number; it is context-dependent and
contrastive. This is in sharp contrast to the standard Bayesian probability of a
hypothesis.
Finally, note that pc(✓) describes an epistemic attitude different from a degree of
belief in the truth of some proposition. Some might be tempted to interpret pc(✓) as
a standard probability that attaches to the proposition <✓ is closest to the truth>.
However, this is a mistake, for the reasons mentioned earlier. The proposition <✓
is closest to the truth> belongs to a different algebra than ✓ does. ✓ indexes a set
of hypotheses in a statistical model, but <✓ is closest to the truth> does not. If
Bayesian inference is to be used on the statistical model that is indexed by ✓, the
probabilities must be assigned to the parameter ✓, not to the associated propositions
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<✓ is closest to the truth>. Hence pc(✓) represents an epistemic attitude towards ✓,
namely the attitude that ✓ is closest to the truth out of the hypotheses in Θ.
7 The Verisimilitude Interpretation of Probability
is Useful
The verisimilitude interpretation of probability is a logically viable solution to the
interpretive problem in the sense that it does not face immediate problems with any
of the probability axioms. However, some characteristics of the verisimilitude in-
terpretation may seem objectionable. In particular, the fact that the verisimilitude
interpretation makes probability assessments contrastive may be regarded as a seri-
ous drawback. Perhaps the appropriate response to the interpretive problem is not
to adopt the verisimilitude interpretation, but rather to not use Bayesian methods
whenever the hypotheses under consideration are all known to be false. On the other
hand, maybe there is an alternative solution to the interpretive problem that is bet-
ter than the verisimilitude interpretation. In this section and the next, I consider
both these alternative responses to the interpretive problem.
In order to determine whether the verisimilitude interpretation is defensible, it is
helpful to step back for a moment and ask a more fundamental question: why use
Bayesian methods at all? If the benefits of Bayesian methods remain even when he
standard interpretation of the probability axioms is replaced with the verisimilitude
interpretation, then the verisimilitude interpretation is not just logically viable, but
potentially useful. The goal of the next subsections is to give a preliminary argument
for the claim that the verisimilitude interpretation is useful.
7.1 Why be a Bayesian?
What is the benefit of using Bayesian rather than other statistical methods? Per-
haps the greatest selling point of Bayesianism is that the prior distribution gives
researchers a principled way of incorporating background information. For exam-
ple, suppose you are estimating the mass of a small cup of water, and suppose you
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model the outcome of your measurement as a likelihood function p(x|m), where x
is the outcome of your measurement and m is a possible value of the cup’s mass.
A standard classical (“frequentist”) method of estimating the mass of the cup is to
choose as your estimate the value of m that maximizes the probability of the ob-
served measurement. This estimation method is known as “maximum likelihood”
estimation.
From a Bayesian point of view, maximum likelihood estimation is essentially
equivalent to Bayesian inference with a flat (improper) prior probability function that
assigns a non-zero and equal probability density to every possible value of m from
−∞ to +∞, because the maximum likelihood estimate will be equal to the estimate
that has the highest posterior probability if and only if the prior is flat. Clearly,
the prior implicitly used in maximum likelihood estimation neglects to incorporate
common sense background information that we have about m, and is therefore –
from a Bayesian and intuitive point of view – deficient. For example, the mass of an
object cannot be a negative number, so no prior should assign any probability mass
to negative values of m. Furthermore, we can be absolutely certain that a small cup
of water is not going to weigh more than, say, 1kg, so we can also assign a probability
of 0 to all values of m greater than 1kg. Thus, as a minimal requirement, any prior
probability distribution we use should be restricted to the interval [0, 1]. Of course,
we have additional common sense knowledge that allows us to restrict the class of
sensible prior distributions further.
The above example shows how even very obvious background information can
be incorporated in a Bayesian prior in order to improve the inference. Indeed, at
least to Bayesian statisticians and scientists who make use of Bayesian methods, this
is probably the single biggest advantage that Bayesianism has over its competitors.
But how are you supposed to take into account your background information when
you are trying to come up with a prior probability distribution over a class of false
hypotheses? Do the advantages of Bayesianism carry over when the goal of inquiry
changes from finding the truth to finding the hypothesis that is closest to the truth?
In the next subsection, I will suggest that the answer is “yes.” Scientists often have
background knowledge that they can use to discriminate between false hypotheses
16
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1508-
in a principled way. And a good way of incorporating this background knowledge is
through the construction of a Bayesian prior.
7.2 Verisimilitude and Background Knowledge
Consider again the example concerning the relationship between barometric pres-
sure and the expected amount of rainfall. Suppose one of the things you know
about the relationship between barometric pressure and precipitation is that the
expected amount of precipitation is not very sensitive to changes in barometric pres-
sure. Throughout the whole possible range of barometric pressure, a small change
in barometric pressure will not lead to a drastic change in the amount of expected
precipitation.
So far, this is background knowledge about the actual, unknown function relat-
ing barometric pressure and precipitation. What consequences does this background
knowledge have for inferences about the hypothesis set actually under consideration?
Suppose, as before, that the hypothesis set you are considering is the set of linear
functions. That is, you model the relationship between precipitation and baromet-
ric pressure by the set of linear functions l(Y ) = ↵X + ✏, where ✏ is a normally
distributed error term. Can you use your background knowledge to discriminate
between the various false linear hypotheses in a principled way? Arguably, you can.
Intuitively, by any reasonable measure of verisimilitude, linear functions according
to which expected precipitation is not very sensitively dependent on barometric pres-
sure are going to be closer to the truth than are linear functions that model expected
precipitation as very sensitively dependent on barometric pressure.
How can all of this be captured reasonably in a prior probability distribution? Let
us first see how you can formally capture your background information. Suppose f is
the true (and unknown) functional relationship between precipitation and baromet-
ric pressure. Then the background information that precipitation does not depend
sensitively on changes in barometric pressure can be modeled as a claim about the
partial derivative of f (with respect to the barometric pressure variable). The sim-
plest and least sophisticated way of translating your background information into a
17
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quantitative restriction on f 0 is to to suppose that f 0 is bounded by some interval
(a, b). Next, the intuition that insensitive linear hypotheses are closer to the truth
than sensitive linear hypotheses can be formalized as follows: there is some suitably
large interval (a0, b0) that contains (a, b) such that every linear hypothesis l for which
l0 is bounded by (a0, b0) is closer to the truth than every linear hypothesis that does
not satisfy this requirement. Now, since l0 = ↵, the requirement that l0 be bounded
by (a0, b0) reduces to the simple requirement that every ↵ ∈ (a0, b0) is closer to the
truth than every ↵ /∈ (a0, b0). This, in turn, translates to a simple rational require-
ment on the prior distribution over ↵, namely that every ↵ /∈ (a0, b0) be assigned a
prior probability of 0.
There are more refined ways of formalizing the background information that
expected precipitation does not depend very sensitively on barometric pressure. In
particular, if we assume a specific verisimilitude measure, then we can get tighter
constraints on ↵.9 Furthermore, if the hypotheses under consideration are more
complicated (i.e. contain more parameters), then the background information will
not lead to rational requirements on the prior distribution as neatly. My goal in
this section is not, however, to demonstrate in full generality how to best translate
background information into reasonable requirements on prior distributions over false
hypotheses. My goal is rather to show that it is possible to do so, and that it is
plausibly useful. I defer a more thorough treatment of these issues to another time.
9For example, suppose we use the following reasonable albeit crude distance measure as our
measure of verisimilitude: if f is the true function over the range (m,n) and l is a linear function,
then the verisimilitude of l is v(l) = Maxx∈(m,n)|f(x) − l(x)|. In this case, if we assume that we
know that f is bounded by (a, b), then it is possible to prove that every linear function l whose
derivative is bounded by (a, b) is closer to the truth than every linear function whose derivative is
not bounded in this way, where closeness to the truth is measured using v. For the sake of space, I
omit the proof.
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8 The Counterfactual Interpretation of Probabil-
ity
The preceding section shows that the verisimilitude interpretation of the probabil-
ity axioms is a potentially useful solution to the interpretive problem. However, it
may be that there is another solution to the interpretative problem that is better.
Earlier, we examined two candidate solutions to the interpretive problem and found
them wanting. However, in a very recent paper, Jan Sprenger (2016) proposes a new
and different solution to the interpretive problem that is more promising. Sprenger’s
solution also involves reinterpreting the probability axioms, but he offers a reinterpre-
tation that is interestingly different from the verisimilitude interpretation. However,
as we will soon see, given certain plausible assumptions, the verisimilitude solution
and Sprenger’s solution are formally inter-translatable.
Sprenger’s suggestion is that the probability of a false hypothesis can sensibly
be interpreted as a counter-factual degree of belief. More precisely, suppose ↵ is a
parameter that indexes a set of hypotheses, all of which are known to be false. Then
any probability assigned to some particular ↵0 should be construed as a degree of
belief in ↵0 that is conditional on the (false) supposition that one of the hypotheses
indexed by ↵ is true. In other words, the probability of ↵0 is really the conditional
probability p(↵0| ∨↵), where the condition ∨↵ is the false disjunction that says that
one of the ↵’s is true.
This idea is less abstract than it may seem at first blush. As an illustration,
suppose I have a coin in a locked cabinet. The probability that the coin would land
heads given that I were to toss the coin is 0.5, even if it is false that I ever toss
the coin. Similarly, according to Sprenger, we can evaluate the probability that a
hypothesis is true given that the false supposition that the world were such that one
of the hypotheses under consideration is true.
According to Sprenger, the counterfactual interpretation of probability offers
a simple solution to the interpretive problem that avoids the “muddy waters of
verisimilitude.” However, in order to actually evaluate counterfactual probabilities
in a principled manner, it seems we have to enter waters that are at least as muddy
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as the verisimilitude waters. Consider again the example concerning the set of linear
hypotheses relating X (barometric pressure) to Y (precipitation in the next hour).
We have already agreed that your actual degrees of belief in all of these linear hy-
potheses is 0. Your degree of belief (or probability density, rather) in some particular
linear hypothesis conditional on the disjunction of all the linear hypotheses may still
be different from 0, but how are you supposed to figure out what it is? You some-
how have to figure out what your probabilities would be on the assumption that the
world were such that barometric pressure and precipitation were perfectly linearly
related. In order for the counterfactual interpretation of probability to be a viable
alternative, guidance on how to evaluate counterfactual probabilities is necessary, in
the same way that some assumptions about verisimilitude are necessary in order for
the verisimilitude interpretation to be viable.
The standard way of evaluating ordinary counterfactuals is by appealing to possi-
ble worlds. According to (a simplified version of) Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals
(Lewis, 1973), in order to evaluate a counterfactual such as ”If A were the case, then
B would be the case,” you have to go to the closest possible world in which A is true,
and then see whether B is true in that world. Crucially, Lewis’s analysis depends on
a ranking of worlds, where worlds are ranked by how similar they are to the actual
world.
Presumably counterfactual probabilities should be assessed in a similar manner.
It is not hard to imagine very strange and fanciful possible worlds in which barometric
pressure and precipitation are linearly related, but presumably most of those possible
worlds are not interesting or relevant. As is the case in counterfactual analysis of
conditionals, it is presumably the closest possible worlds that are the interesting
ones. But which possible worlds are those? To answer this question, you need to be
able to rank worlds in terms of their closeness or similarity to the actual world. But
a ranking of possible worlds is hardly easier to come up with than a verisimilitude
ranking of hypotheses.
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8.1 Relationship Between the Verisimilitude and Counter-
factual Solutions
Indeed, in general, any similarity ranking on possible worlds straightforwardly in-
duces a natural verisimilitude ranking on hypotheses, and vice versa.10 More pre-
cisely, suppose we are given a similarity ranking on worlds wα ≥ w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . .,
where wα is the actual world. Then we can define a verisimilitude ranking on hy-
potheses as follows: suppose w is the closest world in which H is true and w0 is the
closest world in which H 0 is true, then v(H) ≥ v(H 0) if and only if w ≥ w0.11
Conversely, any verisimilitude ranking induces an ordering of possible worlds.
Suppose v(H0) > v(H1) > v(H2) > . . . is a verisimilitude ranking of hypotheses,
and for any hypothesis p, let Sp denote the set of worlds in which p is true. Then
we can define an ordering of possible worlds in the following way: suppose H is the
hypothesis with the highest verisimilitude such that that w ∈ SH and suppose H 0 is
the hypothesis with the highest verisimilitude such that w0 ∈ S 0H , then w ≥ w0 if and
only if v(H) ≥ v(H)0.
Thus, although they appear very different, the verisimilitude interpretation and
the counterfactual interpretation of probability are formally inter-translatable.
Although the two approaches are formally inter-translatable, they provide differ-
ent perspectives and help illuminate each other. In particular, it is arguably easier
to come up with a verisimilitude measure than a ranking over possible worlds; for
example, the Kullback-Leibler measure is a well known verisimilitude measure over
statistical models, and this verisimilitude measure will induce a partial ranking over
possible worlds. Thus, the verisimilitude approach helps explain where rankings over
possible worlds are supposed to come from.
On the other hand, the counterfactual approach helps explain several features
of the verisimilitude interpretation as well. For example, earlier we saw that the
10For simplicity, the following informal demonstration presupposes the so-called “Uniqueness
Assumption” according to which, for every A, there is a unique closest possible world in which A
is true. This is a strong and implausible assumption. However, the demonstration does not depend
on this assumption.
11Hilpinen (1976) uses a similar approach to define a specific verisimilitude measure.
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verisimilitude probability of a hypothesis H is relative to the set of hypotheses un-
der consideration. If H is considered as part of the set {H,H 0}, the verisimilitude
probability of H is the probability that H is closer to the truth than is H 0. But if
H is considered as part of the set {H,H 00}, the verisimilitude probability of H is the
probability that H is closer to the truth than is H 0. The counterfactual interpreta-
tion clarifies what is going on here. In the first case, the counterfactual probability
that corresponds to pc(H) is p(H|H ∨ H 0); in the second case, the counterfactual
probability that corresponds to pc(H) is instead p(H|H ∨H 00). As can be seen, the
two counterfactual probabilities are conditional on different disjunctions, and it is
therefore not mysterious that the corresponding verisimilitude probabilities are also
different.
9 Summary and Future Research
I have argued that the interpretive problem is a serious problem, but that the prob-
lem does not necessarily arise just because the statistical model under consideration
is wrong; rather, the interpretive problem arises whenever the hypotheses of interest
are false. Next, focusing on parameter inference, I have argued that the verisimilitude
reinterpretation of the probability axioms provides a logically viable and potentially
useful solution to the interpretive problem. Finally, I have contrasted the verisimili-
tude reinterpretation with another reinterpretation due to Jan Sprenger, and I have
argued that the two reinterpretations are formally inter-translatable, but that they
nevertheless shed interestingly different lights on the interpretive problem and on
each other.
Several important questions remain unanswered, however. In particular, I have
not discussed the problem of Bayesian model inference or model selection when all
the models are all false. Nor have I discussed in any detail how researchers can come
up with principled prior probabilities that discriminate between false hypotheses.
Finally, I have not said anything about what consequences reinterpreting the prob-
ability axioms has for evidential principles like the Likelihood Principle or the Law
of Likelihood. All of this is work for the future.
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A Approximate Truth and Bayesianism
There are two natural ways of trying to accommodate approximate truth within
Bayesianism. The first way is to expand the algebra of propositions that p ranges
over, so that it also ranges over propositions such as <✓ is approximately true> – or
Pθ for short. Thus, even though strictly speaking we assign each ✓ a probability of
0 of being true, we can consistently assign its associated proposition Pθ a non-zero
probability, and moreover this probability represents the probability that Pθ is true
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and not just approximately true, since the approximation claim is in the proposition
itself. This way, the standard Bayesian interpretation of the probability axioms is
preserved.
The other natural way of attempting an accommodation is to abandon the stan-
dard Bayesian interpretation of the probability axioms, so that p(✓) is interpreted as
the probability that ✓ is approximately true rather than true. This line of reasoning
is pursued by Niiniluoto (1986) and Festa (1999). Let pa be a potential probability
function where the a subscript indicates that the intended interpretation of pa(✓)
is the probability that ✓ is approximately true rather than true. For concreteness,
we may imagine that pa represents the degrees of belief that some agent has in all
hypotheses (and models, theories, etc) that the agent takes to potentially be approx-
imately true. By contrast, p can be taken to represent the same agent’s degrees of
belief in propositions that the agent takes to potentially be true.12 pa is therefore
defined over a much more expansive set of hypotheses, models, theories, etc. than is
p. However, if we allow propositions such as <✓ is approximately true>, then pre-
sumably there will be a simple correspondence between pa and p in that we should
have pa(✓) = p(Pθ).
There is some reason to prefer working with pa rather than with propositions
such as Pθ. Bayes’s formula requires that we assign unconditional probabilities to
data x. If we stay inside the original distribution p, this means we have to calcu-
late p(x) =
P
p(x|Pθi)p(Pθi), but then we are faced with having to make sense of
p(x|Pθi), or in other words the probability of x conditional on the assumption that
✓i is approximately true. But this is hard to make sense of. In statistical practice,
each ✓i will, as was mentioned earlier, in general be part of a fully specified statistical
model, which means it will entail a probability for each of the possible outcomes. The
associated proposition, Pθi , however, does not entail any probabilities for data, and
it is hard to see how to come up with reasonable conditional probabilities of the form
p(x|Pθi). One might try to argue that it is reasonable to hold that p(x|Pθi) ≈ p(x|✓),
and this will provide a rough value for p(x|Pθi), but not a precise one.
12Although I hasten to add that a subjective Bayesian perspective will not really play any signif-
icant role here.
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If, on the other hand, we move to the distribution pa, then we can expand the
probability of x as pa(x) =
P
pa(x|✓i)pa(✓i). Now, if we suppose that the statistical
model stays the same, then it is reasonable to suppose that pa(x|✓i) = p(x|✓i); i.e.
✓i still entails the same probability for x in the pa distribution as it does in the p
distribution. The final thing we need to do is to define the joint probability of ✓i and
x, which we can naturally define as follows: pa(✓i&x) = p(x|✓i)pa(✓i). Thus, we can
write pa(x) =
P
p(x|✓i)pa(✓i).
Introducing the pa distribution has problems of its own, however, since it’s not
immediately clear whether such a function can actually satisfy the probability ax-
ioms. For example, physicists use both the liquid drop model (L) and the shell model
(S) of the nucleus in order to generate predictions, even though these models are
logically inconsistent. Presumably, both L and S should be taken to be “approxi-
mately true” since they are both auxiliary assumptions used by scientists to generate
predictions; hence we should expect it to be the case (at least) that pa(L) > 0.5 and
pa(S) > 0.5. However, since L and S are logically inconsistent, the third axiom tells
us that pa(S ∨ L) = pa(S) + pa(L) > 0.5 + 0.5 = 1, which is impossible because (by
the first axiom) no probability can be greater than 1. Thus, there is apparently a
very foundational problem with trying to change our interpretation of probability so
that probabilities are interpreted as probabilities of approximate truth rather than
probabilities of truth.
However, on closer inspection, this objection fails. The third probability axiom
applies to sets of “logically incompatible” hypotheses; but what does it mean for a
set of hypotheses to be logically incompatible? On the standard interpretation, it
means that it is not possible for more than one of the hypotheses to be true; i.e. the
third axiom is interpreted as follows:
3S. P (✓i) =
P
P (✓i) whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i to be
true.
However, in contexts where approximate truth rather than strict truth is the
target, this is arguably not how the axiom should be interpreted. Instead, the axiom
should be interpreted in the following way:
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3A. Pa(✓i) =
P
Pa(✓i) whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i to
be approximately true.
On the new reading, the earlier objection loses its grip, for – as was pointed out
earlier – it is possible for both the shell model and the drop model to be approximately
true, so the condition for applying the formula in the third axiom is not met—the
two models are not logically incompatible in the sense of 3A.
Unfortunately, this feature also leads to a serious problem, because the hypothesis
spaces that scientists generally use will not be logically incompatible in the sense of
axiom 3A, precisely because it will in general be possible for multiple hypotheses
in the hypothesis space to be approximately true. But this is bad news, because
in order for Bayes’s formula to be applicable, the hypothesis space we use must
consist of logically incompatible hypotheses, since the denominator of Bayes’s formula
requires that pa(x) (or p(x)) be expanded in terms of hypotheses that are logically
incompatible. Consider, for concreteness, the class of one-variable linear hypotheses,
y = ax, indexed by the parameter a ∈ R, and suppose we have available a continuous
verisimilitude measure v. Now suppose the true relationship between y and x is not
actually linear. Suppose moreover that we set the approximation threshold at ✏ > 0,
so that y = ax counts as approximately true if and only if 0 < v(a) < ✏, i.e. if
and only if v(a) is in the open interval S = (0, ✏). Then the set of hypotheses
that are approximately true is indexed by A = {a ∈ R | v(a) ∈ S}. Moreover,
v−1(S) = {a ∈ R | v(a) ∈ S} = A, which means A is also an open interval because
v is continuous. Since A is an open interval, it has either no members or infinitely
many. But this means either none or infinitely many of the hypotheses will be
approximately true. In neither case will Bayesian inference be possible. If none of
the hypotheses are approximately true, then clearly the goal of the inference cannot
be to find a hypothesis that is approximately true. If, on the other hand, infinitely
many of the hypotheses under consideration count as approximately true, then the
hypotheses cannot be used to calculate an unconditional probability for x. But from
this it follows that Bayes’s formula cannot be applied, and so Bayesian inference will
not be possible.
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The above problem arises whenever the verisimilitude measure v is continuous
and the hypotheses we are considering are parameterized by a real-valued parame-
ter. But many of the hypotheses spaces that applied statisticians make use of are
parameterized by continuous parameters; hence the problem arises very widely.
There are, as far as I can see, two ways we can try to get out of this problem.
As was mentioned earlier, there are two ways the unconditional probability of x
can be calculated, depending on whether we use pa or p with an expanded algebra
of propositions. In the pa distribution we have p(x) =
P
pa(x|✓i)pa(✓i). In the p
distribution, we instead have p(x) =
P
p(x|Pθi)p(Pθi), where Pθi is the proposition
<✓i is approximately true>.
If we expand the unconditional probability of x in the first way, we can try to
coarse-grain the hypothesis space; if we expand the unconditional probability of x in
the second way, we can try to create a partition out of the Pθi propositions. Neither
alternative is very promising.
Let us consider the second way out first. Carnap (1950) taught us how to create
a partition out of any set of propositions. The method is as follows: given any set
of propositions – A and B, let’s say – we form the state descriptions A&B, A&¬B,
¬A&B, ¬A&¬B. The resulting state descriptions then form a partition. Now, given
a set of hypotheses {✓i}, Carnap’s method can be used to make a partition out
of the set of associated propositions, <{✓i is approximately true}>; the resulting
state descriptions will then be logically incompatible (in the sense of 3S), and we
can therefore use Bayes’s formula on the resulting partition of state descriptions.
There are, however, two major problems with this proposed solution. First, note
that if there are n hypotheses in the hypotheses set, then the partition of state
descriptions will have 2n propositions. But that means that if the hypothesis space
is parameterized by a continuous parameter – so that its cardinality is ℵ1 – the
partition of state descriptions will have cardinality 2@1 . But it is not possible to
assign a regular probability (density) distribution over a set with cardinality 2@1 .
The resulting probability distribution will have to make use of “hyperreal” numbers
(Wenmackers and Horsten, 2013), but there are significant difficulties associated with
hyperreal probabilities—see, e.g., Easwaran (2014) and Pruss (2014).
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The other problem is perhaps even worse. In order to do use Bayes’s formula,
Bayesians who make use of the above proposed solution will have to somehow assign
likelihoods to each of the state descriptions, each of which is a heinous conjunction
of propositions of the form <{✓1 is approximately true}>&<{✓2 is approximately
true}>&¬<{✓3 is approximately true}>& . . .etc. It is very hard to see how reason-
able probabilities can be assigned conditional on such complicated expressions.
The other possible way out of the problem is to coarse-grain the hypothesis space.
If the hypothesis space is parameterized by a continuous parameter, then – as we have
seen – infinitely many hypotheses will in general count as approximately true if any
hypothesis counts as approximately true. However, if we make the hypothesis space
discrete by throwing out most of the hypotheses, then the remaining hypotheses may
well all be logically incompatible (in the sense of 3A). For example, if the parameter
that indexes the hypotheses ranges over the interval (0, 1), then we could coarse-grain
the parameter to (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0), which may well range over hypotheses that
are logically incompatible. However, coarse-graining the hypothesis space in this way
is not very attractive because (1) how to coarse-grain the space would depend on
which ✏ threshold we use, (2) there are multiple ways to coarse-grain a hypothesis
space, and each way arbitrarily throws out most of the viable hypotheses. Needless
to say, no Bayesian statisticians actually coarse-grain the hypothesis spaces they
use in this way; nor, for that matter, do they create state descriptions in the way
suggested in the previous solution. Hence, accommodating approximate truth within
the Bayesian framework does not seem to be feasible when the hypothesis space is
indexed by a continuous parameter.
The above considerations do not show that all is lost for the approximate truth
interpretation of probability, however. In particular, if the hypothesis space is dis-
crete, then the above problems may not arise. On the other hand, the problems
will arise even with discrete hypotheses spaces, provided there are multiple hypothe-
ses that all meet the verisimilitude threshold that is set for approximate truth. So
to prevent these problems from arising, it is necessary to make sure that the hy-
potheses (or models) under consideration are sufficiently distinct from each other so
that only (and precisely) one of them will count as approximately true. Otherwise,
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Bayesian methods will not be applicable because the hypotheses (or models) will not
be mutually exclusive in the requisite sense (i.e. in the sense of 3A).
But this is an awkward problem to have to deal with. And it points to a defect
with the concept of approximate truth: approximate truth is intrinsically too coarse-
grained a concept since it fails to distinguish between several hypotheses, all of which
are approximately true.
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Establishing causal claims in medicine
⋆
Jon Williamson
Draft of October 28, 2016
Abstract
Russo and Williamson (2007) maintain that in order to establish a causal
claim in medicine, one normally needs to establish both that the putative cause
and putative effect are appropriately correlated and that there is some under-
lying mechanism that can account for this correlation. I argue that, although
this thesis conflicts with the tenets of contemporary evidence-based medicine
(EBM), it offers a better causal epistemology than that provided by EBM be-
cause it better explains two key aspects of causal discovery. First, it better
explains the role of clinical trials in establishing causal claims. Second, it pro-
vides a better account of the logic of extrapolation.
§1
An epistemological thesis
Russo and Williamson (2007, §§1–4) put forward an epistemological thesis that can
be phrased as follows:
In order to establish a causal claim in medicine one normally needs
to establish two things: first, that the putative cause and effect are
appropriately correlated; second, that there is some mechanism which
explains instances of the putative effect in terms of the putative cause
and which can account for this correlation.
This epistemological thesis, which has become known as the Russo-Williamson
thesis or RWT, has generated some controversy—see, e.g., Weber (2007, 2009);
Campaner (2011); Clarke (2011); Darby and Williamson (2011); Gillies (2011); Illari
(2011); Howick (2011a,b); Russo and Williamson (2011a,b); Campaner and Galavotti
(2012); Claveau (2012); Dragulinescu (2012); Clarke et al. (2013, 2014) and Fiorentino
and Dammann (2015). The aim of this section is to explain what the thesis says and
why it is controversial. In §2, I argue that an approach to medical methodology
based on RWT fares better than present-day EBM in explaining three basic facts
about how clinical studies can be used to establish causal claims in medicine. In
§3, I argue that it gives a better account of extrapolation inferences too.
First, let us clarify some of the terms that occur within the statement of the
thesis. ‘Mechanism’ here can be understood broadly as referring to a complex-
systems mechanism, a mechanistic process, or some combination of the two. A
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Figure 1: T cell effector mechanisms in a lung infected by influenza A virus (Gruta
and Turner, 2014).
complex-systems mechanism consists of entities and activities organised in such a way
that they are responsible for some phenomenon to be explained (Machamer et al.,
2000; Illari and Williamson, 2012). An example is the mechanism by which the
heart pumps blood. A mechanistic process is a spatio-temporally contiguous process
along which a signal is propagated (Reichenbach, 1956; Salmon, 1998). An example
is an artificial pacemaker’s electrical signal being transmitted along a lead from the
pacemaker itself to the appropriate part of the heart. A mechanism might also be
a composed of both these sorts of mechanisms: for example, the complex-systems
mechanism of the artificial pacemaker, the complex-systems mechanism by which
the heart pumps the blood and the mechanistic process linking the two.
Note that a mechanism is not simply a causal network. A causal network can
be represented by a directed graph whose nodes represent events or variables and
where there is an arrow from one node to another if the former is a direct cause
of the latter. On the other hand, a mechanism is typically represented by a richer
diagram, such as that of Fig. 1, in which organisation tends to play a crucial explana-
tory role. Organisation includes both spatio-temporal structure and the hierarchical
structure of the different levels of the mechanism.
Note too that high-quality evidence of mechanism can be obtained by a wide
variety of means. Table 1 provides some examples.
Let us turn to some other terms that occur in the epistemological thesis RWT.
A causal claim is ‘established’ just when community-wide standards for granting
the causal claim are met. This requires not only high confidence in the truth of the
claim itself, but also high confidence in its stability, i.e., that further evidence will
not call the claim into question. One theory of evidence holds that evidence con-
sists of propositions that are rationally granted (Williamson, 2015); in which case,
when a causal claim is established it can be treated as evidence for other claims.
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Table 1: Examples of sources of evidence of mechanisms in medicine (Clarke et al.,
2014).
Direct manipulation: e.g., in vitro experiments
Direct observation: e.g., biomedical imaging, autopsy, case reports
Clinical studies: e.g., RCTs
Confirmed theory
Analogy: e.g., animal experiments
Simulation: e.g., agent-based models
Establishing is thus crucial to our inferential practice. Establishing requires meeting
a high epistemological standard. In particular, establishing a causal claim should
be distinguished from acting in accord with a causal claim as a precautionary mea-
sure: in certain cases in which a proposed health action has a relatively low cost,
or failing to treat has a high cost, it may be appropriate to initiate an action even
when its effectiveness has not been established, so that benefits can be reaped in
case the effectiveness claim turns out to be true. Despite being a high epistemo-
logical standard, establishing—unlike knowing, for instance—is fallible. One can
say ‘They established that stress is the principal cause of stomach ulcers but further
investigations showed they were mistaken,’ although one cannot substitute ‘knew’
for ‘established’ in this sentence; one would need ‘thought they knew’ instead.
The epistemological thesis says that one needs to establish that the putative
cause and effect are ‘appropriately correlated’. Here ‘appropriately correlated’
just means probabilistically dependent conditional on potential confounders, where the
probability distribution in question is relative to a specified population or reference
class of individuals. Thus, if A is the putative cause variable, B the putative effect
variable and C is the set of potential confounder variables, one needs to estab-
lish that A and B are probabilistically dependent conditional on C, often written
A ⊥6 B | C. A confounder is a variable correlated with both A and B, e.g., a com-
mon cause of A and B (Fig. 2). The dependence needs to be established conditional
on confounders because otherwise an observed correlation between A and B might
be attributable to their correlation with C, rather than attributable to A being a
cause of B. The set of potential confounders should include any variable that plau-
sibly might be a confounder, given evidence of the area in question. Establishing
correlation is non-trivial for two reasons. First, because it requires establishing a
probabilistic dependence in the data-generating distribution, rather than simply in
the distribution of a sample of observed outcomes. The method of sampling and
size of sample can conspire to render an observed sample correlation a poor esti-
mate of a correlation in the population at large. Second, establishing correlation
requires considering all potential confounders, and there can be very many of these.
To be clear, we shall use ‘observed correlation’ to refer to a correlation found
in the data, ‘genuine correlation’ to refer to a correlation in the target population
from which the data are drawn, and ‘established correlation’ to refer to claimed
genuine correlation that has met the standards required for being considered es-
tablished. Since establishing is fallible, that a correlation is established does not
deductively imply that there is a genuine correlation, though it makes it very likely.
Moreover, to establish a correlation it is not necessary that every relevant dataset
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A
C
B
Figure 2: C is a confounder.
yields an observed correlation, although some observed correlation would typically
be required.
RWT says that one ‘normally’ needs to establish both correlation and mecha-
nism. This is because there are certain cases in which causality is not accompanied
by a correlation and there are cases in which causality is not accompanied by an
underlying mechanism. In cases of overdetermination, where the cause does not
raise the probability of the effect because the effect will happen anyway, there is no
actual correlation between the cause and the effect. In many such cases, one can
expect a counterfactual correlation: if things had been different in such a way that
the effect would not have happened anyway—e.g., had a second, overdetermining
cause been eliminated—then the cause and effect would indeed be correlated. One
might think, then, that one ought to be able to establish a counterfactual correlation
for any causal claim, if not an actual correlation. However, there are cases in which
the cause of interest and a second, overdetermining cause are mutually exclusive,
so that it is not possible both to eliminate the second cause and allow the first cause
to vary so as to establish a correlation (see Williamson, 2009, §10). So, even the
demand for a counterfactual correlation may be too strong. Let us turn next to
causality without mechanisms. Where the cause and / or the effect is an absence, it
cannot be connected by an actual mechanism. In many such cases, one can expect
a counterfactual mechanism. Suppose cause and effect are both absences: e.g., fail-
ing to treat causes a lack of a heartbeat. If things had been different in such a way
that what was absent in the cause were present (e.g., the treatment is administered),
then one would expect a mechanism from this presence to a presence correspond-
ing to the effect (e.g., a heartbeat). One might think, then, that one ought to be
able to establish the existence of a counterfactual mechanism for any causal claim,
if not an actual mechanism. However, there are cases where one of the cause and
effect is an absence and the other is a presence, and this strategy does not work.
For example, suppose that failing to treat causes a blood clot. That the cause is
an absence precludes a mechanism here, but the effect being an absence precludes
a mechanism in the obverse case, namely, treating causes an absence of a blood
clot. Now, establishing causality in these cases is not particularly problematic in
practice. However, it is more subtle than simply establishing correlation and es-
tablishing mechanism, even where counterfactual correlations or mechanisms are
admitted. The question as to how RWT needs to be modified to cover such cases
will be not be considered here, because it is not central to the following arguments.
The use of ‘normally’ is intended to leave open the possibility that in certain tricky
cases one might not need to establish both correlation and mechanism.
RWT requires establishing the existence of a correlation and the existence of a
mechanism, not the extent of the correlation, nor the details of the mechanism.
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Table 2: Possible explanations of an observed correlation between A and B.
Causation A is a cause of B.
Reverse causation B is a cause of A.
Confounding (selection bias) There is some confounder C that has not been
adequately controlled for by the study.
Performance bias Those in the A-group are identified and treated
differently to those in the ¬A-group.
Detection bias B is measured differently in the A-group in com-
parison to the ¬A-group.
Chance Sheer coincidence, attributable to too small a
sample.
Fishing Measuring so many outcomes that there is likely
to be a chance correlation between A and some
such B.
Temporal trends A and B both increase over time for independent
reasons. E.g., prevalence of coeliac disease &
spread of HIV.
Semantic relationships Overlapping meaning. E.g., phthiasis, consump-
tion, scrofula (all of which are TB).
Constitutive relationships One variable is a part or component of the other.
Logical relationships Measurable variables A and B are logically com-
plex and logically overlapping. E.g., A is C∧D
and B is D∨E.
Physical laws E.g., conservation of total energy can induce a
correlation between two energy measurements.
Mathematical relationships E.g., mean and variance variables from the same
distribution will often be correlated.
Of course, in some cases establishing the extent of a correlation is a means to
establishing its existence, and establishing the details of a mechanism is a means to
establishing its existence, but these means are not the only means. We shall return
to this point in §2.
RWT is a purely epistemological thesis, concerning the discovery of causal
relationships. Russo and Williamson (2007) used the thesis to argue for a particular
metaphysical account of causality, the epistemic theory of causality, but RWT itself
does not say anything about the nature of causality. The thesis is intended to be
both descriptive and normative: i.e., as capturing typical past cases of establishing
causality in the biomedical sciences (e.g., Clarke, 2011; Gillies, 2011), as well as
characterising the way in which one ought to establish causality.
To see why one ought to establish causality this way, consider that an observed
correlation between two variables might be explained in a wide variety of ways,
as depicted in Table 2. Some of these explanations provide reason to doubt that
there is a genuine correlation in the underlying population. For example, one of the
potential confounders might not have been adequately controlled for, or the sample
may be rather small. On the other hand, some of these explanations provide reason
to doubt that A is a cause of B, even where there is a genuine correlation between
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these variables. For example, there might be some variable that could not possibly
be considered a potential confounder, given the evidence available, but nevertheless
is a confounder, and has not been adequately controlled for. In such a case A and
B can be appropriately correlated yet A may not be a cause of B—the correlation
is attributable to a common cause. Or there may be a genuine correlation that is
entirely non causal, explained by a semantic relationship, for instance. Thus there
are two forms of error: error when inferring correlation in the data-generating
distribution from an observed correlation and error when inferring that A is a
cause of B from an established correlation. Evidence of mechanisms can help to
eliminate both forms of error. For instance, it can help to determine the direction of
causation, which variables are potential confounders, whether a treatment regime
is likely to lead to performance bias, and whether measured variables are likely to
exhibit temporal trends.
The existence of the second kind of error—error when inferring that A is a
cause of B from an established correlation—shows that it is not enough to simply
establish correlation. If it is genuinely the case that A is a cause of B, then there is
some combination of mechanisms that explains instances of B by invoking instances
of A and which can account for the correlation. Hence, in order to establish efficacy
one needs to establish mechanism as well as correlation.
Let us consider an example. The International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC) Monographs evaluate the carcinogenicity of various substances. When eval-
uating whether mobile phone use is a cause of cancer, IARC found that the largest
study (the INTERPHONE study) showed a correlation between the highest levels of
call time and certain cancers. This correlation was confirmed by another large study
from Sweden. However, evidence of mechanisms was weak and certainly failed to
establish the existence of an underlying mechanism. For this reason, chance or bias
were considered to be the most likely explanations of the observed correlations, and
while causality was not ruled out, neither was it established (IARC, 2013, §§5–6).1
⋆
Further discussion of the descriptive and normative adequacy of RWT can be
found in the above references. We will not revisit all these arguments here. Instead, I
shall argue here that RWT provides a better account of the epistemology of causality
than a rival theory which is motivated by evidence-based medicine (EBM).
Evidence-based medicine is concerned with making the evaluation of evidence
explicit:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of
individual patients. (Sackett et al., 1996)
Of course, this goal is hardly controversial. What characterises present-day EBM
is not the goal itself but the means by which it attempts to achieve this goal. EBM
employs hierarchies of evidence in order to evaluate evidence and these hierarchies
of evidence tend to favour clinical studies and statistical analyses of these stud-
ies over other forms of evidence. Clinical studies (CSs) measure the putative cause
and effect, together with potential confounders. CSs include controlled experiments
such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs) as well as observational studies such as
1I am very grateful to Julian Reiss for alerting me to this example.
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Figure 3: SUNY Downstate Medical Center EBM Tutorial (SUNY, 2004).
cohort studies, case control studies, case series and collections of case reports. In
particular, non-CS evidence of mechanisms, i.e., evidence of mechanisms obtained
from means other than the clinical studies that seek to establish a correlation be-
tween the putative cause and effect, tends to be either ignored or relegated to the
bottom of the hierarchy. For example, Fig. 3 depicts an evidence hierarchy of SUNY
(2004), used for EBM training. This places animal research and in vitro research,
which in the right circumstances can provide high quality evidence of mechanisms,
below ‘opinions’, and well below evidence obtained from clinical studies and sta-
tistical analyses of CSs. A similar point can be made about an evidence hierarchy
used by the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, depicted in
Fig. 4. Fig. 5 depicts the current evidence hierarchy of the Oxford Centre for
Evidence-Based Medicine, which places ‘mechanism-based reasoning’ at the lowest
level. Other approaches, such as the GRADE system, tend to overlook evidence of
mechanisms entirely (Guyatt et al., 2011, Fig. 2).
The main feature of contemporary EBM of relevance to this paper, then, is
that it views non-CS evidence of mechanisms as either irrelevant to the process of
evidence evaluation or as strictly inferior to evidence obtained from clinical studies
and analyses of CSs. In the latter case, opinions differ as to whether or not CSs
trump non-CS evidence of mechanisms, i.e., whether or not one should ignore
non-CS evidence of mechanisms when clinical studies are available. Either way,
however, the sort of studies that provide high quality evidence of correlation are
viewed as superior to other investigations which can provide high quality evidence
of mechanism.
As a consequence, contemporary EBM stands in conflict with RWT. EBM pri-
oritises evidence of correlation over other evidence of mechanism, whereas RWT
treats evidence of mechanism alongside evidence of correlation. An advocate of
RWT might interpret the EBM hierarchy of evidence as a way of evaluating evidence
of correlation, rather than causation. Under this interpretation, Fig. 6 portrays the
epistemological picture motivated by EBM. On the other hand, Fig. 7 represents the
approach motivated by RWT (Clarke et al., 2014).
Given this conflict and the fact that EBM is now very well entrenched in
medicine, it is no wonder that RWT is controversial. However, we shall see that
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Figure 4: Hierarchy of evidence for diagnostic studies from NICE (2006, p.48).
there are good reasons to prefer the RWT-motivated causal epistemology to the
EBM-motivated view. Next, in §2, I shall argue that RWT better explains the role of
clinical studies in establishing a causal claim. In §3 I shall argue that RWT better
explains the process of extrapolating a causal claim from the study population to a
target population.
That present-day EBM fails to provide an adequate epistemology of causality
does not imply that the whole enterprise of evidence-based medicine is doomed.
Current EBM provides a first approximation to the correct epistemology and has led
to numerous advances in patient care. The claim made here is that improvements
to contemporary EBM can be made, and that the picture of Fig. 7 provides a better
approximation. This picture can thus be viewed as a way to develop ‘EBM+’, i.e.,
as a proposal to advance the methodology of EBM by taking better account of
evidence of mechanisms (c.f., ebmplus.org). No claim is made that Fig. 7 is the end
of the story—further improvements can be made, no doubt.
While present-day EBM advances an essentially monistic account of causal dis-
covery in terms of clinical studies that are evaluated according to how well they
establish correlation, the RWT-motivated EBM+ approach is dualistic, treating evi-
dence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation on a par. In this sense, EBM+ has
a close affinity to the approaches of Claude Bernard and Austin Bradford Hill, both
of whom advocated an approach to medicine which treats evidence of mechanisms
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Figure 5: Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine 2011 Levels of Evidence
(OCEBM Levels of Evidence Working Group, 2011).
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Figure 6: The causal epistemology of contemporary EBM.
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Figure 7: Evidence of mechanisms treated alongside evidence of correlation.
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on a par with evidence of correlation (Russo and Williamson, 2007, §2; Clarke et al.,
2014, §2.2).
§2
Explananda concerning clinical studies
In this section, I shall argue that RWT can successfully explain three fundamental
facts about the role of clinical studies in establishing a causal claim, and that the
view motivated by present-day EBM cannot account for all of these facts (although
it can account for the first fact). The three facts are these: (i) in some cases, clinical
studies suffice to establish a causal claim; (ii) in some cases, randomised studies are
not required to establish a causal claim; (iii) in some cases, randomised studies are
trumped by other evidence of mechanisms. We shall examine each of these facts in
turn.
§2.1. In some cases, clinical studies suffice to establish a causal claim
Howick (2011a) suggests that in a number of cases, medical interventions have been
accepted on the basis of comparative clinical studies alone. He cites the following
cases: the use of aspirin as an analgesic; the use of general anaesthesia; and the use
of deep brain stimulation in treating patients with advanced Parkinson’s disease or
Tourette’s syndrome. He argues that these cases are a problem for the epistemo-
logical thesis RWT, because the mechanisms of action were not—in some cases,
still are not—known. Howick points out that these cases are quite compatible with
contemporary EBM, which focuses overwhelmingly on clinical studies.
In response to this objection, one might question whether, in these examples,
the causal claims really were were established on the basis of comparative clinical
studies alone. However, I do not want to question the examples here, because I
want to accept the general principle that it is possible that clinical studies alone
can be used to establish a causal claim in medicine. The point I want to make is
that this general principle is quite compatible with RWT.
Consider the RWT-motivated picture of Fig. 7. Some of the total available evi-
dence can be considered to provide evidence of correlation, in the sense that these
items of evidence contribute to support or undermine the claim that the putative
cause and effect are appropriately correlated. (An item of evidence contributes to
support a claim if, when taken together with other items, it supports the claim, and
the other items do not on their own support the claim to the same degree.) Some of
the total available evidence can be considered to provide evidence of mechanisms,
in the sense that these items of evidence contribute to support or undermine a
claim that there is some mechanism which explains instances of the putative effect
in terms of the putative cause and which can account for the extent of the correla-
tion. There is no suggestion that an item of evidence cannot provide both evidence
of correlation and evidence of mechanisms.
In particular, clinical studies not only provide evidence of correlation, they
can also—in the right circumstances—provide high-quality evidence of mechanisms
(Table 1). Suppose:
◦ There are sufficiently many independent clinical studies,
◦ They are of sufficient quality (e.g., they are sufficiently large, well-conducted
RCTs),
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1533-
Clinical
studies
A is
correlated
with B
A has a
mechanism
to B
A is a
cause of B
Figure 8: Clinical studies can, in the right circumstances, establish a causal claim.
◦ Sufficiently many studies point in the same direction,
◦ They observe a large enough correlation (‘effect size’),
◦ It is clear that the variables in question are such that there are no temporal
trends and they are not semantically, constitutively, logically, physically or
mathematically related,
◦ There is no other evidence to suggest lack of a suitable mechanism.
Then one can infer both:
◦ That there is a correlation,
◦ That there must be some underlying mechanism that explains this correlation.
This is because alternative explanations of the correlation are ruled out (c.f. Table 2).
In such cases, clinical studies can provide evidence of the existence of a mechanism
even though they may fail to shed light on the details of the mechanism. Fig. 8
depicts this kind of inference, from the perspective of RWT. (Here an arrow from
node X to node Y is thick if X on its own would suffice to establish Y ; an arrow
is thin if X is insufficient on its own to establish Y , but nevertheless supports Y .)
In practice, however, the conditions of this inference are rarely met. Thus, non-CS
evidence of mechanisms is typically crucial in establishing causality.
In sum, then, while Howick cites as counterexamples to RWT cases in which
clinical studies have sufficed to establish causality, these cases are in fact quite
compatible with RWT.
Confusingly, Howick also cites as evidence against RWT a range of cases in
which evidence of mechanisms alone led to erroneous causal inferences; see also
Howick (2011b, Chapter 10). These cases clearly confirm—rather than disconfirm—
RWT, which says that causal claims cannot be established just by establishing mech-
anisms, since one needs to establish correlation as well. Moreover, these cases also
support the EBM+ approach, which holds that evidence of mechanisms needs to
made explicit and its quality scrutinised, just as contemporary EBM strives to do
with evidence of correlation arising from statistical studies. This is because in many
of these cases the evidence of mechanisms was rather weak.
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Figure 9: One way to establish a causal claim without RCTs.
§2.2. In some cases, randomised studies are not required to establish a
causal claim
To support the view that in some cases there is no need for RCTs when establishing
causality, consider three examples.
First consider the tongue-in-cheek conclusions of Smith and Pell (2003), who
study ‘parachute use to prevent death and major trauma related to gravitational
challenge’:
As with many interventions intended to prevent ill health, the effec-
tiveness of parachutes has not been subjected to rigorous evaluation
by using randomised controlled trials. Advocates of evidence based
medicine have criticised the adoption of interventions evaluated by us-
ing only observational data. We think that everyone might benefit if
the most radical protagonists of evidence based medicine organised
and participated in a double blind, randomised, placebo controlled,
crossover trial of the parachute. (Smith and Pell, 2003, p. 1459.)
From the point of view of EBM, the evidence for the effectiveness of parachutes
is very weak: no systematic studies, let alone RCTs, and some mechanistic evidence
which sits at the bottom of the evidence hierarchy, if it occurs at all. It is hard
to see how causality could be established on the basis of this evidence, if EBM is
right. From the point of view of EBM+, however, the evidence is strong: excellent
evidence of mechanisms, and, although unsystematic, plenty of observational evi-
dence relating to instances where parachutes were and were not used, and a very
large observed effect size. From the point of view of EBM+, the evidence of mech-
anisms on its own suffices to establish the existence of a suitable mechanism, and,
when combined with the unsystematic observations, the total evidence suffices to
establish correlation too. Hence causality is established. This inference is depicted
in Fig. 9.
Having clarified the structure of this inference, let us consider a second ex-
ample, also considered by Worrall (2007). The question here is how to establish
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Figure 10: The ECMO mechanism.
the effectiveness of extracorporeal membraneous oxygenation (ECMO) for treating
persistent pulmonary hypertension (PPHS). With PPHS, immaturity of the lungs in
certain newborn babies leads to poor oxygenation of the blood. ECMO oxygenates
the blood outside the body (Fig. 10). Observational studies suggested that ECMO
increases survival rate from about 20% to about 80% (Bartlett et al., 1982). However,
under standard EBM procedures for evaluating evidence, the available evidence was
viewed as insufficient to establish causality, and it was felt necessary to conduct an
RCT (Bartlett et al., 1985). At least five subsequent RCTs were carried out, leading
to significant loss of life in the control groups.
Conducting RCTs in such a case is considered standard EBM procedure. That
non-RCT evidence is viewed as insufficient by EBM was confirmed by a recent
Cochrane Review of ECMO, which explicitly disregarded any evidence that did not
take the form of an RCT (Mugford et al., 2010).
On the other hand, Worrall (2007) suggests that RCTs were unnecessary in the
ECMO case. This conclusion is supported by the RWT-motivated EBM+ approach.
This case is analogous to the parachute case: there was strong observational evi-
dence which indicated a large effect size, as well as excellent evidence of mecha-
nisms. Indeed, as in the parachute case, the details of the mechanism of action were
very well established. Thus Fig. 9 captures the pre-RCT inference in the ECMO
case. There is little doubt that conducting RCTs led to yet greater surety; however,
despite being mandated by EBM, RCTs were arguably unnecessary to establish
causality.
As a third example, consider the case of establishing the carcinogenicity of
aristolochic acid.2 When IARC originally investigated aristolochic acid in 2002, it
found that, while there was observational evidence that Chinese herbs that contain
aristolochic acid cause cancer, there was ‘limited’ evidence in humans concerning
the carcinogenicity of aristolochic acid itself as an active ingredient, so carcino-
genicity could not be established (IARC, 2002, pp. 69–128). IARC re-examined
the question some years later and found that there was little in the way of further
2I am very grateful to Kurt Straif for alerting me to this example.
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observational evidence in humans, so the study evidence involving humans was
still ‘limited’. However, there was much more evidence of the underlying mecha-
nisms available, to the extent that the mechanistic evidence could now be described
as ‘strong’ and causality could be considered established (IARC, 2012, pp. 347–
361). The key point here is that the change in evidence that warranted establishing
causality was a change in mechanistic evidence.
These three cases thus instantiate the following form of inference. Suppose:
◦ The mechanisms involved are established,
◦ Observational studies suggest a sufficiently large effect size,
◦ Sufficiently many studies point in the same direction,
◦ It is clear that the mechanisms involved can account for the effect size,
◦ It is clear that the variables in question are such that there are no temporal
trends and they are not semantically, constitutively, logically, physically or
mathematically related,
◦ There is no other evidence to suggest that the correlation is best explained
in another way,
Then one can infer both:
◦ That there is a correlation,
◦ That there must be some underlying mechanism that explains this correlation.
In these cases, evidence of mechanisms obtained by means other than clinical
studies provides evidence of correlation. When taken in conjunction with the ob-
servational studies, this can be sufficient to establish a correlation (Fig. 9). Note
that the observational studies do not need to be very systematic: this is so in
the parachute case, and it may also be true when establishing some adverse drug
reactions (Aronson and Hauben, 2006; Hauben and Aronson, 2007).
While this mode of inference clearly fits the EBM+ approach, which is moti-
vated by RWT, it is harder for contemporary EBM to explain, because, as we saw
in the ECMO case, much of the practice of present-day EBM seems to demand
randomised studies in order to establish causality. To be sure, some deny that ran-
domised trials are required. For example, Glasziou et al. (2007) argue that in cases
where there is a large effect size, RCTs may be unnecessary. However, they struggle
to explain from within the EBM paradigm how evidence of mechanisms can be
treated on a par with observational studies to help establish causality. Instead they
evoke the Bradford Hill indicators of causality, and the Bradford Hill approach is
much more in line with RWT and EBM+ than with standard EBM (§1).
§2.3. In some cases, randomised studies are trumped by other evidence of
mechanisms.
So far, we have seen that while present-day EBM can account for situations in which
RCTs are sufficient to establish causality, it is doubtful whether EBM adequately
handles cases in which RCTs are unnecessary. As we shall now see, it is clear
that EBM cannot capture cases in which randomised studies are trumped by other
evidence of mechanisms. This is because evidence of mechanisms obtained by
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Figure 11: Evidence of a lack of mechanism can trump RCTs.
means other than randomised studies is viewed—when it is considered at all—as
strictly inferior to evidence arising from randomised studies (§1).
There are two kinds of example here. One sort of example involves positive
evidence of causality from randomised studies; this evidence is trumped by evidence
that there is no mechanism by which causality can operate. To start with another
tongue-in-cheek example, Leibovici (2001) presented an RCT which observed a
correlation between remote, retroactive intercessionary prayer and length of stay
of patients in hospital. The patients in question had bloodstream infections in
Israel during the period 1990–6; the intervention involved saying ‘a short prayer for
the well being and full recovery of the group as a whole’ in the year 2000 in the
USA, long after recovery or otherwise actually took place. The study also found a
correlation between the intervention and duration of fever. The author concludes:
No mechanism known today can account for the effects of remote,
retroactive intercessory prayer said for a group of patients with a blood-
stream infection. However, the significant results and the flawless de-
sign prove that an effect was achieved. (Leibovici, 2001, p. 1451.)
Present-day EBM clearly accords with this inference to an effect, because it views
considerations to do with mechanisms as strictly inferior to evidence produced by
clinical studies. However, the implicit inference is that this conclusion is ridicu-
lous: no effect should be inferred. This contrary conclusion goes against EBM.
It is not possible for present-day EBM to account for the possibility that a large,
well-conducted RCT can be trumped by the fact that current science has no place
for a mechanism between remote, retroactive intercessionary prayer and length of
stay of in hospital. On the other hand, this is quite compatible with EBM+. Fig. 11
depicts the inference here, from the perspective of RWT. Undermining evidence is
represented by dashed arrows. The thick dashed arrow depicts an inferential con-
nection that is enough on its own to rule out mechanism. As before, the thick solid
arrow depicts a connection that would normally be enough on its own to establish
the conclusion (correlation): a significant result from a large well-conducted RCT.
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However, there is evidence which undermines this conclusion: well-confirmed sci-
entific theory. The presence of this undermining evidence blocks any inference to
either correlation or mechanism, and thereby blocks an inference to causation.
Other inferences follow the same pattern. Some comparative studies for precog-
nition have observed a significant correlation (see, e.g., Bem, 2011), as have others in
the case of homeopathy (e.g., Cucherat et al., 2000; Faculty of Homeopathy, 2016).
What are the options for resisting an inference to causality in such cases? EBM will
point to the fact that the evidence base shows mixed results and is thus inconclu-
sive. However, while this may be so for precognition and homeopathy in general, it
is not the case for certain specific interventions which are instances of precognition
or homeopathy; as the above references show, there are specific interventions for
which only positive studies are available. An alternative way to resist an inference
to causality in such cases is to invoke the machinery of Bayesianism: to argue that
the prior probability of effectiveness is so low that the posterior probability remains
low, despite confirmatory trials. This strategy is open to the charge of subjectivity,
or relativity to the way the problem is framed. This charge is clearly correct in the
case of a subjective Bayesian analysis, but even under an objective Bayesian reading
this charge is on the mark, as an objective Bayesian analysis typically requires high
prior probability in deception or experimental error (Jaynes, 2003, §§5.1–2). A third
alternative is to apply the RWT-motivated EBM+ approach. The inference in these
cases follows the pattern of Fig. 11, and it is clear that causality has not been estab-
lished, even in specific cases where trials would sufficient in the absence of other
evidence to establish correlation. Arguably, then, the RWT-motivated approach is
the most promising of these three strategies.
In the kind of example considered above, positive evidence from randomised
studies is trumped by evidence of absence of mechanism. But there is another
sort of example, in which there is observational evidence, evidence from RCTs and
other evidence of mechanisms, and in which the other evidence of mechanisms
plays more of a role in establishing causality than do the RCTs. The ECMO case
takes this form at the point after the first randomised trial. The first randomised
trial provided weak evidence, because after the first baby was randomly assigned
to the control arm of the trial and subsequently died, no more individuals were
assigned to this arm. Thus the size of the trial was not sufficient to draw any
strong conclusions. Arguably, at that point in time the evidence of mechanisms was
stronger than that arising from RCTs and it played more of a role in establishing
causality. Indeed, if the analysis of §2.2 is correct then the RCT evidence was
redundant. The evidence of mechanisms trumps the RCT evidence in such a case.
⋆
To conclude, the causal epistemology motivated by RWT can validate all three
facts about the role of clinical studies in establishing a causal claim. The EBM
approach certainly captures the first fact (in some cases, clinical studies suffice to
establish a causal claim). However, the practice of EBM goes against the second
fact (in some cases, randomised studies are not required to establish a causal claim)
and EBM certainly fails to explain the third fact (in some cases, randomised studies
are trumped by other evidence of mechanisms).
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§3
Extrapolation
We now turn to the question of how a causal claim can be extrapolated from a study
population to a target population of interest. This mode of inference is ubiquitous,
because the population within which clinical studies establish a correlation (e.g.,
hospital patients in a particular region who are not too young, not too old, not too
ill and not pregnant) rarely coincides with the population within which a treatment
is intended to be used. It is also very common—and particularly challenging—to
extrapolate causal claims from animals to humans. Any adequate causal epistemol-
ogy needs to explain how extrapolation is possible and needs to clarify the logic of
extrapolation.
Here is a first approximation to the logic of extrapolation:
The causal relationship holds in the study population
The study and target populations are similar in causally relevant respects
The causal relationship holds in the target population
As Steel (2008) points out, this explication faces two immediate problems. The
first, which Steel calls the extrapolator’s circle, is that ‘it needs to be explained
how we could know that the model and the target are similar in causally relevant
respects without already knowing the causal relationship in the target’ (p. 78). The
worry is that extrapolation seems redundant, since the conclusion of the above
rule of inference is apparently needed to establish the second premiss. The second
problem, which we shall call the extrapolator’s block, is that ‘any adequate account of
extrapolation in heterogeneous populations must explain how extrapolation can be
possible even when [causally relevant differences between the model and the target]
are present’ (pp. 78–9). That is, the study and target population are rarely entirely
similar in causally relevant respects—particularly when extrapolating from animals
to humans—and it needs to be made clear what sort of differences are permissible
in order to prevent the second premiss of the above argument from failing and the
inference thereby being blocked.
Note that the study population is chosen for investigation precisely because it is
easier to conduct clinical studies on this population than on the target population.
Thus the clinical studies that one can perform on the study population tend to
be of a higher standard than those directly obtained on the target population. In
the light of this fact, one can sketch an approach to extrapolation motivated by
contemporary EBM as follows:
RCTs establish a causal relationship in the study population
Observational studies in the target population are consistent with this relationship
The causal relationship holds in the target population
This approach to extrapolation circumvents the aforementioned problems very
nicely. There is no extrapolator’s circle because one does not need to know that the
causal relationship holds in the target population to obtain observational studies in
the target population. There is no extrapolator’s block because this theory of ex-
trapolation makes extrapolation possible even when there are substantial differences
between the study and target populations.
That there may be substantial differences between the study and target pop-
ulations points to two problems that face the EBM-motivated approach. First we
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have what we might call the extrapolator’s fallacy: it needs to be explained how
extrapolation is a reliable form of inference, rather than simply fallacious. The
worry is that the EBM-motivated account will lead to lots of mistaken conclu-
sions, because observational studies in the target population typically provide weak
evidence that the target population is similar to the study population in causally
relevant respects. This problem may explain some recent scepticism about extrapo-
lation amongst those interested in medical methodology (see, e.g., Ioannidis, 2012).
However, since almost every causal claim of interest has to be extrapolated from
some study population, scepticism is hardly a viable option.
The second, related problem is that the extrapolator’s standards are slipping . In
the EBM-motivated approach we have a high standard for internal validity but a low
standard for external validity: evidence deemed to be of high quality by EBM (such
as that obtained from RCTs) is used to establish causality in the study population,
while low quality evidence (such as that obtained from observational studies) is
used to establish causality in the target population. In general, an account of
extrapolation should not have double standards—the burden of proof for causality
should be similar in the study and target populations.
As Steel (2008, Chapter 5) suggests, in order to extrapolate a causal claim from
a study population to a target population, one needs evidence that similar mech-
anisms operate in the two populations. This is particularly important in contexts
where mechanisms are likely to differ, such as with extrapolations from animals
to humans or interventions involving long causal pathways. It turns out that this
feature of extrapolation can be captured by the following RWT-motivated account.
Fig. 12 depicts an account of the logic of extrapolation that is motivated by
RWT. In the study population, one can carry out clinical studies that normally
cannot be carried out in the target population; these studies are often enough
on their own to establish correlation. By also establishing mechanism, one can
then establish causality in the study population. In the target population, clinical
studies in the target population, even when augmented with other evidence of the
mechanisms of the target population, are insufficient to establish correlation and
mechanism—otherwise there would be no need for extrapolation. Extrapolation is
possible when evidence of mechanisms in the target population is strong enough
not only to establish the existence of a suitable mechanism M′ in the target pop-
ulation, but also to establish that this mechanism is similar in key respects to the
mechanism M inferred in the study population. The expression M′ ≡ M in Fig. 12
denotes this similarity claim. By means of this similarity of mechanisms, one can
use the claim that A is a cause of B established in the study population to fur-
ther support the correlation claim in the target population. In sum, where clinical
studies and other mechanistic investigations in the target population are not jointly
sufficient to establish correlation in the target, if the corresponding causal claim is
established in the study population and it is also established that the mechanisms
in the target population are sufficiently similar to those which underpin causation in
the study population then this combination of evidence may be enough to establish
correlation in the target population. If so, since mechanism in the target is also
established, causality can be inferred.
As an extreme case, there may be no clinical studies in the target population;
this in itself does not preclude extrapolation under the RWT-motivated account.
For example, when IARC evaluated benzo[a]pyrene, they found no human stud-
ies measuring exposure to benzo[a]pyrene together with relevant cancer outcomes.
However, there were excellent animal studies and enough evidence of mechanisms
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Figure 12: The logic of extrapolation as motivated by RWT.
in animals to establish carcinogenicity in the relevant animal models and to deter-
mine the details of the mechanism of action there. Furthermore, there was excellent
evidence that the human mechanisms were similar to the mechanisms found in an-
imals. This was considered enough to establish carcinogenicity in humans (IARC,
2012, pp. 111–144).3 Note that this example is not validated by the EBM-motivated
account of extrapolation provided above, because there were no relevant clinical
studies in humans. Thus the example favours the RWT-motivated account of ex-
trapolation.
To take another case where there were no clinical studies in the target popu-
lation, consider the IARC evaluation of d-Limonene as a cause of cancer. In this
case, there were no studies available in humans. Carcinogenicity of d-Limonene
was established in male rats, so this seemed to be a candidate for extrapolation.
However, there were crucial dissimilarities between the mechanism of action in
rats and the corresponding human mechanisms: in particular, a protein responsi-
ble for nephrotoxicity in male rats is specific to male rats. Thus no extrapolation
was possible and carcinogenicity was not established (IARC, 1999, pp. 3017–327).4
This example, which is also in accord with the RWT-motivated account, shows how
crucial it is to establish similarity of mechanisms.
⋆
We shall now see that this RWT-motivated account of extrapolation survives the
four problems of extrapolation identified above.
First let us consider the extrapolator’s circle. That there is no circle should be
apparent from the fact that Fig. 12 is acyclic: one does not need to have already
established causality in the target in order to meet any of the requirements of
establishing causality. Of course, once these requirements are all met, causality in
the target is thereby established, but there is no inferential circle here. See Steel
3I am very grateful to Michael Wilde for alerting me to this example.
4I am very grateful to Kurt Straif for alerting me to this example.
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(2008, §5.4.2) for further discussion of how mechanism-based approaches can avoid
the extrapolator’s circle.
Turning next to the extrapolator’s block, one might worry that we are lacking
an account of how extrapolation is possible when mechanisms in the study and tar-
get populations are not identical. Similarity of mechanisms is a matter of degree,
and the more similar the mechanisms, the more causation in the study popula-
tion confirms correlation in the target population. Steel (2008, §5.3.2) discusses
this question and presents comparative process tracing as a method for establishing
similarity:
First, learn the mechanism in the model organism, by means of pro-
cess tracing or other experimental means. For example, a description
of a carcinogenic mechanism would indicate such things as the prod-
uct of the phase I metabolism and the enzymes involved; whether the
metabolite is a mutagen, an indication of how it alters DNA; and so
on. Second, compare stages of the mechanism in the model organ-
ism with that of the target organism in which the two are most likely
to differ significantly. For example, one would want to know whether
the chemical is metabolized by the same enzymes in the two species,
and whether the same metabolite results, and so forth. In general, the
greater the similarity of configuration and behavior of entities involved
in the mechanism at these key stages, the stronger the basis for the
extrapolation. (Steel, 2008, p. 89.)
Two further points are important here. First, it is important to show that the whole
structure of relevant mechanisms is sufficiently similar, not just that the mechanism
M by which causality operates in the study population has an analogue in the target
population. Thus, one needs to establish that any new counteracting mechanisms
in the target population are not so significant that they can cancel out the action
of the analogue of M. Second, it is important to note that comparative process
tracing is but one of several methods for establishing similarity of mechanisms.
One can also establish similarity of mechanisms without determining the details
of the mechanisms M and M′ by employing phylogenetic reasoning, robustness
analysis or even enumerative induction (Parkkinen and Williamson, 2017, §4).
Let us consider the extrapolator’s fallacy next. Unlike the EBM-motivated ap-
proach, the RWT-motivated analysis of extrapolation requires evidence that en-
sures that the study and target populations are similar in causally relevant respects.
Mechanistic evidence is playing a key role here, in ensuring that M′ ≡ M. By being
more demanding in terms of the evidence required in the target population, extrap-
olation promises to be more reliable under the RWT account than under the EBM
account.
Finally, we can ask whether the extrapolator’s standards are slipping. That
this is not so is apparent from Fig. 12: the inferential requirements—establishing
correlation and mechanism—are the same in both the study and target populations.
If anything, one might one worry that the standards of evidence are higher in the
target population than in the study, since Fig. 12 includes the extra requirement of
establishing similarity of mechanism there. However, this is just an artefact of the
diagram. Similarity of mechanisms concerns the relation between the study and
target populations, not just the target population. Therefore, there is a genuine
symmetry between what is required of the study and target populations.
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That the RWT account of extrapolation overcomes the latter two problems while
the EBM approach does not, speaks in favour of the RWT approach.
⋆
Having developed the RWT-motivated theory of extrapolation, we shall now
consider some criticisms of mechanistic accounts of extrapolation in the light of
this theory.
Guala (2010, §6) suggests that there are cases of extrapolation that do not pro-
ceed via comparative process tracing. Guala develops an example involving outer
continental shelf auctions, which are used to sell oil leases in the Gulf of Mexico,
to show that it is not always necessary to determine the details of the relevant
mechanisms, as would be required by comparative process tracing. As noted above,
the RWT-motivated account sees comparative process tracing as but one of several
strategies for establishing similarity of mechanisms, and Guala’s case is perfectly
in accord with this. What is important to the RWT account is the inferential step
M
′ ≡ M: strategies for extrapolation seek to demonstrate similarity of mechanisms.
As Guala notes,
This clearly falls short of a proper articulation of the mechanism . . .
And yet, it is perfectly adequate for extrapolation purposes. Large
parts of the mechanism can be “black boxed” as long as there are
good reasons to believe that they are analogously instantiated in the
laboratory and target system.’ (Guala, 2010, p. 1080.)
One of the advantages of the RWT-motivated approach, then, is that by situating
extrapolation in the inference scheme depicted by Fig. 12 it covers much a broader
range of scenarios than comparative process tracing.
Howick et al. (2013a,b) are broadly sceptical of mechanism-based extrapolation.
They identify several problems for basing extrapolations on mechanistic evidence.
First, our understanding of mechanisms is often incomplete. This is of course true,
but insufficient knowledge of the details of M and M′ for comparative process trac-
ing does not always preclude establishing that M′ ≡ M: one can often employ the
other strategies discussed above. Second, knowledge of mechanisms is not always
applicable outside the tightly controlled laboratory conditions in which is gained.
This is also true, but it is symptomatic of science in general: whatever approach one
takes, one must make sure that one’s conclusions are robust enough to extend to
the application of interest. In particular, an EBM-motivated approach has to ensure
that conclusions based on trials with strict exclusion criteria are transportable to
the population to be treated. The third problem that they identify is that mecha-
nisms can behave ‘paradoxically’, e.g., a drug can have opposite effects in different
contexts. However, it is only by understanding the underlying mechanisms that
one can explain these paradoxical effects and improve treatment. On the other
hand, clinical studies are crucial for identifying such effects, and one advantage of
the RWT-motivated account is that it is not exclusively mechanism-based: it treats
evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanisms on a par. The fourth problem
that they pick out is the extrapolator’s circle. Their worry is that the evidence of
the target population required to establish that M′ ≡ M makes the evidence on the
study population redundant. As Fig. 12 makes clear, this need not be the case:
one can establish that M′ ≡ M in the absence of evidence from clinical studies
in the target population that would be sufficient to establish causality. Howick et
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al. might respond by noting that under the EBM-motivated account of extrapola-
tion presented above, only weak evidence of the target population is required to
establish causality in the target population. However, as discussed above, this is a
problem for the EBM-motivated account: it makes extrapolations too easy to be en-
tirely credible—it is subject to the extrapolator’s fallacy. That the RWT-motivated
theory of extrapolation is more demanding in terms of the evidence required for
extrapolation is an advantage over the EBM-motivated account.
§4
Conclusion
We have seen that the epistemological thesis RWT motivates a view of medical
methodology that stands in conflict with contemporary EBM. Although there is a
tension between RWT and EBM, I have argued that RWT can better explain three
key features of the use of clinical studies to establish causality, and that it yields a
better account of extrapolation. Thus, I conclude that EBM+ is a promising way
forward in the controversy as to how best to improve evidence based medicine.
The EBM approach to causal inference has in recent years extended well beyond
medicine, to public policy making and various areas of the social sciences, for
example. While this paper has focussed on medicine, RWT can be interpreted as
having a broader range of application, and similar conclusions to those drawn in
this paper may apply beyond medicine. The broader scope of these conclusions is
left as a question for further research.
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Abstract
I argue that biological fitness sometimes depends on imprecise probabilities. I
give a new argument that some outcomes are without objective probability, and ar-
gue that organisms encountering environments might sometimes be outcomes of
this kind. I argue that since fitness depends on relationships between traits and en-
vironments, this means that fitness can depend on imprecise probabilities, and can
be defined by an interval between maximum and minimum precise fitnesses. One
trait is fitter than another when its minimum fitness is greater than the other’s max-
imum fitness or when, in some conditions, the first trait has greater fitness in every
environment.
1 Introduction
Despite numerous connections between evolutionary biology and decision theory (e.g.
Alexander 2007; Okasha 2007; Wagner 2010; Okasha and Binmore 2012), work on deci-
sion theory with imprecise probabilities (e.g. Levi 1980; Walley 1991; Joyce 2010; Moss
2015) has had little if any impact on discussions of fitness. Drawing upon ideas from deci-
sion making with imprecise probability, I argue that concepts of biological fitness, which
have traditionally been defined in terms of probability, should be extended to allow def-
inition in terms of imprecise probabilities. I explore the resulting notions of what I call
1
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“imprecise fitness”, focusing especially on the possibility of cases in which environments
vary in ways that can’t be captured by objective probability. Using using a new argument
that some outcomes are without objective probability, I argue that such cases of erratic
environmental variation plausibly exist. One trait is then fitter than another if the least
fitness of the first is larger than the greatest fitness of the other’s, or if the weaker relation
of being fitter in every environment holds between them in certain situations.
In section 2 I introduce the idea of imprecise probability. Section 3 argues that some
outcomes occur erratically, i.e. according to no objective probability. This argument,
which is not specific to evolutionary contexts, suggests a more general role for objec-
tive imprecise probability than has previously been proposed. Section 4 introduces ideas
about fitness and environmental variation that I use as a starting point for arguments in
section 5 that some fitnesses are imprecise. This section also discusses senses in which one
trait can be fitter than another when their fitnesses are imprecise. Section 6 summarizes
my conclusions and remarks on their relationship to work on imprecise decision theory.
2 Imprecise probability
A probability measure assigns precise, real-valued probabilities to a set of outcomes. By
contrast, an imprecise probability function associates a set of probability measures with
a set of outcomes. For each each outcome, there is then a set of real-valued probabilities.
Imprecise probabilities are usually discussed as an extension of Bayesian credence (e.g.
Walley 1991; Joyce 2010; Troffaes and de Cooman 2014; Moss 2015; Schoenfield 2012;
Bradley 2015b; Bradley and Steele 2016). For example, we might think of a particular
person’s degree of belief that P as interval valued—representable by a pair of numbers,
rather rather than a single number—where the two numbers are the minimum and maxi-
mum values assigned by those probability measures that represent the person’s system of
beliefs. Some authors have also argued that conceptions of objective imprecise probabil-
2
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ity may be useful. For example, Dardashti et al. (2014) argued that Best System chances
(Lewis, 1994) may be imprecise, because it might not be determinate which system of
laws best trades off simplicity, strength, and fit. Hajék and Smithson (2012) argued that
the existence of real-world cases like one described in (Papamarcou and Fine, 1986) might
mean that Best System chances should be imprecise.
Terrence Fine and his collaborators have argued that imprecise probabilities may
sometimes be features of the world (e.g. Walley and Fine 1982; Papamarcou and Fine 1986;
Fierens et al. 2009; Fierens 2009). This view does not depend on Best System considera-
tions, but starts from the idea that some objective probabilities are long-run frequencies,
generalizing it to sequences in which frequencies don’t tend toward a limit. For example,
Fierens et al. (2009) explored the idea that in some cases there is a process that determines,
for each trial in a long but finite sequence, which of several objective probability distribu-
tions applies to the outcome of that trial. This process then defines imprecise probabilities
if the probability-choosing process is such that the sequence of probability distributions
has an intermediate level of Kolmogorov complexity.1 Note that the per-trial probabili-
ties must be objective, and Fierens et al. (2009) suggest that they are propensities, but the
framework is consistent with other ways of defining objective probabilities.
1If the Kolmogorov complexity is high, there’s a probability distribution P that governs which individ-
ual probability distribution Pk is chosen for each trial (e.g. Li and Vitányi 2008, chapter 2). An outcome
then has a precise probability that is a P-weighted average of trial probabilities Pk for the outcome. If the
Kolmogorov complexity is low, the process that determines per-trial probabilities Pk is very simple—for
example, alternating between two distributions every 10 trials—so it makes more sense to say that we have
an alternation of (precise) probability distributions. Imprecise probabilities arise when the alternation of
probability distributions on trials is neither as regular as the latter kind of case nor as systematically random
as the former.
3
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3 Objectively erratic outcomes
Any objective probability2 is a probability of an outcome—of a set of occurrences (token
events), of the realization of a type by an occurrence, or of a proposition—in a space of
alternatives. Even the probability that this coin on this toss will trace exactly this path
and land heads in this location is a probability of a type, for it’s multiply realizable. Now
consider mutually exclusive occurrences e1 and e2 (e.g. a particular dollar coin being at po-
sition p1 on a table at time t , or instead being at position p2 at t ). If these two occurrences
have objective probabilities, they do so “under some description”. It is as realizations of
properties that e1 and e2 have objective probabilities. Must there be objective probabili-
ties of the coin being at position p1 on the table or being at position p2 on the table? I don’t
see why there must be. Suppose there were probabilities of the coin being given to one of
two children, Araceli and Billy, in either the pile of gifts for Araceli (which may happen
to be at p1) or the pile for Billy (which may be at p2). Must there also be a probability
that the piles are in particular places? That all coins in Araceli’s pile are free of nicks on
their edges? That at t the coin is within a mile of someone who is over seven feet tall?
Why should all possible properties of the coin have probabilities? Even if it were true
that every occurrence has a probability as a realizer of some property, this doesn’t imply
that every algebra over a set of possible, mutually exclusive occurrences defines a space of
outcomes with objective probabilities. Even in a deterministic world, where any token
event that occurs had to occur, whether that occurrence has a probability is relative to a
set of possible properties.3
I conclude that some outcomes have no probabilities. We can refer these outcomes as
2I mean probabilities that in some sense cause and can be used to manipulate frequencies, as in (Abrams,
2015).
3Outcomes realized only by effects of deterministic processes may have objective probabilities other
than 0 and 1—for example “Spielraum probabilities” (Beisbart, online January 2016; Rosenthal, 2012;
Strevens, 2011; Abrams, 2012).
4
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occurring erratically (Hájek and Smithson, 2012), or with erraticity. This doesn’t mean
that token events realizing erratically determined outcomes happen for no reason. They
are caused, either deterministically, or indeterministically in the way that quantum me-
chanical events are thought to occur. Erratically occurring outcomes have relative fre-
quencies in practice, but there is no predictability to their frequencies except in the sense
that particular occurrences that realize the outcomes may be predictable. Another set of
occurrences that realize outcomes in the same space may have radically different frequen-
cies, even if they are produced in a similar way.
4 Fitness and environmental variation
A primary theoretical role of fitness is in defining natural selection. Natural selection
involves, a the very least, (possibly null) changes in relative frequencies of phenotypic
traits, genotypes, or alleles present in a population over time; fitness differences play
a crucial role in this process, explaining and potentially predicting such changes. Any
attempt to make sense of the theoretical role of fitness must provide some account of the
fitnesses of traits—in particular, heritable traits, since it’s only those whose frequencies
natural selection can affect over many generations (cf. Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith
2009). Though many authors define a notion of fitness that has a value for each actual
token organism (e.g. Mills and Beatty 1979; Brandon 1990; Pence and Ramsey 2013), it
will be fruitful to focus on trait fitnesses.
Most conceptions of fitness assume, at least tacitly, that there are probabilities of bio-
logical outcomes such as having certain numbers of offspring. The idea that trait fitness is
an average number of offspring for actual or possible organisms with the trait is common
in evolutionary biology (e.g. Stearns 1992), but it’s become clear that defining fitness as
probability-weighted expected number of offspring is not always appropriate (Gillespie,
1977; Levins, 1968; Beatty and Finsen, 1989; Brandon, 1990; Sober, 2001; Abrams, 2009a).
5
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Nevertheless, I’ll restrict my discussion to fitness as expectation. In some cases, we can
simply generalize a definition of fitness as expected number of offspring to expected num-
bers of descendants at some particular later generation.
Fitness is always relative to an environment: Were a population of organisms placed
in a different environment (a cold rather than warm one, for example), the relative fit-
nesses of traits might differ. It’s common to extend this idea to smaller “environments”
(habitats, patches, subenvironments) within an overall environment. These variant envi-
ronments may be arranged spatially within the overall environment, or they may occur
at different times, or both. Consider an example like Abrams’ (2009b) or Walsh’s (2013):
In a population of animals, one trait, deep, leads its bearers to dig deep burrows, while
the other, shallow, leads its bearers to dig shallow burrows. The deep trait makes drown-
ing more likely during periods of torrential rain, but it is better than shallow during hot,
dry periods because cool burrows are advantageous. Suppose that the fitness of deep is 1
during rainy (“wet”) periods and 2 during dry periods, while the fitness of shallow is 2
during wet periods and 1 when it is dry. Which trait is fitter? Which will natural selec-
tion most likely favor? If the wet environment is more probable, then shallow is fitter,
and vice versa if the dry environment is more probable. Overall fitness w can be defined
relative to the overall environment, which is defined, in part, by the probabilities of the
wet and dry environments. For example, if w(d )wet is the fitness of deep in the wet envi-
ronments, and w(d )dry is the fitness of deep in dry environments, then the overall fitness
of deep might4 be w(d )wet×P(wet)+ w(d )dry×P(dry).
(Given a set of mutually exclusive, competing heritable traits, we can view other di-
mensions of trait variation as defining “environments”. For example, an allele—a gene—at
a genetic locus on a chromosome is a kind of minimal heritable trait, and it may be copied
more or less often into “environments” consisting alleles at other loci within the genome.
More generally, we can view heritable phenotypic traits as environmental contexts for
4See (Levins, 1968; Abrams, 2014).
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other heritable traits when they may be present in the same organisms.)
5 Imprecise fitness
Imprecise fitness It’s often assumed that that there are determinate probabilities of en-
vironmental fluctuations, or of organisms finding themselves in different environments
(e.g. Levins 1968; Brandon 1990; Gillespie 1998; Ramsey 2006; Abrams 2009b), but this
assumption doesn’t seem required. There may be some cases in which some environ-
mental changes that affect evolutionary success obey no probabilities: Though in some
particular period of time, organisms would encounter some environments more often
than others, there would be no reason for this pattern, or any pattern, to be likely to
continue over many generations.5
I believe that empirical research in evolutionary biology shows that statistical meth-
ods and modeling in terms of probabilities concerning evolutionary outcomes have been
enormously useful. This extends to models of environmental variation (e.g. Giacomini
and Shuter 2013), suggesting that there are in fact objective probabilities that organisms
with given traits encounter particular environmental states (Abrams, 2015). However,
successful use of probability in such methods needn’t imply that all evolutionary pro-
cesses are governed only by objective precise probabilities. Even successful probabilistic
models may owe their success to objective imprecise probabilities that are easily approx-
imated with precise probabilities in models.
When there are no probabilities that organisms will encounter particular environ-
ments, can we ever say that one trait is fitter than another? Yes. For example, if the ex-
pected numbers of offspring for deep in both wet and dry is greater than that of shallow in
5Nevertheless these environments ei might consist of smaller or more narrowly defined, mutually exclu-
sive environments ei j , where part of what defines ei are conditional probabilities P(ei j |ei ) of its component
environments ei j occurring. The precise fitness of a trait in ei can then be defined like overall fitness, but
using probabilities conditional on ei .
7
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either environment, then whatever the frequency with which wet and dry alternate, deep
will have a higher average number of offspring. Suppose, for example, that the expected
numbers of offspring for deep are 1.5 and 1.7 in wet and dry environments, respectively,
and the corresponding numbers for shallow are 1.2 and 0.9. Even if the environment is,
as it happens, erratically, always in the wet state—the one that gives shallow its higher
expected number of offspring—deep should usually have a greater number of offspring
on average than shallow.
Such cases can be represented by treating fitness of a trait A as a pair of numbers repre-
senting the minimum w(A) and maximum w(A) precise fitnesses that the trait has in the
environments that organisms erratically encounter. Here w and w are lower prevision and
upper prevision operators, respectively; these are generalizations of expectation for impre-
cise probability (Walley, 1991; Troffaes and de Cooman, 2014; Augustin et al., 2014).6 I’ll
refer to such a pair a minimum and maximum fitnesses—the values of particular lower
prevision and upper prevision operators applied to a trait—as a “fitness interval”, repre-
sented by the notation [l , h], where l and h are lower and upper previsions, respectively,
for the trait. In the wet/dry example, it’s reasonable to call the pair of fitness values for a
trait a fitness “interval”, since what happens in the world will involve some combination
of the two environmental states. If organisms in the population always found themselves
in just one of the two environments, then the expected number of offspring for the trait
would be either l or h. Otherwise, the result would be a weighted average of l and h, but
this average would depend on what environments were actually encountered (erratically)
by organisms in the population. More generally, for more than two erratically deter-
mined environmental states generating different fitness values, the fitness of the trait is
6So defined, the w and w functions are coherent lower and upper previsions, by the lower envelope
theorem (Troffaes and de Cooman, 2014, Theorem 4.38, p. 71). To say that lower and upper previsions are
coherent means that that they satisfy certain constraints involving linear combinations of gambles (paid
off in numbers of offspring, here) and lower or upper previsions of those gambles (Walley, 1991; Troffaes
and de Cooman, 2014; Augustin et al., 2014).
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still captured by the interval between its minimum and maximum precise fitnesses across
all of the environments that are possible in the overall environment.
Interval dominance The example above in which the fitness of deep is [1.5,1.7] and
that of shallow is [0.9,1.2] illustrates a general claim that can expressed in terms of the
interval dominance relation, ⊐ (Troffaes, 2007; Huntley et al., 2014; Bradley, 2015a):7
A1 ⊐A2 iff w(A1)> w(A2).
That is, A1 ⊐ A2 iff A1’s minimum fitness is greater than A2’s maximum fitness (across
all environments). We can also say that A1’s lower fitness w(A1) is greater than A2’s upper
fitness w(A2). This gives us a partial ordering of traits:
A1 is fitter than A2 if A1 ⊐A2.
A1 is fittest if A1 ⊐Aj for all competing traits Aj .
This is a partial order because it may be that neither A1 or A2 is fitter than the other in
this sense, because the two traits’ fitness intervals overlap, i.e. when w(A1) ≤ w(A2) and
w(A2)≤ w(A1).
Dominance across population-wide environments There is at least one kind of case
in which a trait can be considered fitter than another though they have overlapping fitness
intervals. Suppose that trait A1 dominates trait A2 in the sense that in every environment
e , the precise fitness we(A1) of A1 relative to that environment is greater the correspond-
ing precise fitness we(A2) for A2 (cf. Bradley 2015a). It’s then probable that the instances
of trait A1 will have a higher average number of offspring than instances of A2 if the
environmental variation is such that all members of the population experience the same
environment at any given time, as in the case of population-wide temporal variation in
environments. More precisely, there must be generations that don’t overlap, as when
7The interval dominance relation is used in (Troffaes, 2007; Huntley et al., 2014) to define a somewhat
different rule for choosing gambles, also called “interval dominance”.
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organisms lay eggs and then die (although this needn’t happen in every generation). The
idea is that environments can change erratically only between two non-overlapping gen-
erations. In such cases say that A1 dominates A2 across population-wide environments.
For other kinds of environmental variation, that A1 dominates A2 in every environ-
ment need not imply that A1 will probably increase in frequency. For example, suppose
that the environment of A1 and A2 is composed of two spatially varying environments
e1 and e2, and that whether a given organism ends up in one environment or the other is
merely erratic. (The organisms might be plants whose seeds are distributed by the wind
to soil patches of two kinds, if those aspects of the wind that affect seed distribution are
erratic.) Assume that A1 has precise fitness we1(A1) = 1.5 in environment e1, and fitness
we2
(A1) = 2.5 in environment e2, while corresponding fitnesses for A2 are we1(A2) = 1 and
we1
(A2) = 2. Thus A1 dominates A2 in every environment. However, since it’s erratic
which tokens of A1 or A2 are to be found in either environment, it may turn out that
most of the A2’s end up in e2 where they have a fitness of 2, while most of the A1’s end up
in e1, where their fitness is 1.5. Given that actual distribution of A1’s and A2’s it would
be probable that A2 would increase in frequency even though A1 dominates A2 (but that
distribution is neither probable nor improbable).
Summarizing the preceding points:
If environments e vary erratically in such a way that any time, the entire pop-
ulation experiences the same environment, then:
A1 is fitter than A2 if (∀e)we(A1)> we(A2).
A1 is fittest if (∀e)we(A1)> we(Aj ) for all competing traits Aj .8
(If we change the strict strict inequality to ≥, we can replace “fitter” and “fittest” with “is
at least as fit as” and “is among the fittest”, respectively. An analogous generalization of
interval dominance is not so straightforward.)
8Cf. (Brandon, 1990, chapter 2) and (Abrams, 2014) on “selective environments”, Joyce’s (2010) choice
function 4I, and Rinard’s (2015) Moderate choice function.
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Fitter than Note that if A1 interval dominates A2, then A1 also dominates A2 in every
environment, since A1 ⊐A2 means that the lowest precise fitness of A1 in any environment
is greater than the highest fitness of A2 in any environment. Thus we can summarize the
two kinds of fitness relation above as follows:
A1 is fitter than A2 if and only if either A1 ⊐ A2, or all organisms experience
the same environment e at the same time and (∀e)we(A1)> we(A2).
This generalizes traditional meaning of “fitter than” for fitnesses that are expected num-
bers of offspring. Note that it may be that there is a set A of traits Ai such that each Ai
is fitter than all traits not in in A , but that no trait in A is fitter than any other in A .
If A1 is not fitter than A2 in either of the preceding senses, it would be misleading
to say that they are equal in imprecise fitness, since that would suggests that the traits’
evolutionary successes would usually be similar, at least in the short run, when there are
many organisms with those traits. It’s better to say that when neither A1 nor A2 is (im-
precisely) fitter than the other, the two traits are incomparable, or that it’s indeterminate
(cf. Rinard 2015) which is fitter.
E-admissibility It’s not clear that anything more can be said about fitness inequalities
for imprecise fitness. For example, consider this adaptation to fitness of Levi’s (1980)
E-admissibility rule for choosing gambles:9
The fittest traits are those Ai for which there’s some environment in which
Ai ’s precise fitness is a least as great as that of any trait Aj .
If organisms with such a trait Ai and those without such a trait both encounter an environ-
ment in which Ai ’s precise fitness is greater, it’s likely that those with Ai will have more
offspring, on average, than the others. The problem is that if the environments encoun-
9The decision theoretic rule requires that acceptable gambles must have the highest expected value
according to at least one of the decision maker’s credence distributions (Levi, 1980; Huntley et al., 2014).
Moss (2015) calls this rule “permissive”; White (2009) and Rinard (2015) call it “Liberal”.
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tered by organisms are determined erratically, there’s no reason that organisms of both
kinds would encounter such an environment often—or ever. Thus the E-admissibility of
traits provides no information about evolutionary success.
6 Conclusion
I argued that some outcomes are determined erratically, i.e. according to no objective
probabilities, and that it’s plausible that some environmental variation is erratic. (More
generally, there may be reasons other than erratic environmental variation that proba-
bility distributions relevant to evolutionary success are erratically determined.) Where
environmental variation is erratic, fitnesses can be understood as intervals between a lower
fitness—the minimum precise fitness over all erratically-determined environments—and
an upper fitness—the corresponding maximum. We can say then that a trait A1 is fitter
than another trait A2 when A1 is interval dominant over A2—when A1’s lower fitness is
greater than A2’s upper fitness—or when organisms in the same generation are always
subject to the same environment, and A1’s precise fitness is greater than A2’s in every en-
vironment. In other cases, it appears that fitness intervals are incomparable; they neither
predict nor explain A1 or A2’s ultimate success.
It may be that some lack of fit between models and evolutionary processes is due to
objective imprecise probabilities. Nevertheless, if fitness intervals are often narrow, it
would be useful to model natural selection in terms of probabilities and precise fitnesses.
Analogies between my conclusions and well known positions on decision making
with imprecise probabilities are not as close as one might have expected. However, there
are disanalogies between evolution and decision making. Individual decision making has
no parallel to organisms being simultaneously subject to different erratically determined
probability distributions. Moreover, though rules for permissible actions look like rules
12
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for determining fittest traits, one always must be able to choose some action,10 while there
need not be any fittest traits. Finally, while there are clear standards for evolutionary suc-
cess in some contexts, part of what is under contention in imprecise decision theory is the
standard by which to evaluate rules for choosing gambles—and perhaps what rationality
itself consists in.
The work presented in this paper is, I hope, a starting point for further developments.
Among other things, my arguments should be generalized for fitnesses that can’t easily
be represented as expectations.
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Abstract 
In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics 
concerning the nature of the wave-function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding 
the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging 
when focusing on the wave-function. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-
function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the 
primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I 
argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called 
ȁexplanationismȂ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction 
argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) 
contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-
meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the 
primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the 
pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.  
  
1. Introduction  
Scientific realism would be a commonsensical philosophical position if there werenȂt 
powerful counter-arguments to it, the most famous of which is the pessimistic meta-
induction (PMI) argument: since past successful theories turned out to be false, it is 
unwarranted to believe that our current theories are true simply because they are 
successful [Laudan 1981]. Some scientific realists have responded to the PMI argument 
by restricting realism to a subset of the theoretical entities of the theory. One particular 
way of doing this is explanationism realism (ER), according to which one should be 
realist with respect to the working posits of the theory, namely the ones involved in 
explanations and predictions and that are preserved in theory change. In contrast, one 
does not need to commit herself to believe in the existence of other presuppositional 
posits that theory makes, since they are somewhat ȁidleȂ components [Kitcher 1993], 
[Psillos 1999].   
The proponents of this version of restricted (or localized, or selective, or 
preservative) realism focus on examples like FresnelȂs theory of light that postulated the 
existence of ether, and argue that ether hasnȂt played a crucial role in the success of the 
theory, and did not carry over to MaxwellȂs electrodynamics. Because of this, the realist 
should commit to the existence of electromagnetic waves but not to the existence of 
ether. Similar arguments have been put forward for phlogiston and caloric. I think that 
analyzing these ȁclassicalȂ examples is important and interesting; nonetheless, the case 
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for ER is fundamentally incomplete if one does not show that also in the theory change 
from classical to quantum mechanics the working posits of classical mechanics are 
preserved in quantum theory, and that they play an essential role in the predictions and 
explanations of both theories. In this paper, I argue that ER can be extended to the 
quantum framework. In order to show this, I discuss the different realist approaches to 
quantum mechanics, which fundamentally differ in the interpretation they provide of 
(what seems to be) the fundamental object of quantum mechanics, namely the wave-
function. On the one hand, according to the so-called wave-function ontology (WFO) 
approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity [Albert 1996], [Ney 2013], 
[Lewis 2004]. In contrast, according to the primitive ontology (PO) approach [Allori et 
al. 2008], [Allori 2013], the wave-function does not represent physical objects. I argue 
that the PO approach can naturally provide what ER needs to defeat the PMI argument 
when applied to the transition from classical to quantum physics. In fact the PO can be 
identified with the working posits of the theories, and as such: (1) it is primarily 
responsible for the success of both classical and quantum mechanics, and (2) the PO is 
(suitably) preserved in the classical-to-quantum transition. Therefore, the realist should 
commit to the existence of the PO, while she can be ȁneutralȂ with respect to the other 
theoretical components of both theories. In this way, the PO approach provides an 
interesting framework for the scientific realist, given that it allows ER to naturally 
extend to the quantum domain.  
To conclude, I wish to underline that ER so understood provides an argument in 
favor of the PO approach when compared to the WFO approach: in virtue of being 
preserved in theory change and playing a crucial role in the success of the old and the 
new theory, the PO does not fall prey of the PMI argument. In contrast, if one insists, 
like a proponent to the WFO approach would, that the wave-function represents 
physical objects, then it is hard to see how the working posits can be the same in both 
theories, given that the wave-function does not have any classical analog. Because of 
this, the wave-function ontologist seems to be in trouble: if the ontology of quantum 
mechanics is fundamentally different from the one of quantum theory, how can we 
respond to the PMI argument? Other options could be available to the proponent of the 
WFO approach, like for instance structural realism, but surely not ER, which is available 
only to the primitive ontologist.  
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, there is an overview of the 
PMI argument and of the replies to it in terms of restriction of realism, with a particular 
emphasis to ER. Then in Section 3, the discussion focuses on the necessity of extending 
ER to the quantum domain. The PO approach is presented and succinctly discussed, in 
Section 4, underlining how the PO is preserved through theory change and how it is 
fundamentally responsible for the empirical and theoretical success of the theory. The 
last section discusses the advantage of the PO approach over the WFO approach in 
responding to the PMI argument: while the primitive ontologist can use an 
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explanationist realist strategy, the wave-function ontologist will have to find something 
else.  
2. The Pessimistic Meta Induction and Explanationism Realism  
Scientific realism is, roughly put, the view that scientific theories give us a (nearly) 
truthful description of the world. So, scientific theories discuss the behavior of a 
number of unobservable entities (e.g. electrons), and the scientific realist claims that we 
have good reasons to consider these entities as truly existing. The main argument for 
scientific realism, the no-miracle argument (NMA), can be summarized as follows: 
ȃrealism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracleȄ 
[Putnam 1975: 73]. That is, the empirical success of a theory can and should be taken as 
evidence of its truth. Nonetheless, there are very powerful arguments against scientific 
realism, one of them being LaudanȂs PMI argument. The main idea is that it is not the 
case that, against the NMA, the empirical success of a theory is a reliable indicator of its 
truth. Here is a way to spell the argument out, as a proof by contradiction:  
Premise 1: Empirical success is a reliable indicator of truth (reductio assumption); 
Premise 2: Our most current theory is true;  
Premise 3: Most past successful theories are false;  
Conclusion: Therefore, empirical success is not an indicator of truth. 
More succinctly: our current theories, even if successful, are more likely to be false than 
true since many past theories were successful but false. 
One way to respond to the PMI challenge is to restrict realism, and argue that one 
should be realist about a restricted set of entities, not about the whole theory. This is 
what Psillos calls a divide et impera strategyǱ scientific realists may argue that ȃwhen a 
theory is abandoned, its theoretical constituents, i.e. the theoretical mechanisms and 
laws posited, should not be rejected en bloc. Some of those theoretical constituents are 
inconsistent with what we now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not 
all are. Some of them have been retained as essential constituents of subsequent 
theoriesȄ [Psillos ŗşşŗǱ ŗŖŞ]. So, if one can show that the entities that are retained in 
moving from one theory to the next are the ones that are responsible for the empirical 
success of the theory, the PMI argument is blocked. In fact, this argument works only if 
one assumes that past theories are false in their entirety, even if they were successful, so 
that their success has to come from something else other than their truth. By restricting 
realism, instead, one provides an alternative explanation for the success of past false 
successful theories:  past theories were successful not because they were 
(approximately) true in their entirety, but because some parts of them were. And these 
true constituents of past theories are responsible for the theoriesȂ success and they are 
carried over in theory change. Because of this, we are justified in believing that the 
entities these theoretical constituents represent really exist.  
There are various ways to restrict realism, namely, there are different ways to resist 
the PMI by limiting the number or the kind of entities in the theory the realist should be 
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taking ȁontologically seriously.Ȃ  One such example is WorrallȂs structural realism (SR) 
[Worrall 1989]. According to this view, what is preserved in theory change is the 
mathematical structure of the theory, rather than the theoretical content of the theory: 
the PMI is correct in saying that we often have discontinuity in theory change at the 
level of unobservable entities, but most of the mathematical content of the old theory 
carries over to the new one. Because of this, the scientific realist may not be justified in 
believing what the theory says about the nature of physical objects, nonetheless she is 
justified in believing that the structure that holds between these objects which is 
preserved in theory change is (approximately) true. There are different varieties of SR, 
but a first rough distinction is the one between epistemic SR and ontic SR. In the 
epistemic version, which some attribute to Worrall himself, the claim is that we do not 
have justification for believing that objects have the nature our theories suggest they 
have, but we are only justified in believing that these objects stand in certain structural 
relations with one another. Ontic SR instead goes further and claims that the very 
notion of objects is problematic and is worth dismissing [French 1998], [Ladyman 1998].  
There are other responses to the PMI argument1, but in this paper I will focus on 
ER, developed most prominently by [Psillos 1999] and [Kitcher 1993]. They distinguish 
between ȁworkingȂ and ȁpresuppositionalȂ posits ǻor ȁidle wheelsȂǼ of a theory, and 
argue that one should be realist about the working posits but not the presuppositional 
posits, and this is because these posits are not involved in the success of the theory. In 
fact, if one analyzes the mechanism of empirical success of past theories one will see, 
they argue, that only certain entities are involved, namely the working posits. The 
theory postulates the existence of other entities too, for a variety of reasons, but these 
entities are never used to derive predictions or to provide explanations in the 
framework of the theory. If the working posits are preserved during theory change, 
while the presuppositional posits are not, the argument goes, one is justified in 
believing in the working posits of a theory exist. The other theoretical constituents, the 
presuppositional posits, are ȁidleȂ components, which make no difference to the theoryȂs 
success and thus the realist has no need to commit to.  
In this way one can resist to the PMI argument: past theories were successful 
because they got something right, namely the working posits, but they are also false 
when considered in their entirety because they got something wrong too, namely the 
presuppositional posits. 
                                                          
1 Most notably, another restriction of realism is entity realism [Hacking 1982], according to which 
realist commitments should be limited to unobservable entities that could be causally manipulated. In 
addition semirealism [Chakravartty 2007], which in certain respects is in-between structuralism and 
entity realism, recommends realism with respect of the so-called detection properties, namely the 
properties in the theory which are tied to our perceptual and causal experiences, and not to auxiliary 
properties, which are not essential in establishing existence claims. Therefore, one should restrict realism 
to the detection properties.  
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3. The Classical-to-Quantum Theory Change as a Problem for Explanationsim 
Realism  
Scientific realism has been motivated and discussed almost exclusively discussing 
theories other than quantum mechanics. In particular, Psillos and Kitcher argue for ER 
discussing that FresnelȂs theory of light was successful because it got the working posit 
right, namely the electromagnetic waves: they are responsible for the success of the 
theory, and they were preserved by MaxwellȂs electrodynamics. In contrast, ether was a 
presuppositional posit: the success of FresnelȂs theory did not depend on it, and it was 
abandoned by the subsequent theory. Realists are therefore justified in believing that 
electromagnetic waves exist, but do not have to be committed to believe that ether exists 
too. Another example extensively discussed in the literature is the caloric theory of heat, 
or phlogistonȂs theory of combustion, to again arrive to the conclusion that caloric and 
phlogiston are presuppositional posits. In reply, these historical examples have been 
revisited with the intent of arguing that ether, caloric, phlogiston, and the like, 
contrarily to what it is maintained by ER, played an important role in the success of past 
theories (see, e.g. [Elsamahi 2005], [Chang 2003]).  
Regardless of what the outcome of the debate over these examples is, it seems to 
me that the main threat to ER comes from the transition from classical to quantum 
theories. The fact that the discussion was limited to ȁclassicalȂ theories is, in a sense, not 
surprising: quantum mechanics has been considered, for a long time, incompatible with 
realism: while, on the one hand, quantum theory is incredibly powerful in making new 
and very precise predictions, on the other hand it is extremely difficult to understand 
what image of the world it provides us. Indeed, quantum mechanics has been taken by 
many to suggest that physical objects have contradictory properties, like being in a 
place and not being in that place at the same time, or that properties do not exist at all 
independently of observation. Given that, many have thought that the real lesson of 
quantum mechanics is that the dream of the scientific realist is impossible: the theory is 
extremely successful, but it seems impossible to explain this success in terms of the 
theory being (approximately) true, unless one is willing to give up, say, classical logic or 
the like to account for the existence of objects with contradictory properties. Luckily, the 
situation has changed: today we have various proposal of quantum theories that allow 
for a realist reading. Among these theories, most famously we find Bohmian and 
Everettian mechanics (BM and EM respectively), and the GRW theory (GRW): they are 
empirically adequate fundamental physical theories according to which there is an 
objective physical world, which can be described by non-contradictory, mind-
independent properties.  
The problem for ER is that even assuming that one could be a realist with respect to 
quantum mechanics, quite strikingly, when examples from quantum mechanics are 
discussed, they are brought up to motivate ontic SR rather than ER: ȃwe have learned 
from contemporary physics is that the nature of space, time and matter are not 
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compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontological relationship 
between individuals, intrinsic properties and relationsȄ [Ladyman ŘŖŗŚ]. In addition, 
and presumably more importantly, it does not seem obviously the case, as an 
explanationist realist would have to maintain, that some theoretical entities of past 
theories are carried over to quantum mechanics, and they are the ones responsible for 
quantum mechanicsȂ enormous success. Indeed, exactly the opposite seems to be true: 
in quantum mechanics we have the Schrödinger equation, which is the evolution 
equation of the wave-function, an object which is involved in the derivation of most, if 
not all, predictions and explanations the theory is able to provide, and which arguably 
does not have any classical analog. If so, ER seems to be doomed: not only the wave-
function is something new to classical mechanics, but it seems to be the fundamental 
object that drives quantum mechanics in all its explanations and predictions. We have 
radical discontinuity and therefore the PMI argument has not been blocked. 
In light of all this, I think that case for ER has no hope of being compelling if does 
not cover quantum mechanics. In the next section I show how ER can be extended to 
quantum theories if paired with a particular view about the metaphysics of quantum 
mechanics, namely the PO approach.  
4. Primitive Ontology and Explanationism Realism  
Most philosophers of physics recognize the legitimacy of BM, EM and GRW, but 
disagree about the metaphysical pictures these theories actually provide. In this section, 
I wish to show how the PO theories provide examples of quantum theories with the 
same (or suitably similar) working posits as classical mechanics. That is, the claims are 
going to be that: (1) the PO is the primary responsible of the theoryȂs successǲ and ǻŘǼ the 
PO (suitably) carries over during theory change. If so, assuming that a strategy like ER 
is successful in defending scientific realism, the PMI argument is blocked: the realist is 
justified in believing that the PO is real because it does all the work to explain empirical 
success of theories and it is preserved in theory change.  
Here is a brief summary of the PO account [Allori et al. 2008].  In quantum theories 
understood within the PO framework, there are two fundamental ingredients that are 
supposed to represent, respectively, what matter is, and how matter behaves. Matter is 
represented by entities in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional space-time), 
which are the PO of the theory. Examples of possible primitive ontologies include 
point-particles, continuous fields, and spatio-temporal events (flashes).  Quantum 
theories with different primitive ontologies are discussed and analyzed by the 
proponents of the PO approach in different papers, and some examples are worth 
mentioning: BM is a theory with a particle PO, GRWm is a theory in which matter is 
described by a continuous (three-dimensional) matter field localized where the 
macroscopic objects are, while GRWf is a theory of flashes, namely discrete spatio-
temporal events. How matter behaves is explicated in terms of the law of evolution of 
the PO, which in turn is implemented by the so-called ȁnomologicalȂ variables, most 
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importantly by the wave function. Therefore, even if the wave-function evolves in time 
(according to either the Schrödinger equation or some variant of it), it never represent 
matter. One cannot dispense of the wave function from quantum theories2 but that does 
not mean, according to the proponents of this approach, that we should think the wave-
function represents material objects. Rather, it is a necessary ingredient to implement 
the law of temporal evolution of the PO [Allori 2013]. To continue with the examples 
mentioned above, we have that in BM the wave-function evolves according to the 
Schrödinger equation, while in GRWf and GRWm it evolves according to Schrödinger 
equation and then randomly collapses, following the so-called GRW evolution.  
Here are some fundamental features of the PO approach that is crucial to articulate:  
(1)  [REDUCTIONISM wrt PO] The motivation of the PO approach is to account for 
the existence of macroscopic objects, which are thought to be fundamentally 
composed of the microscopic entities the PO specifies. As such, the PO approach 
is reductionist, at least to the extent that it allows to make sense of claims like 
the PO being ȃthe building blocks of everything else,Ȅ and of the idea that 
macroscopic regularities are obtained entirely from the microscopic trajectories 
of the PO.  
(2) [EXPLANATION and PO] The PO explains the macroscopic regularities using 
reductionist approaches similar to those used in classical mechanics. In fact, in 
classical mechanics, macroscopic bodies are made of a collection of particles, and 
their properties are accounted for in terms of the interaction of these particles 
among each other and the particles of the environment. For instance, the 
transparency of a pair of glasses is explained in terms of the electromagnetic 
forces acting between the particles composing the glasses, which are such that 
incoming light rays will pass through them. Similarly, the PO grounds the 
explanatory schema of quantum theories: macroscopic objects are made of 
entities described by the PO, and their properties are in principle accounted for 
in terms of the POȂs behavior ǻsee [“llori ŘŖŗř]Ǽ. 
(3) [THEOREITICAL VIRTUES] What variable is the PO of a theory is postulated, 
rather than inferred from the formalism. One PO is chosen over another on the 
basis of some super-empirical virtues such as simplicity, explanatory power, 
and unification: the PO that provides the simplest, most unifying explanation 
should be selected (see [Allori 2015]). Because macroscopic regularities are 
accounted for in terms of PO and because the role of the wave-function is to 
implement the law for the PO, the nature of the PO ǻparticles, field, flashes,…Ǽ is 
not necessarily connected to the law of evolution of the wave-function 
ǻSchrödinger, GRW…ǼǱ for instance in ”M the PO of particles is connected with 
                                                          
2 To be precise, some attempts have been made to eliminate the wave-function entirely from quantum 
theories (see e.g. [Dowker Herbauts 2005] and [Norsen 2010]). 
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a Schrödinger evolving wave-function, but one can imagine a theory of particles 
with a GRW-evolving wave-function, (see [Allori et al 2014] for more examples).  
(4) [UNDERDETERMINATION of PSI] The way the wave-function evolves in time 
is irrelevant as long as the law of the PO such wave-function defines remains the 
same: a theory of particles which follow certain trajectories, like BM, can be 
obtained by a Schrödinger-evolving wave-function, like in the usual 
formulation, but also in terms of a collapsed wave-function (see [Allori et al 
2008] for details).  Two theories with the same trajectories for the PO, regardless 
of how they have been obtained (i.e., via a Schrödinger evolving wave-function 
or not) are called physically equivalent. Since different wave-functions can give 
rise to the same trajectories for the PO, and since the trajectories of the PO are 
the ones that account for the macroscopic regularities, the wave-function 
evolution is underdetermined by the data.  
(5) [PREDICTIONS] Once the PO and its law of evolution have been chosen, 
everything else is determined, including the empirical predictions which are 
determined as a function of the PO. The wave-function appears into the 
derivation of the predictions of the theory, but its role is not essential, since as 
we just saw, the way in which it specifies the law of the PO is 
underdetermined(see [Allori et al 2014] for more on this point).   
 
Now, the idea that I wish to put forward is that there are striking similarities between 
the PO approach and ER. In particular, it seems to me that the PO can be identified with 
the working posit of quantum mechanics, while the wave-function is best seen as a 
presuppisitional posit. In fact, as we saw in (5) above, the predictions are determined by 
the PO, not by the wave-function, which does appear in the derivation, but whose 
evolution is underdetermined by data, as we saw in (4). In addition, as we saw in (2), 
explanation is in terms of the PO, and this reminds of KitcherȂs idea that working posits 
are the entities that play a fundamental role in the theoryȂs explanatory schemata. 
Moreover,   there is the explicit fundamental postulation that the PO represent matter, 
while the wave-function does not, and that everything is made of the entities the PO 
specifies, as we saw in (1). The PO approach suggests we should be realist about the PO, 
regardless of what we think the wave-function really is. In fact, all primitive ontologists 
(or supporters of suitably related views) maintain that one should be realist about the 
PO, but they have different ideas about the wave-function: it has been considered to be, 
among other things, a law-like object [Goldstein et al. 2013], a disposition [Esfeld et al. 
2014], a property [Monton 2006], or a new kind of entity [Maudlin 2013]. Nonetheless, 
one can be ȁmetaphysically neutralȂ with respect to the wave functionǱ one does not 
need to postulate the existence of the wave-function in order to account for the success 
of the theory. But this is to say that the PO is a working posit, while the wave-function 
is a presuppositional posit of quantum theories. If so, the PO approach provides a very 
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nice framework for the explanationist realist to extent her view in the quantum domain: 
one should be realist about the PO because it is the sole responsible for the theoryȂs 
success.  
However, this is not enough to successfully reply to the PMI argument: one 
would have to show that the PO is preserved during theory change. What is the PO of 
classical mechanics? The answer seems to be straightforward: according to classical 
mechanics, matter is made of particles, intended as objects with the fundamental 
property of having a position in three-dimensional space. Therefore, since we do not 
need to worry about the wave function, the preservation of PO during the classical-to-
quantum theory change is obvious for quantum theories of particles, like BM.  The 
interesting and more challenging cases are the ones that involve POs different than that, 
namely a mater density PO or a flash PO. In both cases, literally, the PO of classical 
mechanics has not carried over. The nature of the objects the theories postulate is 
fundamentally different: on the one hand in classical mechanics we have particles 
fundamentally identified by having a definite position in space and following given 
trajectories in space-time; on the other hand, we have either a continuous matter filed in 
GRWm, or a discrete set of spatio-temporal event in GRWf. Should we think this is an 
instance of radical discontinuity, and should we take this to be a reason to give up on 
ER? I believe this would be too harsh: what seems to be true is not necessarily that there 
are particles, or fields or flashes, but rather that there is ȁstuffȂ in three-dimensional 
space, and this is what matter is. When there was the theory change from the theory 
that atoms are indivisible to the theory that atoms are made of other particles which 
themselves are thought as indivisible, one could maintain that what the theory got right 
is that there are particles, but it was wrong about which the fundamental particles really 
were: we thought they were atoms, but they are neutron, protons and electrons instead. 
The situation here is slightly different, being more similar to the case in which we move 
to a theory in which the fundamental entities are particles, to a theory in which the 
fundamental entities are instead strings. What are we getting right here? Not the nature 
of the fundamental: before we had one-dimensional particles, now we have bi-
dimensional vibrating loops.  However, I think it is important to underline that if we 
ȁsquint,Ȃ then we donȂt see the fine-grained details, and we take strings to be particles. 
They are, for all explanatory purposes, particles: we need to explain the macroscopic 
regularities, and we explain them in terms of the PO ignoring the details about what 
composes it. Just like when we observe a hose from a distance and we think it is one-
dimensional while it is actually two-dimensional, or when we look at a poster in the 
subway and we think itȂs an image while instead it is a collection of colored dots. “t the 
level of microphysics we may have flashes or a continuous field, but at some 
mesoscopic level they produce trajectories as if they are produced by particles. So, even 
if the microscopic PO is not one of particles, there is a mesoscopic scale in which they 
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behave as if they are, and then from that level up to the macroscopic level, the 
explanation is the same as if they were particles.    
The obvious worry here isǱ isnȂt that just some sort of (ontic) structuralism? If we do 
not preserve the nature of ȁstuff,Ȃ isnȂt what we preserve some structural content of the 
theory? If structuralism is the view that there is just structure and no objects, then 
clearly not, since the PO approach postulates the existence of objects as a starting point.  
What about a moderate version of ontic SR, like the one proposed by [Esfeld 2004]? The 
idea behind this view is something like this: one should be realist about structure but, in 
contrast with the ȁeliminativistȂ ontic SR mentioned above, there are ȁthingsȂ that stand 
in the relation the structure prescribes, even if they have no intrinsic identities. In the 
quantum domain, such structure is the wave-function. Indeed, interestingly enough, 
[Esfeld forthcoming] proposes that in his moderate ontic SR, the relata the wave-
function relates are given by the PO: he argues that the PO approach and his moderate 
ontic SR can help each other make sense of quantum non-locality and entanglement.  
So, in his view, we should be realist about the PO, and also about the structure that 
relates the PO, provided by the wave-function.  In this sense, the reading I provide of 
the PO approach is not structural: the strength of the PO approach in responding to the 
PMI argument is that it regards the wave-function as a working posit. Only because of 
this, one can show there is continuity of PO during theory change. Instead EsfeldȂs 
moderate ontic SR does not have this advantage: if the wave function is the structure 
the realist should be committing to, then it is difficult to see where this structure was 
coming from in classical physics.   
The PO approach entails something like this: we do not get the nature of objects 
right because we believe they are particles in classical mechanics and then we discover 
they are actually, say, flashes in quantum mechanics; but we get some ȁstructureȂ right, 
namely that on some mescoscopic level they behave as if their nature were the one of 
particles. One may call it structural realism, but it does not seem to have much in 
common with the other varieties of SR we just examined. Rather, more appropriate in 
my opinion is the connection with ER: what provides the explanation, namely the PO, is 
what ȁontologically counts,Ȃ if it is preserved in theory change.   
Another interesting question is whether the PO approach can help reply to some of 
the objections that have been raised to ER, most notably the problem that it is not clear 
whether it is possible to precisely and objectively identify the working posits of a theory 
rather than doing that post hoc: the working posits are what we see have carried over 
(see, e.g. [Stanford 2003a, 2003b]). Indeed, the PO approach seems to provide an 
improvement with respect to ER: the PO is postulated when the theory is proposed, 
rather than inferred from the formalism, as the one that provides the best combination 
of simplicity, explanatory and unificatory account of the experimental data. In this way, 
what is a working posit is selected from the time the theory is proposed, and it is never 
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ȃpost hoc.Ȅ If the PO, together with the explanatory schema, is preserved during theory 
change, then there is no radical discontinuity and the PO is truly a working posits.  
5. A New Argument for the PO Approach 
To summarize the last section, I have shown how the PO approach may naturally be 
seen as an instance of ER in which one restricts realism to the PO: since the PO is carried 
over in theory change, and it is the primary responsible for the theory empirical success, 
then one is justified in believing the entities it represents really exists. As such, the PO 
approach provides the ER with a straightforward strategy to block the PMI in the 
quantum framework.  
In this section, I wish to notice that this analysis of the PO approach as an instance 
of ER also provides the PO approach with an important advantage over the alternative 
WFO approach. According to this view, the wave-function is a concrete physical field 
and should be regarded as representing matter. If we analyze this view in terms of ER, 
therefore, the wave-function has to be a working posit of quantum theory. The problem 
with this is that, mathematically, the wave-function is an object that lives in the highly 
dimensional configuration space, and as such is a very different entity from classical 
particles. In addition, the image of the world provided by the WFO approach is very 
different from the image of the world given to us by classical mechanics: in the latter 
there are particles moving in three-dimensional space, in the former there is this matter 
field in a highly-dimensional space. In the classical-to-quantum transition we discover 
that not only we were getting the nature of objects wrong (we believed there were 
particles and actually there are none) but we cannot get our classical picture back by 
ȁsquinting,Ȃ like in the PO framework, since the fundamental physical space is not three-
dimensional. In this way, there is no continuity of working posits between classical and 
quantum mechanics, and the strategy to resist to the PMI argument along the lines of 
ER is precluded to the proponent of the WFO approach. If there is truly a quantum 
revolution, as the WFO approach seems to maintain to a give extent (see [Allori 2015] 
for an interesting take on this), and the way in which we understand the word using 
quantum theory is fundamentally different from the way in which we understood it in 
classical terms, what is our justification to believe that the theoretical terms used in 
quantum mechanics are (approximately) true? It is difficult to see how the PMI could be 
defeated in the WFO framework, unless they go eliminative structural realists, and they 
may not want to do that, given the numerous objection that have been raised against 
this view (see, e.g. [Psillos 1999], [Chakravartty 2007], [Cao 2003] among others).  
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Dissolving the missing heritability problem 
Pierrick Bourrat & Qiaoying Lu 
Abstract: Heritability estimates obtained in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are much 
lower than those of traditional quantitative methods. This has been called the “missing 
heritability problem”. By analyzing and comparing these two kinds of methods, we first show 
that the estimates obtained by traditional methods involve some terms that GWAS do not. 
Second, the estimates obtained by GWAS do not take into account epigenetic factors 
transmitted across generations, whilst they are included in the estimates of traditional 
quantitative methods. Once these two factors are taken into account, we show that the missing 
heritability problem can be largely dissolved. Finally, we briefly contextualize our analysis within 
a current discussion on how non-additive factors relate to the heritability estimates in GWAS.  
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1. Introduction.  
One pervasive problem encountered when estimating the heritability of quantitative traits is that 
the estimates obtained from Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are much smaller than 
that calculated by traditional quantitative methods. This problem has been called the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011). Take human height for example. Traditional 
quantitative methods deliver a heritability estimate of about 0.8, while the first estimates using 
GWAS were 0.05 (Maher 2008). More recent GWAS methods have revised this number and 
estimate the heritability of height to be at most 0.45 (Yang et al. 2010; Turkheimer 2011). Yet, 
half of the heritability is still missing. 
In quantitative genetics, heritability is defined as the portion of phenotypic variation in a 
population that is caused by genetic difference (Downes 2015). Traditionally, this portion is 
estimated by measuring the phenotypic resemblance of genetically related individuals without 
identifying at the molecular level (more particularly the DNA level) the genetic causes of 
phenotypic variation. GWAS have been developed in order to locate the DNA sequences that 
influence the target trait and estimate their effects, especially for common complex diseases 
such as obesity, diabetes and heart disease (Visscher et al. 2012; Frazer et al. 2009). As for height, 
almost 300 000 common DNA variants in human populations that associate with it have been 
identified by GWAS (Yang et al. 2010). Granted by many that the heritability estimates obtained 
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by traditional quantitative methods are quite reliable, the method(s) used in GWAS have been 
questioned (Eichler et al. 2010).  
A number of partial solutions to the missing heritability problem have been proposed, with 
most of them focusing on improving the methodological aspects of GWAS in order to provide 
a more accurate estimate (e.g., Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Some authors have also 
suggested that heritable epigenetic factors might account for part of the missing heritability. For 
instance, in Eichler et al. (2000, 488), Kong notes that “[e]pigenetic effects beyond imprinting 
that are sequence-independent and that might be environmentally induced but can be 
transmitted for one or more generations could contribute to missing heritability.” Furrow et al. 
(2011) also claim that “[e]pigenetic variation, inherited both directly and through shared 
environmental effects, may make a key contribution to the missing heritability.” Others have 
made the same point (e.g., McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008; Johannes et al. 2008). Yet, in the 
face of this idea one might notice what appears to be a contradiction: how can epigenetic factors 
account for the missing heritability, if the heritability is about genes?  
To answer this question as well as to analyze the missing heritability problem, we compare 
the assumptions underlying both heritability estimates in traditional quantitative methods and 
those in GWAS. We argue that a) the heritability estimates of traditional methods include some 
terms associated with broad-sense heritability (�²), as opposed to narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$); 
b) although GWAS are supposed to get ℎ$, ℎ$ relies on an evolutionary concept of the gene 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1581-
	
	
that can include epigenetic factors while heritability estimates obtained from GWAS do not. 
With these two points being illustrated, we expect the missing heritability problem to be largely 
dissolved as well as setting the stage for further discussions. 
The reminder of the paper will be divided into three parts. First, we briefly introduce how 
heritability is estimated in two traditional methods, namely twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression. We show that the estimates obtained by each methods include some non-additive 
elements and consequently correspond neither to �² nor to ℎ$, but to a notion in between 
which we term “broader-sense heritability”. Second, we outline the basic rationale underlying 
GWAS and illustrate that they estimate heritability by considering solely DNA variants. By 
arguing that the notion of additive genetic variance does not necessarily refer to DNA sequences 
but can also refer to epigenetic factors in traditional quantitative methods, we show that the 
notion of heritability estimated in GWAS is more restrictive than that of traditional quantitative 
methods, and term this notion “DNA-based narrow-sense heritability”. Finally, in Section 4, 
based on the conclusions from Section 2 and Section 3, we claim that the gap between the 
heritability estimates of traditional quantitative methods and those of GWAS can be explained 
away in two major ways. One consists in recognizing that if non-additive variance was removed 
from the estimates obtained via traditional methods, they would be lower. The other consists in 
recognizing that if epigenetic factors were taken into account by GWAS, the heritability 
estimates obtained would be higher. We conclude Section 4 by showing how our analysis sheds 
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some light on a discussion about the role played by non-additive factors in the missing 
heritability problem. Because human height has been “the poster child” of the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011, 232), we will use this example to illustrate each of our 
points. 
 
2. Heritability in Traditional Quantitative Methods.  
According to quantitative genetics, the phenotypic variance (�& ) of a population can be 
explained by two components, its genotypic variance (�') and its environmental variance (�(). 
In the absence of gene-environment interaction and correlation, we thus have: 
�& = �' + �(  (1) 
From there broad-sense heritability (�$) is defined as: 
�$ =
+,
+-
   (2) 
�'  can further be portioned into the additive genetic variance (�.), the dominance genetic 
variance (�/) and the epistasis genetic variance (�0). We have: 
�& = �. + �/ + �0 + �(     (3) 
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where �. is the variance due to hypothetical genes making an equal and additive contribution 
to the trait studied (e.g., height). �/ is the variance due to interactions between alleles at one 
locus for diploid organisms, and �0 is the variance due to interactions between alleles from 
different loci. �/ and �0 together represent the variance due to particular combinations of 
genes of an organism. 
Since genotypes of sexual organisms recombine at each generation via reproduction, 
dominance and epistasis effects are not transmitted stably across generations, only additive 
genetic effects are. Therefore, �.  is the variance due to stably transmitted genetic effects. 
Narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) measures to what extent variation in phenotypes is determined 
by the variation in genes transmitted from parent(s) to offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 
123). It is defined as:  
ℎ$ =
+1
+-
                                                            (4) 
ℎ$ is important in breeding studies and is used by evolutionary theorists who are interested in 
making evolutionary projections of a trait within a population across generations. 
To know ℎ$, both �. and �& must be known. �&, for most quantitative traits (including 
height), can be directly estimated by measuring individuals. However, there is no direct way to 
estimate �. in traditional quantitative methods. The traditional way to estimate it requires two 
elements. First, one needs a population-level measure of a phenotypic resemblance of family 
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relative pairs1. This measure is obtained by calculating the covariance of the phenotypic values for 
those pairs. The choice of what sort of relatives to use depends on what data is available. The 
second element is the genetic relation between family pairs. It indicates the percentage of genetic 
materials the pairs are expected to share. With these two elements, one can estimate how much 
the genes shared contribute to the phenotypic resemblance. In a large population with different 
phenotypes, one can then estimate how much the additive genetic difference contributes to 
phenotypic difference in this population, which estimates ℎ$. 
For simplicity, traditional quantitative methods usually assume that there is neither gene-
environment interaction nor correlation (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 131). Thus the covariance 
between the phenotypic values (e.g., height) of pairs equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant and epistasis genetic covariance, plus the environmental covariance. A general 
equation for traditional quantitative methods can be written as follows: 
��� �6, �$ = ��� �6 + �6 + �6 + �6, �$ + �$ + �$ + �$ =
																														��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$  (5)          
where indexes “1” and “2” represent the two family members for each pair studied. 
��� �6, �$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one individual with the other. 
                                                
1
	 Or the mean values of  their class (e.g., offspring) depending on the particular method used.	
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� , � , �  and �  represent additive effects, dominant effects, epistasis effects and 
environmental effects respectively. 
The most commonly used traditional methods for estimating heritability are twin studies. 
In these studies one already knows that monozygotic twins share almost 100% of their genetic 
material while dizygotic twins about 50%. The environment is typically divided into the part of 
the environment that affects both twins in the same way (the shared environment, �) and the 
part of the environment that affects one twin but not the other (the unique environment, �) 
(Silventoinen et al. 2003). Hence, in the absence of interaction and correlation between � and 
�, we have:  
� = 	� + �     (6) 
Assuming epistasis effects to be negligible (a common assumption in twin studies), by inserting 
Equation (6) into Equation (5), we have: 
��� �>6, �>$ = ��� �>6 + �>6 + �>6 + �>6, �>$ + �>$ + �>$ + �>$ 	=
																						��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$   (7) 
where indexes “T1” and “T2” represent the two twins for each twin pair studied. 
��� �>6, �>$ 	is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other. 
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Because each twin’s unique environment by definition is independent of that of the other 
twin, ��� �>6, �>$  is zero for both monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Given that variance is 
a special case of covariance when the two variables are identical, and that for monozygotic twins 
�>6, �>6, and �>6equal to �>$, �>$, and �>$ respectively, we can formulate the equation 
from Equation (7) as follows: 
���?> �>6, �>$ = �. + �/ + �@      (8) 
where ���?> �>6, �>$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of monozygotic twin 
pairs studied. 
By contrast, dizygotic twins are expected to share half of their genes, which means that the 
covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other of dizygotic twin pairs 
studied (���/> �>6, �>$ ) is expected to be equal to half of the additive genetic variance, a 
quarter of dominant variance 2 , and all of the shared environmental variance (with 
��� �>6, �>$  also to be zero). We have: 
���/> �>6, �>$ =
6
$
�. +
6
B
�/ + �@      (9) 
It is classically assumed that �@  in Equation (8) and (9) is the same. That is to say, for both 
monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs, it is assumed that the shared environment would act in 
                                                
2  For each given gene with two alleles, the possibility that dizygotic twins have the same 
genotype is one quarter. 
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the same way if the pair has been reared together.3 �@  can be cancelled by subtracting Equation 
(9) from Equation (8). The heritability can then be estimated as follows:  
ℎCDE
$ =
$ @FGHD &DI,&DJ K@FGLD &DI,&DJ
+-
=
+1
+-
+
M
J
+L
+-
      (10) 
We call ℎCDE
$  broader-sense heritability (the index “b” is for “broader-sense”) from twin studies, 
because the resulting estimate (which is about 0.8 for height) provides an accurate estimate of 
neither �$ nor ℎ$, although it is closer to �$ than to ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 172). 
That is to say, it corresponds to a definition of heritability that includes some elements of broad-
sense heritability but not all of it. 
Another often used traditional quantitative method to estimate heritability involves a 
parent-offspring regression. This method also assumes neither gene-environment interaction 
nor correlation, the covariance between the height of parents (one or the mean of both) and the 
mean of their offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 164), equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant covariance (the epistasis covariance is assumed to be small and is not included), plus 
environmental covariance. Hence, Equation (5) can be formulated as follows:  
                                                
3 This assumption might be problematic because monozygotic twins are often treated more 
similarly by their parents than are dizygotic twins, and monozygotic twins are more likely to 
share a placenta than dizygotic twins. The difficulty can be mitigated by using adoption twin 
studies in which the environments for twins are random on average. But large adoption twins’ 
data are exceedingly difficult to get (Griffiths 2005). 
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��� �& , �N = ��� �& + �& + �& + �& , �N + �N + �N + �N =
																														��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N                  (11)                   
where indexes “P” and “O” represent the “parents” and the “offspring”.  
Two assumptions are then made. The first one is that there is no dominant effects 
transmitted from the parents to the offspring assuming the parents are unrelated (Doolittle 
2012, 178), which means ��� �& , �N  is nil. Another assumption is that there is no 
correlation between the parents’ environment and the offspring’s environment so that 
��� �& , �N  in Equation (11) is also nil. Given that on average, parents share in expectation 
50% of genes with their offspring (parents and offspring share half of their genes), it leaves 
Equation (11) with a result of half of additive genetic variance (
6
$
�.). Given �&, ℎ
$ can be 
estimated straightforwardly.  
But the above two assumptions are problematic. First, the assumption of unrelated parents 
might be violated because of assortative mating in humans resulting in parents to be more 
genetically similar than two randomly chosen individuals (Guo et al. 2014). Hence, 
��� �& , �N  is likely to be non-nil. Second, because the environments experienced by 
individuals are likely to be more similar within a family line, ��� �& , �N  might not be nil, 
either. If we take these two factors into consideration, the covariance of the parents and their 
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offspring is equal to half of additive genetic variance, plus a variance term representing effects 
due to dominance and similarities between environments. This can be written formally as:   
��� �& , �N = ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N =	
6
$
�. + �/&(@      (12) 
where �/&(@  represents the variance due to some dominance and environmental correlation 
effects between the parents and the offspring studied.                                        
The heritability can then be estimated by doubling the parent–offspring covariance in 
Equation (12) and dividing the total phenotypic variance of the population as follows: 
ℎC-PQ
$ =
$@FG &-,&P
+-
=
+1
+-
+
$+L&RS
+-
                                       (13) 
For similar reasons as with the heritability estimates from twin studies, we call ℎC-PQ
$  broader-
sense heritability (with the index “b” also being for “broader-sense”) from parent-offspring 
regression. Indeed, although it is often assumed that ℎC-PQ
$  represent ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 
1996, 147), the resulting estimate (also about 0.8 for height) is broader than ℎ$ as it can include 
a component led by dominance variance and environmental correlation between parent and 
offspring. 
To conclude this section, heritability estimates in both twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression include an extra term when compared to ℎ$, but they do not correspond to �². For 
this reason we regroup them under the term ℎC
$ for “broader-sense heritability”, such that: 
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ℎC
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$                                                     (14) 
where ℎFTUVW
$  is the part of heritability contributed by the extra component(s) representing 
non-additive variance. 
 
3. Heritability in GWAS.  
Although any two unrelated individuals share about 99.5% of their DNA sequences, their 
genomes differ at specific nucleotide locations (Aguiar and Istrail 2013). Given two DNA 
fragments at the same locus of two individuals, if these fragments differ at a single nucleotide, 
they represent two variants of a Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP). GWAS focus on SNPs 
across the whole genome that occur in the population with a probability larger than 1% which 
are called common SNPs. If one variant of a common SNP, compared to another one, is 
associated with a significant change on the trait studied, then this SNP is a marker for a DNA 
region (or a gene) that leads to phenotypic variation. For a polygenic trait like height, if we can 
detect all the SNPs that associate with it, then all the DNA difference makers that determine 
height difference can be located.  
The development of commercial SNP chips makes it possible to rapidly detect common 
SNPs of DNA samples from all the participants involved in a study. By using a series of 
statistical tests, it can be investigated at the population level whether each SNP associates with 
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that target trait. The choice of the statistical tests depends on the data available as well as the 
trait studied. For quantitative traits like height, the most common approach is to make an 
analysis of variance table and assess whether the mean height of a group with one variant at one 
nucleotide is significantly different from the group with another variant of the same SNP4 
(Bush and Moore 2012). With all the SNPs associated with height being detected, data from the 
HapMap project, which provides a list of SNPs that are markers for most of the common DNA 
variants in human populations (Consortium, International HapMap 3 2010), is used to map the 
associated SNPs with common DNA variants. These mapped DNA variants, to be 
distinguished from DNA variants that do not affect the target trait, have been called “causal 
variants” (Visscher et al. 2012).  
Based on the readings of SNP chips as well as further independent tests for SNPs, the 
effects of the associated SNPs (markers for causal DNA variants) on the trait can be calculated. 
By estimating the phenotypic variance contributed by these SNPs and the total phenotypic 
variance of the population, the heritability of causal DNA variants can be estimated as the ratio 
of the phenotypic variance caused by all the associated SNPs compared to the total phenotypic 
variance of the population (Weedon et al. 2008). Since it is common for biologists to assume 
                                                
4  For categorical (often binary disease/control) traits, the association test used involves 
measuring an odds ratio, namely the ratio of  the odds of  disease for individuals having a specific 
variant of  a SNP, and the odds of  disease for individuals who have another variant at the same 
locus. If  the odds ratio of  a common SNP is significantly different from 1, then that SNP is 
considered to be associated with the disease (Bush and Moore 2012). 
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that genes are only made up of pieces of DNA, it is thought that the variance obtained from all 
the causal DNA variants represent exactly the additive genetic variance, and the heritability 
estimated by GWAS should match narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) (Yang et al. 2010; Visscher et 
al. 2006). However, the assumption that additive genetic effects are solely based on DNA 
sequences is problematic when faced with the evidence of epigenetic inheritance. 
As was mentioned in Section 2, traditional quantitative methods for estimating heritability 
are based on measuring phenotypic values and genetic relations without reaching the molecular 
level. The genes are not defined physically, but functionally as heritable difference makers 
(Falconer and Mackay 1996, 123). In other words, they are theoretical units defined by their 
effects on the phenotype. With the discovery of DNA structure in 1953, it was thought that the 
originally theoretical genes were found in the physical DNA molecules. Since then, biologists 
commonly refer to genes as DNA molecules and this assumption is also made by researchers 
of GWAS. As Lu and Bourrat  claim, this step was taken too hastily. If there is physical 
material, other than DNA pieces, that can affect the phenotype and be transmitted stably across 
generations, then it should also be thought to play the role that contributes to additive genetic 
effects. 
Many studies have provided evidence for epigenetic inheritance 5 , namely the stable 
transmission of epigenetic modifications across multiple generations and affect organism’s traits 
                                                
5 We use the notion of  “epigenetic inheritance” in the broad sense that refers to the inheritance 
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(e.g., Youngson and Whitelaw 2008; Dias and Ressler 2014). A classical example of this is the 
methylation pattern on the promoter of the agouti gene in mice (Morgan et al. 1999). It shows 
that mice with the same genotype but different methylation levels display a range of colors of 
their fur, and the patterns of DNA methylation can be inherited through generations causing 
heritable phenotypic variations. Epigenetic factors such as self-sustaining loops, chromatin 
modifications and three-dimensional structures in the cell can also be transmitted over multiple 
generations (Jablonka et al. 2014). Studies on various species suggest that epigenetic inheritance 
is likely to be ‘ubiquitous’ (Jablonka and Raz 2009).  
The increasing evidence of epigenetic inheritance seriously challenges the restriction of the 
concept of the gene in the evolutionary sense to be materialized only in DNA. Relying on 
traditional quantitative methods, it is impossible to distinguish whether additive genetic variance 
is DNA based or based on other material(s). Some transmissible epigenetic factors, which are 
not DNA based, might de facto be included into the additive genetic variance used to estimate 
ℎ². This extension of heritable units also echoes to the recent suggestion that genetic (assuming 
genes to be DNA based) and non-genetic heredity should be unified in an inclusive inheritance 
theory (Danchin 2013; Day and Bonduriansky 2010).  
                                                
of  phenotypic features via causal pathways other than the inheritance of  nuclear DNA 
(Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 112). 
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To apply the idea that some epigenetic factors can lead to additive genetic effects, the 
additive variance of them (�.XYZ) should be added to the additive variance of DNA sequences 
(�.L[1) to obtain �.. Assuming there is no interaction between �.XYZ and �.L[1 , we have: 
�. = �.L[1 + �.XYZ     (15) 
Inserting Equation (15) to Equation (4) leads to: 
ℎ$ =
+1L[1
+-
+
+1XYZ
+-
     (16) 
Here we term the first term on the right side of Equation (16) “DNA-based narrow-sense 
heritability” (ℎ/\.
$ ), and the second term “epigenetic-based narrow-sense heritability” (ℎV]^
$ ), 
we thus have: 
ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$        (17) 
 
4. Dissolving the Missing Heritability.  
As we mentioned it in Introduction, since the first successful GWAS was published in 2005 
(Klein et al. 2005), there have been a lot of proposals for methodological improvements in 
GWAS (Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Studies have been conducted according to 
those proposals that permit to obtain higher heritability estimates. Examples include increasing 
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the sample sizes which has resulted in more accurate estimates (e.g., Wood et al. 2014), 
considering all common SNPs simultaneously instead of one by one which has increased the 
heritability estimates of height from 0.05 to 0.45 (see Yang et al. 2010), and conducting meta-
analyses which can lead to more accurate results when compared to single analysis (see Bush 
and Moore 2012). Biologists have also suggested to search for SNPs with lower frequencies 
than 1% in order to account for a wider range of possible causal variants (Schork et al. 2009). 
Aside from these partial improvements, our analysis reveals two reasons explaining away 
the missing heritability problem: a) In traditional quantitative methods, the heritability estimates 
include extra terms which are not presented in GWAS; b) In GWAS, heritability is estimated 
solely from causal DNA variants, while in traditional quantitative methods the additive effects 
contributed by epigenetic difference (ℎV]^
$ ) are de facto included in the estimates. 
These two reasons can be shown formally. Using our terminology, missing heritability 
(��) equals to the estimates obtained by traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$ ) minus the 
estimates obtained by GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ), which are 0.8 and 0.45 respectively in the case of height. 
Thus we have: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$
      (18) 
Replacing ℎC
$ and ℎ/\.
$  by the right hand side of Equation (14) and (17), we obtain: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$ − ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$ = ℎFTUVW
$ + ℎV]^
$      (19) 
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Which means that the missing heritability results from the part of heritability originating from 
epigenetic factors stably transmitted across generations, plus the part of heritability originating 
from non-additives factors. 
Our point that part of the missing heritability can be dissolved by considering non-additive 
effects echoes to the claim that almost all GWAS to date have focused on additive effects might 
be a reason for the missing heritability (McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008). Although there is not 
enough data to confirm that non-additive effects do explain away some part of missing 
heritability, this claim appears again and again in discussions on the missing heritability problem 
(see for instance Maher 2008; Frazer et al. 2009; Gibson 2010; Kong 2010; Moore 2010). Yang 
et al. (2010, 565) disagree with this claim and respond that “[n]on-additive genetic effects do 
not contribute to the narrow-sense heritability, so explanations based on non-additive effects 
are not relevant to the problem of missing heritability.”  
We agree with Yang et al. (2010) that non-additive effects do not contribute to ℎ². That 
said, because the heritability estimates obtained from traditional quantitative methods do not 
strictly correspond to ℎ² but include some non-additive elements, non-additive effects cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant for the missing heritability problem, though probably they are relevant 
in a way that both Yang et al. (2010) as well as their opponents did not consider.  
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5. Conclusion. 
We have provided two ways in which the missing heritability problem can be explained away. 
First, heritability estimates from traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$) are overestimated when 
compared to ℎ$. The resulting estimates would be smaller if the non-additive elements were 
eliminated. Second, heritability estimates from GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ) are underestimated when 
compared to ℎ$ because they do not take into account the additive effects of epigenetic factors 
behaving like evolutionary genes. The resulting estimates would be larger if epigenetic factors 
were taken into account. We have voluntarily stayed away from the question of whether 
heritability should be defined strictly relative to DNA sequences or if it should encompass any 
factors behaving effectively like an evolutionary gene. Our inclination is that there is no 
principled reason to exclude non-DNA transmissible factors from heritability measures, but our 
analysis does not bear on this choice. 
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Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often
built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries
that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing
receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the
likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often
has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also
help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence
of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of
interest signalling games.
1 Signalling games and evolution
Common interest signalling games were introduced by David Lewis (Lewis,
1969) as part of a game theoretic framework which identified communicative
conventions as the expected solutions to coordination problems. In recent years,
this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication,
incorporating signalling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to
modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms,
2010; Skyrms, 1996).
As the basis for game theoretic modelling of such phenomena, David Lewis
signalling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes.
They are coordination games of common interest between world-observing senders
and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where
interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the stan-
dard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signalling game (hereafter
the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaller) observes that the world is in one of
two possible states (state1 or state2) and broadcasts one of two possible signals
(signal1 or signal2) which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions (act1 or act2). If the acts match the state of
the world (i.e. act1 if state1 or act2 if state2) then the players receive a greater
payoff than otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signalling systems where
senders condition otherwise arbitrary signalling behaviour on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals to secure the mutual payoff. The two
1
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systems only differ on which signal gets to be associated with each state of the
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain
conditions a signalling systems is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution to be discussed further in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is the degree
to which we have confidence in the interpretation and application of such a
highly idealised model to the more complex target systems. The obvious worry
is that by introducing more realistic features into the model one might break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signalling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signalling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur. Some devia-
tions from the standard Lewis signalling game include: more and varied states
of the world, the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals,
partial deviation in interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case and Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Godfrey-Smith (2015) mix signalling games of common interest and conflict of
interest. One complication of the Lewis signalling game (particularly important
for our purposes) is that signalling systems are not guaranteed in the simple
2x2x2 case when the world is biased. In other words, when the probabilities
of the world being in state1 or state2 are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in
which no communication occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily
possible.
2 Symmetry breaking
The focus here will be with the idealisation that sender and receiver are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signallers do on observing the state of the world is send a
signal, and the receivers must act as though the world is in one or other of the
sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers
which is the more problematic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signalling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behaviour for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signalling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signallers than
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’, where the receiver
plays act1 or act2 unconditionally.
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for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate a
fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behaviour’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically rel-
evant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that of
observing a strategically relevant artificial signal. All this leads to two concerns.
Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations are likely to exist between senders
and receivers. Receivers are likely to have locally reasonable options available
to them other than those relevant to signaller-observed states of the world, and
their responsiveness to the strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily mod-
elled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures of standard signalling games.
Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost implications of sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to
differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not
expect their update-responsiveness in any given game to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modelled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (Sterelny, 2012) concerns about Skyrms (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of
the receiver might undermine the evolution of signalling even when these third
options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of
a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy –
taking an action which pays off modestly, regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behaviour of vervets, who
have specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet
takes to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead
to total disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle.
Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a
modest payoff. Translated to signalling games, such a gambit may, in many
cases, be more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signalling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a
3
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This compliments the structural responsiveness concern: receivers (espe-
cially) might have other options of value which will stand in competition to
those assumed in the standard signalling game. Something like these hedgehog
strategies are plausible departures from the idealisation and should be expected
on the part of the receiver given a realistic demandingness of the role. The
question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog strategies might
undermine the robustness of evolution toward signalling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signalling situations – such as predator-
prey signalling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signallers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signalling games (as with games of com-
mon interest in general) the Red Queen effect should have no role to play. How-
ever any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signalling game makes it plausible
to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not the norm.
First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures employed by
senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems will admit to
different degrees of plasticity and evolvability – and will have a different set of
cross-cutting tasks and utilities that will place their own demands upon them.
Quick and easy signalling responses will have different pathways of update and
adaptation than the (typically) more complex set of systems which appropriate
receiver responses require.
The consideration of multiple use or adaptive reuse also makes the Red
Queen hypothesis salient: it is wildly implausible that entirely separate cog-
nitive systems would evolve to deal with competitive signalling situations and
coordination-style situations. Cognitive structures which underpin sender or
receiver behaviour will likely be subject to evolutionary pressures from compet-
itive as well as cooperative situations, and the responsive nimbleness of sender
and receiver strategies is therefore not guaranteed to be the same. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
mediocre payoff. Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are
general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signalling games. Thanks to [name redacted
for review] for helping us better see this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
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not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signalling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as a basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signalling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaller with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR). If the receiver’s action
matches the state of the world, then both signaller and receiver get a fixed
positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero. Signallers and receivers
both have four pure strategies available to them (see table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaller and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signalling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t+ 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t)
Fi
FS
where Xi is the ith sender strategy, Fi is the fitness of that strategy and FS
is the average sender strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t+ 1) = Yj(t)
Fj
FR
where Yj is the jth sender strategy, Fj is the fitness of that strategy and FR is
the average receiver strategy fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle
5
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into an evolutionarily stable arrangement. The update process is deterministic
and no randomising or mutations are allowed.
5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the Skyrms/Lewis idealisation have on the evolutionary stability of signalling
equilibria.
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signalling game, one of the two signalling
equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics. In our
notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of the world
(i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine this, with
an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling equilib-
ria. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signalling strategies
in the sender population. In such situations, receivers do best to simply per-
form the act that is most appropriate for the more likely state of the world.
The incentive for senders to adopt a signalling system then disappears and the
community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we found a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH , becomes significant. The hedgehog strategy R5
is an additional unilateral response, and is able to draw some initial populations
away from the signalling equilibria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average
payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in Figure
14.
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artefacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of hedgehog payoff on proportion of signalling equilibria.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in com-
bination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of H. The
H = 0 curve has the expected n-shape, with perfect signalling being degraded
as world-bias increases away from the mid-point of even bias between L and R.
The inclusion of significant (i.e. H ¿ 0.5) hedgehog payoffs decreases signalling
at even bias. As nature becomes increasingly biased, however, the proportion
of simulations that head to a signalling system does not go down. In fact we
observe a ‘plateau’ followed by a gradual increase in the proportion signalling
as nature becomes increasingly biased. However, once the bias becomes too
extreme, the traditional pooling equilibrium becomes increasingly likely as the
payoff associated with simply performing the appropriate act for the more likely
state of the world approaches 1. This results in a steep decline in the proportion
of simulations that result in signalling systems.
6 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signalling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order control the rate at which sender and
receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and receiver
populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t+ 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t)
Fi
FS
+Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t+ 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t)
Fj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on proportion of sig-
nalling equilibria.
Note that when both ZR and ZS are zero there is no deviation from the stan-
dard replicator dynamics. Rates of changes are slowed as their values increase;
for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change for sender strategies. ZR
(alone) being set to 1 means taht the composition of the receiver population
would not change over time, and only the sender population would evolve.
The result of introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and
receivers is that signalling is more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where senders (ZS) and
receivers (ZR) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds (with the other
population unaltered) as the bias of nature is varied.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population whose conditional signalling is
low will begin to gravitate to the act that matches the more likely state of the
world (and the threshold for ‘low’ is higher at higher bias). This evolution-
ary trajectory only reverses if conditional signalling increases rapidly enough
to tip the fitness balance toward its matching conditional response, before that
response is overpowered. Thus signalling becomes quite a remote possibility
when bias is high and senders are slow, occurring in less than 10% of simula-
tions for some parameter values. Slowing the evolutionary responsiveness of the
receiver population evolves has the opposite effect – as senders will have time to
adopt the best separating strategy given the mix of receiver strategies, and the
receiver population slowly adjusts and a robust signalling system establishes.
By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a quickly evolving sender population
also mitigates against the effect of hedgehog strategies.
8
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on proportion of
signalling equilibria.
7 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized
and simple Lewis signalling game typically considered in the literature. As
shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often
significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For
one, providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a
decent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size
of the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is
a remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However the interaction between hedgehog payoffs and bias shows that signalling-
undermining effects are not strictly additive. Likewise, the situation is much
less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace than receivers. Interestingly,
many scholars in the animal communications literature have noted a similar re-
sponse asymmetry between sender and receiver in conflict of interest and partial
conflict of interest signalling games. For instance, Owren, Rendall, and Ryan
(2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signalling behaviour while re-
ceivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced by senders that
are more difficult to change. Thus some have taken to think of signalling as
primarily involving the manipulation of receivers by senders.
But this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a conflict of interest
between sender and receiver, then what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behaviour of the senders? In other words,
what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver? These are the exact circumstances we would expect the red queen
hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form the basis of
9
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a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. When the interests of sender
and receiver are perfectly aligned it is actually in the interest of both parties for
the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial signalling
system. When the interests of sender and receiver significantly diverge, however,
we would expect this not to be the case since both parties now have reason to
adapt at a faster pace than the other.
Yet individuals who routinely interact rarely find themselves playing either
common interest or conflict of interest signalling games exclusively. As is well
known by any parent, not all signalling interactions between relatives are free
of conflict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be par-
tially opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common
interest signalling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point is that a
variety of strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver, and there
is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve perfect alignment
or sizable conflict. If so, then a proportion of signalling interactions between
sender and receiver may involve no conflict, a partial conflict, or a full conflict
of interest. When the proportion of no or low conflict signalling games is sig-
nificant, the generational asymmetry result from the previous section may hold
to some degree. Both sender and receiver will then profit from the sender pop-
ulation evolving at a faster rate than the receiver population, and receivers do
best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence
of informative signalling systems when their interests do overlap. Thus, while
it may appear puzzling as to why a receiver is not more responsive when her
interests diverge from that of the sender, this confusion might be resolved when
the interaction is put into context.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signalling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signalling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signalling
in realistic environments.
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Abstract 
 
In discussion of mechanisms, philosophers often debate about whether quantitative 
descriptions of generalizations or qualitative descriptions of operations are explanatorily 
fundamental.  I argue that these debates have erred by conflating the explanatory roles of 
generalizations and patterns.  Patterns are types of quantitative relationships that hold 
between quantities in a mechanism, over time and/or across conditions.  While these patterns 
must often be represented in addition to descriptions of operations in order to explain a 
phenomenon, they are not equivalent to generalizations, because their explanatory role does 
not depend on any specific facts about their scope or domain of invariance.    
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Real Patterns in Biological Explanation 
1. Introduction 
Scientists often claim to have identified patterns in the world.  In this paper, I will argue that 
these patterns are often explanatory in biology, and that their roles in explanation are distinct 
from the respective roles normally posited for operations and generalizations in discussion of 
mechanistic explanation.  Operations are types of causal interactions between the parts of a 
mechanism, described qualitatively.  Generalizations are quantitative descriptions of 
regularities, that normally are taken to involve (at least) two distinct properties in addition to 
the quantitative relationship.  First is scope: applicability to a range of cases.  Second is 
domain of invariance: insensitivity to manipulations of variables other than those named in 
the generalization (Woodward, 2010).   
Theorists have almost universally equated patterns and regularities, and thus 
supposed that the explanatory roles of patterns are equivalent to those played by 
generalizations.  For instance, Craver and Kaiser (2013) claim that regularities are “statistical 
patterns of dependence and independence among magnitudes,” (p. 128) and that 
generalizations describe regularities.  Dennett (1991), in his seminal discussion of patterns, 
calls them a “variety of regularity” (p. 40).  Woodward (2010) says that causal relationships 
are “patterns of dependency” that are “stable or invariant” (p. 291).  Most of the literature has 
followed a similar assumption.   
I claim that the explanatory role of patterns is distinct from those of operations and 
generalizations, and thus that patterns should be considered their own explanatory category.   
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Patterns, for current purposes, are type-able variations within or between quantities.  When 
biologists cite patterns, they say that a quantity of type X exhibits a particular type of 
quantitative variation, or that the variations of quantity X stand in a certain type of relation to 
variations of quantity Y.1  I will mainly focus on inter-quantity relations here.  Often it is 
important that these relationships occur across conditions and/or over time—examples 
include two variations being proportional to each other or in phase with one another.1  I will 
discuss instances of explanation that employ these kinds of relationships, which I have 
elsewhere (Burnston, 2016) called “explanatory relations.”  The patterns cited in explaining 
with these relations are distinct from operations, since they consist in quantitative rather than 
qualitative types, and since knowledge of the patterns is not fully specified by knowledge of 
operations.  But they are also explanatorily distinct from generalizations, since their 
explanatory role does not depend on any specific facts about the scope or domain of 
invariance of the relationships instantiating the pattern.   
The initial payoff is simply descriptive adequacy: keeping distinct explanatory 
categories distinct.  I also have a larger target in mind, however.  There is currently a 
considerable amount of debate about whether operations or generalizations are explanatorily 
fundamental—i.e., does one explain the other, or vice versa.  “Generalizationists” cite, 
                                                 
1
 While I mean this definition very liberally—the fact that a quantity “increases” in a certain condition is a 
pattern in this sense—it certainly won’t exhaust all colloquial, or perhaps even scientific uses of the concept of 
a pattern.  For instance, one might suggest that one’s friend exhibits a negative pattern of behavior without 
trying to quantify it.  Moreover, many patterns are simply statistical facts about a given sample (e.g., noise is 
“white” only when it has a constant spectral density).  Finally, there may also be an infinite number of patterns 
that are not type-able by us.  But I’m inclined to think that we need to type a pattern before it can be useful in 
science, and I will assume that here.   
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among other considerations, the need for regular quantitative relationships to hold before one 
can call something an operation (Leuridan, 2010).  “Operationists” cite the need for 
qualitative descriptions of types of relationships in explaining why regularities hold 
(Andersen, 2011; Machamer, 2004).  I think the fundamentality question is, in general, a bad 
one (cf. Tabery, 2004).  In showing that patterns play a distinct role from either operations or 
generalizations, I hope to suggest that no category is fundamental.  This results in a variety of 
contextualism about explanation.   
My strategy is as follows.  I will first (section 2) discuss several cases in which 
biologists explain by representing patterns.  In section 3.1, I will argue that this aspect of 
explanation is distinct from representing operations.  I will then (section 3.2) take up a thread 
in the dialectic between operationists and generalizationists to show that patterns are distinct 
from generalizations.  Some operationists  have argued that generalizations are not 
fundamental for explanation, since we often want to explain in singular or statistically 
unlikely cases, which involve highly restricted scope and domain of invariance.  I will argue 
that even in cases like these, biologists still need to represent patterns.  Hence, operationists 
are wrong to exclude patterns on the grounds of rarity, and generalizationists are wrong to 
insist that patterns explain in virtue of having a particular scope or domain of invariance.  In 
both cases, the error is due to equating the explanatory role of patterns and generalizations.  I 
then close (section 4) by suggesting that which explanatory category is most important 
depends on explanatory context, and thus that there is no fundamentality between 
explanatory them.  As should be clear, my focus is primarily on epistemic concerns.  While 
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the debates about fundamentality discussed above often address both the metaphysics and 
epistemology of mechanisms, it is productive to keep analysis of these issues separate (Levy, 
2013), as I will show below.   
I draw my examples from mammalian chronobiology.  Chronobiologists study 
circadian rhythms—roughly 24 hour, endogenously produced physiological rhythms which 
regulate a large number of processes in the body, ranging from sleep and cognitive abilities, 
to feeding behaviors, to gene expression.  Many organisms have biological “clock” 
mechanisms within individual cells, which operate on the principle of negative feedback in 
gene regulation networks.  In mammals, the intracellular clock consists in gene regulation 
between a “negative” loop consisting of the genes Per and Cry and their respective products 
(mRNAs and proteins), and a “positive loop” consisting of Bmal1 and Clock and their 
respective products.  In outline, it works as follows.  Positive loop proteins bind to E-box 
promoters on the negative loop genes, activating their transcription.  After translation outside 
of the nucleus, the negative loop proteins dimerize and are translocated back inside of the 
nucleus, where they bind to the positive loop genes on their own promoters, thus inhibiting 
their own transcription.  As the negative loop proteins degrade, this inhibition is released and 
the cycle can begin again.  With the right rates of transcription, translation, and degradation, 
these oscillations can occur over a roughly 24 hour period, hence providing a clock signal 
that can regulate other physiological processes.  The clock mechanism is represented in the 
following diagram.   
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Figure 1.  The mammalian intracellular clock mechanism.  Modified from Wang, Zhang, Xu, 
and Tischkau (2014). 
In the mechanism, the important parts include the genes and their assorted promoter 
regions, gene products, the nuclear membrane, etc.  The key operations include the activation 
and inhibition of transcription via selective binding.  There are a variety of more complex 
aspects to the clock mechanism.  The products of the positive loop gene Bmal1 also oscillate, 
due to a subsidiary feedback loop mediated by Rev-erb and Ror products.  In addition, there 
are more gene products involved that play support roles, and more types of promoters.  
Particularly, D-box and RRE (Rev-erb response element) promoters serve as binding sites for 
a variety of proteins, and each of the promoters can regulate several different genes.  Finally, 
several of the clock genes have paralogs—structurally similar genes that serve related 
functions in the clock. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1618-
While the canonical mechanism schema for the mammalian clock, including the parts 
and operations, has been largely agreed upon since the early 2000s (Zhang & Kay, 2010), 
investigation into the mechanism has continued—to a significant extent, investigators have 
turned towards discovering quantitative relationships within the mechanism.  In the cases 
discussed below, I argue that the representation of quantitative patterns over time and across 
conditions is necessary for explaining certain circadian phenomena.  In particular I will focus 
on temporal patterns regarding phase relationships and proportional responses in gene 
networks underlying compensation. 
2.  Patterns in Explanation 
2.1.  Phase relationships.   
While the mechanistic picture given above is necessary for explaining rhythmicity, it 
is not sufficient.  Several subsequent investigations have shown that it is not only that the 
mechanism operates according to the schema above that is important, but also that key 
quantities in the mechanisms bear particular temporal relationships to each other.  Looking 
for these relationships involved measuring and conceptualizing data in certain ways not 
entailed just by knowing the mechanistic organization.   
One such important relationship was discovered by Ueda et al. (2005), who decided 
to look at the temporal relationships between the activations of gene promoter types as 
such—meaning, regardless of the particular genes that they regulated.  Since each type of 
promoter occurs on multiple distinct genes, analysis of promoters had generally taken a back 
seat to the study of the genes themselves.  However, Ueda et al. showed that the particular 
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patterns of activity for each promoter type are important for explaining how an entire cell can 
oscillate in the quantities of its gene products.  They first noticed that all of the different 
activators of a particular promoter type tended to hit their peak expression at similar times, 
and the same for its repressors.  Moreover, for each promoter type—E-boxes, D-boxes, and 
RREs—there is a distinct phase relationship between their activators and inhibitors.  This 
suggested to the researchers two ideas: (i) that each promoter of a given type is activated in 
phase with other promoters of the same type, even if they regulate different genes; and (ii) 
that each type of promoter should have a particular phase of peak activation.  This is indeed 
what they found—E-boxes are most active in the morning, D-boxes during the day, and 
RREs in the evening.   
Ueda et al. claimed a functional import for these relationships.  Since the clock 
mechanism consists in a large number of interspersed gene relationships, the phasic 
regulation of particular promoters across all of the components can keep the many diverse 
gene interactions on a coherent schedule.  For current purposes, however, the explanatory 
import of the patterns is most clear in a subsequent study by Ukai-Tadenuma et al. (2011).  
They showed that through very fine-grained manipulation of the Cry1 D-box, they could 
manipulate the phase of Cry1 expression, advancing or delaying it relative to normal D-box 
mediated expression.  Only a phase of D-box-mediated transcription close to wild-type 
would produce normal cellular rhythms.  So, the relative phases of the individual promoter 
types help to explain how the cell as a whole produces coherent wild-type rhythms. 
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Importantly, Ukai-Tadenuma did not manipulate the operation performed by the D-
box—it still regulated Cry1 just as normal.  Instead, they manipulated the particular temporal 
pattern of its regulation.  So, not only must the particular parts, operations, and causal 
organization of the mechanism be in place for it to work, but it must also have these elements 
coordinated according to the appropriate temporal patterns.  Put simply, if the mechanism did 
not exhibit this particular set of temporal relations between its promoters, it would not 
oscillate, and learning this fact was an important addition to the explanation, overtop of the 
standard mechanism schema given in the clock model.  What, then, is the explanatory role 
being played by the pattern?  I suggest that it is adverbial (cf. Burnston, 2016).  A 
mechanistic description shows what the operations are and shows the causal organization of 
their interactions.  The representation of patterns shows how these interactions are 
coordinated in their levels and timing to produce quantitative phenomena like rhythmicity.  
The next example will further illustrate this role.   
2.2.  Proportionality and compensation. 
Baggs et al.  sought to study an important phenomenon related to molecular clocks, 
namely that of compensation.  In noisy molecular networks, shifts above and below normal 
quantities of key components are common, but can also be problematic—as shown above, for 
instance, the clock requires precise temporal coordination of gene product levels in the 
mechanism.  Baggs et al. (2009) showed that compensation in clock mechanisms relies both 
on their particular mechanistic organization and on the particular patterns of change in 
quantities of gene products as other gene products vary.  Their manipulations consisted in 
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insertion of small interfering RNA (siRNA) into cells in vitro, targeted to specific mRNAs.  
SiRNA knocks down its targeted mRNAs in a dose dependent fashion, thus allowing for the 
comparison of responses in varying levels of knockdown.  They represented their results in a 
variety of bar graphs, taken to show the types of responses that were important in 
implementing compensation.  Two are shown below. 
 
Figure 2.  Proportionality patterns in knockdown conditions.  From Baggs et al. (2009). 
The left panel of figure 2 shows that, with increasing levels of knockdown for Cry1 mRNA, 
Cry2 mRNA increases.  But not only does it increase, it does so proportionally—the greater 
the knockdown of mCry1, the greater the increase of mCry2.  Since Cry2 is the paralog of 
Cry1, it performs similar operations at similar targets.  So, as mCry1 is depleted, the rising 
mCry2 level results in the overall level of Cry influence at its targets remaining the same, 
thus allowing for the cell’s overall pattern of rhythmic gene interactions to continue.  
Proportional responses are also important in non-paralogous compensation.  The right panel 
shows the effect of mPer1 knockdown on mRev-erbß and mBmal1.  Rev-erbß is activated by 
Per proteins, and the proteins it codes for inhibit Bmal1.  When mPer1 levels go down, 
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mRev-erbß levels go up proportionally.  This in turn produces a proportional decrease in 
mBmal1.  The fact that knockdown of mPer1 should cause mRev-erb levels to go up, and 
that increasing mRev-erb levels should subsequently cause Bmal1 transcription to decrease, 
makes sense given the known operations performed by each part: mPer inhibits Rev-erb, 
whose products in turn inhibit Bmal1.  However, the discovery that each relationship is 
proportional is presented by Baggs et al. as an important further fact in explaining 
compensation.   
It is important for compensation for the following reason: the clock relies on precise 
interacting levels of inhibition and excitation between the positive and negative loops.  
Having the levels of one abnormally higher than the levels of the other would wreak havoc 
on the necessary interplay of inhibition and excitation.  As is evident in the right panel, the 
combined proportional interactions result in a balance between the levels of mBmal1 
(positive loop) and mPer1 (negative loop), hence keeping the interaction between loops 
functioning as normal.  Knockdowns of other components are compensated for according to 
similar principles, inducing no loss of rhythmicity elsewhere in the clock.   
Proportional relationships, as revealed in the bar graphs, are inherently patterns of 
quantitative responses across knockdown conditions.  And, as with the case above, one must 
represent these patterns in addition to the mechanistic organization to understand how 
compensation comes about.  As Baggs et al. summarize: “the clock network combines these 
activator and repressor modules with various forms of proportionality to construct relays that 
generate complex gene expression responses to single gene perturbations” (2009, p. 0570).  
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So, it is not only the types of causal interactions that occur (“activator and repressor 
modules”), but also the particular quantitative patterns in which they interact (“forms of 
proportionality”) that explain compensation.  This in turn helps explain how functioning 
rhythms at the cellular level can be maintained despite noisy conditions. 
3.  Patterns as Their Own Category 
3.1.  Patterns are distinct from operations. 
A category is explanatory when representing it shows, perhaps in part, how the 
phenomenon of interest comes about.  In previous work(Burnston, 2016), I argue in detail 
that the explanatory role played by representations of patterns is dissociable from that played 
by representations of operations (e.g., in a mechanism diagram).  I will only summarize these 
arguments here, before moving on to discuss the relationship between patterns and 
generalizations.  The key point to note is that in each of the studies above, the parts, 
operations, and causal organization of the mechanism were already known—neither study 
extends, revises, or modifies the known mechanistic organization.  In each case, however, the 
researchers discovered and represented a set of relationships between quantities in the system 
at specific times and/or across specific conditions.  As such, knowing the relevant facts about 
parts and operations constrains, but does not determine, all of the relevant facts about the 
patterns.  For instance, in discussing the Baggs et al. case I only focused on linear 
proportional patterns of responses, but these are not the only possible ones.  Baggs et al. also 
explore several other types, including proportional relationships with fractional coefficients 
and non-linear responses, which play roles in compensation for other knockdowns.  The 
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point is this:  these distinct patterns of relationships are all (epistemically) possible even 
given the known operations performed by each part and the targets they perform them on.  
So, specifying the parts and operations does not give us all of the information we need to 
explain.  We must also represent quantitative patterns.   
3.2.  Patterns are distinct from generalizations. 
Those who are inspired to consider generalizations as fundamental in explanation 
often note that mechanisms comprise causal relations, but causal relations of a certain sort, 
namely ones that are “stable” or “robust” (Leuridan, 2010; Woodward, 2010).  A mechanism, 
the intuition runs, is one that exhibits a stable organization that can produce “regular 
changes” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000) in its environment.  Hence, mechanisms 
depend on generalizations instantiated amongst their parts.  Those who consider operations 
fundamental often point to the shortcomings of generalizations for explaining causal 
relationships between particulars.  It is the activities of particulars, the intuition goes, that 
have effects on other particulars, not whether they instantiate some generalization.  These 
relationships can hold even in statistically unlikely or rare cases—in extreme cases, we could 
want to explain singular events, which only happen once.  Bogen (2005) and Craver and 
Kaiser (2013) take this argument to show that explanations do not depend on relationships 
with a significant domain of invariance or scope, and thus that generalizations only play 
subsidiary epistemic roles, which help us to access the operations that actually explain.   
Patterns of the type I have described, however, are explanatorily distinct from 
generalizations.  The argument involves two claims, one against the generalizationists and 
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one against the operationists.  Against the operationists: representing patterns is necessary for 
explanation even in cases of minimal scope or domain of invariance.  Against the 
generalizationists: it is the specific pattern in the relationship, not any specific facts about its 
domain of invariance or scope, which is important for explanation.  Presumably, if it were 
really the case that the explanatory role of a pattern depended on its status as a 
generalization, then that role would be closely related to how wide a scope the pattern has or 
how broad its domain of invariance is.  The following two simple thought experiments show 
this not to be the case.  The first assesses domain of invariance, and the second assesses 
scope.   
The fragile oscillator.  Suppose that we have a system that exhibits the patterns of 
phase relationships shown in the Ueda et al. study, and thus oscillations amongst the gene 
products in its molecular clock.  But it is highly fragile, meaning that there is an extremely 
specific set of conditions that has to hold in order for it to oscillate.  Perhaps the constituent 
proteins are easily broken apart, or the environment is highly volatile, so that even slight 
variations in (say) temperature or PH will modify transcription and degradation rates, 
interrupting the needed patterns and preventing oscillation within the system.  One could 
dress up the example until arriving at a case where the patterns have a minimum domain of 
invariance—that is, in which there is only one set of conditions in which the mechanism will 
oscillate.  In this case wiggling any variable other than the ones mentioned in the pattern will 
prevent the pattern from occurring.  If the explanatory role of patterns were based on their 
having some specific domain of invariance, then they should play a lesser or different 
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explanatory role in this case than in a case where their domain of invariance is broader.  This, 
I submit, is not the case.  When we go to explain how this system works, we will need to 
mention both its mechanistic organization and the phase relationships between promoters, 
just as Ueda et al. see fit to do.  But if the explanatory role played by representations of the 
phase relationships is the same in either case, then that role doesn’t depend on its domain of 
invariance.     
  The lonely compensator.  It is important to emphasize here that domain of invariance 
is distinct from scope.  Even if the conditions needed were maximally specific, they could 
occur in many different instances.  To address scope specifically, imagine an opposite case 
from that above, namely an oscillator that was so stable, and existed in such an amenable 
environment, that there were virtually no instances where its gene product quantities varied 
significantly from their normal (oscillating) values.  Now suppose that some cosmically 
unlikely event occurred, whose only effect was to knock Per mRNA quantities away from 
their normal level.  As a matter of historical fact, this has only occurred once, but when it did 
the system compensated, according to the explanation given by Baggs et al.  When giving the 
explanation for what occurred in this system, if Baggs et al. are right, we will need to posit 
proportional patterns of the type I described above (along of course, with the standard 
mechanism schema).  Here, ex hypothesi, we have a phenomenon that occurs only once, thus 
having minimal scope, and yet we still need the representation of patterns in the same 
explanatory role as in our world where compensation is common.  So, the explanatory import 
of patterns does not depend on facts about their scope.   
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Both generalizationists and operationists have erred in conflating patterns and 
generalizations.  Against the generalizationists, the explanatory role of patterns does not 
depend on their having scope or domain of invariance.  Against the operationists, they must 
be represented even in highly specific or unlikely cases.  There are likely to be objections 
from each side.  First, generalizationists might insist that, in the thought experiments I’ve 
discussed, the patterns do have a domain of invariance and a scope; it’s just that these are at 
the theoretical minimum.  Hence, they are still generalizations.  Operationists, for their part, 
are likely to suggest that these patterns only “specify key quantities” (to use Bogen’s phrase) 
and that since they do not themselves describe the causal relationships at work, they rely on 
more fundamental descriptions of operations.   
The response to each of these objections is the same: they may make sense as 
metaphysical claims, but don’t tell against the epistemic thesis I am advocating here.  I have 
argued for a particular explanatory role for patterns.  The cases above show that this 
explanatory role of patterns remains the same regardless of any specific facts about scope or 
domain of invariance.  If a generalizationist wishes to insist that any pattern must be a 
regularity on metaphysical grounds, and is willing to bite the bullet of calling the 
relationships discussed in the thought experiments regularities, this does nothing to 
undermine an explanatory distinction between patterns and generalizations.  As for the 
operationist’s response, the discussion in section 2 showed that knowing the relevant facts 
about parts and operations simply doesn’t exhaust the explanation.  There is a particular role 
to be played in representing patterns, and this role must be pursued in addition to listing the 
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parts, operations, and organization.  If the explanatory roles are distinct and both necessary, 
then there is no in principle epistemic priority between them (Burnston, 2016).  If 
operationists wish to pursue the fundamentality claim as a metaphysical one, I have no 
quarrel with them, so long as distinct explanatory roles are kept distinct.   
Finally, generalizationists are likely to note that I have leaned on counterfactual 
reasoning in discussing the role of patterns—i.e., if the patterns weren’t instantiated, then the 
phenomenon would not come about.  While generalizations are often thought of as grounding 
counterfactuals, this is different from saying that the explanatory role of a pattern depends on 
its status as a generalization.  As the above has shown, we could make the same 
counterfactual claim regardless of any facts about scope or domain of invariance.  For 
instance, the very same counterfactual holds for proportional relationships in the lonely 
compensator case as holds in the real world where the scope of proportional relationships is 
much greater.  Again, so long as we are talking about the epistemology of explanation, the 
role of patterns should be kept distinct. 
4. Conclusion: Contextualism and Explanation 
I think that the right lesson to draw from the foregoing is that we should distinguish 
between (i) describing the mechanistic organization of a system, (ii) explaining how a 
phenomenon comes about, and (iii) generalizing either (i) or (ii).  In science, each of these 
projects is pursued and they are often pursued in tandem; hence they are often run together.2  
                                                 
2
  Craver and Kaiser (2013) clearly distinguish between (i) and (iii), but not between (i) and (ii); this is because 
they miss the distinction between patterns and generalizations, and the important explanatory role played by the 
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Keeping them distinct, however, allows us to overcome the question of fundamentality by 
describing the relative roles of operations, patterns, and generalizations in explanation.  
Aspect (i), obviously, involves discovery and representation of parts and operations.  Aspect 
(ii) often involves aspect (i) plus the representation of key quantitative patterns.  The thought 
experiments above show that while aspects (i) and (ii) can be extended to ask questions about 
generalization, they needn’t be.   
When we do turn to generalization, we do so with specific goals and questions in 
mind.  For instance, how widespread phylogenetically is the set of parts, operations, and 
patterns that implements oscillation?  Are other organizations and patterns exhibited 
elsewhere?  At least in terms of mechanistic organization, interacting positive and negative 
feedback loops between genes is extremely common (although the particular components 
differ) across a wide range of phyla.  This fact about scope is an extremely interesting 
generalization, since it clues us in to the central importance of circadian timekeeping for all 
organisms.  Equally important, however, is learning the limits of these generalizations.  One 
of the major discoveries in chronobiology in the last 15 years is that molecular clocks in 
cyanobacteria operate on a post-translational mechanism, rather than on interlocking 
feedback loops of gene regulation (Masato et al., 2005), and hence that the scope of the dual-
loop model is limited.  Similarly, we could want to know about domain of invariance.  For 
instance, what are the conditions for having a well-functioning clock, and how are they 
                                                 
former overtop of describing the relevant parts and operations.  Some of what I say about generalization in this 
section is compatible with Craver and Kaiser’s discussion of the distinction between (i) and (iii). 
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compromised in shift-work disorder, familial advanced sleep phase syndrome, jet lag, and 
other circadian interruptions?  One hypothesis is that jet lag is due to disrupted phase 
relationships between cellular clocks in two parts of the mammalian suprachiasmatic nucleus 
(Davidson et al., 2009); hence, in odd lighting conditions the normal phase patterns break 
down and cannot instantiate wild type behavioral rhythms.  These are inherently questions 
that rely on the generalizations surrounding circadian mechanisms, but the importance of 
these questions doesn’t support the fundamentality of any particular category in giving 
explanations.   
What I want to suggest is that there are simply distinct explanatory contexts, and 
which category comes to the forefront depends upon the kinds of questions we are asking.  
For instance, if we are asking what type of causal relationship we are analyzing—what parts 
interact, whether they do so directly, what the results of those interactions are, , etc.—this 
this predisposes the explanation to invoke operations.  When we are interested in how 
phenomena arise from the operations of a mechanism, attention turns to the interplay of 
quantities in the mechanism, and thus to patterns and explanatory relations.  If we are 
interested in the robustness of relationships, then scope and domain of invariance, and hence 
generalizations, come to the fore.  This is a distant cousin of contextualisms about 
explanation that have been advanced before (Van Fraassen, 1983), and while it is not 
currently a popular way of thinking, I suggest that contextualism is the best way to make 
sense of the relationship between distinct categories and their relative explanatory roles.    
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Abstract: This paper argues that a significant focus in computational organic chemistry, 
alongside the construction and deployment of models, is the “deconstruction” of computational 
models. This practice has arisen in response to difficulties and controversies resulting from the 
use of plural methods and computational models to study organic reaction mechanisms. 
Diagnostic controllability is the capacity of cognitive agents to gain epistemic access to grey-
boxed computational models, to identify and explain the impact of specific idealizations on 
results, and to demonstrate the applicability of computational methods to target systems. 
 
1. Introduction. 
In quantum chemistry, providing solutions to the non-relativistic Schrödinger equation for 
molecules in the ground state from so-called first principles of quantum mechanics has been an 
acute problem well documented by historians of chemistry (for example Gavroglu & Simões 
2012; Park 2009). Recently, attention has been brought to the “computational turn” in quantum 
chemistry and how it is not merely a matter of technological augmentation but a new discipline 
of computational quantum chemistry with particular emphasis placed on developments in 
computational modelling (Lenhard 2014). My aim in this paper is to explore how computational 
organic chemists attempt to “deconstruct” computational models by diagnosing sources of errors 
resulting from the use of tractable computational models to study the important organic reactions 
such as the Diels-Alder reaction. This amounts to modelers attempting to gain epistemic access 
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to grey-boxed computational processes performed on digital computers by investigating modular 
computational procedures. These modular procedures include various approximations, tools, and 
base-line theoretical models. Much contemporary research in contemporary computational 
organic chemistry is focused on modular computational procedures and their comparative 
performance with respect to classes of target systems in line with various computational goals as 
well as constraints like computational speed and cost. While accuracy is a desideratum in 
computational chemistry a considerable focus of research is the diagnostic controllability of 
modular procedures. Controllability is focused on the applicability of modular procedures to 
specific classes of target systems and focuses on stability or consistency of result. It is 
cognitively prior to determining the accuracy of results. Although diagnostics of modular 
computational procedures is a distinctive practice in contemporary computational chemistry, 
there are important connections to some of the recent literature on simulations in philosophy of 
science. Some chemists regard computational modeling as a kind of chemical “experimentation”. 
But even before practitioners can generate simulated “data”, what stands out in contemporary 
computational chemistry is the degree to which practitioners focus on legitimating the 
application of computational models. I will briefly consider the significance of this issue for 
computational chemistry and how it might relate to the “verification” and “validation” of 
computational models. 
 
2. The configuration problem. 
In order to compute the activation energies of molecules in organic reactions one has to pay 
particular attention to the correlation energies associated with different configurations of 
electrons occupying molecular orbitals. Different interactions between configurations of 
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electrons can lead to changes in excitation levels crucial when investigating molecules in the 
activated state. To study these systems, theoretical chemists make use of computational models 
using digital computers where approximation procedures and idealizations convert equations 
lacking an analytic solution into a tractable form, resulting in computable algorithms whose 
outputs permit practitioners to draw inferences about the mechanisms of reactions that are 
otherwise difficult to access experimentally.  
 
A significant area of early computational organic chemistry addressed pericyclic reactions like 
the Diels-Alder reaction and the Cope rearrangement. These are reactions are thought to pass 
through a transition state formed of a closed circle of bonds and are “allowed” when the 
symmetry of the molecular orbital wave functions corresponding to bonds broken and formed 
during the reaction is conserved. Michael Dewar was one of the first chemists to propose that 
digital computers should be used to semiempirically calculate the activation energies and 
geometries of transition structures for pericyclic reactions. He argued that ab initio methods – 
that is, calculations supposedly performed from first principles of quantum mechanics – were 
simply inapplicable to systems of chemical interest because they effectively ignored electron 
correlations (Dewar & Jie 1992, p. 538). The first semiempirical computational models of 
pericyclic reactions used approximation methods taking some electron correlations into account 
while taking many of the core and electron repulsion integrals to be zero so they are not 
calculated from an explicit Hamiltonian or basis functions. One approximation is called neglect 
of diatomic differential overlap (NDDO), a powerful semiempirical tool that ignores only the 
overlap integrals associated with atomic orbitals on different atoms. Other complex integral 
calculations are replaced by parameters adjusted with reference to experimental data. 
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Early ab initio calculations in quantum chemistry were based on the Hartree-Fock-Self-
Consistent-Field-approach. Electrons are assumed to move in an average potential field 
comprising the other electrons. One chooses an electron, computes it potential energy, the result 
is used to compute the next electron, and so on until the calculated potential fields are “self-
consistent”. Although semiempirical approaches adopted the same base-line model, ab initio 
methods were restricted to very simple systems without parametrization. But as it became 
possible to perform ab initio calculations of activation energies using digital computers in the 
mid-1970s, ab initio and semiempirical computational approaches produced conflicting results. 
Ab initio models generated results supporting the idea of symmetric transition states in which 
bonds break and form in unison (synchronously) in a closed circle of bonds. But semiempirical 
chemists defended alternative reaction profiles tending to suggest asymmetric transition states in 
which bonds break and form asynchronously.1 This came to be known as a “dichotomy of 
methods” because ab initio and semiempirical methods predicted incompatible mechanisms. 
 
Although contemporary chemists tend to play down the seriousness of this dispute, there is 
recognition that it has done much to shape the character of contemporary computational organic 
chemistry. That plural approximation approaches to computational modelling resulted in 
conflicting reaction mechanisms has raised questions about the applicability of various 
approximation procedures to chemical systems and their reliability given potential errors. 
Although the computational chemistry community tends to accept the veracity of the ab initio 
results for pericyclic reactions, that there has been divergence of results for computational 
                                                 
1
 Dewar proposed two alternative mechanisms: reactions either occurred in two distinct kinetic steps via a stable 
intermediate, or even if in a single step, bonds break and form asynchronously. Both conflict with ab initio results. 
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models that share the same background theoretical models within molecular orbital theory, but 
differ in specific model assumptions and the use of parameterization, has resulted in practices of 
error determination and justification of methods via the “deconstruction” of models. 
 
3. Modular procedures, pluralism, and diagnostics. 
Computational modelers aim to generate computational models resulting in algorithms that are 
tractable in the sense that they are capable of rendering equations that lack analytic solution into 
computable form. As computational models eschew the intervention of epistemic agents in the 
computational process, computational models are, as Paul Humphreys (2004; 2009) has argued, 
at least partially epistemically opaque. In what Humphreys calls “hybrid scenarios”, where 
cognitive agents must “balance the needs of the computational tools with human consumers” 
(2009, p. 617), not only is this balance to be achieved in terms of computational tractability 
constrained by computational speed and cost. Consumers aim to deconstruct grey-boxed 
computational models by cognitively accessing them in order to identify errors resulting from 
approximations procedures and to determine how they might contribute to the generation of 
incompatible results. This does not mean that one attempts “full” epistemic access and all errors 
are eradicated. The idea is that errors resulting from approximations should be “controllable” in 
the sense to be discussed shortly. 
  
Computational organic chemistry can facilitate epistemic access to computational models due to 
its methodological characteristics, which include modularity and pluralism. It is modular in the 
sense that there are various components parts with specific functional roles used in 
computational modelling as well as in classifying and organising the tools of the trade. These 
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modules will include what Humphreys (2004) calls “computational templates”. But modular 
procedures and tools, unlike templates, will also include techniques that are more specific to 
computational chemistry. The main kinds of modular tools include minimal or extended basis 
sets (atom centred functions describing atomic orbitals used to construct molecular orbitals from 
linear combinations of atomic orbitals) of varying kinds (Slater or Gaussian-type), semiempirical 
procedures that leave out or approximate the two electron integrals associated with exchange 
interaction and the correlation interactions using the neglect of differential overlap 
approximation and correcting the resulting errors using parameters drawn from experiment. 
These two-electron integrals are a central focus for ab initio procedures and there are various ab 
initio modular procedures available depending on how practitioners want to tackle electron 
correlations. Modules include: configuration interaction, Möller-Plesset perturbation theory, 
multiconfiguration self-consistent field theory, and coupled cluster theory. Some modular tools 
are employed by both semiempirical and ab initio approximation procedures. For example, a 
standard theoretical model would be the Hartree-Fock model, employing a mean-field 
approximation that averages out the effect of electron-electron repulsions. This is a base-line 
model from which corrections to errors resulting from the mean field approximation are then 
made iteratively and by augmentation using ab initio or semiempirical procedures. There are also 
“model chemistries” such as the Gaussian-n theories used to benchmark computational results. 
And as Lenhard (2014) has pointed out, since the 1990s, practitioners have increasingly used 
density functional theory (DFT) to approximate total energy in terms of the total electron density 
rather than the wavefunction. The use of DFT is central to the development of computational 
quantum chemistry. 
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Computational chemistry is pluralistic because the choice of modular procedure is in part 
contextual, depending on the extent to which practitioners seek to tradeoff accuracy of 
computational results for computational speed and cost. Computational studies of the Diels-
Alder reaction or the Cope rearrangement are covered in some depth in contemporary research 
and review articles as well as textbooks where the student and researcher can examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of what have become “off-the-shelf” computational procedures (see 
for example Bachrach 2014). This complex modularity has resulted in organization of 
procedures into hierarchies (“levels of theory”) where increasing accuracy demands increasing 
consumption of resources. The drive towards modularization is important because it represents 
not only many key developments in computational chemistry, it also facilitates access to partially 
epistemic opaque computational models. On one level, this is a matter of practitioners 
diagnosing the sources of errors understood in terms of the contribution made by specific 
modular procedures to computational results. But this is only made possible by the pooling of 
comparative studies of computational models and their relative performance across research 
groups. The general idea of deconstruction is that it is only by first constructing a computational 
model that delivers solutions comparable to data sets obtained by model chemistries and 
experimentally determined values that modellers can then go back to the model and diagnose 
sources of error. The evidence of error is the extent to which results depart from model data or 
when choice of modular procedures deliver results considered incompatible with computational 
models making alternative modular choices. Deconstruction is diagnostics. It consists of the 
collective strategies used to determine the effects of using specific modular components for the 
study of molecular systems using computational models. 
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Diagnostics aims at enabling practitioners to isolate, articulate, and quantify error so that they 
can determine the extent to which computational modules are controllable. Here I borrow from 
Ronald Laymon’s (1983, 1987) and Jeffery Ramsey (1992). Both adopt a view of approximation 
that goes beyond merely assessing approximation validity in terms of the extent to which results 
depart from experimental data. But there are significant difference between the two authors 
because for Ramsey “[a]n approximation is an act and not a relation” and will amount to “any 
methodological strategy which is used to generate or interpolate a result due to underresolved 
data or deficits of analytic or calculational power” (Ramsey 1992, p. 157). Controllability for 
Laymon, as I understand it, is essentially being able to give an account of the effect of 
idealizations of data (Laymon calls these “counterfactual initial conditions”) have on the 
accuracy of predictions such that we are able to seek procedures to “improve” upon them and so 
improve our predictions. This is central to Laymon’s account of confirmation. If one can relax 
the counterfactuality of the initial conditions used to derive testable consequences from our 
theories, and the predictions become more accurate, then that theory is better confirmed because 
it is “monotonic towards truth”. A theory is disconfirmed if it does not lead to better 
approximations (Laymon 1987, p. 211). 
 
My aim here is not engage in the details of the differences between Laymon and Ramsey’s 
respective accounts of approximation and idealization. Both accounts are instructive in that they 
depart from the idea that approximations should be judged merely in terms of how they might 
depart from experimental values. But “controllability” in a diagnostic sense departs from 
Laymon’s account of confirmation in both its content and its aims (Fisher 2016). First, 
controllability does not take place in the context of theory-testing but it is nonetheless concerned 
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with other important epistemic goals in computational modelling. To call a modularized 
computational procedure diagnostically controllable is to claim that one knows how and by how 
much the distortions introduced will affect computational results given that there are no actual 
target systems in which the distortions are realized. We want to know what effect, if any, model 
distortions and other counterfactual assumptions would have in actual cases (this seems to be 
necessary even before we could say that we can “monotonically improve” upon them). It is 
important to emphasise that the aim of diagnostic controllability is not necessarily to remove 
errors nor even to generate accurate results (at this stage at least) but instead to demonstrate that, 
in spite of the errors, which are to some extent inevitable, computational procedures generate 
predominantly stable results for a given class of target systems in light the contextual goals of the 
model users.  
 
For example, ab initio calculations of the Diels-Alder reaction turned out to be controllable 
because chemists could learn what errors to expect when using the Hartree-Fock model and 
furthermore that the results would be more or less stable under augmentations to the base line 
approximation by iterative improvements to the models using some of the modular procedures 
used to take into account electron correlations. Although improving predictive accuracy is 
ultimately an epistemic goal in much modelling, controllability demonstrated by relative stability 
of results under modular iterations can trump accuracy. In early computational organic 
chemistry, it turned out that while ab initio computations were not always the most accurate, 
especially in the early attempts to compute activation energies of the Diels-Alder reaction and 
the Cope rearrangement, they were controllable because they more consistently generated results 
suggesting that the reaction mechanism proceeds in a single kinetic step via a cyclical, 
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symmetric transition state. Furthermore, DFT approaches tend to reproduce this mechanism. 
Semiempirical methods tended to be less controllable (it at times generated some notable 
inconsistencies), and so became considered less applicable to studies of, for example, the Diels-
Alder reaction and other pericyclic reactions like the Cope rearrangement.  
 
4. Diagnostics and simulations. 
Modularization of computational tools and procedures in computational organic chemistry is one 
way in which epistemic access to grey-boxed computational models is facilitated and enhanced 
because pluralism promotes a culture of comparative assessment central to the determination of 
the diagnostic controllability of the modular computational procedures. There are distinctive 
methods, tools and choices in computational chemistry: to what extent the choice of basis sets 
will impact on results, how best to approximate electron correlations, what choice of theoretical 
model to make, to what extent parameters drawn from experiment will contribute to the 
correction of error and whether the methodological choices involved in parameterization are 
justified. While much of this is distinctive of computational chemistry, there is much that relates 
to the existing literature in philosophy of science on computational models more broadly and I 
would like, in closing, to connect to some recent literature on simulations. One motivation for 
connecting with the literature on simulations is that for some chemists, for example Michael 
Dewar and co-workers, computers were “chemical instruments” just as important to chemistry 
as, say, infrared and NMR spectroscopy but used in a new kind of “experimental” chemistry 
(Bingham et al 1975, p. 1285). Computational chemistry of organic reactions began because 
transition structures were inaccessible experimentally and so data was scarce. Furthermore, 
computers were not just used to crunch numbers. The results or “data” produced by these models 
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were deployed in model-based inferences about reaction mechanisms and hence chemical 
dynamics. And what counts as “data” is often derived from model chemistries comprising very 
accurate computations with large basis sets for relatively small molecules which is used to 
benchmark modular computational tools deployed in exploring the dynamics of larger chemical 
systems. 
 
Whether or not simulated data possesses epistemic parity with experimental data is not an issue I 
can explore here. But I would like to briefly explore some other connections to the simulation 
literature. Eric Winsberg (2010) argues that the “sanctioning” of computational models where 
data is scarce depends on possessing model-building principles whose projectability across 
depends not on the truth of these principles (they are often fictions) but rather their reliability. 
Diagnostics in computational organic chemistry can be thought of as part of this sanctioning 
process for computational models in chemistry focusing more on the applicability of procedures 
given the contextual goals of model users. For example, much of the dispute over ab initio and 
semiempirical computational methods in the study of the Diels-Alder reaction was whether these 
methods were applicable to their target system (like the Diels-Alder reaction) and determinations 
of applicability ultimately closely align to demonstrations of the reliability of computational 
models. 
 
In any case, applicability is cognitively prior to determining the accuracy of computational 
methods. Here it is useful to draw on a distinction Margaret Morrison (2015) adopts from the 
simulation literature between “verification” and “validation”. Verification concerns whether the 
equations are correctly solved and is a predominantly mathematical issue whereas validation 
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concerns how well they computational models represent physical systems. In computational 
chemistry, and much in line with Morrison’s claims, until one has a grip on verification one 
cannot proceed with validation. A computational chemical “verification” process is at least in 
part achieved by diagnostics aimed at the identification and quantification of errors and 
ultimately at determining the applicability of modular computational procedures for the study of 
classes of target systems. Until applicability is demonstrated, presumably validation cannot be 
achieved.2 “Verification” would also include procedural justifications of methods: whether 
computations are executed in line with model-building goals like top-down ab initio 
computations or by parameterization from experiment, which are then offered as reasons to 
support the veracity of computational models. 
 
But there is also something distinctive about diagnostics in computational chemistry in the sense 
that it might go beyond immediate methodological goals associated with verification. 
Diagnostics can play an epistemological function in relation to more foundational conceptual 
issues in chemistry. For example, DFT is known to suffer difficulties in studying non-bonded 
interactions between molecules. But diagnostic studies of DFT computations of excitation levels 
in these systems suggest that errors are unsystematic because accurate results are possible with 
some molecules but not others (Peach et al 2008)3. In this case diagnostics might reveal aleatory 
uncertainties associated with errors due to indeterminancy in the physical system.4 In this case, 
the uncontrollability of approximations need not reflect poorly on the method. But in the case at 
                                                 
2
 Diagnostics can therefore perform an exploratory function in the sense that demonstrations of applicability are 
what Axel Gelfert calls a “proof of principle demonstration” in the sense that “a certain type of approach or 
methodology is able to generate potential representations of the phenomena” (Gelfert 2015 p. 85). 
3
 The molecular systems tested include dipeptide, various acenes, H2CO, HCl, N2, and CO. 
4
 On the distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, see Morrison (2015, p. 256). 
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hand, the problem concerns charge transfer excitations in a wide range of molecules, which has 
prompted researchers to probe the viability of existing conceptions of a chemical phenomenon 
whose properties they are attempting to describe. This suggests that while diagnostics can correct 
and change computational procedures, it can also be used to challenge existing descriptions and 
conceptualizations of the target systems practitioners ultimately aim to represent in the validation 
stage. Investigations of diagnostic controllability can form a context for the criticism of existing 
theoretical models and background theoretical assumptions and so is sometimes used to probe 
the conceptual basis upon which the success of representations are characterized in chemistry. In 
other words, diagnostics can enter into both “verification” and “validation” in computational 
chemistry. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
Computational organic chemistry has arisen to address the problem of electron correlations in the 
study of organic reactions such as the Diels-Alder reaction. I have argued that computational 
differences arising from the use of semiempirical and ab initio procedures has promoted 
practices aimed at the deconstruction of computational models. This deconstruction is 
characterized by diagnostics, which focuses on identifying errors arising from plural modular 
computational procedures (approximations, idealizations, and theoretical models) used in 
computational modeling. Although accuracy is a desideratum in computational chemistry, a 
considerable focus of research is diagnostic controllability of modular computational procedures: 
their applicability and reliability to classes of target systems. This practice, as well as the idea 
that computers are used to perform experiments, suggests connections to the philosophical 
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literature on simulations where distinctions between verification and validation seem appropriate 
but that diagnostic might perform a function in both. 
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Abstract
Here is a phrase never uttered before: ”Euler’s philosophy of science.”
Known as an extraordinary mathematician first, a mathematical physicist
second, but never really a physicist — not enough empirical cred — no one
has considered whether Euler had a philosophy of science. Even his famed
“Letters to a Princess” is described as a somewhat naive parroting of New-
ton. But Euler is no Newtonian. His philosophy of science borrows from
Leibniz, a little from Descartes (in spite of, nay, because of, his critiques of
both), but is best seen as continuous with the tradition of a Galilean interpre-
tation of the world as consisting of interacting mechanisms, and the practice
of letting the requirements of sound mechanical description and problem
solving dictate metaphysics.
1 Introduction
Euler’s philosophy of science must be reconstructed from various of his writ-
ings, which as a result span a large portion of his life. But a consistent picture
does arise. It’s main components are a metaphysics, an epistemology, and an
explanatory approach. My plan is to describe, briefly, all three, while claim-
ing that they display similarities to Galileo’s own philosophy of science.
What I have not found is a “smoking gun”; no explicit acknowledgement
by Euler of a debt to Galileo or his approach. But I do think the similarities
1
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are striking. (A supporting argument, not given here, but which I mention
in passing, is that just as there are striking similarities between Euler and
Galileo, there are stark differences between Euler and either of Newton or
Leibniz. Thus, if we are to place Euler in any tradition, it’s most plausible
that it be Galilean rather than one of these other two contenders.) A brief
preview of those similarities are the following:
• a commitment to mechanism and mechanical interaction as an ex-
planatory framework
• a natural science founded equally on matter theory (particularly cohe-
sion) and the science of motion
• seeing mathematics as descriptive of mechanisms, rather than merely
motions
The last claim I think will sound most controversial, given interpretations of
Galileo’s law of falling bodies, for instance, as merely descriptive of the mo-
tion and not offering a causal explanation at all. I think that’s a misinterpre-
tation, that Galileo did seek a causal interpretation of both the time-squared
law and the uniform acceleration law. A number of the diagrams on Galileo’s
working folios seem to be attempts to derive these laws from natural circular
motion. Nonetheless I’m willing to concede that, although Galileo did not
see math as describing mechanisms or causal relations between quantities
(how could the square of time be a cause of a body’s position?), Euler does
see the relations that way, at least the appropriate relations, the principles
of mechanics. Euler’s position would then represent both an innovation and
maturation of Galileo’s philosophy of science.
In what follows, I will demonstrate Euler’s side of the connection: the
role of mechanism in his natural philosophy, his views on the essence of
material bodies, and commitment to all causes of change in motion through
contact.
2 The organization of Natural Science
In addition to the formal domains of mathematics and logic, Euler distin-
guishes three different areas when speaking about the study of nature. Nat-
ural science is his broadest category, the explanation of causes which affect
material bodies.
Natural science is a science that aims to explain the causes of
change that occur to material bodies. (E847, p 1)
2
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But within Natural Science, more specifically, are statics and mechanics, for
bodies at rest or in motion, respectively, and metaphysics, which is basically
an exercise in interpretation for Euler; viz. it is reasoning about the prop-
erties the world must have given the truths of statics and mechanics. (For a
discussion of statics and mechanics, see the preface to Euler’s Mechanica,
E015; for the characterization of metaphysics:
Metaphysics . . . is occupied with the investigation of the nature
and properties of bodies . . . knowing [the truths of Mechanics]
will serve as a guide in these thorny investigations. (E149, p2)
See also E200, with the title “Essay on a metaphysical demonstration of the
general principle of equilibrium”.)
The importance of the organization is the hierarchy implicit it in. The
main activity of Natural Science is mechanics for Euler, the study of how
forces affect the motion of bodies. But mechanics is embedded within a
broader program, which recognizes both the aim of mechanics (demonstrat-
ing the causes of change) and the conditions necessary for the possibility of
that program (the metaphysics of material bodies.)
3 Criterion of understanding
Mechanics is a mathematical discipline, but since the point of mechanics is
explanation of the causes of motion, the mathematical language used within
mechanics must meet a criterion of understanding. Euler describes that cri-
terion in the Preface to his Mechanica.
But in all writings which are written without analysis it happens
most in Mechanics that the reader, although convinced of the
truth of those things which are put forward, nevertheless does
not achieve clear and distinct knowledge of them, and so can
barely solve the same questions by his own devices when they
are altered even a little, unless he engages in analysis and ex-
plicates the same propositions using an analytical method. This
often happened to me when I began to read through Newton’s
Principia and Hermann’s Phoronomia: although I seemed to
myself to have understood the solutions to many problems, still
I could not solve other problems that differed even a little.
Only the analytic approach to mechanics provides a proper understanding
of mechanics, and that is a proper understanding of the causes of the vari-
ous ways the motion of a body can be effected. The analytic calculus has
3
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certain representative affordances which enable easy extrapolation from one
solution to another, physically similar, situation.
The feature which makes this so is the ability, in analytic calculus, to
represent and operate on functions. Those functions represent the mechani-
cal connections between bodies, equilibrium relations among quantities and
changes in quantities. This is a representation more general than merely a
mathematical description of a body’s motion, or a trajectory in time.
An important class of functional relations are those which describe con-
straints among the parts of different types of bodies. Euler has a plan for me-
chanics, exemplified by his plan, albeit, not completed, for his Mechanica.
It beings by considering points and the effects of forces on their motions;
next are rigid bodies, then fluids, and finally gasses. The nature of these
bodies means that the effects of forces on those bodies is different. They are
modified by the internal mechanical connections of those bodies.
Functions describe the internal mechanical connections. They also ex-
press general properties of bodies. A function describes abstract relations
among variables which represent kinds of physical properties. An actual
existing body is one fully determined, i.e. with specific values for all it’s
variables.
If the essence is stipulated in its totality, there arises a single
body, containing nothing indeterminate. Such a body is rep-
resentative of all material bodies really existing as part of this
world, since nothing can exist in reality that is not fully de-
termined. Whilst the essence of material bodies in general is
subject to few stipulations, the particular types of body, and the
individual bodies belonging to each type, arise when the con-
straints placed on the essence are complete, so that nothing is
left indeterminate. (E842, S.8)
Constraints arise through the nature of the body (whether solid, elastic, liq-
uid or gas) and through interactions with other bodies.
There is thus, a close connection between Euler’s metaphysics and his
mechanics, through functions — and through functions to explanation and
equilibrium expressed as mechanical connection.
4
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4 The general properties and essence of bod-
ies
In E847, “An Introduction to Natural Science”, Euler considers four general
properties of all material bodies, finally arriving at impenetrability as the
essence of matter.
Every material body must occupy in space a particular location,
and it is impossible for two bodies to be at the same location at
the same time. (E842, p20)
A body could not be said to occupy space unless it was impenetrable. If
another body could pass through the location of a body, it could not be said
to occupy that space.
The other properties Euler considers as candidates for essence all depend
on impenetrability because they, too, depend on the ability of a body to oc-
cupy space. Those other properties are extension, mobility, and persistence
in a state of motion.
A further distinction is made between what Euler calls coarse matter and
subtle matter. The latter is the ether, which differs from coarse matter in that,
while it is impenetrable, it is also elastic. Ether is the medium in which light
travels, and is also responsible for gravity. Tension in the ether causes there
to be a pressure on bodies. The pressure weakens the faster the ether moves,
in a direction orthogonal to the motion of the ether. And, since the ether
moves faster closer to massive bodies, the difference in sideways pressure
causes bodies to move towards heavier ones in the required 1/R2 relation.
The pressure of the subtle matter is also responsible for cohesion of mat-
ter, as the ether invades the pores of bodies and surrounds bodies. Again,
through the elastic pressure of the ether, bodies cohere, the pressure outside
of a body being greater than within. There is no void, for Euler. All of space
is filled with either coarse or subtle matter.
5 Impenetrability is the cause of all change
Given that the world is a plenum, Euler can ascribe all change to change
through contact. Gravitational attraction is not a property of bodies. There
is no gravitational mass, there is no gravitational force.
140. Gravity arises from the unequal pressure of the aether,
which increases with increasing distance from the earth; there-
fore the bodies are more strongly pushed towards the earth than
5
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away from it, and the net excess of these pushing forces is the
weight of the body.
All change is through contact. When two bodies come in to contact it is
impossible for them to persist in their current state.
88. A body is pushed or pressed by others when, because of
its impenetrability it is in their way, so that they cannot remain
in their state; and through this push or pressure the state of the
body itself is altered. From these circumstances originate all
forces that act on bodies. (E842, §88)
Each body, in attempting to maintain their state, acts to change the state
of the other body. Only in this way is persistence, which Euler says is the
proper notion of inertia, properly considered a Force. A Force is the cause
of a change. No force is required, therefore, to persist in a state of motion.
Persistence is a cause a change of motion in other bodies.
Equilibrium is crucial to the explanation of change through contact. A
longer explanation is given in the paper where Euler considers the contro-
versy over vis viva. That paper is E082, titled “On the force of percussion
and its true measure”, published in 1746. In that paper, Euler gives his ac-
count of the proper understanding of what others call the force of inertia.
His idea is that when an obstacle is encountered so that a body can no longer
maintain its present state there will then be inertia in excess which is no
longer consumed within the first body but rather acts to change the state of
the other body.
For as long as the Body remains in the same state of movement
or of rest the force of inertia is consumed by conserving its state
and consequently is deployed entirely to the inside of the body,
without producing anything to the outside. But when external
obstacles prevent the body from persevering in its state, so that
the force of inertia cannot produce its effect to the inside of the
body, then it is deployed to the outside and acts on the external
obstacles so that the loss that its effect suffers in the body is
exactly compensated by its external action. (E082, p.26)
Any difference in mass between the two bodies will mean that the inertia
results in a different amount of speed being given up to the other body, in in-
verse proportion to the masses. Euler’s conception of inertia thus constitutes
a physical explanation of the conservation laws which govern collision.
If we construe this operation as an equilibrium or balance exchange we
can understand this as a mechanical explanation, relying on analogy with a
6
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lever. 1 This allows a broader class of mechanisms, by allowing functional,
equilibrium relations between new quantities such as action. But Euler’s
conception does not include action at a distance. It is a balanced exchange
through the pressure of contact and contact only, caused by the impenetrabil-
ity of bodies and the force of their attempt to persist in their state of motion.
6 Summary
Euler explains all change in Natural Science through the cause of inertia.
The metaphysics required to make this explanation possible makes impen-
etrability the essence of material bodies. Other general properties, require
impenetrability. In particular, when bodies contact, because of their impen-
etrability, they cannot persist in their given state of motion. The inertia of
a body therefore manifests as a force which changes the state of the other
body. The motion they lose in this way is equal to the change in motion
of the contacted body, and vice versa. Equilibrium is maintained through a
balanced exchange of motion.
1Machamer, McGuire and Kochiras have recently argued for this way of generalizing the me-
chanical philosophy as a way of making even action at a distance a mechanical operation. This I
think goes a little too far, and it’s hard to see why it wouldn’t simply make every cause and effect
explanation a mechanical one (Aristotle becomes a mechanical philosopher).
7
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Abstract: I examine the role and relationship of epistemic and moral values in the Evidence-
Based Policy (EBP) paradigm. I argue that several epistemic values that play a crucial role in 
shaping standard EBP methodology stand in a trade-off relation with certain kinds of moral and 
political values. This is because the outputs afforded by standard EBP methods are insufficient for 
the pursuit of moral and political values that require information about the distribution of 
individual treatment-effects among agents in a population. I examine a potential reply to this 
standard concern, and argue that the changes to standard EBP methodology required for rendering 
research outputs informative about the distributive consequences of policy typically involve the 
sacrifice of several key EBP epistemic values at once. I expand on the implications of this trade-
off for value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP. 
 
 
Keywords: Evidence-Based Policy, epistemic values, non-epistemic values, trade-off 
 
1. Introduction 
Evidence-based policy (EBP) is the call that public policy formation should be informed 
by high-quality empirical evidence for policy effectiveness from randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses. In emphasizing the superior epistemic credentials of these 
methods, EBP advocates seek promote several epistemic values such as rigor, 
unbiasedness, precision and the ability to obtain causal conclusions about policy 
effectiveness.  
In what follows I argue that these epistemic values stand in a trade-off relation with a wide 
range of moral values that policy-makers may be interested in pursuing. Specifically, I 
argue that standard EBP methodology severely complicates policy makers’ ability to 
pursue moral values such as equality or priority for the worst-off. This is because standard 
EBP methods are not informative about the distributive consequences of policy (see e.g. 
Manski 2000). This is a substantive shortcoming, particularly when we have reasons to 
suspect that a policy will render some agents worse off. Yet, since the evidence typically 
afforded by EBP methods is uninformative on such distributive consequences, it is 
differentially useful for the pursuit of different moral and political values, specifically 
utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian values. I argue that this challenges both value-freedom and 
neutrality in EBP.  
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The contents are organized as follows. In Section 2 I offer a sketch of the epistemic values 
involved in EBP as well as whether and how EBP involves ideals of value-freedom and 
neutrality. In Section 3 I expand on the epistemic challenges that standard EBP 
methodology faces with respect to generating information about the distributive 
consequences of policy from RCTs. I discuss how this problem can be addressed by 
performing subgroup analyses and expand on some of the challenges that this method 
faces. I also comment briefly on the extent to which these issues have been anticipated and 
addressed in the extant EBP literature. In Section 4 I give my argument for the trade-off 
relation between basic EBP epistemic values and moral values that are sensitive to the 
distributive consequences of policy. I expand on how this trade-off challenges both value-
freedom and neutrality in the EBP paradigm. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Epistemic Values in EBP 
Before I sketch the central epistemic values in the EBP paradigm and how they relate to 
EBP methodology, it is important to note that there is perhaps no univocally accepted set 
of epistemic values common to all activities under the EBP heading. More fundamentally, 
it may be contested whether there is something like a unified EBP paradigm at all. The 
EBP movement, particularly as it changes over time and in response to various criticisms, 
is difficult to precisely demarcate as a unified paradigm with distinctive and invariant 
objectives, methods, underlying epistemic value presuppositions and so forth.
1
  
Even so, it is not entirely misleading to think that there is a kernel of epistemic values that 
are common to a broad variety of activities under the EBP heading. It is this kernel of 
values that I focus on. These values are not coextensive with traditional epistemic values in 
the context of theory choice or appraisal such as those offered by Kuhn (1977). Instead, for 
empirical paradigms such as EBP it seems more plausible to consider values that concern 
the production of treatment-effect estimates. More specifically, the values that I focus on 
are rigor, unbiasedness, precision and the ability to obtain causal conclusions on grounds 
of EBP evidence. I consider these values to be prima facie uncontroversial instances of 
purely epistemic values that seem to be shared among many EBP practitioners. While it is 
                                                        
1
 In addition to this caveat, it is important to note that the construal of Evidence-Based Policy I 
consider here is somewhat constrained in that it prevalently focuses on the so-called treatment-
effects literature as instantiated in e.g. econometrics and evidence-based economics, evidence-
based medicine and educational research. The distinctive characteristic of this literature is its 
predominant focus on experimental and quasi-experimental methods to estimate treatment 
effectiveness. This is considerably narrower than a construal of evidence-based policy as policy 
that is informed by any empirical evidence rather than only specific kinds of such evidence. I thank 
Erin Nash for raising this important point about the scope of Evidence-Based Policy. 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1657-
  3 
not always clear what these values specifically consist in, my argument is sufficiently 
broad to cover most plausible construals that they permit.
2
 
The values that I focus on are central to EBP in the sense that they jointly give rise to (and 
are promoted by) standard EBP methodology, i.e. a set of salient methodological principles 
that seem to be shared among proponents of the paradigm.  
For instance, EBP methodology specifically focuses on certain epistemic targets, i.e. causal 
conclusions about policy effectiveness. Moreover, EBP methodology is premised on 
principles concerning the relative desirability of certain kinds of evidence, e.g. by 
emphasis of the superiority of experimental and quasi-experimental contra purely 
observational evidence. Finally, EBP methodology emphasizes the relative ability of 
different methods with respect to generating desirable kinds of evidence; again by focusing 
on RCTs (and quasi-experimental designs) as opposed to observational studies. 
Together, these methodological principles mediate between epistemic values and methods 
in the sense that EBP methodology promotes values such as rigor, unbiasedness and causal 
inference in virtue of recommending the use of RCTs. 
 
2.1 Value Neutrality and Freedom in EBP  
Aside from the identification of crucial EBP epistemic values, it is important to consider 
whether EBP involves some ideal of value-freedom and/or neutrality. Similar to the issue 
of identifying key EBP epistemic values, it is not obvious that EBP proponents in general 
pursue any specific ideal with respect to value-freedom and neutrality.  
Even so, it seems that the EBP paradigm rests on a relatively broad axiological 
presupposition that a division of labor with regard to settling normative issues of what 
values policy should promote and settling factual issues of what are effective means to 
promote these values is possible. In other words, EBP proponents seem to assume that 
agreement on the desirability of policy outcomes can be separated from the production of 
evidence speaking for the efficacy and effectiveness of policy in realizing these outcomes. 
                                                        
2 There may be several additional candidate epistemic values that appear to play prominent roles in 
shaping EBP research but are not considered here. One such candidate is generality, where the 
principled aim is to establish general claims about the causal efficacy of intervention-types that are 
robust across time, environments, populations, and individuals. This value seems particularly 
relevant for extrapolation of causal claims to novel targets; an issue that is related to, but 
epistemologically distinct, from the issue of welfare analysis of extant interventions that I focus on. 
I thank Heather Douglas for proposing this additional candidate value at the “Science, Values and 
Democracy” workshop in Tilburg, NL.  
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This broadly parallels traditional ideals regarding the role of non-epistemic, moral values 
in economics, where economists have frequently invoked the metaphor of economists as 
social engineers, who provide factual answers to policy questions independently from and 
typically after policy makers have settled issues concerning the relative desirability of 
social outcomes (cf. Hausman and McPherson 1996). While I am not claiming that EBP 
proponents subscribe to this particular ideal, EBP methodology seems to presuppose at 
least that some such division of labor is possible. Let me expand on what this suggests for 
the role of value-freedom and neutrality in EBP.  
First, it seems plausible that many EBP proponents pursue some ideal of value-freedom in 
the sense that non-epistemic values are generally not and should not be involved in shaping 
the conduct and outcomes of EBP research internally. For instance, while non-epistemic 
values may be involved in selecting outcome variables of interest, or may act as constraints 
on whether conducting RCTs is morally permissible, non-epistemic values are generally 
not and should not be involved in the choice and application of methods once these issues 
are settled. For instance, the choice between RCTs and observational studies, or the 
interpretation of estimands obtained from such studies, should not vary with respect to 
researchers’ preferred conclusions about the desirability of the policies under scrutiny. 
These internal aspects should be guided by epistemic values alone.  
Second, I consider EBP proponents to pursue some version of value-neutrality in the sense 
that the outcomes of EBP research are intended to be value-neutral insofar as they should 
not, and generally do not issue unconditional normative claims about the relative 
desirability of social outcomes or the interventions that promote them. At most, if there are 
normative claims issued in the dissemination of EBP research, these claims take the shape 
of hypothetical imperatives, i.e. normative claims that are conditional on some substantive 
value presupposition but do not endorse this value presupposition as such. 
In order for EBP research to maintain value-neutral, the adequacy of such presuppositions 
speaking for the desirability of some social outcome must be settled independently from 
(and perhaps prior to) generating information about the relative effectiveness of different 
interventions in producing the outcome. If such independence is achieved, then even if 
EBP research sometimes issues normative claims, these claims are still value-neutral since 
they remain non-committal on the adequacy of the substantive moral value presuppositions 
involved. This issue is left to policy-makers to settle. 
With this brief exposition in mind, let me focus on the underlying reasons for why the 
epistemic challenges involved in generating information about the distributive 
consequences of policy yield a trade-off between the epistemic values outlined above and 
non-epistemic values such as equality and priority for the worst-off.  
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3. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity 
Public policy interventions almost invariably affect agents in heterogeneous ways. 
Consider for instance the case of microfinance programs, i.e. programs that supply 
microcredits to agents who lack access to capital markets. Let us grant for the moment that 
at least some of these programs may be successful in generating positive long-run welfare 
consequences for target populations, e.g. by increasing average household endowment or 
private investment. Even so, behavioral response to microfinance access often differs 
significantly between agents (cf. Banerjee et al. 2015)
3
. Some agents, e.g. those whose 
otherwise successful entrepreneurial efforts are inhibited by inadequate access to capital 
markets, may significantly benefit from such programs. Yet, other, economically less 
sophisticated agents may be driven into debt traps by pursuing unprofitable business plans 
and taking up high-interest loans in order to repay initial program loans. 
Such heterogeneity in individual treatment effects is predominantly attributable to 
differences in the causal mechanisms involved in the production of the outcomes of 
interest or the individual-specific realizations of variables that figure in these mechanisms. 
This means that the mechanisms connecting treatment and outcome variables of interest 
typically involve various factors other than treatment that affect the causal relations 
between treatment and outcome in different ways. For instance, the mechanisms that 
causally relate microfinance access and eventual welfare consequences for target agents 
are plausibly mediated and moderated by an extensive battery of factors such as 
entrepreneurial ability, education, prior business ownership, pre-intervention budget 
constraints, business plan feasibility etc. These and other factors jointly moderate or 
mediate the causal effect of treatment on outcome, and agents will typically differ with 
respect to their individual-specific realizations of these factors as well as whether and how 
these factors are involved in the individual-specific mechanism that govern the production 
of the outcomes of interest. As a consequence of such differences, individual treatment 
effects with respect to one and the same intervention will typically differ between 
individuals. 
This kind of causally relevant heterogeneity is likely to obtain in many areas traditionally 
targeted by EBP, e.g. in educational policy, where students may respond differentially to 
educational initiatives as a function of initial ability; in economic policy where policy 
outcomes may differ significantly between industries, individual firms and other agential 
units; and in public health and development economics, where agents’ response to 
programs such as bednet distribution might exhibit substantial heterogeneity as a function 
of agents’ basic needs or epidemiological knowledge. 
                                                        
3
 Cited with permission from the authors 
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As these stylized facts indicate, heterogeneity among agents’ response to treatment is 
ubiquitous in several key areas targeted by EBP. Yet, the issue of heterogeneity has only 
recently attracted attention from EBP proponents (in marked contrast to evidence-based 
medicine, see e.g. Oxman and Guyatt 1992 for an early treatment). This is surprising 
because heterogeneity is responsible for one of the most basic inferential challenges that 
EBP faces, i.e. the problem of extrapolating experimental results from study populations to 
eventual policy targets. Let me expand on some technical background to explain why this 
is the case. 
 
3.1 Heterogeneity Information from RCTs 
Technically, treatment effect heterogeneity is the systematic variation in the sign and/or 
magnitude of individual treatment effects among agents subject to a given intervention. In 
a potential outcomes framework (Rubin 1974, Holland 1986), given an outcome of interest 
�, the individual treatment effect (ITE) for individual � is the difference between her 
potential outcome �!(1) given the treatment and her potential outcome �!(0) in the absence 
of treatment, other things being equal. Since only one of the two values of �! can ever be 
observed, ITEs are in principle unobservable magnitudes.  
RCTs can be considered to remedy this inferential dead-end at least to some extent by 
permitting the estimation of average treatment effects (ATEs) instead of ITEs. This is 
achieved by randomization of confounding factors and treatment moderators and 
mediators
4
 through random assignment of subjects to experimental and control conditions 
and multiple blinding of trial participants, those administering treatment and those 
recording and interpreting outcomes. Provided that randomization (and blinding) are 
successful in that the net effects of confounders and moderators (as well as their 
interactions) are approximately balanced between treatment and control groups, an ideal 
RCT can help obtain a consistent estimate of the ATE by taking the difference in means of 
� for treated and untreated units, or ��� =  �! 1 − �!(0). 
This estimate of the ATE, however, does not permit inferences about ITEs. At best, and in 
the absence of any knowledge about treatment effect covariates such as moderators and 
mediators as well as heterogeneity in their individual-specific realizations, the ATE 
estimate can figure as the expectation of the ITE for an individual randomly drawn from 
the experimental population. But as soon as there is (suspected) heterogeneity among 
treatment-effect covariate realizations and consequently ITEs, this estimate will not be 
                                                        
4 The distinction between confounders and moderators/mediators being that confounders influence 
the outcome variable independently of treatment whereas moderators/mediators influence the 
outcome by affecting the causal pathway(s) connecting treatment and outcome.  
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1661-
  7 
precise, so accurate inferences about ITEs are largely precluded and information on 
heterogeneity cannot be recovered from ���. 5 
This has significant bearing on the transferability of trial results, i.e. the extent to which 
the ATE from a study population A can be expected to be replicated in some other 
population B. Two jointly sufficient conditions for the transferability of trial results to 
some out-of-sample target are first, that the treatment variable plays the same causal role in 
the production of the outcome in the target as it does in the experimental population, i.e. 
that the mechanisms in both populations are sufficiently similar with respect to the causal 
claim to be extrapolated. The second condition is that the distribution of treatment effect 
covariates in the target is the same in both populations (see e.g. Cartwright and Marcellesi 
2015 for similar conditions).
6
 So the transferability of experimental results to targets 
hinges not only on sufficient similarity in mechanisms between populations but also on 
whether there is heterogeneity effected by differences in treatment-effect covariates as well 
as how such covariates such as moderators and mediators are distributed among agents in 
the populations of interest. This problem has received attention from a variety of 
econometricians, methodologists, philosophers of science and EBP proponents (e.g. Hotz-
Imbens and Mortimer 2005, Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2008; Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009; Bareinboim and Pearl 2013; Cartwright and Marcellesi 2015).  
However, heterogeneity does not only affect the transferability of trial results. It also 
creates a second challenge for EBP. The challenge is that in the absence of information on 
heterogeneity, RCTs are not suitable for informing any policy formation process that is 
concerned with the distributive consequences of policy (cf. Manski 2000). More 
specifically, policy-makers are often interested in knowing not only whether an 
intervention is effective on average but also in how effective the intervention will be for 
specific types of agents, how heterogeneous treatment effects are distributed among agents, 
with respect to which observable baseline characteristics, whether heterogeneity obtains in 
magnitude or also in sign, etc.  
This information is crucial particularly in those cases where it is reasonable to suspect that 
at least some agents may respond negatively to an intervention, even though the ATE 
might be positive. In these scenarios, several pertinent distributive concerns arise, e.g. is it 
at all permissible to implement policy that will render some agents worse off? If so, how 
                                                        
5  While this difference-in-means estimation yields, without strong assumptions, an unbiased 
estimate of the sample ATE, and under somewhat stronger assumptions of the population ATE, it 
takes substantive assumptions about distributions of ITEs to estimate even the sample variance of 
the ATE (although this estimate can be bounded by inspection of the treatment and control mean 
variances).  
6
 Necessary conditions might be weaker, cf. Bareinboim and Pearl (2013) 
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should we adjudicate between the negative welfare consequences for these agents and the 
net effectiveness of the intervention? What are the thresholds of proportionality that we 
should use to decide whether welfare benefits on the part of some outweigh welfare losses 
on the part of others? Can the policy be targeted so that it predominantly affects those who 
will benefit from the intervention? And so forth.  
As these stylized concerns suggest, policy-makers may be interested in pursuing a variety 
of different distributive values. Yet, in order to pursue these values rigorously, in the sense 
that they have good reasons to believe that an intervention will promote them, policy-
makers require information on treatment effect heterogeneity, i.e. whether there is 
heterogeneity at all and how heterogeneous treatment effects are distributed with respect to 
agents’ observable characteristics. As I have argued above, RCTs do not provide such 
information on their own.  
Yet, this does not mean that EBP methodology is at a complete loss in this regard, as EBP 
proponents may be keen to point out that one way to address this problem is to perform so-
called subgroup analyses. However, I argue below that performing such analyses comes at 
the expense of sacrificing several key EBP epistemic values and that this creates a tradeoff 
between the epistemic values central to EBP and the pursuit of moral and political values 
such as equality and priority for the worst off. 
 
3.2 Subgroup Analysis as a Remedy for Informing about Heterogeneity 
Following Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008), subgroup analyses partition 
experimental populations into subgroups according to observable characteristics such as 
age, sex, ethnicity, prior education etc. They then typically further partition subgroups into 
different categories or strata, for instance age groups. Given this stratification, a difference-
in-means estimation can be run on the partitioned data to obtain conditional, subgroup-
specific ATEs (CATEs). An alternative to this stratification approach that is applied 
predominantly when investigating binary and categorical variables, is to run so-called 
meta-regressions, where potentially interesting treatment-effect covariates are modeled as 
interaction terms with treatment in a standard regression framework. In doing so, it is 
possible to obtain information on significant interaction effects between observables and 
treatment that may be taken as evidence for the involvement of the respective treatment 
effect covariates as moderators or mediators. 
Even so, while subgroup analyses seem to offer at least tentative information about 
heterogeneity, they are also subject to several pertinent methodological concerns. Let me 
expand on two particularly pressing concerns and explain how they bear on the realization 
of EBP epistemic values. 
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First, the information that meta-regressions can generate is purely correlational in nature, 
and hence subject to standard concerns about endogeneity and consequent bias. For 
instance, statistically significant parameter estimates on treatment effect heterogeneity of 
microfinance programs with respect to differences in prior business ownership do not 
permit the straightforward interpretation that prior business ownership is a causally 
relevant treatment effect covariate.  
This is because the significance of the estimate may be attributable to common-causes, e.g. 
because business ownership is highly correlated with business education, and it is business 
education that is causally relevant for the production of microfinance outcomes, but prior 
business ownership in the absence of business education may not contribute at all to 
outcomes of interest.
7
 In this case, if business education is not included in the regression, 
our estimates of individual-level heterogeneity with respect to prior business ownership 
will be biased.  
More generally, parameter estimates for treatment effect covariates will invariably remain 
subject to such concerns about bias unless we can entertain the relatively strong 
assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term of the meta-regression 
(see e.g. Pearl 2014). However, it is precisely such assumptions, which are necessary for 
unbiased identification in regression contexts, that EBP proponents are typically keen to 
avoid and that are expressly dismissed in the methodological tenets that emphasize 
randomization as the key strategy to avoid questionable identification assumptions. 
Randomization at the treatment stage does not alleviate these concerns either, because 
treatment effect moderators are not necessarily randomly distributed among agents who, 
with respect to one subgroup characteristic, may systematically differ on several other 
relevant and collinear or interacted covariates at once. This means that obtaining unbiased 
estimates and straightforward causal conclusions about the role of covariates as treatment 
moderators is typically precluded, threatening at least two EBP epistemic values at once. 
A second worry about subgroup analyses concerns the precision of effect estimates and 
statistical power. In short, the more subgroups one specifies, the higher the probability of 
obtaining spurious results. For typical significance levels at �  <  0.05 even a moderate 
number of subgroups, strata partitions and corresponding hypothesis tests will render the 
                                                        
7
 For instance, prior business ownership in the absence of business education can be exhibited by 
agents who have previously pursued unprofitable business plans and may continue to do so in the 
future. Thus the unbiased parameter estimate for business ownership is likely to be substantially 
smaller than the estimate for business education. To permit unbiased estimation of interaction 
terms, one would at least need to induce additional exogenous variation in the covariates of 
interest. But this would require significantly different trials designs with multiple, parallel 
interventions on treatment as well as covariate realizations (see e.g. Imai et al. 2013). While such 
designs are in principle feasible, they also raise issues with precision and statistical power. 
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occurrence of spurious results exceedingly likely. At the very least, suitable statistical 
corrections for multiple hypothesis testing are in order to remedy the consequences of 
multiple testing for the prevalence of false positives. Yet, while recommended by some 
EBP proponents (e.g. Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2008, 65), this is rarely carried out in 
practice (cf. Fink et al. 2014, 47). Moreover, to alleviate concerns about insufficient 
statistical power and precision, sample sizes may need to be expanded for subgroup 
analyses to be sufficiently informative. For instance, in order to detect a heterogeneity 
signal of the same magnitude as the ATE and with the same precision as the ATE estimate, 
a difference-in-means estimation on just one subgroup partitioned into two strata requires a 
fourfold expansion of the original sample size (Varadhan and Seeger 2013, 38). Yet, 
subgroup-specific effects are often significantly smaller than ATEs, which requires much 
greater expansions of sample size to maintain sufficient power.  
These and other, related concerns severely limit the extent to which subgroup analyses can 
inform about treatment effect heterogeneity. At most, and in line with standard 
recommendations (e.g. Varadhan and Seeger 2013), subgroup findings should be 
considered exploratory in the sense that they may prompt additional investigations such as 
novel trials on subgroups of interest, but are insufficient to warrant definitive conclusions 
about heterogeneity by themselves.  
However, while conducting novel trials on potentially vulnerable subgroups appears to be 
a viable strategy to address some of the above concerns, this requires prior identification of 
the relevant subgroups. Unfortunately, we are rarely in the epistemically fortunate position 
to know which individuals are most likely to incur welfare losses in advance, since that 
depends on knowing what the causally relevant treatment effect covariates are, how they 
affect the outcomes of interest as well as which agents exhibit beneficial vs. harmful 
realizations of such covariates. So precise information on heterogeneity is still required 
even if we are willing to conduct subsequent trials on vulnerable subgroups. 
The extant EBP literature has only recently started to address treatment effect 
heterogeneity issues. Yet, even though there are several recent social policy and 
development studies that perform at least tentative and exploratory heterogeneity analyses, 
they frequently fail to address one or more of the concerns outlined above (see e.g. Fink et 
al. 2014) or tend to focus on between-trial heterogeneity, which is a related but 
conceptually distinct issue from the within-trial and between-subject heterogeneity that I 
consider here. 
Let me expand on how these epistemic challenges for informing about heterogeneity create 
a trade-off between epistemic and moral values and how this trade-off challenges both 
value-freedom and neutrality in EBP.  
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4. A Trade-off Between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values 
The trade-off between epistemic and non-epistemic values that I want to highlight is a 
result of the differential usefulness of EBP research outcomes for the pursuit of different 
kinds of moral values, i.e. broadly utilitarian and non-utilitarian values respectively. 
Standard EBP methods such as RCTs, Regression Discontinuity Designs and IV 
identification strategies are in general capable of generating outputs that are sufficient for 
the pursuit of standard utilitarian values, i.e. those that are concerned with the increase or 
maximization of aggregate or average welfare. This is because the distribution of 
individual-specific contributions to aggregate welfare outcomes is not a primary concern 
for increasing aggregate or average welfare, so information on heterogeneity is not 
necessary for the pursuit of these values.
8
 
Yet, such information on heterogeneity is necessary for the pursuit of any moral and 
political value that is sensitive to how aggregate outcomes are realized. For instance, the 
pursuit of broadly egalitarian or prioritarian values requires at least information on the 
initial distribution of welfare among agents as well as information on the changes to this 
distribution brought about by the intervention at issue. Yet, as I have argued above, such 
information on treatment effect heterogeneity cannot be provided by RCTs alone. At the 
very least, subgroup analyses need to be carried out in order to permit at least tentative 
conclusions about heterogeneity. Moreover, methods such as Causal Bayes Net Analysis, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Process Tracing and Machine Learning may present 
potentially superior alternatives for the identification of causally relevant treatment effect 
covariates that generate heterogeneity. However, such techniques are rarely acknowledged 
or mentioned in the standard manuals circulating in the EBP literature (e.g. Angrist and 
Pischke 2009), and even if they were, these methods are often neither straightforwardly 
compatible with the identification strategies that EBP practitioners typically pursue nor 
with the evidence ranking schemes that EBP methodologists subscribe to. 
This licenses two conclusions. First, EBP methodology presently favors the production and 
use of evidence suitable for the pursuit of utilitarian values, i.e. those that focus on 
increasing or maximizing average or aggregate welfare. Second, EBP methodology 
presently fails to adequately promote or even hinders the production of high-quality 
evidence on heterogeneity that is necessary for the pursuit of many non-utilitarian values. 
As a consequence, standard EBP methodology renders the pursuit of distributive values 
such as egalitarian or prioritarian ones relatively more difficult or infeasible. 
                                                        
8
 It might still be helpful, since welfare maximization is easier to accomplish when we have 
information that helps pick out those individuals who will likely benefit most from some 
intervention; granted that interventions can be targeted to affect only such individuals. 
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This generates a trade-off between the epistemic values central to EBP and the moral and 
political values that policy-makers are in a position to pursue effectively on grounds of 
EBP evidence. More specifically, whenever the pursuit of moral and political values 
requires information on distributive consequences of policy, standard EBP evidence fails 
to provide the required information. Conversely, whenever evidence of the kind required to 
inform about distributive consequences of policy shall be produced, this requires at least 
some sacrifice of basic EBP epistemic values. More specifically, whenever EBP 
methodology and methods are changed in order to generate information on heterogeneity, 
e.g. by means of subgroup analyses, this comes at the expense of sacrificing at least three 
crucial EBP epistemic values at once, i.e. the unbiasedness and precision of effect 
estimates, as well as the ability to obtain causal conclusions. Maintaining these values, on 
the other hand, comes at the expense of sacrificing the informativeness of EBP research 
outputs about the distributive consequences of policy.
9
 
Let me expand on what this trade-off implies for value-freedom and neutrality in EBP. 
First, if the value-free ideal underlying the EBP paradigm is to say that non-epistemic 
values are generally not and should not be involved in shaping the conduct and outcomes 
of EBP research internally, then the desirability of this ideal is challenged. The reason is 
that moral and political values are at least involved to the extent that without suitable 
changes to EBP methodology, the pursuit of non-utilitarian values is inhibited. If this 
situation should be remedied, then this requires changes to methodology that privilege or 
prioritize the production of evidence on heterogeneity. However, and this is the crucial 
point, these changes will be effected by moral values, since it is the pursuit of moral values 
that motivates the requisite changes to methodology. To the extent that these changes to 
methodology are justifiable and justified, this means that value-freedom in EBP is not a 
desirable ideal, even at internal stages such as method choice and model specification.  
Value-neutrality is challenged as well. It assumes that once the desirability of some social 
outcome is agreed upon, evidence speaking in favor of the effectiveness of some 
intervention in realizing this outcome at most figures in conditionally normative policy 
recommendations. 
                                                        
9 This point may appear similar to Helen Longino’s who argues that several traditional epistemic 
values are not purely epistemic and “[…] that their use in certain contexts of scientific judgment 
imports significant socio-political values into those contexts” (Longino 1996:54). However, my 
point is weaker than Longino’s in the sense that it should appeal even to those who insist on the 
purely epistemic character of values such as unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain 
causal conclusions. Specifically, I do not argue that these values fail to be purely epistemic as they 
exhibit a demonstrably political (or moral) valence (ibid.). Instead, even if we grant that these 
values are purely epistemic, their pursuit may still have important ramifications for the extent to 
which the pursuit of other, moral values is facilitated or inhibited. 
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Yet, inferences about policy effectiveness are typically grounded in information about 
ATEs and as such do not accommodate information on distributive consequences. So this 
way of operationalizing what it means for a program to be effective brackets concerns 
about heterogeneity. As it stands, an effective program is considered a good program to the 
extent that the outcome of interest tracks a relevant moral or societal good. However, even 
if this good is uncontroversial in itself, effectiveness still only means effectiveness on 
average, not some effectiveness for everyone, or sufficient effectiveness for the worst-off, 
or equal effectiveness for all policy subjects.  
To maintain neutrality with respect to distributive values it is not enough to agree on the 
desirability of social outcomes as such. It is also necessary to agree upon the ways in which 
these outcomes may be realized, since a given change in aggregate outcomes can usually 
be achieved in various ways, each of which may have dramatically different distributive 
consequences for target populations, some of which may be more or less desirable in 
themselves. This issue is masked when broadly utilitarian values are pursued, but becomes 
apparent when distributive consequences matter; as is the case for the pursuit of egalitarian 
and prioritarian values. So if we care about differences between agents and about absolute 
and relative changes in outcome distributions, then effectiveness as standardly construed in 
EBP is not informative about the moral permissibility or desirability of policy and might 
be misleading about what effective programs are ultimately able to do for us, given the 
specific moral and political values that we pursue. 
So at present, it seems that the dissemination of EBP research is premised on the implicit 
value presupposition that the relevant magnitude for deciding which policy to implement is 
its effectiveness in terms of average treatment effects. And this fails to be value neutral in 
the envisioned sense because it assumes that average effectiveness is the proper target of 
interest rather than delegating the question of whether it is, to policy makers and other 
agents to settle. In a nutshell, in order to maintain a traditional ideal of value-neutrality, 
additional value presuppositions such as the above must be made explicit for EBP policy 
recommendations to remain value-neutral in the envisioned sense. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that there exists a trade-off relation between key EBP epistemic values and 
non-epistemic values that are sensitive to distributive consequences of policy, e.g. equality 
and priority for the worst-off. This trade-off obtains because the outputs afforded by 
standard EBP methods are differentially useful for the pursuit of different moral and 
political values. I have argued that this trade-off challenges ideals of value-freedom and 
neutrality in the EBP paradigm. This may be taken as starting point to reconsider some of 
the standard epistemic value presuppositions entertained in EBP as well as for refining 
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EBP methodology in ways that enable and facilitate the pursuit of a wider range of moral 
and political values.  
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Abstract
How-possibly models are usually treated as some kind of second-rate theoretical tools. 
They may be indispensable in the early stages of theorizing, but do not constitute the main 
aim of modeling, namely, the discovering of a one true mechanism responsible for the 
phenomenon under study. I argue that this prevailing picture does not do justice to the 
synthetic strategy that is commonly used in the engineering sciences. In synthetic biology, 
how-possibly models are not something to be eliminated by a more detailed analysis, but 
rather design hypotheses for a field whose ultimate goal is to build novel biological 
systems.
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1. Introduction
According to the most influential contemporary account of explanation in the philosophy 
of biology, namely, that of mechanistic explanation, the aim of the life sciences is seen as 
the discovering and modeling of mechanisms that “produce, underlie, or maintain a 
phenomenon” that is being studied (Craver and Darden 2013, 15). The mechanistic 
strategy of modeling is typically conceptualized as proceeding by somehow constraining a 
space of possible mechanisms for a given phenomenon or function. According to Craver 
(2007, 31), the space of possible mechanisms contains all the mechanisms that could 
possibly explain a phenomenon. By explicating a particular point in this space, scientists 
construct a how-possibly explanation or model. Furthermore, it is often assumed that there 
is just one true or correct mechanism, the details of which are ideally captured in a finished
how-actually model. Intermediate between these two extremes are how-plausibly models, 
which form a more tightly constrained subset of how-possibly models, but still lack the full
empirical support of a how-actually model. (Craver and Darden 2013, 34–35.)
According to the prevailing picture of biological modeling strategy, a successful search for 
a mechanistic explanation should converge on one single mechanistic model candidate, and
divergent how-possibly models that differ in their mechanistic details should be discarded 
as superfluous and scientifically incorrect. According to Craver (2007, 131), 
“Distinguishing good explanations from bad requires that one distinguishes real 
components from fictional posits. The most dramatic examples of fictional posits include 
animal spirits, entelechies, and souls, but fictitious entities can be far more mundane than 
these”. He concludes that many how-possibly mechanisms “require parts (and activities) 
2
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that do not exist” (Craver 2007, 131, my emphasis). Because modern-day scientists want 
their models to work, and in particular, do not want to commit themselves to any kind of 
spooky non-existent entities, how-possibly models are usually considered as something 
that should be eliminated as quickly as possible when conducting serious research. In 
contemporary philosophy of science, how-possibly models are often treated as some kind 
of second-rate explanations or theoretical tools (e.g., Rosenberg 2006, 45; see also Craver 
2006, 361, 2007, 112). 
In this paper I will argue that this current view concerning the role of how-possibly models
is very narrow. More precisely, it may be a good approximation in the context of scientific 
analysis of natural systems where research advances through the methods of 
decomposition and localization (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010). However, this does 
not preempt all the goals of biological investigation. The idea of starting from a range of 
possible models and then working towards one or a very limited number of how-actually 
models seems to make much sense when one considers the general purpose of biological 
investigation. For example, given that one of the main aims of science is to provide 
manageable generalizations that unify phenomena as much as possible, focusing on how 
things actually work is a neat idea and surely a good starting point! Especially, it is much 
more manageable to model complex high level input–output phenomena when they can be 
cashed out in terms of a few select mechanisms that are already familiar. Another reason 
that is especially prominent in the life sciences is the ability to effectively intervene on 
various target systems for medical purposes (see Craver 2007). Why would scientists 
3
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bother wasting their time with mere how-possibly models that do not provide good access 
to actual phenomena, not to mention ways to effectively intervene on them?
However, although it is often the case that scientists are interested in some well-defined 
actual target system, it is also true that a lot of times the target of investigation is some 
more abstract feature of the living world that might require studying objects that, strictly 
speaking, do not exist, at least at the moment of investigation (Dawkins 1986; Dennett 
1995, 102–103). I hold that the same is true also in the context of the synthetic strategy that
is commonly used in the engineering sciences. In the field of synthetic biology, researchers
use how-possibly models to study what may be called potential biological systems. I argue 
that in the hands of bioengineers, abstract how-possibly models are not something to be 
eliminated by a more detailed analysis, but rather design hypotheses for a field whose ulti-
mate goal is to build novel biological systems and “re-wire” existing ones. I explicate this 
role further by providing an example from the study of alternative genetic systems by 
synthetic biologist Steven Benner and his group. The case will highlight how the method of
synthesis, even when it fails, provides an effective way to limit the space of possible 
models for biological mechanisms. This has effects for the study of potential and actual 
natural systems alike.
2. From Actual to Potential Biological Systems 
It is often said that one important thing about mechanistic understanding is the ability to 
answer “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions (e.g., Craver 2006, 358, following 
4
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Woodward 2003). This is certainly true in the sense that, ideally, when a mechanism is 
fully understood (i.e., our best model of it does not contain any black boxes left to open) 
we are able to reliably predict its output for a range of input and parameter values and even
manipulate its functioning. Knowing how an actual mechanism operates as accurately as 
possible gives us more effective ways to handle typical contrafactual questions that arise in
science (cf. Craver 2006). However, this kind of access to full mechanistic details of actual 
target systems forms only one part of contrafactual reasoning that is of interest to scientists.
Sometimes, especially when dealing with some more theoretical issues, scientists who ask 
“what-if-things-had-been-different” questions are not in fact inquiring how accurately we 
understand the parts and workings of some actual mechanism. Rather, I suggest, they 
might be wondering whether the mechanism (or the system in general) itself could, or 
could have been, different. It is in this way that, instead of being just an eliminable scaffold
on the way towards a how-actually model, a how-possibly model can become the main 
object of inquiry in its own right.
Taking how-possibly models of biological systems seriously in the above sense might 
mean two things. First, it might simply mean taking seriously the general strategy of 
“turning the tables around”, that is, focusing research on what is possible instead of actual 
in the biological world. This is akin to an exploration into the dark where rather few things 
limit the search space. Second, it might mean that one is committed to the study of some 
particular how-possibly model or set of models for a phenomenon for which there already 
is a how-actually model. The second version has the nice advantage that we already have 
an existential proof that that phenomenon or function is indeed realizable at all. We can 
5
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then investigate whether it can be achieved by means of some alternative mechanism; the 
strategy is essentially contrastive in nature. Indeed, this is something that is done in many 
quarters of biological engineering and especially in the field of synthetic biology.
As in the case of more traditional life scientific research, mechanistic understanding and 
modeling of biological systems is at the heart of synthetic biology. In a sense, synthetic 
biology can be seen as taking them even further. The field is often characterized by a strive
to build novel biological systems (Elowitz and Lim 2010). Because this requires an 
excessive ability to manipulate existing biological mechanisms, synthetic biology is often 
portrayed as the ultimate test for our mechanistic understanding of the living world in 
general (Endy 2005; Elowitz and Lim 2010).1 However, at the same time these 
bioengineers are also testing completely new waters by expanding biological 
understanding over and above naturally occurring systems. Some of the synthetic systems, 
like artificial genetic circuits, that have been built can be seen both as new biological 
objects in their own right and as certain kind of concrete, but theoretical models of what 
kind of design principles are biologically feasible (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2013). 
Although the study of these potential biological systems is targeted at certain very specific 
types of how-possibly models of biological systems, they can be seen as enriching our 
understanding of biology in terms that go beyond mere engineering feats (Morange 2009). 
1 Craver and Darden (2013, 92–94) also mention the importance of engineering or “build 
it” test as an effective way to further refine scientific understanding of biological 
mechanisms.
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For example, it has been suggested that synthetic design methods might be able to prove 
valuable information about the nature and limits of the evolution of gene regulation: 
[An important problem in evolutionary biology is] why the genetic network 
architectures we observe in Nature have evolved to solve a particular problem an 
organism faces in its environment. This challenge is often complemented by the 
question of which selective forces (i.e. environmental or cellular conditions) have 
shaped the biological systems we observe in modern organisms. The null hypothesis 
is simply that a particular architecture has arisen by non-selective forces and that 
multiple architectures would be sufficient to achieve the biological functionality 
observed. (Bayer 2010, R775.) 
In normal evolutionary research, these kinds of questions are often difficult to evaluate 
because many specific functions are found only in a very limited number of systems or 
model organisms; the relevant sample might also be biased by historical contingency. 
Modeling the mechanistic details of the actual system in ever greater detail does not seem 
to be of much help here. However, thanks to synthetic biology and other forms of 
biological engineering, evolutionary studies are no more necessarily restricted by the 
availability of naturally occurring systems: “The construction of synthetic versions of 
natural circuits is a powerful way to interrogate questions of ‘why’ in biology” (Bayer 
2010, R775). Endy also defines one of the main goals of synthetic biology as follows: 
“[…] synthetic biology provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that the genomes 
encoding natural biological systems can be ‘re-written’, producing engineered surrogates 
7
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that might usefully supplant some natural biological systems” (Endy 2005, 449; see also 
Sprinzak and Elowitz 2005).
The re-design strategy depicted here limits its focus on systems that differ in their 
underlying mechanistic architecture, but that are nevertheless capable of realizing the same
higher level function. It is reminiscent of the situation that philosophers often call by the 
name “multiple realizability”. Because how-possibly models are often presented in exactly 
this kind of situation where they are in a sense explanatory rivals for one and the same 
phenomenon, it is easy to see how they fit into the conceptual scheme of “biological re-
writers”. One of the most compelling examples of this kind of research comes from the 
study of artificial genetic systems that can be regarded as functional alternatives for our 
natural DNA. It is there that various how-possibly models, on top of their more traditional 
explanatory purport, seem to have the role of explicit design hypotheses.
3. Alternative Alphabets for Life’s Code
Why is the genetic code based on the DNA molecule? Is it a functional necessity, or just a 
historical accident? Because the sample size of life on Earth is one, there is no 
straightforward empirical way to investigate this issue. In his famous booklet What is Life?
the physicist Erwin Schrödinger (1944) originally proposed an inspirational how-possibly 
model for genetic material in which genes were hypothesized as consisting of some kind of
aperiodic crystals. This was nine years before Watson and Crick’s discovery of the 
structure of the DNA molecule. Because of their groundbreaking work, we, of course, now 
8
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have an excellent how-actually model for the implementation of the genetic material. 
However, as successful as their model has turned out to be, it does not really answer all the
why-questions that can be raised regarding the material nature of the genetic code. To 
answer these questions would require contrasting DNA with some other plausible how-
possibly models for genetic material and hoping for some principled clue as to why nature 
has opted for this particular solution.  
Beginning already in the late 1980’s (Switzer, Moroney, and Benner 1989), synthetic 
biologist and chemist Steven Benner has been studying what can be called artificial genetic
systems. These are chemical structures that are supposed to have the essential functional 
features of a genetic code, but that are nevertheless different from the structural design of 
familiar DNA and RNA molecules. According to Benner:
In a version popular today in some engineering communities, [synthetic biology] 
seeks to use natural parts of biological systems (such as DNA fragments and protein 
“biobricks”) to create assemblies that do things that are not done by natural biology 
(such as digital computation or manufacture of a speciality chemical). […] Among 
chemists, “synthetic biology” means the opposite. Chemist’s “synthetic biology” 
seeks to use unnatural molecular parts to do things that are done by natural biology. 
Chemists believe that if they can reproduce biological behavior without making an 
exact molecular replica of a natural living system, then they have demonstrated an 
understanding of the intimate connection between molecular structure and biological 
9
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1679-
behavior. If taken to its limit, this synthesis would provide a chemical understanding 
of life. (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 372; emphasis in original.)
For the last 25 years Benner has done just that. That is, he has studied a wide range of 
different chemical systems that could potentially be used to fulfill the same role as 
DNA/RNA in naturally evolved organisms. Although no such system still exists, 
researchers have managed to construct many interesting variants that have at least some of 
the features required of a code of life, and new exciting results are frequently being 
reported from scientists working at the junction between synthetic biology and chemistry 
(see, e.g., Malyshev at al. 2014; Marlière et al. 2011; Thyer and Ellefson 2014).
Although these studies are limited and far from conclusive, they nevertheless provide 
reasons to believe that DNA might not be the kind of necessary ingredient that some take it
to be as the only thing capable of turning inanimate matter into living, reproducing, and 
evolving systems. In the language of Craver and Darden (2013, 69), they give us good 
reasons to suppose that alternative genetic systems remain a live possibility. To make the 
continued hegemony of DNA as the biochemical medium of choice seem even less secure, 
Benner noted in an interview published in Nature in November 2012 that “The first thing 
you realize is that [DNA] is a stupid design”, further insisting that, “If you were a chemist 
setting out to design this thing, you would not do it this way at all.” (Kwok 2012, 516.)
However, it is one thing to criticize the structural design of DNA, and another to show that 
any other chemical solution would be able to perform the same functions. Because all 
known organisms have their genetic code based on DNA/RNA, the possibility of 
10
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“alternative genetic alphabets” requires strong empirical proof (Thyer and Ellefson 2014, 
291). One would expect there to be good chemical and evolutionary reasons for DNA to be
the medium for genetic information. Although it is nowadays recognized that biological 
solutions are not always optimal in the strong sense, they are nevertheless often extremely 
robust and surprisingly efficient (see Wagner 2005). Because so much complex, 
evolutionarily successful life is based, at the bottom level, on the structural features of 
DNA, it simply cannot be that inadequate as a molecule. However, it is also because of this
most intense of dependencies that it is actually very difficult to make many far reaching 
biological conclusions about the nature of DNA; it is a deeply generatively entrenched fact 
about the living world (Wimsatt 2007, 135–136). 
To understand the requirements for an adequate genetic code, I will first have to examine 
the definition of a living system that Benner and others advocate. This is a working 
definition, which means that it is open for revisions. It nevertheless captures many of the 
features that biologists take to be essential for living systems. In his work, Benner follows 
the so-called “NASA definition” of life as a self-sustaining chemical system capable of 
Darwinian evolution (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 375). Although this definition leaves 
many important facts up for further refinement, it nevertheless already makes some 
empirical bets by, for example, ruling out genuinely Lamarckian systems. As Benner 
himself notes, we do not have any reasons to believe that even Lamarckian systems would 
be strictly impossible (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 375). However, we have to start from
somewhere, and at least we have many empirical examples of Darwinian life, not to 
mention a particularly successful evolutionary framework that unifies these findings. In a 
11
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sense, synthetic biologists can take the testing of this theory even further by trying to come
up with some other kind of chemical systems that can be subsumed under it.    
Benner’s abstract model of a genetic system has three features: (1) the ability to carry 
biological information, (2) the ability to transmit biological information, and (3) the ability 
to support Darwinian evolution (based on Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011). In practice, the 
above list can be thought to encompass also some implicit auxiliary assumptions à la 
Duhem and Quine. Examples of these could be some kind of linear arrangement of the 
code, or the overall chemical and thermodynamic stability of its structure (see Szathmáry 
2003). These general features can also be broken down into smaller mechanisms or causal 
role functions that make them physically feasible. For example, the encoding of biological 
information is often taken to require some kind of chemical specificity, like bonding, lock-
and-key complementarity, and so on. This brings the whole enterprise closer to the how-
plausibly end of all conceivable possibilities.
Although the above list seems quite simple, it contains an implicit tension that makes it 
more difficult to achieve all of the requirements simultaneously. It is obvious that without 
the first requirement, we would simply have no code at all––genetic or other kind. 
However, the mere ability to store information is not that interesting property in itself. The 
code must also be able to transmit information from one system to another. It is only after 
this step is fulfilled that we can actually speak about inheritance. Taken in isolation, the 
requirements (1) and (2) suggest that the more accurate the functions in question are, the 
better the medium is in realizing the code. In a sense this is true. A system that transmits its
12
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information content so poorly that descendant systems hardly resemble their parent 
systems would clearly not be able to support Darwinian life. However, what the 
requirement (3) implicitly insists is that although the copying process should be reliable, it 
should not be completely certain. Otherwise no variation is ever going to accumulate, and 
the system can only produce an endless army of genetically identical clones. Again, the 
space of possible models for genetic material is in this way constrained before any 
considerations about the physical medium has taken place.
According to Benner, many synthetic biologists’ original expectation was that the best 
place to start changing the chemical basis of the genetic code was the sugar backbone of 
natural DNA molecules. This is because the informational specificity of the genetic code is 
often thought to lie in the highly specific complementary base pairings between the 
nucleobases A-T and C-G. The backbone was believed to be just a contingent structure, a 
kind of molecular “scaffold”, whose purpose is to support the real sources of information. 
(Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 376.) However, as it turned out after numerous trials, 
Benner and his team were unable to achieve functionally stable molecules by changing the 
sugar backbone. For example, backbones made of glycerol units turned out be too flexible 
and the whole structure broke down in normal temperatures; the nucleobase bindings alone
were not strong enough to hold the structure together. (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 377.)
In addition to sugars, the DNA backbone features also phosphates. Similar results were 
attained by Benner and his team when they tried to change the phosphates as did in the 
case of the sugars. For example, when the phosphates were replaced by synthetic 
13
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oligosulfones, the structure tended to fold onto itself. (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 378.) 
This was bad news, because folded structures might not be specific enough to ensure 
faithful pairing. Moreover, if the structure is stripped off of its repeating charges that are 
manifest in the phosphates, it might hamper its mutability; remember that the ability to 
evolve is one of the functional requirements of life that Benner advocates in his working 
model. (Benner, Yang, and Chen 2011, 379–380.) Thus, the sugar and phosphate backbone 
with its repeating charges seemed to be a necessary feature of a biologically plausible 
genetic system capable of Darwinian evolution.2 
This meant that in order to achieve the grand goal of an alternative genetic system, the 
changes must be made to the nucleobases. After trying out numerous working hypotheses 
or possible models for a genetic code that is based on alternative or “unnatural” alphabets, 
Benner and his team finally arrived at the six letter alphabet (A, T, C, G, P, Z). Using 
methods from modern biological engineering, like polymerase chain reaction, Benner and 
his team were able to add the bases P and Z to a system based on the natural (A, T, C, G) 
alphabet. These bases were selected because bonding between them has experimentally 
been shown to be very strong and specific. Furthermore, unlike in the case of alternative 
backbones, the new bases can support Darwinian evolution: In the case of the (A, T, C, G, 
P, Z) alphabet, the new bases have been shown to be mutable to natural bases. Also, and 
2 In the case of some xeno nucleic acids, researchers have been able to change the sugar 
backbone of DNA molecules. However, it is not clear whether these systems can support 
life. See Schmidt (2010).
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perhaps even more interestingly, C and G could mutate to give P and Z. (Benner, Yang and,
Chen 2011, 384.) 
Benner’s alphabet has some very interesting biological properties. First, it is a mix of both 
natural and unnatural biochemical, or genetic, “letters”. Second, its cardinality differs from
that of the natural DNA/RNA alphabet. These two features make it possible to use the new 
alphabet to study both disparate and expanded genetic alphabets at the same time––a 
double win. I maintain that these features also make it an interesting case to study various 
how-possibly models of genetic systems.
Do the incorporated bases P and Z radically differ from the molecular structure of those of 
the natural nucleobases? This is somewhat debatable. It is true that the molecular 
mechanisms of pairing between them resemble those of A-T and C-G. However, they are 
still structurally different molecules. It was certainly far from clear that these bases could 
be inserted successfully into a system of natural alphabet. This is especially so because 
they tend to change the “dynamics” of the whole structure. The more different types of 
parts that can possibly interfere with each other there are, the more likely it is that the 
whole system will fail to be able to perform its functions properly; the basic parts of a 
mechanism often seriously constrain its space of possible models (cf. Craver and Darden 
2013: 105). Also, the informational change that is brought by the new nucleobases can be 
as interesting as the change in structural features. With alphabets of different cardinality, it 
is possible to test the idea whether the functions of living systems can be coded in ways 
that differ from the familiar four-letter system. Although previous models had been 
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susceptible about this (Szathmáry 2003), Benner’s (A, T, C, G, P, Z) alphabet is one of the 
first experimental results to give compelling reasons to believe that they do.
4. Conclusions
Contrary to traditional life-scientific practice, the engineering or “synthetic” strategy of 
fields like synthetic biology can be used to explore the space of biological possibilities by 
taking established how-actually models for biological systems as a starting point, and then 
working towards realizing alternative and contrasting how-possibly models. If it succeeds, 
it opens up new exciting possibilities. For example, a fully functional alternative genetic 
alphabet could work as a genetic “firewall” between engineered and naturally evolved 
organisms, providing an effective biosafety tool (Schmidt 2010). However, even if it does 
not, something new is still being learned about the nature of actual systems. Both situations
can have benefits for basic science.
Besides Benner’s group, many others have also been working on synthetic genetic systems 
and alternative alphabets. For example, Marlière et al. (2011) report a successful 
incorporation of a new nucleobase 5-chlorouracil into a laboratory strain of E. coli, while 
Malyshev et al. (2014) produced similar experiments with the pair d5SICSTP-dNaMTP. 
What is remarkable is that both cases exemplified robust functionality with no obvious 
biological pitfalls. It might be that some of the structural features of DNA, like the 
repeating charges along its backbone, are essential; so-called forced moves in the space of 
available design (see Dennett 1995, 128–131). However, with the case of the familiar 
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genetic alphabet, it seems that nature could have chosen otherwise, but for some reason it 
simply did not. It seems to be a partly contingent solution. Because it is not possible for 
evolution to change this situation anymore, the only plausible way to study these questions 
is to use synthetic design methods. This is also good way to naturalize the notion of 
biological possibility: To show that how-possibly models and speculative scenarios of 
evolutionary theory and the rest of biology can be given a philosophically satisfying 
reading.
17
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Connecting Inquiry and Values in Science Education: An Approach 
based on John Dewey’s Perspective 
        
Introduction 
       The results of science surround us and structure our everyday world, and science impacts us 
almost every moment in our lives. We make numerous decisions on issues related to science 
during our lifetime, and every time we make such a decision, values are involved, because 
science is value-laden (Anderson, 2004; Biddle, 2013; Brown, 2012; Douglas, 2000, 2009; 
Kourany, 2010; Longino, 2002). In fact, values play a role not only in decision-making of 
science-related issues such as socio-scientific issues, but also in science practice. As Coulo 
(2014) pointed out, science not only bears on our values in many ways, but science is also 
affected by values because ethical and political responsibilities of scientific work and knowledge 
impact scientists and science. Values play an implicit role in the choice of research subjects and 
research methods (Coulo, 2014). Also individual scientists may choose to engage in certain kinds 
of research, but different societies and institutions may encourage or discourage them (Forge, 
2008). Furthermore, these non-epistemic types of values including ethical, social, and political 
responsibilities affect science practice because of inductive risk (Douglas, 2000). Therefore 
teaching and learning about the role of values in science in socio-scientific and controversial 
issues can play a role in humanizing sciences and illustrating their ethical, cultural and political 
facets (Matthews, 1994).  
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       A study by Evagorou, Jimenez-Aleixandre, and Osborne (2012) showed an example of how 
non-epistemic values affected students’ decision-making in socio-scientific issues and how little 
scientific inquiry affected decision-making. When two groups of students with different 
background were asked to make a decision on a socio-scientific issue, their decisions appeared to 
be based on their cultural and social background rather than the inquiry that they conducted in 
the science class. There was little change in their opinions before and after the class, and even 
though they conducted an inquiry based on various related information, students tended to accept 
only supporting evidence to their opinions. Students’ reasoning for their decisions was not 
evidence-based (Evagorou et al., 2012). Another study by Nielson (2012) showed that students 
co-opted science to make it appear that their evaluative claims were solidly supported. 
Furthermore, students used scientific evidence not only for justifying their claim but also for 
emphasizing the importance of their claim (Nielsen, 2012).  
       These are a few of the examples showing that conducting scientific inquiry does not 
automatically help students make an informed decision using inquiry-based evidence. Scientific 
inquiry has been emphasized in science education because it is expected to help students 
understand, evaluate and make an informed decision for science-related issues (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science [AAAS], 1993; Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990). K-12 
science education has focused on educating all citizens, and people who are well educated in 
science, whether they are scientists or non-scientists, are expected to possess scientific habits of 
mind, be capable of engaging scientific inquiry, and to reason well in scientific contexts 
(National Research Council [NRC], 2012). Overall, they are expected to make an informed 
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decision when they face a controversial science-related issue. Doing scientific inquiry in the 
science class, however, seems not become a useful experience for students to make a decision in 
socio-scientific issues as expected.  
       In this paper, we explore how to help students use inquiry in decision-making based on John 
Dewey’s perspective. Science education owes a lot to John Dewey’s ideas of how science should 
be viewed and what science education should do (Wong et al., 2001). Unfortunately, although 
Dewey’s ideas can be found in every facet of progressive science education in America and in 
the international science education, they have been underappreciated or misunderstood in many 
ways (Wong et al., 2001). Therefore, it is worth returning to Dewey’s perspective of inquiry in 
science and exploring how it is related to decision-making. 
 
A Missing Link in Science Education Standards 
Inquiry is central to science learning and a prominent feature of science education 
standards including National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996), Inquiry and the 
National Science Education Standards (NRC, 2000), and Benchmarks for Science Literacy 
(AAAS, 1993) focus on scientific inquiry. A Framework for K-12 Science Education: Practices, 
Crosscutting Concepts and Core Ideas (NRC, 2012), and the Next Generation Science Standards 
(NGSS Lead States, 2013) also emphasize inquiry through “science and engineering practices” 
dimension. Meanwhile, decision-making is another important feature that has been emphasized 
in science education standards.  
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 In a world filled with the products of scientific inquiry, scientific literacy has become a 
necessity for everyone. Everyone needs to use scientific information to make choices that 
arise everyday (NRC, National Science Education Standards, 1996, 1p). 
 
We believe that the education of the children of this nation is a vital national concern. 
The understanding of, and interest in, science and engineering that its citizens bring to 
bear in their personal and civic decision making is critical to good decisions about the 
nation’s future (NRC, A Framework for K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting 
Concepts and Core Ideas, 2012, viii). 
 
Making a good decision using scientific information in personal or civic issues is undoubtedly 
important so that students should learn it through science education. The term “inquiry” is used 
in two different ways in science education. First, it refers to the abilities and understanding 
students should develop to be able to conduct scientific investigations and second, it refers to the 
teaching and learning strategies (NRC, 2000). If inquiry also refers the teaching and learning 
strategies, it implies that inquiry can be used to learn an informed decision-making.   
How conducting inquiry helps students learn an informed decision-making, however, is 
not explicitly explained in science education standards. Instead, Benchmarks for Science Literacy 
(AAAS, 1993) mentions critical response skills that students need to learn to make judgments 
based on what they know in science. According to this standard, how to use supporting evidence, 
the language, and the presented argument is an important skill to make judgments of whether 
taking the claim in question seriously or not, so students should learn such a skill and practice it 
to make it a lifelong habit of mind.  
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 Apart from what they know about the substance of an assertion, individuals who are 
science literate can make some judgments based on its character. The use or misuse of 
supporting evidence, the language used, and the logic of the argument presented are 
important considerations in judging how seriously to take some claim or proposition. 
These critical response skills can be learned and with practice can become a lifelong habit 
of mind (AAAS, 1993, 298p). 
 
Learning critical response skills is not, however, enough for students to learn an informed 
decision-making. First, critical response skills are only for making judgments to accept some 
claims, and decision-making requires more than a judgment to accept the claim or the 
proposition. For example, in every decision-making, values are involved. Without considering 
involved values, accepting a certain claim does not automatically achieve a decision. Second, 
critical response skills mentioned in the standards are skills to judge a given claim or preposition, 
not skills to use or learn to do the inquiry. Therefore there is a missing link between scientific 
inquiry and decision-making. If we do not know how conducting scientific inquiry helps students 
make an informed decision in science-related issues, the first question we need to explore will be 
how scientific inquiry is related to decision-making. We explored this question based on 
Dewey’s views of the relationship among scientific inquiry, value judgment in science, and 
decision-making.   
 
Scientific Inquiry, Value Judgment, and Decision-Making 
        Scientific inquiry and its contribution to society play a central role in the philosophical and 
educational work of John Dewey. Dewey (1910/1995) emphasized that science is not only a 
subject-matter and body of results, but also a process or method. He pointed out that science 
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education focused too much on teaching a body of ready-made knowledge and not enough on 
inculcating a method of thinking, in other words, scientific inquiry (Dewey, 1910/1995). For 
Dewey, the primary goal of science education is to develop students’ ability to inquire as a habit 
of mind. Dewey’s emphasis on scientific inquiry is similar to the emphasis made in Benchmarks 
for Science Literacy (AAAS, 1993), National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996), and A 
Framework for K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts and Core Ideas 
(NRC, 2012). Today, the major goal of science education is for students to achieve science 
literacy, and scientifically literate people are expected to be able to make informed decisions on 
the science-related issues that they face in their lives (AAAS, 1993; NRC, 1996, 2012; 
Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990). Thus, whether experiences of conducting scientific inquiry can 
help students in making informed decisions should be the important question to explore. 
Decision-making requires value judgment. Then the relationship between scientific inquiry and 
value judgment needs to be examined to explain how scientific inquiry can help students make a 
decision. Science for All Americans described scientific inquiry, values and attitudes as habits of 
mind (Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990). Although these concepts were considered as essential, they 
were only presented in a way that juxtaposed them as separate and independent factors. What 
seems to be missing here is the connection between scientific inquiry and value judgment. This is 
the place that John Dewey’s idea of scientific inquiry and of the relationship between inquiry and 
values can be used to make the missing connection.  
       According to John Dewey, the uses of scientific inquiry can improve students’ ability to 
make value judgment (Webster, 2008).  Inquiry and values are not separate but related because 
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the direction taken by inquiry is under the influence of values (Dewey, 1948a; 1948b). Thus, in 
science, inquiry should not be guided by inappropriate, external interests as Dewey explained 
below (Dewey, 1948a).  
The actual course of scientific inquiry has shown that the best interests of human living in 
general, as well as those of scientific inquiry in particular, are best served by keeping such 
inquiry “pure” from interests that would bend the conduct of inquiry to serve concerns alien 
to conduct of knowing as its own end and proper terminus (Dewey, 1948a, p.206).  
 
“Pure” inquiry does not mean value-free ideal in scientific inquiry. Rather, it means that, when 
scientific inquiry is not misguided by inappropriate interests, it works based on evidence-based 
thinking, critical thinking and open evaluation, and eventually, it can contribute to make 
judgments as intellectual as possible (Dewey, 1910/1995; Webster, 2008). The inappropriate, 
external interests, the “concerns alien to conduct of knowing as its own end and proper 
terminus,” are not all non-epistemic values, but rather, those values arrived at prior to and 
dogmatically held independently of scientific inquiry. Dewey (1910/1995) warned that if science 
is succumbed to inappropriate, external interests, it is no longer able to contribute to social and 
moral ideals, and further, to democracy. 
The modern warship seems symbolic of the present position of science in life and education. 
The warship could not exist were it not for science: mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, 
electricity supply, the technique of its construction and management. But the aims, the ideals 
in whose service this marvelous technique is displayed are survivals of a pre-scientific age, 
that is, of barbarism. Science has as yet had next to nothing to do with forming the social and 
moral ideals for the sake of which she is used (Dewey, 1910/1995, p.397). 
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The military interests behind the warship are precisely the kind of inappropriate, dogmatic, 
prescientific values that Dewey hopes to keep out of science, in favor of values produced or 
tested in the course of scientific inquiry. In fact, “when the actual courses of scientific inquiry 
has shown the best interests of human living (Dewey, 1948a, p.206),” scientific inquiry can 
contribute to social and moral ideals (Dewey,1910/1995). Therefore Dewey argued that science 
should focus on what we should do, and not merely on how we would do it (Dewey, 1910/1995).  
Thinking about what we should do indicates value-laden thinking. So Dewey’s argument implies 
that science is value-laden practice, so making “pure” scientific inquiry should include making a 
good value judgment. Figure 1 shows the relationship among scientific inquiry, value judgment, 
and decision-making based on Dewey’s view. Values are involved in conducting scientific 
inquiry, so scientific inquiry needs to include making a good value judgment. In other words, 
conducting scientific inquiry is a value-laden activity, so making a good scientific inquiry can 
improve students’ ability to make a good value judgment. Thus, Dewey’s idea of scientific 
inquiry and of the relationship between inquiry and values contributes to make the missing 
connection between scientific inquiry and value judgment in science education standards. Based 
on Dewey’s view, we can see now how scientific inquiry can contribute to make informed 
decisions. Decision-making requires value judgment. Scientific inquiry can improve the ability 
to make a value judgment. Therefore scientific inquiry can contribute to make an informed 
decision through value judgment.  
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Figure 1. The relationship among scientific inquiry, value judgment, and decision-making in Dewey’s 
view 
         
 
      Practical Value Judgment in Scientific Inquiry  
The next question to explore will be how scientific inquiry can improve value judgment. 
Dewey argued that enforcing obedience to precepts does not do any good to students because it 
cut off the possibility of learning better ways to live by experimenting with them (Anderson, 
2014). Considering Dewey’s argument, it would not be appropriate to ask student to accept 
certain values as precepts when they conduct scientific inquiry, because it will take away the 
opportunity to do the experiment with various values. Students need to know that various values 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1699-
 
	
	
10	
	
	
can be involved during the inquiry and science education should provide an opportunity to 
students to conduct inquiries with those various involved values. Dewey suggested that a 
judgment of value is actually a case of a practical judgment, a judgment about the doing of 
something.   
A practical judgment has been defined as a judgment of what to do, or what is to be done: a 
judgment respecting the future termination of an incomplete and in so far indeterminate 
situation. To say that judgment of value fall within this field is to say two things: one, that 
the judgment of value is never complete in itself, but always in behalf of determining what is 
to be done; the other, that judgments of values (as distinct from the direct experience of 
something as good) imply that value is not anything previously given, but is something to be 
given by future action, itself conditioned upon (varying with) the judgment (Dewey, 1916, 
p.230). 
 
The value judgment that students make during the scientific inquiry is also a practical judgment, 
because, at each step of the inquiry, students need to decide what to do or what is to be done, and 
values related in that situation will influence the decision. According to Dewey (1916), value 
judgment can be empirically tested (Anderson, 2014). When students make a value judgment to 
guide an action, there will be consequences of that particular action, and these consequences will 
determine if a certain judgement of values is appropriate or not. If students are aware that values 
are demonstrated in the judgment to guide an action, they can evaluate the values involved in the 
judgment by evaluating the consequences of the action. Thus, students’ value judgment can be 
empirically tested while they are conducting the scientific inquiry. The uses of scientific inquiry 
can improve students’ ability to make a value judgment (Webster, 2008). 
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      Making a good value judgment can also help scientific inquiry. As a practical judgment, 
value judgment will be made during the whole process of scientific inquiry. Every time a student 
decides what to do, values will be involved in that decision of action, whether it is about 
selecting a particular method, collecting data or interpreting the results. Often, non-epistemic 
values such as ethical, social, and cultural values are considered to only affect external part of 
science practice, for example, the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the 
use of scientific technologies (Douglas, 2000). These values, however, can also affect internal 
part of science practice such as statistical significance, evidence characterization, and 
interpretation of the results, because of inductive risk (Douglas, 2000). This is why science 
education includes value judgment in scientific inquiry because values affect both external part 
and internal part of the inquiry that students conduct. For example, social, ethical, or cultural 
values can influence the selection of hypotheses, so taking these values into account when 
selecting hypotheses can help students balance open-mindedness with skepticism (AAAS, 1993). 
Values can also influence in making a methodological choice. Exploring involved values and 
making value judgments can reduce the chances of choosing methodological options which have 
ethically unacceptable consequences (Douglas, 2000). Value judgment can also help in evidence 
characterization, when deciding how to characterize ambiguous data. Questioning and 
challenging values which might be involved in evidence characterization may help reduce 
possible errors in dealing with ambiguous data (Douglas, 2000). Value judgment can also help in 
the interpretation of the results. Not only epistemic values but also non-epistemic values may 
influence when interpreting the results. Taking a process to evaluate values when interpreting the 
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results of inquiry will be useful in avoiding interpretational mistakes (Douglas, 2000). Figure 2 
shows how value judgment is involved during the scientific inquiry. Values influence the 
external part of the scientific inquiry such as the direction taken by the inquiry (Dewey, 1948a; 
1948b), and are involved in the internal part of the scientific inquiry through practical judgments 
(Dewey, 2016; Douglas, 2000). Finally values are demonstrated in the judgment made during the 
inquiry (Brown, 2012; Webster, 2008).  
                     
Figure 2. Making value judgment in scientific inquiry 
 
Returning to John Dewey’s Perspective 
In Dewey’s perspective, scientific inquiry and value judgment are closely related to each 
other. Relating inquiry and values, however, is not unfamiliar idea in science education, because 
Science for All Americans (Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990) already recognized the interaction 
between values and science. 
Throughout history, people have concerned themselves with the transmission of shared 
values, attitudes, and skills from one generation to the next. Even today, it is evident that 
family, religion, peers, books, news and entertainment media, and general life experiences 
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are the chief influences in shaping people’s views of knowledge, learning, and other aspects 
of life. Science, mathematics, and technology can also play a key role in the process, for they 
are built upon a distinctive set of values, they reflect and respond to the values of society 
generally, and they are increasingly influential in shaping shared cultural values. Thus, to the 
degree that schooling concerns itself with values and attitudes, it must take scientific values 
and attitudes into account when preparing young people for life beyond school (Rutherford 
& Ahlgren, 1990, p.171).   
This recognition, however, faded away in Benchmarks of Science Literacy (AAAS, 1993) the 
following publication after Science for All Americans (Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990). 
Benchmarks of Science Literacy (AAAS, 1993) suggested practical standards for different age 
groups under the concepts and ideas from Science for All Americans (Rutherford & Ahlgren, 
1990). There, honesty, curiosity, and balancing open-mindness with skepticism were suggested 
as scientific values that students should know.  
Honesty is a desirable habit of mind not unique to people who practice science, mathematics, 
and technology… Curiosity does not have to be taught. The problem is the reverse: how to 
avoid squelching curiosity while helping students focus it productively… [and] Balancing 
open-mindness with skepticism may be difficult for students (AAAS, 1993, p.284).   
These are descriptions of epistemic values or epistemic virtues shared in science domain, not 
explanations of how values and science are related. Thus the relationship between values and 
science was introduced once, but was not pursued further, particularly not to the point of 
teaching value judgment as part of inquiry. Instead, students were asked to accept values like 
honesty, curiosity, and balancing open-mindness with skepticism as a sort of precepts. As Dewey 
pointed out, giving precepts without opportunities to examine them does not do any good to 
students in science education (Anderson, 2014). Instead of introducing “scientific values” as 
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precepts, scientific inquiry should provide both intellectual and methodological means to 
critically evaluate various values based on the idea in Science for All American (Rutherford & 
Ahlgren, 1990) and the idea of John Dewey (Dewey, 2016; Anderson, 2014).  
Returning to Dewey’s view of inquiry and values can help connecting a missing link 
between inquiry and values in science education. Table 1 shows a few problems that we 
recognized in current K-12 science education through Benchmarks for Science Literacy (AAAS, 
1993), National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996), and A Framework for K-12 Science 
Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts and Core Ideas (NRC, 2012). The missing link is 
that there is not an explicit explanation about how conducting scientific inquiry can help make 
informed decisions in science-related issues. One way to solve this problem is to explore the 
relationship between inquiry and values in science because decision-making requires value 
judgment. The connection between inquiry and values in science, however, are not explicitly 
explained either. Values in science are not supposed to be explored during the scientific inquiry, 
and that does not help connecting inquiry and values in science education. Table 1 also shows 
possible solutions to these problems, based on Dewey’s view. According to Dewey (1916; 
1948a), scientific inquiry should include good value judgments, and a value judgment in the 
scientific inquiry is a practical judgment to guide an action which result reflects involved values. 
Thus, conducting the scientific inquiry can improve students’ ability to make a value judgment 
(Webster, 2008). Considering these ideas, students should be aware of a few things when they 
conduct inquiry in the science classroom. First, students should know that various values are 
involved in the scientific inquiry, and those values can be challenged and evaluated. Second, 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1704-
 
	
	
15	
	
	
students should know that they are making a practical value judgment at every step of the 
scientific inquiry, and they can evaluate the involved values by examining the result of the 
action. Third, students should know that conducting science inquiry needs to include a good 
value judgment. Then, connecting inquiry and values in science education can be completed, and 
the missing link among scientific inquiry and informed decision-making will eventually be 
connected in science education.                                               
 
Problems in current science education Solutions based on Dewey’s view 
Making inquiry does not automatically help 
making an informed decision. 
Decision-making requires value judgment, and making 
inquiry can improve value judgment. If conducting 
scientific inquiry includes making a good value judgment, 
it can eventually help an informed decision-making.  
Inquiry and values in science are not 
explicitly connected.  
The direction of the inquiry is under the influence of 
values. During the inquiry, value judgment has to be a 
practical judgment, a judgment guiding an action. So the 
result of the inquiry will include the result of value 
judgment, and demonstrate involved values.  
Values are provided as precepts and not 
explored during the inquiry. 
Making a practical judgment during the scientific inquiry 
gives students an opportunity to critically evaluate various 
values and apply them. At each step of the inquiry, students 
will decide what to do after evaluating various values 
involved.  
Table 1. Problems found in science education and solutions based on Dewey’s view 
 
Conclusion 
       Although there have been more than nine definitions about science literacy through history 
of science education (DeBoer, 2000), science literacy has been considered as an important goal 
for students to achieve (AAAS, 1993; NRC, 1996; 2012, Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1990). There is 
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a certain consensus of describing scientifically literate people as being familiar with the natural 
world, understanding some of the key concepts and principles in science, having a capacity for 
scientific ways of thinking, and being able to use scientific knowledge and ways of thinking for 
personal and social purposes (DeBoer, 2000). Also, scientific inquiry always has been one of 
essential attributes to achieve science literacy. Naturally, a scientifically literate person is 
expected to be able to make informed decisions for science-related issues based on inquiry. What 
is missing there, however, is that it has not been clear how scientific inquiry can contribute to 
make informed decisions. Since making decisions requires value judgment, the problem turned 
into what the relationship is between scientific inquiry and value judgment. 
       John Dewey’s view that the uses of scientific inquiry can improve students’ ability for value 
judgment provides that missing link between inquiry and decision-making. Inquiry is an active 
process of knowing by understanding, evaluating, and forming the knowledge. Learning science 
through inquiry transforms our world view by opening up for action (Kruckeberg, 2006). Inquiry 
also includes value judgment that is a practical judgment of guiding an action. Therefore, each 
step of scientific inquiry involves value judgment to decide what to do, and in this way, values 
influence both external and internal part of science practice. With the help of John Dewey’s 
view, scientific inquiry in K-12 science education can be connected to value judgment, and 
eventually to decision-making. There, students can learn how to conduct the scientific inquiry 
and how to make practical judgment during the scientific inquiry. Reflecting the result of their 
practical judgment, students can evaluate values involved in their decision during the inquiry. 
Students can learn value judgment while conducting the scientific inquiry and these learning 
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experiences will help them when they make a personal or civic decision in science-related issues. 
Ultimately these learning experiences will lead students to achieve science literacy. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounts of mechanistic explanation, especially as applied to biology and sometimes going 
under the heading of “new mechanism,” provided an attractive alternative to nomological 
accounts that preceded them. These accounts were motivated by selected examples, drawn 
primarily from cell and molecular biology and neuroscience,. These examples pointed to 
sharp contrasts between real‐life biological explanation and discovery and the then‐
dominant models of scientific explanation. However, the range of examples that scientists 
take to be mechanistic explanations is far broader. We focus on examples that differ from 
those traditionally recruited by Mechanists. Our contention is that attention to additional 
examples will lead to a richer conception of mechanistic explanation, prompting a shift 
from what we refer to as Mechanism 1.0 to Mechanism 2.0. In suggesting such a move, our 
goal is not to downplay the importance of Mechanism 1.0 and the progress it signified. 
Mechanism was a big step forward in philosophy of biology. We just think it's time to take 
the next step. Furthermore, by adopting the language of Mechanism 1.0 and 2.0 we mean to 
signal that we anticipate further enhancements to the conception of mechanistic 
explanation as philosophers of science attend to more examples of scientists advancing 
what they characterize as mechanistic explanations. 
One way to approach the distinction between Mechanism 1.0 and 2.0 is to return to the 
machine metaphor that inspired mechanistic research in biology and was invoked explicitly 
by Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010) and implicitly ‐ primarily in the choice of 
examples ‐ by other writers on mechanistic explanation. Most mechanists have attempted 
to differentiate biological mechanisms from machines. However, the examples used to 
motivate accounts of mechanistic explanation by, for example, Bechtel & Richardson 
(1993/2010), Bechtel (2006), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), and Craver and 
Darden (2013) are in fact much like traditional machines. Thus, protein synthesis is 
presented as involving the creation of mRNA from the DNA template in the nucleus and the 
transport of the mRNA to the ribosome, where it serves as a template for forming a chain of 
amino acids. Oxidative metabolism is described as localized to the mitochondria of cells 
where a specific set of enzymes catalyze the successive oxidation of metabolites until only 
carbon dioxide and water remain, generating ATP in the process. In these examples, the 
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mechanism consists of a bounded set of enduring entities or parts in a fixed configuration. 
These explanations accord central importance to the structure of parts and often envision 
the mechanism’s organization as sequential, or perhaps branching. As in classical 
machines—steam engines, typewriters and food processors—the parts are envisaged as 
performing the same activities or operations every time they are called upon so as to 
produce the phenomenon to be explained.  
These features of the examples, we contend, did much to advance an attractive and 
compelling picture of explanation that attracted much interest. For example, they 
established that such explanations did not fit the D‐N model. By portraying a sequence of 
operations that resulted in storing energy in ATP or synthesizing proteins, scientists 
explained these processes without explicitly invoking laws. Moreover, for philosophers 
who were expanding their focus beyond justification to include discovery, these examples 
provided case studies of how the two practices were connected (Darden, 2006). The 
account also offers norms of success: to understand how a system in nature works, one 
should be able to identify its parts, demonstrate what operations they perform, and 
describe how they are organized so as to work together. If researchers cannot identify 
parts and trace how they operate on each other, they fail to show how the mechanism 
generated the phenomenon in terms of parts. 
Still working within the framework of Mechanism 1.0, some philosophers began to focus on 
biological mechanisms whose parts are organized in a more complex manner (e.g., into 
multiple feedback loops). This undercut the ability of scientists to mentally rehearse the 
functioning of the mechanism to understand how it brought about its behavior. Instead, 
scientists had to appeal to mathematical representations and perform computational 
simulations. When the required mathematical representations are non‐linear, 
computational simulations show how mechanisms can produce complex behavior (e.g., 
oscillations that partly synchronize with each other). While mechanists such as Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (2010) and Brigandt (2013) distinguished such explanations as dynamical 
mechanistic explanations, they did not fundamentally challenge the framework of 
mechanism 1.0: they still appealed to a stable and bounded set of parts whose structure 
determines their interactions. Rather, they took a relatively small step away from 
Mechanism 1.0 to version 1.1.  
Our project is much the same as the philosophers who advanced Mechanism 1.0. We focus 
on examples of explanation in biology. The difference is that we focus on ones that do not 
fit the picture of Mechanism 1.0 or 1.1. Some philosophers might see these departures from 
Mechanism 1.0 as requiring abandoning mechanism altogether. We certainly think that 
there are explanations that are not mechanistic – such as teleological, etiological and 
perhaps mathematical explanations. But the cases we explore here, while differing from 
Mechanism 1.0 in specific respects that we will highlight, are still recognizably parts‐and‐
operations explanations, and are typically characterized as such by scientists. We will 
identify several ways in which these examples reveal limits of Mechanism 1.0 in the next 
section. In our view, these examples motivate expanding and reconceptualizing what a 
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mechanism is (hence, we speak of Mechanism 2.0).  Although we are not yet at the point 
where it makes sense to offer a full characterization of Mechanism 2.0, in section 3 we will 
both articulate how the examples offered for Mechanism 2.0 enrich our understanding of 
mechanistic explanation and how mechanisms may differ from machines as they have been 
traditionally understood. We will also identify work that remains to be done in developing 
the conception of Mechanism 2.0. 
2. The limits of Mechanism 1.0 
In this section we will discuss departures from five key aspects of Mechanism 1.0: the 
appeal to the structural features of parts; the idea of a stable and straightforward 
organization; the assumption that parts are stable; the idea that mechanisms have well‐
defined boundaries in space and time; and the conception of mechanisms themselves as 
enduring entities.  
2.1. Parts that are not discrete entities 
In the examples used to illustrate and motivate Mechanism 1.0, mechanisms consisted of 
discrete entities that could be identified structurally in terms of properties such as shape, 
size, and mass. Indeed, many mechanistic explanations are presented in terms of individual 
entities such as molecules that undergo transformations (perhaps binding to another 
molecule and changing their shape in the process). (This is how mechanisms are 
represented in many diagrams of mechanisms, including those below.) But in fact the 
working part is very often not a single entity, but a large collection of similarly structured 
entities. And it is very often not only—sometimes not primarily—structural properties that 
matters but aggregative features such as the concentrations of these entities that performs 
the work.  
Phenomena that involve electrical potentials over membranes provide examples whose 
explanations depend on concentrations. For instance, ATP synthesis strongly depends on 
the direction of the proton gradient across the mitochondrial membrane. Similarly for 
action potentials: to understand how an action potential works, you can't focus merely on 
the molecules that are involved (sodium, potassium, ion channels etc.) and their structures. 
It is the relative concentrations of ions, inside and outside the cell, that determine the 
timing and size of a spike. In such examples, components with the relevant structures are 
present throughout the process, on both sides of the membrane. What drives the process 
isn’t their mere presence or structure. It is their relative concentration, which changes 
continuously as the mechanism operates. As protons build up in the mitochondria’s inter‐
membranal space, they generate a potential, then is then converted into ATP via the ATP 
synthase “windmill.” Structural aspects matter here, of course, but without careful 
attention to concentrations, the system cannot be understood. The role of concentration is 
perhaps even more subtle in action potentials. Sodium and potassium build up to a steady 
state concentration, maintaining a resting potential. When an above‐threshold excitation 
arrives, sodium and potassium change concentrations quickly and in opposite “directions.” 
It is the precise shifts in concentration and their timing that determines whether a spike is 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1712-
Levy and Bechtel, Towards Mechanism 2.0 (PSA 2016 draft; please do not quote)  p. 4 
generated. The structures of ions and ions channels, matter, but changes in concentrations 
are key.1 
A major focus of contemporary biology is the regulation of biological processes, and here 
one often finds references to switches.  A recent paper by Nathan (2014) looks at such a 
case in depth, arguing for a notion of causation by concentration. Nathan’s analysis is 
compelling, though he does not explore potential ramifications for Mechanism. We focus on 
this aspect. A genetic switch is a bi‐stable system in which a given gene can be either "on", 
leading to high levels of transcription, or "off", leading to low levels of transcription. The lac 
operon and the viral lambda switch are very well studied examples. In genetic switches, it 
is not merely the ability of an inducer or an inhibiting molecule to bind to DNA, and initiate 
transcription, that explains switching. Indeed, inducers and inhibitors are typically bound 
to DNA, to some extent, at all times. But what determines whether a switching event occurs 
is the relative rate of binding, which is determined by the their relative concentrations.  
Again, the structure of the parts remains constant. It is the shift in concentrations that 
moves the system into wholly new states. (For an overview of the principles underlying 
genetic switching, see Nelson, 2015, Chapter 10.) 
The cases presented in this section illustrate that in some explanations what is doing the 
explanatory work is not the structure of the parts in question, but the concentrations of the 
parts. Ironically, both ATP synthesis and the generation of action potentials have been used 
in support of Mechanism 1.0. The fact that in these examples it was the concentration of 
protons or electrons that mattered was not noted. But it has direct consequences in terms 
of how the explanation in question is to be confirmed, what kind of discovery strategies it 
will be linked to and so on. Thus, a move away from the idea of parts as (merely) structural 
units has important consequences.  
2.2. Organization that is not fixed 
Although it was typically not commented on, those offering examples of Mechanism 1.0 
recognized that, like parts of machines, the parts of a mechanism go through a sequence of 
different states as the mechanism generates a phenomenon. In many cases, including 
enzyme‐catalyzed metabolic reactions, cell‐to‐cell signaling, DNA and RNA processing, and 
various other phenomena, the ability of a part to perform an operation depends on its 
three‐dimensional shape and associated physical features such as its electrical charge. It is 
as a result of such features that an enzyme is able to bind to a substrate. When bound to a 
substrate, it is no longer able to bind to another and the conformation of the molecule is 
changed. Once the reaction is complete, it returns to its initial conformation and is able to 
bind another molecule of substrate.  
                                                        
1 This is illustrated by the fact that Hodgkin and Huxley, who knew little about the structures of underlying 
molecules, still managed to produce a seminal advance in our understanding of action potentials via a model 
that took into account facts about concentrations alone. See Levy (2013). 
2 In the spirit of our discussion of concentrations above, registration of time of day appears to be a population 
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While recognizing these local changes of parts and how they interact with each other in the 
course of a mechanism’s operations, Mechanism 1.0 presented the overall organization of 
mechanisms as unchanging. This is reflected in what is perhaps the standard form in which 
many mechanisms are represented: a flow diagram in which nodes represent parts and 
arrows represent operations performed by one part on other parts. Most diagrams do not 
represent how individual parts change structurally over time. For example, Figure 1, 
showing the activities of transcription and translation leading to the synthesis of new 
proteins, only shows tRNAs binding to amino acids and transporting them to the ribosome, 
not any change in the tRNA that results. Rather,  the focus is on tracing how each part 
interacts with other parts. The various activities that are shown‐‐the assembly of the mRNA 
along the DNA template, the transport of the mRNA (and tRNA and rRNA) to the cytoplasm, 
the ferrying of amino acids to mRNAs by tRNAs, and the binding of  amino acids are into a 
polypeptide chain‐‐are presented as enduring. 
 
Figure 1. 
In the case of some mechanisms, however, not only do the parts undergo changes but which 
parts interact with which other parts changes as the mechanism functions. The 
cyanobacterial circadian clock provides a relatively simple example. The core mechanism 
involves just three proteins, KaiA, KaiB, and KaiC and a source of ATP.  The ATP provides 
phosphates that reversibly phosphorylate KaiC at two binding sites. Since one site is both 
phosphorylated and dephosphorylated first, the relative concentrations of KaiC in the 
different phosphorylation states uniquely specifies the time of day (Rust, Markson, Lane et 
al., 2007). (Note that in this case as well it is concentrations that do the work in the 
mechanism.) KaiC is itself capable of both autophosphorylation and 
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autodephosphorylation, and which operation it performs depends on KaiA and KaiB. KaiA 
can bind to KaiC in two different regions. When it acts alone, it binds to the A‐loops coming 
out of the C2 domain of KaiC and fosters phosphorylation by changing KaiC’s conformation 
(Figure 2, left). But when KaiB binds to the C1 domain, KaiA moves to bind to KaiB (Figure 
2, right). By changing KaiC’s conformation in a different manner, KaiA and KaiB promote 
dephosphorylation of KaiC (Tseng, Chang, Bravo et al., 2014). Even in this simple 
mechanism, KaiA interacts with different entities at different times, altering how the 
mechanism behaves. Which organization is implemented at a given time determines how 
still other parts (KaiC) behave and hence what time the clock registers. To exhibit this 
change in organization in diagram form, researchers often use separate diagrams to show 
the organization at different times. 
 
Figure 2. Left from Andy LiWang (http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/aliwang/galleries/image‐
gallery). Right: From Tseng, et al. (2014). 
Examples such as this make clear that organization is a dynamic property of some 
mechanisms. The arrangement of parts, who interacts with whom when, varies as the 
mechanism functions, in part due to the operations the parts themselves are performing. So 
here we have another departure from Mechanism 1.0, inasmuch as it assumed a stable 
organizational pattern for mechanisms.  
2.3. Mechanisms whose parts change over time 
The examples we looked at so far involved changing concentrations and organizational 
patterns. But the "list" of parts playing a role in the mechanism was presumed stable. This 
is what we expect, based on the analogy to machines. But in some biological mechanisms, 
the parts change over time. Researchers have often failed to notice this since until recently 
it was not common to investigate a mechanism at different times. But as a consequence of 
automated data collection techniques, it has become possible to collect data about parts 
and their interactions at different times. For instance, in a study combining data about 
which proteins that can interact with each other to form complexes with time‐series data 
on gene expression in yeast, de Lichtenberg, Jensen, Brunak et al. (2005) were able to 
provide evidence of how different parts are incorporated into a mechanism during 
different stages of the cell cycle. Although many genes are constitutively expressed, they 
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identified 600 genes (out of the approximately 6000 genes in yeast) that are only 
expressed during one stage of the cell cycle. Figure 3 shows one mechanism they 
investigated, the prereplication complex, which had previously been shown to involve 
Cdc28p and several Clb‐type cyclins that function in regulating stages of the cell cycle. de 
Lichtenberg et al. demonstrated that individual cyclins are expressed and become available 
to bind with Cdc28p at different phases of the cycle. The color in Figure 3 shows the phase 
of the cycle in which the cyclins are synthesized: those shown in purple are expressed at 
the beginning of the M (mitosis) stage, those in orange through yellow during the G1 (gap 
1) stage, those in green during the S (synthesis) stage, and those in blue during the G2 (gap 
2) phase. At the end of the G2 phase the action of Cdh1p leads to the ubiquitination and 
degradation of the cyclins via Clb2p. The discovery that different parts are added to the 
mechanism at different stages of the cell cycle explains the different regulatory roles the 
mechanism plays at different stages.  
 
Figure 3. From de Lichtenberg et al. (2005). 
The fact that the proteins that constitute the parts of some mechanisms change over time is 
not surprising. Biological mechanisms continually degrade and so are continually being 
built and repaired through the synthesis of new proteins. By not attending to when 
different parts are synthesized, Mechanism 1.0 tended to view mechanisms as enduring 
entities. Emphasizing their construction and degradation is thus a step beyond Mechanism 
1.0. 
2.4. Mechanisms with porous boundaries 
When one buys a machine such as a toaster, it typically comes packaged in a box. The 
toaster cannot toast bread without electricity and bread being supplied, but the boundaries 
between the mechanism and the environment remain well delineated. Moreover, it 
operates in sharply distinguished time periods. Mechanism 1.0 made similar assumptions 
about biological mechanisms. An important discovery strategy was to try to localize the 
mechanism responsible for a phenomenon in time and space. These efforts often appeared 
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to be successful. Mammalian circadian researchers, for instance, introduced the term clock 
to designate the responsible mechanism and localized it initially in the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus of the SCN (Moore & Eichler, 1972) and subsequently in individual cells in the SCN 
(Welsh, Logothetis, Meister et al., 1995).2 Treating circadian rhythms as produced within 
individual cells, investigators sought the component genes and proteins that constituted a 
feedback loops that created oscillations‐‐a proteins accumulated, they fed back to inhibit 
their own expression (Reppert & Weaver, 2001) (Reppert and Weaver, 2001).  
Researchers of course expected different mechanisms to have outputs that were used in 
other mechanisms‐‐protein synthesis generated proteins that provide parts of other 
mechanisms. But over time researchers have found more and more interactions between 
mechanisms, so many that the notion of a mechanism as a well‐delineated "thing", with 
specified boundaries in time and space, can come to look questionable.  
We start with a specific example of an unexpected connection between mechanisms. As 
researchers investigated how circadian proteins fed back to alter the expression of their 
own genes, they discovered that one critical protein, CLOCK, affects gene expression as a 
histone acetyltransferase. In searching for a histone deacetylase needed to counterbalance 
CLOCK, researchers identified SIRT1, a molecule already known to be critical for a host of 
cellular activities including basic metabolism (Sahar & Sassone‐Corsi, 2009; Bass & 
Takahashi, 2010) (left side, Figure 5). Parts identified as belonging to the mechanisms 
responsible for these activities also affect circadian rhythms.  
As a result of sharing components, mechanisms affect the functioning of other mechanisms 
not just through their inputs and outputs, as characteristic of the examples advanced by 
Mechanism 1.0, but through many of their internal operations. The example of SIRT1 is just 
one of a host of discoveries researchers have made where parts of the clock mechanism 
interact with parts of other mechanisms involved in other cell functions. Using sRNA 
screens to identify genes that when modified affected clock performance, Zhang, Liu, Hirota 
et al. (2009) found many such genes involved in a wide array of other cell functions. On the 
right in Figure 5 core clock genes are shown in dark and light blue; those shown as 
connected in various ways to the core clock genes are the ones that altered the period of 
the clock when mutated and whose proteins are known to interact with core clock proteins. 
These are normally identified as parts of different cellular mechanisms. 
                                                        
2 In the spirit of our discussion of concentrations above, registration of time of day appears to be a population 
level effect, but with the extra complication that there are mechanisms to promote synchrony in local 
populations and complex dynamics over the whole (Welsh, Takahashi, & Kay, 2010). 
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Figure 5. Left: Bass and Takahashi (2010). Right: Zhang et al. (2009) 
These developments in circadian research exemplify a frequent trajectory of mechanistic 
research: in the wake of identifying a few parts of a mechanism, researchers continue to 
discover more and more entities that affect the functioning of the mechanism but are also 
recognized parts of other mechanisms. Recent efforts to represent the components of cells 
in networks (e.g., of protein interactions) often reveal that classically characterized 
mechanisms correspond to what are termed modules‐‐clusters of parts that are more 
interconnected with each other than with other components, but which still have extensive 
connections to other modules. There typically are not clear boundaries around modules. 
Rather than finding sharp boundaries, researchers rather make pragmatic judgments as to 
where to draw boundaries (Bechtel, 2015).  
The lack of sharp boundaries also affects the time window in which a mechanism carries 
out an operation. In standard portrayals of an action potential, the cell is at its resting 
potential until a stimulus arrives which depolarizes the cell. If depolarization exceeds a 
threshold, an action potential is generated. A recovery period follows in which the cell is 
first depolarized beyond the resting potential until it gradually returns to the resting 
potential where it resides until the next stimulus arrives. But in fact neurons fluctuate 
around the resting potential. Moreover, the effects of a single action potential can be 
demonstrated to affect these fluctuations, and hence the propensity to generate further 
action potentials up to minutes later, well after the action potential to reach its termination 
conditions (and may well have produced multiple additional action potentials). Marom 
(2010) argues that this shows that there is no characteristic timescale for action potentials. 
Nonetheless, researchers assume a timeframe for action potentials, ignoring these long 
transient effects.  
These examples show that rather than well‐delineated spatial and temporal boundaries 
between what is in and what is outside a mechanism, as are found with machines and is 
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suggested by the examples advanced by Mechanism 1.0, biological mechanisms often have 
porous boundaries. As a result of treating these boundaries as more fixed than they are, 
researchers are only able to account for phenomena approximately. When these 
shortcomings become important, researchers expand boundaries to include other parts 
and operations, but without abandoning the search for mechanistic explanation one cannot 
include everything. Selecting boundaries between multiple plausible candidates is an 
important challenge in Mechanism 2.0.  
2.5. Mechanisms that exist only transiently 
In Mechanism 1.0 mechanisms are viewed as present ready to operate when appropriate 
conditions arise. This corresponds to how we typically view machines, although when we 
adopt a long enough time horizon we recognize that machines are built, maintained for a 
period, and eventually decay, at which point they may be recycled. This occurs in biology 
far more frequently than suggested by Mechanism 1.0. Some biological mechanisms appear 
only to come into existence under specific conditions and are degraded when no longer 
needed.  
Ideker and Krogan (2012) characterized differential network biology as a strategy in which 
network representations of gene or protein interactions identified under different 
conditions are contrasted to identify modules in yeast cells that only appear transiently. 
Employing annotations such as those provided by Gene Ontology, these modules can often 
be linked to mechanisms as identified in traditional molecular biology. The result is the 
identification of mechanisms that arise only in some conditions, presumably ones in which 
the phenomenon for which they are responsible is required by the cell. 
Employing a version of this strategy, Bandyopadhyay, Mehta, Kuo et al. (2010) compared 
gene interactions in yeast growing under unperturbed conditions with those in which 
methyl methanesulfonate (MMS), a DNA‐alkylating agent, was added to the medium. For 
each condition they created an epistatic microarray profile (E‐MAP) that identified pairs 
out of a set of 418 selected genes that interact when mutated (that is, together they have 
effects on colony growth different from the product of their individual effects, as would be 
expected if they did not interact). Interactions are viewed as indicators that the proteins 
coded by the genes operate together in a mechanism. Bandyopadhyah et al. identified 1905 
interactions in the untreated and 2297 in the MMS condition. Most of the interactions were 
only found under one of these conditions. They then created a differential E‐MAP by 
subtracting the E‐MAP for one condition from that for the other. This revealed many 
interactions not found when analyzing the conditions individually. In particular, the 
comparison revealed many interactions between DNA damage‐response genes, which 
suggests that the proteins from these gene work together in mechanisms that arise in the 
MMS condition. When the gene interactions were mapped onto protein interactions, the 
researchers identified the differentially active connections as connecting between protein 
complexes. They interpreted the protein complexes as stable structures that are 
differentially recruited into mechanisms when specific tasks need to be performed. 
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In machines, components that are not needed on a given occasion just sit idle. Given the 
ability of organisms to synthesize proteins as needed, it is not surprising that, unlike 
machines, biological mechanisms construct mechanisms as need and then degrade them 
when not needed.   
3. Mechanism 2.0 
3.1. Recap 
We have characterized Mechanism 1.0 in terms of the examples that were advanced in 
philosophical discussions of mechanistic explanation, and the features highlighted in 
discussions of them—such as the types of parts organization employed, and the kinds of 
discovery strategies used to identify such mechanisms. Our aim has not been to challenge 
the explicit definitions of mechanism that advocates of mechanistic explanation have 
advanced. Our justification is that it was the examples themselves and the discussions that 
emerged from considering them that made mechanistic explanation appear as a compelling 
alternative to other accounts of explanation, and that informed the community’s 
understanding of the contrast between mechanistic and other forms of explanation. 
Pursuing the examples advanced for Mechanism 1.0 has been extremely fruitful. The 
examples had the virtue of being widely intelligible by philosophers without extensive 
background in biology. And they painted a sharp and, we think, justifiable, contrast with 
alternative forms of explanation, including law‐based explanations common in physics and 
some other sciences. However, as we have tried to show, these examples do not reflect the 
full scope of mechanistic accounts offered in science. The examples presented a view that is 
simplified along several key dimensions: portraying mechanisms as having discrete and 
enduring parts, organized in relatively fixed ways, and clearly distinguished from the 
environment in which they operated.  
We have put forward other examples that differ in important respects. In many the 
operation of the mechanism depends on concentrations, rather than discrete parts. In some 
cases the parts change over time. Moreover, we presented mechanisms whose organization 
changes as the mechanism functions and which bled into their environment (including 
other mechanisms) rather than being sharply distinguished from it. Finally, we identified 
mechanisms that are transient, not enduring. All told, this puts the machine image 
underlying Mechanism 1.0 under severe strain. 
3.2. Moving beyond the traditional machine metaphor 
The examples put forward on behalf of Mechanism 1.0 conformed closely to the picture of 
machines designed by humans. Thinking about them as machines facilitated discovering 
and reasoning about them. Like machines, they are assumed to be localized in their 
environments and to have parts that are identified in terms of their structure. Researchers 
expect to be able to trace activity through the mechanism as it generates the phenomenon. 
Their internal states may change in the course of processing, but the overall organization 
remains constant. Several mechanists sought to differentiate biological mechanisms from 
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machines, but given the examples advanced to support Mechanism 1.0, the difference 
between biological mechanisms and machines was not all that clear.  
The departures from Mechanism 1.0 on which we have focused put even more strain on the 
machine metaphor. We need to recognize, however, that machine is also an evolving notion. 
Historically, those opposing mechanism—vitalists and holists—emphasized the differences 
between biological systems and the machines then present (Bechtel, 2016). Inspired in part 
by Bernard and Cannon, cyberneticists (Wiener, 1948) expanded on historical conceptions 
of machines by emphasizing such things as the potential for control provided by negative 
feedback. Negative feedback, and its capacity for facilitating not only control but also 
oscillatory behavior, was a major inspiration for Mechanism 1.1. Sustained oscillators that 
can synchronize with each other and be entrained to external oscillations, provided 
examples of systems that don’t wait for input to initiate activity but are endogenously 
active.  
Today our conception of machines continues to evolve as designers explore options to 
make physical devices behave in ways not conceived of in the past. The ability to control 
electrical activity in computers through software, including software that can be modified 
by the machine itself, has certainly fostered this expansion in the concept of a machine. An 
additional factor has been the application of ideas about organization discovered in biology 
to designing new machines. Some of these are ideas we have characterized as motivation 
for Mechanism 2.0; incorporating them into machines may once again reduce the gap 
between machines and mechanisms. 
Regardless of whether machines continue to evolve to more resemble biological 
mechanisms, our focus is on how biologists are revising their conception of how 
mechanisms are structured and, especially, of how mechanistic explanations work. 
Expectations for a localized, graphically depicted system, whose workings can be tracked 
via mental rehearsal and where discovery consists in large part of “looking under the 
hood,” have been altered. Many biologists now recognize that mechanisms that differ from 
those advanced for Mechanism 1.0 are both common and important, and that modeling 
them requires advanced, typically mathematical, methods that go beyond flowcharts and 
structural figures.  
3.1. Next steps 
Where does this leave us? First, insofar as we have focused on the examples offered, not the 
definitions advanced, we are not contesting the definitions of mechanism. The letter of 
these definitions may well be compatible with several of the examples we have advanced. 
We don’t see much benefit in the project of defining mechanism. Glennan (in press) 
advances the notion of minimal mechanism as providing a common basis for various more 
specific conceptions of mechanism, and this may suffice. Speaking loosely, we can treat any 
explanation that appeals to underlying parts‐and‐organization as mechanistic.  This rough 
way of pointing to the kinds of systems and explanations at issue is all that we need.  
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If we are not contesting the definitions, then why are we making so much out of the ways 
our examples differ from those we see as characteristic of Mechanism 1.0? For one thing, 
we think it is the examples and the way they have been discussed that have shaped our 
understanding of mechanistic explanation. But more crucially, the interest in mechanistic 
explanation is not focused on developing adequate definitions but on issues such as how 
mechanistic accounts explain, how they are discovered and evaluated, and the ways in 
which they get applied in scientific reasoning. On this score, the examples fitting 
Mechanism 1.0 pointed in particular directions—the focus was on a well‐delineated set of 
entities that were organized in a stable manner, were demarcated from others, and 
endured. With these examples in mind, it was natural to pursue particular kinds of 
strategies of research. For instance, decomposition and localization—i.e. breaking down a 
system into its parts and identifying their structure and place in the mechanism’s layout—
were emphasized by Bechtel and Richardson (1993).  Strategies for constructing 
mechanistic hypotheses also followed this pattern, For instance, in the examples 
illustrating Darden’s (2006) and Craver and Darden’s (2013) strategy of modular 
subassembly (i.e.  hypothesizing that a mechanism is composed of modules known from 
other mechanisms, in an altered configuration), the parts are presented as discrete and 
only interacting via their inputs and outputs. In their strategy of forward/backward 
chaining, one uses information about early (or, correspondingly, late) stages in the 
mechanism’s operation to sketch hypotheses about later (or, correspondingly, earlier) 
stages. It is unclear that such a strategy can succeed when the mechanisms does not have 
well‐defined boundaries, so that the kinds of constraints placed by earlier stages on the 
process are very hard to pin down. Thus, these and similar research strategies largely rely 
on discrete and localized parts, sequential organization and well‐demarcated boundaries. 
They are unlikely to succeed with the types of mechanisms we have drawn attention to.  
The mechanisms we have advanced on behalf of Mechanism 2.0 require different 
approaches. In cases in which concentrations matter, researchers often need to measure 
concentrations and collect time series data to understand how they change. If the 
mechanism only exists in certain contexts or if organization changes in different 
circumstances, then researchers need to contextualize the study of the mechanism and use 
tools that allow them to discern which components and processes are active when and 
where. Differential network biology, briefly discussed above, represents one such strategy. 
One should expect that the parts and organization of a mechanism may change as 
conditions in which it operates change. If mechanisms are not sharply differentiated but 
bleed out into their environment, then researchers may need to make different choices 
about the identity of the mechanism on different occasions.  
As we are not advocating definitions, in advancing the notion of Mechanism 2.0 we are not 
seeking new definitions. Rather, we are advocating a broader research agenda that seeks 
different ways in which mechanisms can depart from the examples advanced for 
Mechanism 1.0 and still count as mechanisms. The more important task is likely to be 
distinguishing different kinds of mechanisms, potentially generating a taxonomy of 
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mechanisms. One dimension in such a taxonomy might be whether parts are localized or 
not and whether it is the structure of the parts or their concentrations that matter. Another 
might be whether the organization is enduring, changes under endogenous control, or 
changes in different environments. A taxonomy is only valuable if the different types of 
mechanism that are distinguished matter for philosophical and/or scientific objectives. We 
have made some suggestions as to how the different departures from Mechanism 1.0 do 
matter for understanding how a mechanism serves to explain a phenomenon and how the 
mechanism is discovered. 
A taxonomy of mechanisms would address the diversity of mechanism types. A further set 
of questions concern mechanism tokens, namely: what are the identity conditions for 
mechanisms. When can we say that the same mechanism has changed over time and when 
do we have a new mechanism? Under Mechanism 1.0 this question hardly ever arose, but 
once we have mechanisms with changing parts, shifting organization and fuzzy or non‐
existent boundaries, it is natural to wonder whether and when one can speak of a 
mechanism as persisting through time.  
We cannot resolve this issue here, of course, and it may very well be that the answer can 
only be given as part of a broader story about objects, change and identity through time. 
But let us indicate three potential directions on might proceed to individuate mechanisms. 
First, one can move to an “ephemeral mechanism” outlook, i.e. accept that when 
components and/or organizational features change, as they often do, we no longer have the 
same underlying mechanism. This entails that one and the same phenomenon may often be 
underpinned by different mechanisms over time. This is a somewhat unintuitive idea, as it 
severs, or at least weakens, the link between mechanisms and phenomena. But perhaps it is 
correct and unproblematic. A second option is to identify mechanisms via the phenomena 
they explain. On this approach, so long as we have the same phenomenon we have the same 
mechanism. Of course, this raises questions about the identity of phenomena. Not much has 
been written on this. The only well‐developed account, Kaiser and Krickel (2016), 
construes phenomena as “object‐involving occurrences.” As the name suggests, this 
account presupposes a notion of (biological) objects, and it is not clear that such a notion 
can be retained in light of the cases we have looked at. Finally, one can view Mechanism 2.0 
in the context of process ontology, the idea that the biological world, perhaps the world at 
large, consists of processes rather than objects (i.e. a temporally extended, constantly 
changing, “stream” rather than stably structured “thing”). Dupré (2012, 2014) has recently 
been arguing for such a view, and the cases we have discussed may provide more grist for 
his processual mill. Some will find process ontology to be a radical and implausible 
viewpoint, although there are ways of making it compatible with an explanatory appeal to 
mechanisms, especially if, as we tend to think, explanations are to be seen in epistemic 
rather than ontic terms. Here we remain uncommitted, as our principal aim is to highlight 
the issue as a topic for further exploration. 
In concluding, we should stress again why we treat the examples we have described as 
mechanistic explanations despite the fact that some would treat them as non‐mechanistic. 
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We think it is both more useful philosophically and in better accord with scientific practice, 
to expand our perspective on the types of mechanism that occur in biology. In expanding 
the scope of what qualifies as a mechanism, however, we are not emptying the notion 
mechanism of content. For one thing, the contrast between mechanistic explanation and DN 
or other formalist views of explanation is retained. Explanation is still a matter of 
describing the causal underpinnings of a phenomenon, rather than embedding it in a 
formal deduction schema. But beyond that, there are several sorts of explanations that can 
be seen to be non‐mechanistic: etiological explanations, which chart a causal process 
leading up to an event are one example, as well as teleological explanations, which describe 
the function of an object or feature. Arguably, so are mathematical explanations (Pincock, 
2007; Lange, 2012), which account for a phenomenon in terms of a formal‐mathematical 
properties instantiated by it. 
Clearly, we have only begun the task of transitioning from Mechanism 1.0 to 2.0. If our 
suggestion that there are multiple dimensions in which recognizably mechanistic science 
departs from Mechanism 1.0, Mechanism 2.0 might not have a univocal characterization 
but offer a taxonomy. As with the initial articulation of mechanism 1.0, we expect this 
project to be driven by close attention to the explanations actually offered in science. We 
also expect it to be as fruitful philosophically. And, if successful, it might ultimately itself be 
found wanting, making way for Mechanism 3.0. 
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A Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies in Science 
 
Abstract: Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case 
study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons 
for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the 
truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; 
second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new 
domains. While the first is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case 
study. 
 
1. Introduction 
For much of the 20th century it was hotly contended whether analogies play any 
normatively interesting role in scientific reasoning. Defending analogies, Norman 
Campbell (1920, ch. 6) and Mary Hesse (1966) responded to Pierre Duhem (1914/1954) 
and his intellectual heirs among the logical empiricists, such as Hans Reichenbach. 
Although the latter critics admitted (grudgingly) that analogies sometimes guide the 
development of scientific theories, they regarded this as a mere psychological curiosity, not 
something that plays any interesting normative role in scientific reasoning (e.g. 
Reichenbach 1944, 66-72). Arguing that analogies serve important purposes that 
philosophers of science ought to account for, Campbell and Hesse opposed these at the 
time widely accepted views. 
 Today, most philosophers interested in the issue agree that analogies play an 
important role in scientific reasoning. A number of different roles for analogies have been 
discussed (Bartha 2013, §1). Some challenge the presumption that generative reasoning is 
beyond the scope of normative theorising. For instance, Nersessian (1988), drawing on 
cognitive psychology and computational modelling, has argued that analogies can function 
as heuristics for developing or articulating scientific theories in ways that are both 
“systematic and subject to evaluation” (1988, 42). Call these generative accounts of 
analogical reasoning. Others take analogies to provide epistemic support for hypotheses 
and consequently propose accounts of how or when analogical arguments can provide this 
kind of support. Call these justificatory accounts. 
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My focus in this paper is on what can be called pursuit worthiness accounts, i.e. 
accounts according to which analogies provide reasons for testing or developing a 
hypothesis further.1 While compatible with the other two, pursuit worthiness accounts are 
necessary for explaining some aspects of scientific reasoning that cannot be captured by 
purely justificatory or generative accounts. To illustrate this point, I outline a case study in 
Section 2, involving the early development of the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. 
I argue that in this case the liquid drop analogy motivated physicists to pursue the model 
despite it initially facing empirical and theoretical problems. In the remainder of the paper I 
consider different accounts of how analogies justify pursuit. 
I start, in Section 3, by criticising accounts defended by Wesley Salmon (1967) and 
Paul Bartha (2010), according to which analogies provide reasons for pursuing a 
hypothesis in virtue of providing reasons for their truth. I argue that even if analogies 
sometimes provide epistemic support, this is not always a reason in favour of pursuit. 
Instead, I propose that analogies are better seen as justifying pursuit by increasing the 
value of learning whether the hypothesis is true. In Section 4 I consider an account where 
hypotheses based on analogies have a high potential for unification. I argue that while this 
account is plausible for some cases, it does not fit the case of the liquid drop model. 
Finally, in Section 5, I propose an alternative account of this case according to which 
analogies facilitate the transfer of an already well-understood modelling framework to a 
new domain of phenomena. 
 
2. Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model 
The liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus was developed from the late 1920s onwards, 
during a time where physicists were trying to extend their understanding of the structure of 
atoms to the atomic nucleus itself.2 The model was first proposed in 1928-29 by George 
Gamow, at the time a Russian doctoral student visiting Western Europe, who suggested 
                                                 
1
 I borrow the terminology of ‘generative’, ‘justificatory’ and ‘pusuitworthiness’ accounts from McKaughan 
(2008). 
2
 The following is based on Stuewer’s (1994) account. 
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that the nucleus “may be treated somewhat as a small drop of water in which the particles 
are held together by surface tension” (cited from Stuewer 1994, 80). In line with common 
assumptions at the time, he modelled the nucleus as consisting of a collection of α-
particles, and assumed that the nucleus was in equilibrium between the kinetic energy of 
the particles and the surface tension. On this basis Gamow then tried to derive an 
expression for the mass defects (i.e. the nuclear binding energy) of the different nuclei. 
Niels Bohr and Ernest Rutherford were enthusiastic about the model, providing 
support for Gamow to develop it from 1929 to 1931. However, while Gamow made some 
progress, he quickly ran into problems. Although his theoretically predicted mass defects 
traced a curve of the same general shape as the experimentally determined ones, it only 
gave reasonably accurate quantitative predictions for the lighter elements. He suspected 
this could be remedied by taking into account the nuclear electrons that were thought to 
exist at the time. However, when he tried to incorporate these into his model he ran into a 
major theoretical problem (the so-called Klein paradox) that he was unable to overcome. 
Consequently, by the summer of 1930 Gamow began to turn his attention elsewhere 
(Stuewer 1994, 78-85). 
Despite these problems, the model quickly became popular among physicists, not 
because they were confident it accurately represented the nucleus, but as a speculative 
attempt to solve certain problems. For instance, in 1930 Rutherford wrote that the model 
“while admittedly imperfect and speculative in character is of much interest as the first 
attempt to give an interpretation of the mass-defect curve of the elements” (cited from 
Steuwer 1994, 86-7). During the 1930s the model was further developed, following two 
broad trajectories. First, following the discovery of neutrons in 1932, Werner Heisenberg 
and Carl von Weizsäcker tried to revise the assumptions of the model to yield an 
empirically more accurate mass defect curve (ibid., 87-97). Second, Bohr and several 
others modified the model in order to account for artificially induced radioactivity (i.e. 
radioactive elements produced by bombarding stable elements with neutrons) as an 
excitation and subsequent ‘evaporation’ of particles from the drop of ‘nuclear fluid’ (97-
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107).3 Finally, in 1938-39 Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, combining insights from both 
research programmes, realised that the liquid drop model could be adapted to explain 
nuclear fission, a newly discovered and at the time highly puzzling phenomenon (107-
116).4 
As is clear from the latter part of this story, the analogy played an important role in 
guiding the revisions and extensions of Gamow’s original model. This use of analogy is 
what generative accounts aim to analyse. I return to this use of the liquid drop analogy in 
Section 5. For now, I want to highlight that already when Gamow proposed the liquid drop 
model in 1928-30, it was received positively and was taken up by a number of physicists, 
despite its initial problems. The analogy also seems to have motivated pursuing the model 
in the first place, before there was any particular reason to think it even approximately true. 
The question that I will focus on in the rest of this paper is why it was more reasonable to 
spend time and resources pursuing this particular model, rather than some alternative 
mathematical model not grounded in analogies. 
 
3. Pursuit Worthiness, Plausibility and Probability 
It might be thought that there is a straightforward answer to this question. Although there 
might not have been grounds for accepting Gamow’s model in 1930, the analogy could 
still have shown it plausible and, the idea goes, the fact that the model was plausible made 
it reasonable to pursue it. But since reasons for regarding a model or hypothesis as 
plausible are merely a weaker form of epistemic support, these are not fundamentally 
different from reasons for its truth.5 
A version of this account was suggested by Wesley Salmon (1967). Salmon was 
responding to N.R. Hanson’s (1958, 1074) claim that there is a fundamental difference 
between reasons for accepting a hypothesis H and “reasons for suggesting H in the first 
                                                 
3
 A number of alternative (but sometimes related) analogies also influenced this line of physical theorising 
about atomic nuclei (Stuewer, ibid.). 
4
 See also Andersen (1997) on the experimental and theoretical developments which lead to the discovery of 
fission. 
5
 See Kordig (1978) for an account along these lines, not specifically concerned with analogies. 
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place” since the latter are “reasons which make H a plausible conjecture” (ibid.). Hanson 
(1077-79) argued that reasons for suggesting hypotheses (what I here call reasons for 
pursuit) can be based on analogies, among other things. Against this, Salmon (1967, 113-
18) argues that plausibility judgements should be understood as estimates of the prior 
probability of a hypothesis. Since in a Bayesian framework it is necessary to make some 
judgement of prior probabilities to evaluate the posterior probability of a hypothesis, this 
furnishes an important role for plausibility judgements without these being fundamentally 
different from reasons for acceptance. According to Salmon, analogical arguments are 
plausibility arguments in this sense (127). 
Whereas Salmon thus equates reasons for pursuit with estimates of prior 
probability, Paul Bartha’s (2010) recent work on analogical reasoning gives a more 
nuanced account of their relation. I here outline some details of Bartha’s account of 
analogical reasoning, since I draw on some of them later on. Following Hesse (1966, 59), 
Bartha endorses a two-dimensional analysis of analogical arguments. While many accounts 
only focus on horizontal relations, i.e. the similarities and differences between the source 
and target system, two-dimensional accounts also emphasise the vertical relations, 
consisting of dependency relations (e.g. causal, modal or explanatory relations) within the 
two domains. Building on this idea, Bartha (2010, ch. 4) defends an inference schema that 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
(B1) There is some structure of dependency relations R(a, b, c, …) between 
features a, b, c, … of the source system, S1. [Prior association]. 
(B2) The target system, S2, has one or more features a’, b’, c’, … analogous 
to a, b, c, … [Potential for generalisation]. 
(B3) S2 does not have any features which would preclude R’ (analogous to 
R) from obtaining. [No critical difference]. 
Therefore: 
(B4) It is prima facie plausible that R’(a’, b’, c’, …) obtains for S2, and a 
fortiori that S2 has features a’, b’, c’, … 
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The first premise states that there is a “prior association” in S1, in the form of some 
structure of dependency relations between its features. Which kinds of dependency 
relations to look for varies between contexts, but a good example of a structure of 
dependency relations is how the parts of a mechanism interact and constrain each other to 
produce certain effects. Second, we look at whether there is a “potential for 
generalisation”, meaning that the target system has some features analogous to those 
involved in the prior association in S1. Finally, we consider whether there are any “critical 
differences” between the two systems, i.e. whether S2 has any features precluding a 
relation analogous to the prior association from obtaining. Given these premises, according 
to Bartha, it is prima facie plausible to “transfer” the prior association to the target system, 
and thus infer that the relevant further features involved in the prior association obtain in 
S2 as well. 
Bartha highlights that arguments of this type are often used to support hypotheses 
before they have been tested (2010, 6) and that they provide reasons for investigating 
hypotheses further (16). Like Salmon, he thinks this is because analogies support 
plausibility judgements, but Bartha does not equate plausibility judgements with estimates 
of prior probability. That a hypothesis p is ‘prima facie plausible’, he takes instead to mean 
“roughly speaking, … There are sufficient grounds for taking p seriously” (2010, 16). This 
is partly an epistemic notion. A plausible hypothesis, according to Bartha, “has epistemic 
support: we have some reason to believe it, even prior to testing” (15) and it has “an 
appreciable likelihood of being true” (18). But he also takes plausibility judgements to 
have pragmatic connotations: “To say that a hypothesis is plausible typically implies that 
we have good reason to investigate it (subject to the feasibility and value of investigation)” 
(15). In a suggestive footnote (p. 18, note 19) Bartha furthermore mentions that reasons for 
pursuit depend on epistemic support “in a decision-theoretic sense” given “contextual 
information about costs and benefits.” However, he adds that absent this information “the 
two points are at least partially independent” (ibid.). So although epistemic support is 
important to what Bartha means by plausibility, considerations about ‘feasibility’ and 
‘value’ are relevant as well. 
Given this elucidation of what he means by ‘prima facie plausibility’, it is 
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consistent with Bartha’s account that analogical inferences can provide reasons for 
investigating a hypothesis without necessarily providing reasons for its truth. However, in 
practice he tends to focus on epistemic support. For instance, he claims, “Any argument 
that a hypothesis is prima facie plausible … should provide reasons to think the hypothesis 
might be true” (18). Furthermore, he still follows Salmon in identifying a hypothesis’ 
degree of plausibility with its prior probability (e.g. pp. 15-6, 291-302). As I read Bartha, 
analogies primarily provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses by providing epistemic 
support for them. Once this is established, whether we are then justified in pursuing a 
hypothesis all things considered depends on ‘contextual information’, i.e. information in 
addition to that provided by the analogy, about the costs and benefits of pursuing it. 
Although Salmon and Bartha might be right that analogies sometimes give reasons 
for ascribing higher prior probability to a hypothesis, I do not think this gives a satisfactory 
account of how analogies justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model. First, it is not 
clear that physicists in 1930 regarded the liquid drop model as significantly more probable 
than so many other possible models. Second, while I agree with Bartha that having reasons 
for pursuing a hypothesis can be elucidated in decision-theoretic terms, he fails to take the 
implications of doing so fully into account. Since being justified in pursuing a hypothesis 
depends on a number of factors apart from its epistemic support, why assume that the 
analogy increased its epistemic support rather than some of the other factors? One cannot 
simply assume that when analogies motivate pursuing a hypothesis, the analogy must 
therefore have provided reasons for its truth. Third, it is not always the case that increasing 
the probability of a hypothesis is a reason in favour of pursuing it, let alone a sufficient 
reason. 
When considering whether to pursue a hypothesis H, we need to take into account 
the different possible outcomes of doing so. We might learn that H is true, but we might 
equally learn that it is false. Furthermore, we should also take into account the possibility 
of getting no useful evidence or – even worse – getting misleading evidence, i.e. evidence 
that leads us to mistakenly accept or reject H. Following Nyrup (2015, 755-6), this can be 
represented in a simple decision-theoretic model. Suppose we only distinguish between 
two possible states of the world, that H is true and that it is false, and that we are interested 
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in a range of epistemic attitudes EA1, EA2, … , EAn we might end up having towards H, (e.g. 
accepting H, rejecting H and staying agnostic).6 Then the expected utility of pursuing H is 
given by: 
 
(1) EU(p(H))    =  Pr(H)   × ∑ [U(EAi(H), H) × Pr(EAi(H) | p(H), H)]  
                + Pr(¬H) × ∑ [U(EAi(H), ¬H) × Pr(EAi(H) | p(H), ¬H)]  
                –     C(p(H)) 
 
The unconditional probabilities in this model represent the probability of H being true (or 
false, respectively) at the given state of inquiry, before further testing. They can both be 
initial probabilities prior to all testing or posterior probabilities given previous testing in 
situations where we are considering whether to pursue H further. It is this quantity that 
Salmon and Bartha take analogical arguments to manipulate. The conditional probabilities 
represent how likely we are, given that H is true (or false), to obtain evidence sufficient to 
adopt the attitude EAi towards H. For instance, if EA1 is acceptance then Pr(EA1(H) | p(H), 
H) represents how likely we are to get reliable evidence in favour of H, while Pr(EA1(H) | 
p(H), ¬H) is how likely we are to get misleading evidence in favour of H. U(EA1(H), H) 
represents the value of, e.g., correctly accepting H, while U(EA1(H), ¬H) measures how 
problematic it would be to mistakenly accept H, and mutatis mutandis for other epistemic 
attitudes. Finally, C(p(H)) is the cost (time, resources, etc.) of pursuing H.7 
This analysis highlights that there are a number of different factors relevant to 
whether it is worth pursuing a hypothesis. In order for an argument to provide additional 
reasons for pursuing H, it must be the case that it increases our estimate of EU(p(H)). But 
there is no reason to suppose that it must increase the probability of H being true rather 
than, e.g., showing that it would be more interesting to know whether H is true, showing 
that H is less costly to pursue or showing that pursuing H is more likely to produce reliable 
                                                 
6
 It is possible to include further states of the world, e.g. various degrees to which H is partially true, or a 
broader range of epistemic attitudes without changing the conclusions I draw from this model. 
7
 I assume for simplicity that these costs are commensurable with the utility of knowing whether H is true 
and that the costs of pursuing H are independent of its truth. 
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evidence. In fact, unlike these other factors, it is not generally the case that increasing 
Pr(H) raises EU(p(H)). For instance, if it would be easy to falsify H but difficult to get 
reliable evidence to confirm it, or if knowing that H is false would be more interesting than 
knowing that it is true, reducing Pr(H) could raise EU(p(H)) (cf. Nyrup 2015, 759). 
 
4. Analogies as Guides to Unification 
I have so far criticised the assumption that analogies provide reasons for pursuit by 
providing epistemic support. I propose that analogies instead justify pursuing H by 
increasing the value of knowing whether H is true. I develop this proposal in the remainder 
of this paper. More specifically, I consider two accounts of this type. I start with the idea 
that analogies indicate hypotheses that would provide increased theoretical unification, if 
shown true. While plausible for some cases, I will propose an alternative account in the 
next section which better accounts for the liquid drop case. 
 Campbell’s defence of analogies in physics was arguably based on the 
unificationist idea. While he thought that theories based on mechanical analogies are more 
likely to be false than ones which merely posit generalised laws extrapolated from 
observed regularities (152), he argues that analogically based theories are valuable “simply 
because the ideas which they bring to mind are intrinsically valuable” (1920, 132). The 
reason is that they offer the chance of laws capable of unifying quantities from previously 
distinct domains, e.g., heat and momentum, in the case of the billiard ball model of gases. 
Insofar as we consider it an intrinsically valuable project to achieve this kind of 
unification, we “must balance that value against the chance of error” (152). Although 
Campbell does not elaborate much further on these remarks, it is clear that the value he 
ascribes to analogies is not that they provide increased epistemic support for theories. 
 The idea that the value of obtaining unifying theories has to be balanced against the 
risk of error fits the decision-theoretic model outlined above. If we agree with Campbell 
that it is intrinsically valuable to discover that a unifying theory is true, this would increase 
the first term of equation (1). If this value is sufficiently high, it could outweigh a 
decreased prior probability, which would otherwise shift the weight towards the second 
term of the equation (but notice, again, that reducing prior probability does not necessarily 
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decrease overall the expected utility of pursuit). 
This account also fits one line of justification Bartha (2010, ch. 7) offers for his 
account, viz. that it tends to promote the traditional theoretical virtues, in particular 
unification.8 If we construe unification as the ability to explain a wide range of phenomena 
using the same basic explanatory pattern (Kitcher 1989), we can see how this fits Bartha’s 
inference schema. Premise (B1) identifies the existence of the explanatory pattern R (the 
prior association) in S1, while (B2) points out that there are a number of features in S2 that 
could potentially be explained by the same pattern. Since (B3) there is no known reason to 
rule out this possibility, there is a potential for unifying the relevant features of S1 and S2 
in single explanatory schema. So if we were to discover that R holds for S2, we would 
have increased the unification of our knowledge of the world. 
In my view, this account of analogies provides a plausible account of how 
analogical reasoning justifies pursuit in some cases but not all. In cases such as the billiard 
ball analogy for gases or the ‘waves in a mechanical medium’ analogy for light (discussed 
e.g. by Hesse 1966, Nersessian 1988), the analogies do seem to promise to unify 
thermodynamical and optical phenomena, respectively, with the theoretical framework of 
classical mechanics. From the perspective of nineteenth-century physicists, these analogies 
pointed to potential increases in theoretical unification. However, this story does not work 
for cases like the liquid drop model. Although Bohr, Rutherford and other physicists 
regarded Gamow’s analogy as suggesting a very promising line of research, this does not 
seem to be because it promised to unify the physics of water drops and atomic nuclei. The 
liquid drop model employs modelling techniques analogous to those applied to water 
drops, but it was clear that the explanations for the two kinds of phenomena would be very 
different. Even if one might hope that an increased understanding of the atomic nucleus 
could eventually lead to a unified account of the two types of systems, the liquid drop 
                                                 
8
 Bartha argues that analogies are also conducive to coherence, simplicity and fruitfulness, but regards 
unification as the most central. Bartha (2010, 256) here recognises that as long as we consider these virtues 
valuable to achieve, this is sufficient to show a hypothesis ‘plausible’ in his sense of ‘worthy of 
investigation’. However, he also suggests that his argument can be combined with the argument that the 
theoretical virtues are “indicators of empirical adequacy (or truth)” (ibid.). 
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model does not in itself promise to achieve this kind of unification in the way that the 
billiard ball model and mechanical ether models did. 
 
5. Transferring Modelling Frameworks Through Analogies 
In order to account for how analogies justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model, we 
need to switch to a more dynamic account of the relation between analogies and scientific 
models. I have so far focused on whether analogies can justify pursuing a specific 
hypothesis. However, in the liquid drop case, Gamow and those who subsequently worked 
on the liquid drop model did not exactly pursue any specific hypothesis about the structure 
of the atomic nucleus. Rather, they tried to model the atomic nucleus as if it were a water 
drop in order to construct a potential explanation of some otherwise puzzling phenomenon 
– i.e. the mass defect curve for Gamow, Heisenberg and Weizsäcker, artificial radioactivity 
for Bohr and his colleagues, and nuclear fission for Meitner and Frisch. They were of 
course still interested in achieving a correct (or at least empirically accurate) description of 
the nucleus, but their first priority was to formulate a potential explanation of the target 
phenomenon. Rather than pursuing a specific hypothesis, the water drop analogy motivated 
the pursuit of the research project of adapting a modelling framework to the atomic 
nucleus for certain explanatory purposes. Or, if we want to say that they pursued a 
hypothesis, it was not one of the form “the atomic nucleus has features a, b, c, … 
analogous to a water drop” but rather something like “modelling the atomic nucleus 
analogously to a water drop can provide a (correct) explanation of phenomena x, y, z, ….” 
That analogies guide the development hypotheses is also emphasised by proponents 
of generative accounts, such as Nersessian (1988). But it is important to notice that 
adopting a dynamic view of the relation between models and analogies does not in itself 
answer the question of why it was reasonable to pursue an analogical modelling 
framework, rather than so many others. This is how pursuit worthiness accounts differ 
from generative accounts. The latter primarily describe the cognitive role analogies play in 
shaping and guiding the development of novel scientific theories. Pursuit worthiness 
accounts, by contrast, justify why one should choose to develop a theory using analogies in 
the first place.  
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That analogies should be a help in developing theories is not obvious. Campbell 
(1920, 130), for instance, disagreed: “Analogy, so far from being a help to the 
establishment of theories, is the greatest hindrance. It is never difficult to find a theory 
which will explain the laws logically; what is difficult is to find one which will explain 
them logically and at the same time display the requisite analogy. … To regard analogy as 
an aid to the invention of theories is as absurd as to regard melody as an aid to the 
composition of sonatas.” Now, pace Campbell, it might be that imposing constraints 
actually makes it easier to come up with genuinely novel ideas. However, the core point 
here is that the relevant question is not how to most effectively come up with novel ideas, 
but rather how to come up with ideas that are worth pursuing. Sometimes, e.g. if we lack 
any possible explanations, coming up with genuinely novel ideas might be intrinsically 
desirable. But in other cases, e.g. if we are overwhelmed by too many hypotheses, we may 
instead prefer to restrict ourselves to generating hypotheses of high quality. 
So why are modelling frameworks based on analogies more pursuit worthy in cases 
like the liquid drop model? I want to end by proposing that these frameworks are more 
pursuit worthy because they facilitate the transfer of a modelling framework to construct 
explanations in a new domain.9 One simple reason for trying to adapt an already existing 
modelling framework to a new case is that this is typically easier and less time consuming 
than developing a new one from scratch. Thus, transferring a modelling framework by 
analogy can often reduce the costs of pursuit. 
However, constructing new explanations using analogically transferred modelling 
frameworks arguably also increases the potential understanding one can achieve through 
those explanations. This is because achieving scientific understanding of some 
phenomenon depends upon having a well-understood modelling framework. 
Understanding why a phenomenon occurs requires that one understands the model one 
                                                 
9
 This account is inspired by Hesse’s and Bartha’s idea that analogical inferences “transfer” explanations 
from one domain to another. However, as emphasised above, I focus on adapting a framework to produce 
new explanations rather than one-off inferences. In this respect, it is closer to Hesse’s (1966: 157-177) 
suggestion that analogies provide a form of explanation by “metaphorically redescribing” the target domain 
in terms of the source analogy. 
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understands the phenomenon with (Strevens 2013: 513; cf. de Regt 2009). Thus, if an 
already well-understood modelling framework can be adapted to produce a correct 
explanation, little work is needed to realise its explanatory potential. One might eventually 
achieve a similar understanding of a new, purpose-built modelling framework. But, first, it 
would typically require a lot more effort to achieve this level of understanding. And, 
second, the analogically based framework offers an already proven explanatory power, as 
opposed to a merely potentially achievable one. In this way, even though in physicists in 
1930 did not know that Gamow’s model could be adapted to explain the respective 
phenomena they sought to explain, they still had good reasons to pursue the modelling 
approach indicated by the liquid drop analogy. 
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What,	when	and	how	do	rational	analysis	models	explain?	
(Word count: 4995) 
Abstract	
Probabilistic modeling is a highly influential method of theorizing in cognitive science. Rational 
analysis is an account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but 
self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this article, I disentangle and assess several 
possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing 
models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational 
analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental 
affordances.  
1.	Introduction		
During the past two decades, probabilistic modeling has become one of the most visible strands of 
cognitive modeling alongside connectionism, rule-based approaches and dynamical systems 
modeling. Curiously, against the general trend in the cognitive sciences where theorizing is 
increasingly anchored in neuroscience findings, probabilistic modeling of higher cognition has been 
a characteristically top-down endeavor. Without making any substantial commitments about the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms, probabilistic modeling has been applied to complex aspects of 
human cognition, which have often been thought of as being beyond the reach of mechanistic 
research methods. Models of human memory, categorization, causal learning, concept learning, and 
conditional inference, to mention a few applications, often show an impressive fit with empirical 
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data, and the novel analyses of cognitive capacities provided by the models appear to have shed 
new light on the nature of the explananda under study. 
However, how does that shedding light actually occur – how do such computational probabilistic 
models explain? Although probabilistic modeling, in principle, does not rely on any particular 
method of explanation, modelers often refer to the idea of rational analysis as the account of how 
and why their models help us understand the mind (Anderson 1990; Oaksford & Chater 2007). The 
striking claim made by rational analysis (RA) modelers is that by understanding higher cognitive 
capacities as forms of inductive inference, we can predict behavior, and understand a lot about 
human cognition without making any assumptions about the underlying representations and 
processes. This agnosticism about neural and cognitive mechanisms is justified by making reference 
to the rationality of human behavior: We know that human agents tend to be generally well-adapted 
to their environment, and hence a careful analysis of the cognitive task encountered by the mind, 
coupled with an assumption of the optimality of human behavior, results in a putatively powerful 
methodology of prediction and explanation.  
However, there is a large consensus in the philosophy of science that explanations also in the 
cognitive sciences should track causal mechanisms, and the way RA purports to sidestep the 
evidential and explanatory problems arising from the causal complexity of cognition has given rise 
to a strongly polarized debate (see, e.g., peer commentary in Jones & Love 2011). On the one hand, 
the way that the new mathematical methods in probabilistic modeling can combine structure and 
learning in human thought has lead to an exciting new paradigm for theorizing about the mind. On 
the other hand, the proponents of non-causal explanation need to show when and how it is that non-
causal models explain rather than redescribe or merely formally unify various phenomena (cf. 
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Colombo & Hartmann 2015). Otherwise, rational analysis could simply be seen as the last breath of 
the autonomist dream of studying the mind independently from the brain.  
In this paper, I assess the explanatory status of RA models by disentangling various explanatory 
contributions which have been attributed to them. By relying on the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory of explanation, I distinguish between three possible explanatory contributions such models 
could make: Uncovering (a) constitutive dependencies between parts and wholes, (b) environment-
behavior dependencies, and (c) environment–optimal behavior dependencies. I treat the third 
alternative as the most promising source of new understanding provided by RA models. I argue that 
(c) should be interpreted as being explanatory not of human behavior as such, but of environmental 
affordances. Well conducted modeling of environmental affordances can complement mechanistic 
theorizing by providing means for understanding the possible space of behavior of agents.  
2.	Probabilistic	cognitive	modeling	and	rational	analysis		
2.1	Procedure	of	rational	analysis		
The idea of rational analysis modeling dates back to John Anderson’s work on human memory and 
categorization in The Adaptive Character of Thought (1990). Having already worked on his ACT* 
cognitive architecture, the new methodology put forward in the book reflected Anderson’s 
increasing worries that the research methods of the time could not really uncover cognitive 
mechanisms. Lacking a clear picture of what it is that cognitive mechanisms do (i.e. what the 
psychological explananda are), the available evidence of neural and algebraic level structures was 
insufficient to uncover the mechanistic architecture of the human mind (Anderson 1990, pp.23–26). 
Compared to bottom-up research strategies, rational analysis begins from the other end: 
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[…] We can understand a lot about human cognition without considering in detail what is inside 
the human head. Rather, we can look in detail at what is outside the human head and try to 
determine what would be optimal behavior given the structure of the environment and the goals 
of the human. (Anderson 1990, p.3) 
According to Anderson, careful mathematical modeling of the environment/task structure combined 
with an assumption about the optimality of human behavior leads to a new self-standing research 
strategy for understanding the mind: “As this book is evidence, a rational analysis can stand on its 
own without any architectural theory" (ibid.). By providing a precise model of what the mind does 
as a well-adapted system, rational analysis can constrain the search space for cognitive mechanisms, 
and put the scientific study of the mind on a firm foundation.  
This view of the role of computational modeling immediately brings to mind Marr’s (1982) account 
of multi-level theorizing in the mind sciences. However, whereas Marr provides no systematic 
model for building computational-level theories, RA modeling has predominantly proceeded 
according to the six-step modeling cycle proposed by Anderson (1990. p.29):  
1. Specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system 
2. Develop a formal model of the environment to which the system is adapted 
3. Make minimal assumptions about computational limitations 
4. Derive the optimal behavior function, given items 1 through 3  
5. Examine the empirical evidence to see whether the predictions of the behavior function are 
confirmed  
6. Repeat, iteratively refining the theory 
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These steps embody an account of how a large part of probabilistic cognitive modeling is done. 
However, two further assumptions should be made explicit. First, the derivation of optimal behavior 
in steps 2-4 typically employs probability calculus (not logic) as the normative baseline theory of 
rational behavior. Secondly, the connection between model predictions (step 4) and observed 
behavior of humans (step 5) is mediated by an assumption about the optimality of the observed 
behavior (see quoted passage above).  
Below I illustrate this process with an example. However, a comment on the status of the approach 
in cognitive science is in place: Not all probabilistic modelers endorse the rational analysis 
framework (cf. Danks 2015; Sakamoto et al. 2008; Brighton & Gigerenzer 2008). Focusing on RA 
is useful for two reasons, however. Rational analysis is undeniably influential, and its core 
commitments have been endorsed a large group of well-known modelers (e.g., Anderson 1990; 
Oaksford & Chater 1994, 2007; Griffiths & Tenenbaum 2009). A further advantage of focusing on 
RA has to do with the fact that often the theoretical commitments of mathematical modelers are 
hard to pin down. In some cases, this is surely due to the modelers themselves not being clear of 
where their commitments (about explanatoriness, optimality, etc.) lie. Rational analysis provides a 
clear account of the conceptual foundations of probabilistic cognitive modeling, and therefore the 
following discussion is potentially helpful for challenging the methodological quietism among 
probabilistic modelers.  
2.2	Oaksford	and	Chater	on	the	Wason	selection	task		
To illustrate the rational analysis process, I now briefly introduce Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater’s 
(1994, 2007) analysis of the Wason selection task. Being a relatively simple model, it is a good 
device for illustrating the conceptual basis of RA modeling. 
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Wason selection task is one of the most famous laboratory experiments discussed in the literature 
on human rationality. In the original form of the task, subjects are given four cards, each of which 
has a letter on one side and a number on the other. The subjects’ task is to determine whether the 
rule “If there is a vowel on one side of the card (p), then there is an even number on the other side 
(q)” holds. More precisely, subjects are asked to select all those cards, but only those cards, which 
would have to be turned over in order to discover whether the rule is true for the combination of 
cards they were given. The famous finding from the task and its several replications is that only a 
small minority of the subjects (less than 10%) select the correct cards (vowel, odd number) 
corresponding to the falsifying instance. Judged in the light of logic, most subjects fail to perform in 
a rational way.  
Oaksford and Chater (O&C) challenge the irrationality claim by arguing that logic-based theories of 
inference and rationality misrepresent people’s behavior in the task. O&C’s own information-gain 
model of the situation argues that the apparently irrational behavior can be understood as the 
optimal way of decreasing uncertainty regarding the hypotheses studied. The gist of O&C’s 
reinterpretation of the selection task is that instead of engaging in deductive reasoning, subjects 
interpret the task as inductive one. They do not try to falsify the rule, but instead they try to 
determine which of two hypotheses holds:  
(a) Independence hypothesis  Hi: P(q | h) = P(q) or 
(b) Dependence hypothesis  Hd: P(q | p) is high, higher than P(q).  
Being initially equally uncertain about both hypotheses, subjects aim to reduce this uncertainty as 
much as possible by turning as few cards as possible.  
The rational analysis proposed by O&C relies on three basic starting points:  
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(1)  Higher cognition can be modeled as probabilistic (Bayesian) computation  
(2)  The likelihoods and prior probabilities required by the model can be acquired from the 
analysis of the environment structure 
(3)  Behavior of human agents constitutes an optimal response to the task.  
The Bayesian model of the situation is constructed roughly as follows.
1
 To formalize the idea of 
uncertainty reduction, O&C adopt the optimal data selection paradigm, and interpret uncertainty 
reduction as optimization of expected information gain. Expected information gain ![#$] from 
turning over a card is defined as ![# &'|) − # &' ].
2
 The Shannon information terms #(&), in 
turn, are a function of the probabilities of the hypotheses before and after observing data,	.(&') and 
.(&'|)). These required posterior probabilities can be calculated from the likelihoods .()|&) and 
the priors by applying the Bayes rule. As the initial priors were set to be equal (.5), the rest of the 
crucial model specification is built into the likelihood functions, which describe the nature of the 
four-card task. Oaksford and Chater (1994, Table 1) show in detail how the required likelihoods can 
be read off the contingency tables describing the two hypotheses. 
From these derivations, it follows that the crucial parameter values determining the optimality of 
behavior are the base rates of p and q. These probabilities describe how often positive instances of 
                                                
1
 For mathematical details, see Oaksford & Chater 1994, 2007. 
2
 Uncertainty (Shannon information) # &'  given n mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses (Hi), is 
− . &' log2 . &'
3
'45 .  
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the antecedent and consequent of the rule appear in the environment. The expected information gain 
from turning the four cards depends on P(p) and P(q) in the following way: 
- P(q) is small   à P card is informative  
- P(p) is large   à Not-q card is informative 
- P(p) and P(q) are small  à Q card is informative 
- Not-p card is not informative 
How should these base rates, then, be determined? Instead of attempting to somehow measure the 
base rates of vowels and consonants in a relevant environment, O&C cite various intuitively 
plausible justifications for their rarity assumption. Relying on the observation that categories in 
language cut the world quite finely, the rarity assumption states that, generally, P(p) and P(q) are 
low in most situations.
3
 Under rarity, O&C conclude, the q card is more informative than the not-q 
card. Hence, the model concludes that highest expected information gain is achieved by turning p 
and q cards, exactly as a majority of the participants do. Actually, with the parameter values chosen 
by O&C, there’s a very good fit between meta-analysis results about people’s behavior in the 
standard form of the selection task, and the predictions of the model. Hence, by changing the 
normative model of rational behavior, O&C were able to explain away irrationality, and to show 
that experimental subjects’ behavior is actually very close to optimal. 
The model has received critical attention in the literature (cf. Oaksford & Chater 2009), but it serves 
our current purposes well. The model specification and the modeling assumptions are conceptually 
                                                
3
 See Oaksford & Chater 1994, 2007, and 2009 for alternative justifications of rarity. 
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on a par with those in more complex Bayesian models. The complexity in such models often 
pertains to the structure and generation of hypothesis spaces, and the models often rely on 
computational tools (such as MCMC approximation methods) to make the calculations tractable. 
However, these mathematical complexities have no influence on the fundamental conceptual 
structure of the model. What is common to all such models is that the none of the components 
(hypothesis space, likelihood function, and priors) are interpreted in a psychologically realistic way 
as mental representations (Jones & Love 2011). Instead, they stand directly for properties of the 
environment. Furthermore, data about human behavior is not fed into the model specification to 
empirically calibrate the model. Instead, it is only used to test model predictions. Hence, in this 
sense, the rational analysis of the selection task is an illuminating example of the theoretical and 
conceptual assumptions of computational probabilistic modeling.  
3.	What	rational	analysis	models	fail	to	explain	
A shared starting point for many accounts of scientific explanation has been to distinguish 
explanation from other epistemic activities (e.g., description and prediction) by pointing out that 
explanations offer information of a specific kind. Explanations show how or why something 
happened or obtains. According to a now widely accepted approach, the knowledge that allows one 
to answer such questions concerns change-relating counterfactual dependencies between the relata 
in the explanation.  
Stated generally, according to this contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation, explanatory 
information has the following form (Woodward 2013; Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010): 
{CC} x [x’] because of y [y’]  (variable X takes the value x instead of x’ because Y has the 
value y instead of y’) 
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In this account, being able to explain can be captured by being able to correctly answer what-if-
things-were-different questions, i.e. questions of how changes in explanans variables lead to 
changes in the explanandum variable. In addition to being a sufficiently general account of 
explanation, the contrastive-counterfactual theory suits the purposes of this article well, because it 
does not necessarily tie the notion of explanation to that of causation. That is, although the 
‘because’ in {CC} is typically understood as referring to causal dependency, the account does not 
rule out the possibility of non-causal explanation (Woodward 2013; Pincock 2015; Rice 2015): If 
there are ways of defining the notion of invariant dependency in non-causal situations (e.g. for 
mathematical dependencies), the contrastive-counterfactual theory could be applied to non-causal 
explanations as well. Hence, the theory of explanation casts the net wide enough to give RA models 
a fair chance of being explanatory. 
A further advantage of treating explanations as answers to questions is that it allows us to make 
more precise the possible explanatory claims made by RA modelers. I suggest that there are at least 
three different kinds of objective dependencies that RA models could be said to track: (1) 
constitutive dependencies between parts and wholes, (2) environment-behavior dependencies, and 
(3) environment–optimal-behavior dependencies. In the rest of this section, I argue that in most 
cases of RA modeling, there are good reasons to conclude that the models do not have genuine 
explanatory import with respect to the two first kinds of dependencies.  
3.1	Constitutive	what-ifs		
The notion of mechanism has acquired a central position in the philosophical debates concerning 
explanation in the life sciences. A clear expression of the mechanistic viewpoint has recently been 
given in the model-to-mechanisms mapping (3M) requirement by Kaplan and Craver (2011). 
According to the requirement, dynamical and mathematical models in systems- and cognitive 
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neuroscience explain a phenomenon only if there is a mapping between elements in the model and 
elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. As the example discussed above suggests, rational 
analysis models provide no such mapping. They are agnostic about algorithmic and implementation 
level details, and intentionally so. Does this mean they cannot be explanatory? 
First, as Kaplan and Craver themselves admit, their argument ultimately relies on shared norms 
about explanatoriness in the neuroscience community, and their account of explanation as 
construction of multi-level mechanisms reflects these norms. However, if such norms do not hold 
among probabilistic cognitive modelers, it is not obvious why they should abide by the 3M 
requirement. 
Instead, if we understand explanation according to the contrastive-counterfactual theory, Kaplan 
and Craver’s argument seems less disastrous: RA models obviously do not provide information 
about constitutive and causal dependencies in multi-level mechanisms, but according to the 
account, this does not rule out the possibility of RA models tracking some other kinds of objective 
dependencies, e.g. those holding between relata described in computational-level terms. 
Furthermore, a proponent of RA need not (and should not) claim that adding mechanistic detail 
never improves a computational explanation. To defend explanatoriness of RA models, a far weaker 
claim suffices, one stating that there can be explanatory contributions which do not rely on 
information from uncovering causal mechanisms.  
3.2	Environment–behavior	what-ifs		
A second kind of explanatory question answered by an RA model could be ”how would the 
behavior of the cognizer change when the cognitive task changes in some particular way?” That is, 
a RA model could uncover objective dependencies between properties of the environment and the 
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behavior of cognizers. For example, O&C’s model can be used to derive predictions of what the 
behavior of the subjects in the Wason tasks would be, were P(p) and P(q) to take a range of values.  
It is here that the optimality assumption of RA becomes crucial. To predict how human behavior 
would change in response to changes in the task, without knowing anything about the algorithms 
and processes which produce behavior, RA relies on the assumption that humans are well-adapted 
to their environments: If we assume that human behavior is optimal (or approximates optimal 
behavior) across a large variety of environments, the predictions derived from the RA model (step 4 
of the analysis procedure) should in fact apply to that behavior.  
Given that human (ir)rationality has been the topic of a longstanding debate in philosophy and 
psychology, it is not surprising that the optimality assumption has drawn a lot of criticism (cf. Jones 
& Love 2011). Although proponents of RA are correct in arguing that some degree of rationality of 
target behavior is required for us to even perceive it as intentional action, the modest levels of 
rationality needed hardly license the strong optimality assumptions in RA models. Neither do 
evolutionary arguments provide support for strong optimality claims: Although natural selection is 
a source of design and adaptedness, evolution is not guaranteed to produce globally optimal 
solutions – merely a local comparative advantage is sufficient for evolutionary solutions to survive.  
Being aware of these problems, proponents of RA have avoided appealing to evolutionary defenses 
of the optimality assumption. Instead, they justify optimality by relying on an analogy to behavioral 
ecology and economics, where similar assumptions are commonly made (Chater et al. 2003). I 
believe, however, that the analogy breaks down due to a crucial dissimilarity between these fields: 
Both in biology and economics, rationality claims typically concern aggregate behavior, not that of 
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individual agents. Due to the disanalogy, I do not see how appealing to economics or biology could 
be a viable way to justify optimality assumptions in RA modeling.  
These problems with general defenses of the optimality assumption suggest that perhaps optimality 
should be examined more locally. What kind of evidence should be obtained to justify the 
optimality claim in the case of a particular cognitive task? It seems that to support an objective 
dependency between environment and behavior, we should gather data about human behavior in a 
task across a range of parameter values describing various different environmental states.  If 
human behavior fits the predictions made by the model across a range of conditions, that would 
appear to be rather strong evidence of optimality.
4
  
Existing RA models rarely employ such cross-environmental data. First of all, many models not 
rely on any actual measurements of environment parameters (cf. Jones & Love 2011). Instead, they 
use plausible-sounding assumptions or analogies. For example, in O&C’s selection task model, the 
base rates for p and q originated in such analogical reasoning. Similarly, Anderson’s (1990, ch. 2) 
early model of memory relied on data about library borrowings to model usage of memory 
structures, and Griffiths et al. (2007) use Google PageRank to predict fluency of recall. Models 
devoid of good quality empirical data should be considered as toy models (at best), incapable of 
uncovering actual properties of cognitive environments.  
                                                
4
 Note, however, that such empirical evidence for optimality would make the theory-based optimality assumption 
unnecessary. 
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Furthermore, as Marcus and Davis (2013, Table 1) observe, Bayesian modelers have been selective 
in the results that they report from experimental tasks. They only report ones where human behavior 
follows the model and ignore cases where its not optimal. Although some of the most recent models 
show some improvement in these respects, generally in RA models there is little evidence that 
could support knowledge of the needed invariant environment-behavior counterfactuals. 	
4.	Rational	analysis	and	the	logic	of	the	situation		
Finally, let us think about the epistemic value of a RA model if we drop the optimality assumption. 
Assume that we have a rational analysis model with (i) well-specified task structure, (ii) parameter 
values based on empirical measurement of the environment, and (iii) an account of computational 
costs and limitations. What such a model could do is to link combinations of parameter values to 
best possible behavioral choices in those situations. Is this not a kind of objective what-if 
dependency? However, consider what the relata of such a dependency are. The model tells what the 
optimal behavior would be, given a particular combination of environmental conditions and 
computational limitations. Such counterfactuals do not say anything about actual human behavior. 
Instead, they increase our understanding of the environmental affordance, or, the logic of the 
situation (Popper 1963). 
What mathematical models of affordances – the opportunities the environment offers for the agent – 
can help us understand is the possible space of behavior for cognitive agents. They show what a 
hypothetical rational agent would do in different situations. For what purposes could such 
information be useful? First, were we to design artificial cognitive systems with a particular 
cognitive task in mind, these systems should approximate the optimal behavior specified by the 
model. For example, in the selection task, if we are interested in reducing our uncertainty, O&C’s 
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model tells us something non-trivial: It reveals the best choices of cards under different values of 
base rates for p and q.  
Secondly, as in economics, rational models can act as normative baselines to which human behavior 
can be compared. As Sloman & Fehrbach (2008) argue, often it is just as interesting to find out that 
behavior does not conform to the norm than when it does. Finding out where and how systems 
malfunction is an efficient way to learn about them.  
However, in neither of these uses are RA models employed to directly explain human behavior. 
Instead, they function as inferential aids which help to map the possible space of action for agents 
when faced with a particular task. Herein lies perhaps the hardest evidential problem faced by 
rational analysis. How do we know what the mind really does in some situation, i.e. where do the 
functional hypotheses in step 1 of RA come from? For example, how would O&C defend their 
probabilistic construal of the selection task against an adamant falsificationist? Available empirical 
evidence can hardly decide the issue: Where O&C see optimal behavior, the falsificationist sees 
well-known inferential blunders.
5
 Marcus and Davis (2013) argue that similar problems of model 
selection plague several other RA models as well.  
The difficulty seems to come down to the fact that the cognitive tasks and the affordances available 
for an organism depend on its “life space” – not the physically objective world in its totality, but 
reality filtered through the organism’s needs, drives and perceptual apparatus (Simon 1956). 
                                                
5
 What makes O&C’s model selection seem even more ad hoc is that they do not explain different versions of the 
selection task (e.g., the deontic selection task) by using the same model, but instead they introduce modified versions 
for each of the variations.  
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Therefore, there is no reason to think that a mathematician’s intuitions are a reliable guide to what 
the cognitive tasks of human agents are. Ad-hocness in model selection, in turn, raises serious 
worries about the relevance of RA modeling: Constructing detailed mathematical models of 
potential affordances is of little interest unless they can be shown to be ones humans actually track.  
This leads me to my conciliatory conclusion. As suggested both by the connectionist rivals of RA 
and proponents of multi-level mechanistic explanation in philosophy (McClelland et al. 2010; 
Bechtel & Richardson 2010), functional hypotheses in cognitive science must be formulated in an 
iterative process between bottom-up and top-down research strategies. On the one hand, knowledge 
about perceptual and computational constraints of organisms mostly originates in bottom-up 
research on the mind-brain, and this knowledge should be allowed to constrain RA models. In this 
sense, Anderson’s and O&C’s claims about the self-standing explanatory role of RA are not 
vindicated by my analysis. However, the discussion on mechanistic explanation has been 
downward-looking in spirit, and modeling the environment within which cognitive mechanisms 
function has not received enough attention. Here RA models can complement mechanistic theories 
of cognition by providing precise mathematical models of the task and the environment. For 
example, as Chater et al. (2003) point out, a correctly formulated rational analysis can show why it 
is that some simple approximating heuristic is successful in solving a computationally complex 
task.  
4.	Conclusions		
I have argued that given a sufficiently broad account of scientific explanation, there are several 
possible ways in which probabilistic modeling could increase our understanding of the mind. 
However, the strictly-computational methodology embodied in the six-step formula of rational 
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analysis has led to theorizing which often fails to reliably uncover genuine explanatory 
dependencies. The shortcomings of RA are evidential in nature: The nature of the data, and the way 
it is used in model construction allows too easy curve fitting, and it is insufficient for reliable 
counterfactual inference. 
My new proposal about the epistemic role of RA models without the problematic optimality 
assumption is that they can be understood as models of environmental affordances. Interpreted in 
this way, RA models do not actually provide information about the mind works, or hypotheses 
about cognitive functions (Zednik & Jäkel 2014). Instead, they map the possible cognitive space of 
action for an organism. The explanatory contribution of such information is best worked out as 
constituting a part of a non-reductionist mechanistic research programme. 
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Inherent Complexity:
a problem for
Statistical Model Evaluation
Jan-Willem Romeijn
University of Groningen
Abstract
This paper investigates a problem for statistical model evaluation, in par-
ticular for curve fitting: by employing a different family of curves we can
fit a scatter plot almost perfectly at apparently minor costs in terms of
model complexity. The problem is resolved by an appeal to prior proba-
bilities. This leads to some general lessons about how to approach model
evaluation.
1 Introduction
Theories often interface with empirical fact through a statistical model, namely
a collection of hypotheses that each determine a probability distribution over
possible observations. Most statistical inference is carried out on the basis of a
model, for example by getting the data to choose among the hypotheses in it, or
by redistributing the probability assignment over the hypotheses in the model.
Curve-fitting is an instance of statistical inference. For example, the yearly
number of car accidents with claimable damage follows a Poisson distribution,
whose characteristics depend on the total distance covered by the vehicle. What
determines the statistical model is the exact functional dependence of frequency
1
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on distance. Since vehicles that do not cover any distance will not incur any
damage, the intercept will be zero. One statistical model may be that the
dependence is linear, so that the hypotheses in the model differ in the slope
of the line that relates distance to expected number of accidents. Another
statistical model might postulate a more complicated relation between distance
and expected number of accidents, e.g., a quadratic dependence, perhaps with
the idea that long-distance drivers have proportionally fewer accidents.
While models are typically chosen at the outset, sometimes they are un-
der scrutiny themselves. For example, we might compare the linear and the
quadratic models sketched above. Statistical model evaluation allows us to
compare such models on a variety of performance measures. Model evaluation
is important for scientists and philosophers of science alike. It allows scientists
to submit their modeling assumptions to empirical testing, and thereby address
the uncertainty over their theoretical starting points. And it gives philosophers
of science a concrete and formally precise handle on a fundamental kind of un-
certainty. Examples of model evaluation abound, ranging from climate science
and ecology to psychiatry and computational archaeology. If philosophers can
motivate and develop norms for dealing with model uncertainty, this will have
direct implications for the practice of science.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the norms that drive sta-
tistical model evaluation. After an introduction into model evaluation tools in
section 2, I present a new problem for them in section 3. I then offer a diagnosis
of the problem in section 4. In section 5 I show that the problem can be avoided
if we involve prior probability assignments in the model evaluation. Through-
out I will mostly avoid mathematical detail, to leave more space for conceptual
considerations.
2 Statistical model evaluation
The curve fitting problem sketched in the introduction may not seem statistical.
Given a family of curves, we simply choose by minimizing the errors, i.e., the
2
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sum of the discrepancies between curve and point. In the so-called least-squares
approach, for example, the error is calculated as the sum of the squares of the
vertical distance between point and curve. No model seems to be involved in
this.
Underneath such a minimization procedure, however, we do find a statistical
inference. One central modeling assumption is that the number of accidents N
follows a Poisson distribution. A further assumption is that the mean of this
distribution depends on the distance D covered by the vehicle,
Pθ(〈D,N〉) =
(λ(D))
N
N !
e−λ(D), (1)
with λ(D) = θ1D+ θ2D
2. Then we choose θ1 > 0 > θ2 for the quadratic model
and θ1 > 0 = θ2 for the linear one. Note that the model dictates a distribution
over N for all values of D but that it does not determine a probability distri-
bution over the values of D itself. The distance D is an explanatory variable,
and we presume that it is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution.
The data consist of m pairs of distances and numbers of accidents, collected
in a scatter plot:
SDN = {〈d1, n1〉, 〈d2, n2〉, . . . , 〈dm, nm〉}. (2)
For any curve and associated hypothesis we can calculate the probability of a
scatter plot, i.e., the likelihood of the hypothesis for the data, by multiplying
the probability of all the points,
Pθ(Sdn) =
m∏
i=1
Pθ(〈di, ni〉). (3)
A data point 〈d, n〉 lying outside the normal range for some hypothesis, e.g.,
with n high while d is low and θ2 is too, will be improbable, and hence it will
strongly decrease the likelihood of the hypothesis. To fit the curve we look for
the value of θ, denoted θˆ, that makes the probability of the scatter plot maximal.
Generally speaking, maximizing the likelihood of the curve will correspond to
minimizing the distance of points to the curve under some notion of distance.
Figure 1 offers an impression of what these curves may look like.
3
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Figure 1: The polynomial curves fitted to the scatter plot.
Against this background it will be clear that evaluating the general shape
of the curves, comparing linear and quadratic ones, is indeed part of statistical
model evaluation. Note that I use the term “model evaluation”, not the more
often used “model selection”. The selection of a model is a decision, and so
involves decision-theoretic as well as inferential aspects. But in what follows
I will only consider norms for the comparison of models from an epistemic
standpoint.
A very common idea about model evaluation is that, next to the fit with
data, it involves the complexity of the model. If a neat fit with the data is
achieved by adding many bells and whistles, we are rightly reluctant to put our
trust in it. We then say that the model is fitting to noise, or overfitting. In
the example, the best fitting curve from the quadratic model will have a higher
likelihood than the best curve from the linear model. But this is not to say that
the quadratic curve is better. The question is whether the gain in fit weighs up
against the cost of a more complicated model.
The extant model evaluation tools, most notably the various information
criteria (Claeskens and Hjort, 2008), provide specific formats for this trade-off
between simplicity and fit. The two most prominent tools, the Akaike and
Bayesian information criteria or AIC and BIC for short, express the simplicity
by means of the number of free parameters in the model (cf. Akaike, 1973;
Burnham and Anderson, 2002; Raftery, 1995; Schwarz, 1978). The linear model
4
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of the example has one free parameter, and the quadratic model has two. The
ICs then differ in how they factor the number of parameters into the trade-off:
AIC(Mθ) = 2 log
(
P
θˆ
(S)
)
− 2dim(Mθ), (4)
BIC(Mθ) = 2 log
(
P
θˆ
(S)
)
− log(m)dim(Mθ), (5)
in which Mθ is the model parameterized by the vector θ, the number of free
parameters is given by dim(Mθ), and θˆ is the hypothesis in the model with
maximum likelihood for the data D, so that P
θˆ
(S) is the likelihood of the
maximum likelihood estimator for the data S. In the BIC the penalty for
complexity is scaled according to the sample size of the data m.
The involvement of the complexity of models in their evaluation may seem
intuitive on pragmatic or metaphysical grounds. A simpler model is easier to
use, or we might think that the world itself is a simple place, perhaps because the
Demiurge is an efficient or lazy being. The actual reason for the appearance of
the complexity penalty in the ICs is epistemic though. Moreover, the motivation
is different for the various information criteria on offer. For example, the AIC
factors in the number of parameters as a result of approximating the expected
Kullback-Leibler divergence to the true hypothesis. And for the BIC the penalty
for complexity drops out of an approximation of the past predictive performance
of the model, as measured by the marginal likelihood.
The number of model parameters surfaces repeatedly as a criterion for model
evaluation, under a variety of epistemic good-making features of models. Very
roughly, the underlying reason is that the predictions and general empirical
claims of more complex models will be less robust and reliable. In a more
complex model the same number of data points will be used to determine a
larger number of parameter values, and so the available information will have
to be spread more thinly. For the AIC this shows up in the stumpness of the
likelihood function over the model, and in the BIC it appears as the stumpness
of the posterior probability distribution within the model. The general idea is
that we can always introduce an additional parameter that improves the best
5
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fit in the model, but that we might then lack the data to properly back up a
stable value for this additional parameter.
However, this intuition does not cover everything that is salient about com-
plexity in model evaluation. There is another epistemic good-making feature,
strongly related to complexity and the number of parameters, that needs to
be taken into account when we compare models. This further feature concerns
something like model size. It can be expressed by means of the prior probability
distribution within the models, as the following model evaluation problem will
reveal.
3 Cheap and almost perfect fit
Consider again the example of the scatter plot and the polynomial model. But
instead of using the polynomial curves, as detailed above, imagine fitting the
data with a model based on trigonometric functions, or sine curves for short.
We use the Poisson distributions of Equation (1) but instead of choosing λ(D)
to be polynomial we choose
λ(D) = α1 − α1 cos(α2D). (6)
Figure 2 gives an impression of the fit that may be achieved by the so-called sine
model. Importantly, all the points in the scatter plot are given close to maximal
probability, because they all end up sitting arbitrarily close to the curve, and
hence to the mean for the distribution at the given distance D.
The key observation is that we have achieved this remarkable fit at the
expense of only two parameters, α1 and α2. It is known that we can obtain
a perfect fit to m data points with a polynomial curve of degree m − 1. But
fitting any number m of points with two parameters seems inexplicably efficient.
Clearly, if we were to apply model evaluation criteria like AIC or BIC, or indeed
any other method in which complexity is expressed by the number of parameters,
the sine model wins out on the quadratic model, and most likely also on the
linear model. What is going on?
6
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Figure 2: The sine curve that perfectly fits the scatter plot.
Before providing a diagnosis, let me emphasize that the claim that a near-
perfect fit is always possible is mathematically non-trivial. In the remainder
of this section I will provide more detail to substantiate it. Notably, the fit
does not hinge on the assumption of any particular distribution, be it Poisson,
normal, or otherwise, or on any particular format of the data, be it real numbers,
integers or otherwise. Moreover, given that the scatter plot will manifest on a
finite domain 0 < D < L we need not even suppose that the parameters are
real valued: it is enough to consider sine curves with a period L/t for t ∈ N,
as one does in a Fourier series. Despite all this, it turns out that there are
always infinitely many almost perfect fits to a set of points. This abundance
of solutions will turn out to be of crucial importance for the resolution of the
problem.
Say that we have been given a scatter plot Sdn whose farthest points are
at di = L and nj = H. For convenience we set α1 = H/2, but any α1 larger
than that will work too. Take any specific point 〈d, n〉 from the scatter plot,
consider the curves with α2 = L/t for increasing t, and ask: for what values of t
does the sine curve intersect with the line D = d in very close proximity to the
value n? Observe that d ∈ [kL/t, (k+1)L/t], and that the curve covers the whole
of the range [0, H] over this interval of D twice. If we allow for a discrepancy
of ǫ between the curve and the value n and assume that d falls within the first
7
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half of the interval, we must require that
L
πt
cos−1 (1− 2n−ǫ/H) < d−
kL
t
<
L
πt
cos−1 (1− 2n+ǫ/H) . (7)
If d falls in the second half of the interval [kL/t, (k+1)L/t], we require an analogous
constraint. Because the slope of the cosine is bounded between −1 and 1, we
may replace the above inequalities with
L
πt
cos−1 (1− 2n/H)−
ǫL
πtH
< d−
kL
t
<
L
πt
cos−1 (1− 2n/H) +
ǫL
πtH
, (8)
and similarly for d sitting in the second half of the interval. Consequently, for
every t there is a specific region of length 4ǫL/πtH within the interval of length
L/t that includes d, for which the resulting error lies within an ǫ bound. The
question merely is, for every separately t, whether d indeed lies within this
specific region.
To establish when the latter obtains, we first recall that the di’s from the
scatter plot Sdn were randomly sampled from a uniform distribution over [0, L].
This means that the individual d from the sample is almost surely, i.e., with
probability one, a random number. Consequently, there will be no pattern in
how d shows up inside the intervals [kL/t, (k+1)L/t] for increasing t. The locations
of d are evenly distributed over all parts of this interval. Hence for any ǫ > 0
there will be infinitely many t for which d will fall within the portion of length
4ǫL/πtH inside the interval of length L/t. The relative size of the region in which
the curve is sufficiently close to the value n is constant for increasing t at 4ǫ/πH.
And so there will be infinitely many sine curves that have an arbitrarily small
error in fitting the point 〈d, n〉.
This suffices as an argument for there being an infinity of curves that fit
any finite number of points almost perfectly. For a single point, the fraction
of sine curves will tend to 4ǫ/πH. So for a set of m points that are randomly
distributed over D, the fraction will tend to (4ǫ/πH)m. When making ǫ small
and thus maximizing the likelihoods, the fraction of curves with good enough
fit will be very small. But there will still be infinitely many fitting ones.
8
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -1768-
4 Diagnosis of the problem
The fact that there are infinitely many equally well-fitting sine curves incapac-
itates some of the standard model evaluation tools. The AIC, for example, is
not defined for unidentified models. While being silent may be better than pos-
itively evaluating the intuitively incorrect sine model, a negative evaluation of
the sine model seems preferable. Our discussion revolves around three observa-
tions: the sine model is not robust, counting parameters is a nontrivial affair,
and the set of best fitting sine curves is not well-behaved. This sets us up for a
solution to the problem along Bayesian lines in the next section.
First consider the robustness of the sine model. Imagine that we alter the
scatter plot by slightly nudging a single data point. What will be the result if
the curve is a polynomial of a given degree? Clearly, any curve that was fitted
to the data will change a little as well. But the rough shape of the curve will not
change a lot: a small change in data is matched by a similarly small change to
the best fitting curve. By contrast, if the curve is a trigonometric function, then
nudging a single data point slightly will radically alter the best fitting curve. It
will lead to a completely new set of best fits. We might say that the sine model
is too versatile, lacking robustness, or skittish: it is oversensitive to the smallest
of changes in the scatter plot.
The AIC and BIC do not accommodate this feature of models. MDL-based
model evaluation tools and extensions of the AIC and BIC fare slightly better.
The Fisher information approximation (FIA) for example includes a so-called
geometric complexity term, based on the Fisher information. One might say
that this expresses model size in terms of how densely packed the model is with
likelihood functions (Grunwald, 2007; Myung et al, 2000; Ly et al, 20XX). The
term penalizes skittish models because they will in general cover a larger set
of probable data patters: small changes lead to wildly different functions, and
in this sense the skittish models are indeed packed densely. Furthermore, de-
veloping the AIC and the BIC, as discussed in Bozdogan (1987) and further
references therein, we also encounter the Fisher information. So there are nat-
9
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ural extensions of the AIC and the BIC that accommodate something of the
skittishness.
However, in all of these refined methods, the contribution of the Fisher
information (FI) term is not of the required order of magnitude to resolve the
problem of the sine curves. Apart from the original AIC, the FI term is trumped
by the term that captures complexity as the number of free parameters, and
which grows with log(m). And the FI term cannot compete with the fit term,
which grows with m in all model evaluation tools. For larger data sets the
influence of the FI term on the model score therefore dwindles, so that the sines
seem preferable after all.
A second observation concerns the deceptively low dimensions of the sine
model: it seems to harbor an inherent complexity that is not expressed in the
number of parameters. The sine model illustrates that model dimension is a
fleeting notion. As a quick illustration, note that statistical parameters are
often real numbers. But real numbers are such that we can package any amount
of information into them. For example, a sufficiently complicated function will
allow us to compact two real numbers in a single one, by constructing the
numerical expansion of a number from two such expansions, e.g., 0.135 . . . and
0.246 . . . yield 0.123456 . . ., and so on. While this sort of function is of course
hopelessly contrived, it illustrates that counting statistical parameters does not
give us a fair indication of model dimensions.
This general observation has been made about model evaluation criteria
more often, for example in Bozdogan (1987), who proposes to adapt the AIC by
involving the sample size, thereby bringing it closer to the BIC. His motivation
for adapting the penalty term is, by and large, that the notion of complexity
is not adequately captured by the dimension term in the original AIC. Similar
sentiments are expressed in Balasubramanian (2005) who develops minimum
description length (MDL), and in Romeijn and van de Schoot (2008); Romeijn
et al. (2012) who investigates and extends the BIC. The latter two point to
a more general notion of model size as a component of complexity. However,
10
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while these proposals are in the right direction, the adapted versions of AIC,
BIC, and MDL still give the number of parameters a central role.
A more promising method for dealing with the problem of the sine curves is
offered by the so-called Deviance information criterion, or DIC for short (Spiegel-
halter et al, 2002). The DIC was originally designed for comparing hierarchical
Bayesian models, in which the number of free parameters is not clearly defined.
Central to the DIC is the so-called deviance, i.e., the reduction in surprise due
to estimation, which can be thought of as a degree of overfitting. The penalty
for complexity in the DIC is given by the effective number of parameters, which
is based on the notion of deviance. However, in this paper I will not investigate
in detail how the DIC responds to the sine model.
A final observation brings us closest to the ultimate reason that trigonometric
curves are problematic for the purpose at hand. Note that both polynomial and
trigonometric curves can be used as a basis for the space of functions on a finite
domain, in the algebraic sense that they parameterize that space: we can write
down functions by their Taylor or Fourier series. We can collect the curves that
almost perfectly fit some scatter plot into a set within the space of functions.
But for the Taylor and Fourier series this set will look very different. In the
Taylor parameterization, the set is a well-behaved region sitting somewhere in
the linear combination of at least m axes. But the set of well-fitting curves will
look much wilder and disjointed in the Fourier parameterization, disjointed and
intersecting with distinct axes rather than being lumped together.
The implications of this are best brought out through a variant of the ro-
bustness discussed above, namely by considering what happens if we add a point
in the scatter plot. The original polynomial curve will not change too radically:
the region of well fitting curves shifts slightly. By contrast, the set of best fit-
ting sine curves alters significantly with the addition of a point, not so much by
being relocated but rather by being constrained severely. There are infinitely
many sine curves that fit the scatter plot, but almost all of those curves will
miss the additional point by a stretch, and so be eliminated from the set of well
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fitting curves. The solution of the problem hinges on exactly this elimination of
hypotheses.
5 Priors to the rescue
This section develops a particular response to the problem of the sine curves.
It relies on so-called Bayesian model selection, or Bayesian model evaluation
(BME). Following BME the sine model looses against polynomial models be-
cause of the specific failure of robustness introduced above.
The message of this section is not that we should embrace BME as the new
standard in model selection. I will not make a systematic comparison with other
model evaluation criteria and their relation to the salient notion of robustness.
Looking at the solution that BME provides and the central role for the so-called
marginal likelihood in BME, we might expect that other approaches in which
the marginal likelihood is central, e.g., the DIC and MDL-based criteria, will
also provide a solution. Because we can only compute something like a marginal
likelihood if we adopt some version of a prior within the model, the central point
of this section is rather that solutions will have to rely on priors of some kind.
The central idea of BME is to compare models by their posterior probability
assignment:
P (M1|S)
P (M2|S)
=
P (M1)
P (M2)
×
P (S|M1)
P (S|M2)
. (9)
Assuming an equal prior for the models Mi, the posteriors are completely de-
termined by the ratio of the so-called marginal likelihoods,
P (S|Mi) =
∫
Θ
P (Hθ|Mi)P (S|Hθ ∩M1) dθ, (10)
in which Θ is the parameter space. The likelihoods P (S|Hθ∩M1) are a different
notation for the Pθ(S) of the foregoing. Notice that the prior within the model,
P (Hθ|Mi), plays a key role in the computation of the marginal likelihood. Many
approaches to model evaluation rely on the marginal likelihood of the model,
including the BIC, the DIC, and MDL-based approaches. All these approaches
must use some notion of a prior.
12
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Now recall how sine curves manage to fit any scatter plots almost perfectly,
in particular that there are infinitely many such curves. With the addition of a
new point this set of best fitting curves will loose a large number of members,
and this will severely impact the marginal likelihood of the sine model. Following
Equation (3), we see that the likelihood of sine curves that retain their fit be
multiplied by a maximal probability for every new data point. But this only
holds for a small fraction 4ǫ/πH of the sine curves. The fraction 1 − 4ǫ/πH of
sine curves will be multiplied by a factor that falls far short of the maximum
probability.
By comparison, the likelihoods of the well fitting polynomial curves will pick
up a factor that is somewhat lower than the maximal probability for each point,
though not falling very far short of the maximum. Importantly, this high but
not maximum factor will apply to a set of curves that is more or less stable
and that will accumulate more and more probability with the addition of data
points. Consequently, the overall factor picked up by the marginal likelihood of
the polynomial models will tend to this high but not maximum factor.
To put this in a more mathematical format, say that the average factor
picked up by the likelihood of a sine curve outside of the set of best fitting
curves is U , that the same factor applies to badly fitting polynomial curves,
that the factor for a well fitting polynomial is V , and for a best fitting sine
curve W , so that U < V < W . For the sine curves we obtain
P (〈dm+1, nm+1〉|MSine ∩ Sdn) ≈
(
1−
4ǫ
πH
)
U +
4ǫ
πH
W, (11)
which is arbitrarily close to U . For the polynomial curves we will have
P (〈dm+1, nm+1〉|MPoly ∩ Sdn) ≈ (1−Rm)U +RmV, (12)
in which Rm tends to 1 for increasing m so that the factor tends to V . The
result is that the sine model performs less well than the polynomial model on
the BME criterion. On BME, therefore, the inherent complexity of the sine
curves is adequately factored in.
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It will be insightful to return to the observations that the set of well fitting
sine curves is skittish. Well fitting polynomial curves of a given degree are con-
centrated in a particular region within the model, in which posterior probability
will accumulate when data size increases: all of them will respond to new data
points in roughly the same way. By contrast, with every new data point a small
fraction of the well fitting sine curves is multiplied by a high likelihood, while a
large portion picks up a low factor. It expresses the skittishness of sine curves
that such a large portion of curves is suddenly far off in their prediction.
We can also convert this reasoning to arrive at the observation about model
size. Judged from the prior probability distribution within the sine model, the
set of well fitting curves is very small indeed: after m points it has decreased
to (4ǫ/πH)
m
. But considering the prior within the polynomial model, the set
of well fitting curves retains a reasonable size. What this signals is that the
sine model, although it has only two free parameters, has many more different
statistical hypotheses packed into it. It is versatile at the cost of a particular
kind of robustness. The use of a prior within the model enables us to bring this
kind of robustness out.
6 Conclusion
We cannot turn the foregoing into an argument for BME: other model evaluation
criteria may also have a response to the problem at stake. But there are several
general lessons to take away. One is that we must never mistake the number
of parameters in a model for its actual complexity. A related lesson is that
we must not forget the deeper motivations for the model evaluation tools, i.e.,
the good-making features that the tools are based on. Concentrating on those
features will guide us to a better understanding of our evaluations.
Another general general lesson ties in with earlier work on the role of size in
model evaluation (Romeijn et al., 2012), and indeed with scientific methodology
as a whole. In the solution of the problem with the sine model, we can recognize
a Popperian theme. Models that allow for fewer possible data patterns are
14
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preferable to those that allow for a very wide range of data patterns. To express
some notion of model size in our evaluations, we have to adopt some measure
over the space of distributions over data. So we must involve something akin to
a prior.
There is, however, a problem with the idea that we can objectively determine
how densely distributions are packed together in a model. To say that a set of
distributions shows a wide variety in the data patterns that it can adapt to, we
need to presuppose a notion of similarity among data patters or, more generally
speaking, a metric over sample space. In this paper that metric was adopted
implicitly, as part of the way in which we depict and conceptualize the data. This
dependence on the metric of the sample space points to a potential subjectivity
in adjudicating between statistical models, or at least a reliance on a natural
conceptualization of the sample space. This idea deserves to be studied in its
own right.
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Introduction
The scientific realist claims that the physical sciences provide, or aim to provide, a true de-
scription of the underlying reality behind the manifest world of experience.1 But much of
physical theory is expressed in the language of mathematics, and if any form of scientific
realism is to be grounded in a mathematical science, it is essential that the realist provide
an account of how mathematics is applied to the physical world. Philosophers of applied
mathematics often explicate the use of mathematics in the physical sciences in terms of the
concept of a representation. In the popular “mapping account” of applied mathematics, it is
argued that we use mathematics to represent certain physical structures (Brown, 1999 and
2012; Pincock, 2007 and 2012). The basic idea is that we identify a physical structure in the
world and then map it onto the appropriate mathematical structure within our scientific theo-
ries (Brown, 2012; 6-7, and Pincock, 2012; 27-29). Formally, a representation occurs when
a morphism can be specified between a relational system in the physical world and a mathe-
matical structure. Based on the popularity of the mapping account of applied mathematics,
it worth taking the time to see if this approach can provide a viable foundation for scientific
realism. At first glance, scientific realism and the mapping account appear to be a match
made in heaven. Following the mapping account, the realist would be able to suggest that
mathematics is successfully applied when the relations that hold within a physical system
are correlated with the appropriate mathematical structure.2 However, the mapping account
of applied mathematics has met with wide-ranging criticism (e.g. van Fraassen, 2008; Bat-
terman, 2008; Bueno and Colyvan, 2011; and Berkovitz, 2015). For the realist, the most
pressing concerns with the mapping account pertain to how a physical structure is identified
and represented as a mathematical structure.
The mapping account is appealing to the scientific realist specifically because it is a
variant of the copy theory of representation. In the copy theory of representation, we rep-
1Alternatively, this sentence could be made compatible with the usual concessions to approximate truth.
2Pincock notes that this is the condition for the successful application of mathematics within the mapping
account (Pincock, 2012; 28).
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resent an object (or physical relation) by copying it, or an aspect of it, onto the intended
representation. Such an account would allow the scientific realist to refer to the mathemati-
cal structure of a scientific theory as a copy of the physical structure in the world. However,
any copy theory of representation is subject to Goodman’s (1976) criticism. Goodman notes
that the copy theory of representation is “stopped at the start” by an inability to identify ex-
actly what is being copied by the representation relation (Goodman, 1976; 9). In Goodman’s
view, we do not copy the object or relation itself, but rather how the object or relation is
conceived. When we conceive of an object or relation, we construe or interpret it and “[i]n
representing an object [or relation], we do not copy such a construal or interpretation–we
achieve it” (Goodman, 1976: 9).3 The problem is that the world does not come ‘carved at its
joints’.4 Rather, the joints are constructs of our conceptual systems, i.e. theories.5 Although
Goodman’s general philosophical position is controversial, his point is clear in the case of
theoretical physics, where the “physical structure” that is being represented is not readily
apparent. In fact, the “physical structure” itself has to be constructed out of a mathematical
theory of the world. The constitutive role that mathematics plays in the physical sciences
presents a serious problem for the mapping account of applied mathematics. If mathematics
is applied in the construction of our physical conception of the world, then it has certainly
overstepped the boundaries of the copy theory of representation. Rather, representation be-
comes essential to the very construction of the physical structure that is at the foundation of
our scientific theories.
The same issue can be viewed from another perspective. At the heart of the mapping
account lies a relation that maps a physical structure onto a mathematical structure. This
relation is defined as a morphism, which is a mathematical relation.6 The problem is that a
3The insertion of the phrase “or relation” is supported by Goodman’s footnote on page 5.
4This issue has been recently addressed in the context of the mapping account by Beuno and Colyvan
(2011).
5See, for instance, Cassirer 1923, Duhem 1954, Goodman 1976 and 1978, Putnam 1987, and van Fraassen
2008.
6Alternatively, we could take the representation relation to be a primitive and leave it unanalyzed. There are
important non-reductionist accounts of mathematical representation, for instance Suarez 2010, but a discussion
of these cases would take us too far afield.
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morphism is defined as a structure preserving map, or function, from one domain of mathe-
matical structure to another, and van Fraassen correctly notes that “to define a function we
need to have the domain and range identified first–and the question at issue [is] precisely
how that can be done without presupposing that we already have a physical-mathematical
relation on hand” (van Fraassen, 2008: 120).7 If the definition of a morphism requires that
a mathematical structure be defined on a physical relation, so that it can be representable in
the mapping account, than we are faced with a dilemma: either the mapping account fails
to account for applied mathematics, or the initial mathematization of the world is somehow
already present. Berkovitz (2015) argues that the mapping account implicitly assumes that
physical structure is mathematical, in a neo-Kantian or Pythagorean sense. If we ignore the
problematic Pythagorean option,8 we are once again led into a consideration of how mathe-
matics is initially applied in the construction of our physical conception of the world.
If the scientific realist wants to base a theory of applied mathematics on the popular
mapping account, then they need to clarify how mathematical concepts are brought to bear
on the construction of our physical conception of the world.9 As with any problem of con-
ception, the realist needs to pay attention to where the points of convention lie. When we
formulate certain scientific theories, especially in theoretical physics, mathematics plays an
integral role in both the definition and relation of scientific concepts. The definitional role
of mathematics delimits the domain of study by imposing a mathematical structure on the
world. However, the relational role of mathematics provides the governing structure on this
domain. The relationship between the definitional and relational roles of mathematics in
complicated by the fact that mathematical concepts do not come free of charge. Implicit in
7The word “was” was substituted for “is” to reflect the tense of the discussion.
8If the Pythagorean view is associated with a naturalistic view of mathematics then it is subject to Brown’s
(2012) criticism and any rationalistic Pythagorean view seems to either collapse into the neo-Kantian view, or
rely on an unaccounted for insight that borders on the mystical.
9This concern becomes more pressing when we consider whether or not a mapping-like account of applied
mathematics is essential to any form of scientific realism. In the widely influential semantic account, scientific
theories are thought to present structures or models that can be used to represent physical systems (Ladyman,
1998; 416). Any such account must clarify how mathematical models represent physical structures and it is dif-
ficult to see how the realist can account for the relation between a model and the world without either assuming
that the representation relation is primitive, or presenting a mapping-like account of the representation.
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their definition is a set of constraints that limit the types of physical structures to which they
can be applied. These constraints are a direct result of certain assumptions that concern the
underlying relations between the basic elements of a mathematical theory. Applying a par-
ticular mathematical concept to the physical world then entails that the basic assumptions in
the underlying mathematical structure, such that the concepts may be well-defined, are sat-
isfied by the world. The structural constraints implicit in the mathematical concepts dictate
the type of physical phenomena that the theory can accommodate (Morrison, 2000; 109).10
If we are to untangle the web of issues related to mathematical representation, it is
best to look to scientific practice and consider how a given mathematical theory comes to
be applied. This paper will shed light on the essential conceptual pre-structuring of the
world inherent in the application of mathematics by presenting an analysis of the use of the
differential calculus in physical theory.11 Specifically, this paper will treat the supposedly
simple application of the differential calculus in the modern definition of Newton’s second
law. The application of the differential calculus requires that the world be pre-structured
mathematically. This pre-structuring constrains the form of the world as understood within
Newtonian theory. The constraints are a direct result of the formulation of the mathematical
structure of the differential calculus. Our focus on mathematical constraint will highlight
the dual role that mathematics plays in the definition and relation of physical concepts. The
constraints imposed by the use of the differential calculus fall squarely within the purview
of the definitional role of mathematics and, as such, delimit the applicability of the mapping
account. This focus on the definitional and relational characteristics of applied mathematics
will also showcase the role of convention and draw attention to the viability of any form of
scientific realism that is based on the mapping account.
The body of this paper is comprised of three sections. The first section will develop
the conceptual foundation of the differential calculus and identify the pre-structuring of the
10But here “type” should indicate form rather than kind.
11Note that the use of the term ‘pre-structuring’ should not be taken as a temporal relation but rather a
necessary conceptual pre-structuring in the logical sense.
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world inherent in its application. The second section will present a basic definition of New-
ton’s second law and a discussion of the constraints that the differential calculus imposes on
the structure of the world as conceived within Newtonian physics. This section will con-
clude with a discussion of what we take to be the limits of scientific realism, as conceived
under the umbrella of the mapping account of applied mathematics. Finally, the third sec-
tion will present a case study of a famous thought experiment by John Norton, simply called
‘the dome’. The pre-structuring of the world required by the differential calculus offers a
firm foundation for the mapping account of applied mathematics, but it also precludes cer-
tain physical structures from being understood within the confines of any theory based on
the differential calculus. The modern formulation of Newton’s second law is such a theory.
The dome thought experiment provides a nice example of a hypothetical physical structure
that fails to meet the necessary conditions for the differential calculus to be well-defined.
Therefore, this structure is excluded by the pre-structuring of the world inherent in the ap-
plication of the differential calculus. On the basis of this argument, we suggest that Norton
incorrectly claims that the dome demonstrates the indeterministic nature of Newton’s second
law. Newton’s second law actually cannot be applied in the thought experiment. This case
study was chosen because it demonstrates the inherent danger in assuming that mathematics
can be applied in a world of arbitrary structure.
The Conceptual Foundation of the Differential Calculus
The differential calculus plays an integral role in almost every theory of modern physics. In
the modern formulation of Newtonian physics, it is constitutive of the very definition of mo-
tion. Formally, the differential calculus is applied to characterize the behaviour of a function
in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a point by providing a linear approximation to a func-
tion in that neighbourhood. But the differential calculus poses an interesting problem for any
form of scientific realism based on mapping account of applied mathematics. The calculus
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cannot be applied to an arbitrary function, but only to functions of a specific form. There-
fore, the calculus can only be applied within a physical conception of the world in which the
world is structured in a particular way. This pre-structuring of the world is not accounted
for in the mapping account of applied mathematics and is a clear example of the mathemat-
ical construction implicit the in application of mathematics in the physical sciences. Our
treatment of the differential calculus will begin with the definition of the concept of a func-
tion, and trace its development through the concepts of approximation, continuity, and the
infinitesimal, culminating in a discussion of the differential and its role in the differential
calculus.12
The conceptual foundation of the differential calculus begins with the notion of a func-
tion. A function is a relation, or map, from one domain of mathematical elements or structure
to another. Functions are applied in the physical sciences to represent, among other things,
entities (e.g. electrons and planets), constraint surfaces (e.g. the top of a table or a space-
time), and dynamical variables (e.g. force, position, and velocity) in the physical world. In
each of these cases, a function serves to define the quantitative structure of the world by pro-
viding a map from some physical property, or structure, to a element, or structure, defined
in Rn, the n-dimensional space of real numbers. But how is a function is applicable to the
world? Is this not the same question that lies at the heart of our discussion of the mapping
account?
Within the conceptual system of a physical theory that is based on the differential cal-
culus, the application of the concept of a function serves to define the initial mathematization
of the world. This application of mathematics is itself a form of representation, but it is a
representation akin to Goodman’s characterization, in which we apply a representation to
construe, classify, and interpret the world. In this sense, the application of the concept of
a function serves to delimit the domain of study. But it is important to note that this initial
12In this section, We follow the development of the differential calculus provided by Loomis and Sternberg
(1980). If the reader is familiar with the detailed formal development of the differential calculus, they may
want to pass quickly through the mathematical parts of this section.
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mathematization is both selective and productive. It is selective in that only those aspects
of the world that are amenable to functional representation will enter into our physical con-
ception of the world, e.g. extension and spatial-temporal location. When we conceive of
the world as representable by functions, we limit our conception to only those aspects of the
world that consistently allow such an interpretation. It is productive in that we fit the physical
world for a “garb of ideas” to obtain an objective mathematical science (Husserl 1970; 54).
The world as conceived through functions, is a quantitative mathematical world.13
We have barely gotten our feet wet, but the scientific realist might already feel slightly
uneasy. If this initial mathematization of the world is a representation, in the sense of an
interpretation, then there need not be any physical correlate to the mathematical structure.
Rather, the mathematics is playing a definitional role that is constitutive of our physical
conception. This issue is complicated by the fact that the definitional role of mathematics
does not conclude with the application of the concept of a function, but rather only begins.
When we discuss functions in the differential calculus, we are usually interested in the
behaviour of a function in the neighbourhood of a given point, but as we have already noted
the differential calculus can only be applied to certain types of functions. In order to begin a
discussion of the differential calculus, the functions we consider must satisfy four conditions:
Condition 1: The function must be defined on at least one open neighbourhood
of the point under consideration; except, maybe, the point itself.14
Condition 2: The space of the function and the space of its domain must possess
a norm (a definition of distance).15
13The scientific realist might protest that what is needed is not an exact quantitative world but only an
approximation of the worlds inherent structure, however, any attempt to make the notion of approximation
precise will have to provide a quantitative measure for the relation and, as such, would require an account of
how this quantitative structure is defined and applied. This issue will be addressed in the next section.
14We allow for the possible exclusion of the point itself because, looking forward, the difference ratio of the
calculus is not defined at the point under consideration.
15The concept of a norm allows us to provide a rigorous definition of distance and this provides us with a
means to characterize an approximation and a coordinate system. In one dimension, it is customary to employ
the absolute value of the difference between the elements, e.g. |x− a|, as the norm, but in multiple dimensions
there are a few norms that work equally well.
7
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -1783-
Condition 3: The function must possess a limit in the neighbourhood of the point
under consideration.16
Condition 4: The functions must be continuous.17
These conditions determine the form of the allowable physical structures that a theory based
on the differential calculus can accommodate. These constraints are necessary for the con-
cept of the infinitesimal to be well-defined and consistently applied. They represent the bare
minimum that must be in place for our discussion of the differential calculus to begin.18
In the modern reformulation of the infinitesimal calculus, based on a rigorous foun-
dation, infinitesimals are defined as functions that not only satisfy the previous four condi-
tions, but also tend to zero as the element of their domain tends to zero, e.g. φ(t) → 0 as
t → 0. The difference ratio of the derivative is defined in terms of infinitesimals, f ′(x) is
defined as (f(x + h) − f(x))/t and this is simply the ratio of two infinitesimals (Loomis
and Sternberg, 136). We usually say that the derivative f ′(x) exists and has a value a if
(f(x+h)−f(x))/t−a approaches 0 as t→ 0, or equivalently if ((f(x+h)−f(x))−at)/t ap-
proaches 0 as t→ 0 (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). In this case, φ(t) = (f(x+h)−f(x))−at
“is an infinitesimal that approaches 0 faster than t (i.e., φ(t)/t→ 0 as t→ 0)” (Loomis and
Sternberg, 136). The fact that “φt converges to 0 faster than t as t → 0 is exactly equiv-
alent to the fact that the difference quotient of f converges to a” (Loomis and Sternberg,
137).19 Therefore, the study of the derivative is equivalent to the study of the behaviour of
16In the ǫ,δ-definition of a limit, we say that a function f(x) tends to a limit l as the element x approaches a
if for every positive ǫ there exists a positive δ such that 0 < |x − a| < δ → |f(x) − l| < ǫ. It is important to
note here that only functions possess a limit. Later on, when we discuss the differential calculus, keep in mind
that the relation (f(x+ h)− f(x))/t expresses the ratio of two functions; we consider t to be a function not a
variable.
17A function is ‘continuous at a given point’ if the limit, as defined above, exists at that point and the limiting
value of the function, taken from the left and the right, is the same as the value of the function at that point. A
function is ‘continuous’ if it is continuous at all points of its domain. more intuitive way to talk about continuity
is through Hausdorff continuity. We say a set of elements is Hausdorff continuous if every pair of elements can
be separated by an open neighbourhood.
18One could easily reformulate the following discussion in terms of continuity conditions, but we will base
our treatment of the calculus on a discussion of infinitesimals, due to their intuitive appeal.
19Note: two commas were removed from the quote to fit the quote into the sentence structure.
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infinitesimals.
Following Loomis and Sternberg, we may identify two special classes of infinitesimals:
“big oh”, O, and “little oh”, o (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). A function falls under the class
of “big oh”, f ∈ O, if f is Lipschitz continuous at 0.20 A function falls under the class “little
oh”, f ∈ o, if f(x)/x → 0 as x → 0.21 Clearly, the numerator of the difference ratio of the
derivative, written in the form φ(t) = (f(x + h) − f(x)) − at, must be an infinitesimal of
class “little oh”. If this condition does not hold, the derivative cannot be well-defined.
The notion of an infinitesimal function defines an additional structure within our physi-
cal conception. We require that the functions we define on the world have a certain behaviour
“in the small”. But what type of constraint does this condition impose on the form of the
functions we consider in the differential calculus? To answer this question, we will have to
introduce the mathematical concept of a differential.
In our formal development of the concept of the differential, we will continue to follow
Loomis and Sternberg (1980), and formally base the notion of a differential in terms of a
general coordinate translation.22 The coordinates of a function and its element are usually
represented by an ordered pair containing the point under consideration and the value of the
function at that point, (a, f(a)). We can always move the pair of elements to the origin by a
coordinate translation of the form s = f(x)− f(a) and t = x− a. In what follows, we will
consider an ordered pair (a, f(a)) located near a point at which we would like to study the
behaviour of a function. We can represent a general coordinate translation by the following
diagram.
20a function is Lipschitz continuous if for all x sufficiently close to a, |f(x) − l| ≤ c|x − a|, where l is the
limit of the function and c is a constant.
21From this definition we can show that “big oh” is a subset of “little oh”, o ⊂ O.
22A coordinate translation can represent a passive shift in the coordinate system, or an active translation that
describes the motion of an object.
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f is
a a+ t
∆fa(t)
t
f(a)
f(a+ t)
Figure 1: Diagram of a Coordinate Translation (Loomis and Sternberg, 141)
In the diagram it is clear that the image of f under the translation is given by the relation
∆fa(t) = f(a+ t)−f(a). ∆fa(t) is simply the change in f brought about by the coordinate
translation. The original curve, in the new coordinates, is the graph of ∆fa(t).
We can now define the differential. In the new coordinate system, the equation for the
tangent is given by the functional map l(t) : t → f ′(a)t; where l(t) is the map from t onto
the tangent (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). From this definition of l(t), it is clear that the
existence of the derivative f ′(a) = ∆fa(t)/t as t → 0 is exactly equivalent to saying that
∆fa(t) − l(t)/t → 0 as t → 0 (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). Therefore, for the derivative
to be well-defined in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the point under consideration, the
difference between the map ∆fa(t) and the tangent l(t) in that neighbourhood, given by
∆fa(t)− l(t), must be an infinitesimal of the class “little oh”,∆fa(t)− l(t) = o (Loomis and
Sternberg, 141). To put the same point another way, we can say that the difference between
∆fa(t) and l(t) must tend to zero faster that t. It can also be shown that the expression
∆fa(t) − l(t) = o is unique (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). The differential is defined as the
“unique linear approximation l(t) ... of f at a and is designated dfa” (Loomis and Sternberg,
141). From this definition, it is clear that without a well-defined differential, a derivative
cannot be defined in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the point under consideration.
The concept of a differential provides a valuable tool for analyzing the behaviour of a
10
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function near a given point. In the limiting neighbourhood of the origin in the new coordi-
nate system, the difference between an infinitesimal change in the function, ∆fa(t), and the
differential dfa is an infinitesimal of order o. The existence of a derivative at a given point re-
quires that the infinitesimal behaviour of the function,∆fa(t), can be uniquely approximated
by a differential map, up to an infinitesimal of order o. This means that the existence of the
differential in the neighbourhood of the origin entails that the behaviour of the function in
the neighbourhood can be approximated by a unique tangent. This can be seen clearly in the
following diagram:
f is
a a+ t
∆fa(t)
t
f(a)
f(a+ t) tf 0(a) = dfa(t)
dfa(t)−∆fa(t) = o(t)
Figure 2: Diagram of a Coordinate Translation and the Differential (Loomis and Sternberg, 141)
The converse is also true. If the derivative does not exist, then the differential does not pro-
vide a unique approximation (up to class “little oh”) of the function in the limiting neighbour-
hood of the point (Loomis and Sternberg, 146 -147). Therefore, the existence of a derivative
entails the existence of a unique tangent that approximates the behaviour of the function up
to class “little oh”. Without this internal structure, the derivative cannot be defined. If we
want to apply the differential calculus, then the functions we consider must possess this in-
ternal structure. This imposes a constraint on the form of any physical structure on which
the differential calculus is applied.23
23But, here ‘applied’ should be read in the sense of a scientific realist’s application of mathematics. Of
course, one could apply the differential calculus to discrete systems by smoothing out the discontinuity through
11
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We are now in a position to characterize the interpretation of the world that must be in
place in order for the differential calculus to be applied. We can see that the functions that we
apply within our scientific conception must be defined on at least one open neighbourhood
of the point under consideration, possess a norm, possess a limit in the neighbourhood of
the point under consideration, and be continuous, they must also possess a specific form
such that the concepts and infinitesimal and differential can be well-defined and consistently
applied. The scientific conception of the world, within any theory that applies the differential
calculus, is defined and interpreted to possess this structure. When we interpret the world
to possess a certain mathematical structure we at the same time construe and classify it.
When we apply mathematical concepts to define the structure of the world, we project a
mathematical structure onto the world in order to make it representable within the mapping
account. And the choice among projectable mathematical concepts imposes a classification,
which is simply a result of the governing mathematical conception that prevails within the
larger theoretical structure.
The selective and productive interpretation of the world outlined in this section is based
on the representation of the world given by the differential calculus, and is not based on any
independent physical consideration. This presents a serious problem for the scientific real-
ist, as the definitional role of mathematics does not necessarily possess a physical correlate.
Rather, this mathematical pre-structuring of the world is a result of our intended representa-
tion the world given by the differential calculus. But this definitional role of mathematics is
only half the story, and we now need to address the interrelation of mathematical concepts
that takes place within a given physical theory.
idealization. But in this case the realist could no longer suggest that the mathematical structure of the differen-
tial calculus in any sense represents the structure of the world.
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Newtonian Physics and the Differential Calculus
Newton’s second law is simple enough to be familiar to almost every high school student and
has remained a common discussion point in the philosophy of science. It expresses a relation
between an impressed force on an object and the resulting change in the objects momentum.
The modern definition of the law asserts that the force on an object is equal to the rate of
change of the objects momentum, expressed as derivative of the momentum with respect to
time. We write this symbolically as F (t) = dp(t)/dt. Within the mapping account, the sci-
entific realist would want to claim that the differential relation maps a physical relation that
holds between the physical force and the physical momentum of an object, which are repre-
sented by two time dependent vector functions F (t) and p(t), into R3, that is, if Newtonian
theory were still accepted as a valid representation of the world.
But this simple narrative is untenable. We have noted that the application of the concept
of a function is itself a representation, but one that serves to define the initial mathematiza-
tion of the world. This mathematical construal, classification, and interpretation provides a
quantitative structure to the world in order to provide a foundation for objective mathemat-
ical science. In this sense the interpretation of the world, as representable in R3, is both a
selective and productive interpretation of the world that constitutes the basis of our physical
conception. The use of functions delimits the conceptual system to only those aspects of the
world that are amenable to functional representation. But what is more important in this case
is the productive aspect of representation that fits the physical world for a “garb of ideas”
to obtain an objective mathematical science (Husserl 1970; 54). For, the application of the
concept of a function serves not only to define a quantitative structure on the world, but also
to define which aspects of the world are to be represented as fundamental variables. New-
ton’s second law produces an objective physical conception by setting a definition of inertial
motion. Physical objects are thought to possess momentum, which remains constant unless a
force acts on the object. Forces are construed to be a non-local relation that all objects enter
13
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into as a result of their possession of certain properties, e.g. mass.
When we apply these two functions, F (t) and p(t), we do not represent force or mo-
mentum in the sense of a copy theory of representation, but produce a specific mathemat-
ical/physical conception of the world.24 Newton’s second law expresses a relation within
this conception of the world, and if it meaningful at all, then it is a “law” of the world as
representable within R3. But this law cannot be applied to arbitrary momentum and force
functions, due to the constraints implicit in the definition of the differential calculus. Rather,
we need to pre-structure our conception of the world such that the concepts of the differential
calculus can be consistently applied and well-defined.
In order to apply the differential calculus, the function that represents the objects mo-
mentum must satisfy four conditions: namely, it must be defined on at least one open neigh-
bourhood of the point under consideration, possess a norm, possess a limit in the neighbour-
hood of the point under consideration, and be continuous. The first condition is satisfied by
stipulating that momentum, as construed within the Newtonian conception, is specified by
a function that is defined on the neighbourhood of any point on its trajectory. The second
condition is satisfied by imposing a Euclidean metric on R3.25 The third and fourth condi-
tions require that we represent the world in such a way that only continuous functions define
the momentum of any object. Motion, as construed within the Newtonian conception of the
world, is continuous, that is if we wish to apply Newton’s second law.
The application of the differential calculus also requires that the function that represents
the momentum of an object possess a certain internal structure. This structure is necessary
so that the concept of an infinitesimal and differential can be consistently applied and well-
defined. Specifically, what we require is that the functions possess a certain structure “in
the small”. The concept of a differential provides a valuable tool for characterizing the
24This claim is also supported by the existence of equivalent energy-based formalizations of classical me-
chanics.
25The Euclidean metric is defined as: ‖x‖ = (∑3
i=1
x2
i
)
1
2 . The absolute time of Newtonian physics is a
one-dimensional space, and the absolute value function, |x|, provides a sufficient definition of distance in that
space.
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behaviour of a function near a given point. The existence of a derivative requires that the
infinitesimal behaviour of the function can be uniquely approximated by a unique tangent.
This in turn requires that the function can be uniquely approximated by a differential map in
the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a given point. Motion, as construed within any conception
of the world based on the differential calculus, is defined to have this internal structure “in
the small”.
However, the pre-structuring does not end here. In the modern formulation of Newto-
nian theory, the momentum function, p(t), is defined in terms of two other functions; one
mass function, m(t), and one velocity function, v(t). Formally, the momentum is defined
as the mass times the velocity, p(t) = m(t)v(t).26 In the case, the differentiability of p(t)
requires that both m(t) and v(t) be differentiable. Therefore, the functions m(t) and v(t)
must also possess the necessary internal structure “in the small”. And finally, the velocity
function is defined as the rate of change of position in time, expressed as derivative of the
position, x(t), with respect to time, v(t) = dx(t)/dt, and the position functions as well must
possess the necessary internal structure “in the small” such that the concepts of the differen-
tial calculus can be consistently applied and well-defined. All of this pre-structuring must be
in place in order to form the Newtonian conception of the world.
So where does this leave the scientific realist? On the one hand, we have a theory that is
supposed to represent a physical relation that holds in the world. On the other, we have a set
of mathematical definitions that construe, classify, and interpret the world in order to apply
the theory. This initial representation of the world imparts it with a mathematical structure,
and this pre-structuring undermines any form of scientific realism based on a copy theory of
representation, such as the mapping account.
The fact is that any mathematical scientific theory that is taken to represent certain phys-
ical features of the world must address the implicit mathematization of the world. Husserl
is right to note that “[m]athematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or garb
26Against usual convention, the mass functions is defined to be time dependent in order to highlight the fact
that the continuity conditions apply equally to the mass and velocity functions.
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of symbols of the systematic mathematical theories, encompassing everything which, for
scientists and the educated generally, represent the life world, dresses it up as “objectively
actual and true” nature” (Husserl, 1970; 54). Newton’s second law only expresses a relation
in the objective pre-structured world represented in R3. This mathematical law cannot copy,
or map, a physical relation because there is no conception free physical relation that it can
represent, as understood within a copy theory of representation.
Within the mapping account, It appears as though only a contingent form of scientific
realism can be supported. Given a certain mathematical conception of the world, certain
law-like relations hold, but these relations cannot be said to represent any innate structure
in the world. At this point one might wonder if there any viable alternative open to the
scientific realist. The answer will depend on whether or not the scientific realist can make
do without a copy theory of mathematical representation. There is no question of whether
or not Newton’s second law expresses a functional relation, or map, from one domain of
mathematical elements, or structure, to another. The mapping account provides an accurate
description of the structure of the law itself, but this is not really the issue. The real issue
relates to how a given mathematical structure, as a whole, represents a supposedly physical
structure.
The real problem is that any symbolism, mathematical or not, harbours the curse of
mediacy (Cassirer, 1946; 7). What is symbolized or represented is not a copy of what exists.
The scientific realist might respond by abandoning the mapping account and noting that
was is needed is not some exact copy of the world, which may indeed be impossible, but
rather, a rough approximation to its structure. It may be the case that all this supposed pre-
structuring is simply a form of abstraction or idealization that is typical of science in general,
and in this case the real problem is that of abstraction and idealization, not of copying.
The focus on approximation may change the nature of the question, but not its substance.
The idea that mathematics might approximate, rather than copy, a physical structure still
requires a clarification of how mathematics is brought to bear on the world. The concept
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of approximation is equivocal, to say that a certain structure approximates another might
indicate a closeness with respect to a given measure, an indication of similarity, the presence
of common properties, or a number of other possible relations. The problem for the realist
is to make the notion of approximation sufficiently precise without falling back onto the
notion of approximately, or partially, copied structure. However, if the supposed ‘closeness’,
‘similarity’, or ‘common property’ is explicated in mathematical terms, then we end up right
back where we started. The scientific realist needs to find a non-mathematical notion of
approximation that is strong enough to support a viable realism but yet also weak enough to
avoid the concerns associated with a copy theory of representation. Whether or not such an
account can be found, the supposed marriage between the scientific realist and the mapping
account is an unhappy one. Mathematics is not applied to map relations that hold within a
physical system into an appropriate mathematical structure.
Although this paper has largely been a critical discussion of scientific realism and the
mapping account of applied mathematics, it is not without practical importance. The pre-
structuring inherent in the application of the differential calculus precludes certain structures
from being well-defined within the confines of a Newtonian conception of the world. This
pre-structuring limits the types of supposedly physical structures that the theory can accom-
modate. The form of the Newtonian conception of the world dictates the structure of the
physical phenomena that the theory can accommodate, and in the final section, it is worth-
while to take a closer look at the constraints implicit in the application of Newton’s second
law.
The Newtonian Conception of Motion and a Case Study of
Norton’s Dome
What is the Newtonian conception of motion? The first thing we should note is that
since Newton’s second law can only be applied in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a given
17
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point, motion can only be defined up to an infinitesimal neighbourhood. If the realist wants
to argue that Newton’s second law is a true description of the phenomena, then it is a fuzzy
description, and this inherent fuzziness is an unavoidable conclusion of the Newtonian con-
ception of the world as governed by the differential calculus.
The description of motion, as defined by a Newtonian conception of the world, is com-
plicated by the possibility of both constrained and unconstrained motion. In the case where
the objects’ motion is unconstrained, the objects’ trajectory is defined solely with reference
to the background space and time. If we consider a point-like object located at a particular
point in space and time, we can discuss its motion with respect to a specified well-behaved
force. At the initial time when the force is specified, the object is accelerated at a rate given
by Newton’s second law. The time evolution of the system can be specified by a unique
trajectory in space and time. Since Newton’s second law is an ordinary differential equation,
and there are no additional constraints on the form of the position function, we can refer to
the existence and uniqueness theorems of ordinary differential calculus in order to demon-
strate that the trajectory of the object is indeed defined and unique (Kaplan,1973; 494-497).
The structure of Newton’s second law uniquely specifies the trajectory of an object with re-
spect to the background space and time, and all of the conditions required for the differential
calculus to be well-defined over every neighbourhood of each point along the trajectory are
automatically satisfied.
The case of constrained motion is more complicated. A constraint imposes certain
conditions on the form of an object’s motion. For instance, we might consider the motion of
an object constrained to the top of a billiards table. In this case, the motion of the object is
constrained to the surface of the table and this imposes conditions on the form of the time
evolution of the system given by Newton’s second law. The problem that arises in the case
of constrained motion is that the form of the constraint may impose undesirable conditions
on the form of the function that defines the object’s position. Since the differential calculus
requires that this function possess a certain internal structure, only certain types of constraints
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will allow for the differential calculus to be well-defined in the neighbourhood of every point.
The good news is that many of the constraints that we consider within Newtonian theory are
constructed to satisfy these conditions. The bad news is that there are many constraints that
impose conditions on the form of a function such that it will possess neighbourhoods on
which Newton’s equation of motion simply cannot be applied. We will now discuss such a
case.
Norton (2003) presents a now famous thought experiment simply called ‘the dome’,
which attempts to demonstrate that Newton’s second law allows for indeterministic solutions.
Norton asks us to consider a point-like ball, of unit mass, located at the top of a frictionless,
perfectly rigid, dome. The shape of the dome is given by h = (2/3g)r
3
2 , where h is the
height of the dome and r is the radial arc length measured along the surface of the dome
(Norton, 2008; 787).27 . The ball is subject only to the force of gravity.28 At the start of this
thought experiment, the ball is located at the apex of the dome.
Figure 3: Norton’s dome with static ball, taken from http://www.pitt.edu/ jdnorton/Goodies/Dome
Norton claims that the gravitational force, F , acting on the ball is given by: F = (dh/dr) =
r
1
2 (Norton, 2008; 787). Since the ball has unit mass, Newton’s second law states that the
acceleration, d
2
r
dt2
, is equal to this force, the result gives: d2r/dt2 = r
1
2 . This is the equation
of motion for a ball anywhere on the surface of the dome (Norton, 2008; 787).
We now come to the crux of Norton’s argument. The equation of motion for a ball
located at the apex is given by: d2r/dt2 = 0. One solution to this equation is: r(t) = 0
27From this point onwards the gravitational constant, g, will be set to 1
28Imagine that the dome is located within ahomogeneous gravitational field pointing downwards in the fol-
lowing diagram.
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(Norton, 2008; 788). This is the solution that we naturally accept; that is, the radial co-
ordinate of the ball remains constant. According to this criterion, the ball should not move.
However, Norton claims that there is an alternative solution given by (Norton, 2008; 788):
r(t) =


1
144
(t− T )4 for t ≥ T
0 for t ≤ T.
(1)
This solution states that the ball remains at the apex, for some arbitrary time, where it is
subject to the equation of motion at the apex: d2r/dt2 = 0. However, spontaneously, the ball
may begin to roll and is subsequently subject to the equation of motion for the surface of the
dome: d2r/dt2 = r
1
2 .
This solution states that the ball will remain at rest for some period of time, when
t ≤ T , and at t = T the ball will spontaneously begin to roll down the dome. Notice the
independence of these equations of motion on the radial direction the dome. If the ball is
to move, there is no way of predicting the direction that it will go. Norton’s conclusion is
a result of the fact that the structure of the dome violates the Lipschitz condition and the
associated existence and uniqueness theorem of ordinary differential calculus. It turns out
that there is no way to predict at what time T the ball will begin to roll. If we add this fact to
the independence of the equations of motion on the radial direction of descent, we observe a
true indeterminacy in both the time and direction of descent. This is Norton’s demonstration
of indeterminacy at work in Newtonian physics. The whole situation is summed up nicely in
the following diagram.
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Figure 4: Norton’s dome with falling ball, taken from http://www.pitt.edu/ jdnorton/Goodies/Dome
We intend to show that the problem with Norton’s argument is that the differential cal-
culus actually cannot be applied in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex of the dome.
This can be clearly seen if we consider the case of the ball rolling up the side of the dome to-
wards the apex. We will show that as the ball approaches the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex, the differential structure breaks down. If the differential calculus cannot be defined
in the infinitesimal neighbourhood surrounding the apex of the dome, then Norton cannot
apply Newton’s law in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex, and the argument fails.
To begin, we can define a function, x(s) for the objects’ position on the surface of the
dome in terms of the arch length, s, measured from the apex. We can express the arc length,
s, in terms of the time parameter, t, to define the objects position as a function of time,
x(s(t)). We will express the function x(s(t)) in terms of a coordinate system fixed in the
background Euclidean space. The origin of our coordinates will be centred on the apex of
the dome with the apex itself occupying the point (0, 1).
To simplify the problem, we can consider the case of a ball rolling up the right hand side
of the dome.29 In our coordinate system, the x coordinate of the dome is given by x1(s) =
−2
3
(1−s) 32 + 2
3
, and the y coordinate is given by x2(s) = 1− 23s
3
2 . The right half of the dome
is then given by the equation x(s) = (x1(s), x2(s)). The position of the ball along the dome
as a function of time is then x(s(t)) = (x1(s(t)), x2(s(t))). Newton’s second law states that
29We can define all of the other solutions from the radial symmetry.
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F = mx′′(s(t)), where each prime indicates a derivative with respect to time, t. Expanding
out the derivative by the chain rule, we find that x′′(s(t)) = x¨(s(t))s′(t) + x˙(s(t))s′′(t),
where each dot indicates a derivative with respect to arc length, s. We can immediately note
that x˙(s(t)) is the tangent to the dome and x¨(s(t)) is the normal to the dome. The behaviour
of the derivative x′′(s(t)) in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex is a function of the
tangent and the normal to the dome. Therefore, we can get a good feel for how the ball
will behave in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex by studying the behaviour of the
tangent and normal in that neighbourhood.
In our coordinate system, the tangent and the normal to Norton’s dome are given by:
x˙(s(t)) = (
√
(1− s),−√s) and x¨(s(t)) = (− 1
2
√
1−s ,− 12√s), respectively. Immediately, we
see that we are going to run into a problem. As the ball rolls towards the apex of the dome we
see that the normal to the curve will blow up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex.
This is simply a result of the fact that the curvature of the dome κ(s) =
√
(x¨(s) · x¨(s)) blows
up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Therefore, the derivative that represents
the objects acceleration blows up as the object heads to the apex; Malament has come to the
same conclusion (Malament, 2008). He suggests that the fact curvature blows up at the apex,
shows that the apex of the dome has a zero fly-off speed, and might be considered to be a
more of launching pad than a constraint surface (Malament, 2008; 13). Norton responded by
noting that we could consider the ball, or in this case a bead, to be constrained to the surface
of the dome by a perfectly rigid wire (Norton, 2008; 790). Norton claims that the wire would
then provide the necessary constraint force to keep the ball on the surface of the dome, and
Malament’s concerns are easily alleviated. This apparent “solution” in no way alleviates
Malament’s concerns. The real problem is that the differential calculus simply cannot be
applied in Norton’s thought experiment.
Drawing from our discussion of the differential calculus, we can see what is going on.
We know that the fact that the normal to the curve blows up in the infinitesimal neighbour-
hood of the apex indicates that the infinitesimal ∆x˙(s(t)) − dx˙(s(t)) = x˙(s(t + h)) −
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x˙(s(t)) − l(s(t)), where l(s(t)) is the tangent to the surface, is not of class “little oh”. The
issue is that∆x˙(s(t)) does not tend to its limit as fast as h→ 0. Therefore, when we take the
derivative, we find that it blows up because the change in the function, ∆x˙(s(t)), remains
finite as h → 0. If we cannot define an infinitesimal ∆x˙(s(t)) − dx˙(s(t)) of class “little
oh” then we cannot define a differential to the curve in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex. If we cannot define a differential, then we cannot define a unique tangent, l(s(t)),
to the curve, x˙(s(t)), that approximates the curve up to a class of “little oh”. The problem
is that we simply cannot determine the behaviour of the function x˙(s(t)) in the infinitesi-
mal neighbourhood of the apex, because we cannot employ the concept of a differential to
approximate the behaviour of the curve in that neighbourhood and if you cannot provide a
unique linear approximation to the function x˙(s(t)) in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex, then you cannot apply the differential calculus.
To get a feel for how pathological Norton’s dome truly is, we can consider the normal
force acting on the ball in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. The normal force on
the ball over the surface of the dome is given by: F⊥(s) =
√
(1− s)(−√s,−
√
(1− s));
and its derivative is given by: F˙⊥(s) = (−12(1 − 2s)/(
√
s
√
1− s), 1). Right away, we see
that the derivative blows up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Just as in our
previous discussion, this indicates that we cannot define a differential to the force function
that approximates the behaviour of the function in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the
apex. Therefore, we simply cannot define a well-behaved force acting on the ball in the
infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Geometrically, this is a result of the fact that the
force swings though a finite angle in an infinitesimal neighbourhood.
The fundamental problemwith Norton’s thought experiment is that both of the functions
employed in Newton’s second law behave pathologically in the infinitesimal neighbourhood
of the apex. All of this pathological behaviour is a simple result of applying Newtonian
physics on a surface that is precluded by the pre-structuring of the world inherent in the
Newtonian conception. Motion, as defined within the Newtonian conception of the world,
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takes place within a mathematically pre-structured world that possesses a specific structure
“in the small”. This pre-structuring limits the form of the phenomena that the theory can
describe.
Conclusion
Duhem was right to note that “[t]he role of the scientist is not limited to creating a clear
and precise language in which to express concrete facts; rather, it is the case that the creation
of this language presupposes the creation of a physical theory” (Duhem, 1954; 151). In the
case of mathematics, the application of this language presupposes that our physical concep-
tion of the world has already been pre-structured mathematically. This initial mathematical
pre-structuring of the world is a representation akin to Goodman’s characterization, in which
we apply a representation to construe, classify, and interpret the world. The choice among
projectable mathematical concepts imposes a classification, which is simply a result of the
governing mathematical conception that prevails within the larger theoretical structure. We
saw that this initial mathematization is both selective and productive. It is selective in the
sense that only those aspects of the world that are amenable to functional representation
will enter into our physical conception of the world. And it is productive in the sense that
we fit the physical world for a “garb of ideas” to obtain an objective mathematical science
(Husserl 1970; 54). The world as conceived through mathematics, is a quantitative world.
The real problem is that any symbolism, mathematical or not, harbours the curse of mediacy
(Cassirer, 1946; 7). What is symbolized or represented is not a copy of what exists.
The mapping account of applied mathematics can only serve as a viable foundation for a
contingent form of scientific realism. Given a certain mathematical conception of the world,
certain law-like relations hold, but these relations cannot be said to represent any innate
structure in the world. If a true scientific realism is to be grounded in a mathematical theory
of the world, we must find an alternative to the mapping account of applied mathematics.
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Abstract: It has recently been suggested (for example, Lyons 2006) that
realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic meta-inductions
are not as successful as previously thought. In response, selective realists have
updated the basic divide et impera strategy specifically to take such cases
into account, and to argue, on this basis, that more modern realist accounts
are immune to the historical challenge (cf. Vickers 2013). Using a case-study
– that of the 19th century zymotic theory of disease – I argue that these
updated proposals fail, and that even the most sophisticated recent realist
accounts are just as vulnerable as their predecessors.
1 Introduction
The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) targets the realist’s claim that a the-
ory’s (approximate) truth is the best explanation for its success. It attempts
to do so by undercutting the alleged connection between truth and success
by arguing that highly successful, yet wildly false, theories are typical of the
history of science.1 There have been a number of prominent realist responses
to the PMI, most notably those of Worrall (1989), Kitcher (1993), and Psil-
los (1999). All of these responses try to rehabilitate the connection between
a theory’s (approximate) truth and its success by attempting to show that
there is some kind of continuity between earlier and later theories. One of the
most widely discussed proposals has been Psillos’s divide et impera strategy.
∗tulodziecki@purdue.edu
†Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN
1For a recent and new take on the PMI, see Frost-Arnold (2014).
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Psillos argues (1999, Chapter 5), first, that realists ought to make the notion
of a theory’s success more stringent so as to include use-novel predictions,
and, second, that realists face trouble only if it can be shown that those
elements of a theory that “really fuel” that theory’s genuine success are re-
jected and turn out to be completely false. It has recently been suggested –
for example, by Lyons (2006) –, however, that Psillos’s strategy is not as suc-
cessful as previously thought. Lyons tests Psillos’s move against a number of
historical cases, and concludes that this “form of realism remains threatened
by the historical argument that prompted it” (537). In response to Lyons,
recent realists such as Vickers (2013) have argued that, once the selective
realist strategy is updated appropriately, more modern realist accounts can,
in fact, meet the challenge that Lyons has set.
In this paper, I argue that even recent, sophisticated realist accounts such
as that of Vickers fail to be immune to the historical challenge and are just as
vulnerable as their predecessors. I make my point by providing an example of
such a case – that of the 19th century zymotic theory of disease, predecessor
to the germ theory – and by carefully showing that this theory was highly
successful in the realist’s sense of ‘genuine success’. I explain in detail what
elements of the theory were responsible for its successes, by providing deriva-
tions of its predictions and the theoretical posits involved in making these
predictions, and then show that the elements responsible for its success and
that “really fueled” the relevant derivations were discarded in later theories
and turned out to be completely false.
I will proceed as follows: In Section 2, I provide an overview of the zymotic
theory of disease; in Section 3, I discuss its successes. Section 4 deals with
the updated realist challenge and Section 5 is concerned with a derivation of
the zymotic predictions and those posits of the zymotic theory that brought
them about. In Section 6, I show how the updated realist challenge can be
met, before concluding, in Section 7, that even the most sophisticated recent
realist accounts are in trouble just as much as their predecessors.
2 The Zymotic Theory
The zymotic theory was the most sophisticated version of the miasma theory
and dominated British disease theory from the 1840s to the 1870s (although
it is frequently referenced well into the early 1900s). It sought to explain
diseases in terms of complex interactions between miasmas and so-called
2
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zymotic materials. Miasma was the result of rotting organic matter produced
by decomposition processes. It would be dispensed in the air which, in turn,
would act, via zymotic principles, on individual constitutions, causing one of
several diseases (cholera, yellow fever, typhus, etc.), depending on a number
of more specific factors. Some of these were thought to be extraneous, such as
weather, climate, and humidity, and would affect the nature of the miasmas
themselves; others were related directly to the potential victims and thought
to render them more or less susceptible to disease. Lastly, there were a
variety of local conditions that could exacerbate the course and severity of
the disease, such as overcrowding and bad ventilation.
The term ‘zymotic’ (from the Greek for fermentation) goes back to William
Farr (1807–1883), Statistical Superintendent of the General Register Office
from 1842 to 1879. Farr coined this term to indicate that disease processes
“are of a chemical nature, and analogous to fermentation; by which they
are moreover to a certain extent explained” (1842, 201), yet not identical to
vinous fermentation. Since decomposition figured heavily in the various ac-
counts of disease causation, disease theorists drew heavily on contemporary
chemical theories, such as those of Liebig, who had both a comprehensive
system for explaining the various morbid processes of decomposition, pu-
trefaction, and fermentation, but also his own specific zymotic pathology.
Chemical theories like those of Liebig were well suited to explaining diseases,
because they explained the interaction between living and non-living things,
such as human bodies and the environment, and they did this on a molecular
basis. Moreover, Liebig’s chemical theories were popular, highly respectable,
and they had already had great successes, and so the zymotic theory may be
seen as drawing on some of the most successful science at the time.
Liebig and Farr held a so-called contact theory of decomposition. Accord-
ing to this, diseases occur as a result of introducing into the body (through
inhalation or direct contact) various zymotic principles. These were thought
to be “organic matter in a state of pathological transformation” (Farr 1842,
202). This would be absorbed by the blood, and, through the transfor-
mation, zymotic diseases had “the property of communicating their action
[i.e. decomposition], and effecting analogous transformations in other bod-
ies” (ibid.). The zymotic principles were the ‘exciters’ of the various diseases
and “in the blood corresponding bodies exist, which are destroyed, and by
the transformation of which the exciters are generated or reproduced” (ibid.,
199). In short, pre-existing stuff in a victim’s blood catches the process of de-
composition and communicates this state to other particles of blood (which,
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in turn, would transmit it to various body parts), until it ran out of sus-
ceptible particles to contaminate. The underlying idea of the contact theory
was that zymotic matter was like ferment, a volatile chemical substance that
could transfer its volatility to other materials. So, just as ferment produced
fermentation, zymotic material produced disease (zymosis).
Two things about the zymotic theory are worth stressing: first, zymotic
material was not a specific substance; according to the zymotic theory, the
disease was not the (presence of) zymotic materials, but the zymotic pro-
cesses of transformation. Second, the zymotic account was purely chemical,
and Liebig (and others) explicitly rejected the view that zymotic materials
were living organisms.
3 Successes of the Zymotic Theory
The zymotic theory was highly successful with respect to a number of phe-
nomena. Specifically, it was successful both in terms of explanation and pre-
diction. Among its explanatory successes were explanations of well-known
disease phenomena, such as the fact that diseases were known to be seasonal,
and often tied to particular regions (such as marshy ones) or particular lo-
cations (barracks, prisons, etc.). Similarly, it was well known that sickness
and mortality rates in poor, crowded urban centres were worse than in their
less poor and crowded counterparts, and that, in turn, those parts were af-
fected worse than rural areas. It could also explain a number of facts tied to
epidemics, such as why epidemics began, took the course they did, and then
subsided, yet often came back several years later. It could account for the
fact that epidemic diseases often moved around when there was no known
contact with previous victims, why quarantines were ineffective for some dis-
eases (such as cholera), why only some, but not all people were affected by
a given disease, and, lastly, why certain diseases were endemic.
The zymotic theory could explain all of these phenomena through its claims
that decomposing material produced miasmas. Diseases peaked when condi-
tions for putrefaction were particularly favourable: this was the reason why
certain diseases were particularly bad during periods of high temperature and
in certain geographical regions (for example, the many fevers in Africa), why
urban centres were much more affected than rural areas, and why even spe-
cific locations in otherwise more or less healthy areas could be struck (sewage,
refuse, and general ‘filth’ would sit around in badly ventilated areas). More-
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over, since zymotic material interacted with the blood, the zymotic theory
could provide an account for individual disease susceptibility, and explain
why certain diseases were contracted only once (once the relevant material
in a victim’s blood had been ‘converted’, the person became immune).
While this degree of explanatory success is quite impressive, as we have
seen, however, realists tend to think that, in addition, genuine success also
requires a theory to make use-novel predictions, i.e. predictions that did not
play a role in the theory’s original formulation. Here, the zymotic theory
also delivers. It predicted, for example,
(i) that the air in areas with higher disease incidence ought to be worse
than the air in healthier areas; more specifically, that it should contain
more decomposing organic material,
(ii) a number of different disease incidence patters, based on the prevalence
of decomposing and putrefying materials (in conjunction with facts
about ventilation), including
(a) relationships between disease prevalence and season, temperature,
rainfall, wind, and so on,
(b) a relationship between disease incidence and population density,
(c) a relationship between disease incidence and elevation,
(iii) facts about the course and duration of various epidemics,
(iv) facts about the relation between mortality rates and different occupa-
tions, and, lastly,
(v) facts about relationships between mortality from various diseases and
age.
Thus, the zymotic theory had successes on both explanatory and predictive
levels. Before showing (in Section 6) that these successes were, in fact, due
to a number of essential working posits that did not get retained in successor
theories and that turned out to be completely false, however, let us be clear
about what exactly the new selective realist challenge amounts to.
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4 The New Selective Realist Challenge
In response to the pessimistic meta-induction, besides making the notion
of success more stringent, selective realists have suggested that we ought
to focus only on those parts of past theories that were, in fact, responsible
for their genuine success. Prominent approaches include Worrall’s structural
realism, Kitcher’s distinction between working and presuppositional posits,
and Psillos’s divide et impera strategy. And, while this line of response
has also been popular among more recent realists, such as Harker (2013),
Peters (2014), Saatsi (2005), and Vickers (2013), they also acknowledge the
shortcomings of the traditional responses. In this vein, Vickers, for example,
argues that the basic divide et impera strategy needs to be updated, since (i)
first, there now are cases of successful theories that did make novel predictions
but that, nevertheless, turned out to be completely false (cf. Lyons 2006),
and (ii) second, “the divide et impera position needs significant refinement,
especially concerning the crucial concepts scientific success and responsible
for on which so much weight is placed” (2013, 190).
Thus, Vickers agrees with his predecessors that a given historical case poses
a problem only “if posits that ‘really fuel the derivation’ [of a novel predic-
tion] turn out to be definitely not approximately true” (194), but he thinks
more light needs to be shed on what it means for a posit to “really fuel a
derivation”. To this effect, Vickers proposes a distinction between derivation-
external and derivation-internal posits. The former are those that “merely
influenced the thinking of scientists” (198), but, since they only guide sci-
entists and are not part of the relevant derivation, they are not eligible for
realist commitment. The latter are those “posits [that] were actually in-
volved in the derivation of that prediction” (198). However, Vickers argues,
derivation-internal posits are not “necessarily the ‘working posits’ since any
individual posit might ‘contain within it’ some other posit that is the real
working part” (198). In other words, a posit might contain a ‘weaker’ posit
that is sufficient for the prediction, such as the posit “the passengers are
50kg too heavy” containing within it the weaker posit “the passengers are
too heavy” (198.; originally due to Saatsi 2005, 532).
Thus, contrary to previous realists – especially Psillos, according to whom
scientists’ judgements play an important role in determining what fuelled a
derivation – Vickers thinks that realists ought to commit themselves only to
posits that do logical work, and moreover, to their weakest possible versions
(i.e. if one weakened the posits any more, one could no longer derive the
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prediction). Thus, Vickers makes a distinction between actual, historical
derivations, and (possibly much weaker) logical, epistemic derivations (cf.
Peters 2014, 386). And, while Vickers believes there are now cases showing
that there are theories that contain working posits that turned out to be
false, he does not think that there are cases showing that there are essential
parts of derivation-internal posits that turned out to be false. Coming up
with such cases, then, is the new and updated selective realist challenge.
5 Zymotic Predictions
In order to show that the zymotic theory can rise to it, let’s look at some
of its predictions in more detail, starting with its predictions concerning air
quality. Here, the zymotic theory predicts, (i) first, that air quality ought to
be proportional to disease incidence, so that the ‘right’ locations should have
good and bad air, respectively, and (ii) second that differences in air quality
ought to be related to decomposition and ventilation. A number of mid-19th
century chemists tried to test these predictions; however, for brevity’s sake,
I will restrict my focus to a small subset of the experiments of Robert Angus
Smith (1817–1884), a contemporary of Farr’s, and often cited by the latter.2
Smith began by collecting indoor condensation liquid from crowded rooms
and compared it to fresh rainwater, finding that the indoor liquid, but not
the rainwater, had a strong perspiration smell, and, “on standing it formed
a glutinous mass in which the microscope revealed “Confervae”, “greenish
globules”, “various species of Volvox” [a type of algae], and “monades many
times smaller”” (ibid., 219–220; Smith, 1848, 18). While this was not a strong
result by itself, Smith believed that it at least showed that the the indoor
liquid contained organic material on which the Volvox and the monades were
feeding (ibid., 220). Further, upon burning the liquid’s residue, he obtained
the smell of ammonia, which was significant, since ammonia was tied to the
last stage in decomposition. At the larger scale of towns, these results were
thought to be exacerbated, not just because of the various exhalations of
living bodies, but, in addition, those of animal refuse and fuel combustion
(Smith, 1848).
Smith also tried to measure air quality more directly. He washed air sam-
ples by changing the air in a bottle containing distilled water, shaking the
2Smith was not a particularly distinguished scientist (Eyler 1980, 216), but is, for this
reason, quite representative of a number of people and their work.
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bottle after each change of air (with up to 200 changes), and then performed
a chemical analysis on the water, determining its amount of organic mate-
rial. He found these results to confirm those previously obtained from the
experiments above (Smith 1859, 218–225; cf. also Eyler, 220).
Most telling, however, were experiments in which he tried to show that
there was organic material in vapours given off by putrefying meat, blood
(due to the strong smell, he only performed a limited number of these), and
cesspools. He proceeded to compare these samples to the air in a number of
different locations – everything from different areas of Manchester, to “closely
packed railway carriages[s]” (1859, 221), to the air in bedrooms before and
after someone had slept in them, to the occasion on which a “strong smell of
a sewer entered my laboratory” (221), the fronts and backs of various houses,
alleys, and so on. Smith obtained rather a large variation in air quality, and,
specifically, concluded that by inhaling putrid air from decomposing animal
matter (such as decomposing mutton), “we might be inhaling 9000 times
more of some organic substance or other than we should be doing by inhaling
the purest air” (1859, 222). These figures include the vapours given off by the
putrefying meat, but, without these, he concluded that the difference among
different areas of town is about 22 times, and, within industrial areas, ranges
from about 9 to 22 times, while over the Atlantic Ocean and the Highlands,
the air was clean (223; cf. also Eyler 220–221). Most importantly, however,
as Eyler points out, the ranges Smith found were in proportion “to the range
of the crude death rates for the districts of Manchester” (221): in the districts
with the highest death rates, the air had most organic material in it, and the
ones with the lowest death rate had the cleanest air. Smith concludes that
“[t]hese differences . . . enable us to account for the number which represent
the deaths of the various districts” (1859, 223).
He also performed an investigation for the mining commission, during
which he observed people in air-tight lead chambers, recording their pulse,
respiration, and so on. He systematically measured the carbonic acid con-
centration inside the chamber, and concluded that carbonic acid was quite
harmful, that it “almost always comes in bad company” (Eyler, 222), and
then proceeded to use carbonic acid concentrations to test how well or badly
ventilated a given place was.
However, Angus Smith’s experiments are not the only ones speaking in
favour of the zymotic theory. As we have already seen, the zymotic theory
also predicted a number of other relationships, such as those between disease
incidence and population density and between disease incidence and distance
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from sources of decomposition. Both of the latter were confirmed by Farr.
First, Farr showed that “the mortality of town districts has a certain rela-
tionship to their density” (207). Based on his analyses of the data sets of
a number of Annual Reports of the General Register Office, Farr came up
with a law on whose basis he made a number of precise predictions. When
he then proceeded to compare the calculated, expected mortality to that ac-
tually observed in the 30 London statistical districts, he found the results
agreeing “very directly with the results of direct observation” (ibid.; due to
space constraints, I won’t discuss this result in any detail, but, for a quick
flavour of the kind of law Farr put forth, see figure 1 (ibid.)).
Figure 1: Farr’s Density Equation
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His crowning achievement, however, was his elevation law, relating cholera
mortality to soil elevation. This relation relation followed straightforwardly
from those parts of the zymotic theory having to do with the dilution of
miasma in the atmosphere. Here, what Farr did was to capture the exact re-
lation between the decline of cholera and increased soil elevation in the form
of the following equation: c = c′ × (e′ + a)/(e + a)(e is the elevation above
the Thames high water mark, c the average cholera mortality rate at that
elevation, and e′ and c′ the elevation and mortality at a higher elevation, a
is a constant; 1852, lxiii). Farr then calculated the expected series according
to the formula, compared it to the actual series recorded in London, and
found remarkable agreement (1852, lxiii). Seeking further confirmation, he
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then proceeded to “submit the principle to another test, by comparing the
elevation and the mortality from cholera of each sub-district”, and found
that this “entirely confirms the announced law” (xv-xvi). Lastly, Farr’s pre-
dictions were also confirmed by others in different regions. For example,
“William Duncan, Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool, wrote that when
he grouped the districts of his city by elevation as Farr had done, that cholera
mortality in the last epidemic obeyed Farr’s elevation law for Liverpool as
well” (Eyler, 1979, 228).
6 Meeting the New Realist Challenge
Note that all of the above predictions were use-novel: they could not have
played a role in the construction of the zymotic theory, since they were not
even formulated by then, and, in Farr’s case, the data on which his laws were
based did not even exist. As such, the case of the zymotic theory meets the
realists’ criteria for ‘genuine success’.
However, as we have seen, Vickers does not think that this is enough; in
addition, he requires that it be shown that the derivation of these predictions
involved ineliminable parts of derivation-internal posits that cannot be weak-
ened. Here, I want to argue that the zymotic theory can meet this challenge,
too.
The first question is what the zymotic theory’s relevant posits are. Crucial
to the derivations of the above predictions are the following three:
1. Organic matter given off by putrefying material is the exciting cause
of diseases.
2. This organic matter is suspended in the air (i.e. there are miasmas).
3. This, in turn, is transmitted through the air.
Clearly, all of the above posits are derivation-internal, not derivation-
external: they did not just guide practitioners’ thinking, but they were all
crucially involved in making the various predictions. They were essential in
the air quality predictions confirmed by Angus Smith: if any of the above
posits are taken away, the entire prediction disappears. While the second
and third are directly about quality, the first is also necessary: without spe-
cific reference to (sources of) decomposition, we lose the geographical and
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other location patterns, and, as a result, the entire prediction about air dif-
ferences. Thus, all of these posits are clearly doing work in the production of
the prediction. Similarly for Farr’s predictions about density and elevation.
Both putrefying material as a source of miasma and air as a medium of its
transmission are crucial, since, taking either one away makes the prediction
disappear. Thus, it is clear that the above posits are doing work.
However, as we have seen, according to Vickers, this is not enough – it also
needs to be the case that they don’t entail weaker versions of themselves,
on the basis of which the prediction still goes through. Examining our three
posits, we see that this, too, is the case. Ironically, the fact that the zymotists
knew relatively little about the chemical make-up of the alleged miasmas is
to their advantage here, since, absent any specific information about the
make-up of the allegedly responsible organic matter, these posits are already
as weak as they can get: they effectively state that whatever is given off
during decomposition is transmitted through the air and involved in causing
diseases. Weakening them any more would take away either the decomposing
sources, or air as a medium, and, as we have already seen, both of these are
necessary in order to make the predictions in the first place. Thus, since
these posits cannot be weakened, they ought to count as essential parts of
derivation-internal posits, according to Vickers. Moreover, they did not get
retained in any way, shape, or form, in the germ theory: decomposition is not
responsible for disease, neither is disease material dispensed in the air, neither
is the air a medium for disease transmission. But, if that is right, according
to Vickers, and by his own admission, we ought to have been realists about
miasmas.3
So much for miasmas, but what about zymes? Further zymotic posits we
might add to the miasmatic ones above are:
1. Diseases are a type of decomposition,
2. Disease processes are analogous to processes of fermentation (which is
a type of decomposition),
3. Zymotic material acts like a ferment on pre-existing stuff in a victim’s
blood.
3Note that this poses a problem not just for Vickers, but for selective realists more
generally.
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Now, clearly, none of these posits are necessary for the predictions we
have seen, since it was possible to provide derivations of these predictions
without appealing to any of the zymotic posits. Thus, obviously, they are
non-essential. However, I want to stress at this point that, even if the zymotic
posits fail to be essential, note that the miasmatic posits clearly are, and that
this is already enough of a problem for selective realists. After all, selective
realists face trouble if essential parts of derivation-internal posits turn out to
have been completely false, and the miasmatic posits fit that bill. But, of
course, it is not a requirement that every (rejected) posit be essential (which
is obviously not right). Thus, showing that the miasmatic posits are essential
and were rejected suffices to get the realist into trouble.
More interesting, however, is the fact that even though the zymotic posits
might not have been essential for making predictions, they play a different,
and perhaps equally important role in the zymotic theory: that of providing
unifying explanations.4 More specifically, among other things, the zymotic
posits explain why there is a link between decomposition and disease (they
are essentially variations of each other), why diseases vary with season and
temperature (it was well known that fermentation processes are temperature-
sensitive), why certain diseases only occurred once (victims’ blood would run
out of material to ferment), why certain diseases were childhood diseases
(children’s blood was different from adults’), and why epidemics began (exis-
tence of sufficiently virulent zymotic material) and ended (lack of new victims
with the appropriate blood). Lastly, it had been clear for some time that
disease material needed to replicate itself somehow, and fermentation pro-
cesses offered an explanation of how this was possible. The various zymotic
posits above can make sense of all of these at once. And, while there are no
concrete predictions based directly on these posits, it is clear that the above
explanations disappear without zymosis. Thus, while zymotic material might
not have been primarily responsible for the theory’s predictive success, it was
certainly crucially implicated in the theory’s explanatory success. Without
the fermentation aspect of zymosis, the entire disease mechanism would have
disappeared, and with it disease pathology. Moreover, without it, the link
between diseases and decomposition would have been lost, and, as we have
seen, without decomposition, the predictions of the zymotic theory disap-
4Peters (2014) stresses the importance of this in accounts of essentialness. For this
reason, the zymotic theory might also turn out to be problematic for Peters’ proposal.
However, due to space constraints, I will not pursue this further here.
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pear, too.5
7 Conclusion
What, then, is the upshot of this? What is clear is that the zymotic the-
ory made use-novel predictions, such as those about air quality, and Farr’s
predictions about elevation and density. Miasmatic posits were essential
derivation-internal working posits that, further, could not be weakened, and,
so, according to Vickers, they deserved realist commitment. Yet, they were
rejected, and no miasmatic posits, as we have seen, were carried over to the
germ theory. Zymotic posits were not involved in the predictions in these
crucial ways, but were essential to the theory’s explanatory power, since, tak-
ing away zymosis left a disease theory without a disease mechanism, without
a pathology, and without any explanation of many of the well-known disease
phenomena that needed accounting for, including the all-important link to
decomposition. Thus, even modern, sophisticated selective realist accounts,
such as that of Vickers, cannot rise to the historical challenge that underlies
the pessimistic meta-induction. Realism remains in as much trouble as ever,
at least on this front.
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